ND-21-0659, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08 (Index Number 109)

ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08 (Index Number 109)

ML21281A174
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/08/2021
From:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ND-21-0659
Download: ML21281A174 (7)

Text

^ ,1 >> I I MichaelJ. Yox 7825 River Road

^ ilHi jOUthBrn NUCl63r Regulatory Affairs Director Waynesboro, GA 30830 Vogtle 3& 4 706-848-6459 tel OCT 0 8 2021 Docket No.;52-025 ND-21-0659 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08 rindex Number 1091 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) item 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]. This ITAAC verifies that containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.

The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in NEI 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process under 10 CFR Part 52, which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991 Respectfully submitted,

-rX_,

Michael J. Yox Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4

Enclosure:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08 [Index Number 109]

MJY/CMK/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0659 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena III Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. H. Nieh Mr. M. D. Meier Mr. G. Chick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. M. J. Vox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Ms. J.M. Coleman Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. K. J. Drudy Mr. J. M. Fisher Mr. R. L. Beiike Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. M. Bailey Mr. M. King Mr. G. Bowman Ms. A. Veil M C. P. Patel M G. J. Khouri M C. J. Even M B. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert M . C. Welch M . J. Gaslevic M . O. Lopez-Santiago M G. Armstrong M M. Webb M T. Fredette M C. Santos M B. Davis M . J. Vasquez M J. Eargle M E. Davidson M . T. Fanelli Ms. K. McCurry M J. Parent M B. Griman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0659 Page 3 of 3 Qqlethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. 8. M. Jackson Daiton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinqhouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani Mr. D. C. Durham Mr. M. M. Corletti Mr. Z. 8. Harper Mr. J. L. Coward Other Mr. 8. W. Kline, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., CDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Baich Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0659 Enclosure Page 1 of 4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-21-0659 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.2.01.08[Index Number 109]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0659 Enclosure Page 2 of 4 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment

8. Containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.

Inspections. Tests. Analyses An analysis for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies will be performed to demonstrate (1)that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly.

Acceptance Criteria Analysis exists for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies and concludes that the penetrations are protected against currents which are greater than their continuous ratings.

ITAAC Determination Basis An analysis for the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies is performed to demonstrate (1) that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly.

Most low voltage instrumentation and communication circuits are self-limiting in that circuit resistance limits the fault current to a level that does not damage the penetration. The energy levels in the instrumentation and communication systems are such that damage cannot occur to the containment penetration. For circuits that are not self-limiting, an analysis is performed to verify the as-built containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the manufacturer's continuous ratings. The analysis demonstrates that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or in circuits with high short circuit current, that each circuit has redundant protection devices in series, and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly rated short circuit thermal capacity curves, and the fault current does not exceed the penetration assembly rated short circuit thermal capacity curve in the continuous current time range. Each circuit that requires redundant protective devices is identified in the applicable protection coordination calculations.

The containment electrical penetration assemblies analyzed are listed in Attachment A. Spare penetrations or penetrations containing low voltage instrumentation and communication circuits which are excluded from the analysis are noted in Attachment A.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0659 Enclosure Page 3 of 4 The electrical penetrations are designed In accordance with IEEE Standard 317(Reference 1).

Qualification testing of the electrical penetrations Is performed In accordance with IEEE Standard 317 and IEEE Standard 323(Reference 2). The analysis of the as-bullt containment electrical penetration assemblies Is performed In accordance with section 5.4 of IEEE Standard 741 (Reference 3). Analysis of Class 1E circuits Is documented In APP-IDS-EOC-014 (Reference 4). Analysis of Non-Class lEclrcults Is documented In APP-ECS-EOC-016 (Reference 5). The analysis results are summarized In APP-CNS-ZOR-001 (Reference 6). The analysis results exist for the as-bullt containment electrical penetration assemblies and conclude that the penetrations are protected against fault currents which are greater than their continuous current ratings.

The Electrical Penetration Assemblies(EPA) Protection Analysis Is available for NRC Inspection as part of the ITAAC Completion Package (Reference 7).

ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, Southern Nuclear Operating Company(SNC) performed a review of all ITAAC findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found that there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC.

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above Information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.2.01.08 was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria were met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained In their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition In accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References favailable for NRC inspection)

1. IEEE Standard 317-1983,"IEEE Standard for Electrical Penetration Assemblies In Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

2. IEEE Standard 323-1974,"IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

3. IEEE Standard 741-1997,"IEEE Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class 1E Power Systems and Equipment In Nuclear Power Generating Stations"

4. APP-IDS-EOC-014 Rev. 4, "Verification of IDS Low Voltage Class 1 E-Safety Related Electrical Penetrations"

5. APP-ECS-EOC-016 Rev. 4, "Verification of Primary and Backup Electrical Protection of the Low Voltage and Medium Voltage Non-Safety Related Power and Control Containment Electrical Penetrations."

6. SV3-CNS-Z0R-001 Rev. 0,"Vogtle Unit 3 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies ITAAC 109 As-bullt Analysis Report"

7. 2.2.01.08-U3-CP-Rev0, ITAAC Completion Package

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-21-0659 Enclosure Page 4 of 4 Attachment A Containment System Electrical Penetration Assemblies(EPAs)*

Tag No. EPA Description - Equipment Name DAS-EY-P03Z ** Electr cal Penetration P03 ECS-EY-P01X Electr cal Penetration P01 ECS-EY-P02X Electr cal Penetration P02 ECS-EY-P06Y Electr cal Penetration P06 ECS-EY-P07X Electr cal Penetration P07 ECS-EY-P09W Electr cal Penetration P09 ECS-EY-P10W Electr cal Penetration P10 IDSA-EY-P11Z** Electr cal Penetration P11 IDSA-EY-P12Y Electr cal Penetration PI2 IDSA-EY-P13Y Electr cal Penetration PI3 IDSD-EY-P14Z** Electr cal Penetration PI4 IDSD-EY-P15Y Electr cal Penetration PI5 IDSD-EY-P16Y Electr cal Penetration PI6 ECS-EY-P17X Electr cal Penetration PI7 ECS-EY-P18X Electr cal Penetration PI8 ECS-EY-P19Z ** Electr cal Penetration PI9 ECS-EY-P20Z ** Electr cal Penetration P20 EDS-EY-P21Z** Electr cal Penetration P21 ECS-EY-P22X Electr cal Penetration P22 ECS-EY-P23X Electr cal Penetration P23 ECS-EY-P24(Spare) ** Electr cal Penetration P24 ECS-EY-P25W Electr cal Penetration P25 ECS-EY-P26W Electr cal Penetration P26 IDSC-EY-27Z ** Electr cal Penetration P27 IDSC-EY-28Y Electr cal Penetration P28 IDSC-EY-29Y Electr cal Penetration P29 IDSB-EY-30Z ** Electr cal Penetration P30 IDSB-EY-31Y Electr cal Penetration P31 IDSB-EY-32Y Electr cal Penetration P32

• Excerpt from COL Table 2.2.1-1

• • Denotes a spare or a penetration containing low voltage instrumentation/communication circuits which are excluded from analysis