ML21075A294
| ML21075A294 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/17/2021 |
| From: | Robert Beall NRC/NMSS/DREFS/RRPB |
| To: | |
| Beall R 301-415-3874 | |
| References | |
| 10 CFR Part 53, NRC-2019-0062, RIN 3150-AK31 | |
| Download: ML21075A294 (104) | |
Text
March 17, 2021 1
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
Future Plant Designs Subcommittee 10 CFR Part 53 Licensing and Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors General Discussions and Subpart E Preliminary Proposed Rule Language
Agenda 9:30 am - 9:35 am Opening Remarks 9:35 am - 9:40 am Staff Introductions 9:40 am - 11:30 am Stakeholder Insights 11:30 am - 1:00 pm Continuing Dialogue on Structure and Logic of Part 53 1:00 pm - 2:00 pm Lunch 2:00 pm - 3:00 pm Key Guidance 3:00 pm - 4:00 pm Subpart E: Construction and Manufacturing 4:00 pm - 5:30 pm Upcoming Challenges 5:30 pm - 6:00 pm Discussion 2
Stakeholder Insights 3
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute Marc Nichol Senior Director New Reactors Part 53 Rulemaking NRC ACRS Meeting March 17, 2021
Areas where we agree with the NRC
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 6 Vision: Licensing new reactors under the new rule will be the most efficient option for all new reactor applicants and will meet industry needs for schedule, cost and predictability, consistent with congressional directives, the NRCs own advanced reactor policies and initiatives, and the agencys Principles of Good Regulation.
Goals:
Safety-Focused: Focus on reasonable assurance of adequate protection Technology-Inclusive: All technologies, high-level requirements Efficient: Schedule/cost targets integrated safety/security, commercial quality Flexible: Variety of licensing approaches, reactor uses, interface with Part 50/52 Informed: Insights from previous efforts, near term activities, and other regulators Clear: Nexus to adequate protection, interrelationship of requirements, concise Vision and Goals
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 7 Focus on safety in terms of radiological impacts NRCs bow tie diagram as the safety paradigm Scope of rule as identified by sub-parts (mostly)
Allow for modern regulatory concepts (e.g., LMP/TICAP)
Eliminating prescriptive and technology specific requirements Fundamental aspects to be addressed in requirements Performance-based safety, security, siting and emergency preparedness Radiological hazard Characteristics of the site Event sequences Design features, human actions and programmatic controls Fundamentals of Part 53
Areas where we recommend more efficient approaches to achieve NRCs intent
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 9 Provide example of how to meet vision and goals of rulemaking High level rule language Meeting high standards of safety more efficiently Focus on NRCs regulatory functions Determine standards for reasonable assurance of adequate protection Determine facility characteristics need to meet safety criteria Determine how to provide reasonable assurance in design, construction, and operation Determine types of licenses, permits and approvals and process to obtain Purpose of NEIs discussion draft
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 10 Simplify and clarify the safety criteria Adequate protection - 25 rem for events not expected during lifetime Extra-adequate protection - 0.1 rem for normal operations, and beyond design basis Establish the facility characteristics needed for safety and security Aligned with NRCs bow tie diagram Performance-based safety, security, siting and emergency preparedness Radiological hazard Characteristics of the site Required facility functions necessary and sufficient to meet safety criteria Event sequences Design features and human actions to perform required facility functions Subpart B - Safety
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 11 Simplify and clarify around updated safety criteria Features that are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the design and analyses demonstrate that the facility is able to meet the safety and security criteria High level requirements that allow flexibility Method for determining facility characteristics (required functions, events, design features)
Analysis of SSCs performance of required functions Design requirements and performance criteria for SSCs Method of evaluating risk Measures to address design and analysis uncertainties Qualification of SSCs Categorization of SSCs Subpart C: Design and Analysis
Areas where there are concerns with the NRCs proposed approach
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 13 Approach to high level rule language that is technology-inclusive and performance based Approach to evaluating potential requirements Dont add new requirements that werent needed in Part 50/52 Eliminate requirements that do not enhance safety - efficiency leads to improved safety Openness to reconsider all Part 50/52 requirements, Commission Policies and long-held staff positions Determine whether what was developed based on LLWR technology is applicable to a technology-inclusive approach Areas where more transformational approaches are needed
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 14 ALARA - not appropriate as a requirement (wise practice)
Regulatory philosophy of safe is safe, not unending pursuit of safer Security - beyond current SMR Security rulemaking Might be most prescriptive current NRC rule Need performance based approach to physical barriers at minimum Siting Defining safety criteria at site boundary eliminates need for LPZ and distance to population center Event frequencies consistent with safety dose criteria Quality assurance Commercial quality programs (e.g., ISO-9001) provide equivalent levels of quality as Part 50 Appendix B Greater supply chain base can improve quality Areas where more transformational approaches are needed
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 15 Probabilistic risk assessment Agree that risk evaluation is necessary, but need flexible graded approach Not all designs need a PRA, and not all PRAs need to be the same The approach to risk evaluation should fit the safety profile of the design and licensing approach Defense in depth Treat as a design philosophy similar to Part 50/52 Unnecessary as a requirement, and would create unintended consequences Prescriptive no single feature requirement is unnecessary and not risk informed Topics of Concern
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 16 Quantitative health objectives In the rule could create challenges and unintended consequences In the policy statement works for Part 50/52 How to address beyond design basis events Quantitative frequencies Treat as a design philosophy similar to Part 50/52 Unnecessary as a requirement, and would create unintended consequences Facility safety program Need to see tangible benefits Topics still under evaluation
©2021 Nuclear Energy Institute 17 Many topics not yet evaluated - e.g., reporting, ITAAC, Higher-level requirements will rely more on guidance, potential needs for Part 53 Application scope/content - e.g., TICAP and NRC ARCAP Safety paradigm / licensing approach - e.g., NEI 18-04 and alternatives Quality Assurance Graded approach to risk evaluations Performance-based security (at least physical barriers)
Technology-specific (e.g., facility functions, events, design criteria)
NRC review Oversight program Transport of fueled micro-reactors More work on the horizon
QUESTIONS?
