Text

DPO-2020-003 Case File, Public (Redacted)
	ML21188A281
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/07/2021
From:	Ian Gifford; NRC/OE
To:	;
	Gifford I
References
	DPO-2020-003
	Download: ML21188A281 (62)
	v • d • e

DPO Case File for DPO-2020-003 The following pdf represents a collection of documents associated with the submittal and disposition of a differing professional opinion (DPO) from an NRC employee involving the Safety Evaluation Report for the Surry Subsequent License Renewal.

Management Directive (MD) 10.159, NRC Differing Professional Opinion Program, describes the DPO Program. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1513/ML15132A664.pdf The DPO Program is a formal process that allows NRC employees and contractors to have their differing views on established, mission-related issues considered by the highest-level managers in their organizations (i.e., Office Directors and Regional Administrators). The process also provides managers with an impartial, multi-person review of the issue (one person chosen by the employee). After a decision is issued to an employee, they may appeal the decision to the Executive Director for Operations (or the Commission, for those offices that report to the Commission).

Because the disposition of a DPO represents a multi-step process, readers should view the records as a collection. In other words, reading a document in isolation will not provide the correct context for how this issue was reviewed and considered by the NRC.

It is important to note that the DPO submittal includes the personal opinions, views, and concerns by NRC employees. The NRCs evaluation of the concerns and the NRCs final position are included in the DPO Decision or in the DPO Appeal Decision (for appealed cases).

The records in this collection have been reviewed and approved for public dissemination.

Document 1: DPO Submittal Document 2: Memo Establishing DPO Panel Document 3: DPO Panel Report Document 4: DPO Decision Document 5: DPO Appeal Document 6: Statement of Views Document 7: DPO Appeal Decision

Document 1: DPO Submittal

Document 2: Memo Establishing DPO Panel

K. Webber, et al. 2 The DPO Panel has a critical role in the success of the DPO Program. Your responsibilities for conducting the independent review and documenting your conclusions in a report are addressed in the handbook for MD 10.159 in Section II.F and Section II.G, respectively. The DPO Web site also includes helpful information, such as a Differing Views Best Practices Guide, tables with status information and timeliness goals for open DPO cases, and closed DPO case files (which include DPO panel reports). We will also be sending you additional information that should help you implement the DPO process.

Timeliness is an important DPO Program objective. Thus, the disposition of this DPO should be considered an important and time sensitive activity. Although the DPO MD identifies a timeliness goal of 75 calendar days for the DPO panel review and report and 21 additional calendar days for the issuance of a DPO Decision, the DPO Program also sets out to ensure that issues receive a thorough and independent review. Therefore, the overall timeliness goal will be based on the significance and complexity of the issues, schedule challenges, and the priority of other agency work. Process Milestones and Timeliness Goals specific to this DPO will be discussed and established at a kick-off meeting.

Communication of expected timelines and status updates are important in the effectiveness and their overall satisfaction with the Differing Views Program. If you determine that your activity will result in the need for an extension beyond your timeliness goal, please send an e-mail to Mr. Nieh, the DPO submitter, and DPOPM.Resource@nrc.gov and include the reason for the extension request and a proposed completion date for your work. Mr. Nieh is responsible for subsequently forwarding the request for a new DPO Decision issuance timeliness goal to the EDO for approval.

An important aspect of our organizational culture includes maintaining an environment that encourages, supports, and respects differing views. As such, you should exercise discretion and treat this matter appropriately. Documents should be distributed on an as-needed basis.

In an effort to preserve privacy, minimize the effect on the work unit, and keep the focus on the issues, you should simply refer to the employee as the DPO submitter. Avoid conversations and refrain from behaviors that could be perceived as retaliatory or chilling to the DPO submitter or that could potentially create a chilled environment for others. It is appropriate for employees to discuss the details of the DPO with their co-workers as part of the evaluation; however, as with other predecisional processes, employees should not discuss details of the DPO outside the agency. If you have observed inappropriate behaviors, heard allegations of retaliation or harassment, or receive outside inquiries or requests for information, please notify me or Ian Gifford.

On an administrative note, please ensure that all DPO-related activities are charged to Activity Code ZG0007. Managers should report time to their Management/Supervisor Activity Code. Administrative Assistants should report time to their Secretary/Clerical Activity Code.

We appreciate your willingness to serve and your dedication to completing a thorough and objective review of this DPO. Successful resolution of the issues is important for NRC and its stakeholders. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me or Ian Gifford. We look forward to receiving your independent review results and recommendations.

K. Webber, et al. 3

Enclosures:

1. DPO-2020-003 Submittal

2. Process Milestones and Timeliness Goals cc: H. Nieh, NRR A. Veil, NRR M. Gavrilas, NRR R. Taylor, NRR L. Betancourt, NRR C. De Messieres, NRR J. Gavula, NRR M. Case, RES I. Frankl, RES J. Bowen, RES G. Wilson, OE F. Peduzzi, OE D. Solorio, OE G. Figueroa-Toledo, OE I. Gifford, OE

Document 3: DPO Panel Report

H. Nieh control process as implemented thru 10 CFR 50.59. More detailed AMP descriptions may be preferable because the UFSAR then contains all AMP provisions in a single. consistent location, but such detail is not required.

The Panel also finds that, in the Surry SER, the staff inappropriately credits enhancements to the Generic Letter 89-13 program monitoring activities for components that Surry claimed (without sufficient bases) did not require an aging management review.

It should also be noted that during its review, the panel did not identify, nor was made aware of, any significant safety issues that would require immediate regulatory action.

