ML21055A558
| ML21055A558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/14/2021 |
| From: | Derek Widmayer Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Widmayer, D, ACRS | |
| References | |
| NRC-1337 | |
| Download: ML21055A558 (229) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Future Plant Designs Subcommittee Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: teleconference Date: Thursday, January 14, 2021 Work Order No.: NRC-1337 Pages 1-186 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 1
2 3
4 DISCLAIMER 5
6 7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 9
10 11 The contents of this transcript of the 12 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 14 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 15 recorded at the meeting.
16 17 This transcript has not been reviewed, 18 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 19 inaccuracies.
20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) 6 + + + + +
7 FUTURE PLANT DESIGNS SUBCOMMITTEE 8 + + + + +
9 THURSDAY 10 JANUARY 14, 2021 11 + + + + +
12 The Subcommittee met via Teleconference, 13 at 9:30 a.m. EST, Dennis Bley, Chairman, presiding.
14 15 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
16 DENNIS BLEY, Chairman 17 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 18 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 19 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 20 WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member 21 JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member 22 DAVID A. PETTI, Member 23 PETER RICCARDELLA, Member 24 JOY L. REMPE, Member 25 MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Member NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 1 ACRS CONSULTANT:
4 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
5 DEREK WIDMAYER 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 1 C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 2 Opening Remarks 3 by Mr. Dennis Bley, ACRS . . . . . . . . . 4 4 Introductory Remarks 5 by Mr. John Segala . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6 Part 53 Rulemaking Overview 7 by Bob Beall, NMSS and Bill 8 Reckley, NRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9 10 CFR 53-Subpart B-Technology-Inclusive Safety 10 Requirements 11 by Bill Reckley, NRR and Nanette Valliere, 12 NRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 13 Lunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 14 10 CFR Part 53-Subpart F-Requirements for Operations 15 (Facility Safety Program only) 16 by Bill Reckley, NRR and Nanette Valliere, 17 NRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 18 Adjourn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 (9:30 a.m.)
3 CHAIRMAN BLEY: The meeting will now come 4 to order. This is a meeting of the Advisory Committee 5 on Reactor Safeguard Subcommittee on Future Plant 6 Designs. I am Dennis Bley, Chairman of the 7 Subcommittee. The ACRS members in attendance are Ron 8 Ballinger, Charlie Brown, Vesna Dimitrijevic, Walt 9 Kirchner, Jose March-Leuba, Dave Petti, Joy Rempe, and 10 Matt Sunseri. Also our consultant, Mike Corradini is 11 in attendance. Derek Widmayer of the ACRS staff is 12 the designated federal official for this meeting.
13 Kent Howard of the ACRS staff is the backup designated 14 federal official.
15 I'm hearing a lot of noise. I think 16 somebody's got an open mic. The purpose of today's 17 meeting is to discuss the Preliminary Rule Language 18 for two subparts of 10 CFR Part 53, Licensing and 19 Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors. Subpart B, 20 Technology-Inclusive Safety Requirements. And Subpart 21 F, Requirements for a Facility Safety Program. The 22 subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant 23 issues and facts, and formulate proposed positions and 24 actions as appropriate.
25 This subcommittee meeting is the first of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 1 several scheduled to discuss preliminary proposed rule 2 language for 10 CFR Part 53. The current plan is for 3 a series of subcommittee meetings on all the subparts 4 of the rule before any proposed rule language is 5 presented to the ACRS full committee. However, at the 6 subcommittee's discretion, specific matters may be 7 presented to the full committee for its consideration.
8 The ACRS was established by statuette and 9 is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 FACA. Therefore this committee can only speak through 11 its published letter reports. We hold these meetings 12 to gather information and perform preparatory work 13 that will support our deliberations at a full 14 committee meeting. The rules for participating in all 15 ACRS meetings including today's are announced in the 16 Federal Register on June 13th of 2019.
17 The ACRS section of the U.S. NRC public 18 website provides our charter, bylaws, agendas, letter 19 reports, and posts transcripts of all full and 20 subcommittee meetings including slide presentations.
21 The meeting notice and agenda for this meeting were 22 posted on that website.
23 As stated in the Federal Register Notice 24 and in the Public Meeting Notice posted to the 25 website, members of the public who desire to provide NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 1 written or oral input to the subcommittee may do so 2 and should contact the designated federal official 3 five days prior to the meeting and as practicable.
4 Today's meeting is open to public attendance and we 5 have received no written statements or requests to 6 make an oral statement. We have set aside ten minutes 7 in the agenda for spontaneous comments from members of 8 the public attending or listening to our meeting.
9 Due to the COVID pandemic, today's meeting 10 is being held over Microsoft Teams for ACRS and NRC 11 staff attendees. There is also a telephone bridge 12 line allowing participation of the public over the 13 phone. A transcript of today's meeting is being kept.
14 Therefore we request that meeting participants on the 15 bridge line identify themselves when they are asked to 16 speak and to speak with sufficient clarity and volume 17 so they can be readily heard.
18 At this time, I ask that attendees on 19 Teams and on the bridge line keep their devices on 20 mute to minimize disruptions and only unmute when 21 speaking. I'd also like to ask members to defer 22 questions and comments on regulatory issues concerning 23 how fusion energy systems might be considered under 24 Part 53 until our subcommittee meeting of May 4th, 25 which will consider a staff commission paper on this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 1 topic.
2 Before we begin, Member Walter Kirchner 3 has asked to make a statement. Walt, please go ahead.
4 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Thank you, Chairman 5 Bley. This is Walt Kirchner. I just would like to on 6 this topic of 10 CFR 53 and the related material just 7 quickly share something for the record from Mary 8 Drouin. And it's out of her NUREG, Knowledge 9 Management 009 Report. I think it's relevant for 10 today's proceedings and it's on defense-in-depth.
11 And I'll quickly read her succinct points 12 on the matter. And that is to preserve a reasonable 13 balance among the layers of defense, preserve adequate 14 capability of design features without an over-reliance 15 on problematic activities as compensatory measures, 16 preserve system redundance, independence, and 17 diversity, commensurate with expected frequency and 18 consequences of challenges to the system including 19 consideration of uncertainty, preserve adequate 20 defense against potential common cause failures, 21 maintain multiple fission product barriers, preserve 22 sufficient defense against human errors, and continue 23 to meet the intent of the plant's design criteria.
24 I would observe that Mary presented this 25 material to our committee. I think it was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 1 approximately two years ago. The committee routinely 2 in a year probably sees 10,000+ viewgraphs. This is 3 one that I felt was worthy of keeping and relevant to 4 today's deliberations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
5 MR. WIDMAYER: Dennis, I think you need to 6 unmute.
7 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thank you. I'll repeat 8 what I said to myself. Walt, thanks for those 9 remarks. I appreciate them and I appreciate the 10 credit given to Mary who did a lot of work supporting 11 the NRC's efforts in these areas.
12 We'll now proceed with the meeting. I 13 call on John Segala, Chief of the Advanced Reactor 14 Policy Branch, NRR to make introductory remarks.
15 John, please go ahead.
16 MR. SEGALA: Thank you and good morning.
17 Consistent with the Nuclear Energy Innovation and 18 Modernization Act, we are developing a new alternative 19 regulatory framework for advanced reactors that 20 embraces risk-informed approaches and performance-21 based criteria that will be technology-inclusive to a 22 wide range of new technologies, which we are calling 23 10 CFR Part 53.
24 Key to the development of this rulemaking 25 is the establishment of high level technology-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 1 inclusive performance criteria and leveraging recently 2 developed staff guidance. We've previously briefed 3 the ACRS subcommittee in July of 2020 and the ACRS 4 full committee in September of 2020. And the ACRS 5 sent us a letter in October of 2020 stating that the 6 staff's proposed approach for developing the Part 53 7 Rule is viable.
8 The staff should ensure that applicants 9 compensate for novel designs with uncertainties due to 10 incompleteness in the knowledge base by performing 11 systematic searches for hazards, initiating events, 12 and accident scenarios with no preconceptions that 13 could limit the creative process. And three, the rule 14 should provide a pathway for licensing prototype 15 facilities when uncertainties in the knowledge base 16 and lack of operating experience suggest that 17 additional testing and monitoring are needed.
18 In order to meet the Commission's directed 19 schedule to publish the final Part 53 Rule by October 20 of 2024, we are having extensive stakeholder 21 engagement to solicit feedback to better inform the 22 staff's proposals and to ensure a shared understanding 23 of what will be included in the final rule. We are 24 here today in the first of many meetings we will be 25 having with the ACRS this year to seek ACRS feedback NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 1 on the NRCs development of Part 53, Preliminary 2 Proposed Rule Language for Advanced Reactors.
3 Today we will be seeking ACRS feedback on 4 the first set of preliminary rule language. We have 5 engaged with stakeholders on these subparts in 6 November of 2020 and on January 7th of 2021 and have 7 received feedback, which the NRC staff is still 8 assessing. We are looking forward to hearing from the 9 ACRS today on this first set of preliminary rule 10 language for Part 53 and any insights and feedback you 11 all may have. This completes my opening remarks.
12 Thank you.
13 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thank you, John. I do 14 have to make one comment. You will not hear from the 15 ACRS today. You'll hear from individual members. As 16 you know, the ACRS only speaks through its letters.
17 Who is going to begin for the staff?
18 MS. VALLIERE: Dennis, I'm going to begin.
19 This is Nan Valliere.
20 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. Thanks, Nan.
21 Please go ahead.
22 MS. VALLIERE: Good morning. As I said, 23 my name is Nan Valliere. I'm a Senior Project Manager 24 in the Advanced Reactor Policy Branch. The Part 53 25 Team is happy to be back with the subcommittee today NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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11 1 to continue our discussions on the Part 53 Rulemaking.
2 Can I have the next slide please?
3 This slide shows the subcommittee's 4 meeting agenda. Of course the timeframes are 5 approximate. We are prepared to make adjustment to 6 accommodate the members' interests. We'll begin with 7 some quick background and an overview of the schedule.
8 We'll then provide an overview of the strategy and the 9 structure behind the Part 53 rulemaking. Next, we'll 10 provide a summary of the technology-inclusive safety 11 requirements that make up Subpart B of Part 53. And 12 then conclude today' presentation with a discussion of 13 requirements for a Facility Safety Program, which the 14 staff has drafted as part of Subpart F, which covers 15 operating requirements. Next slide please.
16 I'm going to briefly cover several 17 background slides. Most of this information covers 18 activities that have occurred since we last discussed 19 Part 53 with the full committee in September. As you 20 are well aware, the trigger for this rulemaking was 21 the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act or 22 NEIMA, which was signed into law in January of 2019.
23 NEIMA requires the NRC to complete a rulemaking to 24 establish a technology-inclusive regulatory framework 25 for advanced nuclear reactors by 2027.
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12 1 NEIMA defines an advanced nuclear reactor 2 as a fission or fusion reactor, including a prototype 3 plan that has significant improvements compared to 4 reactors under construction at the time NEIMA was 5 enacted. In line with this definition, the staff is 6 setting the scope of the Part 53 Rule as including 7 light-water small modular reactors, non-light water 8 reactors, and fusion reactors. Next slide please.
9 Slide 4 provides some information about 10 the NRC staff's Part 53 rulemaking plan, which was 11 presented to the Commission last April in SECY 12 0032. In that plan, the staff told the Commission 13 that we thought the goals of NEIMA could be best met 14 by creating a new part in 10 CFR to construct a 15 licensing framework that would be suitable for a range 16 of technologies.
17 As John noted earlier, we plan to build on 18 existing NRC requirements, commission polity, and 19 recent related activities such as those that resulted 20 in issuance of the recent guidance for technology-21 inclusive risk-informed and performance-based 22 methodology for establishing the licensing basis for 23 advanced reactors. This NRC guidance endorsed 24 industry guidance that was developed as part of the 25 Licensing Modernization Project, a cost-shared NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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13 1 initiative led by Nuclear Utilities and supported by 2 the Department of Energy. The rulemaking plan 3 indicated that the NRC's staff was planning for 4 extensive interactions with external stakeholders and 5 with the ACRS. Next slide please.
6 The Commission provided direction related 7 to the staff's rulemaking plan and the Staff 8 Requirements Memorandum on October 2nd of last year.
9 In that memo, the Commission approved the staff's 10 overall approach for the rulemaking, but directed the 11 staff to accelerate its timeline while balancing the 12 need to produce a high quality, thoroughly-vetted 13 regulation. The Commission directed the staff to 14 provide the Commission three things namely a schedule 15 with milestones and resource requirements to achieve 16 publication of the final Part 53 Rule by October of 17 2024, key uncertainties impacting publication of the 18 final rule by that date, and options for Commission 19 consideration on licensing and regulating fusion 20 energy systems.
21 The Commission requested the first two of 22 these items within 30 days. The Commission also 23 directed the staff to develop and release preliminary 24 proposed rule language intermittently, followed by 25 public outreach and dialogue. As John mentioned, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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14 1 since the SRM was issued, the staff has released draft 2 rule text twice ahead of two public meetings; one held 3 last November and the other, earlier this month to 4 help us fulfill the Commission direction. Next slide 5 please.
6 On November 2nd, the NRC staff issued a 7 memorandum that provided the Commission with the first 8 two items requested in its direction on the rulemaking 9 plan. That memorandum provided a schedule with 10 milestones and resources to complete the Part 53 final 11 rule by October of 2024. In addition, the memorandum 12 included a discussion of key uncertainties that could 13 impact publication of the final rule by that date.
14 Next slide please.
15 Slide 7 replicates the milestone schedule 16 that was provided to the Commission in the 30-day 17 commission memo. Highlights of the schedule include 18 19 months, starting last October, to interact with 19 stakeholders and the ACRS and to produce the proposed 20 rulemaking package for submittal to the Commission.
21 Publication of the proposed rule in October of 2022 22 will be followed by a 60-day public comment period.
23 Fourteen months are planned for generation of the 24 final rule package to include additional public 25 outreach. And the draft final rule package is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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15 1 projected to be submitted to the Commission in March 2 of 2024 in order to accomplish publication of the 3 final rule by October of that year. Next slide 4 please.
5 This slide lists the key uncertainties 6 associated with meeting this schedule that were 7 provided to the Commission in the staff's 30-day memo.
8 Those key uncertainties include the ability to reach 9 alignment on the scope of the rulemaking with external 10 stakeholders, the time needed for engagement on key 11 issues within the NRC and for communication with 12 external stakeholders and the ACRS, the timing of 13 guidance document development to support the rule, the 14 ability of the public to review the proposed rule 15 within the suggested 60-day public comment period, and 16 the ability to include the regulatory framework and 17 requirements for fusion facilities in the final rule 18 by 2024.
19 Before we go on to discuss the rule 20 language, I'd like to pause here to see if the members 21 have any questions on the background material.
22 MEMBER BROWN: Dennis, can I ask a 23 question?
24 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Certainly, Charlie.
25 MEMBER BROWN: Go back to Slide 3. Your NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 bullet where you talk about the term "advance reactor" 2 means -- and then it goes on to say "with significant 3 improvements compared to commercial nuclear reactors 4 under construction fundamentally today." In pawing 5 through the, I guess B, C, D and that we were given 6 for today in 53.2, I guess, I didn't see anything that 7 says when do we do a comparison with the proposed 8 advanced reactor against what we think the significant 9 improvements are?
10 In other words, is there a definition of 11 what the problems are with today's? And then you can 12 significantly evaluate what the proposed problems 13 there would be with a new reactor. And then see -- do 14 a comparison of which ones are better or not. And is 15 that not in this section or is that going to be 16 someplace else in other parts of the rule? Was I 17 clear?
18 MS. VALLIER: I think I understand your 19 question and we'll determine if I do by my answer.
20 Yeah, so the applicability portions of the rule, yeah, 21 that is in a section that is not included in what's 22 being presented today. So the information about, you 23 know, exactly which type of reactors the rule applies 24 to, that provision is not in what's being presented so 25 you have not seen that yet.
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17 1 I guess I will say at this point in line 2 with what I mentioned when I presented this slide is 3 that at this moment, we are -- we are setting the 4 scope of the rule as including light-water SMRs, non-5 light water reactors, and fusion reactors. And the 6 assumption is that those types of reactors would meet 7 the NEIMA definition. Of course, we don't have the 8 complete definition here. They listed, you know, some 9 of what those improvements should include in terms of 10 safety improvements and nonproliferation improvements, 11 and things of that nature. So the assumption is that 12 the type of reactors that will be scoped into Part 53 13 would meet that definition.
14 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Nan, this is Dennis. I'm 15 a little concerned by your answer. On your slide, 16 you're talking about what the law is addressing. And 17 the law is saying maybe we don't have an appropriate 18 process for these advanced reactors. And it defines 19 them. When you write Part 53, at least the hints I've 20 been getting, it's hard to see why it wouldn't apply 21 to almost any reactor, including the existing reactors 22 if they should choose to use it. So I hope the staff 23 uses care. And I don't see any reason why you have to 24 build in what was the motivation in the law into the 25 rule.
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18 1 MS. VALLIER: So I understand -- I 2 understand your point. I think that where the staff 3 is at this point in time, especially in light of the 4 more aggressive schedule for completing this rule that 5 we are -- we are for the proposed rule at least, 6 sticking with the guidance that was provided by 7 Congress and NEIMA that the rule should apply to 8 reactors that have improvements over those that were 9 operating while under construction is of the time of 10 the enactment of the rule.
11 Not to say that in the end, you know, 12 obviously when the proposed rule is issued, we will 13 receive likely a large number of comments on that 14 rule. And of course the staff will take into 15 consideration, both the public comments we receive and 16 any, of course, feedback from the committee in 17 developing the final scope of the rule.
18 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Nan, my last comment for 19 now is the law doesn't say it should apply to these 20 and no others, but go ahead.
21 CHAIRMAN BALLILNGER: This is Ron 22 Ballinger. I very strongly agree with what Dennis is 23 saying. And I think if you wait until the last minute 24 in effect to make additional statements relating its 25 applicability to any reactor, that's kind of when the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 1 cat is out of the -- wait a minute, I'm sorry -- the 2 horse is out of the barn. And it becomes very 3 difficult to do things.
4 MS. VALLIER: So I understand. I think we 5 understand the members position. But Bill, I'll just 6 stop if you have anything more you want to add.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Could I make one response 8 to your answer? This is Charlie Brown again.
9 MS. VALLIER: Certainly.
10 MEMBER BROWN: I guess what I was -- you 11 didn't quite answer and I'm not being negative with 12 this response. All I'm looking for is obviously we've 13 got advanced reactors that include the light-water 14 SMRs. There's a basic understanding of what the 15 hazards are we have to deal with and how difficult 16 they are to deal with, with light-water reactors for 17 the most part. My concern is that when we evaluate 18 any new reactor design that's a non-light water one, 19 that there's a thorough understanding of what new 20 hazards are introduced even though you've done away 21 with some of the old hazards. And how do they 22 compare?
23 Are we getting better or are we making it 24 more difficult? And I haven't seen that in the last 25 -- on any of the last few meetings we've had on the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 1 advanced reactor approaches. I'm not against them.
2 That's not the purpose of my comment. It's just that 3 a few description of why are we getting better, but 4 are we introducing something that's even more 5 difficult to deal with just because we put the name 6 advanced in front of it?
7 So that's kind of my concern is I've been 8 looking for that in the various meetings we've had and 9 haven't seen that addressed. It's always assumed that 10 they're better and less hazardous and more easily 11 dealt with. And it seems to me if we're writing a 12 rule where you say our intent is with significant 13 improvements to make it easier to operate and they're 14 less of a hazard to the public, then we ought to try 15 to define that. That was the purpose of my comment.
16 MS. VALLIER: I understand better now.
17 Thank you for that clarification.
18 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, and your other parts 19 were fine. I mean I totally agree with the responses 20 we've gotten and the interchange we've had. But that 21 was the fundamental thrust and it was obviously not in 22 these parts of the rule that we're examining today.