By Third Way, GENSLER
U.S. Nuclear Industry Council Comments for NRC ACRS Part 53 Meeting Cyril Draffin Senior Fellow, Advanced Nuclear U.S. Nuclear Industry Council Peter Hastings Vice Chair, Advanced Nuclear Working Group U.S. Nuclear Industry Council 17 March 2021 19
Goals for Part 53
- Safety-Focused: Focus on reasonable assurance of adequate protection
- Technology-Inclusive: All technologies, high-level requirements
- Efficient: Schedule/cost targets, integrated safety, commercial quality
- Flexible: Variety of licensing approaches, reactor uses, interface with Part 50/52
- Informed: Insights from previous efforts, near term activities, and other regulators
- Clear: Nexus to adequate protection, interrelationship of requirements, concise U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 20
NEIMA Expectations and Objectives
- Expectations:
o Technology inclusive (use by any fission reactor technology) o Risk-informed (focus on safety-significant elements of safety case) o Performance-based (clear, consistent, and understandable criteria)
- Success Criteria (Objectives):
o Clear, effective regulatory framework and guidance resulting in significant improvements o Framework founded on demonstration of reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety o Regulatory burden should not be increased U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 21
Rulemaking Process
- USNIC comments/questions in multiple forums*
o Transient & Accident Radiological Safety Criteria (25 rem total effective dose equivalent) o Postulated events in guidance (~1E-2 yr-1) o Use 10 CFR Part 20 o Support but not require the LMP approach (additional guidance where needed)
- ML20318A007 ML21006A000 ML21032A045 ML21035A003 22
Topics for Consideration
- Adequate Protection Standard
- Dose Consequence-Based Performance
- Development and Application of Risk Insights
- Evaluating Defense in Depth Adequacy
- Quality Assurance U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 23
Adequate Protection Standard for Part 53
- Provide clarity for adequate protection (radiological foundation) o Requirements predicated by fundamental safety functions (53.210) o Requirements established in Part 53 should have a clear nexus to supporting the adequate protection standard o Adequate protection standard should be independent of technology, reactor size, or selected licensing process
- Avoid regulatory requirements that are not needed for adequate protection o Requirements need not exceed existing requirements under Part 50 (do not ratchet requirements compared to existing reactors) o Necessity of second tier has not been established
- Part 53 should establish the minimum criteria and supporting information necessary for demonstrating the safety case U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS Note: ALARA is important concept and good practice, but should not be included in Part 53 24
Dose Consequence-Based Performance
- Section 53.23 requires analysis of QHO o Need for new requirement not clear o QHO calculations would be required in addition to quantitative limits at site boundary o QHO method introduced in 1986 but deemed impractical and CDF and LERF surrogates were introduced instead (not applicable to non-LWRs); no QHO requirement in 10 CFR 20, 50, 52 o QHOs virtually guarantee a specific analytical methodology (i.e., PRA) is required o Recommend removing (b)(2) from 53.23 in NRC preliminary Subpart B, Second Tier Safety Criteria, unless clear benefits shown
- Continue to have QHOs as NRC policy
- Quantitative frequencies could be included in guidance U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 25
Development and Application of Risk-Insights
- Risk tool (PRA today) insights complement the safety case
- Attributes of a useful Part 53 framework for the use of risk tools:
o Provide flexibility without focusing on a specifically mandated analytical approach (like PRA) o Avoid prescriptive requirement for approach on defining LBEs, SSC classification, and DID determinations o Enable RG 1.233 implementation, but not require it o Enable combinations of risk-informed and deterministic approaches where appropriate (e.g., external hazards, seismic, bounding analyses, especially for designs with very small source terms such as microreactors) o Support international regulatory frameworks (e.g., IAEA SSR-2/1 and markets with dual-DSA/PSA requirements)
- PRA matures with plant design and site selection/characterization. Requiring extensive PRA with application submittal may not be feasible for all application types, especially for plants in early phases of application (e.g. CP) o Application content should be limited to information central to the safety case findings o Application content should be developed as part of ongoing regulatory guidance activities 8 l U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 26
Evaluating Defense in Depth (DID) Adequacy
- DID important design philosophy for LMP and non-LMP applications o Further discussion needed on adequate DID for license applications, accounting for the range of potential reactor designs and features that prevents and mitigates accidents o DID demonstration will vary across range of designs and features o LMP example level of detail (rule should enable, not require)
- DID details should be described in guidance, not regulation
- Guidance should also clarify what DID is required when prevention/mitigation is physics or passive/inherent U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 27
Clarity in Quality Assurance Requirements
- Clarify QA requirements and facilitate application across industry (vendors, suppliers, and operators) o Opportunity for a fresh look at alternatives to Part 50 Appendix B and NQA-1 o Commercially available components quality may meet/exceed nuclear standards with reduced artificial burden o Rule should require quality control program, but not specify approach
- Guidance should support broad standards, e.g., ISO 9000 series, IAEA, commercial dedication o Reduce barriers to commercial competition, and facilitate licensing abroad-recognizing greater supply chain base can improve quality o International acceptance of a single approval could be important in international marketability o Guidance should show ISO standards and IAEA approaches meet requirements o Guidance could address topic of universal acceptance of codes and standards (mechanical, electrical)
U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 28
Conclusion
- Encourage ongoing participation and engagement of stakeholders
- Continue working to clarify more appropriate rulemaking objectives and implementation detail
- Achieve NEIMA goals without increase in regulatory burden for deployment of Advanced Reactors U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS 29
U.S. Nuclear Industry Council Contacts U.S. Nuclear Industry Council March 2021 Part 53 ACRS For questions or comments contact:
Cyril W. Draffin, Jr.