The Panel also offers the following recommendations for your consideration:

Provide additional clarity in Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2014-06 on how to address operating experience that occurs late in the license renewal process. Such clarity could help ensure consistent staff treatment of such operating experience in future license renewal reviews. It should be noted that any such clarifications in RIS 2014-06 could lead to inconsistencies in associated industry guidance contained in industry's treatment of operating experience if NEI 17-01.

Provide staff an option to request an independent review of their non-concurring opinion (NCO) as part of the Non-Concurrence Process (NCP). The review could be performed by a single individual who did not review or concur on the subject document and who is also outside the decision-making chain. This review could be reserved for situations where the NCO has sufficient safety or regulatory significance. The conclusions of the independent review could be considered as part of the disposition of the NCO.

Investigate development and implementation of risk-informed approaches within the license renewal process. Such approaches offer the possibility for a more efficient and effective process consistent with NRC's strategy to transform the agency into a more modern, risk-informed regulator. Additional staff training and guidance development would likely be needed to support such approaches.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions regarding the enclosed report.

Enclosure:

DPO Panel Report cc: Submitter A. Veil, NRR, M. Gavrilas NRR R. Taylor, NRR G. Wilson, OE G. Figueroa-Toledo, OE I. Gifford, OE

Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) on Safety Evaluation Report for Surry Subsequent License Renewal (DPO-2020-03)

DPO Panel Report

/RN Kimberly A. Webber, Panel Chair

/RN Robert L. Tregoning, Panel Member

/RN Brian K. Harris, Panel Member December 21, 2020 Date

2 Introduction On August 5, 2020, a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff member filed a Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) in accordance with NRC Management Directive 10.159, "The NRC Differing Professional Opinions Program." The DPO involves an NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for the Surry subsequent license renewal (SLR). The submitter's issues claim that the SER provides an insufficient regulatory basis to ensure that operating experience has been appropriately addressed and inappropriately credits Generic Letter 89-13 program monitoring activities.

The NRC's Office of Enforcement accepted the DPO on August 13, 2020 and assigned the DPO case number DPO-2020-003. By memorandum dated September 2, 2020, the Office of Enforcement established an Ad Hoc Review Panel (the Panel) to perform a review of the DPO.

The Panel developed a draft Summary of Issues (SOI) and shared it with the submitter on November 10, 2020. Based on subsequent discussions and feedback from the submitter, a final SOI was agreed to by the DPO Panel and the submitter. The final SOI is documented in the next section.

The Panel was tasked with reviewing the individual DPO issues and providing conclusions along with recommendations, if necessary. Following initial discussions with the submitter and development of the SOI, the Panel performed its review by collecting and reviewing documents and conducting interviews with knowledgeable NRC staff. A list of documents reviewed, and NRC staff interviewed are listed in Appendices A and B, respectively. During its review, the panel did not identify, nor was made aware of, any significant safety issues that would require immediate regulatory action.

Summary of Issues (SOI)

Based on a review of the DPO submittal and associated references as well as an interview with the submitter, the Panel identified that the individual concerns could be grouped into two distinct areas, namely, improper dispositioning of operating experience and inappropriately crediting Generic Letter 89-13 program monitoring activities. The issues raised by the submitter are summarized as follows by the Panel.

1. The approach taken in the staffs acceptance of the Selective Leaching Program (as documented in the March 2020 SER) in light of the Fire Water System (FWS) operating experience that unfolded during the review, provides an insufficient regulatory basis to ensure the operating experience has been appropriately addressed in applicable aging management programs.

a. The SER credits undefined and undetermined corrective actions as meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29 for identifying actions that have been or will be taken with respect to managing the effects of aging. The approach as set forth in the SER sets a precedence that will undermine the effectiveness of future operating experience reviews for license renewal (LR) and is inconsistent with published industry and NRC guidance.

b. The SER accepts a generic updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) supplement for the Selective Leaching Program that does not include the extensive aging management program changes taken by the licensee to remedy the leaking FWS piping. The inadequate UFSAR program description does not

4 extended operation." Additionally, Part 54.29 states that a renewed license may be issued"... if there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed license will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB, and that any changes to the plant's CLB in order to comply with this paragraph are in accord with the Act and the Commission's regulations.

These matters are: (1) managing the effects of aging during the period of extended operation on the functionality of structures and components that have been identified to require review under

§ 54.21(a)(1) ... ".

F urther, there is both regulatory clarification and industry guidance on addressing OpE within an SLRA. Industry guidance in NEI 17-01 states that, per 10 CFR 54.30, licensees shall take measures under its current license to ensure that the CLB will be maintained throughout the term of its current license and, therefore, such measures are not within the scope of the license renewal review. However, NE 17-01 further states that"... an applicant for renewal is not relieved from addressing the issue relevant to the subsequent period of extended operations as part of its SLRA." Clarification is provided by Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2014-06, "Consideration of Current Operating Issues and Licensing Actions in License Renewal." The RIS addresses the timing of CLB changes with respect to major milestones pertaining to the SLRA (or LR application) including the receipt of the SLRA, the last required SLRA update, and the issuance of the renewed license.

The FWS operating event occurred prior to Surry's last required SLRA update, which corresponds to Scenario B in RIS 2014-06. In this scenario, the RIS indicates that CLB changes are reported pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21(b). The RIS also, requires that applicants must amend the SLRA to identify any CLB changes that materially affect the contents of the SLRA and states that the"... NRC will issue its SER when all open items have been closed, including any open items created by the reported CLB changes." The RIS further addresses issues affecting the content of an AMP and clearly states"... for plant-specific technical issues, the applicant needs to provide a sufficient technical basis to justify the adequacy of the proposed AMPs and [time-limited aging analyses] (TLAAs) in order to meet 10 CFR 54.21. When an applicant does not provide an adequate technical basis, the NRC staff cannot complete its review of the LRA."

