ML23034A101

Comment (2) E-mail Regarding Oconee SLR Suppl Scoping

ML23034A101
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	02/02/2023
From:	Public Commenter Public Commenter
To:	NRC/NMSS/DREFS
NRC/NMSS/DREFS
References
87FR77643
Download: ML23034A101 (10)

Text

From:

Diane Curran <dcurran@harmoncurran.com>

Sent:

Thursday, February 2, 2023 4:59 PM To:

OconeeEnvironmental Resource Cc:

Lance Rakovan; Paul Gunter (paul@beyondnuclear.org); frank powell (fmpowell3@gmail.com)

Subject:

[External_Sender] NEPA Scoping comments for EIS -- Subsequent License Renewal Review for Oconee Reactors Attachments:

2023.02.02 Beyond Nuclear Sierra Club scoping comments Oconee.pdf

Dear Madam/Sir:

Attached please find NEPA scoping comments by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club for the Oconee reactors EIS.

Sincerely, Diane Curran Counsel to Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club

Federal Register Notice:

87FR77643 Comment Number:

2 Mail Envelope Properties (MN2PR15MB2557E73F77FD35FEB7B5EE91C6D69)

Subject:

[External_Sender] NEPA Scoping comments for EIS -- Subsequent License Renewal Review for Oconee Reactors Sent Date:

2/2/2023 4:59:24 PM Received Date:

2/2/2023 5:00:20 PM From:

Diane Curran Created By:

dcurran@harmoncurran.com Recipients:

"Lance Rakovan" <Lance.Rakovan@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Paul Gunter (paul@beyondnuclear.org)" <paul@beyondnuclear.org>

Tracking Status: None "frank powell (fmpowell3@gmail.com)" <fmpowell3@gmail.com>

Tracking Status: None "OconeeEnvironmental Resource" <OconeeEnvironmental.Resource@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None Post Office:

MN2PR15MB2557.namprd15.prod.outlook.com Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 210 2/2/2023 5:00:20 PM 2023.02.02 Beyond Nuclear Sierra Club scoping comments Oconee.pdf 608912 Options Priority:

Normal Return Notification:

No Reply Requested:

No Sensitivity:

Normal Expiration Date:

February 2, 2023 Office of Administration U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Submitted electronically via Federal rulemaking website Docket ID NRC-2020-0234 Re:

Comments by Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club on Scoping of Environmental Impact Statement for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Docket ID NRC-2021-0146

Dear Office of Administration Officials:

Pursuant to the notice published at 87 Fed. Reg. 77,643 (Dec. 19, 2022) (Scoping Notice),

Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear) and the Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra Club) submit the following comments regarding the scope of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRCs) supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) for the subsequent license renewal for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLCs (Dukes) Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3.

Description of Commenters Beyond Nuclear is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that aims to educate and activate the public about the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and the need to abolish both to protect public health and safety, prevent environmental harms, and safeguard our future. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an end to the production of nuclear waste and for securing the existing reactor waste in hardened on-site storage until it can be permanently disposed of in a safe, sound, and suitable underground repository. For more than fifteen years, Beyond Nuclear has worked toward its mission by regularly intervening in NRC licensing, relicensing, and other proceedings related to nuclear safety matters.

Founded in 1892, the Sierra Club is a national environmental organization with 3.8 million members across the United States. The purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earths ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.

In 2021, the NRCs Atomic Safety and Licensing Board found that both Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club have standing to challenge Dukes subsequent license renewal application.1 1 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-22-01, __

N.R.C. __, slip op. at 2, 27 (Feb. 11, 2022).

