Text

Redacted QSA Global Consolidated Renewal Request to USA/9269/B(U)-96 Type B(U) Certificate for the Model 650L
	ML23011A059
Person / Time
Site:	07109269
Issue date:	01/15/2020
From:	Podolak L; QSA Global
To:	Garcia-Santos N; Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch
References
	Download: ML23011A059 (1)
	v • d • e

QSAGLOBAL I 15 January 2020 Ms. Norma Garcia Santos, Project Manager Spent Fuel Licensing Branch DMsion of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike One \t\/hite Flint Rockville, MD 20852 RE: Consolidated Renewal Request to USA/9269/B(U)-96 Type B(U) Certificate for the Model 650L

Dear Ms. Santos:

As requested by you in our telephone conversation or 1/14/2020, enclosed is a consolidated renewal application for the Model 650L transport package. Please see the attached CD for the application files. A hard copy of the full application is being submitted to the Document Control Desk.

As stated previously, this renewal is submitted in advance to ensure sufficient time to obtain additional, international Type B approvals which are based on the USNRC certificate. There are no significant changes to the approval at this time, however administrative changes related to regulatory references, certificate revisions, etc. are noted in the attached change table for the enclosed Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Revision 10. Should you have any questions, or wish to discuss amendment request, please contact me.

Sincerely,

(,---...

I ~ by Lon Podolak

~1-1514 29 -40 GMT

~ by Michael Fuler

~-1~14341~C3MT Lori Podolak Senior RA/QA Specialist RNOA Email: Lori.Podolak@gsa--global.com

~~ by SleYe C3reruer ori~CJ'.-01-1514*48.38 GMT Enclosures on CD: Engineering

List of Affected Pages

Summary Table SAR Changes Rev 9 to Rev 1O

SAR Revision 10 cc: ATTN: Document Control Desk Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike One White Flint Rockville, MD 20852 QSA Global Inc.* 30 North Avenue Burington, MA 01803

800.815.1383

781.272 2000 ext. 241

qs8iJlol)al.com

QSAGLOBAL Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package List of Affected Pages Revision 1, Replacement of Appendix A Index; Added Drawing R65006, 19 November, Revision F to Appendix A.

1999 Revision 2, Replacement of Appendix A Index; Added Drawing R65006, 31 October, 2000 Revision G to Appendix A.

Revision 3, Refom,atting of the SAR to cover compliance to IAEA TS-R-31 October 2005 1 and NRG guidance format. Addition of Se-75 as authorized nuclide.

Revision 4, 6 Changes to Sections 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 to address NRG RAI June 2006 dated 31 May 2006 Revision 5, 29 Changes to pages 5-1, 5-2, 5-5, 5-6 and 7-1.

June 2006 Revision 6, 14 Changes to pages 1-1, 5-1 and 5-2.

July 2006 Revision 7, April SAR updated to reflect compliance to NUREG 1886 (Final 2010 Report- March 2009).

Revision 8, Correction of typographical errors on page 3-6 of the SAR.

August 2010 Revision 9, Changes to incorporate changes to R65006 and other minor January 2015 content updates.

Revision 10, Changes to update regulatory references, make minor January 2020 grammatical corrections and consolidate prior submission documentation.

QSAGLOBAL Revision Description for the Model 650L SAR from Revision 9 to Revision 1O January 2020 Page 1 of 1 Revision 10 to the 650L SAR addresses changes noted below. These changes are listed under the SAR Section in Revision 10 where the change occurs.

Section Summary Change Comment Location General

Updated references to IAEA TS-R-1 from ST-1, Revised to

Change made to reflect latest revision endorsed under the 10 CFR 71 Updates 2009 Edition. regulations.

Throughout SAR

Updated CNSC PTNS regulation reference from

Reflect current revision issued by CNSC.

SOR/2000-208 to SOR/2015-145.

Updated references to ISO 2919-1999 to ANSI/HPS 43.6-

Changed from reference to an international standard to reflect the 2007 (R2013). equivalent American reference standard. In impact as the criteria in both standards are identical.

1.2.1.2 Revised option for inner and outer shells to clarify that either Clanfication. No impact on package design.

shell can be either carbon steel or stainless steel.

2.2.1 Updated grammar of* ... these materials is shown ... " to "these Grammatical accuracy. No impact on package design materials are shown .. ."

2.4.3 Revised references to the source assembly securing Clanflcation for accuracy as the lock slide secures the source assembly m mechanism to remove reference to stop ball and replace place but not necessanly by engaging the stop ball on the assembly. No references to the source wire assembly to simply refer to the impact on package design.

source assembly.

2.12 Updated special form certificate references to reflect current Accuracy. No impact on package design.

revisions.

3.5.1 Replaced "Section 2.12 and 2.12" with "(Section 2.12). Clarification. No impact on package design.

3.5.3 & 3.5.4 Minor wording changes to clarify intent. Clarification. No impact on package design.

5.4.2 Updated grammar of* ... container was .. " to * .. container Grammatical accuracy. No impact on package design are .. "

7.4.2 Updated reference to the 2014 Emergency Response Reflect current document revision. No impact on package design.

Guidebook to 2016.

Safety Analysis Report QSAGLOBAL.

Model 650L Type B(U) - 96 Transport Package January 2019 Revision 10

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision 10 Burlington, Massachusetts Page i Contents SECTION 1 - GENERAL INFORMATION .........................................................................................................1-1 1.1 INTROOUCTION ************************************************************************************************************************************ 1-1 1.2 PACKAGE DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................................................... 1-1 1.2.1 Packaging..................................................................................................................................... 1-1 1.2.2 Contents ....................................................................................................................................... 1-3 1.2.3 Special Requirements for Plutonium ............................................................................................ 1-3 1.2.4 Operational Features.................................................................................................................... 1-4 1.3 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................................... 1-4 SECTION 2 - STRUCTURAL EVALUATION .................................................................................................... 2-1

2.1 DESCRIPTION

OF STRUCTURAL DESIGN ................................................................................................ 2-1

2. 1. 1 Discussion .................................................................................................................................... 2-1

2. 1. 2 Design Criteria.............................................................................................................................. 2-1

2. 1. 3 Weight and Centers of Gravity ..................................................................................................... 2-1

2. 1.4 Identification of Codes and Standards for Package Design ........................................................ 2-1 2.2 MATERIALS ......................................................................................................................................... 2-1

2. 2. 1 Material Properties and Specifications ......................................................................................... 2-1 2.2.2 Chemical, Galvanic or Other Reactions ....................................................................................... 2-2 2.2.3 Effects of Radiation on Materials ................................................................................................. 2-3 2.3 FABRICATION AND ExAMINATION .......................................................................................................... 2-3 2.3. 1 Fabrication .................................................................................................................................... 2-3 2.3.2 Examination .................................................................................................................................. 2-3 2.4 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL PACKAGES .................................................................................... 2-3 2.4.1 Minimum Package Size ................................................................................................................ 2-3 2.4.2 Tamper-Indicating Feature ........................................................................................................... 2-3 2.4.3 Positive Closure ........................................................................................................................... 2-3 2.5 LIFTING AND TIE-DOWN STANDARDS FOR ALL PACKAGES ..................................................................... 2-4

2. 5. 1 Lifting Devices .............................................................................................................................. 2-4

2. 5. 2 Tie-Down Devices ........................................................................................................................ 2-4 2.6 NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT .................................................................................................. 2-4

2. 6. 1 Heat .............................................................................................................................................. 2-4 2.6.2 Cold .............................................................................................................................................. 2-6

2. 6. 3 Reduced External Pressure ......................................................................................................... 2-6

2. 6. 4 Increased External Pf98Sure ........................................................................................................ 2-6

2. 6. 5 Vibration ....................................................................................................................................... 2-6

2. 6. 6 Water Spray .................................................................................................................................2-7

2. 6. 7 Free Drop ..................................................................................................................................... 2- 7 2.6.8 ComerDrop .................................................................................................................................. 2-9

2. 6. 9 Compression or Stacking ............................................................................................................. 2-9 2.6.10 Penetration ................................................................................................................................. 2-10

2. 7 HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT ...................................................................... 2-11

2. 7. 1 Free Drop ................................................................................................................................... 2-11 2.7.2 Crush ..........................................................................................................................................2-14

2. 7.3 Puncture ..................................................................................................................................... 2-14

2. 7.4 Thermal ...................................................................................................................................... 2-17

2. 7. 5 Immersion - Fissile Material.. ..................................................................................................... 2-18

2. 7. 6 Immersion - All Packages.......................................................................................................... 2-18

2. 7. 7 Deep Water Immersion Test (for Type B Packages Containing More than 105 A2) .................. 2-18

2. 7. 8 Summary of Damage ................................................................................................................. 2-18

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision 10 Burlington, Massachusetts Page ii 2.8 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS FOR AIR TRANSPORT OF P LUTONIUM OR PACKAGES WITH LARGE QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVITY ***.************.*.*********.*****.****.**.****.*****************.**....**.********.*********.***.***********..**..**** 2-21 2.9 ACCIDENT CONDITIONS FOR FISSILE MATERIAL PACKAGES FOR AIR TRANSPORT ******.*.*.*.*.*.**************** 2-21 2.10 SPECIAL FORM ..................................................................................................................................2-21 2.11 FUEL Roos ...................................................................................................................................... 2-21 2.12 APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................................... 2-21 2.12.1 Test Plan 80 Rev 1 (March 1999) .......................................................................................... 2-23 2.12.2 Test Plan 80 Report Minus Manufacturing Records (Jun 1999) . .......................................... 2-24

2. 12.3 USDOT Special Form Certificate USA/0335/S-96 Rev 13 .................................................... 2-25

2. 12.4 USDO T Special Form Certificate USA/0502/S-96 Rev 12 .................................................... 2-26 SECTION 3 - THERMAL EVALUATION ...........................................................................................................3-1

3.1 DESCRIPTION

OF THERMAL DESIGN .****.***.***.*.***.*...*.*...****.*.*.*.***...***..***....*****..**.******....***..******.***.**.**. 3-1

3. 1. 1 Design Features ........................................................................................................................... 3-1

3. 1. 2 Decay Heat of Contents ............................................................................................................... 3-1 3.1.3 Summary Tables of Temperatures ............................................................................................... 3-1

3. 1.4 Summary Tables of Maximum Pressures .................................................................................... 3-1 3.2 MATERIAL PROPERTIES AND COMPONENT SPECIFICATIONS................................................................... 3-2 3.2. 1 Material Properties ....................................................................................................................... 3-2

3. 2. 2 Component Specifications............................................................................................................ 3-3 3.3 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS *****.***...*.**.....*.**..*.............*..*.*.....*..........*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*.*******.*.*********************** 3-3 3.3. 1 Evaluation by Analysis ................................................................................................................. 3-3 3.3.2 Evaluation by Test........................................................................................................................ 3-3 3.4 THERMAL EVALUATION FOR NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT .......***......*..***..***.****.*.*....****..******..*. 3-3 3.4. 1 Heat and Cold .............................................................................................................................. 3-3 3.4.2 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses ............................................................. 3-8 3.4.3 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure ......................................................................................... 3-8 3.5 THERMAL EVALUATION UNDER HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS .***.***.*******...**********..*******.*****.*.** 3-8

3. 5. 1 Initial Conditions ........................................................................................................................... 3-8 3.5.2 Fire Test Conditions ..................................................................................................................... 3-8 3.5.3 Maximum Temperatures and Pressure ...................................................................................... 3-10 3.5.4 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses ........................................................... 3-10 3.5.5 Fuel/Cladding Temperatures for Spent Nuclear Fuel ................................................................ 3-10

3. 5. 6 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport ......................................... 3-10 3.6 APPENDIX *.*******.*.*.*.*****....*.*......****.****..************.*.*..*.***...***..***....*********.*****.*.*.***.***..***********.*...*.*.*...* 3-10 SECTION 4 - CONTAINMENT .........................................................................................................................4-1

4.1 DESCRIPTION

OF THE CONTAINMENT SYSTEM .......................................................................................4-1

4. 1. 1 Special Requirements for Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel ............................................................ 4-1 4.2 CONTAINMENT UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT {TYPE 8 PACKAGES) ***************.*.*.******.*..* .4-1 4.3 CONTAINMENT UNDER HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT CONDITION ...............................................*................ 4-1 4.4 LEAKAGE RATE TESTS FOR TYPE B PACKAGES ************************************************************************************ 4-1 4.5 APPENDIX **********************************.****.**.**************.*****.**********.******.*********.***********.************.***********..***.***.* 4-2 SECTION 5

SHIELDING EVALUATION .........................................................................................................5-1

5.1 DESCRIPTION

OF SHIELDING DESIGN .................................................................................................... 5-1 5.1.1 Design Features ........................................................................................................................... 5-1

5. 1.2 Summary Table of Maximum Radiation Levels............................................................................ 5-1 5.2 SOURCE SPECIFICATION ...................................................................................................................... 5-3 5.2. 1 Gamma Source ............................................................................................................................ 5-3 5.2. 1 Neutron Source ............................................................................................................................ 5-3 5.3 SHIELDING MODEL ***********************************************.***************************.*******************************************..***** 5-3

5. 3. 1 Configuration of Source and Shielding......................................................................................... 5-3

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision 10 Burlington, Massachusetts Page iii 5.3.2 Material Properties ....................................................................................................................... $-3 5.4 SHIELDING EVALUATION ...................................................................................................................... 5-3 5.4.1 Methods........................................................................................................................................ $-3 5.4.2 Input and Output Data .................................................................................................................. $-4 5.4.3 Flux-to-Dose-Rate Conversion..................................................................................................... 5-4 5.4.4 External Radiation Levels ............................................................................................................ 5-4 5.5 APPENDIX ***************.*******************************.*********************************************.**************************.****************** 5-5 SECTION 6 - CRITICALITY EVALUATION ...................................................................................................... 6-1 SECTION 7 - PACKAGE OPERATIONS ......................................................................................................... 7-1 7.1 PACKAGE L OADING ............................................................................................................................. 7-1 7.1.1 Preparation for Loading................ - .............................................................................................. 7-1 7.1.2 Loading of Contents ..................................................................................................................... 7-2

7. 1.3 Preparation for Transport ............................................................................................................. 7-3 7.2 PACKAGE UNLOADING ......................................................................................................................... 7-3 7.2. 1 Receipt of Package from Carrier.................................................................................................. 7-3 7.2.2 Removal of Contents.................................................................................................................... 7-4 7.3 PREPARATION OF EMPTY PACKAGE FOR TRANSPORT............................................................................ 7-4 7.4 OTHER OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 7-5 7.4. 1 Package Transportation by Consignor......................................................................................... 7-5 7.4.2 Emergency Response .................................................................................................................. 7-6 7.5 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................................... 7-6 SECTION 8 - ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM ...................................................... 8-1 8.1 ACCEPTANCETEST ............................................................................................................................. 8-1 8.1.1 Visual Inspections and Measurements ........................................................................................ 8-1 8.1.2 Weld Examinations................ ....................................................................................................... 8-1 8.1.3 Structural and Pressure Tests...................................................................................................... 8-1 8.1.4 Leakage Tests .............................................................................................................................. 8-1

8. 1.5 Component and Material Tests .................................................................................................... 8-2 8.1.6 Shielding Tests ............................................................................................................................. 8-2 8.1.7 Thermal Tests .............................................................................................................................. 8-2 8.1.8 Miscellaneous Tests..................................................................................................................... 8-2 8.2 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM .................................................................................................................... 8-3 8.2. 1 Structural and Pressure Tests...................................................................................................... 8-3 8.2.2 Leakage Tests .............................................................................................................................. 8-3 8.2. 3 Component and Material Tests .................................................................................................... 8-3 8.2.4 Thermal Tests .............................................................................................................................. 8-3 8.2.5 Miscellaneous Tests..................................................................................................................... 8-3 8.3 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................................... 8-3 SECTION 9 - QUALITY ASSURANCE ............................................................................................................ 9-1 9.1 U.S. QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................... 9-1 9.2 CANADA QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM REQUIREM ENTS.................................................................... 9-1

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision 10 Burlington, Massachusetts Page iv List of Tables TABLE 1.2.A: MODEL 650L PACKAGE INFORMATION ..*.**.........*.........**...**.....**..*.*..*.....*.*.*..........*..........*.*.**.....***..*..** 1-l TABLE 2.2.A: MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT PACKAGE MATERIALS ********.***...***.***.***.*..*.**** 2-2 TABLE 2.6.A: RADIONUCLIDE DECAY ENERGY ............................................................................................................2-5 TABLE 2.6.B:

SUMMARY

TEMPERATURES NORMAL TRANSPORT ******************************************************************************** 2-5 TABLE 2.7.A:

SUMMARY

OF DAMAGES DURING TEST PLAN 80 *******************************************************************************.*** 2-18 TABLE 3.1.A:

SUMMARY

TABLE OF TEMPERATURES ...................................................................................................3-l TABLE 3.1.8:

SUMMARY

TABLE OF MAXIMUM PRESSURES .........................................................................................3-2 TABLE 3.2.A: THERMAL PROPERTIES OF PRINCIPAL TRANSPORT PACKAGE MATERIALS *****..***.......*..***.****....**.*.*.*** 3-2 TABLE 3.4.A: INSOLATION DATA....................................................................................................................................3-4 TABLE 5.1.A: MODEL 650L TEST UNIT TP80(A)

SUMMARY

TABLE OF EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS EXTRAPOLATED TO CAPACITY OF 240 Cl (8.88 TBQ) IR-1 92 (NON-EXCLUSIVE USE) ...................................... 5-1 TABLE 5.1.8: MODEL 650L TEST UNIT TP80(8)

SUMMARY

TABLE OF EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS EXTRAPOLATED TO CAPACITY OF 8.88 TBQ (240 Cl) IR-192 (NON-EXCLUSIVE USE) ...................................... 5-2 TABLE 5.1.C: MODEL 650L TEST UNIT TP80(C)

SUMMARY

TABLE OF EXTERNAL RADIATION LEVELS EXTRAPOLATED TO CAPACITY OF 8.88 TBQ (240 Cl) IR-192 (NON-EXCLUSIVE USE) ...................................... 5-2 TABLE 5.1.0: MODEL 650L S/N 27 4 SE-75 PROFILE RESULTS

SUMMARY

TABLE OF EXTERNAL RA.DIATION LEVELS EXTRAPOLATED TO CAPACITY OF 11 .1 TBQ (300 Cl) SE-75 (NON-EXCLUSIVE USE) ......................... 5-3 List of Figures FIGURE 1.2.A - 650L ASSEMBLy .................................................................................................................................. 1-2 FIGURE 1.3.A- SKETCH OF MODEL 650L PREPARED FOR TRANSPORT ...*...........*..........*...*.......*.....*........................ 1-4 FIGURE 2.6.A - MODEL 650L (TP80(A)) 1.2 M DROP TEST ORIENTATION *.*****.***********.********.***..******.*.**********.***.**.*.* 2-7 FIGURE 2.6.8 - MODEL 650L (TP80(8)) 1.2 M DROP TEST ORIENTATION ................................................................2-8 FIGURE 2.6.C - MODEL 650L (TP80(C)) 1.2 M DROP TEST ORIENTATION *.****************************.***.**.**...*********....*..***** 2-9 FIGURE 2.6.D - MODEL 650L COMPRESSION TEST ORIENTATION .**********.*************.*************************************************.** 2-10 FIGURE 2.6.E - MODEL 650L PENETRATION TEST ORIENTATION ................................................................................ 2-l l FIGURE 2.7.A- MODEL 650L (TP80(8)) 9 M DROP TEST ORIENTATION- END DROP .............................................. 2-12 FIGURE 2.7.8 - MODEL 650L (TP80(A)) 9 M DROP TEST ORIENTATION- SIDE DROP ............................................. 2-13 FIGURE 2.7.C - MODEL 650L (TP80(C)) 9 M DROP TEST ORIENTATION-CORNER DROP ....................................... 2-13 FIGURE 2.7.D - MODEL 650L (TP80(A)) PUNCTURE TEST ORIENTATION ****** ,. ..........................................................2-15 FIGURE 2.7.E - MODEL 650L (TP80(C)) 2N° PUNCTURE TEST O RIENTATION ............................................................ 2-16 FIGURE 3.5.A - MODEL 650L (TP80(8)) THERMAL TEST ORIENTATION .................................................................... 3-9

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page l - 1 Section 1 - GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1 Introduction The Model 650L is designed as an industrial radiography source changer and transport package for Type B quantities of special form radioactive material. It conforms to the Type B(U)-96 criteria for packaging in accordance with 10 CFR 71, 49 CFR 173, IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material No. TS-R-1 2009 Edition and Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) PTNS Regulations SOR/2015-145. This submission is formatted in accordance with NUREG-1886 "Joint Canada - United States Guide for Approval of Type B(U) and Fissile Material Transportation Packages" dated March 2009.

1.2 Package Description The Model 650L package consists of a welded carbon steel shell encasing a uranium shield which houses a titanium "U" tube. The tube is crimped in the middle of the "U" to provide a positive stop for the source assembly. The package has two source locking assemblies mounted on the top cover plate that are used to secure the radioactive source in a shielded position during transport. The Model 650L package is constructed in accordance with descriptive drawing R65006 (see Appendix 1.3). The package measures approximately 13 % inches (337 mm) tall by 10 inches (254 mm) wide by 8 %

inches (210 mm) deep. The maximum weight of the package is 90 pounds. The general package information is shown in Table 1.2.A:

Ta bl e 1 2 A ModeI 650L Pac kaae Informaf 10n Package Nuclide Form Maximum Chemical/ Maximum Maximum Maximum Maximum ID Capacity 1 Physical Content Decay DU Package Form Weiaht4 Heat3 Weight Weight lr-192 Special 240Ci Metal 36 grams 4.8 Watts 650L Form 2 Sources 441bs 90 1bs Se-75 Special 300 Ci Metal- 36 grams 1.52 (20 kg) (41 kg)

Form 2 Selenide Watts Sources Compound 1 Maximum Activity for lr-192 is defined as output Curies as required in ANSI N432 and 10 CFR 34.20 and in line with TS-R-1 and Rulemaking by the USNRC and the USDOT published in the Federal Register on 26 January 2004.

2Special Form is defined in 10 CFR 71 , 49 CFR 173, and IAEA TS-R-1 .

3 Maximum decay heat for lr-192 is calculated by correcting the output activity to content activity. A factor of 2.3 is used for lr-192 to account for source capsule and self-absorption in this conversion. No corrections are made for Se-75.

4 Maximum content weight includes the mass of the radioactive material and the source capsule handling wire assembly for a shipment containing two source wire assemblies.

1.2.1 Packaging Except for the shield assembly, fill foam and some components of the lock assembly, all materials of construction are stainless steels. The major components of the package consist of the following:

Inner and Outer Shells

Depleted Uranium shield

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page l-2

Locking assemblies

Protective Lid Protective Lid DU Shield Inner Shell Lock Assembly

+-- Outer Shell Special Form Source Capsule Figure 1.2.A- 650L Assembly The following paragraphs describe the major components of the transport package.

1.2.1.1 Source Capsule and Shield Assembly The special form capsule is shielded by a titanium "U" tube set in depleted uranium. The tube is crimped in the middle of the "U" to provide a positive stop for the source assembly and two "effective" source tubes in the shield. On some source changers, additional shielding is provided by lead or tungsten positioned at various locations around the depleted uranium shield. The lead/tungsten is secured in place prior to setting the shield in the shell configuration with polyurethane foam (see Section 1.2.1.2).

1.2.1.2 Inner and Outer Shells The shield assembly is protected by two shells of carbon steel or stainless steel.

The inner shell is rectangular and the outer shell is cylindrical. The shells are positioned between two stainless steel top and bottom plates. The plates are secured with four stainless steel, 5/16-18 hex head through bolts. All steel-uranium interfaces are separated with copper shims. The void between the depleted uranium shield and the inner and outer shells is filled with rigid polyurethane foam.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 20 19 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page l -3 1.2. 1.3 Protective Lid During transport, the locking assembly is protected by a carbon steel lid. The lid is secured to the top plate by four stainless steel, 3/8-16 hex head bolts with optional steel washers. The lid is provided with a tamper indicating seal during shipment.

1.2.1.4 Source Locking Assembly The package incorporates two stainless steel and brass locking assemblies which secure the source(s) inside the shield. Each lock assembly secures one source in one source tube. The locking assemblies are secured to the top plate by four X-20 stainless steel screws. Two of the screws on each lock assembly are safety wired for added security of the lock assembly to the top plate.

1.2.2 Contents The Model 650L transport package is designed to transport lr-192, or Se-75, as special form capsules attached to source wire assemblies. Actual content to output activity for lr-192 varies based on the capsule configuration as well as variations in isotope self-absorption. A factor of 2.3 was used to convert output activity to content activity for lr-192, as this factor reflects the worst case variation for lr-192 sources transported in this package. No correction was necessary for Se-75 as the activity transported is based on content activity and not output activity.

The maximum decay heat for lr-192 is 4.8 watts, and has been adjusted to account for content activity of the source. Based on the decay energy and total content activity, lr-192 produces the maximum decay heat when transported in this package. The source capsules are loaded into the Model 650L device and secured according to the procedure described in Section 7.

The maximum weight of the package contents is 0.08 lbs (36 grams). The content weight value is based on shipment of two source assemblies. The radioactive material contained within the special form capsule along with the weight of the source wire assembly components is the value used as the maximum weight of the package contents. The radioactive material weight value is calculated based on the package capacity and the lowest specific activity of lr-192 (200 Ci/gram) used in source production for these devices.

Note: lr-192 of higher specific activity can be used but this would produce sources with lower total mass of the contents. Se-75 has a lower density than lr-192 and will produce source capsules of lesser maximum weight than their lr-192 counterparts. Values listed in the Table 1.2.A are the maximum content masses.

1.2.3 Special Requirements for Plutonium Not applicable. This package is not used for the transportation of plutonium.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page l-4 1.2.4 Operational Features This package does not involve complex containment systems for source securement.

The sources for this package are all special form, welded capsules. The capsules are attached to flexible source wire assemblies and held securely in the device by components of the lock assembly attached to the top plate. One of these components, the lockslide, engages the source wire and prevents it from being pulled through the top of the lock assembly.

When the Model 650L device is prepared for transport, the lock slide is locked in the secured position by a key lock, a shipping cap is installed above the source in the lock assembly, and the protective lid is secured to the top plate over the lock assemblies.

1.3 Appendix Figure 1.3.A. shows a sketch of the Model 650L package as prepared for transport.

Additional drawings of the Model 650L transport package are also enclosed in this appendix.

