ML21125A542
Text
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Revised: 27.0 Table:
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1 of 1 Net Positive Suction Heads for Post-DBA Operational Pumps Pump Flow and Condition (per pump) gpm 1 Suction Source NPSHa (available minimum) ftabs NPSHr (required) ftabs Water Temp
°F
- 1. Safety Injection 678 max. flow Refueling Water Storage Tank 45.4 31.8 105 max.
- 2. Centrifugal Charging 530 max. flow Refueling Water Storage Tank 39.8 17.6 105 max.
- 3. Residual Heat Removal 4,175 max. flow Recirculation Sump 26.3 17.1 190
- 4. Containment Spray 3,406 max. flow Recirculation Sump 27.8 14.9 190
- 5. Component Cooling 11,200 max. flow Closed Loop 37.1 25.5 160
- 6. Essential Service Water 12,200 max. flow Screenhouse (forebay at Elevation 562 ft.)
37.5 34.1 88.8 1 NPSH values represent bounding conditions lowest NPSH margin for the most conservative operating conditions and component alignments analyzed of either unit.
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision:
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1 of 1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM CODE REQUIREMENTS1 Component Code Refueling Water Storage Tank Not applicable Residual Heat Exchanger Tube Side ASME B&PV Code Section III Class C Shell Side ASME B&PV Code Section VIII Accumulators ASME B&PV Code Section III Class C Valves ANSI B16.5, MSS-SP-66, and ASME B&PV Code Section III, 1968 Edition 1 Piping USAS B31.1, 1967 Edition 1 ASME III Appendix F 2 Boron Injection Tank ASME B&PV Code Section III Class C Recirculation Sump Strainers (Main and Remote)
AISC-69, 7th Edition Debris Interceptors (CEQ Fan Room, Flood-Up Overflow Wall, and Entrance to Containment Wide Range Sump Level Instrument)
AISC-69, 7th Edition 1 Repairs and replacements for pressure retaining components within the code boundary, and their supports, are conducted in accordance with ASME Section XI.
2 The evaluation criteria of ASME III Appendix F (faulted conditions) is applicable to accumulator fill line piping from outside containment isolation valve to the normally closed inlet valves at each accumulator and the normally closed valves in the flow path to the low head SI hot leg loops (CPN 32).
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 16.1 Table:
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1 of 1 ACCUMULATOR DESIGN PARAMETERS Number 4 per unit Type Stainless steel clad / carbon steel Design pressure, psig 700 Design temperature, ºF 300 Operating temperature, ºF 120 Normal pressure, psig 621.5 Minimum pressure, psig 585.0 Total volume, ft3 1350 Maximum water volume at operating conditions, ft3 971 Minimum water volume at operating conditions, ft3 921 Boron concentration (as boric acid), ppm 2400 to 2600 Code ASME B&PV Code Section III Class C UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 16.1 Table:
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1 of 1 BORON INJECTION TANK DESIGN PARAMETERS Number 1 per unit Total Volume, gal (also useable volume) 900 Boron concentration, (ppm) 0 to 2600 Design pressure, psig 2735 Design temperature, ºF 300 Operating pressure, psig (Injection Mode) 2340 Operating pressure, psig (Standby) atmospheric Operating temperature, ºF ambient Material SS Clad Carbon Steel Code ASME B&PV Code Section III Class C UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 16.3 Table:
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1 of 1 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK DESIGN PARAMETERS Number 1 per unit Tank Capacity, gal.
420,000 Required Capacity, gal.
375,500 Design pressure, psig Static head and sloshing Design temperature, ºF
-30 to 100 Normal pressure, psig Atmospheric Liquid temperature,º F 70 - 100 Inside diameter, ft (approx.)
48 Straight side height, ft 31 Material Stainless Steel UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 21.1 Table:
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1 of 1 DESIGN PARAMETERS - ECCS PUMPS Centrifugal Charging Pumps Safety Injection Pumps Residual Heat Removal Pumps Number per unit 2
2 2
Design pressure, psig 2800 1700 600 Design temperature, oF 300 300 400 Design flow rate, gpm 150 400 3000 Design head, ft.
5800 2500 350 Max. flow rate, gpm 550 7001 4500 Head at max. flow rate, ft.