NRC Office of Administration February 2, 2023 Page 2

=

Background===

As discussed in the Scoping Notice, this proceeding for the preparation of a site-specific environmental impact statement (EIS) for subsequent renewal of the Oconee operating licenses arises from two NRC decisions: Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), CLI-22-02, __ N.R.C. __ (Feb. 24, 2022) (CLI-22-02) and Duke Energy Carolinas, L.L.C. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), et al., CLI-22-03, __ N.R.C. __

(Feb. 24, 2022) (CLI-22-03).2 In those decisions, the Commission reversed the agencys previous reliance on the NRCs generic environmental impact statement (GEIS) for initial license renewal3 for the purpose of approving subsequent license renewal applications.4 As explained by the Commission in CLI-22-02, [n]either the original 1996 GEIS nor the revised 2013 GEIS analyzed the environmental impacts of subsequent license renewal periods.5 Taken together, CLI-22-02 and CLI-22-03 establish procedural requirements for the environmental review of Dukes 2021 subsequent license renewal application, including the environmental report attached to the application as Appendix E.6 Pursuant to these decisions, all environmental reviews for subsequent license renewal applications - including the Oconee review -- must address the Category 1 environmental impacts listed in Appendix A to 10 C.F.R.

Part 50, which formerly were exempted from consideration. As also provided in those decisions, the Staff is now preparing a GEIS for subsequent license renewal. The NRC gave applicants the option to either wait for the GEIS to be completed or perform a site-specific environmental review.

Duke has requested a site-specific environmental review. Accordingly, Duke has submitted a revised Environmental Report.7 Under standard NRC practice, the NRC Staff will rely heavily on the 2022 Environmental Report Supplement in preparing the site-specific EIS. Nevertheless, 2 87 Fed. Reg. at 77,644.

3 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants (Final Report), NUREG 1437, vols. 1-2 (May 1996) (ML040690705, ML040690738) (1996 GEIS);

Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (Final Report),

NUREG-1437, Rev. 1 (June 2013) (ML13106A241) (2013 GEIS).

4 CLI-22-02, slip op. at 1-2, 12-13; CLI-22-03, slip op. at 2.

5 Id., slip op. at 12.

6 Oconee SLR Application, encl. 3, attach. 2 (Appendix E, Applicants [ER], Subsequent Operating License Renewal Stage, [ONS] Units 1, 2, and 3 (Mar. 2021) (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML21158A193)). (2021 Environmental Report).

7 Subsequent License Renewal -- Appendix E Environmental Report Supplement 2 (Nov. 7, 2022) (ML003670637) (Environmental Report Supp. 2).

NRC Office of Administration February 2, 2023 Page 3 the NRC Staff must conduct its own independent review, which is not limited by Dukes Environmental Report and must correct any deficiencies in Dukes report.8 Issues That Must be Covered by Site-Specific EIS for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 General As a general matter, the NRC must conduct a site-specific environmental analysis for all environmental impacts previously classified as Category 1 (i.e., subject to generic findings) using up-to-date and complete information. In addition, the NRC must re-evaluate environmental impacts previously characterized as Category 2 (i.e., subject to site-specific findings), using up-to-date and complete information.

In addition, as required by NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act, the NRC should ensure that any analysis on which it relies is publicly available and referenced in the EIS with information on how to access it.9 Specific Scoping Issues Our most pressing concerns about the required scope of the EIS for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 are described below. We note that this is not a comprehensive list and that we reserve the right to comment on the draft version of the EIS, as provided by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and NRC regulations.

Accident Risks. The scope of the EIS should include an independent evaluation of Dukes claim in Environmental Report Supp. 2 that:

The impacts [sic] of severe accidents is addressed in the 2013 GEIS, where the NRC confirmed the findings of the 1996 GEIS are still valid and concluded that the probability-weighted consequences of atmospheric releases, fallout onto open bodies of water, releases to groundwater, and societal and economic impacts from severe accidents are SMALL for all plants.10 8 See Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-96-25, 44 N.R.C.

331, 339 (1996) (NRC Staff ultimately is responsible for preparing the EIS required by NEPA).

9 See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-08-1, 67 N.R.C. 1, 15 (2008) (noting the link between NEPA and the FOIA).

10 Id., § 4.15.1.1.2 at page 100 of 109.

NRC Office of Administration February 2, 2023 Page 4 As discussed above, the Commissions decision in CLI-22-2 precludes Duke or the NRC from relying on the 2013 GEIS without an independent analysis.11 The NRC should conduct an independent evaluation of whether this finding from the 2013 GEIS is supportable.