Figure 1.3.A - Sketch of Model 650L Prepared for Transport

Drawings withheld per 10 CFR 2.390 Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2- 1 Section 2 - STRUCTURAL EVALUATION This section identifies and describes the principal structural engineering design of the packaging, components, and systems important to safety and compliance with the performance requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 and TS-R-1 .

2.1 Description of Structural Design 2.1.1 Discussion The Model 650L transport package is described in Section 1.2, "Package Description".

2.1.2 Design Criteria The Model 650L transport package is designed to comply with the requirements for Type B(U) packaging as prescribed by 10 CFR 7 1, IAEA TS-R-1 2009 Edition and CNSC PTNS SOR/2015-145. All design criteria are evaluated by a straightforward application of the appropriate section of these requirements.

2.1.3 Weight and Centers of Gravity The transport package weighs a maximum of 90 lbs (41 kg). The center of gravity of the 650L transport packages is approximately 4 ~ inches (64 mm) above the bottom plate along its central axis.

2.1.4 Identification of Codes and Standards for Package Design See Section 2.1.2 relating to design criteria of the package. No specific codes or standards were directly incorporated in the design effort of the finished assembly for the 650L transport packages. However, the design was based on the Type A and Type B(U) container requirements of 49 CFR, 10 CFR 71 and IAEA regulations in effect at the time of the package component design.

All component fabrication (including assembly) is controlled under the QSA Global, Inc.

Quality Assurance Plan approved by the USNRC and ISO. All welding under this plan adheres to the standards referenced on the drawings in Appendix 1.3. All hardware meets the standards referenced on the drawings in Appendix 1.3. All external fabrication deemed critical to safety is either verified to equivalent in-house standards or dedicated as appropriate for use prior to release as part of this transport package.

2.2 Materials 2.2.1 Material Properties and Specifications Table 2.2.A lists the relevant mechanical properties (at ambient temperature) of the principal materials used in the Model 650L transport package. The location and use of these materials are shown on the drawings contained in Appendix 1.3. The reference for the table information is listed in the last column of the table.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-2 Table 2.2.A Mechanica IP rooert1es ofp*rmc1 pa ITransoort p ac kaae Materia

Is Material Tensile Yield Elongation Source Strength Strenath Depleted Uranium 65 kpsi 30 kpsi 12% Reference #1 Copper 25 kpsi 9 kosi 25% Reference #2, paae 224 Titanium 145 kpsi 134 kpsi 10% Reference 3 page 98 Lead 1.8 kpsi 8 kpsi 30% Reference 2 paae 550 Stainless Steel (304) 75 kpsi 30 kpsi 40% SAE 30304 per AMS551 3 or ASTM A276 Condition A Hot or Cold Finished Austenitic Stainless Steel 80 kps i Not Not ASTMA493 specified specified Cold Rolled Steel Sheet Not 20-40 ksi 30% Min ASTM A 1008/A1008M-09 1 Specified Hot Rolled Steel Sheet Not 30-50 ksi 25% Min ASTM A1011/A1011 M-09 1 Specified Strain-Hardened Stainless Steel 125 kpsi 100 kpsi 12% ASTM A 193/A193M Bolts Stainless steel bolts 70 kpsi 30 kpsi 30% ASTM F593 Group 1, Condition A 1

Mechanical properties for the referenced materials listed in this standard are considered "Typical Ranges". These materials, as used in this transport package, do not provide structural support to the package containment under normal or hypothetical accident test conditions. The use of typical material properties ranges for these materials is sufficient to meet the intended performance requirements for the package.

Resource references:

1. Lowenstein, Paul. Industrial Uses of Depleted Uranium. American Society for Metals.

Metals Handbook, Volume 3, Ninth Edition.

2. American Society for Metals. Metals Handbook, Volume 2, Tenth Edition. Ohio: Materials Park, 1990.

3. American Society for Materials, Metals Handbook desk Edition , Metals Park Ohio 1985 2.2.2 Chemical, Galvanic or Other Reactions The non-safety related materials are brass and polyurethane. These materials are more susceptible to corrosion and chemical reaction than the safety materials, but pose no threat to safety or containment. The safety related materials, used in the construction of the Model 650L transport package, are depleted uranium metal, stainless steel, carbon steel, titanium, tungsten (in some cases), lead (in some cases) and copper. There will be no significant chemical or galvanic action between any of these components.

To prevent the possible formation of a eutectic alloy of steel and depleted uranium during the Hypothetical Accident Conditions thermal scenario, defined by 10 CFR 71 .73(c){4), copper separators are used at all steel-uranium interfaces. The steel-uranium eutectic alloy temperature is approximately 1,337°F (725°C). However, vacuum conditions and extreme cleanliness of the surfaces are necessary to produce the eutectic alloy at this low temperature. Due to the conditions in which the depleted

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-3 uranium shield components are assembled and used in the shield containers, conditions sufficient to allow formation of this eutectic do not exist. With these container constructions, there will be no significant chemical or galvanic reaction between package components during normal or hypothetical accident conditions of transport.

2.2.3 Effects of Radiation on Materials Lead, depleted uranium, tungsten , titanium , steel and polyurethane foam have been used in this package as well as other transport packaging for decades without degradation of the package performance over time due to irradiation from the package contents.

2.3 Fabrication and Examination 2.3.1 Fabrication Package components are procured , manufactured and inspected for use under QSA Global Inc. NRC approved QA Program Number 0040. This QA program is based on the application of guidance contained in NUREG/CR-6407 "Classification of Transportation Packing and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components According to Importance to Safety" (1996). Quality Class A components on the package are considered to be important to the package safety. All transport package components are evaluated and documented for compliance to the drawings provided in Appendix 1.3 prior to initial use as part of a Model 650L transport package.

2.3.2 Examination Section 8 describes the acceptance testing and routine maintenance requirements for package components used on the Model 650L packages.

2.4 General Requirements For All Packages 2.4.1 Minimum Package Size The Model 650L transport package is approximately 1O inches (254 mm) long, 8 %

inches (210 mm) wide and 13 % inches (337 mm) high and therefore exceeds the minimum package size requirements.

2.4.2 Tamper-Indicating Feature The Model 650L package incorporates a seal wire attached to two bolts which secure the protective lid to the top plate. If the seal wire is broken during transport it serves as evidence of possible unauthorized access to the contents.

2.4.3 Positive Closure These packages do not involve complex containment systems for source securement.

The sources for these packages are all special form, welded capsules. The source wire

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-4 assembly is held securely in the device by components of the lock assembly. One of these components, the lock slide, engages the source assembly to prevent it from accidentally being pulled from the shielded position in the package.

When the 650L package is prepared for transport, the source assembly is secured by the lock slide, the lock plunger is depressed and the key removed, preventing source movement. A cover over the source assembly prevents access to the source during transport.

2.5 Lifting and Tie-Down Standards for All Packages 2.5.1 Lifting Devices The Model 650L transport package is desig ned to be lifted by the bottom or top plates or the top lid. The top lid is secured to the top plate by four 3/8-16, strain-hardened stainless steel hex head bolts. The bottom plate is secured to the top plate by four 5/16-18 stainless steel hex head bolts. Since the package can be lifted by either the top or bottom plate, analysis of the stress due to lifting considers the strength of the 5/16-18 through bolts, which are more limiting than the lid bolts.

Each 5/16-18 bolt has a cross-sectional area of 0.0524 in2 (33.8 mm2). The yield strength of the material is 30,000 psi. Thus, each bolt can support at least 1,572 lbs (713 kg) of force, or more than 17 times the package weight before failing. Therefore, the lifting device complies with the requirements of 10 CFR 71.45(a).

2.5.2 Tie-Down Devices The Model 650L package has no tie down devices. The package can be blocked and braced according to standard transportation practices.

2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport 2.6.1 Heat The heat sources for the Model 650L transport package are listed in Table 2.6.A.

lridium-192 releases approximately 8.6 milliwatts per Curie based on a decay energy of 1.46 MeV/decay. Assuming all the decay energy is transformed into heat, the heat generation rate for 8.88 TBq (240 Ci) of lr-192 (when corrected from content to output curies) would be approximately 4.8 Watts. The thermal evaluation for the heat test is described in Section 3 and is based on the decay energy of lr-192 since it releases a greater amount of decay energy than Se-75 (see Table 1.2.A).

Assuming the entire decay heat, 4.8 Watts, is absorbed by the package, this would result in a worst case package surface temperature of 46°C (115°F) (Section 3.4.1.2).

Accounting for solar heating effects (Section 3.4.1.1), the maximum temperature of the package surface was calculated to be 70°C (158°F). Since the sources in a fully loaded Model 650L package generate no more than 4.8 Watts as shown in Table 2.6.A, it can be assumed that no part of the package will be greater than 70°C (158°F) or be

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-5 significantly affected by heating effects. In addition, the materials used in these packages will not be significantly affected by 70°C (158°F).

... I e Decay Energy T a bl e 2 6 A Ra d"1onucl"d Radionuclide Package Activity MeV/Decay Watts/Package (Ci) lridium-192 240 1.46 4.8 Selenium-75 300 0.86 1.52 Resource references:

Table of Isotopes, Volumes I & II, Eighth Edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996.

2.6.1.1 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures Temperature Model 650L Comments Condition lnsolation 10°c Section 3.4.1 .1.

38°C in full sun 158 ' F Decay Heating 46°C Section 3.4.1.2 38°C in shade 115'F As all components are vented to ambient, no pressure will build up in the package under Normal Transport conditions that would adversely affect package performance or integrity. Evaluation of pressures for this package are contained in Section 3.4.2 and summarized in Table 3.1.B.

2.6.1.2 Differential Thermal Expansion Any thermal expansion encountered during Normal Transport will be insignificant with respect to the manufacturi ng tolerances for the components of this package.

2.6.1.3 Stress Calculations Stress calculations for normal transport of this package are contained in Sections 2.5.1 and 2. 7 .4.3. Results of these calculations demonstrate that the package meets the requirements for Normal Transport.

2.6.1.4 Comparison with Allowable Stresses The Model 650L package was fully tested and passed under Normal Conditions of transport. It is therefore concluded that the package will satisfy the performance requirements specified by the regulations.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-6 2.6.2 Cold The carbon steel components of the Model 650L transport package are susceptible to brittle fracture at low temperature. To assess the package performance under the worst case test conditions, the drop and penetration tests described in 10 CFR 71 .71 (c)(7) and (10) were performed with the package at the coldest temperature referenced in the regulations. This condition was most likely to produce package failure under these test conditions due to the brittle fracture nature of these package components. The transport package successfully met Type B(U)-96 Transport Tests requirements at temperatures below -40°C (-40°F), the minimum specified in the 10 CFR 71.71 (c)(2), therefore it is concluded that the Model 650L transport package will withstand the normal transport cold condition.

2.6.3 Reduced External Pressure The Model 650L transport package is open to the atmosphere and contains no components which could create a differential pressure relative to atmospheric conditions or components within the package. The authorized contents are special form source capsules that meet a minimum ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 (R2013) classification of Class 3 for pressure. This classification is more limiting than the reduced external pressure requirement as it covers 25 kN/m 2 to 2 MN/m2

Therefore, the reduced external pressure requirements of 3.5 psi in 10 CFR and 8. 7 psi (60 kPa) in 49 CFR and IAEA will not adversely affect the package containment.

Reference:

ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 (R2013), Sealed Radioactive Sources - Classification 2.6.4 Increased External Pressure The Model 650L transport package is open to the atmosphere and contains no components which could create a differential pressure relative to atmospheric conditions. The authorized contents are special form source capsules that meet a minimum ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 classification of Class 3 for pressure. This classification is more limiting than the increased external pressure requirement as it covers 25 kN/m 2 to 2 MN/m2* Therefore, the increased external pressure requirements of 20 psi in 10 CFR 71 will not adversely affect the package containment.

2.6.5 Vibration The Model 650L (and its predecessor the 650) package has been in use for over two decades without failure due to vibration. The lock attachment screws and end plate through screws are tightened to a prescribed torque and safety wired to prevent unintentional release even after repeated use. It is therefore concluded that the Model 650L packages will withstand vibration normally incident to transport.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-7 2.6.6 Water Spray The Model 650L transport package is constructed of water-resistant materials throughout. Therefore, the water spray test would not reduce the shielding effectiveness or structural integrity of the package.

2.6. 7 Free Drop Three test specimens, as described in Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12) were subjected to the 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drop followed by the hypothetical accident 9 m drop and puncture bar drop tests. All free drop and penetration tests were conducted with the test specimen temperatures at or below -40°C (-40°F). The test specimens included standard locking assemblies. Drop orientation impact locations for the 1.2 m free drop are shown in Figures 2.6.A through 2.6.C. The justification for these orientations is provided in Sections 2.6.7.1 through 2.6.7.3.

The Model 650L package maintained its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport drop test conditions and the package complies with the requirements of this section.

2.6.7.1 Horizontal Long-Side Down Orientation The intent of this orientation was to determine if the depleted uranium shield could move laterally through the foam during impact (which could result in source pullout from the titanium tubes), and whether brittle failure of the inner and outer shells could occur due to the low temperature testing. The long-side down orientation was selected because the long side of the package has a stiffer configuration than the short-side. This results in a shorter deceleration and higher impact load. Testing for this orientation (shown in Figure 2.6.A) was performed on test specimen TP80(A) .

1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(A)

Figure 2.6.A - Model 650L (TP80(A)) 1.2 m Drop Test Orientation Horizontal Long-Side Down Drop

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 20 19 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-8 Damage to TPBO(A) was limited to impact witness marking on the bottom plate, top plate and both lid flanges. There was no significant change in the radiation profile of the test specimen after the 1.2 m (4 ft) drop test (See Section 5).

2.6.7.2. Vertical Upside Down Orientation The intent of this test orientation was to determine if any of the following could occur and have a significant impact on the package:

deformation of the lid weldment,

crushing of the foam between the depleted uranium shield and top plate,

deformation (bowing upward) of the top plate due to the impact load of the depleted uranium shield applied through titanium source tubes and foam,

failure of the through bolts, or

failure of the locking assemblies.

These deformations or failures could result in partial pullout of the source from its shielded position. Testing for this orientation (shown in Figure 2.6.B) was performed on test specimen TPBO(B) .

. . .*. :* . /

. . ~* :

~

1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(B)

Figure 2.6.B - Model 650L (TPSO(B)) 1.2 m Drop Test Orientation Vertical Upside Down Drop Damage to TP80(B) was limited to impact witness marking on the top of the lid.

There was no significant change in the radiation profile of the test specimen after the 1.2 m (4 ft) drop test (See Section 5).

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-9 2.6. 7.3 Vertical Top Corner Drop Orientation The intent of this test orientation was to determine if failure of the lid or lid closure bolts could occur which could expose the locking assembly to damage during subsequent Hypothetical Accident Testing. Failure of the locking assembly could result in source pullout. Additionally, this orientation would load the through bolts in tension and could cause them to fail. Testing for this orientation (shown in Figure 2.6.C) was performed on test specimen TP80(C).

~-**. 1 ~-. * ......* ;

1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(C)

Figure 2.6.C - Model 650L (TP80(C)) 1.2 m Drop Test Orientation Vertical Top Corner Down Drop Damage to TP80(C) was limited to a 2 inch (50.8 mm) long crack in the top of the protective lid and the flange corner was bent in the drop. There was no significant change in the radiation profile of the test specimen after the 1.2 m (4 ft) drop test (See Section 5) .

2.6.8 Corner Drop This test is not applicable, as the transport package does not transport fissile material, nor is the exterior of the transport package made from either fiberboard or wood.

2.6.9 Compression or Stacking Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12) documents that the three test specimens (TP80(A),

TP80(B) and TP80(C)) were subjected to compressive loads of 462 lbs (210 kg), 458 lb (208 kg) and 459 lb (208 kg) respectively, for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (See Figure 2.6.D).

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-10 These loads exceed five times the maximum transport package weight of 90 lbs (41 kg).

These loads are also greater than 13 kPa (2 lb/in2) multiplied by the vertically projected area of the transport package.

Following the test, no damage to the specimens was observed. Radiation profiles performed at the conclusion of the test showed no significant increase in radiation levels.

The Model 650L package maintained its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness and demonstrated that the packages comply with the requirements of this section.

Compression Test Orientation - All Specimens Figure 2.6.D - Model 650L Com pression Test Orientation 2.6.10 Penetration Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2. 12) documents that the three test specimens (TP80(A),

TP80(B) and TP80(C)) were subjected to the penetration test. Each specimen was impacted on the long side of the package with the intention of damaging the outer shell (See Figure 2.6.E). The penetration bar impacted as intended and caused no significant damage to the specimens. In each case there was a small indentation at the point of impact.

Radiation profiles performed after testing showed no significant increase in radiation levels. The Model 650L package maintained its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness and demonstrated that the packages comply with the requirements of this section.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2- 11

.... 4'- _*** * * * :* .. : * .. * * .. . . . ....

.. : * :* ** * ** 4.,

Penetration Test Orientation - All Specimens Figure 2.6.E - Model 650L Penetration Test Orientation

2. 7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport Sections 2.7.1 through 2.7.5 summarize evaluations and testing for the hypothetical accident conditions of transport tests. Section 2. 7 .6 summarizes the results of this testing.

Three (3) test specimens were used to conduct the hypothetical accident tests. Testing was performed after the test specimens had undergone the testing in Section 2.6 for Normal Conditions of transport. Detailed description of this testing is contained in Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12).

2.7.1 Free Drop Justification for all test unit drop orientations are included in Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12). All tests were conducted with the test specimen temperatures at or below -40°C (-40°F). The test specimens included standard locking assemblies.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision 10 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-1 2 2.7.1.1 End Drop This orientation was used for Test Specimen TPBO(B) and the orientation is shown in Figure 2.7.A. The test specimen impacted flat on the top of the lid.

One of the lid rivnuts cracked open, but the lid bolt remained in place. There was no other damage to the lid or lid bolts/rivnuts.

The top plate deflected up, resulting in source displacements of about 1/32 inch (0.8 mm) and 1/16 inch (1 .6 mm). The carbon steel outer shell unzipped along the spot weld line and opened up about % inch (12 mm). The carbon steel inner shell fractured (brittle fracture) in the middle of the short side and opened up a crack about % inch (13 mm) wide and 3 inches (76 mm) long. The crack started at the top (under the top plate). At the end of this opening , the crack turned and continued behind the foam that fills the volume between the inner and outer shells. The foam cracked and several small pieces came out.

...~,....

........ go,_.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(B)

Figure 2.7.A - Model 650L (TP80(B)) 9 m Drop Test Orientation - End Drop

2. 7.1.2 Side Drop This orientation was used for Test Specimen TPBO(A) and the orientation is shown in Figure 2.7.B. The test specimen rotated slightly so that the long edge of the bottom plate struck the ground first. The long edge of the bottom plate deformed, but no cracking was observed. The outer shell deformed at the interface with the long edge of the bottom plate. There were impact witness marks on the long edge of the top plate and the long edge of the bottom lid flange. There was a small deformation of the lid top flange .

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-13

- *** * :: : * * **:. t ~ -'"; : * * ~ *:

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(A)

Figure 2.7.B - Model 650L (TP80(A)) 9 m Drop Test Orientation - Side Drop

2. 7.1.3 Corner Drop This orientation was used for Test Specimen TP80(C) and the orientation is shown in Figure 2.7.C. The specimen impacted on the top corner of the lid. The crack in the top flange of the lid, which initiated during the 1.2 meter (4 ft) drop test, increased and the top surface of the lid deflected inside the lid about Y2 inch (13 mm) along one edge. The lock assemblies were not impacted during the drop. The column section of the lid and the bottom flange of the lid remained intact. There was no damage to the lid bolts or rivnuts.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(C)

Figure 2.7.C - Model 650L (TP80(C)) 9 m Drop Test Orientation - Corner Drop

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2- 14

2. 7.1.4 Oblique Drops The oblique drop was not performed. In an oblique drop, the energy generated at impact would be distributed across the initial and secondary impact surfaces (two upper and one lower flange). This will produce less force on impact at the initial impact location and the force from the secondary impact will cause deformation of the flanges without contributing to damage which could result in container failure.

Unlike the End, Side and Corner drops described in Sections 2.7.1.1 through

2. 7 .1.3, an oblique drop is less likely to cause a container failure by the mechanisms identified in Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12). These included displacement of the sources relative to the shield within the container shells and breach of the container shells sufficient to allow oxidation of the depleted uranium shield during the thermal test.

2. 7.1.5 Summary of Results See Table 2.7.A for additional test unit results summary. In all cases, radiation profiles performed at the conclusion of all testing showed no significant increase in radiation levels for the test units and demonstrated that the 650L packages comply with the requirements of this section.

2.7.2 Crush Not applicable. This package is not used fo r the Type B transport of normal form radioactive material.

2. 7 .3 Puncture Justifications for all test unit puncture orientations are included in Test Plan Report 80 (Section 2.12) and results are summarized in the Sections 2. 7 .3.1 through 2. 7 .3.4. All tests were conducted with the test specimen temperatures at or below-40°C (-40°F).

The test specimens included standard locking assemblies.

2.7.3.1 Test Specimen TPBO(A)

Test Specimen TP80(A) impacted the puncture bar so that it impacted the horizontal long side of the package (see Figure 2.7.D). There was a small dent on the long side of the outer shell just above the bottom plate and there were witness marks on the top plate.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-15 Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80{A)

Figure 2.7.D - Model 650L (TP80(A)) Puncture Test Orientation Horizontal Long-Side of the Package 2.7.3.2 Test Specimen TPBO(B)

Test Specimen TP80(B) was dropped horizontally so that the edge of the puncture bar impacted the axial crack. This orientation was selected to increase the damage from the 9 meter (30 ft) drop test and to try to further open the axial crack.

The test specimen impacted directly on the crack. There were small indentations on both sides of the crack where the puncture bar impacted, but no further opening of the crack was observed.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-16 2.7.3.3 Test Specimen TPBO(C)

Test Specimen TP80(C) was dropped on the puncture bar in two orientations.

The first orientation dropped the package so that the edge of the puncture bar impacted the crack in the lid. This orientation was selected to increase the damage from the 9 meter (30 ft) drop test with the specific intention of increasing the lid crack opening and trying to impact the lock assemblies.

On impact the edge of the puncture bar hit the top plate of the lid within the column of the lid increasing damage to the lid slightly. The lock assemblies were not impacted and remained protected by the lid. The lid bolts and rivnuts remained intact.

The second drop orientation for this package dropped the specimen so that the edge of the puncture bar impacted the underside of the top plate corner at a lid bolt rivnut. The intent of this orientation was to pry up the top plate and load the through bolts in tension. This orientation was also intended to damage the lid bolt connection. See Figure 2.7.E.

In the drop, the specimen impacted <5n the under side of the top plate corner.

There was a small deformation of the top plate edge at the impact point. The lid bolts/rivnuts were not damaged. No gaps were created at the top plate/shell interface and the through bolts remained secure.

Second Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(C)

Figure 2.7.E - Model 650L (TP80(C)) 2nd Puncture Test Orientation Underside of Top Endplate

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2- 17 2.7.3.4 Summary of Results See Table 2.7.A for additional test unit results summary. A more detailed summary is given in Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12). In all cases, radiation profiles performed at the conclusion of the puncture testing showed no significant increase in radiation levels for the test units and demonstrated that the 650L packages comply with the requirements of this section.

2. 7 .4 Thermal See Section 3.5 for a discussion of the thermal test performed on the 650L package.

2. 7.4.1 Summary of Pressures and Temperatures These containers are vented to atmosphere. As such, no pressure will build up in the units under Hypothetical Accident conditions. See Tables 3.1.A and 3.1.B for summaries of temperature and maximum pressure related to the Model 650L package.

2. 7.4.2 Differential Thermal Expansion Physical testing has shown that any differential thermal expansion in the package has no detrimental effect on its ability to pass the thermal testing portion of the Hypothetical Accident Conditions. Design clearances between fitted components in the 650L are sufficient to allow for thermal expansion at the test temperature.

It can be drawn from the actual testing results in Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12) that thermal expansion does not have a significant effect on the Model 650L package.

2. 7.4.3 Stress Calculations As was noted in Section 2.7.4.2, thermal differentials will have no detrimental effect on the interfaces between the steel shells, shield, endplates, lock assemblies or protective lid. The Model 650L transport package is open to the atmosphere and contains no components which could create a differential pressure relative to atmospheric conditions This analysis demonstrates that the pressure inside the source capsules used in conjunction with the model 650L container, when subjected to the Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport thermal test, does not exceed the pressure which corresponds to the minimum yield strength at the thermal test temperature.

Under the Hypothetical Accident Conditions, it is assumed that the capsule could reach a temperature of 800°C (1,475°F). The special form capsules transported in the Model 650L package meet an ANS I/HPS N43.6 Class 6 temperature rating. For a classification of 6, the capsule has been subjected to an 800°C temperature for one hour, and subsequently thermally shocked from 800°C to 20°c with no resulting failure of weld or capsule. Therefore, any special form capsule with a minimum ANS I/HPS N43.6 Temperature Classification of 6 will not fail during Hypothetical Accident Conditions.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-18

Reference:

ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 (R2013}, Sealed Radioactive Sources -

Classification.

2. 7.4.4 Comparison of Allowable Stresses The Model 650L package was fully tested and passed under Normal and Hypothetical Accident Conditions of transport. It is therefore concluded that the Model 650L package will satisfy the performance requirements specified by the regulations.

2.7.5 Immersion - Fissile Material Not applicable. This package is not used for transport of Type B quantities of fissile material.

2. 7 .6 Immersion - All Packages The Model 650L transport package is open to the atmosphere and contains no other components that would create a differential pressure under immersion. All materials are impervious to water and would not be affected.

The primary containment system in the model 650L package is a special form source, which meets the ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 requirements for Class 3 pressure testing.

Therefore the 650L could withstand the immersion test as Class 3 is in excess of the required 150 kPa (21 .7 lb ft/in2).

2.7.7 Deep Water Immersion Test (for Type B Packages Containing More than 105 A2)

Not applicable. This package does not transport normal form radioactive material in quantities exceeding 105A2.

2. 7 .8 Summary of Damage Table 2.7.A summarizes the results of the Normal Conditions of Transport and Hypothetical Accident testing performed on the Model 650L transport packages.

Table 2.7.A: Summary of Damages During Test Plan 80 Test Soecimen Test Actual lmoact Point Damaae Observed at Test Site TP80(A) Compression Weight applied to top No damage.

80 lb (36.3 kg) of protective lid Penetration Side of Container Impact Mark. No other visible damage.