1400 1500 300 Motor horsepower 600 400 400 Pump Speed, rpm 48102 3570 1780 Type Horizontal Multistage Centrifugal Horizontal Multistage Centrifugal Vertical, in-line Single stage Centrifugal Material Stainless Steel or Stainless Steel clad Carbon steel Stainless Steel Stainless Steel The motor starting times from electrical activation to full speed (steady-state-voltage) as obtained by a computer simulation are as follows:
Centrifugal Charging Pump 1.14 seconds Safety Injection Pump 1.13 seconds Residual Heat Removal Pump 0.704 seconds 1 Maximum flow rate is limited to 675 gpm for pumps that have not been qualified to a higher flow rate, up to a maximum of 700 gpm.
2 Equipped with speed increaser gear.
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision:
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1 of 3 SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RECIRCULATION PHASE Component Malfunction Comments A. Accumulator Deliver to broken loop Totally passive system with one accumulator per loop.
Evaluation based on three accumulators delivering to the core and one spilling from ruptured loop.
B.
Pump:
- 1) Centrifugal Charging Fails to start Two provided. Evaluation based on operation of one.
- 2) Safety Injection Fails to start Two provided. Evaluation based on operation of one.
- 3) Residual Heat Removal Fails to start Two provided. Evaluation based on operation of one.
C.
Automatically Operated Valves:
- 1) Boron injection tank isolation a) inlet valve Fails to open Two parallel lines; one valve in either line is required to open.
b) outlet valve Fails to open Two parallel lines; one valve in either line is required to open.
- 2) Centrifugal Charging pumps a) suction line from RWST isolation valve Fails to open Two parallel lines; only one valve in either line is required to open.
b) discharge line to the normal charging path isolation valve1 Fails to close Two valves in series; only one valve required to close.
c) minimum flow line isolation valve Fails to close Two trains in parallel; only one train required.
d) suction from volume control tank isolation valve Fails to close Two valves in series; only one valve required to close.
1 The reactor coolant pump seal water path is left open.
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision:
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2 of 3 SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RECIRCULATION PHASE Component Malfunction Comments Recirculation Phase A. Valves operated From Control Room for Recirculation:
- 1) Containment sump recirculation isolation Fails to open Two lines parallel; only one valve in either line is required to open.
- 2) Residual heat removal pumps suction line from RWST isolation Fails to close Check valve in series with two gate valves; operation of only one valve required.
- 3) Safety injection pumps suction line from RWST Fails to close Check valve in series with gate valve; operation of only one valve required.
- 4) Centrifugal Charging pumps suction line from RWST isolation valve Fails to close Check valve in series with two parallel gate valves.
Operating of either the check valve or the gate valves required.
- 5) Safety injection pump suction line isolation valve at discharge of the west residual heat exchanger Fails to open Separate and independent high head injection path via the centrifugal charging pumps taking suction from discharge of the East residual heat residual head exchanger. A cross over line allows the flow from one heat exchanger to reach both safety injection and charging pumps if necessary.
- 6) Residual Heat Removal discharge bypass line Fails to close The second isolation valve for RWST backflow is still available.
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision:
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3 of 3 SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RECIRCULATION PHASE Component Malfunction Comments B. Pumps:
- 1) Component Cooling Water Pump Fails to start Two provided. Evaluation based on operation of one. One pump is running during normal operation. An additional shared pump is available.
- 2) Essential Service Water Pump Fails to start Four provided for both units. Two pumps are required for normal operation.
- 3) Residual Heat Removal Pump Fails to start Two provided. Evaluation based on operation of one.
- 4) Charging Pump Fails to operate Same as injection phase.
- 5) Safety Injection Pumps Fails to operate Same as injection phase.
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 16.1 Table:
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1 of 1 SINGLE PASSIVE FAILURE ANALYSIS - EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RECIRCULATION PHASE Flow Path Indication of Loss of Flow Path Alternate Flow Path COLD LEG From containment recirculation sump to low head cold leg injection header via the residual heat removal pumps and the residual heat exchangers.
Reduced flow in the discharge line, from one of the residual heat exchangers (one flow monitor in each discharge line) and/or leakage sump level alarm Via the independent identical low head flow path utilizing the pumps second residual heat exchanger HOT LEG From containment recirculation sump to hot leg low - head injection header via RHR pumps and RHR heat exchangers.
Same as above Same as above COLD LEG From containment recirculation sump to the high head cold leg injection header via the west residual heat removal pump, west residual heat exchanger and the safety injection pumps.
Reduced flow in the discharge lines from the safety injection pumps (one flow monitor in each discharge line) and/or leakage sump level alarm.
From containment recirculation sump to the high head cold leg injection headers via east residual heat removal pump, east residual heat exchanger and the centrifugal charging pumps cross - tie to SI pump suction.