23 But the implication of the -- not the implication --
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21 1 for improvements, not where we add hazards that may 2 well be more difficult to deal with. Water and 3 uranium we know about. The other ones, the long-term 4 things, we don't. And there ought to be an assessment 5 of those to go along with our approaches. That's all.
6 Thank you very much.
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Dennis, this is Walt.
8 Just an observation, and this is not to question the 9 language that Congress has passed or anything. But 10 typically at least in my review of the policy 11 statements that the Commission has issued over the 12 years, it typically talks about comparison to the term 13 "operating fleet". This one -- the choice of words is 14 such that it would suggest a comparison to those under 15 construction. And of course I'm now referring to 16 Vogtle 3 and 4. And that may prove to be a challenge 17 in terms of demonstrating the significant 18 improvements. But that's just an observation on my 19 part.
20 MEMBER BROWN: That's actually a good 21 point, Walt. Thank you. This is Charlie again.
22 MEMBER PETTI: So this is Dave. I'm just 23 struggling with this whole equivalency of the existing 24 fleet. Do you have to make the comparison, 25 particularly if you're going to do something different NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 1 in the regulation? I'm thinking Subpart F. And so we 2 don't have to deal with it now, but in a legal is 3 there some sort of requirement to somehow tie yourself 4 back to all the rules of the current fleet with lights 5 and thunder?
6 MEMBER BROWN: Well safety is safety, 7 isn't it? I mean the public's either safe or it's 8 not. Those rules apply regardless of the -- This is 9 Charlie again -- regardless of the reactor that we end 10 up building in the future.
11 MEMBER PETTI: But will stuff be 12 challenged legally if this new path, you know, that's 13 developed, Part 53? If you can't -- or do you have to 14 show that, you know, that you're adequately protecting 15 the public in this path versus the historic path. Is 16 that something that when you guys put this together, 17 you have to kind of be mindful of, that an intervener 18 could, you know, somehow upend things?
19 MS. VALLIER: Yes. I think we are -- we 20 are obviously going to have to -- Go ahead, Bill.
21 MR. RECKLEY: No, I was -- This is Bill 22 Reckley. And I'll be getting into some of this as we 23 go through and also be interested in hearing the 24 members viewpoints as we go through some of this. But 25 the -- on this slide, if you look at what the -- what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 1 NEIMA defines as advanced reactors, safety is one, but 2 it also includes economics, fuel utilization, a whole 3 number of other factors that go into the consideration 4 of an advanced reactor. And so as Nan was pointing 5 out, we're going in thinking we can at least define 6 the minimum set as being the ones that she mentioned, 7 light-water SMRs, non-lights, and potentially fusion.
8 And then to Dennis' point, I think as we 9 go through this, whether that minimum scope can be 10 expanded to, for example include Generation-III+
11 plants, future Gen III+ plants, that would be a point 12 of discussion that we'll have over the next months as 13 we develop the rule or as Nan said, addressing 14 comments if we were not to revise our current thinking 15 of the scope.
16 MEMBER BROWN: Relative to your comment, 17 Bill, is there -- I'm just thinking back when I first 18 went to work for Naval Reactors -- well 1965. And we 19 had our -- we were all briefed in how we got to where 20 we were at that point, which was, you know, 15 years 21 -- 13 years after the Nautilus went to sea. And the 22 key in most of that was prototypes. If the prototypes 23 had not been successful, then we wouldn't have had 24 what we had today in whatever form they were.
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24 1 the new plants are the prototype plants. And maybe 2 I'm wrong, but it seems that industry -- it's going to 3 be difficult for them to be able to pay for prototype 4 plants without some government involvement to ensure 5 that they get built promptly and quickly and meet a 6 certain set of standards. But the money's got to come 7 from somewhere. And the prototypes to me on moving 8 forward with this is one of the most important things 9 before you start proliferating some other types of 10 plants. You want to make sure that you're in the 11 right realm. So that's just an observation to make --
12 (Simultaneous speaking.)
13 MR. RECKLEY: And a very good one. And I 14 hope as we go through this that if we're not clear on 15 how we think this can work that we continue the 16 discussion. I think one of the important things and 17 it actually came out of an interaction with the ACRS, 18 I don't know, a year or so ago or more when we were 19 first broaching this subject is the caution. And I 20 think it's a great one, that just because you call 21 something an advanced reactor, you should not say 22 well, it's safer.
23 MEMBER BROWN: Exactly.
24 MR. RECKLEY: You have to prove that 25 point. And I hope as we go through this that, that is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 1 reinforced that what we're trying to construct here 2 and we'll be getting into this more, but what we're 3 trying to construct is a set of requirements that will 4 enable certain things for advanced reactors. But not 5 lessen the burden of proof that is associated with 6 making the safety case. And you're right, there's all 7 kinds of testing and some of that might be through 8 prototype testing, but maybe others could do a 9 thorough series of separate effects or integral 10 testing. But all of that will have to be done to 11 prove the point.
12 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Thank you, Bill.
13 MS. VALLIER: Do we have any further 14 questions on any of the background material?
15 MEMBER PETTI: Bill, I like what you said, 16 particularly on the burden of proof. It's something 17 that I've thought about a lot as well. When you've 18 been in the public meetings with the stakeholders, do 19 they understand that position as clearly as you 20 articulated it to us? Because when I read the stuff, 21 you know, that Derek has given us, I sometimes think 22 they're on a different page.
23 MEMBER BROWN: That's a good point.
24 That's a good point, Dave.
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26 1 been to the stakeholder meetings, it's just reading 2 the information. I kind of get a different vibe from 3 the written information.
4 MR. RECKLEY: Of course when we have a 5 stakeholder meeting, there's a range of stakeholders.
6 I believe personally that the developers, the actual 7 people that are involved in developing designs, that 8 they understand this. At least the ones that we're 9 having interactions with. I think they have a good 10 understanding of this.
11 MEMBER BROWN: Bill, is there based on 12 what you've been seeing -- the NRC, they're the 13 regulator. They're trying to put down the stuff they 14 have to do when they're, you know, evaluating the 15 design of the plant and all that kind of stuff. They 16 don't provide money. They don't provide schedules or 17 anything else. But is there -- like going along with 18 the new rules, is there a parallel effort in other 19 parts of the government such as DOE to provide 20 suitable funding to bring several of these designs to 21 fruition using the rules that you're developing?
22 MR. RECKLEY: I think. We are routinely 23 interacting with DOE. And I think in a couple slides, 24 we can show maybe some examples of how that's working.
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27 1 I'm worried about -- I think there's just not enough 2 money to bring more than one across the finish line --
3 MEMBER BROWN: I agree.
4 MEMBER PETTI: -- at least right now.
5 MEMBER REMPE: So Dave, would you say 6 there's not enough money or it's too widely 7 distributed among a bunch of different designs?
8 (Simultaneous speaking.)
9 MEMBER REMPE: But that's a policy --
10 (Simultaneous speaking.)
11 MEMBER REMPE: Yes, there's that as well.
12 But even if you pulled all that and put it together, 13 yeah, you're diluting the resources. And you know, 14 because this is a billion dollar activity to do a 15 prototype for instance -- in the billion dollars. And 16 right now, hundreds of millions are being given or 17 even less and you know, there's stuff on social media 18 about it, blah, blah, blah, blah. That all sounds 19 good, but it doesn't move the ball as much as it needs 20 to move the ball to get there.
21 MEMBER PETTI: Dave, I'm going to 22 interrupt you. It seems to me we're drifting far away 23 from where we were. And maybe you ought to continue 24 this with the Department of Energy. I'm not sure 25 anybody here can do much about it. So let's continue NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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28 1 with the presentation.
2 MS. VALLIER: Okay, I think we can go back 3 to Slide 9 and Bill is going to take over with the 4 presentation at this point.
5 MR. RECKLEY: All right. Thanks, Nan.
6 Again, this is Bill Reckley. Also Senior Project 7 Manager in the Advanced Reactor Program in NRR. And 8 I want to start talking about the construct of Part 53 9 or at least our thinking on this. This isn't set in 10 stone necessarily, but we've been using this same 11 basic slide and same basic construct for well over a 12 year to talk about an approach. And this is what we 13 previously provided to the ACRS and to stakeholders to 14 build out logically what the requirements are.
15 So after evaluating possible ways to put 16 it together and looking at various philosophies like 17 systems engineering approaches and the DOE evaluation 18 processes, and plenty of other examples, they all seem 19 to be somewhat similar. And talked about the 20 importance of first setting out what are the criteria?
21 And then laying out how throughout a project's life 22 cycle, you use the requirements or in a system 23 standpoint, how you prove or support those safety 24 (telephonic interference) -- in this particular case, 25 a safety function since that's what we're defining.
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29 1 And as systems engineering approach, it might be some 2 actual service being provided by a facility or a 3 machine at some output.
4 But for us, it's the same concept. But 5 the requirements for this system that we're building 6 -- this Part 53 -- is to ensure that the safety 7 requirements are met. So the first thing is to define 8 them. And that's what's in the -- that's what's in 9 the purple box there as being the place we start. And 10 what we'll be talking about later today, which is our 11 first stab at that by developing Subpart B to say what 12 are the actual underlying safety requirements for this 13 part of the regulations?
14 Then the other subparts were just seen as 15 representing the rest of the life cycle in what 16 requirements would be in place, what programs, what 17 requirements would be in place during those phases of 18 the project that would either provide or demonstrate 19 how the facility continually meets the safety 20 requirements. And so under Subpart C, that's the 21 design and analysis requirements. And so what do you 22 do during design? What evaluations do you do to show 23 you meet the established performance requirements --
24 the safety requirements in our case? Likewise, how 25 does citing contribute to making sure you meet the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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30 1 requirements?
2 What we'll get into as we talk about 3 Subpart B is that the challenge was that this is a 4 technology-inclusive approach -- an umbrella approach 5 for any design up to and possibly including non-light 6 water reactors, light-water reactors, or even 7 dramatically different technologies. And so when we 8 look at how you define safety criteria for such a 9 diverse group of technologies, it comes back to 10 ultimately what the NRC's concerned about, limiting 11 the dose -- the radiation dose to members of the 12 public and plant workers. That's our underlying 13 mission. So when we get into Subpart B, you can --
14 you can basically see that most of the requirements or 15 all of the requirements in Subpart B are going to come 16 back to that concept, minimizing radiation dose to the 17 public.
18 So -- Go ahead, Dennis.
19 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Maybe this is the place to 20 ask this question rather than when we're get in the 21 details of Part B -- Subpart B. In our letter to you 22 and I think you mentioned it, we suggested something 23 akin to the GDC or the current regulations to appear 24 here. And if something like that does, Subpart B is 25 probably the place that would be most appropriate.
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31 1 The NRC received a letter from NEI saying that we were 2 off base in suggesting that because these new designs 3 could cover a wide range of things. And having GDC 4 here would be a problem.
5 We hadn't included the GDC specifically, 6 but something akin to them in trying those principles 7 that go across all reactor designs, the staff had 8 already come up with the advanced reactor design 9 criteria at ARDC, which we commented on a couple of 10 years ago. Have you been talking about that? What 11 are your thoughts on that area?
12 MR. RECKLEY: And this will come down and 13 we'll be trying to talk about what we include in the 14 rule and what we address through guidance. And 15 whether we have the right split for where that goes.
16 And we'll get into this in Subpart B when we get into 17 that later today. But the current thinking is that --
18 the current construct in Subpart B is that the 19 applicant needs to define the safety functions that 20 are needed to limit the radiation dose. And it gives 21 -- it gives examples and they're the typical 22 fundamental safety functions that we're familiar with; 23 control power or reactivity, heat removal. And then 24 actual barriers to the radiation release as examples.
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32 1 don't even know for sure what even technologies up to 2 and including fusion might fall under this part, we 3 left that to the applicant to do. And then things 4 like the GDC, the General Design Criteria for light-5 water reactors or the advanced reactor design criteria 6 in Reg Guide 1.232 would be guidance that's already 7 available for them to define not only the higher level 8 safety functions such as heat removal for example.
9 But also then how to carry that down into -- from the 10 function to particular design features that would 11 support that function.
12 So my thinking anyway is that we've 13 largely kept that, but the GDC and ARDC in the Reg 14 Guide would be available for guidance on how to meet 15 that aspect of Subpart B that puts the onus on the 16 applicant to define safety functions.
17 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Since you mentioned 18 (telephonic interference) I think in previous 19 discussions it was indicated that some of the guidance 20 or key guidance will be available at the time the rule 21 language is brought together. Others will come later.
22 It seems to me in like the area we were just talking, 23 something fairly strong in the SRP to give reviewers 24 a good idea of what needs to be there will be very 25 important. Will that be talked about at a particular NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 1 point later or can you talk a little bit about how 2 that guidance is going to come together and what kind 3 of things are going to be in the first round?
4 MR. RECKLEY: Our initial plan and it is 5 something we're constantly looking at to see what 6 guidance we might be able to prepare and on what 7 schedule. But as we laid it out in the rulemaking 8 plan and actually it's even reflected in the 9 Commission's decision and Staff Requirements 10 Memorandum is one of the reasons that we think we have 11 a shot at doing this on the schedule they proposed is 12 to build from what we've been doing over the -- from 13 the last few years going as Walt said, all the way 14 back to the work that Mary Drouin did.
15 You know, this is our -- at least since 16 I've been involved, this is our second shot at 17 developing Part 53. So we went back obviously and 18 looked at the work that Mary and others had done in 19 the early 2000s, all of the work that was done for 20 NGNP that then was built upon for Reg Guide 1.2333, 21 the Licensing Modernization Project. And then as I 22 mentioned, we also have for the safety function 23 discussions Reg Guide 1.232, the Advanced Reactor 24 Design Criteria. The hope is we can -- we can build 25 on those and at least have that as one acceptable way NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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34 1 to meet this rule. And so those two Reg Guides do 2 provide a lot of guidance for key parts of the 3 process.
4 As we get into specific topics -- and you 5 can look at this slide -- some guidance related for 6 example to configuration control -- I'll just pick 7 that out of the Operations column -- there's some 8 existing guidance on reliability assurance programs 9 for example and the existing maintenance rule. We may 10 not have something that looks exactly like those 11 things, but that guidance would nevertheless be 12 useful.
13 Other areas like staffing, we're also 14 looking at existing guidance. Some of which was used 15 for example even for the NuScale reviews to justify 16 lower staffing. Some of the proposals for some of the 17 designs we're talking about go beyond even what 18 NuScale proposed. That will likely require new 19 guidance. And we'll have to look at our ability and 20 the timing for which we might be able to develop such 21 guidance. We're working on it, we just -- it's not 22 clear that the timing in relation to the rule that 23 we'll have that ready.
24 So the other part that we'll look at is in 25 a couple of slides, we'll talk about for example, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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35 1 movers that will shape what we're doing. Like the 2 selection of the DOE demonstration plants; where they 3 are, what guidance might be needed for those since 4 they're an existing early mover.
5 DR. CORRADINI: Bill, this is Corradini.
6 So we're going to talk only about Subpart B today 7 eventually. But have you guys already done --
8 assuming that this picture you have here on Slide 9 is 9 the right look at the Part 53, have you done kind of 10 like a gap analysis of where things exist if you could 11 place already available information, regulatory 12 guidance, et cetera in it and see where are the big 13 gaps? And then specifically within Subpart B, my 14 sense of it is that there are no big gaps at this 15 point in time given the Licensing Modernization 16 Program efforts ahead of time.
17 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, we're doing that and we 18 have done that. There's a parallel activity where 19 we're trying to develop guidance for the actual 20 content of applications. And part of that has been to 21 look at existing guidance and to do kind of the gap 22 analysis that you're talking about. We did that in 23 particular to look at what the industry is preparing 24 as an add-on to the Licensing Modernization Project, 25 the NEI-1804 Guidance to say what parts of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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36 1 application, what parts of the final safety -- of a 2 safety analysis report are directly supported by that 3 activity, the NEI-1804 activity.
4 And then we've looked at well, what other 5 parts of the safety analysis report are dressing 6 things outside of the Licensing Modernization Project.
7 And also for things like normal operations or just 8 things that don't relate to the unplanned events 9 addressed by NEI-1804. And what guidance and where 10 might additional new guidance be prudent? So yeah, 11 we're right in the middle of that. And actually the 12 subcommittee will be at some point learning of that 13 project as well.
14 DR. CORRADINI: Okay, thank you.
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Bill, this is Walt 16 Kirchner. Good morning. On Subpart B, it seems to me 17 when you defined just a few moments ago your 18 fundamental safety functions, it suggests to me that 19 -- and just one person -- one member's opinion -- that 20 somehow there's some equivalency in terms of 21 fundamental general design criteria to those 22 fundamental safety functions. And it seems to me that 23 at some point in Subpart B, the concept of having 24 these fundamental design criteria, which then are 25 elaborated for the advanced reactors and the Reg Guide NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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37 1 1.232 or wherever.
2 I don't know. It seems me it's just 3 fundamental to that requirement's definition aspect of 4 your work. And one could construct actual principle 5 design criteria or general criteria for those three 6 main functions that you defined. And then you would 7 still have the flexibility through guidance and other 8 means to address the variety of concepts that may come 9 in from fixed fuel to actual fuel solution or fuel 10 moving and so on. But it seems to me that, that 11 hierarchy of fundamental safety functions lends to 12 actually defining fundamental general design criteria 13 that would be technology -- what's the phrase that we 14 use -- technology neutral.
15 And then the other thing I guess I got --
16 I didn't expect to do defense in-depth right at the 17 beginning of the meeting, but it seems to me that has 18 to be built into your requirements definition and not 19 something that's an add-on after the fact, which is 20 where I probably philosophically would depart from the 21 Licensing Modernization Project where it was being 22 used as a after the fact, we'll go through and see if 23 we've maintained defense in-depth. It seems to me 24 it's a fundamental part of the requirements 25 definition. So that's just one person -- one member's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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38 1 view.
2 But you said very well what the 3 fundamental safety functions are. And it just seems 4 to me that they have a -- can easily be -- not easily, 5 but they can be stated as the fundamental general 6 design criteria that you expect to be addressed by 7 these different technologies. Thank you.
8 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Just a heads up to 9 everybody -- all the members. We are running a bit 10 behind. And I think Bill and Nan have about eight 11 more slides before we get to Part B. So let's make 12 our comments as concise as we can. Please go ahead, 13 Bill.
14 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. So the primary reason 15 for this slide at this point was just to have members 16 keep in mind how we would be using Subpart B as kind 17 of the foundation as we address the technical 18 requirements that go across the top, the Subparts C 19 through G. And then also when we get into the actual 20 licensing processes submittal requirements and so 21 forth in that bottom part -- Subpart H and I.
22 So if we go to Slide 10, this is kind of 23 a process slide given the schedule and what we've been 24 asked to do. So we were just trying to develop a 25 process by which we could be developing the criteria, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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39 1 the proposed or preliminary requirements interacting 2 with stakeholders. And the way we're currently doing 3 that is through those various subparts. So as we've 4 talked, we've given you Subpart B and part of Subpart 5 F to support this process. And we're currently or 6 just recently released a version of Subpart C on 7 design and analysis and Subpart D on siting.
8 We're working on the other subparts with 9 the notion that by this Summer, we will have 10 constructed the first cut at a total Part 53 package 11 that then we can start to look at to make sure all the 12 pieces fit together appropriately. So the primary 13 reason for this slide was just to lay out in a 14 schedule that as Nan pointed out, by May of 2022, we 15 need to get the package to the Commission, which 16 really means we have Calendar Year 2021 to put this --
17 to put this together. And obviously that's a 18 challenge.
19 And so it's trying to lay out here when we 20 would have discussions on various aspect of this. And 21 when we think we need to at least acknowledge the 22 current draft that exists is what we're going to use 23 to construct the other parts. That's what we call 24 closure. It's not closure in a definitive sense.
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40 1 point of the discussion.
2 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill?
3 MR. RECKLEY: Go ahead, Dennis.
4 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Two things jump at me when 5 I look at this. One is as of today, the framework 6 should be closed. And as of next month, the safety 7 criteria should reach closure. Can you back up one 8 slide? We're going to be talking a lot about Subpart 9 B today, which is fine. We'll see how that works.