Bar Shell (See Figure 2.6.E) 4-foot free Horizontal Long Side

Impact mark on edge of plates drop of Package

Small Change in radiation profile (See Section 5 and Test Plan 80 Report Section 2.1 2)

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-19 Test Specimen Test Actual Impact Point Damage Observed at Test Site 30-foot free Horizontal Long Side Bent bottom plate flange inward.

drop of Package Puncture Horizontal Long Side Shallow dent on outer shell at impact drop of Package point.

Post Test NA

Protective Lid remained securely in Inspection place.

Locks were undamaged, sources secured.

No significant change in source positions.

Small change in radiation profile .

TP80(B) Compression Weight applied to top No damage.

83.6 lb (37 .9 of protective lid kg) Penetration Side of Container Impact Mark. No other visible damage.

Bar Shell (See Figure 2.6.E) 4-foot free Vertical Upside Down

Impact mark on top of protective lid .

drop on Protective Lid

Small change in radiation profile (See Section 5 and Test Plan 80 Report Section 2.12) 30-foot free Vertical Upside Down

Outer shell split open from top to drop on Protective Lid bottom.

Inner shell cracked creating a 3 inch (76.2 mm) long by% inch (12.7 mm) wide opening.

Small upward deflection of top plate .

Puncture Crack in Shell Bent shell inward slightly in area of crack.

drop Produced by 9 m drop Post Drop NA

Protective Lid remained securely in Test place.

Inspection

Locks were undamaged, sources secured.

Top plate deflection at center about 0.16 inch (4.1 mm).

No damage to through bolts .

No significant change in source position.

Outer and inner shells cracked; opening 3 inch (76.2 mm) long by %

inch (1 2.7 mm) wide openinQ.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-20 Test Specimen Test Actual Impact Point Damage Observed at Test Site Thermal See Figure 2.7.F

Shield moved down as expected .

Polyurethane foam burned off exposing the shield.

Some oxidation of the shield near the shell crack occurred.

Shield self-extinguished after removal from oven.

Source pullout less than Y2 inch (12.7 mm).

Maximum radiation level at one meter from the package was 28 mR/hr.

TP80(C) Compression Weight applied to top No damage.

89 lb (40.4 kg) of protective lid Penetration Side of Container Impact Mark. No other visible damage.

Bar Shell (See Figure 2.6.E) 4-foot free Top Corner Down on

Bent corner of lid and cracked top drop Protective Lid plate of lid (brittle fracture).

Small change in radiation profile (See Section 5 and Test Plan 80 Report Section 2. 12) 30-foot free Top Corner Down on

Increased lid top plate crack length in drop Protective Lid vicinity of impact point.

Lock assemblies still protected by the lid.

Puncture Vertical Upside Down Broke inside of lid top plate (locks still drop #1 on Protective Lid protected.

Puncture Underside of Top Top plate deformed slightly.

drop #2 Endplate (See Figure 2.7. E)

Post Test NA

Protective Lid remained securely in Inspection place.

Locks were undamaged, sources secured.

No significant change in source positions.

Small change in radiation profile .

Based on the results and assessments for the test specimens addressed in Test Plan 80 Report (see Section 2.12), it is concluded that the Model 650L transport packages maintain structural integrity and shielding effectiveness during Hypothetical Accident Conditions and Normal Conditions of Transport.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-21 2.8 Accident Conditions for Air Transport of Plutonium or Packages with Large Quantities of Radioactivity Not applicable. This package is not used for transport of plutonium or normal form radioactive material. This package is also not used for transport of special form material in quantities~ 3,000 A1.

2.9 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Not Applicable. This package is not used for transport of Type B quantities of fissile material.

2.1 O Special Form The Model 650L transport package is designed for use with a variety of special form source capsules which meet the ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 requirements for Class 3 pressure testing and Class 6 for temperature testing. The source capsule must be special form, meet the ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 Class 3 pressure criteria and meet the ANSI/HPS 43.6-2007 Class 6 temperature criteria for transport in the Model 650L.

Typical special form sources, transported as Type B quantities of radioactive material, in this container include the Models 875 Series and the X540/1. These special form capsules are assembled into flexible source wire assemblies (typical Models include A424-9 and A424-25W) which allow for storage of the radioactive material in the shield position of the package.

Details of the Model A424-9 source wire assembly can be found under USA SS&D registration MA-1059-S-104-S and the lr-192 capsule under USDOT Special Form Certificates USA/0335/S-96.

Details of the Model A424-25W source wire assembly can be found under USA SS&D registration MA-1059-S-126-S and the Se-75 capsule under USDOT Special Form Certificates USA/0335/S-96 and USA/0502/S-96.

Based on performance testing, any source capsule that has been tested and achieved special form classification from a Competent Authority, has achieved an ANSI/ISO Pressure Classification rating of 3 and has also achieved an ANSI/ISO Temperature Classification of 6 can be safely transported in the Model 650L package so long as it is attached to a source wire assembly that is secured by the lock mechanisms on the top plate and locates the source capsule in the shielded position within the package.

Therefore, any source assembly/capsule combination meeting these criteria should be approved for transport without requirement of amendment to the Type B(U) certification.

2.11 Fuel Rods Not applicable. This package is not used for transport of fuel rods.

2.12 Appendix 2.12.1 Test Plan 80 Rev 1 (March 1999).

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-22 2.12.2 Test Plan 80 Report Minus Manufacturing Records (June 1999).

2.12.3 USDOT Special Form Certificate USA/0335/S-96 Rev 13 2.12.4 USDOT Special Form Certificate USA/0502/S-96 Rev 12

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-23 2.12.1 Test Plan 80 Rev 1 (March 1999)

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Test Plan 80 Revision 1 Model650L Source Changer

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AEAT~logy Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, lno. March 12, 1999 Btxlington,Maasachusetts Pagel Contents Contents***--************* .. ******-********..............._ .............................-.................................. _................... *-* i List of Figures, Tables and Workshcets .............. - ..................................... ,_ ......................................... lii 1.0 Introduction .......................................................... -, ............. ._ ..................................................... 1 2.0 Transport Package Description ......................................................................................... - ......... 2 3.0 R ~ r y Compliance ... - ............................................... ,................................................... _ .. _3 4.0 Systi;,m Failures and Package Orientations ...................................................................... - .......... _4 S.O Assessment of Package Conformance ................................................................... - ......... ,_., ........ 6 5.1 Regulatory Requirentents ***-*-, ............................................................................. - ... -, .... 6 5.2 Test Paclcage Contents ..............................,................... _. ... _........................................ - ..... 6 6.0 Construction and Condition of Test Specimens .................................................. - ........................ 7 7.0 Material and Equipment List. ........................................................................................................ 8 8.0 Test Procedure ............................................................................................................ _................. 9 8.1 Roles and Responsibilities .................................................................................................... 9 82 Specimen Temperature Measurement ......................................................................... ._ ...... IO 8.3

Test Speciinen Prepaxatlon and Inspection ........................................................................ -.10 8.4 Summary of Test Schedule ... - ..............................................................................- ............ 11 85 Com:pression Test (10 CPR 71. 71(cX9)) ........................................................................... .-15 8.5.1 Compression Test Setnp .............................................................................. - ...- ..... 15 8.52 Compression Test Assessment ........................................................ -, ....................... 16 8.6 Penetration Test (10 CFR 71.71(c)(10)) ............................................................................... 16 8.6.1 Penetration Test Setup ... ._ .................................................. --.................... _.............. 16 8.62 Penetration Test Orleotation ..................................................... .-................ - ............ 17 8.6.3 Penetration Test Assessmcnt ................... - ......................................... - ... '"""'"""'-18 8.7 1.2 Meter (4 Foot} Free Drop Test (10 CFR 71.71(c)(7)) ............................................. - ..... 18 8.7.1 12 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Setup ....................................... - ........................ 18 8.7 2 12 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TP80(A) ........................ 19

8. 7.3 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(B) ......................... 20 8.7.4 12 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specbnen TP80(C) ......................... 21

8. 7.S 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test AssesSIIlent ........................ - ............................. 22

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burflngton, Massachusetts PagaU 8.8 First Intermediate Test Inspection ........................................................................................ 22 8.9 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test (10 CFR 71. 73(c)(l)) ........................................ - ........... 22 8.9.1 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Setup ................................................................... 22 8.9.2 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(A) ......................... 24 8.9.3 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(B) .......................... 24 8.9.4 9 Meter (30 Foot) Fn,e Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(C) ........ - ............... 26 8.9.5 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Assessmeot ......................................................... 27 8.10 Puncture Test (10 CFR 71.73(c){3)) ...................................... m ............................................ 27 8.10.1 Puncture Test Setnp ........................... ._"' ....... _ ........................................................ 27 8.10.2 Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(A) ......................................................... 28 8.10.3 Puncturo Test Orientation, Specimen TP80(B) ......................................................... 29 8.10.4 Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(C) ......................................................... 30 8.10.5 Puncture Test Assessment ......................................................................................... 31 8.11 Second Intermediate Test Inspectfon ................................................... .-......... _ .................... 31 8.12 Thermal Test (10 CFR 71.73(cX4)) ..... _.."' ............. _. .......................................................... 31

~.12.1 Thermal Specimen Selection ..................................................................................... 31 8.12.2 Thermal Test Setup ................................................................................................... 32 8.12.3 Thermal Te61: Procedure ............................................................................................ 32 8.12.4 T h ~ Test A.ssessment .......................................................................................... 33 8.13 Final Test Inspection. ................................................................................... - ..................... 33 9.0 Worksheets ......... - ....... - ................................................................................................. - ......... 35 Appendix A: Drawing R-TPSO, Revision D

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burllngtoo, Maaachuaetls Pageffl List of Figures, Tables and Worksheets Figure 1: Side View of Model 650L Package ....................................................................... 2 Figure 2: Compression Test Setup ............................. - ......................................................... 18 Figure 3: Penetration Test Orientation.......................................... - .................................. m20 Figure 4: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen TPSO(A) ............................ 23 Figure 5: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen TPSO(B) ............................. 24 Figure 6: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Prop Orientation, Specimen TP80(C) ............................. 25 Figure 7: 9 Meter(30 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen TP80(A) ........ '" .................. 28 Figure 8: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen TP&O(B)m ........................... 29 Figure 9: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen TPSO(C) .............................. 30 Figure 10: Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO{A) ................................................... 33 Figure 11: Ptmcture Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(B) ................ ._ ................................ 34 Figure 12: Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(C) ................................................... 35 Specimen Preparation List ........................................... _ ...................................................... 40 Equipment List 1: Compression Test ................................................... ._.............................. 41 Equipment List 2: Penetration Test ...................................................................................... 44 Equipment List 3: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop ............................................... - ............... .47 Equipment List 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop .. ._ ....................... - ..................................... 50 Equipment List 5: Puncture Test ................................................................. - .................... 53 Equipment List 6: Thermal !est ........................................................................................... 56 Checklist 1: Compression Test ............................................................................................. 42 Checklist 2: Penetration Test ................................................................................................ 45 Checklist 3: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop ....................................- ... - .....- ........................ 48 ChecJclist 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop "'..............................................._,, ___ ................. 51 Checklist 5: Puncture Test ....................... '" .... - ................... _. .._ .......................................... 54 Checklist 6: Thermal Test ................................................-...... - ........................................... 57 Data Sheet 1: Compression Test .................................................... - .... ,................................ 43 Data Sheet 2: Penetrati~ Test.............................................................. _.............................. 46 Data Sheet 3: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop ................................................ _. ...................... 49 Data Sheet 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop ... - ........................ _.......................................... 52 Data Sheet 5: Puncture Test ........................... - .................................................................... .55 Data Sheet 6: Thermal Test ... - ...................................... "' ........ - .......................................... 58

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burington, Masaachl.lS8Hs Page 1 of 54 AEA Technology/QSA Test Plan 80 1.0 Introduction This document describes Type B(U) transport package testing of the SENTINEL Model 650L Source Changer, Certificate of Compliance Number 9269. The purpose of the testing is to demonstrate that the package meets the NRC requirements for Type B(U) paclcages under Normal Conditions of Transport (10 CFR 71.71), Hypothetical Accident Conditions (IO CPR 71.73), and the criteria stated in lAEA, Safety Series 6 (1985, es amended 1990).

The test plan specifies the test package configmations, testing equipment and scenarios, justifies tho paclcage orientations, and provid~ test worksheets to record key steps _in the testing sequence.

Refer to Appendix A for a drawing of the test specimen.

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, lno. March 12, 1999 Burlngton,Mauac:husetts Page 2 of 54

.. ---- 2.0 Transport Package Description The Model 650L source changer shown in Appendix A is 13 ~" high, 10" long, and 8 Y." wide in overall dimension, and has a maximum weight of90 lb. The package consists of the following components:

Source Capsule and Shield Assembly: The Special Form Source Is contained in a capsule and is attached to the source wire assembly. The source is shielded by a Yrtanimn U" tube that is enclosed in a depleted uranium (DU) shield.

Outer Casing: The shield assembly ie encased in two Carboo. Steel shells. The inner shell Is rectangular and is 0.135" thick. The outer shell is circular end is 0. 048" thick. The shells arc positioned between two, Stainless Steel, 0.135" thick top and bottom plates. The plates are secured with four 5/16-18 hex head.stainless steel through-bolts. The voids between the depleted, uranium shield and the inner and outer shells are filled with a rigid 8 pound Polyurethane foam.

Protective Li¢ Dtning transport, the locking 8$Mlbly is protected by a 0.135" thick, Carbon Steel lid Toe lid is secured to the top plate by four 3/8-16 hex head strain-hardened stainless steel bolts.

Source Locking Asseutbly: Model 6501 has two Stainless Steel locking assemblies that keep the source inside the Titanium "TY' tnbe. Bach locking assembly is secured to the top plate by four Y"""20 Stainless Steel s~s.

The 6501 package is shown below in Figure 1.

u_--1-..;1-=:~=i=i-=:;:..:~+==-~+4-.>>.----- Top Plate Titanium Tube Inner Shell Outer Shell Polyurethane Foam Bottom Plate .

Figure 1. Side View of Model 650L Package

AEA Technology Test Plan BO, Revtalon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3 of 64 3.0 Regulatory Compliance The purpose of th.is plan, which was developed In accordance with AEAT/QSA SOP-BOOS, is to ensure that the Model 650L Source Changer shown in the descriptive drawing provided In Appendix A meets the Type B(U) ~ package requirements of IO CFR 71 and IAEA Safety Serles No. 6 (1985, as amended 1990).

The Normal Conditions of Transport tests (10 CFR. 71.71) to be performed are the compression test, penetration test, and 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drop.

Water spray preconditioning of the package ls not perfonncd as the Model 650L packages are constructed of waterproof materials throughout. The water spray would not contribute to any degradation in structural integrity.

The Hypothetical Accident Tests (10 CFR 71.73) to be performed are tho 9 meter (30 foot) free drop, puncture to&, and thermal test.

The crush test (10 CPR 7I.73(c)(2)) is not performed because the radioactive contents are special-forin radioactive material.

The immersion test and all other conditions specified in IO CFR. 71 will be evaluated separately.

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'4EA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Bµrflngton,Mas&achusetts Page4 of 64

~ **- . 4.0 System Failures and Package Orientations The location of the source relative to its stored position in the shield is an important safety element Displacement of t h e ~ and/or shield :from its orfgfnal stored pooition could elevate the dose rate ai: the surface of the package above regulatory limits. Tests in this plan focus on damaging those components of

,the package which could cause displacement of the source, relative to its stored position, within the shield and which affect the integrity of the shield itself.

System failures that could affect package integrity and cause radiological dose rates to exceed the regulatory limits include:

.Oxjdation of DU Shield dming the thermal test could occur if either distortion/local buckling of the bmer and outer shells, or failure of the through-bolts dnrlng drop testing results in a large. open path to the DU shield.

Source Pull-Out from Shield could occur if there is significant relative displacement between the shield and the top cover plate penetration and locking assembly.

Three orientations are considered most likely to cause damage during the 1.2 meter and 9 meter drop tests, Le., the most lilcely to cause unacceptable extemal dose rates. *For all three orientations, the worst case temperature is the lower limit of -40°C due to embrittlement of the DU and Carbon Steel' components.

Case I. Horizontal, Long-Side Down: The DU shield could move through the foam during impact, which could result in source pullout from titanium tubes. Also, due to the low testing temperature, brittle failure of the inner end outer 5hells could occur. The fiillure(s) may be sufficient to open a significant path to the depleted uranium shield during thermal test end cause burning of the DU shield. The Long-Side Down orientation is selected because the long side of the pe.ckage has a stiffer comiguration than the short side, which will result in a shorter deceleration end a higher impact load.

Case 2, Vertical, Upside Down: Deformation of the lid weldment, croshing of the foam between the depleted uranium shield end top plate, defoxmation (bowing upward) of the top plate due to the bnpact load of the DU shield applied through titanium source tubes and foam, failure of the through-bolts, and failure of the locking assembly could occur.

When the package ls tmned upright for the thermal test, the DU shield and its integral titanium tubes could drop down to their original positions while the source is pulled out of the tubes by the bowed top plate or failed locking assembly. Also, a lead shim (which will melt during thermal testing) tmder the DU shield could cause additional source pullout.

Case 3, Vertical, Top Comer Down: Failure oflid or lid closure bolts could expose the locking assembly to dam.age during the puncture bar test Failme of the Jocking assembly could result in source pullout. Additionally, this orientation will load the through-bolts in tension, and could cause them to fall.

The following orientations ere planned for the puncture tests. These orientations will be modified, if necessary, based on the results of the engineering assessments conducted afte.r the 9 meter drop tests. The puncture test orientations will be selected to maximize damage to the test specimens.

Case 1, Horizontal Long-Sjde Down: This orientation is the same as for the Case 1, 12 meter and 9 meter drop tests.

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revblon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 BU111ngton, Mwachusetts Page5of 54

Case 2, Underside of Top Plate at Lid Bolt The top plate could be pried up, and. es a minimmn, load the through-bolts in tension. The impact on the lid bolt rivnut could damage the lid bolt connection.

Cpse 3, Bottom of Package: Impact on the four Stainless Steel rivnuts could damage the through-bolt connection. If the lid is removed during the Case 3 9 meter drop, the test specimen will be dropped upside down such that the lock assemblies strike tho puncture bar.

Tho limiting orientation for the penetration bar test is discussed in Section 8.6.2.

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12. 1999 Burlington. Massachusetts Page 6of 54 5.0 Assessment of Package Conformance The Model 650L Source Changer must meet the Type B(U) transport package requirements of 10 CFR 71.

Tho conformance criteria are detailed in the following. two sections.

5.1 Regulatory Requirements

Normal Conditions of Transport Tests (]l.43Cf)): There should be no loss or dispersal of radioactive contents. no significant increase in external surface radiation levels and no substantial reduction in the effectiveness of the pa~~g.

Hypothetical Accident Conditions {71,5l{a){2)}: There should be no escape of radioactive materials greater than A 2 in one week and no external dose rate greater than 1 R/br at 1 moter from the external surface when tho package contains its maximwn design radioactive contents.

5.2 Test Paqkage Contents The Model 650L is designed to carry Special Form Sources. Containment of the radioactive source is tested at manufacture. The source capsules haw been certified by the Competent Authority in accordance with the performmice requirements for Special Form as specified in IO CFR Part 71 and 49 CFR The test plan therefore does not dlscuss/specify tests of the containment of the radioactive source. The purpose of the tests is to demorurtrate that the shielding remains effective within the limits specified by the regulations, end that the sonn:o capsule remains contained within the source changer.

A simulated source will be used during testing of the p a ~ The radiation levels after the test will be monitored by replacing the simulated sonrce with an active source.

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 OSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burington, Massachusetts Page7of 54 6.0 Construction and Condition of Test Specimens The Test Plan 80 (TP 80) test specimens will be Model 650L units constructed in accordance with AEAT/QSA Drawing R-TP80, Revision D.

Drawing TP650L specifies the Model 650L package in its worst case transport conditions, whlch vary depending on the Test Caso. Load shielding ple.cement shou41 be as described below:

Test Case Lead Shielding Placement Ratlonale I-Horizontal, No lead between DU shield and long Lead between DU and shell or through-bolts

' Long-Side side of inn.er shell. might stop DU from travelling through foam Down dtning drop impact.

I Specimen TP80(A) t

'2,-Vertical, Thickest Lead under DU shield, use Lead under DU may melt during thermal test Upside Down heavy package. and could allow DU to settle, which could

' allow source pnllout. Impact force will be

, Specimen larger for heavier packages, which would result Tf80(B) in larger top plate deflection.

3-Top Any location, use heavy package. Lead placement will not affect lid failure, and Corner Down inipact force will be larger for heavier packages.

Specimen TPSO(C)

For all Drop Test Cases the temperature of the specimen must be below -40°C at the time of each test, a minimwn temperature required by IAEA, Safety Series 6 (1985, as amended: 1990). The low temperature represents the worst-case condition for the packBge because of tho potential for brittle fracture of the shield and Carbon Steel Hd.

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, ReVlslon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 BurUngtan, Meaaachusetts Page B of 54 7.0 Material and Equipment List The equipment checklists, test worksheets. and data sheets in Section 9.0 list the key materials and equipment specified in 10 CFR 71 and the necessary measurement ins1rmnenm.

When video recording is specified, ~lect video cameras with the highest shutter speed practical to record testing.

Additional materials and equipment may be used to facilitate the tests.

AEA Technology Test Plan 60, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burflngtoo, Massachusetts Page8of 54 8.0 Test Procedure Three specimens are to be tested to detennine the transport*lntegrity ofthe package. The testing sequence is shown *below:

I. Test specimen preparation and impection 2 Compression test (10 CPR 7I.71(c)(9))

3. Penetration test (10 CFR 71.7l(c)(IO))

4. 1.2 Meter (4 foot) free drop test (IO CPR 71. 7l(c)(7))

5. First intermediate test inspection

6. 9 Meter (30 foot) free drop tost (10 CPR 71.73(cXI))

7. Puncture test (10 CFR 7I.73(c){3))

8. Second intermediate test inspection

9. The.nnal test(IO CFR 7I.73(c)(4)) (If applicable, see Section 8.12.1)

10. Final test inspection Each specimen must be put through the entire test sequence, mtless the thermal test is considered unnecessary based on the test specimen conditicm after the puflcture test and the assessment by Engineering, Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affain;, If test conditions such as the orientation at impact are not met during the test of a particular specimen, it may be replaced with. a specimen of equivalent construction. The replacement must go through the entire test sequence.

8.1 Roles and *ResponslbUities The responsibilities of the groups Identified In this plan are:

Engineering executes the tests according to the test plan and summarizes the test results.

Engineering also provides technical input to assist Regulatory Affairs and Quality Assurance as needed.

Regulatory Affairs monitors the tests and reviews test reports for compliance with regulatozy requirements.

Quality Assurance oversees test execution and test report generation to ensure compliance with AEAT/QSA Quality Assurance Program.

Engineering, Regulatory Affairs, and Quality Assurance are jointly responsible for assessing test and specimen conditions relative to 10 CFR 71.

Quality Control, a function that reports directly to Quality Assurance, is responsible for measuring and recording test and specimen data throughout the test cycle.

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( I AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1899 Bur11ngton 1 Massachusetts Page 10 of 54 8.2 Specimen Temperature Measurement The penetration, drop, and puncture tests are to be carried out while the package is at or below -40"C.

Temperature measurements will be made by positioning thermocouples on the package surface and the shield (inside the somce tube).

8.3 Test Specimen Preparation and Inspection Refer to tho Specimen Preparation Lisi ln Section 9.0 to ensure that test sequence is followed. Sign and date the list when completed.

To prepare the test nnits:

1. Inspect the test units to ensure that they comply with the requirements of Drawing R-TPSO, Revision D.

2. Weigh the test package, including the lid.

3. Pecform and record the radiation profile in accordance with AEAT/QSA Work Instruction WI-Q09.

4. Quality Control, Engineering, Regulatory Affairs, and Qnallty Assurance will jointly verify that the test specimens comply with Drawing R-TP80, Revision D, and the AEAT/QSA Quality Asst.mm.cc Program.

5. Measure and record the location of the simulated source.

6. Place thermocouples on package surface and inside one of the source tubes.

7. Prepare the package for transport

8. Clearly and Indelibly mark the units with identification.

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burington, MB888Chusetts Page 11 of 54 8.4 Summary of Test Schedule Test Paragraph Specimen Diagram Compression 71.71(c)(9) ALL Penetration 71.71(c)(10) ALL ltoputP-obaw Cenllr of OfHfY

. - 1.*. . : . : .. : .*: *: .. . * * . . :. *.* ~

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AEA Technology TMt Plan BO, Revision 1 QSA, Ina. March 12, 1999 Burllngton, Massachusetts *Page 12 of 64 Test Paragraph Specimen Diagram 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) 71.71(c)(7) TPBO(A)

Free Drop. Case 1, Horizontal, Long Sida Down

-~....

1.2 Meter(4 Foot) 71.71(0)(7) TPSO(B)

Free Drop, Case 2, Vertical, Upside Down

-*Tl<Ja 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) 71.71(c)(7) TP80(C)

Free Drop, Case 3, Top Comer Down

.... ,1"111:1

......... .c

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Rsvlslon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burtlngton, Massachusetta Paga 13 of 54 Test Paragraph Specimen Diagram 9 Meter (30 Foot) 7I.73(cXI) TP80(A)

Free Drop, Case 1, Horizontal, Loog Side Down

A,....,

9 Meter (30 Foot)

Free Drop, Case 2, Vertical, Upside Down 71.73(cXI) TP80(B)

"'-9-TIIN:l 9 Meter (30 Foot) 71.73(cXt) TPSO(C)

Free Drop, Caso 3, Top Com.er Down

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, lno. March 12, 1999 Burli!Qf.on, Maaaachusetts Page 14 of 54 Test Paragraph Specimen Diagram Puncture, Case 1, 7I.73(c)(3) TP80(A)

Horizontal,Long Side Down Puncture, Case 2, 71.73(c)(3) TP80(B)

Underneath Comer of Top PJati)

Pnnctmc, Case 3, 71.73(c)(3) TP80(C)

Vertical Upright Thermal 71.73(c)(4) AU. Requirement for thermal test to be determined for each unit following completion of drop and puncture tests.

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Bwtlngton I Massachusetts Page 15 of 54 8.5 Compression Test (10 CFR 71.71{c)(9))

The first test is the compression test, per IO CFR 71.71(cX9), in which lhe package is placed tmder a load of 455 pounds which is greater than five times the maximum package weight and greater than 2 Ibffm2 multiplied by the vertically projected area:

5 X 90 !bf= 450 lbf 8 ~" wide x IO" long x 2 lbfTml = 165 lbf Refer to Equipment List 1 for information about required tools. Use Checklist 1 to ensure that the test sequence ls followed. Use Data Sheet 1 to record testing results. Sign and date all action items and record required data on the appropriate worksheets.