HOT LEG From containment recirculation sump to the high head hot leg injection headers via west residual removal pump, west residual heat exchanger and the safety injection pumps.
Reduced flow in the discharge lines from the safety injection pumps (one flow monitor in each discharge line) and/or leakage sump level alarm.
From containment spray to the high head hot leg injection points via East residual heat removal heat removal pump, East residual heat exchanger and the centrifugal charging pumps cross tie to SI Pump suction UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 19.1 Table:
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1 of 1 ACCUMULATOR INLEAKAGE OBSERVED LEAK RATE CC/HR TIME PERIOD BETWEEN LEVEL ADJUSTMENTS (BETWEEN LEVEL ALARM) 1, 2 (OBSERVED LEAK RATE) DIVIDED BY (MAX ALLOWED DESIGN) 3 MAXIMUM ANTICIPATED 1538 1 month 16 days 77 513 3 months 7 weeks 25.7 256 6 months 13 weeks 12.8 171 9 months 20 weeks 8.6 128 1 year 27 weeks 6.4 1 25.0 cu. ft. between level alarms.
2 Accumulator initially at "Lo" level and pressure conditions.
3 Maximum allowed leak rate for manufacturers acceptance test is 20 cc/hr (Back Leakage through check valves).
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 21.1 Table:
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1 of 1 RECIRCULATION LOOP LEAKAGE Items No. of Units Type of Leakage Control and Unit Leakage Rate Used in the Original Analysis1 Leakage to Atmosphere cc/hr Leakage to Drain Tank cc/hr
- 1. Residual Heat Removal Pumps (Low Head Safety Injection) 2 Mechanical seal with leakoff - 1 drop/min 0
6
- 2. Centrifugal Charging Pump 2
Same as residual heat removal pump 0
6
- 3. Safety Injection Pump 2
Same as residual heat removal pump 0
6
- 4. Flanges:
Gasket adjusted to zero leakage following any test 10 drops/min/flange used in analysis
- a. Pump 8
240 0
- b. Valves Bonnet Body (larger than 2")
40 1200 0
- c. Control Valves 6
180 0
- 5. Valves Stem Leakoffs 40 Back-seated, double packing with leakoff 1 cc/hr/in. stem diameter 0
40
- 6. Misc. Small Valves 50 Flanged body packed stems - 1 drop/min used 150 0
TOTALS 1770 58 1 License amendments 49 (Unit 1) and 34 (Unit 2) require implementation of a program to reduce leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to as low as practical levels. This table is retained as part of the original FSAR and is not intended to be updated. The original FSAR assumed approximately 1770 cc/hr ECCS leakage and 2806 cc/hr CTS leakage for a total of approximately 4576 cc/hr total ESF leakage. See Section 14.3.5.19 and Section 14.3.5.20.4 for current information.
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision:
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1 of 1 RECIRCULATION SUMP COMPONENT DESIGN LOAD COMBINATIONS1 Load Combination Case No.
Description Load Combination 0
Full Recirculation Flow with Clean Main and Remote Strainers; Applicable to Main and Remote Strainers DW2 + TAL3 + DBE4 + FRHL5 + DL6 +
NL(t)7 1
Loads Immediately after the Pipe Rupture; Applicable to Main and Remote Strainers DW(2) + TBL8 + DBE(4) + NL(t)(7) 2 Containment Fill; Forward Flow through Main Strainer with Reverse Flow through Waterway to Remote Strainer DW(2) + TFL9 + DBE(4) + NL(t)(7) +
PFHL10 3
Plugged Main Strainer with Recirculation Flow from Remote Strainer DW(2) + TAL(3) + DBE(4) + FRHL(5) + DL(6)
+ NL(t)(7) 4 Pressure Pulse at Instant of Pipe Rupture; Applicable to Main and Remote Strainers DW(2) + TOL11 + PP12 + NL(t)(7) 1 The load combinations are used for the design and qualification of the main and remote strainers and waterway, unless otherwise indicated in the Description column.
2 DW - Dead Weight.
3 TAL - Thermal effects at accident temperature of 160°F when recirculation is initiated for a large break LOCA consistent with the time of maximum hydrodynamic load.
4 DBE - Design Basis Earthquake.
5 FRHL - Full Recirculation Hydraulic Loads at 14,400 gpm, the bounding value for ECCS flow 6 DL - Debris Load. For structural analysis of main and remote strainers, bounding debris mass values of 1986 lbs and 1530 lbs, respectively, were used.