10 But we see the structure here, which is going back 11 through Part 50 and you know, you can't lay out 12 anything quite this organized for it. I think the way 13 you've structured it at least to me makes a lot of 14 sense. But I would ask the other members, you know, 15 this is kind of our shot if we see some up there that 16 doesn't quite make sense to us, we ought to talk about 17 it right now because I think that's about the end of 18 it.
19 MEMBER BROWN: Are you just referring to 20 what is across the bar at the top?
21 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Yeah in the grey. The 22 beige box is right below it. Subpart C is design 23 analysis, Subpart D is siting, E is construction, F is 24 operation. We'll begin to touch on that today, but 25 that goes on a long time. And finally G is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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41 1 retirement.
2 With B being the fundamental safety 3 structure, if there's something you think is missing 4 up there or if it doesn't make sense, this is a good 5 time to say what's eating at you because this is what 6 all the rest of their work is fitting pieces into this 7 structure. So to me, it looks pretty reasonable. But 8 go ahead if anybody's got anything.
9 CHAIRMAN BALLILNGER: This is Ron. I 10 guess echoing what I'm sure is Joy's concern is 11 somewhere in here, I don't see transportation. I'm 12 sure it's in there somewhere, but I just don't see it.
13 Can you tell me -- somebody tell me where it is?
14 Somebody's got to transfer one of these SMRs that's 15 fully constructed, haul it on a truck, install it.
16 Where is that in here?
17 MR. RECKLEY: I'll just give you the 18 current thinking --
19 CHAIRMAN BALLILNGER: All right, okay.
20 MR. RECKLEY: -- which is what we -- what 21 we are hoping is that we could address this largely 22 under Subpart H. So we will be addressing -- it's a 23 licensing part.
24 CHAIRMAN BALLILNGER: Oh, okay.
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42 1 under a manufacturing license, it may be built 2 somewhere, even tested, then put on a truck and moved.
3 That when we get to that possible scenario, which we 4 agree we should be putting in, we'll be looking at the 5 requirements in Part 70 because at this point, the 6 construction of the reactor will also include putting 7 in the special nuclear material, possibly even testing 8 the reactor at the factory. And then also looking at 9 the transportation requirements to see what kind 10 overpack, what kind of controls are going to be 11 needed.
12 We're hoping that the existing 13 transportation requirements can handle that. But 14 that's an assessment that we'll be doing over the next 15 couple months. And we'll be working with our Office 16 of NMMS and the transportation people to see if that 17 is true or whether this might be more complicated than 18 what we first think.
19 CHAIRMAN BALLILNGER: I'm thinking that it 20 probably might be more complicated because even in the 21 requirements definition, might there likely be some 22 feedback from transportation issues that need to be 23 incorporated into these -- into Part B and maybe some 24 of the others as well.
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43 1 that is -- when I was showing the consolidated 2 package, when we start to talk about whoa, wait a 3 second. The requirements on the reactor design that 4 arise from transportation requirements need to be at 5 least mentioned because in some point, maybe they're 6 more constraining than once it gets deployed. We'll 7 have to make sure once we get to that consolidated 8 package, that all the pointers are to the right place.
9 But you're absolutely right. Right now there is no 10 such pointer.
11 CHAIRMAN BALLILNGER: I'm old enough to 12 recall a long time ago where they ran freight trains 13 and phantom fighters and all that kind of stuff into 14 transportation casks.
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Well Ron, there's a lot 16 of history in this area actually. I think the 17 framework -- the framework for approaching this and 18 designing for the challenges of transporting say an 19 intact core have already been addressed in past 20 projects. Now they probably -- that probably needs to 21 be updated and reflected here. But I'll just point 22 you to one example -- well there's one example I can't 23 talk about, but there's one I can. And that's all 24 this space reactor and radioisotope history where you 25 were transporting special nuclear materials or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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44 1 radioisotopes like PU-238 capsules and such. And then 2 they're designed appropriately for the -- well the 3 ultimate challenge was actually launching these 4 things.
5 So you had to ensure during the launch 6 that they were safe. By that I mean you had physical 7 insertion of control rods for the reactor designs, for 8 the radioisotope capsules, the testing, and so on. So 9 there is -- there is history. I think Bill's correct 10 in his response that there's a framework there. It's 11 obvious that if some advanced concept wants to 12 transport from the factory intact, then that has to be 13 factored into the design analysis. But I'm confident 14 that those things are there and can be addressed.
15 They may need to be updated, but there's experience 16 with doing this kind of thing.
17 CHAIRMAN BALLILNGER: I'm sure that's 18 true, especially with the Navy folks.
19 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thanks for bringing this 20 one up, Ron. But I think we're going to -- we ought 21 to move ahead.
22 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. Yeah, so if you can 23 go back to 11 -- Slide 11. It's basically the same 24 slide except ACRS interactions. It's already out of 25 date because we just last week I think scheduled a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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45 1 couple of additional meetings. But the same concept 2 and the same plan that as we move forward, we'll be 3 preparing the subparts. And then also within this, 4 we'll be kind of trying to define what guidance has 5 either developed already or might be developed in the 6 future to support -- to support this activity.
7 Dennis already mentioned that at the 8 Committee's discretion, if you feel that you want to 9 call a full committee meeting and weigh in on any 10 particular aspect of this, then obviously that's 11 within your discretion and we would support that.
12 That's not currently built into here. But again, all 13 of these are living schedules. As we make progress, 14 hopefully we can kind of walk down this staircase as 15 it's laid out to have the consolidated package ready 16 -- ready at the end of the year.
17 I'll just touch quickly on slide twelve.
18 I think this is really old news to everyone. But the 19 flier on the left is the DOE -- it's on the DOE 20 website. And talks about the various programs and how 21 they envision moving forward on advanced reactors.
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46 1 manufactured and transported. Given this is where the 2 DOE programs are laid out and what they're supporting, 3 we look at Part 53 as needing to address that.
4 I think as we -- as we get into this, 5 we'll have to identify if there's anything that we --
6 that we just need to possibly defer. But we would 7 have to do that after extensive interactions with DOE 8 and stakeholders to make sure that if anything is 9 deferred, it would be for a longer term project and 10 not the first movers. So the item on the right is the 11 more traditional NRC breakdown by technologies, be it 12 liquid metal or gas-cooled or molten salt, 13 microreactors.
14 As Dennis mentioned, we'll be coming back 15 to the subcommittee to talk about fusion reactors and 16 how they might -- how we might develop a framework for 17 those. I just put accelerator-driven systems in-18 between fusion and traditional fission-based reactors.
19 We haven't had much internal discussion about 20 accelerator-driven systems, but as we go through, we 21 will have to assess whether we specifically need to 22 identify and make sure that we don't preclude that 23 technology.
24 Go to the next slide, Slide 13. It's 25 basically --
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47 1 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill, you followed what's 2 going on with SHINE and the way the regulations were 3 adapted to deal with that accelerator (telephonic 4 interference) system.
5 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. Yeah, we're following 6 that. And when I listed, it would just be if you were 7 to use a somewhat similar approach for energy 8 production. And there are -- there are programs --
9 there's some pursuit to that within the United States.
10 And then there's also some pursuit of that in Europe.
11 MEMBER BROWN: Anyway, thanks for the 12 input.
13 (Telephonic interference.)
14 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. On Slide 13, this --
15 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Charlie, turn off your 16 mic.
17 DR. CORRADINI: Dennis, can I ask a quick 18 question?
19 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Sure. Yes, go ahead.
20 DR. CORRADINI: So Bill, let me ask the 21 question about microreactors. Let me put in not the 22 exactly proper manner, but at least a way to start the 23 discussion. And you can postpone this or maybe you've 24 already thought about it. Is there a power level 25 below which this whole construct becomes too onerous NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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48 1 to even deal with? And one would essentially view 2 these microreactors as essentially running along the 3 NPUF rule?
4 MR. RECKLEY: That's a current discussion 5 we're having, both internally and with stakeholders as 6 to whether Part 53 and the way we're constructing it 7 is too onerous. I'll just leave it there. It's a 8 point of discussion, both internally and with the 9 stakeholders.
10 DR. CORRADINI: So we'll hear about that 11 when you guys feel it's appropriate to discuss your 12 thinking?
13 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah. And it probably will 14 be at the next meeting.
15 DR. CORRADINI: Okay, thank you.
16 MR. RECKLEY: So again, this is just 17 laying out. And what we've done is this is an old 18 slide as well. We've just overlaid it with the DOE 19 activities in terms of the demo reactors, the 20 TerraPower, GEH, Natrium was selected, as well as the 21 X-Energy, gas-cooled reactor was selected for the 22 demonstration project.
23 The next level down in the DOE support the 24 Risk Reduction Program to reduce -- to address 25 potentially future demonstration. And you can see the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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49 1 ones that were picked there, the technologies and the 2 particular companies. And then in green was the R20 3 Program and additional allotment of funds for some 4 companies and design concepts. So this just shows 5 that landscape of -- as somebody mentioned earlier, 6 just to make sure that we are aware of and developing 7 an approach that can address this wide range of 8 technologies.
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill?
10 MR. RECKLEY: Go ahead.
11 CHAIRMAN BLEY: DOE demonstration 12 reactors, do they fall strictly under DOE or will they 13 have to be licensed by NRC?
14 MR. RECKLEY: It depends on how it's 15 constructed. And I showed for example the PRISM, 16 which is the Versatile Test Reactor. That's a DOE 17 program that we're following because it's also using 18 elements of the Licensing Modernization to try to make 19 the safety case for DOE. The demonstration reactors 20 are envisioned to be NRC-licensed reactors.
21 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay, thanks.
22 MEMBER REMPE: So Bill, the red shading 23 that's not defined in your legend means that it's not 24 going to be licensed by NRC? When I looked at this 25 slide, I was wondering.
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50 1 MR. RECKLEY: I just wanted to highlight 2 the PRISM, so I put a shading on it -- I mean the VTR.
3 It's a major activity and obviously -- I just didn't 4 want it to go unnoticed. So I should have added it to 5 the legend. I'm sorry.
6 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. And your 7 interpretation is you just wanting to give it special 8 emphasis because what is the intent of this?
9 MR. RECKLEY: Just to basically show this 10 landscape. So as these reactors are designed and we 11 learned from these activities -- again, I just wanted 12 to kind of highlight it. We've talked about it 13 before. The NRC is following this activity and we'll 14 draw lessons out of the DOE experience.
15 MEMBER REMPE: Okay, thanks.
16 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Bill, this is Jose.
17 MEMBER PETTI: Go ahead, Jose.
18 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Can I ask a question?
19 I don't see on this list the BWRX-300. Is that 20 because we considered then C+?
21 MR. RECKLEY: The top of the slide --
22 again, the landscape is bigger than this. This is 23 just the non-light water reactor landscape. We could 24 add a -- We could add a column for SMRs and it would 25 add another three or four designs to the picture.
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51 1 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: By going back to 2 earlier ones, would those be applicable under 53 or 3 would they have to be licensed under 52 or 50?
4 MR. RECKLEY: No. We're constructing 53, 5 such that if they wanted to, it would be available to 6 them.
7 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So they would qualify 8 as advanced reactors, okay.
9 MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Thank you.
11 MR. RECKLEY: Okay, if we go on to --
12 Charlie, did you -- Okay.
13 MEMBER BROWN: No. That answered my 14 question, Bill. Thank you. Jose had the same 15 question I did.
16 MR. RECKLEY: The next couple slides we've 17 used and you've seen before. So I won't spend a lot 18 of time on them. Other than as we talk about Subpart 19 B, this is the line of thinking from which those are 20 drawn. So this one was used -- or a variation of this 21 slide -- was used when we presented the functional 22 containment paper, SECY-18-96 to the ACRS, as well as 23 SECY-19-117 on Licensing Modernization. And it's just 24 a representation -- a simple, maybe overly simple 25 representation of a kind of mechanistic source term NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 1 approach to defining what the requirements are.
2 And ultimately we're concerned and focused 3 on that arrow, which is what are the radionuclides 4 that might be released? In simple terms, that just 5 carries the inventory that you start with and the 6 barriers you put in place to prevent its release. And 7 we're going to establish requirements on design and 8 construction and maintenance during operations to make 9 sure that those barriers remain in place.
10 To some degree, one of the concepts that 11 Dr. Corradini just brought up is do you reach a point 12 -- using this slide as kind of -- maybe as a 13 discussion tool -- Do you reach a point for example on 14 a microreactor where the combination of inventory and 15 the soundness of one or two barriers would simplify 16 the process so much that you can go a different 17 approach than what we're currently thinking? Again, 18 that will primarily come up in the next section next 19 month when we talk to the committee about design and 20 analysis requirements. That's where some are 21 proposing that maybe there might be a simpler 22 approach.
23 But one way for me anyway to visualize 24 what a simpler approach might be is to still use these 25 same first principles. And all of this comes out of, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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53 1 you know, this is kind of textbook stuff; DOE orders 2 and other sources of information that basically you 3 are just assessing in the end what is the inventory of 4 various radionuclides and what are the success of 5 various barriers in its path?
6 So again, we'll come back to that, I 7 think, next month when we talk about design and 8 analysis. And by that point, we will have further 9 discussions on microreactors in particular. Go ahead, 10 Joy or Dennis.
11 CHAIRMAN BLEY: This is Dennis.
12 Atmospheric dispersion is what we're worried about 13 from NRCs perspective. It's the release of 14 radionuclides. Some technologies might include 15 serious chemical or explosive or poison of one sort of 16 another potentials. Do these fall under what you're 17 doing or does NRC have to bring in another agency to 18 look at those sorts of problems? It seems like they 19 at least need to be identified as one goes through the 20 licensing process.
21 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah. In both -- Yes, I 22 agree with you. And to some degree, we would have to 23 address those. We may do that in cooperation with 24 another agency like EPA. But in the end, it would 25 need to be -- need to be addressed.
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54 1 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Does the concept at least 2 need to be in Subpart B?
3 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah. Currently we have it 4 only in the terms of the atmospheric dispersion. And 5 the potential need to identify chemical attack or 6 chemical reactions as a contributor to atmospheric 7 dispersion of radionuclides. You might have a good 8 point that maybe we need to look also at chemical 9 releases. I'm not all that familiar. I know we need 10 to do it for fuel cycle facilities. And I know in the 11 fusion discussions because of their potential use of 12 beryllium and some other materials that, that's often 13 talked about as a need in the regulatory space. So 14 it's a good point and we'll make a note.
15 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Bill, this is Walt.
16 Just to elaborate a little bit. You know, some of the 17 concepts on your preceding viewgraphs using some of 18 the molten salts, these are toxic materials. These 19 are highly toxic materials. And they will need 20 barriers just for normal operation. And I think that 21 -- and the people who are promoting those concepts 22 know that and are anticipating that they are going to 23 have to control that release, as well as the fission 24 products.
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55 1 sulfur hexafluoride, a really nasty chemical.
2 MEMBER REMPE: So if it's okay, I'd like 3 to bring up a different topic that could have been 4 brought up on several subsequent slides. But this is 5 a good graphic to -- and some of the questions that 6 were raised by my colleagues is a good place to bring 7 it up. When I look at how you've defined the critical 8 safety functions in this Part 53, I see something 9 different than what I see in for example 10-CFR-50.2 10 or 49 or in IAEA documents. You have a primary safety 11 function of controlling nuclides released.
12 And then I believe you said earlier today, 13 you're going to let the applicant decide whether this 14 other supporting critical safety functions -- whether 15 it's controlling heat generation, heat transfer, 16 chemical reactions, et cetera. And when I saw this, 17 I thought about that for a while. And it may be a 18 good idea, parts of me are saying this is a good idea, 19 but parts of me want to try and think of ways people 20 might have problems with it.
21 So I'm interested -- and you can defer to 22 this later in the Part B discussion or you can try and 23 tell me your thinking now on what led to that 24 reordering. And have you thought about how that might 25 affect -- because people decide their safety-related NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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56 1 system structures and components based on if they're 2 meeting these critical safety functions. And so I'm 3 curious on the motivation and why the staff did it 4 this way, Bill.
5 MR. RECKLEY: The primary driver -- and 6 again, we're here to listen and be challenged and 7 that's great -- the primary logic is again, this 8 technology-inclusive umbrella. And without knowing 9 exactly what technologies will be within Part 53, I 10 think there's universal agreement that at least the 11 release of radiation from the NRCs standpoint is our 12 primary mission as we just talked about. In the 13 absence of that, you know, another agency would be in 14 charge. With the radiological hazard, maybe we need 15 to work with another agency on the chemical releases.
16 So I think there's universal agreement 17 that the release or radionuclides is one safety 18 function. And so we called it the primary. And so as 19 you get into the different technologies, there may be 20 different supporting safety functions. Can one think 21 of -- Well again, not to belabor because it's maybe 22 not a technology that's being actively pursued, but on 23 an accelerator-driven system, reactivity control is 24 easier one might argue. So is it still a fundamental 25 safety function or would you only have heat removal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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57 1 for such a system?
2 If you bring in -- again, I know we're not 3 talking about it, but as we're developing the rule, we 4 have to have in the back of our minds, in the 30-day 5 memo, we basically committed to the Commission that we 6 would not preclude fusion in developing Part 53. So 7 that's the primary logic is just are we smart enough 8 to know that those same three things; reactivity, heat 9 removal, and retention of radionuclides are always 10 critical safety functions for any technology that we 11 might be asked to look at.
12 MEMBER REMPE: Is being the primary -- the 13 radionuclide release going to be treated differently 14 than the secondary ones in defining safety-related 15 system structures and components? Or are they all 16 going to be -- Because the way that it's structured in 17 later slides, there's the primary and then there's 18 these others that are supporting --
19 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah.
20 MEMBER REMPE: -- and does it -- is it 21 going to treat things differently -- is the staff 22 going to treat things differently, whether it's a 23 primary effect versus a secondary? I mean so they 24 don't remove heat removal as -- you know, is that 25 going to make a safety-related system structure NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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58 1 component versus something that's going to be 2 affecting radionuclide release?
3 MR. RECKLEY: No.
4 MEMBER REMPE: How's that going to be 5 structured?
6 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah in the -- and I know --
7 and this is the challenge, right? Because we're 8 working on future subparts. As we did the future 9 subparts, we didn't make a distinction. Once they 10 identified as a safety function under Subpart B, then 11 they're all treated the same.
12 MEMBER REMPE: So you'll have arguments 13 then with the applicant probably -- or discussions I 14 guess I should say -- on if they've identified all the 15 critical safety functions. Because you've included 16 and rightfully so, control chemical reactions which 17 hasn't been defined in other places in the regulatory 18 framework they have. And so that will be a good point 19 of discussion. Can they identify all their critical 20 safety functions? And then you plan to treat them 21 equally. Is that a good way to summarize what we've 22 discussed here?
23 MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
24 MEMBER REMPE: Cool. Okay, thanks.
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59 1 concept -- and I'll just spend a couple minutes on it 2 -- is the other theme if we can go to Slide 15 that 3 we've tried to tie into Part 53 is that we're looking 4 at an integrated approach. And we've used this bow 5 tie figure -- and this is just the generic bow tie 6 figure that you'll pull out of a textbook for this 7 particular risk assessment methodology.
8 If you go to Slide 16. It's also a slide 9 -- This is also a slide we've used with the 10 subcommittee before that tries to take that generic 11 slide bow tie and pull it into more traditional 12 nuclear discussions. And shows for example that 13 Licensing Modernization Project was aimed at looking 14 at internal and external events and laying out how one 15 would do the analysis and ultimately calculate 16 potential radiological releases.
17 And then we've talked about in regards to 18 things like SECY Paper 20-45 that we brought before 19 the committee on how to use those analytical results 20 to make a decision on population-related citing 21 considerations. And you'll remember -- hopefully many 22 of you will remember that paper. Or the interactions 23 that we had on using the results from processes such 24 as Licensing Modernization to calculate doses that 25 would support alternatives in spaces like emergency NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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60 1 planning zones.