Therefore, as stipulated by the submitter, the existing regulatory position in RIS 2014-06 and associated industry guidance certainly imply that all changes necessitated by OpE to relevant FWS AMPs (i.e., selective leaching and buried and underground pipes and tanks) should have been included in Surry's SLRA and not deferred to the CAP for resolution after approval of their SLRA. Most of the staff interviewed by the Panel had little knowledge of this RIS and, in particular, its relevance to the issue raised by the submitter. More importantly, staff had honest differing interpretations of what information and certainty would be needed to satisfy the 10 CFR 54.21 and 54.29 requirements and provide a"... sufficient technical basis from which to evaluate the adequacy of the applicant's aging management activities."

The submitter believes that the issues surrounding the Surry OpE should have been addressed by enhancing the Selective Leaching AMP, as part of the supplemented SLRA. Such an approach appears consistent with past practice as interviewees cited several examples (e.g.,

resolution of alkali-silica reaction issues in structural concrete at the Seabrook plant) where the approval of the SLRA was suspended until the licensee satisfactorily identified associated AMP changes. Interviews also confirmed that the approach used in Surry's SER, which credits the eventual disposition of the OpE through Dominion's CAP, appears to be unique.

5 However, one staff member interviewed by the DPO panel believes that a sufficient technical basis supporting the staff's evaluation is provided in Surry's SLRA, and is appropriately documented in the SER. In this instance, the applicant identified several changes to the Selective Leaching AMP based on the OpE that staff determined to be acceptable and further demonstrated that the FWS rupture had been successfully mitigated. The staff member believes that this demonstration provides an effective basis for determining that their Selective Leaching AMP is effective. This staff member also believes deferring any additional needed changes to the AMP until successful completion of the CAP is warranted given that final CAP resolution routinely takes two years. In this staff s opinion, requiring resolution of the impacts of all OpE on AMPs prior to approving an SLRA creates the possibility of multiple lengthy delays in the review process that have no significant safety benefit. Additionally, this practice also provides unique preference to OpE that occurs before the SLR license is granted compared with OpE that occurs after the license is granted. The Panel believes that there is merit to this argument.

The last part of the submitter's issue 1a (above) is that the approach as set forth in the SER sets a precedence that will undermine the effectiveness of future operating experience reviews. The submitter's concern is that such precedence would allow an SLR applicant to defer any AMP changes based on OpE until the CAP is completed. The Panel does not agree that the practice used in the Surry SER fundamentally alters how OpE will be addressed and evaluated in SLRA.

Only OpE that is still being resolved through an applicant's CAP program would be affected by this precedent. However, consistent with 10 CFR 54 and the approach taken in the Surry SER, the expectation is that an SLRA should provide an acceptable basis demonstrating the effectiveness of the AMPs while recognizing that AMPs are living programs that continually evolve, in part, due to OpE.

The Panel concludes that, as stipulated by the submitter, the SER credits undefined and undetermined corrective actions as meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29 for identifying actions that have been or will be taken with respect to managing the effects of aging and further that such an approach appears inconsistent with NRC's regulatory position and associated industry guidance. Ho e Panel disagrees with the contention that the approach as set forth in the SER sets a precedence that will undermine the effectiveness of future operating experience reviews for SLR. The DPO panel recognizes that the relevant Surry OpE was somewhat unique in both its timing and potential implications, which contributed to its unique handling within the SER. To eliminate future inconsistencies related to this type of scenario, the Panel recommends that staff consider providing additional clarity in RIS 2014-06 on how to address operating experience that occurs late in the license renewal process. Such clarity could help ensure consistent staff treatment of such operating experience in future license renewal reviews. It should be noted that any such clarifications in RIS 2014-06 could lead to inconsistencies in associated industry guidance contained in industry's treatment of operating experience if NEI 17-01.

Issue 1b:

The Panel agrees that, as stipulated by the submitter for issue 1b, the SER documents the acceptance of a generic UFSAR supplement for the Selective Leaching AMP that does not include the extensive AMP changes made by the licensee to remedy the leaking FWS piping.

10 CFR 54.21(d) requires that applicants submit an FSAR supplement containing a summary description of the programs and activities for managing the effects of aging and the evaluation of time-limited aging analyses for the period of extended operation. However, the requirements in 10 CFR 54.21 are not prescriptive about the level of detail that should be provided in the

11 The Panel recognizes that the agency has made a significant effort over the last few years to transform into a more modern and risk-informed regulator. Such change can be challenging, necessitating a change in culture and in the way that the agency has made regulatory decisions in the past. A challenge in this regard is for staff to understand and articulate the underlying safety significance of issues so that the agency's regulatory focus is appropriate. The 10 CFR Part 54 LRA/SLRA reviews are particularly difficult to assess in a risk-informed framework because age-related degradation is often characterized by low-likelihood, potential high consequence, high uncertainty, and cross-cutting attributes. These attributes make it challenging to accurately quantify the risk-significance of these issues compared to potential failures in active SSCs.

Associated staff review guidance, such as the GALL report, has focused on identifying best practices for aging management. While such guidance is laudable, it may not be necessary to adopt best practices in all situations and a graded approach could be considered where aging management practices are adopted that are commensurate with the risk-significance associated with the impact of applicable degradation mechanism on each specific SSC within the scope of license renewal. Therefore, the DPO panel recommends that staff consider developing and implementing risk-informed approaches within the license renewal process. Such approaches offer the possibility for a more efficient and effective process consistent with NRC's strategy to transform the agency into a more modern, risk-informed regulator. Additional staff training and guidance development would likely be needed to support such approaches. Qualitative evaluation rubrics could be helpful in this regard. Such an effort would be resource intensive and should be undertaking in concert with other changes being considered for the license renewal review process.