Senior Fellow, Advanced Nuclear, U.S. Nuclear Industry Council cyril.draffin@usnic.org Peter Hastings Vice Chair, Advanced Nuclear Working Group U.S. Nuclear Industry Council hastings@kairospower.com 30
1 Part 53 Rulemaking Southern Company Perspectives Presented to ACRS Sub-Committee for Future Plants Amir Afzali Licensing and Policy Director March 17, 2021
2
- Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Rule-making activities terminated in 2011)
- Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA), signed Jan. 2019, directs NRC to complete a rulemaking to establish a technology-inclusive regulatory framework for optional use by commercial advanced nuclear reactor applicants for new reactor license applications by 12/31/2027.
- Commission directed the Staff on 10/2/2020, to provide the Commission a schedule with milestones and resource requirements to achieve publication of the final rule by October 2024 and inform the Commission of key uncertainties impacting publication of the final rule by that date.
- Implement the development and intermittent release of preliminary draft rule language, followed by public outreach and dialogue, and then further iteration on the language until the staff has established the rudiments of its proposed rule for Commission consideration.
- May need to develop requirements at a high level and utilize guidance documents to address details and technology-specific considerations; therefore, the staff should continue to work prospectively with stakeholders to identify and develop necessary regulatory guidance and technical bases.
2 Current Part 53 Rulemaking History
3
- Part 53 rulemaking offers an important opportunity to set the foundation for developing an integrated, technology inclusive transformational regulatory framework to achieve the following goals:
- 1. Cohesive technical requirements and regulatory oversight programs set for all stages of a nuclear power plant life cycle (Design, Licensing, Construction, Operation, and Decommissioning)
- 2. Coherent and consistent requirements and regulatory oversight programs for different designs based on design-specific safety margins, minimizing unbalanced regulatory requirements for different designs resulting in unfair competitive advantages
- 3. Development and deployment of owner-controlled programs to improve efficiency and effectiveness of programmatic requirements and regulatory oversight programs.
- Southern Company believes achieving the above goals will result in commercially-viable designs that can be effectively and efficiently licensed, constructed, and operated.
Southern Companys Perspective on Part 53
4
- Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Part 53 that includes the following will achieve the goals:
- An alternative to the current qualitative Part 50 and Part 52 language to meet regulatory expectations. This will support Goals 1 and 2 by allowing coherent and consistent regulatory requirements and regulatory oversight programs to be established for a specific design and across different designs.
- The foundation for regulatory oversight programs in which the regulatory body sets clear expectations and enforces them while the operator is primarily responsible for safety (consistent with the Canadian approach). This will make such programs more effective and efficient.
- The current Commission-directed deadline of 2024 for a new rule that facilitates achieving the above transformational goals is aggressive (making effectiveness of interim interactions more difficult and critical), but the timeline is justified and achievable because we have worked on RIPB for over 30 years.
- Similar to using any new language or structure, the concern that new rule may cause regulatory complications is real. Unforeseen licensing complications should be addressed through industry and NRC engagement.
Southern Companys Perspective on Part 53
5 5
Other Regulatory Modernization Needs
- Examples
- Special Treatment Requirements (10 CFR Part 21 - Reporting of defects, 10 CFR 50.49 - Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants, inservice testing requirements in 10 CFR 50.55a, inservice inspection, etc.)
- Emergency Planning Zone
- Reactor Oversight Program
- Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)
- Maintenance Rule
- Needed because they impact:
- Commercial viability through rightsizing the requirements
- Balance treatment of different designs based on their design specific safety case
- Regulatory oversight efficiency and effectiveness
- Systematically, predictably and efficiently managing state of knowledge changes (even more crucial for new designs)
6 Example of Systematic, Transparent, and Coherent Treatment of Different Designs
7
- Transformational and robust Part 53 is needed and can be deployed by 2024.
- The Rule language, as part of... an integrated master plan [1]
should establish a firm foundation... to help the agency achieve the Commissions goal of a holistic, risk-informed and performance-based regulatory structure. [1] This will result in a predictable, coherent, and transparent framework being available for efficient and effective establishment of technical requirements and regulatory oversight.
- Per Commission direction, the NRC staff should work collaboratively with the industry to manage potential implementation risks.
[1] Staff Requirements Memorandum M060503B, Briefing on Status of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Reactor Regulation, June 2006.
7 Concluding Remarks
8 Back-Up LMP/TICAP and Part 53
9 Risk-Informed Ground Rules 9
Rule 1: There is no practical Zero risk option Rule 2: All options do not have equal significance level Rule 3: The required confidence level is dependent on the significance level Rule 4: Conservative decision making is best achieved through realistic and integrated risk assessment.
Rule 5: Using systematic uncertainty analysis is best option for managing it (If a man will begin with certainties he shall end in doubts, but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties. Francis Bacon The Advancement of Learning, 1605.
Rule 6: Risk-informed decision making provide a useful tool for dealing with uncertainty and complexity, but it does not make the problem simple or difficult. It allows for rightsizing.
10
- Mission To facilitate the generation of safe, reliable, and affordable energy through a risk-informed operational-focused framework that incentivizes continuous performance improvements through state-of-knowledge advancements and plant-specific margin enhancements.
- Guiding Values Conservative decision-making based on realistic analysis Utility ownership of safety, resulting in effective plant-specific safety improvements Incentivizing an environment of continuous knowledge improvement, resulting in innovative solutions
- Strategy Transitioning to advanced risk-informed programs (see Slide 5 for more information)
Providing industry-wide support of risk-informed initiatives such as piloting risk-informed applications for NRC and industry (e.g., 4b and 50.69 pilots), developing industry-leading tools (e.g., FPRA and SPRA), and assisting NRC with its research program (NRC L3 PRA)
Investing in the modernized RIPB AR regulatory framework (e.g., NEI 18-04)
Context for Southern Company Perspective Southern Company RIPB Regulatory Framework
11
- Modernizing the What
>> Change the regulatory dose limits to the public based on new scientific evidence
- Not part of the LMP
- Not recommended as a priority by Southern Company
>> Frequency boundaries of meeting these dose limits
- Establishing frequency boundariesHighly recommended and it is part of LMP
- Establishing new frequencies Not recommended; not a priority for Southern Company
- Modernizing When
>> Eliminating elements of When such as AOOs Not recommended as a priority by Southern Company
>> Establishing a transparent, RIPB approach for selecting When constituents Recommended and part of LMP
- Modernizing How
>> RIPB approach for SSCs classification Recommended and is part of the LMP
>> RIPB base for establishing technical requirements of the SSCs (e.g., functional containment)
Recommended; not part of LMP, but LMP products can be used for this purpose.