In this context, the NRC should address the inconsistency between Dukes SMALL risk finding and the high accident risks risk documented in the License Renewal GEIS, Supplement 2: internal events at 6.3E-5 per year (Table 5-3), fire risk as 6.1E-5 per year Draft Revised License Renewal GEIS (Table E.3-10) and the seismic risk as 5.7E-5 per year Draft Revised License Renewal GEIS (Table E.3-11).12 These risks -- coupled with the unquantified but substantial risks from low power shutdown (LPSD) and other hazards including the ignored flooding risk -- total well above 1E-4 per year. Reg. Guide 1.174 Rev. 3 describes an approach that is acceptable to the [NRC Staff] for developing risk-informed applications for a licensing basis change that considers engineering issues and applies risk insights.13 RG-1.174s Figure 5 Acceptance guidelines for CDF and LERF describes a Region I where no changes [are]

allowed.14 The Region I lower limit on delta CDF is at approximately 1E-5 per year. To approve subsequent license renewal for the Oconee reactors, the NRC must compare the environmental risks of three permanently shutdown reactors with the risks of continuing to operate the three reactors with a total operating plant risk of greater than 1E-4. Thus, this change in risk exceeds the NRC RG-1.174 guidance. The NRC should address the environmental significance of this issue, including whether the accident risks posed by continued operation are so high as to warrant denial of the subsequent license renewal application.

Internal Events Core Damage Frequency. In the Environmental Report Supp. 2, Duke states that the core damage frequency (CDF) is comparable and slightly lower than the initial license renewal analysis.15 The NRC should independently verify this assertion. If the NRC relies on it, all supporting analyses should be referenced and made accessible to the public.

Consideration of External Events. In the Environmental Report Supp. 2, Duke states that:

Improvements in safety at ONS since the initial license renewal analysis have provided significant risk reduction but have been offset by refinements in PRA methodology and 11 Id., slip op. at 2 (We hold that the 2013 GEIS does not cover the subsequent license renewal period )

12 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants (Final Report), Supplement 2 Regarding Oconee Nuclear Station, NUREG-1437, Supp. 2 (Dec. 1999)

(ML003670637).

13 Regulatory Guide 1.174 Revision 3, An Approach for Using PRA in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis at 1 (Jan. 2018) (ML17317A256)

(RG-1.174 Rev. 3).

14 Id. at 27.

15 Id., § 4.15.1.2.2 at page 102 of 109.

NRC Office of Administration February 2, 2023 Page 5 conservative analysis assumptions.16 The statement effectively acknowledges that the understanding of the external event risk has increase since the initial license renewal. This increase in external event risk is consistent with information published in the draft revised License Renewal Generic Environmental Impact Statement (NUREG-1437, Dec. 2022) (Draft Rev. 2 License Renewal GEIS). Table E.3-10, for instance, shows that the understanding of fire risk has increased from 4.5E-6 to 6.1E-5 per year, a more than doubling. In addition, Table E.3-11 indicates that the understanding of seismic risk has increased from 3.9E-5 to 5.7E-5 per year, a 50% increase. The footnotes to these tables show that these new risk evaluation values derive from post-1999 amendments to the Oconee operating licenses. Therefore, it appears reasonable to assume these values include all the plant improvements at the time of the license amendment requests. NRC should incorporate these substantial increases in risk into its assessment.

Further, the NRC should verify and document all aspects in which it deems accident risks to have increased or decreased. Broad assertions by Duke that combine risk increase and decrease or claim that one offsets the other must be evaluated with a quantitative analysis. The NRC should also document changes in risk from physical changes to the plant, equipment, process, etc. and changes simply from changes in PRA methods (which have no impact on the risks to the public).