Recommendations Recommendation 1:

Provide additional clarity in Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2014-06 on how to address operating experience that occurs late in the license renewal process. Such clarity could help ensure consistent staff treatment of such operating experience in future license renewal reviews. It should be noted that any such clarifications in RIS 2014-06 could lead to inconsistencies in associated industry guidance contained in industry's treatment of operating experience if NEI 17-01.

Recommendation 2:

Provide staff an option to request an independent review of their non-concurring opinion (NCO) as part of the Non-Concurrence Process (NCP). The review could be performed by a single individual who did not review or concur on the subject document and who is also outside the decision-making chain. This review could be reserved for situations where the NCO has sufficient safety or regulatory significance. The conclusions of the independent review could be considered as part of the disposition of the NCO.

Recommendation 3:

Investigate development and implementation of risk-informed approaches within the license renewal process. Such approaches offer the possibility for a more efficient and effective process consistent with NRC's strategy to transform the agency into a more modern, risk-

12 informed regulator. Additional staff training and guidance development would likely be needed to support such approaches.

14

14. NUREG-2192, "Standard Review Plan for Review of Subsequent License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants," Accession No. ML17188A158.

15. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Open Session Transcript, April 8, 2020, Accession No. ML20115E451.

16. Letter, "Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application Safety Review- Documentation of Questions on Dominion Energy's October 31, 2019 Letter," December 2019, Accession No. ML193338960.

17. Letter, "Final Requests for Additional Information for the Safety Review of the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Subsequent License Renewal Application (L-2018-0023/000951)- Set 4," August 14, 2019, Accession No. ML19231A153.

18. Letter, "Final Requests for Additional Information for the Safety Review of the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Subsequent License Renewal Application (L-2018-0023/000951)- Set 3," August 2, 2019, Accession No. ML19217A358.

19. Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Subsequent License Renewal of Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, December 2019, Accession No. ML20052F523.

20. Generic Letter 89-13 (Supplement 1), "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment," April 4, 1990, Accession No. 9003300128.

21. Surry Power Station- Integrated Inspection Report 05000280/2020001 and 05000281/2020001; and 07200055/2020001, May 8, 2020, Accession No. ML20129J824.

Licensee Documents

1. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, October 15, 2018, Accession No. ML18291A828.

2. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Supplement 1, January 29, 2019, Accession No. ML19042A137.

3. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Supplement 2, April 2, 2019, Accession No. ML19095A666.

4. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Supplement 3, June 10, 2019, Accession No. ML19168A028.

5. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Supplement 4, October 14, 2019, Accession No. ML19294A044.

6. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Supplement 5, October 31, 2019, Accession No. ML19310E716.

15

7. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Supplement 6, November 19, 2019, Accession No. ML19329A287.

8. Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Response to Requests for Additional Information - Set 1, June 27, 2019, Accession No. ML19183A388.

9. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Response to Requests for Additional Information - Set 2, July 17, 2019, Accession No. ML19204A357.

10. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Response to Requests for Additional Information Sets 3 and 4, September 3, 2019, Accession No. ML192538330.

11. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Subsequent License Renewal Application, Response to Requests for Additional Information Sets 3 and 4, Revised SLRA Mark Ups, September 19, 2019, Accession No. ML192698734.

12. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 51, October 19, 2019, Accession No. ML19295D919.

13. Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 52, September 30, 2020, Accession No. ML20308A452.

SUBJECT:

STATEMENT OF VIEWS REGARDING APPEAL OF DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION DECISION INVOLVING SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR SURRY SUBSEQUENT LICENSE RENEWAL (DPO-2020-003) Introduction The purpose of the memorandum is to provide you with my statement of views regarding the appeal of the differing professional opinion decision (DPO)-2020-003. 1 The appeal asserts that corrective actions proposed in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Directors Decision memorandum are not sufficient to adequately address the DPO concerns. 2 Specifically, the appealer highlights a maintained concern regarding the regulatory basis for addressing fire water system (FWS) operating experience (OpE) and for crediting Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment (Legacy Library Accession No. 9003300128) activities in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staffs safety evaluation report (SER) for the subsequent license renewal (SLR) of Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Surry) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20052F523). CONTACT: Candace de Messieres, NRR (301) 415-8395 1 On August 5, 2020, DPO-2020-003, titled Safety Evaluation Report for Surry Subsequent License Renewal (ADAMS Accession No. ML15132A664), was submitted. The DPO concerns the regulatory basis documented in the staffs safety evaluation report related to the subsequent license renewal of Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20052F523). Specifically, issues related to the regulatory basis to ensure that operating experience has been appropriately addressed in applicable aging management programs and the credit for Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment (ADAMS Accession No. 9003300128) program monitoring activities are raised. 2 On January 28, 2021, the NRR Director, Ho K. Nieh, issued a Directors Decision regarding DPO-2020-003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML21025A309). The decision largely aligned with the recommendations and observations of the Ad Hoc DPO panel (the DPO Panel or Panel) (ADAMS Accession No. ML20353A330). Accordingly, NRR staff were tasked to update or evaluate pertinent guidance.