11 LMP/TICAP and Part 53
12
- Modernizing How Well (need for diversity, redundancy, external events treatments, etc.) and programmatic features (inspections, monitoring, Tech Spec., analytical tools verification, etc.)
>> Modernized RIPB process for setting high level performance objectives Recommended and is part of the LMP-based safety case
>> Modernized RIPB programmatic elements (RIPB ISI, RIPB Fire Protection Program, RI technical specification, RIPB surveillance frequency, Maintenance Rule, regulatory framework, etc.) Not part of the LMP, but the framework (e.g., the C-F curve) can be used to modernize all the RIPB programs. It is highly recommended to be developed.
>> Modernized RIPB External Events Requirements (e.g., establishing RIPB methods for establishing seismic design basis) Not part of the LMP, but the framework (e.g., the F-C curve) can be used to modernize all the RIPB programs. It is highly recommended to be developed.
12 LMP/TICAP and Part 53
American Nuclear Society Comments on Proposed 10 CFR Part 53
N. Prasad Kadambi Kadambi Engineering Consultants March 17, 2021 44
Purpose of ANS Input to Part 53 ANS members have a great deal of interest in advanced reactors. It is important for ANS to offer them opportunities to participate in formulating the rules of the road in this vital rulemaking The NRC staff has been holding stakeholder meetings regularly at which a lot of information is presented The ANS letter of March 3, 2021 offers our interpretation of certain key points with the expectation that there will be further discussion and clarification The ANS letter contained eight bullet points covering a variety of the areas for which rule language and staff explanation have been provided This presentation provides a separate slide for each of the bulleted points to reiterate our understanding of provisions that have been made available so far 45
Part 53 Should Support Endorsed Consensus Standards The first bullet addresses current ANS efforts to modernize our standards We want to take full advantage of national and NRC initiatives promoting modernization of safety standards NEIMA has incorporated risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) methods in statute and calls for consensus standards NRC incorporated RIPB into regulatory policy 20 years ago o
NRC implementation of RIPB has been ad hoc o
ANS has pursued a more systematic approach We point out that Subpart D is unnecessarily prescriptive in part Proposed Part 53.530(c) imposes a population center distance over which a licensee may not have any control Subpart D is important for ANS standards that address population distribution, environmental effects, and socio-economic factors 46
Integrated Decision Making for Safety Findings The proposed Part 53 construct is supportive of structured performance objectives with integrated decision-making to ensure defense-in-depth A hierarchical decomposition of performance factors appears to be part of Subpart B One category of factors requires accomplishment of safety functions to support adequate protection Another category appears to cover cost-justified safety enhancements purportedly for consistency with current practice o It appears that ALARA is used as an analog for including cost-benefit analysis requirements.
This deserves further discussion o A later slide deals with ALARA in more detail A properly constructed structure of performance objectives may reveal unnecessarily prescriptive elements 47
Design, Construction and Operation in Continuum Part 53 offers the opportunity to depart from fragmented consideration of design, construction and operation The inefficiencies of the current practice of disjointed consideration of the major phases of project accomplishment are well known In addition to correcting for these inefficiencies, additional benefit of effectiveness is possible by managing requirements hierarchically Large margins included at the component level may offer little benefit at the system or function levels NRCs Standards Forum showed need for harmonization of standards that impose margins in isolation Part 53 should be combined with a systems engineering framework that holistically considers the phases on a life-cycle basis 48
Implementation of Parts 50 and 52 Offer Valuable Lessons While 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 have been successful in assuring adequate protection currently, experience indicates lessons to be learned Part 52 has not been consistently implemented with RIPB methods being applied in safety decisions A prominent example relates to rebar issues in AP-1000 plants under construction Potential benefits of RIPB in Part 52 relate to how ITAACs may be improved using performance-based approaches Implementation of Part 50 has accommodated RIPB methods successfully Promulgation of 10 CFR Part 50.69 has provided much benefit The application of RIPB concepts in the Reactor Oversight Process offers valuable lessons that should fully inform Part 53 development Part 53 can benefit from RIPB not having to be bolted on afterwards 49
Build on Success of the Licensing Modernization Project The LMP has resulted in production of industry reports and RG-1.233 which should facilitate licensing applications that are easier to review and establish more effective licensing bases for oversight Part 53 should support application of RIPB methods in all aspects of the licensing basis The regulatory structure should support development of coherent and consistent requirements and regulatory oversight programs for different designs based on design specific safety margins, minimizing unbalanced regulatory requirements for different designs resulting in unfair competitive advantage It should also enable development of owners-controlled programs to improve efficiency and effectiveness of programmatic requirements and regulatory oversight programs (example of such programs currently in place include RIPB surveillance frequency program and 10CFR 50.69) 50
Build on NUREG/BR-0303, Guidance for Performance-Based Regulation NUREG/BR-0303 offers the structure of the Reactor Oversight Process to support adequate protection findings. Part 53 should provide for construction of such objectives hierarchies whereby logically decomposed performance objectives and their associated decision criteria are part of managing requirements.