2 So the importance of this is again that 3 we're being asked under Part 53 to look at how all of 4 these pieces fit together. And to give the 5 flexibility to the designers on how they want to 6 pursue this. So you know, one classic example that we 7 had early on in the discussions with the industry is 8 Generation IV Forum has laid -- you know, laid out as 9 a goal, emergency planning alternatives for a very 10 long time. Can we just assume that everybody will be 11 going that route?
12 And therefore as we're looking at 13 something like the next slide, which is going to be 14 the frequency consequence target figure, can we just 15 cut it off at one Rem because everybody is going to be 16 shooting for that. And the discussion was that the 17 industry wanted to maintain maximum flexibility. And 18 if emergency planning as a mitigating measure is a 19 business decision and they would therefore incorporate 20 from the beginning that the design would not need to 21 demonstrate the lower doses that would be needed to 22 justify an alternative to emergency planning.
23 So it would have made our lives a little 24 simpler had we been able to make an assumption. But 25 we've decided to maintain maximum flexibility. So all NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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61 1 of these possible prevention measures, mitigation 2 measures remain on the table. And so that requires 3 this integrated approach that we've talked previously 4 to the Committee about.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Bill?
6 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, Charles.
7 MEMBER BROWN: If you had another thought, 8 I'll let you go. But I just had a question when 9 you're finished.
10 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah, that's good.
11 MEMBER BROWN: I'm trying to put in 12 context when you say the one Rem limit, that you could 13 -- the way I saw that is the industry wanted to not 14 have the limit. Is that proper phraseology?
15 MR. RECKLEY: Well and again, I apologize 16 for short-handed discussions. Within the emergency 17 planning zone, alternative discussion is that the 18 emergency planning zone could be defined at for 19 example, the site boundary if the dose at the site 20 boundary was less than 1 Rem for the worst 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> of 21 the event. And then under siting, we also used 1 Rem 22 over a month from an event to use within a guidance 23 document for giving an alternative to the 500 people 24 per square mile out to 20 miles. So I apologize for 25 just short-handing it to just the one Rem.
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62 1 MEMBER BROWN: No, that's okay. I'm 2 trying to connect it back to again a long, long, long 3 time ago when I first got in the naval program. There 4 were a lot of discussions. The limits were higher and 5 people had bank accounts, you know for annual exposure 6 limits.
7 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, okay.
8 MR. RECKLEY: And Rick finally in our 9 program just put a stop to all that. He says no, you 10 have this. That's it. You can't bank it up and say 11 you didn't reach your 5 Rem, you know, annual 12 exposure, which it was at one time -- or maybe it 13 might have been higher. I just don't remember the 14 numbers. But if you only use 2, you then had 8 the 15 next year. And he stopped all that stuff.
16 And I guess my worry here is that you want 17 to be flexible, but there seem to be fundamental 18 health effects that we learned many years ago and 19 flexibility to some of those limits seems to be not a 20 good idea, depending on how they're -- Look, I 21 understand the point of the site or EPZ or whatever 22 based on population. But it doesn't seem like it's a 23 good idea to have greater exposures because of 24 flexibility. That's all. And I don't know how you 25 balance -- I don't know how you define it. That's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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63 1 tough.
2 MR. RECKLEY: Right. We'll get into that 3 a little bit when we look at the language for Subpart 4 B or the preliminary language for Subpart B.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Yeah I saw it was 6 sprinkled all throughout. There are a bunch of 7 different numbers. Okay, I'll pass. Thank you.
8 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill, is anybody there?
9 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah, I'm sorry. I pulled 10 a Dennis and was making an elegant speech with mute 11 on. So if we go then to Slide 17. The last two 12 slides are just kind of a reminder of Licensing 13 Modernization. I already mentioned the frequency 14 consequence target and how that methodology lays out 15 the selection of licensing basis events. I'll not 16 spend time -- I think you guys have seen this numerous 17 times.
18 Slide 18 also kind of a background on 19 Licensing Modernization and its use for safety 20 classification and assignment of special treatment.
21 Also there has been some in-depth discussions and I 22 appreciated what Walt led with. Again, a lot of this 23 -- for those that have been involved a long time, 24 there is a bit of a continuity -- or I hope there's a 25 continuity between what we're proposing in some of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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64 1 that discussions and the knowledge management NUREG on 2 defense in-depth for example.
3 I did want to just spend one note -- or 4 use this slide to make one note. And that is the 5 discussions -- and it was in your letter on prototype 6 or first of a kind. And I think this is probably a 7 good graphic to show how that assessment can be done.
8 And how combinations of the plant capability and also 9 -- and maybe even more importantly, the programmatic 10 defense in-depth can really be used as a tool as we 11 approach the first of a kind deployment. Whether it's 12 termed a prototype or not, to make sure that programs 13 are put in place, both testing and then once in the 14 Operation Surveillance Programs and so forth, to 15 address those first of a kind deployments.
16 So I think we have within the LMP and then 17 as we carry that into Part 53, I think we have the 18 mechanisms to do that. I'll admit we'll have to be 19 careful and make sure we put them and use them 20 appropriately. But in the end, as we led with, the 21 demonstration and the confidence that they'll be 22 meeting the safety criteria have to be maintained 23 throughout the life cycle of the facility. And for 24 the first of a kind, that might -- would likely 25 actually even require additional surveillance and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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65 1 additional things until the confidence is gained. And 2 that's -- So anyway, I'll leave it there. And before 3 we start the --
4 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Can I ask a -- Can I 5 ask a question on 17? There's something else that 6 popped up to mind. Are we getting rid of the concept 7 of SAFDLs for AOOs? I mean is everything going to be 8 a variation of the boundary even for AOOs? Because 9 that's the way I read the language.
10 MR. RECKLEY: From the highest level, yes, 11 it is put in the context of the offsite release. In 12 a practical sense, the applicant based on interactions 13 we've had, will use SAFDLs and/or SARDLs, the 14 radiation release limits as likely surrogates to going 15 back to that barrier figure. To simplify the analysis 16 for various -- for obvious economic reasons, you don't 17 actually want radionuclides to get past even the first 18 barrier. So as they use SAFDLs and SARDLs as a 19 surrogate measure, that would be brought into their 20 actual applications, their actual methodology, the 21 computer --
22 (Simultaneous speaking.)
23 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It would be out of 24 the goodness of their heart. It won't be a 25 requirement?
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66 1 MR. RECKLEY: It would be -- the 2 expectation is that, that will be one way that they 3 will demonstrate that they meet the requirements.
4 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Here is the problem 5 I'm thinking. I mean the big (telephonic 6 interference) for this (telephonic interference) is 7 not performing analysis or being able to report 8 different (telephonic interference) frequency. The 9 driver is that if you don't have a licensing basis 10 event, you don't need safety grade SSCs to support it.
11 For example, if you can get rid of the large 12 (telephonic interference) basis, you don't need 13 (telephonic interference). And you don't need diesel 14 generators. That's the big driver. That's the real 15 cost savings and it's good.
16 But when you -- and when it comes to the 17 licensing, you have very good engineers and 18 everything, but it would be best (telephonic 19 interference) new concepts. And there will be 20 licensing managers who (telephonic interference) 21 investors is to do the minimum required to satisfy the 22 regulation. So I don't feel comfortable not having 23 samples as a requirement for AOOs, so I'm just putting 24 it on the record.
25 I think it's a mistake and it will have --
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67 1 you've built with these licensing managers. And they 2 say well, the regulation says I have to do this and 3 I've done it. What else do you want me to do? And 4 they're going to get rid of a lot of safety grade 5 components based on -- because if they can do a more 6 sophisticated analysis on those on the boundary and 7 get rid of my diesel generators, I'll do a 8 sophisticated analysis to get rid of the diesel 9 generators. And one can make an argument that you 10 don't need them, but that's not (telephonic 11 interference). I said enough. Keep going.
12 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. And again, we'll 13 probably touch on some of this as we get into the 14 discussions on Subpart B. And especially next month 15 when we talk to you guys about the design and 16 analysis, the preliminary language on Subpart C, this 17 really comes to light or it can be a topic of 18 discussion. Any other things before we get into the 19 specific slides on the language for Subpart B?
20 CHAIRMAN BLEY: I think we're ready to do 21 that, but I think we're also ready for a break. We'll 22 break for 20 minutes. Come back at 11:35 and begin 23 our consideration of Subpart B. And Bill, thanks for 24 the presentation, Nan too, and everyone for the 25 discussion. We are recessed until 11:35.
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68 1 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 2 off the record at 11:15 a.m. and resumed at 11:35 3 a.m.)
4 CHAIRMAN BLEY: We are back in session.
5 Before we go to the staff's presentation on Subpart B, 6 I have a little something for the members and for the 7 staff, questions.
8 A couple issues were raised today such as 9 chemical reactions, poisons being flagged as at least 10 to be looked for in Subpart B, the use of SAFDLs or 11 SARRDLs, and there are others that will come along the 12 way.
13 We have the option of asking for a full 14 committee meeting and writing a letter on things that 15 we're concerned about. On some of these, the staff 16 said they're working on them. And, I guess, it would 17 seem as reasonable to me to wait and see what they 18 come up with.
19 Bill, are we likely to see any revisions 20 in the kind of text we're looking at today in the 21 future, or if we have some concerns there, would a 22 letter be the best way for us to go?
23 MR. RECKLEY: You will see at least one 24 iteration.
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69 1 that helps a lot. I think we're ready. Go ahead.
2 MR. RECKLEY: And to that point, I just 3 want to read from the SRM. I think Nan mentioned it, 4 but the sentence from the Commission reads as follows:
5 the staff should implement the development and 6 intermittent release of preliminary draft rule 7 language followed by public outreach and dialogue and 8 then further iteration on the language until the staff 9 has established the rudiments of its proposed rule for 10 Commission consideration.
11 And that is the phase we are in with these 12 iterations, both with public stakeholders and the 13 ACRS. I know the schedule compresses this in 14 comparison to previous experience developing policies 15 and so forth that would take maybe months in between 16 iterations, but based on this -- interactions with 17 public stakeholders and today's interactions, we will 18 be preparing a revision to Subpart B to put out.
19 And so, again, these are living schedules.
20 It is going to be kind of hard as we go through it, 21 but that is the project as it's kind of been laid out 22 for us.
23 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. Thanks. That 24 helps. We just don't want to wait until you're 25 thinking everything is fine, and we'll jump in and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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70 1 object to some of it, so --
2 MR. RECKLEY: Right.
3 CHAIRMAN BLEY: So we'll see what comes.
4 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. So if we can go to 5 Slide 20, we'll start into the discussions on the 6 current preliminary version of Subpart B. And as you 7 can see here on this slide, it's laid out into safety 8 objective, safety function. Some of these concepts we 9 talked about already this morning. I mean, we'll 10 continue to talk about them, but we touched on them 11 this morning.
12 Then a fairly important concept that we're 13 trying to build into Part 53, is this tiered approach 14 where you have a first tier safety criteria and a 15 second tier. And we'll have, I expect, a fair amount 16 of discussion on that.
17 And then the kind of, high-level 18 discussion of the need to identify licensing-basis 19 events, ensure defense-in-depth, and then, we have a 20 provision that addresses occupational dose, or the 21 protection of plant workers.
22 So if we go to Slide 21, this kind of lays 23 out the tiered structure and also within the first 24 safety objectives preliminary language, on the 25 preliminary language that we're proposing under 53.200 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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71 1 for safety objectives, the language from the Atomic 2 Energy Act itself that defines the necessity for the 3 NRC to ensure adequate protection and then the 4 provision under Section 161 of the Act that empowers 5 the NRC to go further than adequate protection to 6 further minimize danger to public health and safety.
7 So using these concepts, what Part 53, 8 Subpart B currently includes is this tiered structure 9 that we tried to show on this graphic where the first 10 tier would generally align with the stronger adequate 11 protection provision and lay out the requirements for, 12 under the current proposal, both normal operations, 13 and unplanned events.
14 And the safety functions for that are as 15 we have talked about. An applicant would have to 16 define them, but generally, for the vast majority of 17 reactor designs we're looking at, they'll be the 18 traditional control heat generation or reactivity, the 19 control heat removal, the control of chemical 20 interactions, especially important for some of the 21 non-light water reactor designs.
22 And the requirements that would carry 23 through for operations and other stages of the life 24 cycle would be the more stringent tools that we have 25 in our arsenal, if you will. So those are the things NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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72 1 that would be controlled by technical specifications.
2 Licensees would have little ability or 3 reduced flexibility in meeting those requirements that 4 were set out for the first tier.
5 The second tier would be in normal 6 operations, the ALARA provisions, currently in Part 50 7 and Part 20, and go for unplanned events. The current 8 language proposes to use the NRC safety goals as the 9 second tier safety criteria.
10 Then for safety functions, you would 11 likely have the same general functions; however, you 12 might put on additional requirements to meet the more 13 stringent goal established by the second tier.
14 And under the programmatic controls, there 15 would be the need to identify special treatment, but 16 there would be more flexibility in the licensee's 17 control of those special treatments in terms of things 18 like prior NRC approval, so that's why it kind of 19 lists licensee programs. They would be regulatory 20 requirements, but within the regulatory requirement 21 would be more flexibility.
22 So this is kind of the basic construct.
23 It's a little different. Because Part 50 and the 24 technical requirements evolved from the early '60s to 25 present day, the structure and the logic is not as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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73 1 clean as this. And one can probably find examples 2 where existing requirements would not follow this 3 construct.
4 But, you know, this is an opportunity we 5 have to try to be more clear and to establish a more 6 understandable regulatory system. I do think we, in 7 more recent decisions, including the most recent being 8 the Fukushima experience, we were more clear as to why 9 we were imposing things. And an example would be the 10 Mitigating Strategies Order was implemented as a 11 measure needed for adequate protection while making 12 the containment vents for boiling water reactors 13 capable of addressing severe accidents was clearly 14 identified as a measure taken to meet something beyond 15 the adequate protection standard. It was a cost-16 justified safety improvement.
17 So I think more lately we've made this 18 distinction more clear. But again, given the long 19 regulatory history dating all the way back to the 20 early days, it's not always as clear in existing 21 requirements.
22 Dr. CORRADINI: Bill, this is Corradini.
23 So let me say it to you quickly, and you tell me if 24 I'm wrong. The second tier connects to 161, and the 25 first year connects to 182?
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74 1 MR. RECKLEY: In general. I mean, if we 2 defined it that way clearly, that would be something.
3 I'm just, as a kind of regulatory bureaucrat, I will 4 wait to see if we, ultimately, can be that clear.
5 Dr. CORRADINI: But is it the intent to be 6 that clear, or is the intent to be, excuse my English, 7 mushy here? Because the way you explained it, I was 8 losing it until I connected second tier to 161 and 9 first tier to 182.
10 MR. RECKLEY: We'll try to maintain it as 11 much as we can along those lines.
12 Dr. CORRADINI: Okay. All right. Thank 13 you.
14 MEMBER REMPE: Bill, just to follow-up on 15 my earlier point, under safety functions, an applicant 16 would not need to define something like control 17 barrier integrity because the primary safety function, 18 retention of radionuclides, would catch SSCs needed or 19 associated with barrier integrity.
20 Is that, again, I'm really struggling with 21 primary versus secondary safety functions because, in 22 the past, we would see them all on the controlled 23 radionuclide release, and heat generation, and heat 24 removal on the same level. Do you understand what I'm 25 saying?
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75 1 MR. RECKLEY: I do, and it's always 2 dangerous to answer with a hypothetical, but let me 3 give it a shot to see if the hypothetical helps.
4 So let's say a design, independent of 5 technology, a design decides to keep or to rely on a 6 structure to retain radionuclides. And I'll be a 7 little simplified here. So, and they can show that 8 that structure would keep the dose -- we're going to 9 get into a second what the actual numbers are -- but 10 would keep the dose less than 25 rem over the two 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> that the exclusionary boundary, and that meets 12 the retention of radionuclides for the first tier.
13 They might argue the destruction of the 14 facility, the destruction of the internal components 15 that led to a radionuclide inventory being withheld 16 back by that barrier is an economic factor for them.
17 They've met the first tier safety criteria by 18 retaining radionuclides.
19 However, for most designs, a reliance on 20 a single structure like that is going to be a 21 challenge when you get into the probabilistic risk 22 assessment area. And they may need to bring in the 23 more traditional safety functions to provide the 24 second tier.
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76 1 they only need one or two barriers to retain the 2 radionuclides, in my view, most likely, other 3 functions will show up for the second tier.
4 MEMBER REMPE: So when I was looking at 5 this, I was thinking, well, okay, you just have an 6 earthquake that -- or just something, a flaw 7 propagates due to aging, or something that's not 8 really a chemical interaction. It's not due to lack 9 of heat removal. It's not due to lack of heat 10 generation. To me, you need a fourth secondary tier 11 for barrier integrity. But you're saying no, this 12 will be covered by the primary. We would identify 13 that as a safety-related function. And I think that's 14 what your response back to me is saying.
15 MR. RECKLEY: As either a, and we'll get 16 into the categorizations, but as either a safety-17 related function, or as a function needed to meet the 18 safety goals, and they would be treated differently.
19 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. I think -- I'm good.
20 Thank you.
21 MR. KIRCHNER: Bill, this is Walt.
22 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: The thing -- go 23 ahead, Walt.
24 MR. KIRCHNER: Yes. I'm having a problem 25 with why controlling chemical interactions is so NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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77 1 prominent instead of fission product barriers. I just 2 would, for some designs, chemical interactions aren't 3 a big issue. They could be for some of the concepts 4 we're hearing about, but, in general, it's a secondary 5 -- like you just said in your own example, that's kind 6 of internal to them, the detail of their design.
7 Going back to defense-in-depth, it seems to be fission 8 product barriers have to be a fundamental design 9 criteria or function.
10 MR. RECKLEY: And, yes, I agree with you.
11 And I think they end up doing it even within the 12 current way things are setup. The reason, by and 13 large, you are controlling heat generation is to 14 maintain a fission product barrier, be it the fuel 15 form itself or the first barrier being the cladding, 16 likewise heat removal.
17 So if you go back to that -- actually, if 18 you can just go back, Liz. Just keep going back until 19 you get to the -- there.
20 The safety functions that are being 21 defined are those functions that are needed to protect 22 these barriers. And so for some designs, chemical 23 interactions may -- Walt, you may be right. For some 24 designs, that might not be a big factor, or it might 25 only be a factor in protecting one barrier.
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78 1 And, likewise, like I said, heat removal 2 is and reactivity control is usually meant to protect, 3 in traditional space, the first and second barriers as 4 part of an overall plan to limit the dispersion of 5 radionuclides. The containment structure itself, the 6 barrier four in this example, is then relied on, 7 assuming you have some compromise of the other three 8 barriers.
9 So all we're saying under these concepts 10 is, and this goes again back all the way to SECY Paper 11 in 1896 is, an applicant to decide, a designer is 12 really responsible to lay out what barriers they are 13 relying on, and then to show, under the examples we're 14 talking about, that for unplanned events the behavior 15 of the plant maintains the appropriate barriers. So, 16 you know, traditionally in -- so I guess I'll just 17 leave it there.
18 MR. KIRCHNER: I get it. I guess looking 19 at this figure here, first principle is what I think 20 of is, okay, inventory, that means controlling --
21 basically, you have to be able to control the nuclear 22 reaction. That's what's so different about fission 23 reactors and the fission products.
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79 1 down safely. The second thing you do is you keep 2 control of the material, and I know we may have liquid 3 fuel concepts, so it's a little bit different than the 4 traditional fixed fuel form.
5 But, basically, let me just say in 6 shorthand: maintaining core integrity, and that core 7 could be a very different design in some of the 8 systems, is fundamental number two. And then 9 retaining your barriers that prevent and/or mitigate 10 release is the third basic principle. And to me, 11 that's kind of generic without -- I think an 12 equivalency to this picture could be constructed for 13 what I would call the principle general design 14 criteria.