Since I was not involved with the initial review of this DPO, and, given the importance of the issues raised by the appealer, I took the time to assess related documents and information and to discuss the concerns with the appealer and staff involved with evaluating the original DPO. These steps enabled my views on this appeal and informed my decisions regarding if any additional actions are warranted. My Views of the Differing Professional Opinion Directors Decision Clarifying Statement The DPO Panel report summary of issues, item 2, states the following: By inappropriately crediting the program, the staff became a proponent of the license renewal application instead of performing an objective review. The appealer notes that the DPO Panel report does not include a finding regarding the staff being or not being a proponent of the license renewal application. The appealer further notes that the Directors Decision includes the following statement: The Panel also did not find that the staff was a proponent of the license renewal application by crediting GL 89-13 program monitoring activities, and requests a correction since while the absence of any finding technically makes the quoted sentence true, the absence of a finding cannot be portrayed as the DPO Panel making such a determination. I agree with the appealer from a literal interpretation standpoint; however, since the DPO appeal and this statement of views are included in the DPO case file and reflect an active dialog between individuals, I disagree the Directors Decision needs correction. Moreover, based on my independent assessment of the DPO Panels findings, conclusions, and recommendations, I do not find evidence to conclude that the staff was a proponent of the license renewal application. Setting a Precedent by Deferral to the Applicants Corrective Action Program The DPO Panel report summary of issues, item 1a, states the following: The SER credits undefined and undetermined corrective actions as meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29 for identifying actions that have been or will be taken with respect to managing the effects of aging. The approach as set forth in the SER sets a precedence that will undermine the effectiveness of future operating experience reviews for license renewal (LR) and is inconsistent with published industry and NRC guidance. While the DPO Panel acknowledges the approach does set a precedence, it did not agree that the approach fundamentally alters how OpE will be addressed and evaluated in subsequent SLR applications. The appealer contends that it does not seem possible to predict how or whether a newly established position will be cited as a precedent in future situations. I partly agree with the appealer; however, the Panel report states that the relevant Surry OpE was somewhat unique in both its timing and potential implications, which contributed to its unique handling within the SER and that only OpE that is still being resolved through an applicants corrective action program (CAP) would be affected by this precedent. In addition, the Directors Decision is aligned with the DPO Panel recommendation that the staff evaluate the germane guidance, Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2014-06, Consideration of Current Operating Issues and Licensing Actions in License Renewal, (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML13177A325), to provide

additional clarity on appropriate approaches to addressing OpE that occurs late in the license renewal process. The Directors Decision tasking also includes a review to evaluate if other pertinent guidance documents or training program updates are needed. Therefore, I concluded that no additional actions are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of future OpE reviews for license renewal. Lastly, I acknowledge the appealers summary of the treatment of OpE through existing programs as it relates to SLR and the NRCs oversight role in execution of licensee corrective actions. However, the Reactor Oversight Process is an effective, mature program that continues to evolve and improve in order to ensure it continues to meet its original program goals providing appropriate oversight throughout the operating lifecycle of the plant. Lack of Current Licensing Basis Clarity by Deferral to the Corrective Action Program I acknowledge the appealers perspective regarding deferral of corrective actions to the licensees CAP. However, I disagree that the approach used by the staff to evaluate the Surry FWS OpE in the context of SLR subverts the current licensing basis and that the treatment does not provide for a clear record of the basis for the staffs conclusions. I also do not believe that the approach clouds the licensing basis for future regulatory actions. The Surry SLR SER, Section 3.0.3.1.6, Selective Leaching, includes citations to the licensees SLR application supplements that report the FWS pipe rupture OpE and respond to pertinent NRC requests for information. The SER documents the NRC staffs evaluation of the licensee provided information, including its findings regarding the licensees initial actions and enhancements to Surrys Selective Leaching Aging Management Program (AMP) given the OpE. The SER states that additional changes to the AMP to address other possible issues, if necessary, will be identified as the licensee completes its development of corrective actions. However, it also states that the NRC staff finds that the conditions and operating experience at the plant are bounded by those for which the selective leaching program was evaluated. I agree with the position taken in the Directors Decision that the Surry SLR SER is adequate and that the NRC staff SER documents the basis for how applicable Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 54, Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants requirements are met. I note that the staffs SER was subject to a thorough review and concurrence process, that included a no legal objection determination by the Office of the General Counsel (OGC), comprehensive documentation and disposition of two related non-concurrences, and a rigorous Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) technical review. One strength of the NRC regulatory framework is that it provides for needed oversight through inspection, which includes review of a licensees corrective action program and its resolution of issues through that program. I support Region 2s efforts to review the final corrective actions either through a resident focus sample inspection or through a problem identification and resolution inspection. Applicants Failure to Follow Guidance Should Not Cause Us to Revise Our Guidance The appealer contends that no updates to RIS 2014-06 are needed and that the staffs limited awareness of the RIS is because applicants have, except for this occurrence, used the approach delineated in RIS. The appealer also provides an excerpt on the role of the license renewal technical review branches from NRR Office Instruction, RNWL-100, Application Review Process for License Renewal and Subsequent License Renewal (ADAMS Accession No. ML19171A409) highlighting the importance of ensuring clarity in SERs and expectations for