Transparency and predictability would be enhanced with discrete objectives being successfully accomplished Performance elements identified in this way can incentivize improved outcomes while providing flexibility for innovation The interdependence between flexibility and margins needs to be deliberately incorporated into the integrated decision-making processes of the regulator as well as the licensee 51
Consistency with ANS Position Statement 46 ANS PS-46 anticipated the need for a rulemaking of the type now underway It recognized the flexibility available in the existing regulatory structure even without RIPB methods Flexibility by itself, without other necessary elements, was recognized to be insufficient for new reactor designs Achieving observable outcome attributes is superior to mere compliance with prescribed processes It is now entirely possible to envision broadly similar beneficial outcomes from implementing a wide range of technologies 52
Careful Deployment of ALARA Principles Success of ALARA principles for radiation protection does not necessarily translate to other areas Experience with implementation of ALARA offers plentiful evidence of suboptimal and counterproductive results Being risk-informed does not by itself produce sound outcomes The proposed Subpart F lacks clarity on defining desired outcomes and the use of ALARA principles and cost-benefit analysis to achieve them Subpart F may work better if oriented toward margins optimization over the different phases of the plant life-cycle 53
Summary ANS is convinced that the aspirations of the Commissions White Paper on RIPB (SRM-SECY-98-0144) can and should be realized in practice through the advent of 10 CFR Part 53 Five outcome attributes of risk-informed approaches (including logically prioritized challenges, consideration of a broad set of resources to defend against them, and better decision-making that considers sensitivity to assumptions);
Four outcome attributes of performance-based approaches (including flexibility with incentives for improved outcomes);
Five outcome attributes of RIPB approaches (including focusing attention on the most important activities, objective decision criteria for evaluating performance, identifying parameters for monitoring system and licensee performance, and focusing on results for regulatory decision-making).
54
American Nuclear Society ans.org
Stakeholder Insights Discussion 56
Continuing Dialogue on Structure and Logic of Part 53 57
58 Key Messages The staff is committed to developing a technology-inclusive, risk-informed regulatory framework in accordance with the Commission-approved schedule.
The staff is implementing a novel approach of releasing preliminary rule language to facilitate discussion and recognizes this requires an iterative dialogue as language is refined.
The staff is committed to a framework that achieves the goals of the Commission Advanced Reactor Policy Statement and NRCs Principles of Good Regulation.
The staff recognizes the importance of developing a regulatory framework that provides predictability and stability while accommodating various technologies.
The staff is ensuring that it collects input from numerous stakeholders including industry, trade groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the public, and ACRS, as it evaluates changes to the preliminary language.
o The rule language will remain open for discussion as the staff works toward providing the Commission a proposed rule.
59 1)
Provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety and common defense and security at reactor sites at which advanced nuclear reactor designs are deployed, to at least the same degree of protection as required for current-generation light water reactors; 2)
Protect health and minimize danger to life or property to at least the same degree of protection as required for current-generation light water reactors; 3)
Provide greater operational flexibilities where supported by enhanced margins of safety that may be provided in advanced nuclear reactor designs; 4)
Ensure that the requirements for licensing and regulating advanced nuclear reactors are clear and appropriate; and 5)
Identify, define, and resolve additional areas of concern related to the licensing and regulation of advanced nuclear reactors.
Rulemaking Objectives
NRC Staff Plan to Develop Part 53 60 Retirement Design Changes Configuration Control Surveillance Maintenance Operation Construction/
Manufacturing Construction Siting Design and Analysis Analyses (Prevention, Mitigation, Compare to Criteria)
LB Documents (Applications, SAR, TS, etc.)
Plant/Site (Design, Construction, Configuration Control)
Requirements Definition Fundamental Safety Functions Prevention, Mitigation, Performance Criteria (e.g., F-C Targets)
Normal Operations (e.g., effluents)
Other Project Life Cycle Clarify Controls and Distinctions Between Plant Documents (Systems, Procedures, etc.)
System
& Component Design Analysis Requirements Subpart B Subpart C Subpart D Subpart E Subpart F Subpart G Subparts H & I Safety Categorization
& Special Treatment External Hazards Site Characteristics Environmental Considerations Ensuring Capabilities/
Reliabilities Change Control Environmental Considerations Staffing &
Programs Facility Safety Program
NRC Staff Engagement Plan 61 Stakeholder Interactions Framework Safety Criteria Design Siting Construction Operations Decommission Licensing General/Admin Sept 20 Nov 20 Dec 20 Jan 21 Feb 21 Mar 21 Apr 21 May 21 Jun 21 Jul 21 Consolidated Technical Sections Aug 21 Consolidated Technical Sections Sept 21 Oct 21 Nov 21 Consolidated Rulemaking Package Dec 21 Jan 22 ACRS Full Committee Feb 22 Mar 22 Apr 22 May 22 Draft Proposed Rulemaking Package to the Commission Jun 22 Jul 22 Aug 22 Sept 22 Oct 22 ACRS Interactions Concept/Introduction Discussion Interim Staff Resolution
Subpart B Flowchart 62 Safety Related SSCs Tech Specs Chapter 15 Second Tier ALARA for Normal Ops NRC Safety Goals for unplanned events Control frequency/consequences (QHOs)
Risk/Safety Significance Defense in Depth Non-Safety Related SSCs Special Treatment Licensee Programs First Tier
§ 20.1301 - Normal Ops
§ 50.34/52.79 - Unplanned Events Required Safety Functions (DBAs)
Retention of radionuclides Control heat generation Control heat removal Control chemical interactions Two Tiers of Safety Criteria Design Features and Programmatic Controls Safety Functions Safety Objectives
Additional Discussion 63 Taken from Technology-Inclusive Content of Applications Project (TICAP) Presentation
Part 50 and Part 53 Licensing Frameworks Safety criteria Same safety criteria in Parts 50 and 53 QHOs used in guidance under Part 50 Design and Analyses DBAs
- Part 50: Assessed using prescriptive, highly conservative analyses
- Part 53: Assessed methodically using event frequencies and assuming only safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are available BDBEs
- Part 50: Identified & assessed by largely ad-hoc, prescriptive approach with uncertainties addressed through conservatisms