8.5.1 Compression Test Setup To prepare a specimen for the compression toot

1. Review the setup shown in Figure 2.

2. Place the specimen on e concrete surface oriented in its nonnal, upright transport position.

3. Gradually'place 455 to 465 pounds uniformly distributed onto the specimen as shown in Figw'e 2.

4. Test specimen in acconumce with Checklist 1.

455 lo 485 U,.

Figure l. Compression Test Setup

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burllngton, Massachusetts Paga 16of 54 8.5.2 Compression Test Assessment Upon completion of the test, Engineering, Regulatory Afta.lrs, and Qoallty Assurance team memben will jointly talce the following actions:

1. Review the test execution to emure that the test was performed in accordance with IO CFR 71.

2. Make a preliminary evaluation of the specimen relative to the requirements of IO CFR 71.

3. Assess the damage to the specimen to decide whether testing of that specimen is to continue.

4. Evaluate the condition of the specimen to determine if changes are necessary in the package <.>rientation for the penetration test to achieve maximmn damage.

8.6 Penetration Test (10 CFR 71.71(c)(10))

The compression test is followed by the penetration test, per 10 CFR 71.71(c}{10), in which a penetration bar ls dropped from a height of at least 40 inches to impact a specified point on the package. The bar is dropped through free air.

Refer to Equipment List 2 for Information about required tools. Use Checklut 2 to ensure that the test sequence is followed. Use Data Sheet 2 to record testing results. Sign BI1d date all action items and record required data on tho appropriate worksheets.

8.6.1 Penetration Test Setup This test requires that the test specimen be at -40°C or below at the time of the penetration bar release. The worksheet calls for measuring and recording the specimen temperature before and after the test.

To set up a package for the penetration test

l. Place the specimen on the drop surface (Drawing AT10122, Revision B) end position it according to the orientation described in the next section. Use shims to position the pa,ckage, if necessary.

2. Position the penetration bar shown in Drawing BT10129, Revision B, directly above thQ specified point of Impact, and raJse the bar 40 to 42 inches above the target

3. Measure the specimen's internal and smface temperature to ensure that the package is at the required temperature.

4. Test specimen in accordance with CheclcJist 2.

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I AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Bur!ngton, Massachuaetfs Page 17 of 54 8.6.2 Penetration Test Orientation The 650L package ls placed harizontally, long side down on the drop surface specified in ~wing AT10122. Revision B. The orientation of the package is shown in Figme 3. The desired impact point is on the long side of the outer shell, directly above the center of gravity of the package, to try to penetrate the shells.

Other orientations for this specimen were considered including ~ normal transport position. In the normal transport oricntatloo, the lock assembo/ is protected by the 0.135" thick steel outer lid.

The penetration bar dropped from four feet would OBDSe cmly minor damage to the outer lid.

Penetration Bar - - ~

Im pact Point above Center of Gravity 40 ~5 Inches

____ _J_

I Test

~- I

_-( r I I Specimen J;[~~-1 1:1-- I -

--, r J- I

,- I rop Surface Dwg #T10122 44 . 4* .*

4 . * <t

..... " . ~* ..

Fignre 3. Penetration Test Orientation

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Massachusetl$ Page 18of 64 8.6.3 Penetration Test Assessment Upon completion of the test, Engineering. Regulatory At!afrs, and Qualtty Assurance temµ members will jointly mkc the fullowing'actions:

1. Review the test execution to ensure that the test was performed in accordance with IOCFR 71.

2. Make a preliminary evaluation of the specimen relative to the requirements of JO CFR 71.

3. Assess the damage to the spechnen to decide whether testing of that specimen is to continue.

4. Evaluate the condition ofthe specimen to determine if changes arc necessary fn the package orientation for the 12 meter (4 foot) free drop test to achieve maximum damage.

8.7 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test (10 CFR 71.71(c)(7))

Toe final Norm.al Transport Conditions test is the 1.2 meter (4 foot) free drop as descn"bed in 10 CFR 71.71(c)(7). The drop compounds any damage caused in the first two tests. Upon completion of this step, the first intermediate test inspections will be performed.

Refer to Equipment List 3 for infonnation about required tools. Use Checklist 3 to ensure that the test sequence is followed. Use Data Sheet 3 to record testing results. Sign and date all action items and record required data on the appropriate worksheets.

8;7.1 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Setup

1n this test, the package is released from a height of four feet and lands on the steel drop surface specified in Drawing AT10122, Revision B.

This test requires that all test specimen be at -40°C or below at the time of hnpact. Follow the instructions in the appropriate cbecldist for measuring and recording the test specimen temperature before and after the drop.

To set up a package for the 12 meter (4 foot) free drop test

1. Use the drop smface specified in Drawing AT10122, Rev. B.

2. Measure and record the test specimen temperature to ensure that the package is at the specified temperature.

3. Place the specimen on the drop stnface and position it according to the appropriate orientation:

Refer to Figure 4 for the Specimen TP80(A) package orientation

Refer to Figure 5 for the Specimen TPSO(B) package orientation

Refer to Figure 6 for the Specimen TPSO(C) package orientation

4. Align the selected center-of--gravity as shown in the referenced drawing.

r -

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revlslon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burtlngton 1 Massactpsetts Page 19of 54

5. Raise the package so that the impact target is 4.0 to 4.5 feet above the drop surface.

6. Test specimen in accordance with Checldut 3.

8.7.2 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(A)

The impact surface of Specimen 1P80(A) ls horizontal, long-side down.

Center of Gravity Impact Surface 4 :,: 112 Feet

- 0 Drop Surface Dwg #T10122

"' 4 ... ..

Figure 4. 12 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Orientation. Specimen TP80(A)

ASA Technology Test Plan BO, Ravlalon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burllngton,Massachuselts Page20of 54

8. 7.3 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(B)

The impact surface for Spechnen TPSO(B) is vertical, upside down.

Test Specimen Center of Gravlly Impact Surface Drop Surface OWg #T10122 Figure 5. 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen TPSO(B)

AEA Tectmology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burllngton,Masaachusetts Page 21 of 54 8.7A 1.2 Meter (4 foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(C)

Tue impact surface for Specimen TP80(C) is the top (lid) comer.

rest Spoolmen 4 + 1/2. Feat D rap S\.lrfac& - 0 Dwt1 # T10122 A

Figure 6. 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specbnen TPSO(C)

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burtlngto'!i Massachusetts Page22of M 8.7.5 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Assessment Upon completion of tho test, Engineering, Regulatory Affairs, and Quality Assurance temp members will jointly perform tho following tasks:

1. Review the test execution to ensure that the test was performed in accordance with 10 CFR 71.71.

2. Make a preliminary evaluation of the specimen relative to tho requirements of 10 CFR 71.71.

3. Assess the damage to the specimen to decide whether testing of that specimen is to continue.

4. Evaluate the condition of the specimen to determine if changes are necessary in packago orientation for the 9 meter (30 foot) free drop to achieve maximum damage.

5. Measure and record any damage to the test specimen.

6. Measure and record a radiation profile of the test specimen in accordance with.

AEAT/QSA Work Instruction WI-Q09.

8.8 First Intermediate Test Inspection

Ell2,loeerlng, Regulatory Affalrs, and Qnallty Assurance team members will make an assessment of the test specimen and jointly determine whether the specimen m~ts the requirements of 10 CFR 71.71.

8.9 9 Meter (30 Foot).Free Drop Test(10 CFR 71.73(c)(1))

The first Hypothetical Accident Conditions test is the 9 meter (30 foot) free drop as described in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(l). This drop uses the same orientations as the 12 meter (4 foot) free drop and compounds any damage caused in that test Refer to Equipment List 4 for information about required tools. Use ChecJ:list 4 to ensure that the test sequence is followed. Use Data Sheet 4 to record testing results. Sign and date all action items and record required data on the appropriate worksheets.

8.9.1 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Setup In this test, the package is released from a height of thirty feet end lands on the steel drop surface specified in Drawing AT10122, Revision B.

This test requires that the test specimen be et -40°C or below et the time of impact Follow the instructions in the appropriate checklist for measuring and recording the test specimen temperature before and after the drop.

To set up a package for the 9 meter (30 foot) free drop test I. Use the drop swfaco specified in Drawing AT10122, Rev. B.

2. Measure and record the test specimen tempeiature to ensure that the package is et the specified temperature.

i AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 CSA, Inc. Marcil 12, 1999 Bw1nmon, Massachusetts Page23of M

3. Place the specimen on the drop surface and positio.i;1 it according to the appropriate orientation;

Refer~ Figure 7 for ihe Specimen TP80(A) package orientation

Refer to F'igure 8 for the Specimen TP80(B) pacbge orientation

Refer to Figure 9 fur the Specimen TP80{C) package orientation

4. Align the selected center-of-gravity marker as shown in the referenced drawing.

5. Raise the package so that the impact target is 30 to 31 feet above the drop swface.

6. Test the spechnen in accordance with Checklist 4.

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AfA Technology Test Plan BO, Rev!slan 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Massachusetts Page24of 54 8.9.2 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, TPBO(A)

The impact surface fur Specimen TP80(A) is horizontal, long-side down. This orientation is. the same as the orientation for the 12 meter (4 foot) drop for Specimen TP80(A).

Center of Gravity Teat Impact Surface 30 _ 6Feet Drop Surface Dwg # T10122.

4 **

.~ ... . "' . q. A

. 4 *...

4* .., . .,

FJgore 7. 9 Meter(30 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen 'IPSO(A)

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AEA Techno\ogy Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Messechusetls Page25of 54 8.9.3 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO{B)

The impact surface for Specimen TPSO(B) is vertical, upside down. This orientation ls the same as the orientation for the 12 meter (4 foot) drop for Specbnen TP80(B).

Tlllit Specimen Center of Gravity Impact Sudace 1

30+* D Fee Drop8wfa:e Dwg#T10122

."1

... A** -.*.,

Figure 8. 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Spechnen 1P80(B)

~ Technoklgy Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12. 1999 BurUnpton. Mas&adlusetts Page26of 54 8.9.4 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(C)

The impact surface for Specimen TP80(C) is the top (lid) comer. This orientation is the same as the orientHtion for the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop for Specimen TP80(C).

1 30~ Fm Drop 8ulface Dwg #T10122

... . .. .......... . d Figure 9. 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Orientation, Specimen TP80(C)

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AEA Technology Test Plan BO, Revl&Jon 1 QSA, Inc. Marcil 12, 1999 Burflngton, Massachusetbs Page27 of 54 8.9.5 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Test Assessment Upon completion of the test. Engineering, Regnlatory Affairs, and Quality Assurance team members will jointly perform the following tasks:

I. Review 'the test execution to ensure that the test was performed in accordance with 10 CFR 71.73, and in accordance with the impact orientation and other conditions specified in this plan.

2. Make a preliminary evaluation of the specimen relative to the requirements of 10 CFR 71.73.

3. Perform an assessment to determine if any change in puncture test orientation is necessary in order to IIUStain inaximmh specimen damage during the Punctme Test, and documllllt 8.10 Puncture Test (10 CFR 71.73(c)(3))

The 9 meter (30 foot) free drop is followed by the puncture test, per 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3), In which the pacJrngc is dropped from a height of at least 40 inches onto the puncture billet specified in the Drawing CTlOl 19, Revision C.

The billet Is to be bolted to the drop surface used in the free drop rem. The 12-inch high ptmotnre billet meets the minimum height (8 inches) required in 10 CPR 71.73(0)(3). The specimen bas no projections or ovemanging members longer than 8 Inches, which could act as hnpact absorbers, thus allowing the billet to cause the maximum damage to_ the specimen.

Refer to Equipment List 5 for fnfoonation about required tools. Use Checklist 5 to ensure that the test sequence ls followed. Use Data Sheet 5 to record testing results. Sign and date all action items and record required data on the appropriate worksheets.

This test requires that the test specimen be at -40"C or below at the ti.me of impact Follow the instructions in the appropriate checklist for measuring and recording the test specimen temperature before and after the drop.

8.10.1 Puncture Test Setup To set up a test specimen for the puncture test

1. Measure and record the test specimen temperature to ensure that the package is at the specified temperature.

2. Place the specimen on the drop surface and position It according to the appropriate orientation (unless the 9 meter Test Assessment selects different orientations):

Refer to Flgme 10 for the Specimen 1P80(A) package orientation

Refer to Figure 11 for the Specimen TP80(B) package orientation

Refer to Figure 12 for the Specimen TP80{C) package orientation

3. Check: the alignment of the specified center-of-gravity marker with the targeted point of impact

AEA Technology Teat Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA. lno. March 12. 1999 Burlington, ft¥6sachusetls Page 28of 54

4. Raise the package so that there are 40 to 42 inches between the package and the top of the puncture billet.

5. Test the specimen in accordance with Checklist 5.

8.10.2 Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(A)

Tho impact surface for Specimen TP80(A) is the horizontal. long-side of the outer shell Test Specimen.

lmpaotsurt.ce on Skkl l 40 '!" Slnchec.

Puncture Bllet Attachm ant Bob (4)

" 4

A.

A* ...

Fignre 10. Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TP80(A)

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AEA Technology Teet Plan ao, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burtlngtgn, Massachl.lS8tts Paqe29 of 54 8.10.3 Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(B)

The impact surface for Specimen TPSO{B) is the underside of the top plate. The puncture bar should impact the comer of the plate on the lid bolt

. Impact 8 urface on Comer Ud Boll 40 21nohee

- 0 Puncture Bll!lt Allachm1nt Bolla (4)

Figure 11. Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPSO(B)

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burllngton, Maasacl]usetts Page30of 64 8.10.4 Puncture Test Orientation, Specimen TPBO(C)

The impact surface for*Specimen TP80(C) Is the bottom of the package.

Lift Cable Attachment Tut Spaclmen I

\

\.-- ---('

I

Canter of C3 ravlty.

Impact Surface I 40 : N1n11hea Pun otura Bmet Attachment Bolls (4)

Drop Surface Owg # T10122 Figure 12. Puncture Test Orientation, Spechnen TP80(C)

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AEA Technology Test Pfan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 31 of 54

.- -- .. 8.10.5 Puncture Test Assessment Upon completion of the test. Eogioeerlog, Regulatory Affairs, and Quality Assurance team members will jointly perform the following tasks:

1. Review the test execution to ensure that the test was pmormed in accordance with 10 CFR 71.73, and ln accordance with any other conditions specified in this plan.

2. Make a preliminary evaluation of the specimen relative to the requirements of 10 CPR 71.73.

3. Assess the damage to the specimen to decide whether testing of the specimen is to continue.

8.11 Second Intermediate Test Inspection Perfonn a second intermediate test inspection of all specimens after the puncture test and before the thermal test.

1. Measure and record any damage to the test specimen.

2. Determjne and record the location of the source.

3. Remove and assess the condition of the simulated source.

4. Reassemble the package using an active source, making sure that the source wire position and the package configuration ere the same as they were immediately after the puncture test.

5. Measure and record a radiation. profile of the test specimen in accordance with AEAT/QSA Work Instmction WI-Q09.

6. Reassemble fur., package using the same simulated source used in the spt!Cimen during the previous tests.

7. Make sure that the source wire position and the package confignratio.n are the same as they were immediately after the puncture test

8. Weigh package.

8.12 Thermal Test (10 CFR 71.73(c)(4))

The final requirement is the thermal test specified in 10 CPR 71.73(cX4).

Refer to Equipment List 6 for Information about required tools. Use Checklist 6 to ensure that the test sequence is followed. Use Data Sheet 6 to record testing results. Sign and date all action items and record required data on the appropriate worksheets.

8.12.1 Test Specimen Selection The specimen(s) selected for thermal testing will be based on en assessment of the damage sustained by the packages following the puncture test The selected packagr., testing orientation will also be determined based on an assessment of the test specimen condition. As a minimum requirement, the vertical, upside down drop orientation (TP80(B)) will be tested in a vertical, right

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AEA Technology Teat Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burl!ngtof1 Massachusetts Page 32 of 54 side up orientation for the thcnnal test The TP80(B) specimen is most likely to have the source pull out from its shielded position due to deflection of the top plate during the drop tests and melting of lead shielding/shims below the DU shield during the thermal test 8.12.2 Thermal Test Setup To ensure sufficient heat Input to the test specimens, the oven will be pre-heated to a temperature of not less than SlO"C. This temperature, above the required 800°C, includes an allowance for measurement tmcertainty.

The test environment is a vented electric oven capable of creating a time weighted average temperature of S00°C.

Thermocouples will be attached to the specimen top, bottom, and 2 side surfaces. The 2 side surface thermocouples will be positioned 180" apart, facing the front and back of1he oven. A fifth thermocouple will be inserted into one of the soorce tubes to measure source changer internal tcmperature. The external thermocouples will be shieldod from the radiant heat of the oven so that the surface temperature of the source changer can be accurately measured.

When the oven bas been pre-heated to 810°C, the package will be placed in the oven in the orientation determined to be worst case, per Section 8.10.2. When the temperature of the source changer surface has risen to no less than 810°C, the test will start The package will remain in the oven for a period of 3 Ominutes after the start of the test To allow for combustion of the foam daring the thermal test, the oven door will remain slightly open. It has been determined that a gap of one inch at the top and bottom of the oven door allows airflow into the oven and allows the oven to maintain its temperature. The oven door is 36 inches long.. As a result, there wlil be about a 36 square inch opening at both the top and bottom of the furnace door. This allows for the nataml convection of air into the furnace.

If the specimen is burning when the oven is opened, the unit will be allowed to extinguish by itself and then cool naturally. Although solar radiation assumed during a hypothetical accident could reduce the rate of package cooldown, such a reduction in cooldown rate is considered to have a negligible effect on the package compared with the 30 minutes of exposure to 8100C. This test plan, therefore, does not require insoletion effects to be explicitly modeled during package cooldown. Appropriate measures should be taken to avoid the radiological risks associated with this potential hazard. The final evaluation of the package is perijmned when the specimen reaches ambient temperature.

8.12.3 Thermal Test Procedure To perform the thermal test I. Attach the thermocouples to the test specimen's measurement locations.

2. Preheat the oven temperature to not less than 8IOOC.

3. When the oven temperature is stable at above 8100C, place the specimen in the oven.

and partially close the door.

4. When the temperature of the surface of the specimen rises above 810°C, start the 30-minute time interval.

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Bwington 1 Massachusetts Page 33 of 64

5. Throughout the test. measure and record the oven and the test specimen temperatures.

6. At the end of the 30 minute time interval, open the oven door and shut riff the oven.

WARNING; ff the package Is barning, appropriate safety measures must be in place to avoid the risks associated with burnfn& polyurethane foam and/or depleted nranlum. Consult with the oven operator and other appropriate penonneL

7. Allow the package to self-extinguish and cool

8. Record any damage to the package and make a photographic and radiographic record of shield position and damage.

8.12.4 Thermal Test Assessment Upon completion oftbe test, Engineering, Regulatory AfJafrs, end Quality Assurance team members will jointly perform the following task I. Review the test execution to ensure that the test was performed in accordance with IO CFR 71. 73 end the test conditions specified in this plan.

2. Make a prelhninary evaluation of the specimen relative to the requirements of 10 CPR 71.73.

8.13 Final Test Inspection Perform the following inspections after completion of all the required testing:

I. Measure and record any damage to the test specimen.

2. Determine and record the location of the source.

3. Remove and assess the condition of the simulated source.

4. Reassemble the package using an active source, making sure that the source wire position and the package configuration are the same as they were hmnedlately after the thermal test *

5. Measure and record a radiation profile of the test specimen in accordance with AEAT/QSA Work: Instruction WI-Q09.

6. Document and assess the radiation level at one meter from the surface of the package.

7. Determine whether it is necessary to dismantle the test specimen for Inspection of hidden component damage or failure.

8. If proceeding with the inspection., record and photograph the process of removing any component

9. Measure and record any damage or failure found in the process of dismantling the test specimen.

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. . March 12, 1999

.Burington, Massachusetts. . Page 34of 54 Eogfneerfn~ Regulatory Affairs, and Qnallty Assaraoce team members will make a final assessment of

~ test specimen and jointly determine whether the specimen meets the testing requirements of 10 CFR 71.

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, ReYlslon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlington, !',4aseachU8etlls Page 35 of 54 9.0 Worksheets Use the.following worlcshects for executing these tests. Thete arc three worksheets for each test: an equipment list, a test procedure checklist, and a data sheet.

Use the test equipment list to record the serial number of each measurement device used. Attach a copy of the relevant Inspection report or calibration certificate after verifying the range of accuracy of the equipment.

Quallty Control will initial each step on the checklist as it is executed and record data as required. The Eogfoeering, Regulatory Affairs, and Quality AJsurancc representatives must witness all testing to ensure the testing is perfonned In accordance with this test plan and IO CFR 71.

Make copies of the forms for additional attempts. Maintain records of all attempts.

AEA Technology Test P1ari 80, Revision 1 0SA. Inc. March 12, 1ggg Eklrllngton. Massachufftts Page 36 of 54 Specimen Preparation Ust Step TP80(A) TP80(B) TP80(C)

1. Serial Number:

2. Total weight of package (lb):

3. Location of simulated source from top plate (in):

4. Location of lead shielding:

5. AU fabrication an4 inspection records documented in accordance with the AEA T QA Program?

6. Does the unit comply with the requirements of Drawing R-TP80, RcvJslon D7

7. Has the radiation prQfile been ~ In accordance with AEAT QSA Work Instruments Wl-Q09?

8. ls the package prepared for tramport'J Verified by: Prin~Name: Signature: Date:

Engineering 8.e2olatoryr Affairs Quality Assurance

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 6urllngton. Massachusetts Page37of 54 Equipment List 1: Compression Test Attach Inspection Enter the Model and Serial Report or Description Number Calibration Certificate Weight Scale Record any additional tools used to facilitate the test and attach the appropriate inspection report or calibration certificate.

PrintName: Signature: Date:.

Completed by:

Verified by:

AEA Technology Teat Plan 80, Revlslon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12. 1999 .

Burlington, Massachusetts Paga 38 Of 54 I

.--- Checklist 1: Compression Test Step TP80(A) TPSO(B) TP80(C)

I. Position the. specimen on c:oocrete surface. per the appropriate drawing. Figme2 Figure2 Figure 2

2. Measure the ambient temperature.

Note the instrument used:

3. Apply a uniformly distributed weight of 45S to 465 pounds on the top of the lid for a period of24 hours.

Record the actual weight Note the Instrument med:

Record start time and date:

4. After 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , remove the weight. .

Record end time and date:

s. Measure the ambient temperature.

Note the Instrument used:

6. Photograph the test specimen and record any damage on Data Sheet I.

7. Eo~eertng, Regalatory Afl'aln and Quality Asmrance make a preliminary assessment relative to 10CFR 71. Record the assessment on Data Sheet 1.

Determine what changes are necessary in package orientation for lhe penetration test to achieve maxbnmn damage.

Verified by: Print Name: Signature: Date:

Englaeerfng Rqulatory Affairs Quality Assurance

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Bwlnpton, Massachusetts Page39 of 54 Data Sheet 1: Compression Test Test Unit Model and Serial Number: Test Specimen:

Test Date: j TestTime: Test~lan 80 Step No.: 8.5 Describe test orientation and setup:

Describe on-site inspection (damage, broken parts, etc.):

On-site assessment P.nginecring; Regulatory: QA; Describe any post-test disassembly and inspection:

Describe any change fn smrrce position:

Describe results of any pre- or post-test radiography:

Completed by: Date:

MEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revlslon 1 QSA, lno. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Massachusetts Page40of 54 Equipment List 2: Penetration Test F.ntm- tho Model end Serial Attach Inspection Report or ..

Description Number Calibration Certificate Penetration Bar Drawing BT10129, Rev. B Drop Snrface Drawing AT10122, Rev. B Thermometer Thermocouple Thermocouple Record any additional tools used to fa.oilltate the test and attach the appropriate inspection report or calibration certificate.

. Print Name: Signature: Date:

Completed by:

Verified by:

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Massachusetts Page41 of M Checkllst 2: Penetration Test Step TP80(A) TP80(B) TP80{C)_

I. Immerse the test spechnen in dry ice or cool in frcm:er as needed to bring specimen temperature below -40°C.

2 Position the package as shown in the mferenced figure, or by Step 7, Checklist 1. Figure 3 Flglll'e 3 F!gure3

3. Begin video recording of the test.

4. Inspect the orientation setup and verify the bar height

5. Photograph the set-up in at least two perpendicular planes.

6. Measure the ambient temperature and the specimen's internal and surface temperatures. Ensure 1hat the specimen is at the specified temperature.

Record the ambient temperature:

Note the instrument used:

Record the specimen's internal temperature:

Note the instrument used:

Record the specimen's surface temperature:

Note the instrument used:

7. Drop the penetration bar.

8. Check to ensure that penetration bar hit the specified area.

9. Measure the specimen's surface temp. &sure that specimen is et' specified temp.

Note the instrument used:

10. Photograph the test specimen and record any damage on Data Sheet 2.

11. Engineering, Regulatory Affairs aoo Quality Assunmce make a preliminary assessment relative to 10 CFR 71. Record the assessment on Date Sheet 2.

Determine what changes are necessa:ry in package orientation fur the 12 meter (4 foot) free drop to achieve maximmn damage.

Verified by: Print Name: Signature: Date:

Engineering Regulatory Affairs Qnality AB1IJ'ance

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AEA Technology. Test Plan 80, Revfsfon 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burington. Massachusetts Page42of 54 Data Sheet 2: Penetration Test*

Test Unit Model and Serial Number: Test Specimen:

Test Date: J TestThne: Test Plan 80 Step No.: 8.6 Describe test orientation and setup:

Describe impact (location. rotation. etc.):

Describe on-site inspection (damage, broken parts, etc.):

On"'8ite assessnµm.t Englneetlng: Regulatory: QA:

Describe any post-test disassembly and inspoction:

Doscribo any cltango in source position:

Describe results of any pre- or post-test radiography; Completed by: Date:

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Bw11ngton. Massschusatts Page43of 54 Equipment List 3: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Enter the Model and Serial Attach Inspection ..

Description Nmnber Report or Calibration Certificate Drop Surface DrawingAT10122, Rev. B Thermometer Thermocouple Thermocouple Record any additional tools used to th.cillta1e the test and attach the appropriate Inspection report or calibration certificate.