following guidance. Lastly, the appealer questions why the DPO Panel and the Office Director did not reinforce that safety evaluation reports should be consistent with the existing guidance. I appreciate the appealers perspectives and commitment to ensuring clarity and reliability by raising this concern. While I support adherence to guidance, as appropriate and as practicable, I also realize that in some cases it is necessary to balance its strict adherence with alternatives as dictated by our NRC Principles of Good Regulation: where several effective alternatives are available, the option which minimizes the use of resources should be adopted. Regulatory decisions should be made without undue delay. As noted previously, the SER was subject to a thorough review and concurrence process, that included OGC and ACRS reviews, as well as comprehensive documentation and disposition of two related non-concurrences. Therefore, I support the Panel recommendation and Office Directors Decision to update RIS 2014-06 to provide additional clarity on approaches for addressing late breaking OpE in license renewal reviews. Newly Identified Operating Experience Shows that Aging Management Is Needed The DPO Panel report summary of issues, item 2, states the following: The safety evaluation report inappropriately credits GL 89-13 program monitoring activities for components that Surry claimed (without sufficient bases) did not require an aging management review. The DPO Panel report states that there were no safety concerns identified during the staffs review of the aging management of the equipment monitored through GL 89-13 or summarized in the staffs SER. However, the appealer cites newly identified OpE that, if known at the time, may have impacted the staffs finding that the GL 89-13 program adequately managed aging. Since this new information was not available for consideration by the DPO Panel, I requested information on the license renewal process and the potential safety impact of the newly identified information as it relates to the SER conclusions. As the appealer notes since the applicant considered the subject equipment to be part of an active assembly the OpE was not provided to the NRC staff. While it is plausible that the OpE could have impacted the staffs review of the aging management, GL 89-13 commitments remain in place and the licensing basis, which includes applicable technical specifications, is sound ensuring the plant continues to operate safely. I also note, that while not provided to the NRC to support its SLR application, the OpE was documented and is still subject to appropriate assessment and corrective actions per established processes and procedures. Therefore, while I appreciate the appealers notation of this new OpE and potential implications to the NRC inspection program, I concluded that no additional actions are needed regarding the Surry SER. Additional clarity through guidance or training updates may be warranted to ensure consistency in NRCs approach to reviewing active assemblies in future SLR reviews. Moreover, I support further investigation of ways this type of OpE is assessed through the Reactor Oversight Process. Additional Actions by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation The information presented in the appeal justifies the following additional actions to be tasked within 14 days following issuance of this statement of views memorandum.

1. I am tasking NRRs Division of New and Renewed Licensing to evaluate if additional guidance or training is needed to ensure consistency in NRCs approach to reviewing active assemblies in future license renewal reviews.

2. I am tasking NRRs Division of Reactor Oversight to: 1) examine the OpE referenced by the appealer and look for similar or related OpE to determine if there is enough information available for the industry to appropriately perform preventative maintenance and prevent future failures; and 2) based on the information gathered, evaluate the adequacy of current NRC inspection program activities.

ML21085A390 NRR-106 OFFICE NRR NRR NAME CdeMessieres AVeil DATE 03/26/21 03/26/21 Document 7: DPO Appeal Decision UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 8, 2021 MEMORANDUM TO: James A. Gavula, Mechanical Engineer Division of New and Renewed Licenses Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Roberts, Darrell signing on behalf FROM: Margaret M. Doane of Doane, Margaret on 06/08/21 Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION APPEAL CONCERNING SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR SURRY SUBSEQUENT LICENSE RENEWAL (DPO-2020-003) The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of my considerations and conclusions regarding the Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) appeal you submitted on February 18, 2021. The appeal raised concerns with the regulatory basis documented in the staffs safety evaluation report (SER) related to the subsequent license renewal of Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20052F523). Specifically, you raised issues related to the regulatory basis to ensure that operating experience has been appropriately addressed in applicable aging management programs and with respect to the SER crediting Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment program monitoring activities. After careful consideration of your appeal, I conclude that although there were deficiencies in the review of the Surry subsequent license renewal application, no additional actions are needed with regard to the Surry SER. However, given these inadequacies, I am tasking the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to revise its guidance to increase clarity regarding the treatment of operating experience during license renewal reviews and to provide training to staff to ensure a common understanding on how to document deviations from guidance and how to appropriately review an aging management program for complex assemblies. CONTACT: Suzanne Dennis, OEDO 301-415-0760

J. Gavula 2 Your DPO appeal raised four specific issues. A paraphrased summary of issues and my conclusions for each are as follows. Issue 1: The staffs approach in the Surry SER sets a precedent that will undermine the effectiveness of future operating experience reviews. Answer 1: The staffs approach in the Surry SER does not set a binding legal precedent that the staff must follow in its subsequent license renewal reviews. However, to ensure that late-breaking operating experience is handled consistently and in a manner that does not undermine the effectiveness of operating experience reviews, I support NRRs recommendations to update RIS 2014-06 to provide additional clarity. Issue 2: The staffs approach in the Surry SER does not provide a clear record of the basis for the staffs conclusions and clouds the current licensing basis (CLB) for future regulatory actions. Answer 2: Based on my review, the Surry SER provides a rational basis for the staffs conclusions. Further, the staffs approach, in this instance, does not cloud Surrys CLB for future regulatory actions or otherwise subvert Surrys CLB. Issue 3: The NRC should not revise Regulatory Issue Summary 2014-06, as recommended in the DPO Panel report. Answer 3: I support NRRs decision to evaluate an update to the guidance, specifically RIS 2014-06. Issue 4: Newly identified operating experience shows that Surrys Generic Letter 89-13 activities did not adequately manage the effects of aging with respect to the right-angle drive cooler. Answer 4: I agree that although there are no immediate safety concerns, Surry did not adequately demonstrate how the effects of aging would be managed for the complex assembly components, and the NRC staff did not appropriately review the complex assembly guidance during the license renewal review period. Additionally, in response to all four issues, I am tasking NRR to provide training on their existing, or updated as appropriate, guidance to ensure that all staff is aware of the expectations when implementing guidance. This training should reinforce appropriate documentation of cases where the staff deviates from guidance. Thank you for taking the time to raise your concerns to me and for the detailed information you provided to support your position and my review. Your willingness to raise concerns through the DPO process is consistent with our organizational values of Openness and Commitment. More in-depth analysis of each of the issues you raised is provided below. In accordance with Management Directive (MD) 10.159, a summary of this appeal decision will be included in the Weekly Information Report posted on the NRCs public website to advise interested employees and members of the public of the outcome.