- Part 53: Derived methodically using event frequencies with explicit consideration for uncertainties Special Treatment for Non-Safety-Related but Risk-Significant SSCs Part 50: Ad-hoc (e.g., § 50.69 programs, Reliability Assurance Programs)
Part 53: Systematic approach to control frequencies and consequences of the LBEs in relation to safety criteria 64
Additional Discussion - First Tier 65
- Possible Applications of First Tier Safety Criteria o Minimally acceptable level of safety o Defines required safety functions o Defines safety classification (safety-related SSCs) o Supported by analyses DBA o Defines SSCs for protection against external events up to the design basis external hazard levels o Defines appropriate content of technical specifications Reserved for the most significant safety requirements Necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety o May support staffing and operator licensing decisions o Greatest level of detail for information in licensing documents
Additional Discussion - Second Tier 66
- Possible Applications of Second Tier Safety Criteria o With first tier, ensures appropriate level of safety for long-term, risk-informed operations o Supported by systematic analyses o Defines additional risk-informed requirements o Enables appropriate special treatment for non-safety related SSCs o Enables risk management approach to operations o May enable staffing and operator licensing decisions o Enables appropriate level of detail in licensing basis documentation based on a risk-informed, function-oriented and performance-based approach
Continuing Dialogue on Structure and Logic of Part 53 Discussion 67
MEETING BREAK Meeting to resume in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 68
Key Guidance 69
Key Guidance by Subpart 70 Subpart A: General Provisions Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance N/A Subpart B: Safety Criteria Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance N/A Further explanation of criteria and two-tier structure in the Statements of Consideration Subpart C: Design and Analysis Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance NEI 18-04 & RG 1.233, LMP ANS/ASME-RA-S-1.4 (Non-LWR PRA Standard)
ANS/ASME Standards Fuel Qualification RG 1.232, Advanced Reactor Design Criteria (ARDC)
Application of Analytical Margins Treatment of Chemical Hazards Subpart D: Siting Requirements Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance SECY-20-0045/RG 4.7, Siting External Hazard Updates Risk-Informed Seismic Design (RES); ANS 2.26 N/A
Key Guidance by Subpart 71 Subpart E: Construction and Manufacturing Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance N/A Manufacturing Guidance QA Alternatives Subpart F: Operations SSCs Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance NEI 18-04 & RG 1.233, LMP Technical Specifications Special Treatment (possible industry initiative)
Maintenance, Repair & Inspection Personnel Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance Division of Reactor Oversight (DRO)
Paper/preliminary Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)
Concept of Operations Programs Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance EP for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)/Other New Technologies (ONTs) Final Rule, RG 1.242 Radiation Protection Emergency Preparedness Security Programs Facility Safety Program
Key Guidance by Subpart 72 Subpart G: Decommissioning Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance N/A N/A Subpart H: Licensing Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance TICAP ARCAP Manufacturing Licenses Possibly Conceptual Design Subpart I: Maintaining Licensing Basis Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance N/A 50.59 Equivalent Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)/PRA Updates Subpart J: Administrative/Misc.
Existing Guidance or Guidance Under Development Additional Guidance N/A Reporting Requirements Financial/Liability
TICAP / ARCAP 73
- Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP) o Purpose is to develop technology-inclusive, risk-informed and performance based application guidance o Being developed to support 10 CFR Part 50, Part 52, and Part 53 applications
Near-term need to develop guidance to support expected advanced reactor Part 50/52 applications using the LMP process endorsed in RG 1.233
Guidance will be updated as Part 53 rulemaking language is adjusted o Encompasses TICAP
- TICAP o Scope is governed by the LMP-based safety case
LMP process uses risk-informed, performance based approach to select licensing basis events, develop SSC categorization and ensures defense-in-depth is considered o Industry developing key portions of TICAP guidance o Industry guidance will be supplemented by NRC staff-developed guidance as appropriate
ARCAP 74 Outline Safety Analysis Report (SAR) -
Based on TICAP Guidance
- 1. General Plant Information, Site Description, and Overview of the Safety Case
- 2. Generic Analyses
- 3. Licensing Basis Event (LBE) Analysis
- 4. Integrated Plant Analysis
- 5. Safety Functions, Design Criteria, and SSC Categorization
- 6. Safety Related SSC Criteria and Capabilities
- 7. Non-safety related with special treatment SSC Criteria and Capabilities
- 8. Plant Programs Additional Portions of Application
- Technical Specifications
- Technical Requirements Manual
- Quality Assurance Plan (design)
- Fire Protection Program (design)
- Quality Assurance Plan (construction and operations)
- Physical Security Plan
- Special Nuclear Material (SNM) physical protection program
- SNM material control and accounting plan
- Cyber Security Plan
- Fire Protection Program (operational)
- Radiation Protection Program
- Inservice inspection/Inservice testing (ISI/IST) Program
- Environmental Report
- Site Redress Plan
- Exemptions, Departures, and Variances
- Facility Safety Program (under consideration for Part 53 applications)
Audit/inspection of Applicant Records Calculations Analyses P&IDs System Descriptions Design Drawings Design Specs Procurement Specs Safety Analysis Report (SAR) structure based on clean sheet approach Additional SAR Content -Outside the Scope of TICAP
- 9. Control of Routine Plant Radioactive Effluents, Plant Contamination, and Solid Waste
- 10. Control of Occupational Doses
- 11. Organization
- 12. Initial Startup Programs
Visual Depiction of TICAP Guidance in Context of an Advanced Reactor Application (Taken from Industry TICAP presentation) 75
Tentative Schedule 76
- TICAP o 4/15/21: Draft NEI Guidance Document to NRC
Will factor in lessons-learned from TICAP tabletop exercises on 4 different technologies that are being performed in the February-March 2021 time frame o May 2021: Workshops with NRC on draft guidance document o Late July: NEI Guidance Document Rev. 0 provided to the NRC o Early August: NRC TICAP draft regulatory guide issued
- ARCAP o Several ARCAP draft documents discussed in public meetings including:
Site Information
Chapter 9, Control of Routine Plant Radioactive Effluents, Plant Contamination, and Solid Waste
Chapter 10, Control of Occupational Doses