15 MR. RECKLEY: Okay.
16 MEMBER REMPE: So, just to emphasize why 17 I think there's confusion, Bill, when I've tried to 18 answer -- ask a question similar to what Walt's 19 asking, I think, if I look at the text, you have the 20 primary safety function is limiting release of 21 radioactive materials. If you'd add some words, "this 22 means the applicant has to protect, or maintain, or 23 control the integrity of the barriers," that would 24 solve this issue, because the reason I kind of 25 suggested maybe you need a secondary one that would be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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80 1 maintain or control the integrity of the barriers, I'm 2 saying I don't think you need it cause it would be 3 redundant.
4 But maybe if you'd elaborate in 53.210, 5 this means barriers have to be maintained that would 6 help eliminate the confusion with what Walt is asking 7 and what I've been trying to ask.
8 MR. RECKLEY: Okay.
9 MEMBER REMPE: Does that sound --
10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes, and what I've 11 been trying to ask too, I mean, with my previous 12 comment. I don't think, Joy, that Bill is in 13 agreement with you. I mean, he told you after you 14 have an AOO, something highly likely to happen, it is 15 perfectly acceptable to destroy the whole plant as 16 long as you keep one barrier and you don't kill 17 anybody outside. That's what, Bill, that's what you 18 say. That's what your write-up says. And I disagree 19 strongly. Just because you don't kill anybody on your 20 best estimate calculation, God knows how good that is, 21 that's not good enough, man. But for AOOs, we should 22 have integrity to the barrier, which means no fuel 23 damage, that's what they meant by SAFDL. I --
24 (Simultaneous speaking.)
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81 1 that you have to limit the release of materials from 2 the facility and must be maintained during routine 3 operation and for licensing-basis events.
4 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Right.
5 MEMBER REMPE: If he would add some words 6 about barriers have to be maintained during routine 7 operation and licensing-basis events, I think it would 8 satisfy your concern.
9 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: All barriers, yes.
10 All barriers, not just the last one. Because --
11 MEMBER REMPE: Well, yes --
12 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Look at what's going 13 to happen. I mean, I hate licensing managers because 14 they are by definition refutable, because their job is 15 to save money to investors. To do the minimum amount 16 possible to get away with satisfying regulation. And 17 what they are going to do is they are going to 18 eliminate all safety-related components because that 19 will save money to the investors. They're not going 20 to be safety grade, and they're going to put them, 21 non-safety grade, so that they will protect the 22 investment but not to the level that would be required 23 to protect the personnel.
24 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Jose, I'm going to 25 interrupt you here. I --
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82 1 MEMBER REMPE: I don't agree.
2 CHAIRMAN BLEY: -- don't think our 3 meetings are the appropriate place to defame other 4 people --
5 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay.
6 CHAIRMAN BLEY: -- or to decide we know 7 what they're going to do or what their motives are.
8 We can talk about what we think ought to be in place 9 without that. But I --
10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay.
11 CHAIRMAN BLEY: -- want to bring up, to 12 talk a little bit about this confusion issue, and I 13 think it's kind of built in. When I read the actual 14 words you put into 53.210, 220, and 230, that's the 15 safety functions, the first tier safety criteria, and 16 the second tier safety criteria. And when I look at 17 your picture, the one you just put on the board, these 18 things don't quite align in any particular way.
19 Marty Malsch, who used to be on the staff 20 of the general counsel and who was involved when the 21 current two-tier system was developed, it was 22 developed to support some court cases that were going 23 on, and it helped out. I'm not quite sure how it 24 helps out.
25 If I read 210, you have (a) and (b), which NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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83 1 is primary safety functions limiting the release and 2 (b) additional safety functions support that issue.
3 If 220 and 230 follow that logic, I think it would 4 hang together well, but they don't. They kind of have 5 this chart, adequate protection and minimize danger, 6 but they don't say that either.
7 I did like Joy's suggestion that some of 8 the concepts that are in your pictures, if you reduce 9 those to words in 210, it would help. But the first 10 tier and the second tier don't hang together for me 11 logically, and I don't see what they do for you in 12 writing the rule. That's what I said. They don't 13 help me understand what's coming next and why things 14 would fit into one category or the other.
15 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. I'll --
16 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: That's supposed to 17 be the -- this is Vesna. I have exactly the same 18 question. What is the advantage of this between first 19 and second tier? I mean, because it looks a little 20 artificial to me, and I don't know how it helps.
21 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. The notion, and we 22 tried to show it on the graphic, apparently not very 23 well, is that by establishing the two tiers, the first 24 tier, as we go through the rest of Part 53, the design 25 part, construction, operations part, those things, be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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84 1 they equipment, or human actions, or programmatic 2 controls that are needed to show you meet the top 3 tier, the first tier safety criteria, would get the 4 most stringent regulatory controls. So that's going 5 to be your safety-related equipment. That's going to 6 be controlled in your technical specifications.
7 Those things that are needed for the 8 second tier would have more flexibility. You would 9 still have special treatment defined for those, but 10 there would be more flexibility provided to the 11 licensee for maintaining those equipment, or human 12 actions, or program.
13 So going back to the guidance that would 14 be available to recognize this two-tiered structure, 15 what we had in mind was that, and we'll get into the 16 discussion, that the first tier would, under the 17 licensing modernization, be the design basis accident 18 part. This, again, the safety-related equipment part.
19 The second tier, related to the safety 20 goals, which is one of the metrics under the licensing 21 modernization, would be special treatment. And, 22 again, an established regulatory program but not with 23 the level of controls and that would be established 24 for the first tier.
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85 1 this way would be how you can use the distinction 2 between the two as you define the rest of the 3 requirements within Part 53.
4 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill, two things that 5 haven't gelled for me. One is, at least when I think 6 of special treatment, the most important special 7 treatments are covered in the text spec. So you have 8 special treatment on both sides.
9 Unfortunately, the way you list safety 10 functions, the two sides are identical. If one used 11 the concept that's in 210 of the primary safety 12 function and things it support, well if you have 13 control of heat generation -- let's say heat removal 14 and there was some kind of, like in a light water 15 reactor, an injection system that depended on electric 16 power, electric power couldn't really be a secondary 17 thing because the first one won't work without it.
18 So it's, you know, when you discuss it, I 19 understand what you want to do with it. When I look 20 at your pictures and the words that are in Subpart B, 21 they don't tell me what you just said in your speech.
22 And I'll have to go back and look at the transcripts 23 to see what you actually --
24 MR. RECKLEY: No. Okay. Well, no, I 25 mean, this is valuable because, obviously, if it's not NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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86 1 coming across, then that's an issue, so.
2 So if we can go on to Slide 22, this is, 3 again, this is all inter-related so, you know, it will 4 be largely, kind of, continuing discussion as we go 5 through this cause they support each other. So go 6 ahead, Dennis.
7 CHAIRMAN BLEY: No. I just forgot to turn 8 off my mic is all.
9 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. So the preliminary 10 language on 200 and also 220 and 230 are the notion 11 of, in the end, the objective is to ensure reasonable 12 assurance of adequate protection and, in addition, to 13 identify those measures to minimize danger to life and 14 property. And to do this, we're proposing the two-15 tiered structure that we discussed already, but we'll 16 get into it more in the next slide. You can go to 23.
17 Thank you.
18 So the proposal in the preliminary 19 language is that the first tier, and we generally laid 20 out the criteria in two steps as we go through this 21 with Element (a) or Paragraph (a) addressing normal 22 operations, and Paragraph (b) addressing licensing-23 basis events or unplanned occurrences.
24 So under normal operations in the first 25 tier, the preliminary language proposes to adopt the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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87 1 traditional Part 100 operations should not exceed 2 100 millirem.
3 For the unplanned events, the frequency 4 number that we put in the preliminary language, again, 5 is consistent with the NEI 18-04 and the licensing 6 modernization, as being one in ten thousand years and 7 lays out the criteria typically used for the design 8 basis accident assessments, which is the 25 rem number 9 over a two hour period at the exclusionary boundary 10 and 25 rem during the duration of the event for the 11 low population zone boundary.
12 MEMBER REMPE: So, Bill, this is Joy. And 13 I have another comment that when I saw this that I 14 would really like to emphasize. The language here 15 assumes that there is a radioactive cloud and a 16 fission product release. And it implies a single one.
17 And all the other specifications have a time period 18 except this one.
19 And if you'll recall, ACRS issued a 20 lessons learned with advanced reactors. And in that 21 letter, we emphasized the need for the applicant's 22 analyses to be continued to the extent necessary to 23 ensure that applicants demonstrate an effective and 24 reliable means to place the plant in a safe, stable 25 condition with no ongoing degradation.
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88 1 I'd like to, I'd suggest, again, this is 2 one member, that some flavor of what we had provided 3 in that lessons learned be attached to this last 4 statement about the 25 rem because how long does one 5 need to analyze this would be, I think, a point of 6 contention, and I'm not sure how else you could answer 7 that question at this point other than to say until 8 the plant's in a safe, stable condition.
9 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. It's a good 10 observation. And we'll look at the words, especially 11 in the next subpart that talks about the analysis to 12 see if it's clear that the analysis should be carried 13 out to, like you say, until you reach a stable 14 condition.
15 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you.
16 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. A 17 stable condition with no (telephonic interference),
18 but my point was different. We talked a year or two 19 ago about the definition of frequency, what we call 20 granularity. If I take a LOCA, and now divide LOCAs 21 into small break and large breaks, certainly each of 22 those have half the frequency, I assume this will be 23 discussed on the guidelines and clarify what we mean 24 by that frequency. But maybe a couple of words in the 25 rule will save you 200 pages in a guideline. So have NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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89 1 we addressed the granularity, I mean how did you 2 collect events to define the frequency?
3 MR. RECKLEY: Well, this is the frequency 4 of an event sequence. So it --
5 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Let me give you an 6 example. A small break LOCA, you have to run a 7 spectrum of breaks. Is that spectrum of breaks a 8 single event or 12 events?
9 MR. RECKLEY: It would depend on the 10 behavior of the plant. The event families that are 11 plotted is based on both similarity of the initial 12 conditions and the end point. And so within the 13 spectrum that you're talking about, to the degree that 14 you end up with a different end point, then it might 15 end up in a different family and be broken apart into 16 to event families.
17 The guidance for this, and I guess your 18 committee is looking or will look, is for non-light 19 water reactors is within the non-light water reactor 20 PRA standard that we're currently assessing and 21 preparing a regulatory guide to address.
22 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay. I don't know 23 the answer. I'm just bringing up the question that 24 you guys think about it.
25 MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
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90 1 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And you may save a 2 lot of hardship in the future if we clarify it in the 3 rule instead of waiting ten years from now.
4 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. Yes. I mean, that 5 particular topic is a frequent topic ever since the 6 methodology in NEI 18-04 has been proposed, which goes 7 all the way back to when it was first developed as a 8 strategy for the modular high temperature gas-cooled 9 reactor in the '80s.
10 So, but yes, we'll look and see at the 11 rule language and especially within the guidance.
12 Hopefully, that's clear. So --
13 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Maybe just adding a 14 use and approved PRA standard or --
15 MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
16 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I mean, three words 17 like that can save us a lot of hardship.
18 MR. RECKLEY: Right. By the way, you will 19 see that when you see the next section on design and 20 analysis. We used something pretty close to that 21 language.
22 So the last bullet on here was that this 23 section 220 for the first tier, and we had some 24 discussion with stakeholders about how it's worded, 25 does give the Agency the ability to add additional NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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91 1 standards. And so we just have an additional bullet 2 of additional requirements established by the NRC for 3 reasonable assurance for added protection.
4 So that's the last discussion. If we go 5 then to the second tier on Slide 24, the normal 6 operations paragraph, Paragraph (a) in the preliminary 7 language, brings in the concept of as low as 8 reasonably achievable. The language is largely taken 9 from Appendix I to Part 50 that was developed many 10 years ago for light water reactors.
11 But the principles remain basically the 12 same. The guidance documents for light water reactors 13 that lay out specific radionuclide inventories, or 14 releases, or concentrations may differ, but the 15 concept of as low as reasonably achievable is 16 consistent.
17 Then for unplanned events, Paragraph (b),
18 it lays out that the, as it says, design futures and 19 programmatic controls are defined to ensure that the 20 capabilities and reliabilities of systems needed to 21 address licensing-basis events will be maintained.
22 Also, to provide measures for defense-in-depth and 23 maintain the overall accumulative plant risk that's 24 consistent with the NRC safety goals.
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92 1 defining the special treatment requirements for 2 another set of equipment, another set of human 3 actions, needed to meet this metric.
4 MEMBER BROWN: Bill, this is Charlie. A 5 question -- in, what is it, 53.23 or 230, whichever 6 document you're looking at, Item 2 down under (b) when 7 you talk about maintained, what is within the vicinity 8 of the plant? Is that defined? That's kind of a 9 very --
10 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. It's --
11 MEMBER BROWN: That's very, very vague.
12 MR. RECKLEY: And, again, yes. Within the 13 safety goals, it's defined. And if my memory serves 14 me, it's one mile for immediate health effects and ten 15 miles --
16 MEMBER BROWN: Okay.
17 MR. RECKLEY: -- for latent cancer.
18 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. So there is a 19 definition for what we mean within the safety goals, 20 an upper level document.
21 MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
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93 1 part of my uneducated. What does five mean? What's 2 the context of five?
3 MR. RECKLEY: It would be if you had a 4 population of ten million, no more than five people.
5 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, five people, immediate 6 health effects remain below five people? It just says 7 five right now in your document.
8 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, cause it's a frequency.
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Five occurrences in --
10 It's five times ten to the minus seven per year.
11 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. You totally lost me.
12 If it's a frequency --
13 MR. RECKLEY: No.
14 MEMBER BROWN: -- I guess it should've 15 been expressed as a frequency then. I'm sorry. Five 16 in ten million, I just could've done the math.
17 MR. RECKLEY: Years.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, I have a 19 question. My main problem with this division of tier 20 one and tier two because as Dennis pointed out, there 21 is no big difference safety functions so that -- is 22 this division of the safety criteria between tier one 23 and tier two?
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94 1 informed applications, things like that only applies 2 to tier two? I mean, is it how the tier one is 3 defined now if there is no consideration of the, you 4 know, the use in risk, the meeting safety goals, the 5 addressing the defense-in-depth thing, then other 6 thing which is risk-informed is a part of this that 7 already applies to tier two safety criteria. I 8 actually simplify a little, but you can see what my 9 passion is.
10 MR. RECKLEY: So what we're, let's go 11 maybe another example, an example that has been used 12 in the past even for specific technology.
13 So go to a gas-cooled reactor, the notion 14 of the two tiers and how that might play out would be 15 for at least some analysis of some designs, the design 16 basis accident could be handled in meeting the 25 rem 17 criteria with just the TRISO fuel. For that subset of 18 events, the challenge to the plant, the TRISO fuel 19 would retain the radionuclide sufficient to prevent 20 that kind of release and that kind of dose to the 21 public.
22 But some designs when you get to some 23 supporting systems and even for some, the reactor 24 building, is sometimes credited for retaining 25 radionuclides for events lower frequency event NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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95 1 sequences, and so the building may get assigned 2 special treatment requirements.
3 Carrying that through, the logic I was 4 trying to explain, things related to the TRISO fuel 5 then would have the highest level regulatory controls.
6 The fuel would be safety-related for example. The 7 reactor building serves a function for some event 8 sequences and would not need to be safety-related 9 under this scenario, but special treatment 10 requirements would be assigned to the building. It 11 would have certain capabilities as they're modeled in 12 the PRA and in the release model, the mechanistic 13 source term model.
14 And the controls would be put in place to 15 make sure those capabilities were maintained, and the 16 reliability of those systems were also maintained, but 17 they may not be in technical specifications.
18 This concept is not all that much 19 different than what we've used in the past in the 20 operating fleet for things like a station blackout 21 diesel or the mitigating strategies under the 22 Fukushima orders where you set out that there is a 23 requirement to maintain them, but the hierarchy is 24 such that the licensees have more flexibility in how 25 they're going to do the controls for the second tier.
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96 1 So it is not really a new concept. We're 2 just trying to be more clear on how we're going to use 3 it and how it's going to translate across the other 4 subparts.
5 MR. KIRCHNER: Bill, this is Walt. This 6 is going to sound simplistic on my part, but listening 7 to you and thinking about it, by showing it in 8 parallel, I think it's going to create problems and 9 redundancies that you don't intend and added work.
10 What if you put the second tier box below 11 the first tier? In other words, these are the primary 12 first tier safety criteria, and then to provide 13 substantial additional protection, this next set of 14 criteria are then applied.
15 So you do it in series, not parallel. I 16 know that sounds really simplistic, but, otherwise, 17 like in your boxology, you're creating, you know -- if 18 we could go back to the viewgraph that shows your top 19 level of viewgraph starting with the Atomic Energy Act 20 and then branching down. Yes, thank you, number 21.
21 Why wouldn't you put the second tier under 22 the first tier instead of running them in parallel, 23 and then you have safety functions that look, for all 24 practical purposes, the same and redundant?
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97 1 know, when you do a viewgraph or a slide, you don't 2 always -- you think it's being clear from what you're 3 trying to say, and sometimes it's only clear to 4 yourself. So I think that might've been a case here.
5 What we were trying to just show was that 6 the two columns, one set of requirements for adequate 7 protection and one to minimize danger and under 8 Section 161. But what we lost is what you're exactly 9 saying is that the intent is that that sets up a 10 hierarchy that's not shown on this slide, so.
11 MR. KIRCHNER: Yes.
12 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill --
13 MR. KIRCHNER: And I just --
14 CHAIRMAN BLEY: -- I've just been thinking 15 that what we need, and maybe a bunch of other people 16 will need, is a pretty good white paper that goes 17 through your intent, and maybe that becomes the 18 Statements of Consideration or a major part of the 19 Statements of Consideration for this rule that 20 explains how all this fits together and what you're 21 trying to do.
22 MR. RECKLEY: That's a good point, Dennis.
23 It's proving hard -- and not just this meeting, by the 24 way, our engagement with headquarters also, it's 25 proving harder to explain that what I had thought. So NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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98 1 I think you're exactly right. We need something. I 2 don't know what it is, but we will need it. If 3 nothing else, when we try to explain this rule to the 4 Commission and releasing it as a proposed rule, so.
5 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes. One thing that 6 will help me a lot is if we take a light water 7 reactor, where all the calculations already exist, you 8 don't have to start a research project on this, you 9 pick up all the calculations and tell us what 53 10 relation will result. What components will remain 11 safety-related, and what components will go into 12 outside tech specs? I mean, that will help see what 13 the consequences of your proposal is. And that will 14 not be an incredibly large effort because all those 15 calculations have already been performed. All those 16 numbers are available somewhere but, just a 17 suggestion.
18 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. We have it for non-19 lights, but we'll look at that. The historical 20 difficulty of trying to do this for light water 21 reactors is they are designed to a different standard, 22 and so there is an appendix, for example, to NUREG-23 1860 that tries to do the exercise that you mentioned.
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99 1 to a different standard, and so you can get insight, 2 it's just not as definitive as one might think. So --
3 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: You just tried to 4 explain what we were discussing the division of second 5 tier scenario like a station blackout diesel 6 generator. Well, I have a really tough time relating 7 how does that relate to dose calculation on, you know, 8 in the exclusion area or low population zone.
9 So the thing is that you try to do some 10 explanation by using station blackout diesel generator 11 or after Fukushima requirements. So it will be good 12 to see how good that come from this division. You 13 know?
14 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. We'll prepare 15 something and can use some examples, again, to show, 16 basically, this is probably not as large a leap as 17 what it first appears maybe.
18 So, let's go to Slide 25. So we've talked 19 about this point some already. The notion was to lay 20 out that given the NRC's objective, public health and 21 safety, that's ultimately determined by limiting the 22 release of radionuclides, so that's why we defined 23 that as the primary. And then require that additional 24 functions needed to support the retention of 25 radionuclides must be defined by the designer, by the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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100 1 applicant.