Consideration of Low Power and Shutdown Risk. In the Environmental Report Supp. 2, Duke asserts that SECY 97-168 documents the industry improvements in low power and shutdown (LPSD) implement throughout the industry.17 But SECY-97-168 was written in 1997, and discusses improvements that predate it. In fact, most of the improvements were incorporated prior to the 1996 License Renewal GEIS. Thus, the Staff should not give credit to these measures for reducing risks previously evaluated in the 1996 License Renewal GEIS and the revised 2013 License Renewal GEIS.

Duke also states that: [T]he offsite consequences of severe accidents, considering low power and shutdown events, would not exceed the impacts predicted in the 1996 GEIS.18 But the LPSD impacts were not explicitly addressed in the 1996 GEIS. Moreover, Duke ignores the fact that for much of a refueling outage the Oconee containment is open directly to the environment when the containment equipment hatch is opened, supplying an unmitigated release path from core damage events to the environment. The NRC should evaluate these LPSD configurations to determine if the environmental impacts meet the NEPA requirements.

Uncertainties. Since the publication of the original 1996 GEIS the NRC has published Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed 16 Id., § 4.15.1.2.2 at page 103 of 109.

17 Id., § 4.15.1.1.2 at page 104 of 109 (citing SECY-97-168, Issuance for Public Comment of Proposed Rulemaking for Shutdown and Fuel Storage Pool Operation (December 11, 1997)

(ML003752569).

18 Id., § 4.15.1.1.2 at page 104 of 109.

NRC Office of Administration February 2, 2023 Page 6 Decisionmaking, Revision 1 March 2017 (ML17062A466). The NRC should adhere to their own guidance to evaluate uncertainties throughout their environmental analysis.

Claims by Duke to risk-beneficial plant changes. Under the topic of Other Considerations, Duke lists a number of plant improvements that have been made since the first license renewal for Oconee to lower overall plant risk.19 The NRC should quantify and publish for public use the risk improvements that these changes made with the methods and inputs used and the results with uncertainties quantified.

Climate Change and Flooding. The EIS for the Oconee reactors must include the most up-to-date research on the rapidly changing climate. Given Oconees location downstream of the Jocassee Dam, the environmental impacts of flooding is a significant environmental issue.

Climate change clearly will increase probable maximum precipitation (PMP) and probable maximum flood (PMF). This can increase the flooding heights at Oconee and its Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) the only permanently installed equipment capable of mitigating a flooding event above grade. Not only will climate change increase the consequences of flooding, but it will increase the frequency of such events.

Local, state, federal, and international authorities have published significant information on projected climate changes such as rising temperatures, storm intensity and duration, and drought since the previous NRC analysis.

The NRC should propagate these new insights through the external events analysis including impacts on PMP and PMF, local intense precipitation (LIP) increases in wind speed intensity from tornadoes and hurricanes, etc. The NRC must use this updated climate research, information, and projections to define the baseline environment for the subsequent license renewal period.

New and Significant Information regarding potential for core melt accident. The EIS should address new and significant information, which has become available since publication of the 2013 revised License Renewal GEIS, showing that the past environmental analyses on which Duke relies are now demonstrably wrong, and that the risk of a core melt accident during a second license renewal term is significant and must be addressed.

In particular, NRCs most recent risk analysis, shows that the likelihood of a core melt accident caused by a random failure of the Jocassee Dam, which lies twelve miles above Oconee, is 2E-4 per year which is 30 times higher than presented in Dukes Environmental Report.20 This new and significant information demonstrates that Duke erred by concluding that operation of Oconee for an additional license term will have no significant environmental impacts. It also 19 Id., § 4.15.1.1.2 at page 106 of 109.

20 See Technical Basis for Allowing ONS to Remain in Operation through November 2010, August 12, 2009 (ML090570117).

NRC Office of Administration February 2, 2023 Page 7 demonstrates that Dukes analysis of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs) is incorrect and should be done again using reasonable and up-to-date assumptions.21 Environmental Significance of 2011 Safety Evaluation. The EIS should address the environmental significance of the Staffs 2011 Safety Evaluation that the potential for a random (i.e., sunny day) Jocassee Dam failure constitutes an adequate protection issue and therefore must be addressed by new measures to protect against flooding of essential safety equipment that would inevitably cause a reactor meltdown.22 Because Duke has failed to protect Oconee from the floods evaluated in the 2011 Safety Evaluation, the outstanding and unresolved safety issue now constitutes a significant environmental issue that must be addressed in the Environmental Report.