Chapter 11, Organization
Chapter 12, Initial Startup Program o Staff developing ARCAP Roadmap ISG o Early August: NRC draft interim staff guidance to be issued for above document
- Tentative plan to brief ACRS Subcommittee on the above document in Fall of 2021
Tentative Schedule 77 Legend Industry Action NRC Staff Action Industry/NRC Joint Action Notes:
TICAP portion of the application based on applying LMP process to appropriate portions of an application. TICAP milestones shown above the timeline ARCAP broader than TICAP. Provides roadmap for all portions of an application and encompasses TICAP Timeline does not reflect TICAP and ARCAP efforts that started in December of 2019. These early efforts led to the development of the industry-led TICAP Annotated Outline discussed in an October 22, 2020, public meeting and the NRC-led ARCAP outline plan discussed in a August 27, 2020, public meeting 2022 Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr Jun Aug Oct Dec Feb Industry TICAP Annotated Outline 10/22/2020 Draft NEI TICAP Guidance Document 4/15/2021 NEI Revision 0 of TICAP Guidance Document 7/28/2021 NEI Revision 1 of TICAP Guidance Document 12/19/2021 NRC Comments based on TICAP Workshops 6/1/2021 NRC TICAP Regulatory Guide (Draft) 8/6/2021 NRC TICAP Regulatory Guide 3/25/2022 NRC/Industry brief ACRS Subcommittee on TICAP guidance documents (NEI, Rev0 and Staff Draft RG) 9/8/2021 NRC/Industry brief ACRS Subcommittee on final TICAP guidance 1/12/2022 NRC/Industry brief ACRS Full Committee on final TICAP guidance 2/3/2022 NRC ARCAP entire application outline 8/27/2020 ARCAP Application Outline Updated to be Consistent with TICAP outline 1/30/2021 Draft ARCAP Roadmap ISG, ARCAP ISG for "Site Information," and ARCAP Chapters 9, 10, 11, and 12 issued 8/6/2021 4/2/2021 TICAP Tabletop Exercises 5/2/2021 TICAP Workshops 5/21/2021
Key Guidance Discussion 78
Subpart E - Construction and Manufacturing 79
Retirement Design Changes Configuration Control Surveillance Maintenance Operation Construction/
Manufacturing Construction Siting Design and Analysis Analyses (Prevention, Mitigation, Compare to Criteria)
LB Documents (Applications, SAR, TS, etc.)
Plant/Site (Design, Construction, Configuration Control)
Requirements Definition Fundamental Safety Functions Prevention, Mitigation, Performance Criteria (e.g., F-C Targets)
Normal Operations (e.g., effluents)
Other NRC Staff Plan to Develop Part 53 Project Life Cycle Clarify Controls and Distinctions Between Plant Documents (Systems, Procedures, etc.)
System
& Component Design Analysis Requirements Subpart B Subpart C Subpart D Subpart E Subpart F Subpart G 80 Subparts H & I Safety Categorization
& Special Treatment External Hazards Site Characteristics Environmental Considerations Ensuring Capabilities/
Reliabilities Change Control Environmental Considerations Staffing &
Programs Facility Safety Plan
Part 53 General Layout Subpart A, General Provisions Subpart B, Technology-Inclusive Safety Objectives Subpart C, Design and Analysis Subpart D, Siting Requirements Subpart E, Construction and Manufacturing Subpart F, Requirements for Operation Facility Safety Program Subpart G, Decommissioning Requirements Subpart H, Applications for Licenses, Certifications and Approvals Subpart I, Maintaining and Revising Licensing Basis Information Subpart J, Reporting and Administrative Requirements 81
Subpart E - Construction and Manufacturing Scope and Purpose Part 1 - Construction
- (a) Management and Control
- (b) Construction Activities
- (c) Inspection and Acceptance
- (d) Communication Part 2 - Manufacturing
- (a) Management and Control
- (b) Manufacturing Activities
- (c ) Fuel Loading
- (d) Communication
- (e) Transportation
- (f) Acceptance and Installation at the Site 82
§ 53.600 - Scope and Purpose Subpart applicable to construction and manufacturing activities authorized by Construction Permit (CP),
Combined License (COL), Manufacturing License (ML), or a Limited Work Authorization (LWA) 83
§ 53.610 - Construction Management and Control o
Design and analyses conform with subpart C o
Organization and procedures describing qualifications, responsibilities, and interfaces o
Program to evaluate construction experience o
Preliminary emergency plan for site, fitness-for-duty program o
Quality Assurance conforms to generally accepted codes and standards o
Radiation protection, information security, and cyber security programs, as applicable 84
§ 53.610 - Construction Construction Activities o
Procedures in place to appropriately handle special nuclear material, multi-unit site hazards, control of design, redress plan o
Requirements for fresh fuel storage, fire protection Inspection and Acceptance o
Inspect and test SSCs prior to acceptance Communication o
Procedures for coordinating with other units and NRC 85
§ 53.620 - Manufacturing Management and Control o
Design and analyses conform with subpart C o
Organization and, procedures describing qualifications, responsibilities, and interfaces o
Program to evaluate manufacturing experience o
Fitness-for-duty program o
Quality Assurance conforms to generally accepted codes and standards o
Radiation protection, information security, and cyber security programs, as applicable 86
§ 53.620 - Manufacturing Manufacturing Activities o
Adhere to manufacturing license, conform to generally accepted codes and standards o
Procedures in place to appropriately handle SNM, fresh fuel, fire protection, emergency planning, radiation protection, minimizing contamination Fuel Loading - Develop further, if pursued 87
§ 53.620 - Manufacturing Communication - Stay in contact with NRC Transportation o
Interface with 10 CFR Part 71 o
Procedures for movement, transfer only to accepted license holders o
Supports fixed siting of manufactured reactors o
Not currently planning to address mobile reactors Acceptance and Installation o
Reactor must be certified in compliance with ML prior to installation Consideration of transport and disposal post operation in subsequent subparts 88
Subpart E: Construction and Manufacturing Discussion 89
Upcoming Challenges:
Operations, Manufacturing, and Licensing 90
91 Upcoming Challenges:
Use of Analytical Safety Margins Subpart C, Design and Analysis Requirements Possible applications to operating flexibilities beyond siting and EPZs Establishing appropriate design criteria (e.g., offsite dose limits) to justify possible flexibilities Preliminary Language
§ 53.470 Application of Analytical Safety Margins to Operational Flexibilities Where an applicant or licensee so chooses, design criteria more restrictive than those defined in
§ 53.230(b) may be adopted to support operational flexibilities (e.g., emergency planning requirements under Subpart F of this part). In such cases, applicants and licensees must ensure that the functional design criteria of § 53.420(b), the analysis requirements of § 53.450, and identification of special treatment of SSCs and human actions under § 53.460 reflect and support the use of alternative design criteria to obtain additional analytical safety margins.