~

PrlntName: Signature: Date:

Completed by:

Verltled by:

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12., 1999 Burlington. Massachusetts Page44of 64 Checkllst 3: 1.2 Mater (4 Foot) Free Drop Step TP80{A) TP80(B) TPBO{G)

1. Immerse specimen in dry ice or cool in freezer to bring specimen below -40°C.

2. Measure the ambient temperature.

Note the insttument used:

3. Attach the test specimen to the release mechanism.

4. Begin video recording of the test.

5. M ~ specimen internal and surface temps. Enmre specimen is at specified temp.

Record the specimen's internal temperature:

Note the instmm.ent used:

Record the specimen's surface temperatme:

Note the instrument used:

6. Lift and orient the test specimen as shown in the specified referenced figure. Figure4 Figme5 Figure 6

7. Inspect the orientation setup and verify drop height

8. Photograph the set-up in at least two perpendicular planes.

9. Release the test specimen.

10. Measure specimen intmna1 and ~ temps. Ensme specimen is at specified temp.

Record the specimen's internal temperature:

Note the instrument used:

Record the specimen's surface temperatme:

Note the instrument used: \

11. Photograph the test specimen and record any damage on Data Sheet 3.

12. Measure and record a radiation profile of the test spechnen in accordance with AEAT/QSA Work Instruction WI-Q.09.

13. Engineering, Regulatory Affairs and Quality Assurance make a preliminmy asscssmcint relative to 10 CPR 71, and record on Data Sheet 3. Determine package orientation for the 9 meter free drop to achieve maximum damage.

Verified by: Print Name: Signature: Date:

Bnglneerlng R~latory Affairs Quality Assurance

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AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burtilgton, Massachusetts Page46of 54 Data Sheet 3: 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Free Drop Test Unit Moc;le1 and Serial Number: Test Specimen:

TesfDate: ITest:Time: Test Plan 80 Step No.: 8.7 Describe drop orientBtion end drop height:

Describe impact (location. rotation, etc.):

Describe on-site inspection (damage, broken parts, etc.):

On-site essessment:

F.ngincering: Regulatory: QA:

Describe any post-test disassembly and inspection:

Descnoc any ~ge in source position:

Describe results of any pre- or post-test radiography:

Completed by: Date:

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AEA Technology Teat Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burlfngton. Maasachusatts Page46of 54 Equipment Ust 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot} Free Drop F.nter the Model and Serial Attach Inspection .-

Description Nmnber Report or Cah'bration Certificate Drop Surface Drawing AT10122, Rev. B Thermometer Therm.ocoople Thermocouple Record any additional tools used to facilitate the test and etta.ch the appropriate inspection report or cam>ration certificate.

Print Name: Signature: Date:

Completed by:

Verified by:

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12. 1999 Burington, Massachu98(ts Page47of 54 Checklist 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Free Drop Step -TP80(A) TP80(B) TP80(Q I. Immerse test specimen in chy ice or cool in freezer to bring specimen temperature below-40°C.

2. Measure the ambient temperature.

Note the instrument used:

3. Attach the test specimen to the release mechanism.

4. Begin Video Recording of tho test..

5. Measure specimen's internal and smface temps. Ensure specimen is at the specified temperature.

Record the specimen's internal temperature:

Note the instrument used:

Record the specimen's surface temperature:

Note the inst:rmnoot used:

6. Lift and orient the test specimen as shown in the specified referenced figure. Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9

7. Inspect the orientation setup and verify drop height

8. Photograph the setup in at least two perpendicular planes.

9. Release the test specimen.

10. Measure specimen's internal end surface temps. Ensure specimen is at specified temperature.

Record the specimell's internal temperature:

Noto the instrument used:

Record the specimen's surface tempera.tore:

Note the instrument used:

I I. Photograph the test specimen and record any damage oo Data Sheet 4.

12. Englueerlog, Regulatory Affairs and Quality Assurance make a prelhrifnary assessment relative to 10 CFR 71. Record assessment on Data Sheet 4. Determine what changes are necessary in package orientation for the ptmcbn test to achieve maximum damage.

Verifled by: Print Name: Signature: Date:

Engineering Regulatory Affairs Quality Assurance

l AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Burington, Maaaactu@eHs Psgo48of 54 Data Sheet 4: 9 Meter (30 Foot) Fl'8$ Drop Test Unit Model end Serial Number: Test Speclmen:

Test Date: I TestTime: Test Plsn 80 Step No.: 8.9 Describe drop orientation and drop height:

Desc.n'be bnpact (location, rotation. etc.):

Describe on-site impection (damage, broken parts, etc.):

On-site assessment:

Englneeting: R.cguhltory: QA:

Describe any post-test disassembly and inspection:

Describe any change In source position:

Describe results of any pre- or post-test radiography:

Completed by: Date:

AEA Technology Tast Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12., 1999 Burington, Ma988Chuseb Paga49 of 54 Equipment List G: Puncture Test Enter the Model and Serial Attach' InsP,eCtion Description Number Report or Calibration Certificate Drop Surface Drawing AT10122, Rev. B Puncture Billet Drawing CTIOl 19, Rev. C Thermometer Thermocouple Thermocouple Record any additional tools used to facliitate the test end attach the appropriate inspection report or calibration certificate.

Print Name: Signature: Date:

Comple~by:

Verified by:

rI N:A Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Borllngton, Massachusatls Paga 50of 54 Checklist 6: Puncture Test Step TP80(A) ~) TPSO(C)

1. Immerse spcc[men Jn dry Ice or cool In freezer to bring specimen temp. below-40"C.

2. Mc:osure the mnbient tcmpcmture.

Note the instrument used:

3. Attach the test specimen to tho release mechanism.

4. Begin Video Recording of the test.

s. Measure specimen's internal and ~ temps. Ensure that specimen is at specified temp.

Record the specimen's Jntcmal tempemturc:

Note the Instrument used:

Record the specimen's smfacc tanpciaturc:

Note the instrument used:

6. Lift and orient the test specimen as shown in the specified referenced figure, or as Figure lO Figure 11 Figure 12 determined during the assessment of the 9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test

7. Inspect the orientation setup and verify drop height.

8. Photograph t4e set-up in at least two perpendiculBr planes.

9. Release tho test specimen.

10. Measure ttie* specimen's internal end surface tcmpeiratures.

Record the specimen's ink:mal temperetorc:

Note the instrument used:

Rccord*tlie specimen's surface r.em.,...atme; Note the Instrument used:

11. Photograph the test specimen and record any damage on Data Sheet 5.

12. Englaeering,.Rezalatory Affltlrs and Quality Assurance make u. preliminary BSSCSSillOOi ~ e to lO CPR 71. Record asscssnumt on Data Sheet S. Determine what changes arc ncccssary in package oricotatiw for thermal test to achieve maximum damage.

Vcrified by: Print Name: Signature: Date:

Engineering Regulatory Affain QuaUty Auuraace

AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc:. March 12. 1999 Blringtoq. Massachusetls Paga51 of 54 Data Sheet 5: Puncture Test Test Unit Model and Serial Number: Test Specimen:

Test Date: I TestTime: Test Plan 80 Step No.: 8.10 Dcscribo drop orientation and drop height:

' Describe impact (location. rotation, etc.):

Descn'be on-site inspection (damage, brobn parts, etc.):

On-site assessment:

F.ngincering: Regulatory: QA:

Desaibe any post-test disassembly and inspection:

I Describe any change in source position: i Describe~ of any pre- or post-test radiography:

Completed by: Date:

AEA Technology Test Pfan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12, 1999 Boo1ngton1 Massachusetts Page52of 54 Equipment List 6: Thennar Test Enter the Model and Serial Attach Inspection Description Number Report or Calibration Certificate Bottom Surface Theonocouple 1 Top Surface Thermoconplc 2 Side Sa:rface Facing Oven Front Thermocouple 3 Side Sarfucc Facing Oven Rear Thermocouple 4 Sowa, Tube Thermocouple 5 Oven Oven thermostat Record any additional tools used to facilitate the test and attach the appropriate inspection report or calibration certificate.

Print Name: Signature: Date:

Completed by:

Verified by:

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I AEA Technology Test Plan BO, Revision 1 QSA, loo. March 12, 1999 Burlington, Maesachuaetts Page53of 54 CheckUst 6: Thermal Test Step TPSO(A) TP80(B) TP80(Q

1. Record Test Specimen Serial Number.

2. Preheat the oven to 81 O"C.

3. Attach the thermocouples es descn"bed in Equipment List 6. Ensure the recording devices are active., and that the external tbennocooples are shielded..

4. Place the package in the oven in the worst case orientation and partially close the oven door such that a 1 inch by 36 inch opening is provided. Record the time.

5. When all of the test spechnen's surfuce temperatures exceed BlOOC. begin 1he 30-minute time interval. Record the time.

6. Monitor and record the test specimen and the oven temperatures throughout the 30-minute period to ensure that they are above 81 O"C

7. At the end of the 30-minute test period, shut off the oven and open the door.

Record the time.

8. Describe combustion when door is opened.

9. Allow the specimen to cool, then remove the specimen from the oven. Record the time.

NOTE: If specimen continues to bum, let it self-extinguish and cool mrturally.

IO. Measure end record the ambient temperature.

11. Photograph the test specimen and record any damage on data sheet 6.

I2. Rudiograph the unit to determine the shield location.

13. Measure and record the source location.

14. Englueerlng, Regulatory Affaln and Quality Asmrance mab a preliminary assessment relative to 10 CFR 71. Record assessment on Data Sheet 6.

Verified by: PrintName: Signature: Date:

Engineering Regulatory Affairs Quality Assurance

I AEA Technology Test Plan 80, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12. 1999 Burflngton, Massaa,usetts PageMof §4

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Data Sheet 6: Thermal Test Test Unit Model and Serial Number. Test Specimen: -

Test Date: ITestTimc: Test Plan 80 Step No.: 8.12 Describe test oril'ln1lltion and setup:

Describe package during testing:

Desaibe on-site inspection (damage, broken parts, etc.):

On-site assessment Bnginecring; ReguJatnry: QA:

Describe any post--test disassembly and inspection:

Describe any chmige in source position:

Describe resulf:S: of any pre- or post-test radiography:

Completed by: Date:

AEA Technology Test Plan BO, Revision 1 QSA, Inc. March 12. 1899 Burington, Massachusetts Page55of 54 Appendix A: Drawing R-TP80, Revision D

..... ,.,.. ....... . Notes:

1. Refer to Drawing C650091br ~ of orlgbml unit.

2. Modify UDit II ibllaws:

a) Removo lid mid discmd bolts.

b) Remove through bolta ad dllCIEd.

o) IfboUom plau, fl omboD llteel. mnovo axlmoa plm,.

Patch miamg or darn*p! ban with new Vultafoam., Item (4).

Iimtal1 naw mfnless meal boCtom plato, Item (1),

d) Instail new t1uaagb bo1ta, !tam (3), with lock wasbm, toiqao 1hmogh bolts to 100:i:5 Ja.b IDd lmsa11 Afety wb for aecm:Jty.

o) Install two Cl,) dam.my aomoo auembly 424-9'8, one in each aldo.

3. Verlfymmkina 011nawUd bolll. IlmD (2), ls "BS".

4. Jnstall lld with MW lid boltl, ltml (21 and famll aeaJ. win, fbr sbipmmt tamper bvficetN.

8 AR WilPER PROCF &rlJ. 1W:

7 AR SAFEIYIIIE 8 I.OCIC IMSH£R &/1 e CM 4 M' ~ f1M.-708

s +

2 +

COPPER SHIM OR SHIELD SUPPORT ~ .. -., .. *-* . . -";;::-=:~)-~. . . DESCRlPTIVE

/t::.:/-*., 1::1_, ,,\!0.1'.:0G~' ,* .;*

-,:, ..-------- ....... *****- _';I.:./ DRAWING

r-= r TP 80* (A) TP 80 (B)

NOTE: ~*

I NO SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LEAD LOCATION IN TP80(C)

UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED: -ALL DIMENSIONS ARE -REFERENCE SIZE DWG. NO. R-TP80 'REV A SCALE: NONE SHEET 2 OF 2 0

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-24 2.12.2 Test Plan 80 Report Minus Manufacturing Records (Jun 1999).

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18 du/ "f'J:.

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TEST PLAN SO REPORT M0DEL650L June 1999 PreparcdBy: ctOJ,&M, ~

Laura Riclx.on. M P R ~ Inc-.

Date: 2 "8 ..) lJ rJ 'R Reviewec\By: ~

N"iebclatl,RAss Inc.

Date: 211 Jw..'?7 ApprovedBy: ~ ~ A ,_ _ :=:::,,. Date: Z3 J()I\) 9'7 Caroline S. Schlaseman, MPR Associates, Inc.

AEA Technology QSA, Inc.

Burlington. MA

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc.

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Test Plan 80 Report TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................... 1

2. SCOPE OF TESTIN"G ...................... - ..................................................................................... 2

3. FA.11,URE MODES ...................................... - ......................................................................... 3

4. TEST UNIT DESCRIP'TION .................................................................................................. 4

5. SlJM1\1ARY AND CONCI.,USIONS .....*.... - .......................................................................... 5

6. TP80 NORMAL 'I'ESTS ..................................................................................... ,................... 8 Compression Test ................................................................................................................ 8 Penetration .Test ................................................................................................................... 9 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Test ............................................................................................ 10 Post-Test Inspection and Assessment ............................................................................... 12

7. TP80 ACCIDEN1' DROP TESTS-TP80(A) ...................................................................... 13 9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test ............................................................................................. 13 Puncture Test ..................................................................................................................... 14 Post-Test Inspection and Assessment ............................................................................... 14

8. 1'P80 ACCIDEN1' DROP 'TESTS -TP80(B)....................................................................... 15 9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test ............................................................................................. 15 Puncture Test ..................................................................................................................... 16 Post-Test Inspection and Assessment ............................................................................... 16

9. TP80 ACCIDENT DROP 1'ESTS -TPSO(C) ....................................................................... 17 9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test ....................- ....................................................................... 17 Puncture Test ......................................... _.......................................................................... 18 Post-Test Inspection and Assessinent ............................................................................... 18

10. 'fP8011IERMAl, 1'EST-TP80(B) ........ - ........................................................................... 19 Orientation and Setnp ........................................................................................................ 19 Test Chronology ................................................................................................................ 20 Post-Test Inspection and Assessment ............................................................................... 21 APPENDICES A. CALIBRATION RECORDS B. MANUFACTURING ROUTE CARDS AND PRE-TEST RADIATION PROFILE DATA SHEETS C. TFSI' CHECKLISTS AND DATA SHEETS D. TEST PHOTOGRAPHS

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AEA Technology QSA. Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 1 of21

1. PURPOSE This report ~bes the Type .B test results for the Model 650L source changer. These tests were performed in accordance with Test Plan 80 and were conducted March 15 through 20, 1999. The Test Plan specified testing necessary to demonstrate compliance with the requirements in 10 CFll Part 71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6 (1985 as amended 1990) for "Normal Conditions of Transport" and "Hypothetical Accident Conditions.'; Evaluation of the compliance of the Model 650L with these requirements is provided in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR).

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 2 of21

2. SCOPE OF TESTING Test Plan 80 identified three orientations that could potentially cause the most significant damage to the Model 650L source changer in the 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests. Therefore, the test plap. required three test specimens. Each of these test specimens was subjected to the tests described below.

1. Normal Conditions of Transport Tests per 10 CFR 71.71, including the following for each test specimen:

a) Compression test with the test specimen under a load greater than or equal to five times the Model 650L maximum weight for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

b) Penetration test,. in which a 13.4 lb (6.08 kg) penetration bar is dropped from at least 1 meter (40 inches) onto the test specimen in the most vulnerable location.

c) 1.2 meter (4 foot} drop test. in which the test specimen is dropped in an orientation expected to cause maximum damage.

Water spray preconditioning of the test specimens prior to testing was not required in the test plan and is evaluated separately.

2. Hypothetical Accident Condition Tests per IO CPR 71. 73, including the following for each of the test specimens:

a) 9 meter (30 foot) drop test. in which the test specimen is dropped in an orientation expected to cause maximum damage.

b) Puncture 1:efil, in which the test specimen is dropped from at least 1 meter (40 inches) onto a 6 inch (152.4 mm) diameter vertical bar in an orientation expected to compound damage from the 9 meter (30 foot) drop test.

c) Thermal test, in accordance with 10 CFR71.73(c)(4), in which the test specimen is exposed for 30 minutes to an environment which provides a time-averaged environmental temperature of at least 800°C (1472°F), and an emissivity coefficient of at least 0.9. For the Model 650L, the test plan specified that the thermal test would be performed for only one of the three test specimens, unless other test units suffered significant damage in the drop and puncture tests. This requirement was based on the evaluation of the construction of the unit, and on the potential failure modes, which are discussed in the following section.

The crush test specified in 10 CFR 71.73(c)(2) was not required because the source capsules are qualified as Special-Form radioactive material.

The water immersion test specified in 10 CPR 71.73(c)(6) and other tests specified in 10 CFR 71 are evaluated separately.

For all tests, sufficient margin was included in test parameters to account for measurement uncertainty. These test parameters included test specimen weight, temperature, and drop height.

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AEA Technology QS~ .fnc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 3 of21

3. FAILURE MODES For the Model 650L source changer, the key function important to safety is the positive ~ntion of the radioactive source in its stored position within the depleted uranium shield. Displacement of either the source or the shield from the design position or failure of the shield could cause radiation from the package to increase above regulatory limits. Mechanisms, which could cause these modes of failure, include:

Oxidation of the DU Shield - During the thermal test, oxidation of the DU shield could lead to reduced shielding effectiveness and higher radiation exposure. This could occur if failure of the inner and outer shells or failure of the through-bolts during drop testing results in a large, open path to the DU shield.

Source Poll-Out from the Shield - During drop testing or during the thermal test. source pull-out could lead to higher radiation exposure. This could occur if there is significant relative displacement between the shield and the lock assembly on the top cover plate.

Such displacement could occur if the top plate is deformed outward, and the shield moves laterally or downward through the polyurethane foam.

The drop orientations for the normal and hypothetical accident tests were selected to challenge the components that are intended to prevent these failures. For the 1.2 meter (4 foot) and 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests, these orientations include the following:

Horizontal with the long side of the unit down - This orientation could cause movement of the shield or failure of the inner and/or outer shells.

Vertical ypside down - This orientation could cause deformation of the top plate, failure of the through-bolts, or failure of the lock assembly which would all lead to source pull-ffiit from the shield. Additionally, movement of the shield 1hrough the foam in the upper part of the unit would put a large lateral load on the upper portion of the inner shell, which is subject to brittle failure.

Top comer down - This orientation could cause failure of the bolts holding the protective lid in place, exposing the lock assembly to damage during the puncture test This orientation also loads the through-bolts, top plate, and inner shell similar to the vertical upside down orientation.

Because of the potential for brittle failure of carbon steel components, all test units were packed in dry ice and cooled to less than -40°C (-40°F) (the minimum temperature required by IAEA Safety Series 6) for the penetration, 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop, 9 meter (30 foot) drop, and puncture tests.

In selecting test units for the thermal test, it was concluded that an undamaged unit would not be significantly affected by exposure to the conditions of the thermal test. In particular, for an undamaged unit, the depleted uranium shield would still be completely enclosed within the inner and outer shells and be supported by foam and a shim of either copper, stee4 or lead. Under the thermal test conditions, degradation of the foam and melting of the shim. if it is lead, will allow

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AEA Technology QSA, .fnc. Test Plan 80 Report Page4 of21 the shield to move by a small amount. This coold result in limited movement of the source relative to the shield, but not enough to significantly increase radiation levels.

Therefore, the thermal test is only expected to have a significant effect on those units which sustained damage relating to the two modes of failure described above, specifically: (1) an opening in the inner and outer shells to allow oxidation of the shield, or (2) relative displacement of the lock assembly and shield which could be compounded by shield movement during the thermal tesL Since relative clisplacem.f2lt of the lock assembly was expected in the vertical upside down drop orientation, it was planned to perform the thermal test with the unit dropped in this orientation. The test plan required thermal tests of the other test specimens only if they sustained damage that could lead to failure dnring the thermal ~

4. TEST UNIT DESCRIPTION The Model 650L test specimens, identified below, were originally constructed in accordance witb drawing c;65009 and were prepared for testing in accordance with drawing R-TP80, Rev. R The manufacturing route cards for the units document the compliance of these units with the AEA Technology QSA Inc. QA program (see Appendix B).

Specimen Serial No. Total Weight Lead Configuration TP80(A) 2243 80.0 lb No lead between DU shield and (36.3 kg) long side of inner shell.

TP80(B) 182 83.6 lb Thickest lead under DU shield (37.9 kg) (total 3/8" thick).

TP80(C) 195 89.0 lb Any location.

(40.4 kg)

Important featores of the test unit construction include the following:

The configuration of lead added to each unit for supplemental shielding was specified as shown above ti> provide the worst case for the each drop orientation.

For TP80(B). the original steel shim used in the unit was replaced with a solid 3/8" thick lead shim.

Toe original carbon steel through-bolts were replaced with stainless steel bolts.

The original carbon steel lid bolts were replaced with high strength, strain hardened stainless steel bolts.

The weights of the test specimens are representative of the heaviest 6SOL units in use.

The range of weights of 650L units is 75 lb to 90 lb (34.0 kg to 40.8 kg).

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AHA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 5 of21

,,**- The test specimens were radiographed to document the lead configurntion ~d the position of the internal components. Also. the position of the "dummy" source used in the units was measured prior to testing.

5.

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSIONS All test specimons met the requirements for 10 CFR. 71 Type B{U) Transport Testing, as shown in the following table of Radiation' Profile results.

Specimen Specimen AtSurface, At One Meter, AtSurface. At. One Meter, At One Mete£,

I Surface Before Test Before.Test After After4 ft AfterFinal

\

4ftDrop Drop Test Test Test. (Notes 1.2)

' Reg.Limits 200mR/hr lOmRllir 200mR/hr lOmR/hr lOOOm.R/hr TPSO(A) Too 84 3.2 94 2.4 2.7 Riu:ht ,47 0.6 47 0.7 0.8 S/N2243 Front 88 0.7 89 0.8 1.0 Left 56 0.6 65 0.7 0.7 Rear 74* 0.7 89 0.8 0.9 Bottom 51 '0.4 94 0.7 0.6 TP80(13) Top 60 3.1 71 2.0 28 Right 56 0.4 53 0.6 5.6 SIN 182 Front I 84 0.8 83 0.8 5.6 Left 88 0.6 83 0.6 7.9 Rear 79 0.8 77 0.8 7.9 Bottom 74 05 83 0.7 1.1 TP80(C) Top 72 2.2 59 2.0 2.2 Right 105 0.7 71 0.1 0.9 SIN 195 Front 50 0.6 47 05 0.6 Left 127 0.7 106 0.8* 1.0 Rear 50 0.6 53 0.6 0.6 Bottom 61 0.6 59 0.5 0.5 Notes:

1. The final Hypothetical Accident Condition test fur test specimens TPSO(A) and TP80(C) was the Puncture Test The final test for specimen TP80(B) was the Thermal Test

2. R.ad'IStion profile at the surface is not required for the Hypotbetlcal ~ Condition test (see 10 CFR 715I(a)(2)).

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 6 of21

. --* Results of each test are summarized in the table below, in the sequence in which the tests were completed. Detailed results are provided in the following sections of this report, test data sheets me in Appendix C, and photographs are included in Appendix D.

Specimen Test .Performed Test Results (Note 1) 1P80(A) Compression Test No damage I 1 meter C40 inch) penetration bar on Impact mark; no visible damage side 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop, horizontal

Impact mark on edge of plates on long side

Small change in radiation profile 9 meter (30 foot) drop, horizontal on Bent bottom plate flange inward long side 1 meter (40 inch) punctare, Shallow dent on outer shell at impact horizontal on long side (dropped point twice to ensure specimen temperature was below-40°C

(-40°F))

Post-Drop Inspection

Lid secured in place

Locks undamaged; source secured

No significant change in source position

Small change in radiation profile TP80(B) Compression Test No damage 1 meter (40 inch) penetration bar on Impact mark; no visible damage side 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop, vertical

Impact mark on top of lid upside down

Small change in radiation profile 9 meter (30 foot) drop, vertical

Outer shell split open from top to upside down bottom

Inner shell cracked, creating a 3 inch (!6.2 mm) high by 0.5 inch (12.7 mm) wide opening Small upward deflection of top plate

Top end bottom plates remained secured by the tbromm bolts.

1 meter (40 inch) puncture on crack Bent shell inward slightly in area of in shell crack

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 7 of21 Specimen Test Performed Test Results (Note 1)

TPSO(B) Post-Drop Inspection

Lid secured in place (con't)

Locks undamaged; source secured

Top plate deflection at center about 0.16 inch (4.1 mm).

No damage to through bolts No significant change in source position.

On~ and inner shells cracked; opening about 3 inch (/62 mm) by 0.5 inch (12.7 mm).

Thermal test

Some oxidation of DU shield near crack in shell

Shield moved down (as expected)

Polyurethane foam burned off, exposing the shield

Some oxidation of shield near crack in shell

Shield self-extinguished after removal from oven

Source pullout less than 0.5 inch (12.7mm).

Max. radiation level at one meter was 28 mR/hr (which is much less than lOOOmR/br allowable)

TP80(C) Compression Test Nodamage 1 meter ( 40 inch) penetration bar on Impact mark; no visible damage side 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop on top edge of lid

Bent comer of lid and cracked top plate of lid (brittle failure)

Small change in radiation profile 9 meter (30 foot) drop on top edge

Increased lid top plate crack length of lid in vicinity of impact point

Locks still protected by lid 1 meter (40 inch) puncture vertical Broke inside of lid top plate (locks still upside down on lid and on 1Uiderside protected) oftopplate Post-Drop Inspection

Locks undamaged; source secured

No significant change in source position

Small change in radiation profile Note 1-: None of the new stainless steel bolts installed in the test specimens failed.

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AEA Technology QSA, .fu.c. Test Plan 80 Report Page 8 of21

~,* .. -.

Specimen TPSO{A) was not l?igoificantly damaged in the testing. On specimen TP80(C). the top plate of the protective lid was substantially cracked and portions broke away; however, the rectangular tube section which surrounds the locks was undamaged and still attached to the lower portion which in tutn was secured to the body of the changer. As such, the locks remained protected. The post-test radiation profiles showed a slight increase in radiation levels for these units, but these radiation levels were well below the allowable values.

The only significant damage to any unit was the cracked shell in specimen TP80(B). Because of this crack, the depleted uranium shield was exposed to air during the thennal test, and portions of the shield near the crack opening were oxidized. In addition, after the lead shim melted, the shield was free to move downward, pulling the dummy source *out of its fully inserted position in the shield. However, even with the oxidized shield and source pull-out. the post-test radiation profile showed a maximum radiation level of 28 mR/hr at one meter. This is well below the maximum allowable level of 1,000 mR/br at one meter following the hypothetical accident conditions.