J. Gavula 3 DEDM-LED APPEAL PANEL ANALYSIS To better understand your concerns, I assigned the Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration, and Human Capital Programs (DEDM), an Executive Technical Assistant from my office, a subject matter expert from the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and an attorney from the Office of the General Counsel, to review the issues raised in your appeal. This DEDM-led appeal panel gathered information through discussions with you, the NRR Director, the DPO Panel, and other knowledgeable staff who reviewed documents pertinent to your appeal. The information collected provided independent insights and perspectives for my considerations. On August 5, 2020, you submitted a DPO on Safety Evaluation Report for Surry Subsequent License Renewal. On September 2, 2020, an ad-hoc review panel was formed and tasked by the NRC Differing Views Program to review your DPO. The DPO Panel subsequently issued their findings report to the Director of NRR on December 21, 2020. With respect to the concerns discussed in your appeal, the DPO Panel concluded that although the Surry SER credited undefined and undetermined corrective actions, the approach in the SER did not set forth a precedent that will undermine future subsequent license renewal review. Additionally, the DPO Panel found that the staff inappropriately credited enhancements to the Generic Letter 89-13 program. On January 28, 2021, the Director of NRR issued his decision regarding the DPOs concerns as informed by the DPO Panel report and his own review. The Director agreed with the DPO Panels findings and directed staff to update Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2014-06 to clarify the treatment of operating experience that occurs late in the review process. On February 18, 2021 you submitted an appeal. This appeal stated four continuing concerns:

1) the agency has set a precedent by deferring to the licensees corrective action program; 2) there is a lack of current licensing basis clarity due to the deferral to the corrective action program in the Surry SER, 3) RIS 2014-06 does not need to be revised, and 4) newly identified operating experience shows that aging management is needed at Surry. Additionally, for clarity purposes, your appeal requested that the Office Directors memorandum be corrected with respect to its characterization of an issue discussed in the DPO Panel report.1 The Director of NRR issued her statement of views on March 26, 2021.

Given the unique circumstances surrounding the timing of the Surry subsequent license renewal review, I directed the appeal panel to do an initial review of the DPO appeal to ensure that the staffs decision on the application appropriately considered the issues raised. On April 22, 2021, the appeal panel recommended that the agency not delay its decision on the Surry subsequent license renewal application. Response to Issue 1 In your appeal, you take issue with the DPO Panels finding that crediting entry of operating experience (OpE) in the corrective action program as meeting the requirement of 10 CFR 1 The Office Directors memorandum serves as a record of the prior decisions that have been made with respect to this DPO. To ensure that DPO records are accurately preserved and maintained in accordance with the procedures outlined in MD 10.159, I conclude that no revisions to the Office Directors memorandum are warranted.

J. Gavula 4 54.29(a) sets a precedent and their view that it will not undermine the effectiveness of future operating experience reviews. You state that it does not seem possible to predict how or whether a newly established position will be cited as a precedent in future situations. First off, I note that while Commission rulings on certain adjudicatory decisions can serve as binding legal precedent that the staff must follow in site-specific licensing reviews, staff positions established during a particular licensing review do not set binding legal precedent that the staff is required to follow in other licensing reviews. Thus, staffs approach in the Surry SER does not set a binding legal precedent that the staff must follow in its subsequent license renewal reviews. Nevertheless, I recognize that the staff and the industry typically use the term precedent to describe a previously established staff position that is used as justification for taking a similar position in another licensing review. In this context, I agree that it is not possible to predict how or whether a newly established position will be cited in a future situation. However, as the DPO Panel noted, the Surry OpE at issue here was unique in its timing and only OpE that is still being resolved through an applicants corrective action program (CAP) program would be affected by the staff position established in the Surry SER. To ensure that such late-breaking OpE is handled consistently and in a manner that does not undermine the effectiveness of operating experience reviews, I support the recommendations of the DPO Panel, as well as both Office Directors, to evaluate and update RIS 2014-06 to provide additional clarity on approaches for addressing late-breaking OpE in license renewal reviews. Response to Issue 2 With respect to Issue 2, you state that [f]rom a licensing perspective, crediting undefined and undetermined corrective actions subverts the current licensing basis of a plant. While you acknowledge that deferral to the CAP is appropriate for ongoing inspections through the reactor oversight program, you assert that deferring to undefined and undetermined corrective actions does not provide a clear record of the basis for the staffs conclusions and clouds the licensing basis for future regulatory actions. Section 3.0.3.1.6 evaluates the applicants (Dominions) Selective Leaching program and states that it is consistent with GALL-SLR Report Aging Management Program (AMP) XI.M33, Selective Leaching. The SER notes that based on operating experience related to buried cast iron piping ruptures, Dominion augmented the Selective Leaching program in three areas: exploratory holes for groundwater, corrective actions for presence of groundwater, and sample expansion (selective leaching due to elevated groundwater). The SER further notes that the buried cast iron piping ruptures have been entered into Dominions CAP and Dominion is identifying necessary corrective actions as part of the program. The SER states that [c]hanges to the aging management program(s) to address other possible issues (e.g., long-standing exposure to moist corrosive soil, soil parameter consistency across the site), if necessary, will be identified as Dominion completes its development of corrective actions. SER 3 3-24. As discussed above, the SER acknowledges the possibility of future modifications to the AMP(s), if needed, after Dominion completes its development of corrective actions. However, the possibility of a future change to an AMP does not alter Surrys CLB. Surrys CLB is based on the Selective Leaching AMP at the time the subsequent renewed license was issued; it does not include any future modifications that may or may not result from deferral to the CAP. Likewise, entry of an issue into the CAP, alone, does not alter the AMP or Surrys licensing basis. As stated in the SER, Dominion must determine appropriate modifications and will make further