2 And that they then would set up design 3 features and programmatic controls to fulfill those 4 safety functions. And so a fairly often used example 5 of that is shown in Slide 26 -- which was developed 6 in, unfortunately, some of the color didn't make it 7 through to this slide, but yes, somewhere in 8 translation the slide got a little distorted, but at 9 least the way I'm seeing it on my screen.
10 So the NGNP laid this out, and again, it's 11 consistent with the way licensing modernization and 12 more recent discussions have progressed. It again 13 starts with that same higher-level function. Highest 14 level function is to control the release of 15 radionuclides.
16 Then for a gas-cooled reactor, it goes 17 through a logic on how you, what is needed to actually 18 do that in terms of the inventory in different places.
19 And this example is using the core and, in order to 20 maintain the radionuclides within the facility, it 21 goes down ultimately, to you can do that by 22 maintaining them in the TRISO particles. And to do 23 that, it's only showing one blue box, but actually, 24 the figure should be showing all three blue boxes as 25 needed safety functions to maintain the radionuclides NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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101 1 within the fuel.
2 And so you need to remove heat -- you need 3 to provide core heat removal. You need to control the 4 heat generation by controlling power. And you need to 5 control chemical attack either from the ingress of 6 moisture or air into the system.
7 So, again, I apologize. The graphic 8 should be showing all three of those blue boxes. But 9 this is an example of how although you define or start 10 with the highest level goal of limiting the release, 11 you do, ultimately, for most fission reactors, you're 12 going to end up with the same functions being defined 13 as the required safety functions, which is to remove 14 heat, control power, and in some plant designs, 15 control chemical attack. So it's just provided as an 16 example. And, hopefully, in another version where 17 what we provided you, it's more clear.
18 MR. KIRCHNER: So I would say, Bill --
19 this is Walt Kirchner, again. I'm going to risk 20 repeating myself. From this illustration that you've 21 walked through, my sense is you can define fundamental 22 safety functions or safety design criteria that would 23 be technology neutral. And, again, using your logic, 24 you start at the highest area, you want to maintain 25 the capability to retain or prevent and mitigate the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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102 1 release of the radionuclides. You've got to keep 2 control of the radionuclide inventory within the 3 plant. And then you got to have control of the 4 fission at the chain reaction. You have to be able to 5 shut it down in a safe and stable condition.
6 And so you're illustration suggests to me 7 that there are three fundamental functions. I 8 wouldn't, personally, hang my head just on removing 9 core -- a hat -- on core heat removable generation 10 control and chemical because there are other issues 11 with some of the newer designs.
12 If you're actively, for example, stripping 13 fission products, then you have mechanical issues, you 14 know, mechanical integrity and control. It may not be 15 so much a matter of heat or chemical, but it may be 16 that you've created a separate vessel for retaining 17 fission products and such, and you need to maintain 18 control of that radionuclide inventory.
19 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. Yes, I totally agree 20 that for a different design. This is particular for 21 a design and actually for one source term within the 22 design.
23 MR. KIRCHNER: Yes. No, I understand 24 that.
25 MR. RECKLEY: So, right. Okay. I mean, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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103 1 this is a good conversation, and I, you know, we'll go 2 back and think about how this is laid out. I think 3 technically there's no argument here. So we'll just 4 go back and look at how this is worded and see if it 5 would be better served to put it in the more 6 traditional language of the fundamental safety 7 functions.
8 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Yes, Bill, I would also 9 recommend, I've probably said this earlier, that you 10 take a look at the transcript and see what you said 11 here cause a lot of your discussion really helped and 12 could be the core of how you put this together.
13 MR. RECKLEY: Thank you. So go on to 14 Slide 27. The normal operations sections, Paragraph 15 (a) in both first and second tier, are largely 16 controlled by programs also needed to be supported, 17 obviously, by the design of the plant. We are working 18 somewhat separately on that activity under the content 19 to applications project to come up with guidance on 20 normal operations and, hopefully, to define some 21 performance-based approach to make the licensing 22 process more efficient by pointing to the programs 23 that are in place to maintain or limit normal 24 effluence.
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104 1 the first and second tier, go to unplanned events.
2 And for those, as I think everyone understands, for 3 those the way you show you meet them is primarily 4 through analysis.
5 And so the need is to first identify what 6 unplanned events you need to analyze. And so we 7 include a provision, this Section 53.240, that say you 8 must address, or must identify a set of licensing-9 basis events that address combinations of 10 malfunctions, human errors, and external events.
11 So, again, our thinking is that one way to 12 do this would be through the process that's identified 13 in NEI 18-04 and endorsed in Reg Guide 1.233. The 14 events that you identify then are used to confirm that 15 the design features and programmatic controls address 16 both the first and the second tier safety criteria.
17 MR. KIRCHNER: Bill, this is Walt, again.
18 Sorry for the interruption.
19 MR. RECKLEY: No.
20 MR. KIRCHNER: But if indeed these are 21 advanced reactors, what we should be seeing is that 22 the design features are such that the need or reliance 23 on programmatic controls is lessened versus the 24 existing fleet. See where I'm going with that?
25 MR. RECKLEY: Well, and likewise the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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105 1 reliance on human actions.
2 MR. KIRCHNER: And human action, yes.
3 MR. RECKLEY: More or less.
4 MR. KIRCHNER: Right. You know, so it's 5 fair --
6 MR. RECKLEY: That's where --
7 MR. KIRCHNER: Have you thought of how 8 your guidance would kind of drive that when you go to 9 the next phase, which is design requirements and such?
10 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. And, again, we entered 11 this right after or having in mind the guidance that 12 we just issued in the Regulatory Guide in terms of how 13 a designer will, hopefully, or at least have the 14 capability, of building into the design the design 15 features to reduce the requirements during operations 16 or the programmatic controls, if you will.
17 So really, the sections of NEI 18-04 that 18 talk about analyzing the events and identifying what 19 you're relying on, and then identifying the special 20 treatment, it lays out the process. When you see how 21 that is actually done and the results of it on 22 previous examples, like I mentioned before, the MHTGR 23 is an example, you can see how building into the 24 design does enable relaxations in programmatic 25 controls as well as justifying alternatives to some of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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106 1 the traditional mitigation measures such as emergency 2 planning. We've given it thought. Whether we've 3 clearly explained it, we will see.
4 MR. KIRCHNER: Well, maybe it comes.
5 Maybe I'm getting ahead of you, and it will come in 6 the next section that you present on the design 7 aspects of the Part 53. I'm just thinking the 8 difficulties. If you look at the Commission's 9 Advanced Reactor Policy Statements, they're kind of 10 phrased in expectations, and I suspect that the 11 challenge for you then is how do I incentivize these 12 expectations being met in terms of laying out these 13 kind of basic requirements.
14 If it's an advanced reactor, I would hope 15 we wouldn't see a lot of special treatment add-ons to 16 the plant, or programmatic needs and/or human 17 intervention. But, again, trying to figure out a way 18 to incentivize that or convert that to requirements is 19 going to be a challenge.
20 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill? I'm going to make 21 a different kind of comment. We said this in several 22 letters to the staff over the last year or so. And 23 I'm going to return to that letter from NEI to John 24 Tappert from December of last year that complained 25 about our letter on Part 53 where we suggested a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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107 1 return to the earliest days of licensing. I think it 2 was misconstrued by those folks. That's a kind way to 3 say it.
4 We weren't suggesting a return to coming 5 up with you have to be able to survive some maximum 6 hypothetical accident. What we were arguing was that 7 with these new designs and the uncertainties 8 associated with them, you can't start in your search 9 for licensing-basis events, initiating events for the 10 PRA that lead to these, from the current guidance to 11 light water reactors of what those initiators ought to 12 be. You really need to start fresh and do a complete 13 search of what things could happen, and you need that 14 before you can do a risk-informed approach. You have 15 to look at the broad spectrum.
16 That's actually something for guidance, 17 and we're talking to different groups on staff about 18 this, but I think that's something that is not 19 addressed in the LMP. It's not addressed in the 20 standards for PRA, and it's something the staff's 21 going to need to make very clear before anyone tries 22 to carry out this process. So it's more a comment 23 than a question here.
24 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. The things you're 25 talking about are sort of a precursor to being able to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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108 1 do the PRA or other assessment if you go a different 2 route.
3 In relation to the molten salt community, 4 for example, that's coming at it with a bit of a 5 history of, since that's in large part, a chemical 6 processing, there was some projects jointly done under 7 DOE funding with EPRI, and Vanderbilt, and Southern 8 where they looked at more traditional process hazard 9 analysis and trying to identify that.
10 And then they wrote a paper on how that 11 would do, in part, what you're talking about, which is 12 to inform as you go to the next step, which is to do 13 the PRA. But, yes, I do think it might be a message.
14 I don't know where we do it, but it has to be a 15 message that we continually give that the processes 16 we're talking about here can be straight forward, but 17 they're all based on the premise that you have an 18 understanding of how things behave, such that you can 19 model.
20 And gaining that understanding is not an 21 easy endeavor. So, yes, to the degree we have to 22 reinforce that, we will continue to reinforce it. So 23 I agree with you, and I guess if you see a place for 24 us to continually echo that message, that's good.
25 So if we go on to Slide 28, this is the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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109 1 defense-in-depth element. And we tried to reflect the 2 goal and saw it at least as a step to take defense-in-3 depth from a philosophy and elevate it to an actual 4 regulatory requirement, a straight forward regulatory 5 requirement and not just kind of a, like I say, a 6 philosophy that you have to read into some of the 7 current requirements.
8 But it was defined, as shown on the 9 bullets, measures have to be taken to ensure the 10 appropriate level defense-in-depth emphasizing that an 11 important reason for doing this is to compensate for 12 uncertainty. This also goes to the point you just 13 made, Dennis, and that when these measures are taken 14 to provide margins as an alternative means to 15 accomplish a safety function.
16 The reason to mention that is, in part, 17 the second there, the last bullet, to just kind of lay 18 down a founding principle, if you will, that you can't 19 exclusively rely on one design feature or one 20 operational or programmatic program, so.
21 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Let me say for the 22 record that I love this. This is the paragraph I like 23 best for the whole through, especially the third 24 bullet.
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110 1 with the second bullet. I don't think examples of how 2 will you accomplish this belong in the rule. They 3 belong in a guideline. So I will consider that you 4 leave that sentence from the rule.
5 I mean, to start with, the examples you 6 have not given much thought to, and you have not -- I 7 mean, obviously, you've given some thought, but they 8 don't belong in there. That's my comment.
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill, we have scheduled a 10 lunch break in the middle of Subpart B discussion. Do 11 you want to go forward much further, or is this a good 12 place for us to take our lunch break? If you want to 13 go with another slide or two, or three, that's fine 14 too.
15 MR. RECKLEY: I think we can finish out 16 the slides and then maybe during lunch, I hate to ask 17 you to do this, but you can give it some thought and 18 then come back, you know, fully charged to continue 19 the discussions.
20 CHAIRMAN BLEY: What you can do in ten 21 minutes or so.
22 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. So this is the 23 defense-in-depth Section 250. I understand what 24 you're saying about the language. Probably wouldn't 25 actually affect the requirement much if that was there NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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111 1 or not.
2 So with that, we can go then to the last 3 one, which is 260, which is a little bit up in the 4 air. This has gotten a fair amount of feedback from 5 stakeholders that we don't, that protection of plant 6 works is a complication to add to the safety 7 requirements given the program is largely defined in 8 Part 20 and even our requirements point to Part 20.
9 So we weren't really proposing anything 10 new here. We were just bringing Part 20 in and saying 11 protection of plant workers would be defined under the 12 safety criteria. So --
13 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill, this says some of 14 the elements we talked about earlier. Workers safety 15 for some of these new processes could involve 16 significant hazards beyond radiologic hazards.
17 MR. RECKLEY: Okay.
18 CHAIRMAN BLEY: It probably belongs here 19 in some form.
20 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. Going on to Slide 30, 21 Additional Discussion Topics. As I said, maybe this 22 is a good thing. I'll just bring these up, and you 23 guys can think about them over lunch.
24 One of the things we asked stakeholders 25 was there are Department of Energy guidance, and on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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112 1 the seismic side, in particular, ANS 2-26, and then 2 this is reflected in some of the American Society of 3 Civil Engineering codes, that they use a concept of 4 unmitigated consequences.
5 So you, in order to look at and classify 6 equipment in terms of the seismic design categories, 7 going to Mike Corradini's earlier thought, maybe 8 unmitigated consequences would be a way to look at 9 microreactors, for example, and say it's an easy thing 10 if you look at an unmitigated consequence, and it 11 meets a certain threshold that maybe that would be 12 something to consider.
13 Whether you do it this way or some other 14 way, that's one of the things we're thinking about.
15 But there's a lot of guidance that's already available 16 on assessing unmitigated consequences. Again --
17 CHAIRMAN BLEY: I didn't know quite what 18 you meant by it until you just talked about it some.
19 We've raised this with the staff earlier on some of 20 the papers that we've reviewed in the last two years 21 on that the plan for going forward here.
22 And I think what, at least what we were 23 thinking about, was not that you need a lot of 24 guidance here, but there ought to be a pathway if you 25 can live with unmitigated consequences with no real NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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113 1 significant impact that that ought to be a pathway 2 that's at least identified, so you don't need some new 3 whole regulatory regime should you have a design for 4 which the consequences are de minimis.
5 MR. RECKLEY: Right. And so it's a matter 6 we're thinking about. Again, we asked stakeholders to 7 give it some thought. And we're currently seeing how 8 we might incorporate such an idea. We haven't to 9 date, so even what you see in terms of design and 10 analysis for next month, we haven't really 11 incorporated this, but we're continuing to think about 12 it and would appreciate any thought.
13 And then the last bullet is, and you'll 14 see this, in particular, when we get to the design and 15 analysis stage, the Subpart C that we'll be providing 16 to you. And it goes to somewhat an earlier point made 17 that advanced reactors following the Advanced Reactor 18 Policy Statement are expected to have additional 19 safety margins. And what do you do with those? How 20 do you trade those safety margins off against 21 operational flexibility in areas such as the examples 22 I keep throwing out, the emergency planning, siting, 23 staffing, and some of the others?
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114 1 that we're developing on how to trade analytical 2 safety margins for operational flexibilities.
3 And I think that was the last slide. Yes.
4 We've talked about that one. So just the, you know, 5 the bowtie figure just again gives an example of how 6 you trade off design against mitigating measures like 7 emergency planning. So that was the only reason for 8 having that last slide there.
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. Thanks. And we're 10 going to take a lunch break. And when we come back, 11 we will do what Bill suggested and see if members have 12 comments on what we've seen and this first subsection 13 of the rule. It's almost 1 o'clock back east. Please 14 come back by 2 o'clock, and we will begin meeting 15 again. We are in recess.
16 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 17 off the record at 12:57 p.m. and resumed at 2:00 p.m.
18 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. It's time for us to 19 go back into session. Bill, are you going to continue 20 on?
21 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, thank you, Dennis. We 22 just had a couple extra slides at the end related to 23 Subpart B on the safety criteria or safety objectives 24 to summarize some of the other comments we've gotten 25 from interactions with stakeholders.
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115 1 And so, perhaps we can just go through 2 some of these. We'll be probably consistent with what 3 we've been hearing today and some new or different.
4 So, I'll just go through these and then we 5 can, if it's okay then just open it up maybe to close 6 out Subpart B and then we can get into the next part.
7 So, we've had a couple interactions, a 8 couple public meetings in which the safety objectives 9 were discussed. And one comment, and this is -- it's 10 kind of hard because we have meetings with 11 stakeholders.
12 So, these are kind of a collection of 13 observations, not necessarily a consistent set of 14 comments from one organization.
15 So, but some stakeholders recommended that 16 we avoid regulations that would go beyond what's 17 needed for reasonable assurance of adequate protection 18 and perhaps even clarify more than we have what we 19 mean by reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
20 Another observation or a comment has been 21 to allow flexibility in how applicants would present 22 their safety case and not require a probabilistic risk 23 assessment to support the safety case.
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116 1 talked about the one in 10,000 as being a threshold 2 for design-basis accidents, maybe to replace the 3 language and the frequencies with terms sometimes used 4 in other guidance or other regulations -- unlikely and 5 highly unlikely, that kind of language versus the 6 numerical frequencies.
7 Another comment was to go into more detail 8 on the event categories. So, this could be similar to 9 some of what we've heard today in terms of going into 10 more detail on the anticipated operational 11 occurrences, the design-basis events and in 12 particular, beyond design-basis events.
13 We can go to 33. One proposal was in lieu 14 of using the QHOs as a performance criteria or a 15 safety criteria, that we adopt an approach more like 16 the mitigating strategies under 5155 in which the 17 language would be something like, you know, every 18 design will have mitigation capabilities for beyond 19 design-basis events.
20 There was some discussion about the 21 Paragraph C under the adequate protection or first 22 tier safety criteria about the ability of the 23 Commission to add additional criteria under the 24 adequate protections standard.
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117 1 that the Commission and the Agency has the capability 2 as to caution against the staff's ability to just do 3 that without some discipline.
4 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill, back to your 5 previous bullet on cumulative risk. Of course 1860 6 had a whole appendix on more direct addressing of 7 cumulative risk and we had some letters come to us, 8 I'm sorry, to you that we discussed during OMP 9 discussion, wanting something like the target curve as 10 a cumulative risk curve against which they would lay 11 their own cumulative risk curve. So, that's a more 12 direct approach. I'm sure you've thought of it.
13 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah. And we thought about 14 that. And again, as you remember we basically said 15 that could be an approach. And actually, I do believe 16 it's mentioned in the PRA standard as a possible 17 metric.
18 Now this, that would also require PRA to 19 support, whereas this proposal would basically take 20 out a risk measure and simply say again, something 21 along the lines of mitigating strategies will exist, 22 more like we did for 5155, the mitigating strategies 23 rulemaking.
24 Again, these are just a set of comments 25 from various stakeholders. One, I guess that is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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118 1 echoed today is the two-tier concept is complex and 2 difficult to understand. So, we obviously are hearing 3 that from numerous directions.
4 There is some comment that the ALARA 5 concept would not need to be put into Part 53. And if 6 we can then go on to 34. Taking that even one step 7 further a question as to whether even normal 8 operations would need to be addressed within Part 53.
9 And again, some of this would just be a 10 matter of doing a review to make sure that if we did 11 not address it in 53 that it is adequately addressed 12 in other regulations such as part 50, maybe Part 51.
13 So, again a comment received. Something we're going 14 to look at and assess.
15 Some comment regarding the defense-in-16 depth wording. The last, next to last bullet, we did 17 have some terminology like high confidence that events 18 would be assessed and just some issue with the 19 language and whether such terminology adds confusion 20 or at least identifying something we would have to 21 pick up in the guidance document to clarify what such 22 terms mean.
23 And then the last bullet, that is fairly, 24 this was a fairly consistent observation from at least 25 the stakeholders at the meeting or at least the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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119 1 industry stakeholders that occupational dose would not 2 need to be addressed in Part 53.
3 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill, back to the first 4 one on defense-in-depth, I'm a little surprised by 5 that. But I'm not sure what you've presented and 6 talked about.
7 The language that's in 53-250 right now is 8 pretty high level with only one or two exceptions and 9 they're pretty straightforward. And I would assume we 10 would have a link to your Reg Guide and the NEI 11 document on LMP, which has at least to me a pretty 12 thorough and flexible way of attacking defense-in-13 depth issues.
14 So, I don't know if everybody from your 15 public meetings have looked at that and thought about 16 it in depth. But that to me is pretty good.
17 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, I mean they were seeing 18 the same thing you are seeing. And we did address 19 that Reg Guide 1.233 or NEI 1804 lays out one way to 20 do the defense-in-depth assessment.
21 Again, from the stakeholders' points of 22 view, at least some fraction of them, they wanted to 23 make sure that we didn't write this rule so closely 24 linked to that methodology that was basically the only 25 way to comply with this new Part 53.