7 NL(t) - Nozzle Loads. Loads applicable only to the remote strainer and local conditions at the time of the load case.
8 TBL - Thermal Break Load. Thermal effects at post-break containment environment temperature of 236°F.
9 TFL - Thermal Fill Loads During Pool Fill (200°F).
10 PFHL - Pool Fill Hydraulic Loads - reverse flow and waterway loads.
11 TOL - Thermal effects at normal (maximum) operating temperature of 160°F for the main strainer and 120°F for the remote strainer.
12 PP - Pressure Pulse. Short term pressure pulse of 5.0 psid acting outward from within the main strainer and waterway and 2.5 psid acting outward from within the interface between the waterway and the remote strainer.
UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision: 16.1 Table:
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1 of 1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP DESIGN PARAMETERS Quantity 2 (per unit)
Type Vertical, centrifugal Design Pressure 600 psig Design Temperature 400 o
F Design flow rate 3200 gpm Design head 490 ft.
Motor horsepower 600 hp.
Motor speed 1780 rpm UFSAR Revision 30.0
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Revised: 28.0 Table:
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1 of 2 Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Design Parameters Heat Exc hanger Heat Exc hanger Quantity, Unit 1 / Unit 2 2 (1-HE-18E / W) / 2 (2-HE-18E / W)
Type Vertical / Shell and U Tube Heat Transfer per unit (Btu / hr) 114.2 x 106 Flow, tube side, gpm 2942 Flow, shell side, gpm 2400 Shell side inlet temperature, ºF 90 Tube side inlet temperature, ºF 164 Shell side outlet temperature, ºF 137.87 Tube side outlet temperature, ºF 124.20 Material Shell / Tube Carbon Steel / SS Design Pressure, Shell / Tube psig 150 / 300 Design Temperature, Shell / Tube, ºF 200 / 200 UFSAR Revision 30.0
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Revised: 28.0 Table:
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2 of 2 Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Code Requirements Shell Side ASME 1968 B&PV Code Section VIII Div. 1 Tube Side ASME 1968 B&PV Code Section III Class C UFSAR Revision 30.0
IINNDDIIAANNAA M MIICCHHIIGGAANN PPOOW WEERR DD.. CC.. CCOOOOKK NNUUCCLLEEAARR PPLLAANNTT UUPPDDAATTEEDD FFIINNAALL SSAAFFEETTYY AANNAALLYYSSIISS RREEPPOORRTT Revision:
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1 of 1 SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK DESIGN PARAMETERS Quantity 1 (per unit)
Volume, gal 5218 Design temperature, °F 200 Design pressure, psig 10 Material stainless steel SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK CODE REQUIREMENTS ASME 1968 B&PV Section VIII Div. 1 UFSAR Revision 30.0
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Revised: 26.0 Table:
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1 of 2 Containment Spray System Malfunction Analysis Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences
- 1. Containment Spray Pump Rupture of Pump casing Isolate train.
Redundant train continues to operate requi rement is one train.
- 2. Containment Spray Pump Pump fails to start.
One of two pumps operating will supply 100 percent of requi red flow
- 3. Containment Spray Pump Pump suction line closed This is prevented by pre startup checks. During power operation, each pump is tested on a periodic basis. During these tests checks will be made to confirm that a motor operated valve (from the refueling water storage tank) is open. The manual valve from the recirculation sump is locked or sealed open. Motor operated valve positions (open or closed) are indicated in the control room
- 4. Containment Spray Pump Pump discharge motor operated valve fails to open.
Motor operated valves are redundant and only one of the two need operate. Valve positions (open or closed) are indicated in the control room.
- 5. Containment Spray Pump Discharge Check Valve fails to open The check valves were checked in preoperational tests and are checked during periodic tests.
- 6. Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Drain Valve left open /
Manways left open This is prevented by pre-startup checks.
Leak detection sumps in the spray system compartments are provided with level alarms which are initiated if a drain valve is open and discharging into the compartment UFSAR Revision 30.0
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER D. C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Revised: 26.0 Table:
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2 of 2 Containment Spray System Malfunction Analysis Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences
- 7. Containment Spray Heat Exchangers Tube or shell rupture Isolate train.
Redundant train continues to operate.
One train will provide 100% flow.
- 8. Containment Spray Eductors Motor Operated Supply Valve fails to open The motive water supply valve is normally open and is checked by periodic test.
The suction supply valves (from the spray additive tank) are redundant and only one of the two need be open.
Valve position is indicated in the Control Room.
UFSAR Revision 30.0