J. Gavula 5 necessary changes to the AMP(s), if necessary. Those modifications may result in a future licensing basis change. For these reasons, I conclude that the SER provides a rational basis for the staffs conclusions, and that the staffs approach, in this instance, does not cloud Surrys CLB for future regulatory actions or otherwise subvert Surrys CLB. Response to Issue 3 In your appeal, you challenged the NRR Office Directors direction to revise Regulatory Issue Summary 2014-06, Consideration of Current Operating Issues and Licensing Actions (ADAMS Accession No. ML13177A325). You noted that both the DPO Panel and NRR Office Director concede that the safety evaluation report did not follow staff guidance, and noted that they did not reinforce that safety evaluation reports should be consistent with existing guidance. While I agree that the SER deviated from staff guidance, I support NRRs decision to evaluate RIS-2014-06 to provide additional clarity. I agree with the current NRR Office Director who stated in her statement of views that sometimes strict adherence to guidance must be balanced with other factors. I agree with the Office Director and DPO Panel that there could be additional detail added to clarify how operating experience that occurs late in the license renewal review process should be treated. I also direct that NRR develop an on-the-job training aid on its existing, or as appropriate, updated guidance. This training guide should reinforce that in cases where the staff deviates from guidance, it should be documented appropriately. Additionally, this training guide should include the Be riskSMART principles, such as being clear about the problem, identifying what can go wrong, what the consequences would be (e.g., if there are deviations from guidance), and managing the insights from clarification of the issues. In addition to the above, I recommend that NRR consider using an agency-wide Knowledge Management resource, such as a Nuclepedia page, to capture expectations and best practices on the use of (and deviations from) such guidance. Response to Issue 4 In your appeal, you claim that newly identified operating experience shows that an aging management review of the right-angle drive oil cooler should have been performed by the applicant and reviewed by the staff. You assert that if the staff had been aware of this OpE at the time of its initial review, it may have impacted the staffs finding that the GL 89-13 program adequately managed aging. Based on my review, I conclude that although there were no safety concerns identified with the newly identified OpE for an emergency service water pump engine heat exchanger and the right-angle drive cooler (component) at Surry, an aging management review of the right-angle drive cooler was needed and should have been performed by the license renewal applicant. The applicant did not adequately demonstrate how the effects of aging would be managed for the complex assembly components, and the NRC staff did not appropriately review the complex assemblies guidance during the license renewal review period. As a result, the applicant and NRC staff were deficient during the license renewal review period. The applicant did not adequately demonstrate the aging management for the complex assembly components in accordance with NEI 95-10 Rev. 6 guidance and, therefore, did not perform the proper aging management review for each structure and component that make up

J. Gavula 6 the complex assembly. This approach is inconsistent with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1), which requires that a license renewal application identify and list those structures and components subject to an aging management review. Further, as you note in your appeal, OpE related to the right-angle drive oil cooler was not provided to the NRC staff for its review of the Surry subsequent license renewal application, even though it was available two months prior to the submittal of the Surry subsequent license renewal application. As a result, the SER inappropriately credited enhancements to the GL 89-13 program monitoring activities for components and credited it to the CAP. While this issue was managed through existing programs, it could provide an example that may undermine the effectiveness of the staffs complex assembly OpE reviews needed during the license renewal review period. This review could encourage both the staff and applicants to use a comparable approach for future license renewal reviews. In addition, the staff should have more meticulously reviewed NUREG-2192, Standard Review Plan for Review of Subsequent License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants - Final Report, Table 2.1-2 Specific Staff Guidance on Scoping, which clearly illustrates how to determine the scoping and treatments of complex assembly components and what portions require an aging management review. This approach was a deficiency in the agencys approach to reviewing what Dominion defined as active assemblies. As a result, there was also an OpE treatment inconsistency as it relates to subsequent license renewal and the NRCs oversight role in execution of licensee corrective actions. Despite the deficiencies identified on both the applicant and the NRC staff, this OpE is still subject to appropriate assessment and corrective actions per established processes and procedures. I agree with the NRR Office Director that no additional actions are needed with regard to the Surry SER. Nevertheless, I support the Office Directors decision for staff to further investigate this OpE. I recommend that NRR revise RIS 2014-06 and other pertinent guidance documents to provide additional clarity on how to address complex assembly operating experience that occurs in all stages (beginning, middle and late) in the license renewal process. Such clarity could help ensure consistent staff treatment of such operating experience in future license renewal reviews and ensure there are no additional inconsistencies in associated industry and NRC guidance. I also recommend additional training to ensure a common understanding of acceptable approaches to disposition operating experience related to complex assemblies and to credit existing programs in license renewal. This guidance and/or training is needed to ensure a correct approach when reviewing complex assemblies in future license renewal reviews. Conclusion I want to thank you for bringing your concerns to my attention. I appreciate you taking the time to document and share your concerns. Our agency relies on dedicated professionals, such as yourself, who are willing to raise concerns that could impact the NRC mission. As discussed above, after careful consideration of your appeal, I conclude that although there were deficiencies in the review of the Surry subsequent license renewal application, no additional actions are needed with regard to the Surry SER. However, given these inadequacies, I direct NRR to do the following:

1. Evaluate and update guidance to provide additional clarity on how to address late-

J. Gavula 7 breaking operating experience.

2. Provide training to staff to ensure common understanding on how to review complex assemblies, the disposition of operating experience related to complex assemblies, and how to document deviations from guidance. This training should include Be riskSMART principles.

3. Update guidance to provide additional clarity on how to address complex assembly operating experience that occurs in all stages (beginning, middle and late) in the license renewal process.

cc: D. Roberts, OEDO S. Dennis, OEDO A. Veil, NRR C. De Messieres, NRR J. Gavula, NRR L. Ramadan, RES T. Campbell, OGC A. Ghosh Naber, OGC A. Vegel, OE D. Solorio, OE I. Gifford, OE J. Thompson, OE

ML21152A284 OFFICE OEDO EDO NAME SDennis MDoane (DRoberts acting for) DATE 6/3/21 6/ 09 /21}}

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