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120 1 And so, we're trying to walk that line.
2 Again, as I mentioned earlier, we've said all along 3 that our intention and quite intentionally is that one 4 way to meet Part 53 is through the use of LMP and 5 then this content of application guidance that's 6 currently being prepared and that work that we've done 7 back even to include the advanced reactor design 8 criteria.
9 So, to build Part 53, to look at it as 10 building from those previous efforts. At the same 11 time we are sensitive that we were trying not to make 12 it the only way to comply.
13 So, we're trying to walk that line where 14 it's one way to meet it, but not the only way to meet 15 it. So, sometimes when we bring in the language from 16 NEI 1804, that's where you get some observations that 17 maybe we're tying it to closely.
18 At least we're hearing that from some 19 stakeholders. Those stakeholders that plan to use the 20 LMP are less sensitive to those concepts being 21 incorporated.
22 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Well, just as one 23 individual here, the way your language is laid out, I 24 don't see how it links you tightly to that. So, I 25 think you have left yourself room.
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121 1 MR. RECKLEY: So, that was the last of the 2 slides on Subpart B. If we wanted to kind of have an 3 additional discussion from the Members or 4 observations, suggestions.
5 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Anything from the Members?
6 MEMBER BROWN: Somebody else was starting 7 to talk. Go ahead.
8 DR. CORRADINI: This is Corradini. I'll 9 be quick, Charlie.
10 MEMBER BROWN: That's okay.
11 DR. CORRADINI: Bill, you mentioned that 12 the occupational dose from safety criteria requirement 13 was something that I'll call more than just a single 14 comment from a single individual or organization.
15 Were there others that essentially were 16 more, I'll call like a majority of the people that you 17 had in the stakeholders' meetings kind of came 18 together and had a comment?
19 What I guess I should have asked is, are 20 most of these isolated comments or do some of these 21 besides the occupational dose requirement were more, 22 I'll call, broadly supported in terms of their 23 commentary?
24 MR. RECKLEY: Maybe I'll ask Nan to help 25 me. But it's a mix. And even when I say individual NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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122 1 stakeholders, some of the stakeholders are 2 organizations, so they represent more than one entity 3 or one designer.
4 But maybe ALARA. And again, this was from 5 those that are linked to the industry.
6 I think maybe ALARA was something that 7 most of the industry groups and developers, individual 8 developers thought we need not include. Nan, do you 9 have anything?
10 MS. VALLIERE: So, I guess I would say 11 they kind of fall in two categories. One like Bill 12 mentioned on occupational dose and ALARA where we're 13 hearing some consistent comments but across multiple 14 individuals or organizations.
15 There is also another category which I 16 would put comments on the QHOs in, in that we got a 17 lot of stakeholder comments about, saying that there 18 was perhaps something they were uncomfortable with 19 regarding the QHOs, the way they are presented in the 20 rule text. But they were not consistent in what it 21 was they were uncomfortable or the extent to which 22 they were uncomfortable. So, I guess I would say the 23 QHOs is another areas where we got quite a bit of 24 stakeholder comment.
25 DR. CORRADINI: All right, thank you.
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123 1 MEMBER PETTI: Just, Bill, to follow on 2 that. I don't understand the concern on the 3 occupational dose.
4 Practically, they have to follow Part 20.
5 If you're reiterating it in Part 53 in large part, 6 does it really change anything on the ground in terms 7 of what has to be done?
8 MR. RECKLEY: From the staff's point of 9 view, we didn't think it did. So, but it does, I 10 think maybe -- when you put it at the top level safety 11 objectives and then start to carry it through all the 12 other elements, including design, for example, I think 13 the viewpoint of some stakeholders was that goes 14 beyond where it is now. It's primarily a programmatic 15 control. And whether then it would open things up 16 more than they already are for, to create licensing 17 issues because we're looking to say, for example, is 18 this plant layout design really supporting a criterion 19 like occupational dose or as low as reasonably 20 achievable?
21 MEMBER PETTI: Well, let me give you a 22 different perspective. When I was in fusion, we were 23 talking to the Canadian regulator because Canada was 24 an new site.
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124 1 and I think you could say this about advanced 2 reactors, are so much safer than existing fission 3 systems, then maybe we ought to look at the worker 4 dose more closely, because some of those dose limits 5 could go back to the rationale where, you know, in 6 part there is wording about lifesaving, you know, 7 you're trading off the worker against the public in 8 the event of an accident and allowing the worker to 9 get more dose.
10 Their perspective was that they might 11 consider tightening the dose for workers because 12 that's where the real risk is if you believe, you 13 know, what is said. It was a very interesting 14 perspective when I first heard it and it still sticks 15 in my mind here 15 years later.
16 So, you know, the fact that it's here, I 17 don't have a problem with it being at the high level.
18 But it is a different perspective.
19 MR. RECKLEY: Okay, thank you.
20 DR. CORRADINI: Can I just follow on 21 Dave's point? I apologize, Charlie, just to be sure.
22 MEMBER BROWN: That's all right.
23 DR. CORRADINI: I didn't appreciate the 24 nuance you said, Bill, about because it appears as a 25 rule they were worried about some sort of legal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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125 1 requirement that isn't there now. Could you repeat 2 that please?
3 MR. RECKLEY: Well, it's not so much the 4 legal requirement is not there now. But -- and again, 5 I'm speculating somewhat too here, because these were 6 comments from outside and they didn't always go into 7 a great level of detail on the rationale.
8 But I think the concern is elevating it to 9 this top level safety criteria, because of the 10 understanding that our intent is to take these top 11 level safety criteria and apply them across the whole 12 life cycle, they thought, at least as I remember the 13 conversation, that elevated these requirements.
14 And no one is really arguing that you 15 don't need to protect workers. But that it elevated 16 it and introduced a potential licensing issue that 17 goes beyond what we currently require.
18 So again, Nan, please feel free to chime 19 in, because I don't remember all of these 20 conversations that we've had.
21 MS. VALLIER: I think you've portrayed it 22 pretty accurately. It was that raising it to a higher 23 level that was, that's what I recall as the concern.
24 DR. CORRADINI: Okay, thank you.
25 MEMBER BROWN: Can I go now, Bill?
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126 1 MR. RECKLEY: Please.
2 MEMBER BROWN: I might have missed this in 3 all the discussions. So, I tried not to miss it. But 4 we talked about dose, radiation issues, et cetera, et 5 cetera.
6 But a lot of these new reactors have some, 7 putting aside the uranium issues, they all have that, 8 have much more hazardous materials associated with 9 them from coolants, sodium, lithium, bismuth, whatever 10 you want to call them.
11 And there is nothing in here relative to 12 chemical hazards relative to being dispersed if there 13 is some design-basis event which could end up 14 releasing those types of materials as well. And that, 15 am I missing that or are you just depending on Part 20 16 for that?
17 MR. RECKLEY: No, we talked about that 18 earlier. It might be a shortfall in what we've done.
19 We tried to address chemical interactions 20 contributing to the release of radionuclides. But we 21 did not address specifically the release of the 22 chemicals themselves and the potential hazards 23 associated with the chemicals.
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127 1 where they have taken on chemical hazards in addition 2 to the radiological hazards.
3 And it's also a matter of we'll just have 4 to look and I need to talk to people smarter than me 5 about how we did those chemical hazards and how we 6 treat them as our agency, either through an MOU with 7 another agency or whether a facility would simply need 8 to comply with both our requirements for the 9 radiological hazards and EPA requirements for the 10 chemical hazards.
11 I'm not familiar with that. So, that's a 12 takeaway for us to go back and do more research on 13 that.
14 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, it would just seem to 15 me that water is water and contamination and 16 contaminants and corrosion and irradiation hazards 17 from material irradiations, those all we're very 18 familiar with.
19 It's just I don't know how we can separate 20 it if somehow we don't, if we have design-basis events 21 that could result in the widespread, you know, 22 dispersion of bismuth or other type of very, very 23 hazardous materials.
24 And it just seems to me it can't be pushed 25 off to something else. It's got to be part of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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128 1 design of the plant. That's my only thought there.
2 The second item was, I'll echo Dave's and 3 Mike's and Dennis's rather, I guess on the 4 occupational dose moving it. Removing a requirement 5 seems to be not really on the list of good things to 6 do.
7 And I was, the defense-in-depth 8 requirement, I don't see how we could ever get away 9 from not having a defense-in-depth. Your paragraph 10 that you've proposed the key part of it is the last 11 sentence, in my mind.
12 There is a lot of other uncertainties and 13 epistemic and aleatory and all this other good stuff 14 people like to talk about mathematically. But the 15 bottom line is you don't want a single design feature 16 to be the only thing you rely upon.
17 That just seems to be a principle that you 18 didn't, you shouldn't remove. And let me see, there 19 was one more, if I can find it again.
20 Yeah, the ALARA thing. Not having as low 21 as reasonably achievable seems to be -- there has been 22 a lot of experience with that. I don't remember 23 hearing a whole lot of problems with that.
24 I understand their desire to do stuff.
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129 1 got to retain -- that's not a light water reactor 2 thing. That's fundamentally radiation protection type 3 stuff.
4 So, I don't know. I just -- I think 5 you're going to have to be very careful and see if we 6 can get a little bit more specificity in there along 7 the way. I'll quit talking now and we can get on with 8 it.
9 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah, and the stakeholders, 10 to be fair they weren't arguing against the concept or 11 the principle.
12 They were just observing or offering their 13 suggestion. They didn't think it needed to go into 14 the regulation.
15 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, but then how, 16 somewhere you've got to have something other than just 17 we'll figure it out later and then fight about what's 18 needed from plant to plant. It needs some of that.
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Charlie, this is Walt.
20 MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
21 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Let me ask Bill this.
22 Bill, to what extent have you looked at 52 in 23 particular, 10 CFR 52?
24 To what extent do they reference things 25 like occupational health, or is the model there that, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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130 1 you know, you have to comply with 52 and all of the 2 other extant 10 CFR 50 regulations? Does that provide 3 any guidance?
4 I mean, in a sense I'm looking at this as 5 the 10 CFR 52 for advanced reactors because force 6 fitting an advanced reactor or especially a non-LWR 7 into 52 is going to be problematical at best.
8 MR. RECKLEY: And, Nan, please you're more 9 familiar. But I don't think -- and this is the 10 caution. I don't think either 50 or 52 talk a lot 11 about it.
12 But what can happen is that a regulation 13 like the current sets in 50 and 52 can have a glancing 14 comment, like within 52.79 or 50.34 on content of 15 applications, and can simply say something like submit 16 a radiation protection plan.
17 And so, the rule doesn't seem to have very 18 much in it. But when you look at the history and look 19 at what radiation protection programs are and what 20 guidance exists you would step away saying well, the 21 rule doesn't say much, but what has gone into 22 complying with those few words in a regulation is 23 quite extensive. And so, one needs to be a little 24 careful.
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131 1 careful about dropping stuff out that when you put it 2 in black and white in a little more clear terms, it 3 might look like we've elevated it or increased a 4 requirement, whereas from our, I'll say personally 5 from my viewpoint, it may not have added very much at 6 all if you look at the history of what goes into 7 complying with something like 50.34 or 52.79. But, 8 Nan, do you have a view?
9 MS. VALLIERE: Well, I think my view is 10 consistent with yours. Certainly, when Part 52 was 11 promulgated and even when we revised it in 2007, there 12 was no intent to change the requirement related to 13 these things like ALARA and occupational dose from 14 what they had always been under the Part 50 licensing 15 process.
16 And again, when we developed this 17 preliminary language for Part 53, again there was no 18 intent to change the requirements from what they had 19 traditionally been in the past.
20 So, I think it's just, as Bill pointed 21 out, a higher sensitivity or having the requirements 22 in a more prominent place, if you want to call it 23 that, that has, you know, has sort of sparked this 24 discussion.
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132 1 change the requirements from what they have been 2 traditionally.
3 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. And another example of 4 that to me is, you know, it's been a longstanding very 5 important requirement in terms of the siting analysis 6 and the use of the 25 rem as a, not a strict 7 regulatory requirement but as a pretty well 8 established guidance number.
9 And, but Part 53 is identifying it as, to 10 me, for what it is, and bringing it up to be the first 11 tier criteria. In both Parts 50 and Parts 52 that's 12 a footnote.
13 So, you know, not changing a requirement, 14 but putting it in a different light.
15 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. Could 16 the concern be that today we operate with a lot of 17 requirements, and by placing it where you put it in 18 now in 53 you may be requiring to design to a lot of 19 requirements?
20 Meaning that you have to change the design 21 to minimize radiation to the dose to your employees.
22 That might be one question, that would cost me money 23 if I'm designing a reactor.
24 So, maybe we should clarify on the rule 25 that's not what we mean, unless we mean it.
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133 1 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, good point. I think 2 ALARA considerations do go into the design process.
3 Maybe not as prominent as some others but they do go 4 into the design process. So --
5 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: But to make it as low 6 as reasonable, I can, I never stop putting more 7 shielding, whereas a couple of feet of shielding is 8 sufficient, ALARA makes me now put five or six or 9 seven or how much is enough?
10 MR. RECKLEY: Right. And to be fair, the 11 criteria both currently and there is a difference in 12 the occupational and the Appendix I. But it's keeping 13 the same concept for ALARA, part of the logic is 14 sooner or later it becomes diminishing returns for the 15 cost. And the cost, you can consider the cost in 16 making your decision on what is reasonably achievable.
17 But anyway, we digressed a little bit.
18 So, additional thoughts or --
19 MEMBER PETTI: I just think, I mean, the 20 ALARA discussion, you know, salt fueled reactors are 21 going to have major, major shielding problems with all 22 this fuel moving around outside of a vessel if that's 23 the way it's designed.
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134 1 that are, you know, potentially out there.
2 MEMBER BROWN: But also, echo Dave's 3 thought process. He knows more about the specific 4 plants than I do in terms of the fuel movement around.
5 But if it appears that the advance reactor 6 rule is, doesn't emphasize or provide the same 7 radiation or dose considerations that the light water 8 reactors, that doesn't sound like it's going in the 9 right direction.
10 It could raise a lot of resistance when we 11 really know that nuclear power plants are probably a 12 key for energy generation. So, I mean, to me it 13 doesn't -- you've got to be very careful relative to 14 how you play that particular routine.
15 I mean, Rick recognized back in the early 16 50s that he couldn't send mom and dad's sailors back 17 home being irradiated and being put in a hospital.
18 So, the radiation shielding in our plants was 19 effectively -- I mean I went on like 25 sea trials.
20 Not like Dennis with his operations. Had to stand up 21 near the reactor compartment shield and monitor 22 certain instrumentation for five to six, seven, eight, 23 ten hours during full power trials.
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135 1 history. You know, I just think you've got to be 2 careful playing with the dosage that you allow workers 3 to get.
4 MR. RECKLEY: Right, understood. And 5 again, I don't want to exaggerate what the 6 stakeholders are saying.
7 Basically, they're just discussing it in 8 the context of where it sits within the regulations, 9 not that it wouldn't be pursued either through the 10 requirements in Part 20 or otherwise. But point is 11 taken. Thank you.
12 MEMBER BROWN: And I guess the last item 13 would be the effluent releases if -- and Dennis may 14 remember this because he was actually on the 15 Enterprise for how many years? I don't know how, but 16 he was an officer.
17 But we didn't have in-hull retention tanks 18 for effluent releases for heat ups and cool downs and 19 things like that when you had to dump. And we ended 20 up redesigning. Pardon, Dennis.
21 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Or resin.
22 MEMBER BROWN: Or resin, right. So, we 23 ended up incorporating in-hull retention tanks to 24 eliminate or very heavily minimize the need for any 25 effluent dumps when we're out at sea or going out the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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136 1 rivers or what have you.
2 Effluent releases of almost any kind, 3 chemical, device, just contaminant radioactively 4 contaminated, dumping that stuff, increasingly 5 allowing the higher limitations does not -- that's not 6 a good public issue.
7 I just think we have to tread very 8 carefully on how in this rule we allow some relaxation 9 of that. So, it's just another -- I would have a hard 10 time trying to sign off on stuff like that, that's 11 all.
12 So, the public comments are good to get 13 them raised but I just -- somewhere along the line you 14 need to put up the stop sign and I'm done now, Bill.
15 MR. RECKLEY: Well, thank you. And, yes, 16 again we disposition comments. We don't always accept 17 them.
18 I mean, but we will consider them and 19 we'll make a decision.
20 MEMBER BROWN: I understand that. Just, 21 I'm only an individual on the committee. I have no 22 idea what we would do if we had to write a letter on 23 this.
24 So, just on an individual thought process 25 on that anyway. Thanks.
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137 1 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Bill, this is Walt 2 again. This discussion raised something in my mind.
3 Is there a preamble to 10 CFR 53 that 4 addresses all the other 10 CFR 50 regulations that may 5 or may not apply or is there -- where I'm going with 6 this is that much of 10 CFR 50 regulations obviously 7 are tailored, the specific ones, beyond 50 and 52 are 8 to address issues that came up over time with the 9 existing fleet and they are very LWR technology 10 centered.
11 Is there, I'll just throw one out 12 rhetorically. Post-TMI requirements, would those be 13 part of 10 CFR 53 or are they in the spirit of all the 14 regulations apply and this goes beyond it as a 15 mechanism for licensing advanced reactors?
16 MR. RECKLEY: So, we will develop and 17 describe the relationship with other rules. And there 18 will be cases where we refer to Part 51 on the 19 environmental side, Part 73 on the security side.
20 And there will be cases where we, where 21 Part 53 will contain all of the requirements. The 22 ones you mentioned in regards to the kind of 23 traditional safety approaches would be in Part 53.
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138 1 will be when you look at the next section on analysis 2 and design to say would that process that we're 3 requiring appropriately identify anything that's 4 needed to do safety issues?
5 So, we're not going to have a requirement 6 for a high point vent. But will the analysis that 7 we're requiring through the PRA and the deterministic 8 analysis being required identify if a high point vent 9 would be needed, if that makes sense.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay, I get that. Then 11 what about things like generic issues? And I'm 12 thinking of things like internal and external, man-13 made and natural hazards.
14 How are you going to incorporate those?
15 Will those come up next in the Part C or --
16 MR. RECKLEY: A combination of C and D 17 which we might talk about both of those next time.
18 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay.
19 MR. RECKLEY: But, yes, that will be 20 identified that those need to be assessed. And by and 21 large, as we talked about during the licensing 22 modernization activities, this is more in the guidance 23 area than in the actual regulatory language.
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139 1 can be a real probabilistic approach to that then that 2 can fit right into this risk-informed approach.
3 If there is a hazard for which that's not 4 yet the state of the art, the existing guidance still 5 remains and they can identify a design basis flood or 6 a design basis wind loading or snow loading using the 7 existing guidance.
8 MEMBER KIRCHNER: One more question, Bill.
9 The always touchy topic of quality assurance. How do 10 you, let me see if I can pick my words carefully.
11 How do you determine when an NQA-1 12 equivalent program is going to be necessary.
13 Obviously, it's interrelated with classification of 14 structures, systems and components.
15 But if the, where I'm struggling is that 16 if you look at 10 CFR 50 and 52 in effect the genesis 17 of the requirement or the NQA-1 equivalent originates 18 with safety-related, the definition of safety-related.
19 MR. RECKLEY: So, the way -- and again 20 we'll get into some of this in the future sections but 21 they're all interrelated so it's always difficult to 22 separate them out would be that we would keep the 23 safety-related designation and require QA.
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140 1 areas or some of the current Appendix B criteria 2 related to specific tasks whether they might include 3 other standards beyond NQA-1.
4 Maybe the ISO standards or even QA 5 standards from another government, another regulator.
6 But all of that is under discussion and would in our 7 view will probably get worked out in the guidance 8 provided we can make the rule language open enough.
9 And then for the other set of equipment 10 like the equipment related to the second tier safety 11 criteria, those would be subject to the special 12 treatment requirements which an applicant would have 13 to define in terms of combinations of quality 14 assurance, monitoring, reliability assurance programs, 15 whatever would be needed or whatever they would want 16 to propose as providing the necessary confidence that 17 the capabilities and reliability of those structured 18 systems and components are maintained.