6. TPSO NORMAL TESTS Compression Test All three test specimens were loaded as shown in the figure below. Lead weights were placed on a steel pJate, which was positioned on top of each test specimen.

The vertical projected area of the unit is 8.25 inch (209 mm) x 10 inch (254 mm) or 82.5 square inches (531 square centimeters). yielding a total load of 165 lb (74.8 kg) for an applied pressure of 2 psi. Since the maximum weight of the Model 650L source changer is 90 lb (40.8 kg), a load of 5 times the weight, or 450 lb (204 kg}, is more conservative. The total compressive load actually used was 458 lb to 462 lb (208 kg to 210 kg).

Compression Test Orientation - All Specimens

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 9 of 21 After a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , the weights were removed. No visible deformation or buckling occurred and no other damage was observed for any of the test specimens.

Penetration Test The three test specimens were subjected to the penetration test Temperature readings taken just before the test are summarized below.

s Ambient Surface Internal TP80(A) 10°c -96°C -95°C 50 -141 -139°F)

TP80(B) 9°c -93°C -83°C 48 -135° -117 TPSO(C) 10°c -90°C -90°C 50° (-130° -130° The penetration bar target was the side of the unit in an attempt to damage the shell. For this test, each specimen was positioned with its horizontal long side down, as shown below.

. *.1.*. * : - : - . : ... -: *: .. * : .... -: ~ *---~....

Penetration Test Orientation - All Specimens The penetration bar was dropped from a height of at least 1 meter (40 inches) above the impact point The bar bit as intended on each package, leaving a visible impact mark, but no other damage.

AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 10 of21 1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drnp Test The three test specimens were then subjected to the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop test. Temperature readings taken just before the test are summarized below.

Specimen Ambient Surface Internal TP80(A) l3°C -92°C -90°C 55° 134 (-130 TP80(B) 13°C -'87°C -89°C 55 -125 -128° TP80(C) l3°C -95°C -92°C 55°F) -139 (-134 The drop orientations for each unit are shown below and on the next page. These orientations are the same as those UBed for each specimen in _the 9 meter (30 foot) drop tests.

1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for SpecimenTPSO(A)

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AEA Technology QSA, me. Test Plan 80 Report Page 11 of21

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1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(B) u--

1.2 Meter (4 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(C)

Each test specimen impacted as intended. Visual inspections showed impact marks but no significant damage to either TP80(A) or TP80(B). For TP80(C), a 2 inch (50.8 mm) long crack in the top of the protective lid was observed, and the flange comer was bent.

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AEA Technology QSA, Toe. Test Plan 80 Report Page 12 of 21 Post-Test Inspection and Assessment Results of the first intermediate inspections and assessments are summarized below. The radiation profile of each specimen was measured, and data sheets are provided in Appendices B andC.

Specimen Damage Source Movement Radiation Profile (Note 1)

TPSO(A) No visible damage, No significant change Largest change at locks functional observed bottom surface:

5lmR/hr to 94 mR/hr (Note 2)

TP80(B) No visible damage, No significant change Largest change at top locks functional observed surface:

60 mR/hr to 71 mR/hr TP80(C) Cracked top lid, No significant change Largest change at rear locks functional observed surface:

50 mR/hr to 53 mRlhr Note 1: Radiation levels at one meter were 2.4 mR/hr or less after Normal Condition Tests.

Note 2: All other surfaces measured remained essentially the same, exhibiting no corresponding shift in radiation levels. Additionally, no source movement was measured. Therefore, this change was considered insignificant

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AEA Technology QSA, Jnc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 13 of21

7. TPSO ACCIDENT DROP TESTS -TPSO{A)

Specimen TP80(A) was subjected to a 9 meter (30 foot) drop test and a puncture test in accordance with Test Plan 80. The results are descn"bed below.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Test Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen 1P80(A) were as follows:

Internal (source tube): -93°C (-135°F)

Surface (shell): -92°C (-134°F)

The orientation for Specimen TP80(A), shown below, was the same as for the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop. The intention was to cause the shield to move relative to the lock assembly and/or to cause failure of the inner and outer shells.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TPBO(A)

The package rotated very slightly causing the edge of the bottom plate to impact first However, the impact was sufficiently close to ideal as to impart the desired force into the package. Visual inspections showed that the edge of the bottom plate had bent inward to the point where it contacted and dented the outer shell. The edge of the top plate of the lid also bent inward slightly.

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 14of21 Puncture Test For the puncture test, TPBO(A) was dropped, as planned, on its side with the center of gravity over the impact area, as shown below. The intention of this orientation was to inflict further damage to the shell. The thermocouple reading on the surface of the unit before the puncture test Was -69°C (-92°F) but Wanned tO -26°C (-15°F) just after the test due f.o delays in rigging the unit for the drop. Consequently, the unit was cooled again and dropped a second time. For the second test, the surface temperature was -46°C (-51 °F) before the test and -42°C (-44°F) after the test Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen 1P80(A)

For both drops, the unit impacted on its side as intended. Each impact caused the side of the shell to deform inward slightly, but no significant damage was observed.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment Following the test, the protective lid was removed and the unit was inspected. No damage to the lock assembly was observed, and no significant source movement was measured. Radiographs of the unit showed no discemable change in the position of the shield. The post-test radiation profile showed no significant chan.ge in radiation levels from the pre-test profile (see Appendices Band C). Because no significant damage occurred t.o the unit, the thermal test was not considered necessary (see Section 3). In addition, Specimen TPSO(B) was considered worst case.

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 15 of21

8. TP80 ACCIDENT DROP TESTS - TP80(B)

Specimen TP80(B) was subjected to a 9 meter (30 foot) drop test and a puncture test in accordance with Test Plan 80. The results are described below.

9 Meter {30 Foot) Drop Test Just before the drop test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP80(B) were as follows:

Internal (source tube): -94°C (-137°F)

Surface (shell): -93°C (-135°F)

The package orientation for Specimen TPSO(B ), shown below, was the same as for the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop. The intention was to cause deformation of the top plate, failure of the through-bolts, and failure of the lock assembly, leading to source pull-out from the shield.

9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(B)

The package impacted as intended. The impact caused the depleted uranium shield to move into the foam below the top plate, putting a large lateral load on the inner shell, and causing the sµell to crack. The cracking of the inner shell resulted in a transfer of the lateral load to the outer shell, breaking the spot welds that hold the outer shell together. The outer stainless steel wrap also failed and sprung open. One of the rivnuts in the top plate broke, but its associated bolt and the all the other lid bolts were undamaged and the lid remained secured to the package.

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AEA Technology QSA, 1nc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 16 of 21 Puncture Test For the puncture test, the planned orientation was changed in order to inflict the greatest damage, based on the on-site assessmoot of Engineering, Regulatory and QA. As such, TPSO(B) was dropped so that the cracked shell was aligned with the top edge of the puncture bar. The intention was to open up the crack or cause additional cracking in the damaged area. The thermocouple reading on the outside surface of the unit was -57°C (-71 °F) before the puncture test and -44°C (47°F) after the test The unit impacted directly on the crack. The outer shell was deformed inward at the impact area, but additional cracking was not observed.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment Following the test the protective lid was removed and the unit was inspected. The through-bolts were all intact One of the locks had broken out, but the dummy source remained securely retained (i.e., the lock slide was still secure). The top plate {with the lock assembly) deflected outward by about 0.16 inch (4.1 mm). The resulting source pull-out was measured to be 0.Cll7 inch (0.69 mm) in one side and 0.064 inch (1.6 mm) in the other side. Radiographs showed the crack in the inner shell extended from the top plate to the bottom plate.

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 17 of 21

9. TPSO ACCIDENT DROP TESTS - TPSO(C)

Specimen TPSO(C) was subjected to a 9 meter (30 foot) drop test and a puncture test in accordance with Test Plan 80 and results are descdbed below.

9 meter {30 Foot) Drop Test Just before .the drop. test, thermocouple readings for Specimen TP80(C) were as follows:

Internal (source tube): -97°C (-143°F)

Surface (shell): -98°C (-144°F)

The package orientation for Specimen 1P80{C), shown below, was the same as for the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop. The intention was to fail the bolts holding the protective lid to the rest of the unit.

This would expose the lock assembly to further damage during the puncture test

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9 Meter (30 Foot) Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(C)

The package impacted as intended. Visual inspections showed that none of the lid bolts failed, but the lid crack initiated in the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop increased in both directions. The crack went around the top plate at its interface with the rectangular tube section that protects the locks.

The crack went about halfway around the lid, and the top plate was deflected downward about 0.5 inch (13 mm). Portions of the top plate flange also broke off.

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AHA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 18 of21 Puncture Test Specimen TP80(C) was subjected to two puncture tests. An additional puncture drop was added as two possible orientations were deemed "worst case". In the first test, the unit was dropped vertically upside down, with the intention of breaking through the lid and damaging the locks.

The thermocouple reading on the surface of the unit was -53°C (-63°F) before the puncture test and-50°C (-58°F) after the test.

For the second test, the unit was dropped such that the impact was on the underside of the top plate, as shown below. The objective of this drop was to damage the rivnuts, which hold the lid to the top plate, and to pry the top plate off of the unit by overloading the through-bolts. The initial surface temperature was -47°C (-53°F).

Second Puncture Drop Orientation for Specimen TP80(C)

The unit impacted as intended in both drops. In the first drop, the top of the lid was damaged further, however, the lid remained intact and the puncture bar did not impact the lock assembly.

In the second drop, the top plate deformed slightly, but no significant damage was observed.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment Following the test, the protective lid was removed and the unit was inspected. No damage to the locks was observed and no significant movement of the source was measured. The post-test radiation profile showed no significant change in radiation levels from the pre-test profile (see Appendix B). Because no significant damage occurred to the unit, the thermal test was not considered necessary (see Section 3). In addition, Specimen TP80(B) was considered worst case.

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 19 of21

10. TPSO TI-IERMAL TEST - TPSO(B}

Based on the results of the drop tests, a thermal test was performed with specimen TP80(B). The dam.age to this unit was such that the maximum source pull-out, as well as oxidation of the depleted uranium shield, could occur during the thermal test. The thermal test was not considered necessary for the other test specimens since the results are bounded by those for TPBO(B).

Orientation and Setup Based on the damage observed in the drop tests, it was concluded that worst orientation for the thennal test was to have the unit at an angle such that the center of gravity of the shield was over the bottom comer edge of the inner shell. The cracked side of the unit was oriented downward, so that the shield would move toward the crack as the lead shim melted and the shield dropped down. The worst case angle was determined to be 53° based on the internal geometry of the unit This would allow the maximum amount of shield movement relative to the top plate, pulling the source out of position. To hold the specimen in this orientation, a steel jig was constructed as shown below.

Front of OVen TP80(B) Orientation and Thermocouple Locations Seven thermocouples were attached to the specimen on the top, bottom, and four side surfaces (two thermocouples on the front side). An eighth thermocouple was inserted into one of the source tubes to measure the internal temperature. A ninth thermocouple was used to measure the ambient oven temperature.

To allow for combustion during the thermal test, the oven door was blocked open with a gap of 1 inch (25 .4 mm) at the top and bottom of the door, permitting airflow into the oven while allowing the oven to maintain its temperature. Since the oven dooris 36 inches (914 mm) long, each opening was approximately 36 square inches (232 square centimeters).

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I AEA Technology QSA, inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 20of21 Test Chronology Temperatures were recorded from the time the specimen was inserted in the oven until after it had cooled and was moved to a temporary storage area. The total duration of this period was about 1,000 minutes (16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months ). Plots of the temperature data are included in Appendix C. The overall test chronology is as follows:

2.ero to 32 minutes - heat up of the specimen from ambient to over 8 lO"C (1490°F).

The 30 minute test started when all smfaces of the specimen exceeded 8100C (1490°F).

The thermocouple on the bottom of the unit was the last to reach the target temperature, and the test was started when it reached 813°C (1495°F).

32 to 64 minutes - 30 minute test period, with all temperatures maintained above 8 l0°C (1490°F). The maximum temperature was 996°C (1825°F) on the side of the unit facing the rear of the oven, while the minimum temperature was 813°C (1495°F) on the bottom of the unit The initial and final temperatures of all thermocouples over the 30 minute period are shown below. Flames due to combustion of the foam were observed, however these diminished and stopped before the end of the 30 mm.ute test Location Initial Temp. Final Temp. Average Temp.

Bottom 813°C s61°c 872°C 1495 1582° 1602 Top 980°C 879°C 913°c 1796 1614° 1675 (Lid) Front 934°c 848°C 879°C Oven 1713 (1558° (1614 (Lid) Back 995°c 884°C 923°c Oven 1823 1623°P) 1693°F)

(Lid) Left Side 949°c 865°C 899<?C 1740 1589° 165D°F)

(Lid) Right Side 979°c 872°C 909°C (1794 1602° 1668 Side (Opposite 830°C 810°C 823°C Crack) (1526°F) (1490°F) 1513° Source Tobe 906°C 865°C 886°C 1663 1589° 1627°F)

Oven/Ambient 940°c 839°C 877°C 1724 1542 1611°

64 minutes - removal from oven. The depleted uranium shield was visible, with a slightly red glow in areas. Some depleted uranium oxide (black power) was observed coming out of the crack and onto the surface below, indicating the shield was oxidizing.

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AEA Technology QSA, Inc. Test Plan 80 Report Page 21 of21

64 to 700 minutes - cool down to below I00°C (212°F). During this time. the shield was allowed to self-extinguish.

During the cool down period, the unit was allowed to cool via natural convection with no*

additional heat input. The hypothetical accident conditions specified in the IAEA Safety Series 6 regulations include a requirement to account for heat input clue to insolation during the cool down period. This heat input could reduce the cool down rate. However, the reduction was not considered to have any effect on the damage sustained by the test specimen, particularly compared with the 30 minute exposure to 810°C (1490°F) in the oven.

Post-Test Inspection and Assessment The initial on-site assessment of the test specimen included the following observations:

A cracked piece of the inner shell was dislodged and had dropped out of position.

Most paint had vaporized. Radiation labels were still legible.

All the foam had burned off, leaving a small amount of carbon char.

The lead shielding and shim melted and some lead had dripped out the bottom of the unlt

Radiography showed the shield moved laterally and downward as expected. The resulting source pull-out was measured to be 0.436 inch (11.1 mm) on one side and 0.480 inch (12.2 mm) on the other side.

The lock assemblies were functional; however, the source tQbcs had completely pulled out of the top plate and had shifted laterally. This caused an interference between the source wire and the top plate, and required that the top plate be machined to enlarge the holes before the unit could be profiled.

After the thermal test, visual observations indicated that the shield had come to rest on the through bolts and bottom plate. However, to securely fix the shield in position for shipping and extensive handling, holes were drilled in the shell of the unit so that foam could be poured in, and the shield was foamed in place. A radiation profile was then done on site with the source located to replicate the amount of observed source pull-out. The highest radiation measurement was 28 mR/hr at one meter (when scaled to the 240 Ci licensed capacity of the unit) at the 'top of the unit The small amount of shield oxidation experienced in the test had a minimal effect on the overall effectiveness of the shielding.

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AEA Technology QSA: Ule. Te.st Plan 80 Report APPENDIXD TEST PHOTOGRAPHS

Test Plan 80 Photographs Compression Test Typical Penetration Impact Typical Penetration Test Setup D-1

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(A)4FootDropResults TP80(A) 4 Foot Drop Setup TP80(A) 30 Foot Drop Setup TP80(A) 30 Foot Drop Results D-2

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(A) Puncture Test Results TP80(A) Puncture Test Setup D-3

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(B) 4 Foot Drop Test Results TP80(B) 4 Foot Drop Setup D-4

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(B) 30 Foot Drop Setup TP80(B)30FootDropResulb TPSO(B) 30 Foot Drop Results 0-5

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(B) Puncture Test Setup TPSO(B) Puncture Test Results D-6

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(C)4FootDropT~tResulu TP80(C) 30 Foot Drop Setup TP80(C)30FootDropResuJu TP80(C) 30 Foot Drop Resulu D-7

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(C) Puncture Drop 1 Setup TP80(C) Puncture Drop 1 Results TPSO(C) Puncture Drop 2 Results TP80(C) Puncture Drop 2 Setup Showing Closeup of Rivnut D-8

Test Plan 80 Photographs TP80(B) Thermal Test Setup TP80(B) Thermal Test Setup TPSO(B) Thermal Test TP80(B) Thermal Test After After Removal From Oven Removal From Oven D-9

Test Plan 80 Photographs TPSO{B) Detail of TP80(8) ThennaJ Test After Cracked Shell Removal From Oven

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TP80(B) Detail of TP80(B) Detail of Uranium Oxide Uranium Oxide Residue Residue D-10

Test Plan 80 Photographs TPSO(B) Thermal Test After TP80(B) Thermal Test After Removal Removal From Oven--Detail of From Oven-Lid Removed Crack After Foaming to Stabifue Shield TP80(B) Thermal Test After TP80(B) Thermal Test After Removal From Removal From Oven-Oven--Detail of Source Tube Displacement After Dummy Source Wire--White Removal of Lock As.,emblies Mark Shows Top of Source Tube Position D-11

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Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Source*Changer AEAT/QSA Inc. 16July 1999 Burlington, Massachusetts Appendix D: Multiple Wire Locking Assembly D.1 Background Currently the Model 650L source changer is equipped with the standard locking assembly. It is the intention of AEAT to modify all 650L source changers to the mnltiple wire lock assembly during the currently planned modification cycle (i.e., replacement of the through and cover bolts).

The Type B(U) Testing documented in Appendix C was performed with source changers equipped with the standard locking assemblies. Qualification of the source changer when equipped with the standard locking assemblies is addressed in the body of this document In this appen~ the Model 6501. source changer, equipped with multiple wire locking assemblies, is evaluated with respect to the requirements for Type B(U) Transport

packages contained in 10CFR.71. This evaluation is performed by reviewing the 10CFR71 requirements that are potentially affected by the design of the locking assemblies, and assessing the effect of the differences between the standard and moltiple wire designs.

D.2 Design Description The standard and multiple wire locking assembly designs are descnoed in the following sections.

D.2.1 Standard Locking Assembly Design The main components of the standard locking assembly are the base plate, lock slide, key lock, and hold down cap, as shown in the drawings in Appendix A With the exception of the key lock subassembly, all components are stainless steel The key lock is a standard, ~mmercially available part. The standard locking assembly is secured to the source changer top plate with fonr 1/4-20 stainless steel screws. These screws are arranged in a rectangular pattern (1.25 inch x 1.124 inch) around the source hold down cap.

When the assembly is in the locked position, the source can not be withdrawn from its shielded position because the source wire is captured by tines on the end of the lock slide.

The lock slide is prevented from disengaging from the source wire by a lock bolt that projects down from the key lock cylinder and captures the slide. The standard lock assembly is designed to accommodate sources using teleflex wires.

D.2.2 Multiple Wire Locking Assembly Design The main components of the multiple wire locking assembly are the base plate, base plate D-1

i '

Safety Analysis :Report for the Model 650L Source Changer AEAT/QSA Inc. I6July 1999 Burlington. Massachusetts adjustment shims, lock slide, key lock, and hold down cap, as shown in the drawings at the end of this iq,pendoc. All components are stainless steel, except for the brass key lock and guiding insert.

The multiple wire locking assembly can accommodate source wires with lengths that differ by as m.nch as In inch. To allow the capture of the different length source wires, the lock base plate and lock slide are thicker than in the standard design. Additionally, there are spacers of varying heights (0 to 0.25 in) between the top plate and bottom of the lock base plate to provide a tightly controlled distance between the bottom of the source tube and the locking assembly. These dimensional changes result in a slight weight increase for the multiple wire locking assembly of approximately 1 lb (0.45 kg) per source changer (with 2 locking assemblies). Additionally, the overall height of the multiple wire locking assembly is 2.8 to 3.0 inches at the hold down cap, versus 2.3 inches for the standard design. The method of attachment of the lock assemblies to the source changer top plate is the same as for the standard lock assembly, i.e., 1/4-20 screws threaded into the same holes in the top plate.

When the multiple wire locking assembly is in its locked position, the source wire can not be removed from the source changer. The stop ball on the source wire is contained within the 1/2 inch vertical cavity in the lock slide by the slots in the top and bottom of the slide.

The spring-loaded pin within the hold down cap keeps the source wire fully inserted in the DU shield.

D.3 Effect of Multiple Wire Locking Assembly Design on Type B(U) Transport Requirements The characteristics of the multiple wire locking assembly that could have an effect on Type B(U) Transport requirements, as defined in 10CFR71, are compared with those of the standard locking assembly in the following sections.

D.3.1 Weight and Center of Gravity The source changer weighs up to 90 lb (41 kg), including the DU shield, which weighs approximately 42 lb (19 kg). The weight difference between the standard and multiple wire locking assemblies is 1 lb (0.45 kg) for two assemblies. This increase of 1% for total package weight is considered negijgible.

D.3.2 Positive Closnre Toe multiple wire locking assembly, which secures the source assembly in the shielded position and assures positive closure, cannot be exposed without first removing the top lid of the source changer. After removal of the seal-wired lid, the hold down cap must be removed, the key lock unlocked, and the lock slide moved to the unlocked position before the source wire can be removed from the source changer. When the lock slide is in the D-2

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Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Source Olanger AEA.T/QSA Inc. 16 July 1999 Burlington. Massachosctts locked position, the stop ball on the source wire is contained within the 1/2 inch vertical cavity in the lock slide by the slots in the top and bottom of the slide.

One other change in the design of the multiple wire locking assembly is the use of a brass key lock. This lock is used by AEA Technology QSA Inc. in all of the Posil~ devices.

It has proven safe and effective without failure througq extensive field use and Type B testing, whether in or outside of an overpack. Additionally, brass does not undergo a ductile to brittle transition at low temperatures like cast zinc and carbon steel. The brass lock, therefore, is not susceptible to the lock cylinder damage that occurred at low temperatures during the 650L experimental and Type B drop tests. As a result, the key lock is considered capable of ensuring that the lock slide remains in the locked position under both the normal and hypothetical accident conditions.

Based on this evaluation, the multiple wire lock assembly meets the requirements for positive closure.

1).3.3 Normal Conditions of Transport Tests The use of mnltiple wire locking assemblies would have no impact on the results of the Normal Conditions of Transport Tests discussed in the body of this report, and in Appendix C. Specifically, as shown in the Test Report (Appendix C), there was no damage to the source changer that could have been affected by the lock assembly design.

For Specimens TPSO(A) and TP80(B), damage was limited to impact witness markings on the top and bottom plates and the lid. For Specimen TP80(C), the 1.2 meter (4 foot) drop initiated a crack in the top of the lid. No damage was observed for either the locking assemblies or source changer top plates.

1be multiple wire lock assembly has the same basic dimensions, materials, and attachment to the source changer top plate, as the standard lock assembly. Therefore, it is concluded that these lock assemblies would not be damaged by the Normal Conditions of Transport Te.m.

D.3.4 Hypothetlcal Accident Condition Tests The Hypothetical Accident Condition Tests reported in Appendix C identified three potential damage mechanisms that could be affe.cted by tho change in the design of the lock assembly. These potential damage mechanisms include the following:

1. Large Deflection of Source Changer Top Plat.e (Resulting in Source Tube Pullout and Failure of Lock Assembly Attachment Screws)

2. Failure of Lid (Resulting in Failure of Lock Assemblies)

3. Shock of Impact (Resulting in Failure of Lock Assemblies)

D-3

Safety Analysis Report for the Model ~L Source Cllanger AEA.T/QSA Inc. 16Iuly 1999 Bmliogton. Massacbnsetts These potential damage mechanisms are discussed below.

Large Deflection of Source Changer Top Plate-In the vertical upside down 9 meter (30 foot) drop test of TP80(B), the top plate was deflected upward about 0.16 inch (4.1 mm) in the center of the plate. The top plate, which is 10 gage (-1/8 inch) thick, is less stiff than the standard locking assembly. Therefore, the area of the top plate bounded by the rectangles funned by the lock screws stayed in plane (flat). The distances between the screws (1.124 inch x 1.250 inch) are the same for both designs, and the multiple wire lock assembly is at least as stiff as the standard design. Therefore, the top plate deformation (and potential source tube pullout) would be unaffected by use of the multiple wire locking assembly. Note that although the footprint of the multiple wire locking assembly is slightly different than that of the standard design. the differences are in the key lock end of the assembly, which cantilevers above the top plate when the plate deflects upward.

The extra weight (I lb) of the multiple wire locking assembly would have a negligible effect on the deflection of the top plate, which is driven by the weight of the DU shield (approximately 42 lb).

Failure of Lld-In the top corner down 9 meter (30 foot) drop test of TPSO(C), the source 1

changer lid partially failed due to the brittle condition of the carbon steel. Specifically, the lid cracked and its top plate deflected inward about 1/2 inch along one edge. The subsequent puncture test increased the lid damage slightly.* The normal height of the lid (4 1/2 inches) is sufficient to allow such a deflection and still protect the multiple wire locking assembly, which is about 3 inches high at the cap. Therefore, it is con~nded that the source changer lid would protect the multiple wire lock assembly during Hypothetical Accident Condition Testing.

Shock of Impact-The standard locking assembly was dropped three times from 9 meters (30 feet). The assemblies stayed in the locked position for all three tests. The multiple wire lock asserqbly has the same basic dimensions, materials, and attachment to the source changer top plate, as the standard lock assembly. Therefore, it is concluded that these lock assemblies would remain in the locked position dnring the Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport Tests.

DA Conclusion The Model 650L source changer, when equipped with the multiple wire locking assembly, satisfies the requirements for Type B(U) Transport packages by comparison to the standard locking assembly.

D-4

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-25 2.12.3 USDOT Special Form Certificate USA/0335/S-96 Rev 13

East BuDdlng, PHH-23 1200 Naw Jersey Ave, SE Waahlngton, D.C. 20590 U.S. Department IAEA CERTIFICATE OB' COMPETENT AUTHORITY of Transportation SPECIAL B'ORM RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS Pipeline and CRRTIFICATE USA/0335/S-96, REVISION 13 Hazardous Materials Safety Administration This certifies that the sources described have been demonstrated to meet the regulatory requirements for special form radioactive material as prescribed in the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1 and the United States of America 2 for the transport of radioactive material.

1. Source Identification - QSA Global, Inc. Model 875 Series.

2. Source Description - Cylindrical single or double encapsulations with the outer capsule made of Type 304L stainless steel and tungsten inert gas or laser welded. Approximate outer dimensions are 6.35 mm (0.25 in.) in diameter and either 19.05 mm (0.75 in.) or 24.2 mm (0.954 in.) in length. Inner capsules, when present, are made of stainless steel or titanium. Construction of the outer capsule shall be in accordance with attached QSA Global, Inc.