Cumulative effects of reliance on aging safety equipment, including seismic risks to aging equipment. The EIS should include a discussion of the cumulative effects of extended operation using aging safety equipment. The problems experienced by sixty-to-eighty-year-old equipment and identified technical knowledge gaps in understanding the initiation and progression of numerous age-related degradation mechanisms for that period of operation are distinct from, more severe, and less understood than those experienced by forty-to-sixty-year-old equipment.

As recently stated in an NRC presentation to the International Atomic Energy Agency:

Considering guidance to address plant operation for 80 years is significantly different from making routine revisions to the license renewal guidance documents for plant operation to 60 years. Of particular concern is the identification of potential aging issues that may arise with the extended operating time and greater exposure levels, such as neutron fluence levels. This could include potential new aging degradation phenomena either in new locations from that where it would be expected to occur, different forms of degradation, or greater severity than expected from past OE. The degradation could be from known mechanisms that could become more active, due to either exceeding incubation times or activation energies, or the development of late blooming phases, or potentially new phenomena not previously seen.23 Aging problems include reactor pressure vessel embrittlement, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals, concrete structures and containment degradation, and 21 Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene by Beyond Nuclear and Sierra Club and Petition for Waiver of 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(3)(i), 51.71(d), and 51.95(c)(1) to Allow Consideration of Category 1 NEPA Issues (Sept. 27, 2021). See also enclosed expert report by Jeffrey T. Mitman, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam (Sept. 2021) (Mitman Report).

22 Safety Evaluation on Confirmatory Action Letter to Address External Flooding Concerns (Jan. 28, 2011) (ML110280153) (2011 NRC Safety Evaluation). See also Hearing Request and Mitman Report.

23 Allen L. Hiser, Jr., How Did the United States Get to the Point of Renewing Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses to 80 Years? (Nov. 28, 2022) (ML22286A027).

NRC Office of Administration February 2, 2023 Page 8 electrical cable qualification and condition assessment, as identified in SECY-14-0016, Memorandum from Mark A. Satorius, NRC Executive Director of Operations, to NRC Commissioners, re: Ongoing Staff Activities to Assess Regulatory Considerations for Power Reactor Subsequent License Renewal at 1 (Jan. 31, 2014) (ML14050A306) and the NRCs five-volume Expanded Materials Degradation Assessment (EMDA), NUREG/CR-7153 (Oct. 2014)

(EMDA Report).24 The cumulative impacts analysis should also include at the cumulative or compounding effects of operating an aging reactor for an extended period with safety equipment that is not only deteriorating in unknown ways but that is subject to flooding risks.

Impact mitigation by safety upgrades. We respectfully submit that if the NRC revises its accident risk analysis to take into account all current and relevant information, the estimated risk of an accident will substantially increase, thereby changing the cost-benefit analysis for mitigation measures to make mitigation more cost-effective. In light of this new information, the EIS should address the cost-effectiveness of mitigation measures for reduction of accident risk.

For instance, the EIS should address the costs and benefits of safety upgrades to ensure that the design of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 is adequate to protect against a catastrophic accident caused by the failure of the Jocassee Dam.

Thank you for considering our comments. Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.

s/Diane Curran Counsel to Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club dcurran@harmoncurran.com 240-393-9285 24 The five volumes of the EMDA Report are as follows: Volume 1, Core Internals and Piping (ML14279A321); Volume 2, Core Internals and Piping (ML14279A331); Volume 3, Reactor Vessel Aging (ML14279A349); Volume 4, Concrete Aging (ML14279A430); and Volume 5, Cable Aging (ML14279A461).