Licensees must ensure that measures taken to provide the analytical margins supporting operational flexibilities are incorporated into design features and programmatic controls and are maintained within programs required in other Subparts.
92 Upcoming Challenges:
Operations, Staffing (Subpart F)
- Subpart F: Establishing and Maintaining Appropriate Staffing o Concept for Operations Identifying Role of Personnel in Meeting First Tier Safety Criteria Identifying Role of Personnel in Meeting Second Tier Safety Criteria
- White Paper to be released on Staffing Considerations:
o Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Human-System Considerations for Advanced Reactors
93 Upcoming Challenges:
Licensing (Subpart H)
- Manufacturing Licenses o Manufacturing, Transportation, Deployment
- Conceptual Design Reviews (if needed)
- PRA and Other Submittal Requirements
- Process for Conversion of Part 50 or 52 application to Part 53 application (if needed)
- Interplay with Parts 50 and 52 Lessons Learned Rulemaking
94 Upcoming Challenges:
Maintaining Licensing Basis (Subpart I)
- Amendments to a license o Application (review?)
o Public notice and consultations o Issuance
- Change control o Changes during construction
95 Upcoming Challenges:
Misc Requirements (Subpart J)
- Reporting
- Notifications (§§ 50.72, 50.73)
- Financial Qualifications
- Property insurance (§ 50.54(w))
- Liability / Price Anderson
First Principles 96 See: SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria for Non-Light-Water-Reactors, and INL/EXT-20-58717, Technology-Inclusive Determination of Mechanistic Source Terms for Offsite Dose-Related Assessments for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Facilities
Unmitigated Consequences &
Inherent Characteristics 97 ANS 2.26 unmitigated consequence analysis shall be performed considering only the inherent physical or chemical characteristics of the hazardous material and the energy sources for dispersing the material
Integrated Approach (NRC Activities) 98 Note that a goal of the current effort is to build from the LMP and have that guidance (NEI 18-04, RG 1.233) be one acceptable way of meeting the requirements to be developed and incorporated into Part 53
Upcoming Challenges: Operations, Manufacturing, and Licensing Discussion 99
Part 53 Rulemaking Schedule Milestone Schedule Major Rulemaking Activities/Milestones Schedule Public Outreach, ACRS Interactions and Generation of Proposed Rule Package Present to April 2022 (13 months)
Submit Draft Proposed Rule Package to Commission May 2022 Publish Proposed Rule and Draft Key Guidance October 2022 Public Comment Period - 60 days November and December 2022 Public Outreach and Generation of Final Rule Package January 2023 to February 2024 (14 months)
Submit Draft Final Rule Package to Commission March 2024 Office of Management and Budget and Office of the Federal Register Processing July 2024 to September 2024 Publish Final Rule and Key Guidance October 2024 100
Final Discussion and Questions 101
Acronyms and Abbreviations ACRS Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ALARA As low as reasonably achievable ANS American Nuclear Society AOO Anticipated operational occurrence AR Advanced reactor ARCAP Advanced Reactor Content of Applications Project ARDC Advanced Reactor Design Criteria ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BDBE Beyond design-basis event CDF Core damage frequency CFR Code of Federal Regulations COL Combined License 102 CP Construction Permit DBA Design-basis accident DBE Design-basis event DBEHL Design-basis External Hazard Level DG Draft regulatory guide DID Defense in Depth DRO Division of Reactor Oversight DSA Deterministic Safety Analysis EAB Exclusion Area Boundary EP Emergency preparedness EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone
Acronyms and Abbreviations 103 F-C Frequency - Consequence FPRA Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FSF Fundamental Safety Function IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ISG Interim staff guidance ISI Inservice Inspection ISO International Organization for Standardization IST Inservice Testing ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria LB Licensing basis LBE Licensing basis event LERF Large Early Release Frequency LLWR Large Light-water Reactor LMP Licensing Modernization Project LPZ Low population zone LWA Limited Work Authorization LWR Light-water Reactor ML Manufacturing License NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NEIMA Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act NGO Nongovernmental organizations NQA Nuclear quality assurance NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSRST Non-safety related with Special Treatment NST Non-safety related with no Special Treatment ONT Other new technologies
Acronyms and Abbreviations 104 P&ID Piping and instrumentation diagrams PAG Protective action guide PRA Probabilistic risk assessment PSA Probabilistic safety assessment PSF PRA Safety Function QA Quality assurance QHO Quantitative health objective rem Roentgen equivalent man RES Risk-informed seismic design RFDC Required Functional Design Criteria RG Regulatory guide RI Risk-Informed RIPB Risk-Informed and Performance-Based RSF Required Safety Function SAR Safety Analysis Report SECY Office of the Secretary SMR Small modular reactor SNM Special nuclear material SPRA Seismic probabilistic risk assessment SR Safety-related SRDC Safety-related SSC Design Criteria SRM Staff requirements memorandum SSCs Structures, systems, and components TICAP Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project TS Technical specifications USNIC U.S. Nuclear Industry Council