Drawing No. R875 OUTER, Rev. E. Construction of any inner capsule shall be in accordance with attached QSA Global, Inc. Drawing No.

R875 INNER, Rev. C, or QSA Global, Inc. Drawing No. R87527-40, Rev.

A.

3. Radioactive Contents - No more than either: 14.8 TBq (400 Ci) of Iridium-192 as a solid metal; 8.14 TBq (220 Ci) of Cobalt-60 as a solid metal; 5.56 TBq (150 Ci) of Selenium-75 in the form of a physically inert and stable metal-selenide compound; 1.11 TBq (30 Ci) of Cesium-137 as encapsulated CsC1 2 ; 1.85 TBq (50 Ci) of Thulium-170 as Tm 2 0 3 ; or 7. 4 TBq (200 Ci) of Ytterbium-169 as Yb 2 0 3

Only the activity of Ir-192 in special form may be determined from a measurement of the rate of decay or a measurement of the radiation level at a prescribed distance from the source.

1 "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2012 Edition, No. SSR-6" published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

Vienna, Austria.

2 Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 100-199, United States of America.

(- 2 -)

CERTIFICATE USA/0335/S-96, REVISION 13

4. Management System Activities Records of Management System activities required by Paragraph 306 of the IAEA regulations shall be maintained and made available to the authorized officials for at least three years after the last shipment authorized by this certificate. Consignors in the United States exporting shipments under this certificate shall satisfy the requirements of Subpart H of 10 CFR 71.

5. Expiration Date This certificate expires on March 31, 2023.

Previous editions which have not reached their expiration date may continue to be used.

This certificate is issued in accordance with paragraph(s) 804 of the IAEA Regulations and Section 173.476 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, in response to the February 22, 2018 petition by QSA Global, Inc., Burlington, MA, and in consideration of other information on file in this Office.

Certified By:

May 31, 2018 William Schoonover (DATE)

Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety Revision 13 - Issued to extend the expiration date, clarify Se-75 form, and update QSA Global, Inc. Drawing No. R875 OUTER.

TUNGSTEN INERT GAS OR LASER WELDED

.02 C

.094

~---D---_.

A---------..i SECTION A-A NOTES:

1. INTERNAL VOID TO BE 0.010 ml OR GREATER.

2. MATERIAL: 304L STAINLESS STEEL

3. INNER CAVITY DIMENSIONS MAY VARY. METALLIC SPACERS SPRINGS AND GUARDS, WHICH SECURE AND/OR LOCATE THE UNLESS OTI--!ERWISE SPEOFIED-RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WITHIN THE CAPSULE, MAY BE USED, AND SHALL A LL DIMENSIONS ARE INCHES TOLERANCES:

HAVE A MELTING POINT ABOVE 800°C. FRACTIONS +/- l /8 x.x +/- 0.12

4. MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS TO BE 0.02 INCHES. x.xx +/- 0.06 x.xxx +/- 0.020 CAPSULE NO. A 0B C D DESCRIPTIVE 87501 .954 .190 .150 .522 QSA GLOBAL I DRAWING 88702 .750 .190 .118 .522 40 NORTH AVE, BURLINGTON, MA 01803 1--E_R_F_#--,-_ _ 0_AT_E--1 A.;:PP:;..;R~O_V...,..,.A--:LS:---::-,--,-- r IT LE 87 5 SER IES ss DR OUTER CA PS ULE SIZE DWG. NO. 5 UTER REV 3788 f----:-=-r....----+--------t A SCALE: NONE SHEET 1 OF 1 E

r.30S TUNGSTEN INERT GAS OR LASER WELDED f

~.205

1.191 t t

.258 .051 NOTES:

1. MATERIAL: 304L STAINLESS STEEL

2. INTERNAL VOID VOLUME TO BE 0.010 ml OR GREATER.

3. INNER CAVITY DIMENSIONS MAY VM((. METALLIC SPACERS, SPRINGS AND GUARDS WHICH SECURE AND/OR LOCATE THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WITHIN THE CAPSULE MAY BE USED.

4. MINIMUM WAU THICKNESS TO BE 0.019.

DESCRIPTIVE DRAWING UNL!SS OTHERWISE SPECIFl[D DIMEHSIQNS Dt INCHES TITLE 875 SERIES INNER CAPSULE TOlERAHCES:

FRACTIONS +/- 1/8 X.X :!: 6.12 SIZE DWG. HO. R87 INNER REV ERF # 1739 lC.XX :!: 0.06 XJOO< :!: 0.020 A SCALE: NONE C ..

,--.30 0 .16 ~ .20

. 19 TUNGSTEN INERT GAS OR LASER WELDED NOTES:

1. MATERIAL: 316L STAINLESS STEEL OR EQUIVALENT, OPTIONAL MATERIAL: COMMERCIALLY PURE TITANIUM, GRADE 4.

2. INNER CAVITY DIMENSIONS MAY VARY. METALLIC SPACERS, SPRINGS "AND GAURDS WHICH SECURE AND/OR LOCATE THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL WITHIN THE CAPSULE MAY BE USED.

,l MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS TO BE 0.009.

QS!LGi_Q.f14.L. _

TITLEX540N CAPSULE ASSEMBLY SIZE DWG. NO. 5 - 4 REV ERF II 1739 A SCALE: NONE A

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global, Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 2-26 2.12.4 USDOT Special Form Certificate USA/0502/S-96 Rev 12

East Bulldlng, PHH-23 1200 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, D.C. 20590 U.S. Department IA.BA CERTIFICATE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY of Transportation SPECIAL FORM RAD:IOACT:IVE MATERIALS Pipeline and CERT:IF:ICATE USA/0502/S-96, RBV:IS:ION 12 Hazardous Materials Safety Administration This certifies that the sources described have been demonstrated to meet the regulatory requirements for special form radioactive material as prescribed in the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency 1 and the United States of America 2 for the transport of radioactive material.

1. Source Identification QSA Global, Inc. Model Nos. X54 (Manufactured before January 1, 1998), X540 (Manufactured on or after February 17, 1981), and X540/1 (Manufactured on or after September 27, 2000).

2. Source Description Tungsten inert gas or laser seal welded cylindrical single or double encapsulations. The outer encapsulation is made of titanium or stainless steel and the inner encapsulation, if used, is made of titanium, stainless steel, or aluminum. Approximate exterior dimensions are 5.15 mm (0.2 in.)

maximum diameter and 15.15 mm (0.6 in.) in length (Model X54); and 5.16 rnm (0.2 in.) in diameter and 7.65 mm (0.3 in.) in length (Models X540 and X540/1). Construction shall be in accordance with attached Amer sham Drawing No. A10639, Issue C (Model X54) or QSA Global Inc. Drawing No. R87527, Rev. H (Models X540 and X540/1).

1 "Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2012 Edition, No. SSR-6" published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

Vienna, Austria.

2 Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 100-199, United States of America.

(- 2 -)

CERTIFICATE USA/0502/S-96, REVISION 12

3. Radioactive Contents - No more than 17.0 TBq (459.5 Ci) of Cobalt-60, in the form of a metal, in the Model X54. No more than either:

20.0 TBq (540.5 Ci) of Cobalt-60 in the form of a metal; 17.0 TBq (459.5 Ci) of Iridium-192 in the form of a metal; or 5.56 TBq (150.3 Ci) of Selenium-75 in the form of a physically inert and stable metal-selenide compound, in the Models X540 and X540/1. Only the activity of Ir-192 in special form may be determined from a measurement of the rate of decay or a measurement of the radiation level at a prescribed distance from the source.

4. Management System Activities Records of Management System activities required by Paragraph 306 of the IAEA regulations shall be maintained and made available to the authorized officials for at least three years after the last shipment authorized by this certificate. Consignors in the United States exporting shipments under this certificate shall satisfy the requirements of Subpart H of 10 CFR 71.

5. Expiration Date This certificate expires on March 31, 2023.

Previous editions which have not reached their expiration date may continue to be used.

This certificate is issued in accordance with paragraph(s) 804 of the IAEA Regulations and Section 173.476 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, in response to the February 22, 2018 petition by QSA Global, Inc., Burlington, MA, and in consideration of other information on file in this Office.

Certified By:

May 31, 2018 William Schoonover (DATE)

Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety Revision 12 - Issued to extend the expiration date, clarify Se-75 physical form, and update production drawings.

DRG NO. A10639 Item Ducrlptlon Drawing No. No. ott 1 BODY A10836 ITEM. 1 2 PUJG STAIN.Sll.. A10638 FOR ENGRAVING DETAIL~

SEE DRAWING A62615 ACTUAL SIZE APPROVAL USED ON 1'1111-.-11 . . , . . . . . . . ,

,... - aa * #NMII

7.65 MAX X540,540/1 LID SHANK MODEL MATERIAL X540 316L STAINLESS STEEL 05.16 MAX X540/1 TITANIUM 5.00 MAX& TUNGSTEN INERT GAS OR LASER WELDED NOTES:

1. INTERNAL VOID TO BE 0.010 ml OR GREATER.

2. MATERIAL: SEE TABLE

3. INNER CAVITY DIMENSIONS MAY VM((. METALLIC SPACERS, SPRINGS AND GUARDS WHICH SECURE AND/OR LOCATE TI-IE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR INNER SOURCE CAPSULE WITHIN THE CAPSULE MAY BE USED.

4. MINIMUM WALL THICKNESS TO BE 0.22.

5. DIMENSIONS ARE IN MIWMETERS NOTES:

1. MATERIAL: SEE TABLE DESCRIPTIVE DRAWING 40 NORTH AVF.. EIURUNOTON, MA 01803 UNLESS Oll£RWl9E SPECIFIED TITLE OIMEN!IONS IN INCt£S TOLERANCES:

X540 CAPSULE SERIES FRACTIONS :I: 1/8 X.X :I: 6.12 SIZE DWG. NO. REV ERF # 3726 x.xx :I: 0.06 x.xxx :!: 0.()2() A SCALE: NONE OF H

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3- 1 Section 3 - THERMAL EVALUATION 3.1 Description of Thermal Design The Model 650L transport package is a completely passive thermal device having no mechanical cooling system or relief valves. Cooling of the package is through free convection and radiation. There are no specific cooling or insulating design features.

Pressure relief of the container is not necessary during the thermal test as the construction is not air tight and will allow venting to the atmosphere.

The maximum activity for this package is 240 Ci (8.88 TBq) of lr-192 or 300 Ci (11 .1 TBq) of Se-75. Accounting for self-absorption in the source, this equals a maximum content activity of 552 Ci (20.4 TBq) of lr-192. The corresponding decay heat generation rate for the content activity is approximately 4.8 Watts (See Table 1.2.A). The thermal evaluations are based on the decay energy of lr-192 as this is greater than the decay energy of Se-75.

3.1.1 Design Features The Model 650L transport package is described in Section 1. The containers use depleted uranium shielding. The depleted uranium is fully enclosed in the steel structure and endplates which are attached by screws. This construction prevents oxidation by severely limiting oxygen from reaching the depleted uranium shield.

3.1.2 Decay Heat of Contents From Table 1.2.A, a maximum of 4.8 Watts of decay energy is available to be absorbed by the package.

3.1.3 Summary Tables of Temperatures Tabl e 31 A Summary Tabl eofTemperatures Surface Temperature Model 650L Packages Comments Condition lnsolation (38°C in full sun) 70°C (158°F) Section 3.4.1 .1 Decay Heatina (38°C in shade) 46°C (115°F) Section 3.4.1.2 Maximum Fire Test Temperature 996°C (1,825°F) See Test Plan Report TP80 Post-Fire (Maximum 884°C (1,623°F)

Temperature) 3.1.4 Summary Tables of Maximum Pressures All Model 650L containers are vented to atmosphere. As such, no pressure will build up in the units under either Normal or Hypothetical Accident conditions.

Any pressure generated within the special form source is significantly below that which would be generated during the Hypothetical Accident Conditions thermal test, which is shown in Section 2.7.4.3 to result in no loss of structural integrity or containment.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-2 Ta bl e 31..B S ummary T a bleofM ax1mum . p ressures Normal Conditions Fire Conditions Void Package 88°C (190°F) 800°C (1,472°F)

Volume Comments Configuration Pressure Pressure IN 3 Developed Developed 650L 0 0 psiQ O psiQ 3.2 Material Properties and Component Specifications 3.2.1 Material Properties Table 3.2.A lists the relevant thermal properties of the important materials in the transport package. The sources referred to in the last column are listed below the table.

. : Therma IP ropert1es ofp*

Tab e 3 .2A . IT ransoo rt p ac kaae Mater1a rmc1pa

Is Material Density Melting/Combustion Thermal Source (lb/in 3} Temperature Expansion Depleted 1,130°c Reference #1 , p. 6-11 0.68 8µin/in°F Uranium (2,066°F) and Reference #2 1,082°C Reference #1 , p. 6-7 Copper 0.32 9.2µin/in°F

{1,980°F} and 6-11 321°c Reference #1, p. 6-7 Lead 0.41 29.3µin/in°F (620°F) and 6-11 Carbon Steel 1,510°C Reference #1 , p. 6-7 0.28 6.3µin/in°F (nominal) (2,750°F) and 6-11 Stainless 1,427°C Steel-Type 0.29 9.9µin/in°F Reference #1 , p. 6-11 (2,600°F) 304 1,104°c Titanium 0.18 5.2µin/in°F Reference #1 , p. 6-11 (3, 100°F)

Polyurethane Foam 8 lb/ft3 - 150µin/in°C Reference #1 , p. 6-199 3,426°C Tungsten 0.58 min 2.5 µin/in °F Reference #1 , p. 6-11 (6,200°F)

Resource references:

1. Eugene A. Avallone and Theodore Baumeister Ill, Mark's Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, Tenth Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996.

2. Lowenstein, Paul. Industrial Uses of Depleted Uranium. American Society for Metals. Metals Handbook, Volume 3, Ninth Edition.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-3 3.2.2 Component Specifications All components are specified and described on the drawings included in the Appendix 1.3.

3.3 General Considerations 3.3.1 Evaluation by Analysis Evaluations by analysis are described in the section they apply to in this Safety Analysis Report or when applicable in the Test Plans contained in Section 2.12.

3.3.2 Evaluation by Test Evaluations by direct testing are documented in the Test Plans contained in Section 2.12.

3.4 Thermal Evaluation for Normal Conditions of Transport 3.4.1 Heat and Cold 3.4.1.1 lnsolation and Decay Heat This analysis determines the maximum surface temperature produced by solar heating of the Model 650L transport package loaded at maximum activity with the contents that produce the highest energy input in accordance with 10 CFR 71 .71(c)(1) and IAEA TS-R-1 . This will be compared to the Normal Transport test conditions temperature range to determine which is the most onerous for thermal stress considerations.

The model consists of taking a steady state heat balance over the surface of the transport package. In order to ensure conservatism, the following assumptions are made:

The transport package is assumed to undergo free convective heat transfer from the top and sides.

The inside package faces are considered perfectly insulated so there is no conduction into the package. The faces are considered to be sufficiently thin so that no temperature gradients exist in the faces.

The lid of the package is modeled as a rectangular solid, 10 inches (254 mm) long, 8 % inches (210 mm) wide and 5 inches (127 mm) high. The outer shell of the package is modeled as a cylinder, 7 7/16 inches (189 mm) in diameter and 8 % inches (210 mm) long.

The decay heat load (4.8 Watts) is added to the solar heat input load.

The emissivity coefficient of the steel package is assumed to be 0.8.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-4

The absorptivity coefficient of the steel package is conservatively assumed to be 1.0.

The following heat calculations are based on the steady-state equilibrium relationship between the heat gained by the package and the heat lost.

In the steady state Heat Input= Heat Output, 01N = Solar Heat Input + Decay Heat Oour = Heat loss by Radiation and Convection The solar heat input is the combined solar heating of the top horizontal surface (flat), side vertical surface of the lid (flat) and the side vertical surface of the outer shell (curved). The insolation data, provided in 10 CFR 71.71(c)(1) , is found in Table 3.4.A.

Table 3.4.A: lnsolation Data Surface lnsolation for a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period fa-cal/cm 2 or W/m 2 )

Horizontal base None Other horizontal flat surfaces 800 Non-horizontal flat surfaces 200 Curved surfaces 400 Practically all solid materials are opaque to thermal radiation (even glass is only transparent to a fairly narrow range of wavelengths), and thermal radiation is in fact either reflected or absorbed within a very shallow depth of matter. Thus, for solids, it is possible to neglect transmissivity and write:

reflectivity, p + absorptivity, a. = 1 where p = 0 and a.= 1 i.e., the sum of the radiation reflected and absorbed by the material is equal to the total incident energy. Since the reflected energy does not contribute to the heat energy contained within the system, or package, it is not necessary to consider it in the analysis. However, the absorptivity of the material is the fraction of the total incident energy entering the system, which in this case is the heat input due to insolation.

Heat input due to insolation falling on top surface, QIT Oir = 800 W/m 2 x 0.053 m2 = 42.4 W Heat input due to insolation on lid side surfaces (assumed rectangular box) , 01Ls 01Ls = 200 W/m 2 x 0.118 m2 = 23.6 W Heat input due to insolation on outer shell surface (assumed cylinder), 01os 01os = 400 W/m 2 x 0.124 m2 = 49.6 W

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-5 Decay Heat Input: QoT = 4.8 W The total heat input is the sum of the solar heat input multiplied by the absorptive constant a. for the material plus the decay heat input.

Total Heat Input Q,N = a.(Q1T + Q1Ls + Q,os) + QoT = 120.4 W The total heat output is the sum of the radiation and convection heat transfer

(

Reference:

Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer, F.P. lncropera, 4th Edition, 1996, p. 9-10).

Total Heat Output: QouT = QR + QLT + QLs + Qos Radiation Heat Transfer (QR):

QR = B E ATs {(Tw + 273)4 - (TA + 273)4}

o-s Where: B = 5.67 x 1 W/m 2 K4 (Stefan-Boltzmann Constant)

E = 0.8 (emissivity)

ATS = 0.295 m2 (surface area of the lid top, lid sides and outer shell)

T w = The maximum surface temperature of the package TA= 38°C (ambient temperature)

Therefore, QR = 1.34 x 1 o-s {(Tw + 273)4 - 9.35 x 109}

Lid top surface convection (QLT):

QLT = HLTALT(Tw - TA)

Where ALT = 0.053 m2 (lid top surface area) and HLT = the free convection coefficient for a flat horizontal surface.

For a heated plate facing up, the free convection coefficient for laminar flow is:

HLT = 0.54[(g P(Tw- TA) L3 ) / (v a. )]0 *25 (K / L)

(

Reference:

Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer, F.P. lncropera, 4t11 Edition, 1996, Ch. 9)

Where:g = 9.8 m/s2 p = 0.00322 (1/TA assuming TA= 311 K)

L = 0.0572 m (Area/Perimeter) v = 18.9 x 10..a m2/s a.= 26.9 x 1()-6 m2/s K = 28.52 x 10*3 W/m K HLT = 2.79 (Tw- 38) 0*25 Substituting this into the convection equation for the lid top surface produces:

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-6 QLT = 0.148 (Tw- 38)1.25 Lid side surface convecti on (0Ls):

0Ls = HLsALs(Tw - TA)

Where ALs = 0.118 m2 (total surface area of lid sides) and HLs = the free convection coefficient for a vertical surface.

For a heated plate, the free convection coefficient for laminar flow is:

HLs = [0.68 + 0.67[(g ~ (Tw - TA) L3 ) / (v a. )] 0*25 / {1 + (0.492 a./v) 9116}419] (K / L)

(

Reference:

Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer, F.P. lncropera, 4th Edition, 1996, Ch. 9)

Where: L = 0.056 m (area/perimeter). Therefore:

HLs = 0.346 + 2.67 (Tw - 38) 0-25 Substituting this into the convection equation for the lid side surface produces:

0Ls = 0.041 (Tw-38) + 0.315 (Tw-38)1.25 Outer shell surface convection (Oos):

Oos = HosAos (Tw - TA)

Where Aos = 0.124 m2 (total surface area of the outer shell) and Hos = the free convection coefficient for a vertical surface.

For a vertical plate the free convection coefficient for laminar flow is:

Hos = [0.68 + 0.67[(g ~ (Tw - TA) L3 ) / (v ex )]0- 25 / {1 + (0.492 a./v)911 6}419) (K / L)

(

Reference:

Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer, F.P. lncropera, 4th Edition, 1996, Ch. 9)

Where L = 0.077 m (area/perimeter). Therefore:

Hos = 0.194 + 2.47 (Tw - 38)0-2 5 Substituting and solving for Oos produces Oos = 0.024(Tw- 38) + 0.306 (Tw- 38)1.25

As stated above, 01N cx(O,r + 01Ls + O,os) + Oor 120.4 W, and Oour =QR +

0Lr + 0Ls + Oos. Setting 0,N = Oour and substituting produces:

120.4 W = (1.34 x 10-S{(Tw + 273)4 - 9.35 x 109}] + [0.148 (Tw - 38) 1*25) + [0.041 (Tw - 38) +

0.315 (Tw-38) 1*25) + (0.024 (Tw- 38) + 0.306 (Tw-38) 1*25)

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-7 Which when reduced produces:

120.4 W = 1.34 x 1o-s(Tw + 273)4 - 125.29 + 0. 769 (Tw - 38) 1*25 + 0.065 (Tw - 38)

Iteration of this relatio nship yields a maximum wall temperature (Tw) of 70°C (158°F).

This temperature will not adversely affect the package during normal transport since the melting temperatures of all safety critical components are well above this temperature. Additionally, charring of the polyurethane foam will not begin to occur at such low temperatures.

3.4.1.2 Still Air (shaded) Decay Heating This analysis calculates the maximum surface temperature of the Model 650L Transport package in the shade (i.e., no insolation effects), assuming an ambient temperature of 38°C (100°F).

The same assumptions from Section 3.4.1 .1 are used. To ensure conservatism, the following additional assumptions are made:

The entire decay heat (4.8 W) is deposited in the exterior surfaces of the package.

The interior of the package is perfectly insulated and heat transfer occurs only from the exterior surface to the environment.

100% of the total heat is conservatively assumed to be deposited in the sides of the package lid.

The only heat transfer mechanism is free convection.

Using these assumptions, the maximum wall temperature T w is found using:

Tw=(q/hA)+TA Where:q = 4.8 W (heat deposited per unit time on the package surface) h = 5 W/m 2 K (free convection heat transfer coefficient for air)

A = 0.118 m2 (surface area of the lid sides)

TA= 311°K (ambient air temperature of 38°C)

(Reference Fundamentals of Heat and Mass Transfer, F.P. lncropera, 4th Edition, 1996)

Solving for T w produces a maximum wall temperature (Tw) of 46°C (115°F),

which is less than the maximum 50°C (122°F) allowed by 10 CFR 71.43(g).

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-8 3.4. 1.3 Cold Affected Materials T he carbon steel components of the Model 650L are susceptible to brittle fracture at low temperatures. However, the package successfully met the Normal and Hypothetical accident transport tests at temperatures below-40°C {-40°F},

therefore the package complies with the requirements of this section.

3.4.2 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses The temperature and pressure variations described in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.3 will not adversely affect the transport package during normal transport. The melting temperatures of all safety critical components are well above these temperatures and there will be no pressures generated in the package to cause package failure. It is therefore concluded that the Model 650L transport package will maintai n its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport thermal stress conditions.

3.4.3 Maximum Normal Operating Pressure All 650L components are vented to the atmosphere. As such, pressure will not build up in the packages during Normal Transport conditions. Containers will exhibit a pressure differential of O psi as they are vented to the atmosphere with no means for creating a pressure differential. No other contributing gas sources are present.

3.5 Thermal Evaluation Under Hypothetical Accident Conditions 3.5.1 Initial Conditions The thermal test performed and described under Test Plan 80 and Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.1 2) for detailed description of the test specimen initial conditions.

3.5.2 Fire Test Conditions The thermal test was performed for test specimen TP80{B). The damage produced during the drop and puncture tests had allowed maximum source displacement in the shield as well as the potential for shield oxidation during the thermal test. The thermal test was not considered necessary for the other test specimens since their results would be less severe than TP80(B)

For TP80(8), lead shims placed under the depleted uranium shield were expected to melt during thermal testing. This would allow the shield to drop down towards the bottom plate and away from the top plate. Since the lock assemblies remained securely attached to the top plate this would allow the source assemblies to be raised above the fully shielded position in the shield.

The crack in the inner shell and the opening in the outer shell provided a path for air to reach the depleted uranium shield during thermal testing. Therefore, oxidation of the shield was possible.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-9 To obtain the largest possible displacement of the shield during thermal testing, the test specimen was placed on a jig to raise the side face of the unit to an angle (53° above horizontal) that positioned the center of gravity of the shield over the bottom plate inside edge (See Figure 3.5.A). The side with the crack was facing down.

Front of Oven TP80(B) Orientation and Thermocouple Locations Figure 3.5.A - Model 650L (TPSO(B)) Thermal Test Orientation During thermal testing, the test period of 30 minutes was started after all specimen thermocouples measured at least 810°C (1,490°F). To allow sufficient air for combustion of the specimen's polyurethane foam, the door of the oven was held open by 1 inch (25 mm) thick insulating strips placed on each side of the furnace door. This created a 1 inch (25 mm) wide by 36 inch (914 mm) long opening at the top and bottom of the oven door (total opening of 72 in 2 (465 mm2)).

At the end of the 30 minute test interval, the specimen was removed from the furnace and allowed to self-extinguish and cool down. Post-test visual inspections showed that the crack width did not change (but a cracked piece of the inner shell had dropped out of position). The polyurethane foam had burned off and some minor oxidation of the shield had occurred as evidenced by a small amount of depleted uranium oxide below the cracked shell.

Post-test radiographs showed that the shield had shifted down as expected. This resulted in some pullout of the source tubes from the top plate (less than 0.5 inches (13 mm)). The radiation profile of the device performed following the thermal test showed that the highest observed radiation level , 28 mR/hr at one meter was well below the allowable level of 1,000 mR/hr at one meter. Therefore, the 650L satisfies the thermal test requirements of 10 CFR 71.73(c)(4).

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision 10 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 3-10 3.5.3 Maximum Temperatures and Pressure In Section 2.12, detailed description of the temperature variations measured in the test specimen during the thermal test is provided. Since the 650L is vented to the atmosphere, no pressures were generated in the package during the thermal test.

3.5.4 Temperatures Resulting in Maximum Thermal Stresses In Section 2.12, a description of the damage induced in the test specimen due to thermal stresses generated in the package during the thermal test is provided .

3.5.5 Fuel/Cladding Temperatures for Spent Nuclear Fuel Not applicable. This package is not used for transport of spent nuclear fuel.

3.5.6 Accident Conditions for Fissile Material Packages for Air Transport Not Applicable. This package is not used for transport of Type B quantities of fissile material.

3.6 Appendix Not Applicable.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 4-1 Section 4 - CONTAINMENT 4.1 Description of the Containment System The containment system for the Model 650L transport package are the radioactive source capsules. The source capsules transported in the 650L transport package are certified as special form radioactive material under 49 CFR 173 and IAEA TS-R-1 . The special form source capsule, stop ball and connector are swaged to a flexible steel wire to form the source wire assembly.

The source wire assembly is maintained within the shielded configuration of the package by components of the lock assembly after being inserted into the shield tube. The lockslide component engages the source wire and prevents it from being pulled through the top of the lock assembly.

4.1.1 Special Requirements for Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel Not applicable. This package is not used for the transport of spent nuclear fuel.

4.2 Containment Under Normal Conditions of Transport (Type B Packages)

As demonstrated in the Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12) and supported by assessments when applicable, performance of the normal conditions of transport testing caused no loss or dispersal of radioactive contents, no significant increase in surface radiation levels and no substantial reduction in the effectiveness of the package. The Model 650L package, therefore, meets the requirements of this section.

4.3 Containment Under Hypothetical Accident Condition As demonstrated in the Test Plan 80 Report (Section 2.12) and supported by assessments when applicable, performance of the hypothetical accident conditions of transport testing, the radiation level at one meter from the surface of the package did not exceed 1 R/hr. The Model 650L package, therefore, meets the requirements of this section.

4.4 Leakage Rate Tests for Type B Packages The primary containment for the radioactive material in the Model 650L transport package is the radioactive source capsules. All source capsules authorized for Type B transport in the Model 650L package are certified as special form radioactive material under 10 CFR Part 71, 49 CFR Part 173 and IAEA TS-R-1. After manufacture and again once every six months thereafter prior to transport, the source capsule is leak tested in accordance with ISO 9978:1992(E) (or more recent editions) to ensure that containment of the source does not allow release of more than 0.005 µCi (185 Bq) of radioactive material. These fabrication and periodic tests ensure that contamination release from the package does not exceed the regulatory limits.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burli ngton, Massachusetts Page4-2 Reference : ISO 9978: 1992(E) - Radiation Protection - Sealed Radioactive Sources -

Leakage Test Methods.

4.5 Appendix Not Applicable.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 5- 1 Section 5 - SHIELDING EVALUATION 5.1 Description of Shielding Design 5.1.1 Design Features The principal shielding in the Model 650L transport package is the depleted uranium shield assembly. In some cases, additional supplemental lead shielding is added to the shield assembly as described in the drawings included in Appendix 1.3.

5.1.2 Summary Table of Maximum Radiation Levels The tables in this Section include radiation profile data obtained from the 650L packages that were tested to the Normal and Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport under Test Plan 80 Report (see Section 2.12).

Table 5.1.A: Model 650L Test Unit TPSO(A) Summary Table of External Radiation Levels Extrapolated to Capacity of 240 Ci (8.88 TBq lr-192 (Non-Exclusive Use)

Normal Package Surface mSv/hr (mrem/hr) 1 Meter from Package Surface mSv/hr Conditions of (mrem/hr)

Transport2 Radiation Top Side Bottom Top Side Bottom Gamma 0.94 (94) 0.89 (89) 0.94 (94) 0.024 (2.4) 0.008 (0.8) 0.007 (0.7)

Neutron NA NA NA NA NA NA Total 0.94 (94) 0.89 (89) 0.94 (94) 0.024 (2.4) 0.008 (0.8) 0.007 (0.7) 10 CFR 71.47(a) 2 (200) 2 (200) 2 (200) 0.1 (10) 1 0.1 (10) 1 0.1 (10) 1 or Paragraphs 530 and 531 of TS-R-1 Limit Hypothetical Accident Conditions2 Gamma 0.027 (2.7) 0.010 (1 .0) 0.006 (0.6)

Neutron NA NA NA Total 0.027 (2.7) 0.010 (1.0) 0.006 (0.6) 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2) or Paragraph 656(b)(ii)(I) of TS-R-1 10(1,000) 10 {1,000) 10(1,000)

Limit 1Transport Index may not exceed 10.

2Table results are extrapolated to the device capacity and incorporate surface correction factors

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 5-2 Table 5.1.B: Model 650L Test Unit TP80(B) Summary Table of External Radiation Levels Extrapolated to Capacity of 8.88 TBq (240 Ci lr-192 (Non-Exclusive Use)

Normal Package Surface mSv/hr (mrem/hr) 1 Meter from Package Surface mSv/hr Conditions of (mrem/hr)

Transport2 Radiation Top Side Bottom Top Side Bottom Gamma 0.71 (71) 0.83 (83) 0.83 (83) 0.02 (2.0) 0.008 (0.8) 0.007 (0.7)

Neutron NA NA NA NA NA NA Total 0.71 (71) 0.83 (83) 0.83 (83) 0.02 (2.0) 0.008 (0.8) 0.007 (0.7) 10 CFR 71 .47(a) 2 (200) 2 (200) 2 (200) 0.1 (10) 1 0.1 (10) 1 0.1 (10) 1 or Paragraphs 530 and 531 of TS-R-1 Limit Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport2 Gamma 0.28 (28) 0.079 (7.9) 0.011(1 .1)

Neutron NA NA NA Total 0.28 (28) 0.079 (7.9) 0.01 1 (1 .1) 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2) or Paragraph 656(b)(ii)(I) ofTS-R-1 10 {1, 000) 10 (1, 000) 10 (1 ,000)

Limit 1

Transport Index may not exceed 10.

2Table results are extrapolated to the device capacity and incorporate surface correction factors Table 5.1 .C: Model 650L Test Unit TP80(C) Summary Table of External Radiation Levels Extrapolated to Capacity of 8.88 TBa (240 Ci lr-192 (Non-Exclusive Use)

Normal Package Surface mSv per hour 1 Meter from Package Surface mSv per Conditions of (mrem per hour) hour (mrem per hour)

Transport2 Radiation Top Side Bottom Top Side Bottom Gamma 0.59 (59) 1.06 (106) 0.59 (59) 0.002 (2.0) 0.008 (0.8) 0.005 (0.5)

Neutron NA NA NA NA NA NA Total 0.59 (59) 1.06(106) 0.59 (59) 0.002 (2.0) 0.008 (0.8) 0.005 (0.5) 10 CFR 71 .47(a) 2 (200) 2 (200) 2 (200) 0.1 (10) 1 0.1 (10) 1 0.1 (10) 1 or Paragraphs 530 and 531 of TS-R-1 Limit Hypothetical Accident Conditions of Transport2 Gamma 0.022 (2.2) 0.01 (1.0) 0.005 (0.5)

Neutron NA NA NA Total 0.022 (2.2) 0.01 (1 .0) 0.005 (0.5) 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2) or Paragraph 656(b)(ii)(I) ofTS-R-1 10 (1 ,000) 10 (1, 000) 10 (1,000)

Limit 1Transport Index may not exceed 10.

2Table results are extrapolated to the device capacity and incorporate surface correction factors.

Table 5.1.D includes radiation profile data used to demonstrate that the Model 650L package configurations will meet the external radiation level requirements for non-exclusive use transport when loaded to capacity for Se-75.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 5-3 Table 5.1.D: Model 650L s/n 274 Se-75 Profile Results Summary Table of External Ra diation Levels Extrapolated to Capacity of 11.1 TBc (300 Ci) Se-75 (Non-Exclusive Use)

Package Surface mSv/hr (mrem/hr) 1 Meter from Package Surface mSv/hr (mrem/hr)

Radiation Top 1 Side Bottom Top 1 Side Bottom Gamma 0.19(19) 0.12(12) 0.12 (12) 0.005 (0.5) 0.005 (0.5) 0.002 (0.2)

Neutron NA NA NA NA NA NA Total 0.19 (19) 0.12 (12) 0.12 (12) 0.005 (0.5) 0.005 (0.5) 0.002 (0.2) 10 CFR 71.47(a) 2 (200) 2 (200) 2 (200) 0.1 (10) 0.1 (10) 0.1 (10) or Paragraphs 530 and 531 ofTS-R-1 Limit 1

Profile results from the top of the 650L were taken without the protective cover installed on the package. Actual surface and one meter readings from the top of the package will be lower than noted in the table.

5.2 Source Specification 5.2.1 Gamma Source The gamma sources allowed for transport in the Model 650L transport package are specified in Sections 1.2.2 and 2.10.

5.2.1 Neutron Source Not Applicable. The Model 650L transport package is not used for the transportation of neutron emitting sources.

5.3 Shielding Model 5.3.1 Configuration of Source and Shielding Not applicable. A shielding model was not used to justify acceptance of this package.

Shielding justification was based on direct measurement.

5.3.2 Material Properties Not Applicable. A shielding model was not used in the justification of this package.

Shielding justification was based on direct measurement.

5.4 Shielding Evaluation 5.4.1 Methods Shielding justification was based on direct measurement. See Test Plan Report 80 (Section 2.12) for results of radiation surveys of the 650L test specimens. The test specimens were profiled before testing, and after the hypothetical accident testing.

These results are shown in Tables 5.1.A through and 5.1.D. All radiation profile data are within regulatory acceptance limits. All newly manufactured packages were profiled prior

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Jnc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 5-4 to final acceptance and all packages are surveyed prior to shipment. This fi nal acceptance profile takes into account the maximum capacity of the package. Any package not meeting the required dose rates is rejected.

5.4.2 Input and Output Data Radiation measurements included in this Section were adjusted to the maximum activity capacity for the package (e.g., activity correction factor) . Activity correction factors (CFA) were obtained by using the following relationship:

Maximum Package Acti vity Capacity (Ac)

CF.= ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

A Actual Pro f ile Activity (Ap)

For Example, ifAp = 235 Ci and Ac = 240 Ci, then 240Ci CFA = 235 Ci = 1.02 Therefore, all original surface and 1 meter profile measurements would be multiplied by a factor of 1.02 for a package profiled using 235 Ci and a package capacity of 240 Ci.

Radiation measurements at the surface of the container are adjusted to compensate for the off-set of the survey meter probe from the true surface of the package for newly manufactured packages .

Note: The addition of correcting for the meter probe position relative to the package surface was an NRC requirement first implemented in the early 1980's when Amersam (QSA Global's predecessor) purchased Automation Industries. At that time, the NRC required the implementation of this correction factor for newly manufactured equipment, however, no backfit was required or performed for Type B packages manufactured prior to that date. The current population of 650L devices in use were manufactured prior to the date when surface correction factors were required.

The radiation profile data showed no increase in radiation dose after testing beyond normal measurement variations. All test specimens met the regulatory requirements.

5.4.3 Flux-to-Dose-Rate Conversion Not Applicable. Flux rates were not used to convert to dose rates in any shielding evaluations.

5.4.4 External Radiation Levels Radiation surveys for the Model 650L showed maximum surface and 1 meter radiation levels from the transport packages within regu latory limits. Radiation surveys of the Model 650L transport packages after undergoing normal and accident condition transport testing were also well within the regulatory limits.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 5-5 5.5 Appendix Not Applicable.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 6-1 Section 6 - CRITICALITY EVALUATION All parts of this section are not applicable. The Model 650L transport package is not used for shipment of Type B quantities of fissile material.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 7- l Section 7 - PACKAGE OPERATIONS Operation of the Model 650L transport package must be in accordance with the operating instructions supplied with the transport package, per 10 CFR 71.87 and 71.89. All paragraph references to IAEA TS-R-1 apply to IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material No. TS-R-1 2009 Edition .

7.1 Package Loading 7.1.1 Preparation for Loading The Model 650L packages must be loaded and closed in accordance with the following written procedures. Shipments of Type B quantities of radioactive material are authorized for sources specified in Section 7.1.1.1. Maintenance and inspection of the Model 650L packaging is in accordance with the requirements specified in Section 7.1 .1.2.

7.1.1.1 Authorized Package Contents The Model 650L transport packages are designed to transport 240 Ci (8.88 TBq) of lr-192 or 300 Ci (11 .1 TBq) of Se-75 as special form capsules attached to source wire assemblies. .

The Model 650L transport packages are designed for use with a special form source capsule as approved under a Competent Authority (e.g. U.S. Department of Transportation) special form certification. Details of encapsulation as well as chemical and physical form of the radioactive material will comply with specifications approved under U.S. Department of Transportation special form certifications. Sources transported in this package must also meet a minimum ANSI/HPS N43.6-2007 (R2013) Temperature Classification of 6 and Pressure Classification of 3.

7.1.1.2 Packaging Maintenance and Inspection Prior to Loading

a. Ensure all markings are legible and labels are securely fastened to the container.

b. Inspect the container for signs of significant degradation. Ensure that the housing integrity is secure and does not have any significant dents, cracks of any type or rust.

c. Ensure all lid cover bolts and fasteners (hardware) required for assembly of the package and as specified on the drawings referenced on the Type B transport certificate are present, intact, and fit for use.

Without disassembly or removal from the device, examine the visible external surfaces of the top plate bolts and lock assembly screws for any signs of fatigue cracking.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 7-2 The bolts/fasteners must be replaced if they are no longer fit for use (e.g., threads stripped, unable to fully thread, signs of cracking, etc).

Ensure any replacement hardware meets all applicable specifications listed on the drawings referenced on the Type B transport certificate.

d. Ensure the locking assemblies allow free movement of the lock slide when performi ng an operational test and that the plunger lock engages and is functional. Ensure the shipping caps install and secure over the source tubes on the lock assemblies.

e. Ensure threaded holes used to secure the protective lid to the container body do not have damaged threads and engage the 3/8-16 x 7/8 inch long shipping cover bolts.

f. If the container fa ils any of the inspections in steps 7 .1.1.2.a-e, remove the container from use until it can be brought into compliance with the Type B certificate.

7.1.2 Loading of Contents NOTE: These loading operations apply to "dry" loading only. The Model 650L package is NOT approved for wet loading.

7.1.2.1 Ensure the contents are authorized for use in the package.

7.1.2.2 Ensure the package condition has been inspected in accordance with Section 7.1.1 .

7.1.2.3 Ensure that the source(s) are secured into place in the storage position(s) in accordance with the following requirements. Compliance with the following requirements ensures that the source(s) are securely locked in position before shipment.

a. Removal and installation of radioactive material contained within the shield container must be performed in a shielded cell/enclosure capable of holding the maximum isotope capacity of the container, or by using remote transfer operations for wire mounted sources. Container loading can only be performed by persons specifically authorized under an NRC or Agreement State license (or as otherwise authorized by an International Regulatory Authority). All necessary safety precautions and regulations must be observed to ensure safe transfer of the radioactive material.

b. Using remote handling techniques, load the source assembly so that it is fully inserted into the source tube with the inactive end of the source assembly protruding from the top of the source tube.

Once the source is loaded, push the lock slide to the "locked" position, depress the plunger lock and remove the key.

c. Install the shipping cap over the source on the lock assembly.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 7-3

d. Repeat 7.1.2.3.b and 7.1.2.3.c for the second source tube if transporting more than one source in the container.

e. Secure the shipping cover to the container top plate using the hardware specified on the descriptive assembly drawing (see the drawings referenced on the Type B transport certificate). Tighten the screws so that no gap exists between the screw heads, cover or container top plate.

7.1.3 Preparation for Transport 7.1.3.1 Ensure that all conditions of the certificate of compliance are met.

7.1.3.2 Perform a contamination wipe of the outside surface of the package and ensure removable contamination does not exceed 4 Bq/cm2 (0.0001

µCi/cm 2) when averaged over a wipe area of 300 cm 2

Note: If an overpack is used for shipment of the Model 650L, surveys and contamination wipes must first be performed on the external surface of the 650L and then on the surface of the overpack.

7.1.3.3 Survey all exterior surfaces of the package to ensure that the radiation level does not exceed 2 mSv/hr (200 mR/hr) at the surface. Measure the radiation level at one meter from all exterior surfaces to ensure that the radiation level is less than 0.1 mSv/hr (10 mR/hr).

7.1.3.4 Ship the container according to the procedure for transporting radioactive material as established in 10 CFR 71.5.

NOTE: The US Department of Transportation, in 49 CFR 173.22(c), requires each shipper of Type B quantities of radioactive material to provide prior notification to the consignee of the dates of shipment and expected arrival.

7.2 Package Unloading 7.2.1 Receipt of Package from Carrier 7.2.2.1 The consignee of a transport package of radioactive material must make arrangements to receive the transport package when it is delivered. If the transport package is to be picked up at the carrier's terminal, 10 CFR 20.1906 requires that this be done expeditiously upon notification of its arrival.

7.2.2.2 Upon receipt of a transport package of radioactive material:

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 7-4

a. Survey the transport package with a survey meter as soon as possible, preferably at the time of pick-up and no more than three hours after it was received during normal working hours.

Radiation levels should not exceed 2 mSv/hr (200 mR/hr) at the surface of the transport package, nor 0.1 mSv/hr (10 mR/hr) at a distance of 1 meter from the surface.

b. Record the actual radiation levels on the receiving report.

C. If the radiation levels exceed these limits, secure the container in a Restricted Area and notify the appropriate personnel in accordance with 10 CFR 20 or applicable Agreement State regulations.

d. Inspect the outer container for physical damage or leaking. If the package is damaged or leaking or it is suspected that the package may have leaked or been damaged, restrict access to the package. As soon as possible, contact the Radiation Safety Office to perform a full assessment of the package condition and take necessary follow-up actions.

e. Record the radioisotope, activity, model number, and serial number of the source(s) and the transport package model number and serial number.

7.2.2 Removal of Contents 7.2.2.1 Unloading of the package must be in accordance with the instructions supplied with the package per 10 CFR 71.89.

7.2.2.2 Unloading of the package must also be in accordance with applicable licensing provisions for the user's facility related to radioactive material handling.

7.3 Preparation of Empty Package for Transport In the following instructions, an empty transport package refers to a Model 650L transport package without an active source contained within the shielded container. To ship an empty transport package:

7.3.1 Perform the following procedure to confirm that there are no unauthorized sources within the container. Use only the gauge provided with the source changer. Do not use any other tool or gauge for another device:

7 .3.1.1 Unload the container in accordance with Section 7 .2.2.

7.3.1.2 After removing the source(s) insert the depth gauge attached to the container into the empty tube(s) of the package. Read the gauge at the top of the outlet fitting.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 7-5 7.3.1.3 The gauge should bottom out in the empty source tube(s) and indicate a safe condition. The red line should be flush with the top of the outlet fitting. Verify that each empty tube indicates a safe condition.

7.3.1.4 If the gauge indicates an unsafe condition (redline is above the outlet fitting) there may be an obstruction in the tube. Remove the gauge slowly while observing the survey meter. If the radiation levels increase as the gauge is being removed keep the gauge within the source tube, secure the container and contact QSA Global Inc. for further instructions.

7 .3.1.5 If radiation levels remain normal as the gauge is being removed, completely remove the gauge, secure the container and contact QSA Global Inc. for further instructions.

7.3.2 Ensure that the levels of removable radioactive contamination on the outside surface of the transport package do not exceed 4 Bq/cm 2 (0.0001 µCi/cm 2) when averaged over 300 cm 2

7.3.3 When it is confirmed that the Model 650L transport package is empty, prepare the transport package for shipment. Survey the assembled package to ensure the external surface radiation level does not exceed 5 µSv/hr (0.5 mR/hr).

7.3.4 Ship the container according to the procedure for transporting radioactive material as established in 10 CFR 71.5.

7.4 Other Operations 7.4.1 Package Transportation by Consignor Persons transporting the Model 650L transport package in their own conveyances should comply with the following:

7.4.1.1 For a conveyance and equipment used regularly for radioactive material transport, check to determine the level of contamination that may be present on these items. This contamination check is suggested if the package shows signs of damage upon receipt or during transport, or if a leak test on the special form source transported in the package exceeds the allowable limit of 185 Bq (0.005 µCi).

7.4.1.2 If contamination above 4 Bq/cm2 (0.0001 µCi/cm 2), when averaged over 300 cm 2 , is detected on any part of a conveyance or equipment used regularly for radioactive material transport, or if a radiation level exceeding 5 µSv/hr (0.5 mR/hr) is detected on any conveyance or equipment surface, then remove the affected item from use until decontaminated or decayed to meet these limits.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 7-6 7.4.2 Emergency Response In the event of a transport emergency or accident involving this package, follow the guidance contained in "2016 Emergency Response Guidebook: A Guidebook for First Responders During the Initial Phase of a Dangerous Goods/Hazardous Materials Incident", or equivalent guidance documentation.

Reference:

"2016 Emergency Response Guidebook: A Guidebook for First Responders During the Initial Phase of a Dangerous Goods/Hazardous Materials Incident" 7.5 Appendix Not Applicable.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 8-1 Section 8 -ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 8.1 Acceptance Test 8.1.1 Visual Inspections and Measurements Visually inspect each transport package component to be shipped to ensure the following:

8.1 .1.1 The transport package was assembled properly to the applicable drawings referenced on the Type B transport certificate.

8.1 .1.2 Evaluate each Model 650L for shielding to ensure the transport dose rate requirements are met when the container is loaded to capacity.

8.1 .1.3 All fasteners as required by the applicable drawings on the Type B transport certificate are properly installed and secured.

8.1 .1.4 The relevant labels are attached, contain the required information, and are marked in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1904, 10 CFR 40.13(c)(6)(i),

10 CFR 34, and 10 CFR 71 or equivalent Agreement State regulations.

Visual inspections and measurements will be performed in accordance with QSA Global lnc.'s USNRC approved Quality Assurance Program No. 0040.

8.1.2 Weld Examinations Weld examinations will be performed in accordance with the applicable drawings requirements and in accordance with QSA Global lnc.'s USNRC approved Quality Assurance Program No. 0040.

8.1.3 Structural and Pressure Tests Prior to first use of a 650L transport package, container structural conformance will be evaluated in accordance with the applicable drawings requirements and in accordance with QSA Global lnc.'s USNRC approved Quality Assurance Program No. 0040. The containment system is not designed to require increased or decreased operating pressures to maintain containment during transport, therefore pressure tests of package components prior to first use is not required.

8.1.4 Leakage Tests The source capsules (primary containment) are wipe tested for leakage of radioactive contamination upon initial manufacture. The removable contamination must be less than 0.005 µCi (185 Bq). The source capsules will also be subjected to leak tests under ISO 9978:1992(E) (or more recent editions). The source capsules are not used if they fail any of these tests.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 20 19 - Revision I 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 8-2 8.1.5 Component and Material Tests Component and material compliance is achieved in accordance with the requirements in QSA Global lnc.'s USNRC approved Quality Assurance Program No. 0040.

The lock assembly of the device is tested to ensure that the security of the radioactive source will be maintained. Failure of this test prevents use of the device until the lock assembly is corrected and re-tested.

8.1.6 Shielding Tests The radiation levels at the surface of the transport package and at 1 meter from the surface are evaluated prior to first transport. This survey is performed in a low background area and involves a slow scan survey of the entire surface area as well as one meter from the surface of the device. This survey is used to identify any significant void volumes or shield porosity which could prevent the finished device from complying with the dose limits in 10 CFR 71.47.

These radiation levels, when extrapolated to the rated capacity of the transport package, must not exceed 2 mSv/hr (200 mR/hr) at the surface, nor 0.1 mSv/hr (10 mR/hr) at 1 meter from the surface of the transport package. Failure of this test will prevent use of the device. In addition, the surface and 1 meter radiation levels are measured prior to every shipment. If the reading exceeds 2 mSv/hr at the surface or 0.1 mSv/hr at one meter, the package is not shipped.

Failure of the radiation profile tests for any Model 650L container indicates the potential of significant shielding porosity and causes the rejection of the affected Model 650L package. Rejected packages which do not comply with the construction requirements on the applicable drawings referenced on the Type B certificate, or that do not comply with the radiation profile requirements will not be distributed as approved Type B(U) packages.

8.1.7 Thermal Tests Not applicable. The source content of the Model 650L packages has minimal effect on the package surface temperature and therefore no additional testing is necessary to evaluate thermal properties of the packaging.

8.1.8 Miscellaneous Tests Upon initial manufacture of the source assembly, and prior to first shipment of the source assembly, subject the swage coupling between the source capsule and cable to a static tensile test with a load of 100 lbs (445 N). Failure of this test will prevent use of the source in the Type B(U) transport package.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision l 0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 8-3 8.2 Maintenance Program 8.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests Not applicable. Material certification, or equivalent dedication process, is obtained for Safety Class A components used in the transport package prior to their initial use.

Based on the construction of the design, no additional structural testing during the life of the package is necessary if the container shows no signs of defect when prepared fQr shipment in accordance with the requirements of Section 7 of the SAR.

The 650L packaging system is not designed to require increased or decreased operating pressures to maintain containment during transport, therefore pressure tests of package components prior to individual shipment is not required.

8.2.2 Leakage Tests As described in Section 8.1.4, "Leakage Tests," the radioactive source assembly is leak-tested at manufacture. In addition, the sources are leak tested in accordance with that Section at least once every six months thereafter if being transported to ensure that removable contamination is less than 0.005 µCi (185 Bq). Additionally, a contamination wipe of the shield source tubes is performed whenever the shield is returned to the manufacturer (typically the shield is shipped to a customer with new sources and may be returned directly to the manufacturer with decayed sources for disposition).

8.2.3 Component and Material Tests The transport package is inspected for tightness of fasteners, proper seal wires, and general condition prior to each use as described in Section 7 and Section 8.1 .1 of this SAR. No additional component or material testing is required prior to shipment.

8.2.4 Thermal Tests Not applicable. The source content of the Model 650L packages has minimal effect on the package surface temperature and therefore no additional testing is necessary to evaluate thermal properties of the packaging prior to shipment.

8.2.5 Miscellaneous Tests Inspections and tests designed for secondary users of this transport package under the general license provisions of 10 CFR 71 .17(b) are provided in Section 7.

8.3 Appendix Not applicable.

Safety Analysis Report for the Model 650L Transport Package QSA Global Inc. January 2019 - Revision I0 Burlington, Massachusetts Page 9-1 Section 9 - QUALITY ASSURANCE 9.1 U.S. Quality Assurance Program Requirements All component fabrication (including assembly) is controlled under the QSA Global, Inc.

Quality Assurance program approved by the USNRC (approval number 0040) and ISO 9001.

9.2 Canada Quality Assurance Program Requirements Not applicable. This package is originally submitted for certification in the United States and complies with the criteria in Section 9.1.

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