19 An area just to kind of do like a little 20 movie trailer here, an area that's going to be very 21 interesting that we'll probably talk about with you 22 guys not at the next meeting but the meeting after 23 that at least introducing the topic will be the human 24 element and how you incorporate all of the 25 considerations of the roles that operators and other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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141 1 staff provide.
2 So, it's going to be one interesting topic 3 after another.
4 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Yes, it will, Bill.
5 What I'm thinking about is, you know, one of the, I 6 think one of the motives of Congress and perhaps the 7 Commission itself is to make the process ensure 8 adequate protection, of course and everything that 9 you've enumerated but at the same time make it more 10 predictable and hopefully more expeditious.
11 And the problem that I see coming up is 12 that you have a big challenge in front of you because 13 of the diversity of technologies that may be 14 submitted.
15 But if there aren't some fundamental 16 principles in place it's going to be a pitched battle 17 on every single application about where one draws 18 these different lines. And maybe that's the nature of 19 the beast, I guess.
20 But I'm concerned that you, the staff, get 21 caught in the middle of something that may prove 22 difficult to manage effectively. You don't have to 23 respond to that. It's just an observation that I see.
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142 1 know, or may force you into customizing the 2 regulations with each application.
3 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. I think we agree that 4 it's going to be a challenge that the -- yes. I'll 5 just leave it there too.
6 MEMBER PETTI: Bill, I had a question. I 7 was reading that NEI letter that we just got 8 yesterday. So, I will admit I haven't digested it 9 all.
10 But like QA, codes and standards came up.
11 And that document was basically taking all the 12 requirements that were out there or those that were 13 out there for LWRs and saying they didn't apply to 14 advanced reactors because they weren't light water.
15 When I got to the codes and standards I 16 was a little bit concerned and, again, maybe I read it 17 too quickly. But, yes, I agree ASME Section 3 may not 18 be the, you know, Div 1 may not be the right code and 19 standard to design a pressure vessel for an advanced 20 system.
21 But we're not going to design the active 22 vessels with band aids and bailing wire and peanut 23 butter. You know, there needs to be a code and 24 standard.
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143 1 there had been a lot of effort to develop some new 2 standards and we're going to be reviewing those here 3 in the coming months.
4 But that, you know, that there were other 5 standards out there but that you need a standard from 6 mechanical design of key components like the reactor 7 vessel.
8 And that just struck me. That's why 9 earlier I said I'm worried that they weren't on the 10 same page and they were, you know, being a little too 11 loose with the it's an LWR thing and so it doesn't 12 apply.
13 In the letter of the law it doesn't apply.
14 But in the intent of the law you better believe it 15 applies is sort of my opinion.
16 Have you, I mean did that come up at all 17 in any of these stakeholder meetings? I mean, am I 18 misreading because all I'm seeing is the hard copy and 19 not having been in the meetings?
20 MR. RECKLEY: I mean they are complex 21 discussions. And, I mean we do have -- for the last 22 few years, every year we've been having a standards 23 forum.
24 I think when you look in total, most of 25 the stakeholders understand the important role of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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144 1 consensus codes and standards and the standard 2 development organizations, because if you don't rely 3 on those, you have to prove your point by yourself, if 4 you will.
5 And so, the whole nature of referring to 6 codes and standards is a body has already looked and 7 said this is good. And if you're not going to refer 8 to such a standard then you, the whole argument relies 9 on an individual designer's test programs and other 10 arguments. So, that's --
11 MEMBER PETTI: Right.
12 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: I'm sorry, aren't we 13 just referring to GDC-1? I mean it's not so much 14 specific codes and standards. It's just the quality 15 assurance.
16 MR. RECKLEY: I think we drifted broader 17 than just the QA standard, if I understood Dave's 18 question or observation.
19 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Okay.
20 MEMBER KIRCHNER: It seems to me, Bill, 21 your answer is a good one, because again going back to 22 my observation about, you know, predictability and 23 getting through the licensing process, I can't imagine 24 anybody coming in with something that is an advanced 25 reactor, it's going to have some kind of vessel as a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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145 1 container, that doesn't meet some appropriate section 2 of the ASME code.
3 There are good reasons for that, that have 4 nothing to do with the NRC. In the private sector, if 5 you don't meet something in code like that how do you 6 insure yourself, et cetera, et cetera?
7 I mean, it's more than just the nuclear 8 aspect of it. But for predictability and getting 9 through the system, I can't imagine not using an ASME 10 case for the vessels, et cetera.
11 MR. RECKLEY: Right. And, you know, again 12 I don't want to exaggerate any particular observation.
13 There has been wide consensus, for 14 example, on the work that's being done on Division 5 15 for high temperature materials. And, you know, every 16 time we have such a forum or a discussion, everybody 17 acknowledges the importance of doing that to support 18 the advanced reactor programs.
19 So, again these are just a collection of 20 comments. And sometimes you do have to back up and 21 look at the broader context and programs and things 22 like ASME that work on Division 5 for high temperature 23 materials, and that's got wide support.
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146 1 a slide. So, hopefully that's the case anyway.
2 Anything else, observations or questions 3 on the safety objectives?
4 MEMBER PETTI: So, yeah, just one more, 5 Bill. In the defense-in-depth area, many of these 6 advanced reactors have intrinsic characteristics that 7 I think the designers would like to use in place of a 8 system to execute a safety function or part of a 9 safety function.
10 That's not prohibited, is it, as you think 11 about it?
12 MR. RECKLEY: No. It's not prohibited, 13 and actually it's a good thing. One of the questions 14 we posed on Subpart C when we released it for 15 discussion was whether we needed to look at developing 16 additional guidance on the treatment of intrinsic or 17 inherent features.
18 As many of you will recall, as the 19 movement in reactor design went from active systems to 20 passive systems, there was a fair amount of work that 21 needed to be done to support that movement. I think 22 there was a general agreement it was a good idea. It 23 still required a fair amount of work. And so, our 24 question to the stakeholders was again, relying on an 25 intrinsic or inherent feature that doesn't, that goes NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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147 1 perhaps even one step beyond passive, in that you 2 don't need to support a process like natural 3 circulation, then that's a good thing, but do we need 4 to develop guidance?
5 So, that's still a point that we have 6 under kind of an open item for discussion as to what 7 guidance, if any, needs to be done to support the 8 treatment of an inherent feature, because the trick is 9 even though it's inherent it's still, you still have 10 to guarantee that the physics will behave that way.
11 And so, there would be some controls 12 necessary to make sure that the properties actually 13 exist to support that inherent behavior.
14 MEMBER PETTI: Right, right. No, that I 15 understand. This is particularly in regard to micro 16 reactors.
17 And it's interesting some of the sort of 18 gut feeling you have for the bigger machines when you 19 bring them down smaller you find that these inherent 20 characteristics play an even bigger role and can 21 really change the whole sort of look at safety and 22 ultimate safety margins because they play, they just 23 play a larger role in the overall picture than they 24 would in a bigger machine.
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148 1 example of that and then, I guess, we do have to move 2 on.
3 But just looking ahead one example of that 4 is, you know, to some degree especially on some of the 5 micros, when you get to the heat transfer discussions 6 the mechanisms become conduction and then radiation 7 which one might characterize as an inherent feature.
8 You don't need to add anything for it.
9 But again we'll need to look closely to make sure that 10 you do get the conduction and you do get the radiation 11 heat transfer.
12 MEMBER PETTI: I was thinking in the 13 reactivity control, the machines sometimes are so 14 small now, when you talk about the micros, that the 15 negative temperature coefficient of some of these 16 designs will turn things around, so that it makes you 17 rethink how you classify the shutdown systems and how 18 many you need and the redundancy and diversity, et 19 cetera, et cetera.
20 So, it's been sort of interesting to look 21 at some of that.
22 MR. RECKLEY: Right. That might have been 23 a better example. Okay, Dennis, you want us to move 24 on?
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149 1 we're right on time so that's good.
2 MR. RECKLEY: All right. So, the next 3 preliminary language that we shared and thought we 4 would go over at this meeting, because it does have 5 some relation to safety criteria, it's got some 6 criteria within this, these couple sections of the 7 operations Subpart F, was a concept for a Facility 8 Safety Program.
9 The rationale for considering this is we 10 were trying to look at the broader context and the 11 broader regulatory controls. For example, as the 12 units get smaller, there is a general observation that 13 from a regulatory perspective having a constant 14 resident inspector may not be practical.
15 It might be one, more than is needed to 16 provide regulatory assurance. And from another 17 perspective, it may not be practical because the 18 regulatory costs then start to make designs 19 impractical. I mean, the regulatory costs as a 20 function of the operating costs become prohibitive.
21 And so, looking at the broader context of 22 how one can do kind of a risk management approach with 23 perhaps less reliance on the traditional NRC 24 inspection and oversight programs, as well as maybe 25 less reliance on generic safety issues and the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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150 1 imposition of new requirements by the NRC through 2 orders and rule changes, might there be a way to do 3 risk management different than that traditional 4 approach that we've taken?
5 And again, that might be especially 6 important if you look at advanced reactors in the 7 context of a more distributed electric power system 8 where the units are smaller but their numbers are 9 larger. So, we wouldn't be regulating necessarily 60 10 plant sites but many more than that.
11 So, just as a practical matter we thought 12 we would look to see if there might be a different 13 vehicle to use. And so, we looked at other agencies 14 that regulate, if you will, larger numbers of 15 licensees, and looked at programs that, Department of 16 Transportation for example, EPA, even a little bit of 17 looking for those familiar, not a direct parallel but 18 similarities to DOE's Part 8-30 and how they address 19 the responsibility of the operators of their 20 laboratories.
21 And after looking at those we picked one 22 to use as kind of a model. And the one we picked was 23 from the Federal Railroad Administration, Part 270.
24 Their requirements are for a system safety program.
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151 1 Facility Safety Program, and then tailored it, 2 obviously, to make some changes from a transportation 3 to a nuclear application.
4 So, that was the concept and kind of our 5 thought process to propose this requirement. Go to 6 Slide 36.
7 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill?
8 MR. RECKLEY: Yes, Dennis.
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: I would like to sneak 10 something in at this point. This really jumped at me 11 when I first heard about it.
12 I'm going to read the first sentence in 13 this section. Each licensee must establish and 14 implement a Facility Safety Program that, and I'm 15 underlining this, routinely and systematically 16 evaluates potential hazards, operating experience 17 related to plant SFC's, human actions and programmatic 18 controls affecting safety functions, and so on, over 19 the entire operating lifetime.
20 This is a big new concept. When you 21 looked at other agencies you didn't mention NMSS and 22 the fact that state regulators regulate a lot of their 23 side of things through agreements.
24 I'm not sure that has any relevance here.
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152 1 through it. It puts the responsibility where I 2 believe it belongs.
3 And it also takes care of something we've 4 been troubled by over the years when, despite what 5 regulations say, both licensees and regulators in 6 specific cases haven't been aware of changes near or 7 within their facilities that could affect effectively 8 their licensing basis. And this puts the onus on the 9 owner to keep track of that.
10 The third section on Facility Safety 11 Program plan, there is a lot of details. And have 12 you, my comment is to the rest of the Members, this is 13 kind of a big new deal and it's very interesting and 14 I think deserves a lot of good thought.
15 My second is a question to build on the 16 others which you can pick up later. At 53(A)20 17 program plan with all of its detail, the question is 18 in two parts.
19 Have you shared that in the stakeholder 20 meetings? And what kind of reactions have you gotten, 21 because that looks like something that might worry 22 some people?
23 MR. RECKLEY: We did share it, and it did 24 worry some people. And I should have mentioned, this 25 is not totally new even to the NRC. Part 70 has an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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153 1 element that requires periodic assessments.
2 Yeah, again, part of the integration that 3 we were thinking of as we developed this, and again, 4 we were thinking a probabilistic risk assessment of 5 PRA would be required and would be required to be 6 updated. As we had this discussion during the 7 development of licensing modernization, the PRA does 8 play an elevated role in this process. And so, having 9 this in place also logically fit in that if you were 10 doing a periodic update to confirm the plant's 11 behavior, it was also an opportunity to look and see 12 whether additional measures make sense.
13 And we'll get into that as we get into the 14 performance criteria. But, yeah, the stakeholders are 15 still mulling it over. We weren't too surprised with 16 some initial pushback because it is a new program.
17 And it, I think the way I characterized it during the 18 stakeholder meeting, and this is, you know, this is 19 maybe part of the issue, is that to me this is what I 20 called an enabling regulation.
21 And what I mean by that is if this is in 22 place, then the NRC can consider stepping back on some 23 things, not totally obviously. But stepping back and 24 taking credit for this program as we lay out what the 25 inspection program will be, how we'll address things NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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154 1 like the current generic safety issue program and so 2 forth.
3 So, if this is in place, we might be able 4 to look at those programs and do some scaling back, 5 and this might enable that. If you don't have this or 6 something like it, then one would have to ask what 7 will the NRC need to do in its absence, to me?
8 So, yeah, thank you for the observation.
9 Again, it's one that we're going to talk about a lot.
10 It does go to an increased responsibility on the 11 licensee.
12 I don't think I would want to try to 13 characterize it any other way. But, you know, one 14 observation is, so did the maintenance rule. So, does 15 50.69. And if you want the benefits, then there is 16 measures that have to be done and assessments that 17 need to be done in order to gain the flexibility 18 that's afforded by the maintenance rule and 50.69.
19 So, anyway --
20 MEMBER BROWN: Can I make a comment?
21 MR. RECKLEY: Sure, please.
22 MEMBER BROWN: I hate certain cites of 23 stuff and if I had been the public for the utilities 24 guys, I would have put a giant x through almost 25 everything in here. I mean, this is extremely complex NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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155 1 and would be a paperwork nightmare.
2 Just look at technology assessment 3 program. Just going through that and look at the 4 paperwork that's going to be established to do that is 5 just very elaborate and detailed.
6 And all these programs are just going to 7 add all types of stuff. I don't think I would ever 8 hear myself say this. But the Facilities Safety 9 Program framing, that one makes sense. But the rest 10 of these to me really don't, they don't meet the 11 metric as far as I'm concerned.
12 MR. RECKLEY: Okay.
13 MEMBER BROWN: And this is new. I mean, 14 it just doesn't exist in the existing world, isn't 15 that right? The way I read your lead-ins on the 16 discussion paragraph this was new.
17 MR. RECKLEY: This is new. And we'll get 18 in --
19 MEMBER BROWN: This is a huge amount of 20 administrative detail other than just how do you make 21 sure your SSCs are in operation conditions? What's 22 their failure history? Maintaining track of the 23 repairs you've had to make. That all makes sense.
24 But the stuff in here goes way, the role of personnel 25 in making decisions in the plant operating SSCs.
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156 1 I've said enough. I just can understand 2 their reluctance to sign up with this.
3 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. And that, you know, 4 as always, this is a first step. And like we talked 5 about, iterations and maybe even a decision to not 6 include it.
7 But we wanted to put it out there as a 8 first proposal. So, we've talked about the general 9 layout here. And maybe I can elaborate a little bit; 10 that might alleviate some concerns.
11 But so again, 53.800 preliminary language 12 lays out to establish the program and defines it as 13 routinely as Dennis already read, to reevaluate 14 potential hazards, operating experience, and to 15 consider measures to mitigate or eliminate the 16 resulting risks.
17 And that, I think in terms of how 18 complicated it is, it's probably the last bullet that 19 we can spend some time talking about. So, if you go 20 to the next slide, 38.
21 The challenge will be, I think, in 22 establishing these criteria. And so, the general 23 requirement under section, the preliminary language in 24 Section 53.810 is that a licensee would take measures 25 as reasonably achieved when considering costs.
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157 1 So, this whole assessment under the 2 Facility Safety Program, 53.800, is basically a cost 3 benefit assessment. It requires licensees to do a 4 cost benefit analysis. And to consider risks both 5 associated with normal operations and unplanned events 6 as they would be assessed primarily using, for the 7 second one, primarily through the probabilistic risk 8 assessment tools.
9 We didn't lay out, here, the specific 10 criteria. But mentioned in our discussion paper, the 11 table that we released with the language, that if we 12 can get some discussion of the concept, we can then go 13 into the performance criteria.
14 And the trick will be to define the 15 criteria such that you do the, that they are low 16 enough to trigger the assessments, but not so low as 17 to initiate unnecessary evaluations.
18 And so, the three criteria that we 19 included, for example, the first one is basically the 20 performance criteria out of Appendix I, the ALARA 21 considerations, which again already includes that you 22 consider costs when evaluating those performance 23 measures.
24 And then for the unplanned events that the 25 hazard that you've identified would result in an AOO, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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158 1 anticipated operational occurrence, giving a dose that 2 exceeds 2.5 millirem or 5 person rem if you're looking 3 at it collectively.
4 For the second criteria related to design 5 basis events, that category, that it increases the 6 risk by ten percent. So, if you're looking at the 7 QHOs, that it reduced your margin by ten percent and 8 again, increases the public dose by five person rem.
9 And lastly, if you're using your analysis 10 to justify alternatives in an area like emergency 11 planning, that it decreases the margin between your 12 new alternative metric like 1 rem over 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> by ten 13 percent or again increases the population dose by 5 14 person rem.
15 And the reason to establish, and it might 16 not be the right number or the right metric. But we 17 were trying to get by saying 5 person rem is if you do 18 a cost benefit assessment 5 person rem is about 19 $30,000.
20 And so, you set the floor to say if it's 21 not increasing the dose by 5 person rem, then it 22 wouldn't warrant an assessment because an engineering 23 assessment is going to cost at least $30,000 just to 24 initiate the paperwork.
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159 1 the criteria such that they're low enough to actually 2 contribute to risk management but not so low as to 3 initiate unwarranted and unnecessary paperwork, as 4 Charlie mentioned the concern being.
5 So, if we can get to the point of defining 6 these, I think it might be possible to split the 7 difference here and keep a risk management program 8 like this one and avoid unnecessary costs and 9 concerns.
10 So, that would be the hope of the -- so 11 again, we didn't want necessarily to delve right into 12 the criteria. But if we were to keep the program, I 13 think a large focus would be on those criteria and 14 establishing them to try to strike that balance 15 between initiating risk assessments and potentially 16 evaluating risk reduction measures against doing it 17 when it's not cost effective. So, that will be the 18 challenge.
19 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Bill.
20 MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
21 CHAIRMAN BLEY: After Charlie's 22 condemnation, I just wanted to say, yes, it looked 23 overwhelming when I first skimmed through it. But as 24 you look through it, an awful lot of the items people 25 are already doing or have to do. And some others are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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160 1 kind of, you do them once and they last pretty much 2 forever. Maybe some kind of organization to make it 3 clear.
4 It could devolve into the hideous 5 paperwork problem Charlie described. It could work 6 just the opposite way if it's laid out carefully.
7 And I think, two things kind of come to 8 mind. One is being careful of how much is in the 9 rule. And two, making sure people think hard about 10 this before they put things in place.
11 I'm thinking of the programs which we 12 haven't implemented yet under Part 52 for clearing all 13 of those ITAACs. Industry came forward with a plan, 14 the staff as I remember endorsed.
15 But it was very heavy on administrative 16 burden, and I think much heavier than would have been 17 needed if they had come at it from the other way.
18 So, this is -- if you go forward with 19 this, keeping the regulation as clean as possible and 20 trying to make sure your guidance, and I'm sure you 21 would be working with industry folks, their guidance 22 doesn't make it an administrative nightmare are really 23 essential to giving it a chance to be an effective 24 addition to the rules.
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161 1 to do over again, much of this pages of what's 2 required and again, I was largely copying it from 3 another agency, if we had simply shorthanded this to 4 say they'll have a program and they'll have a program 5 plan submitted to the NRC, a lot of this would have 6 been typically in a template or some other guidance 7 document, and probably would not have engendered the 8 same reaction. Although the requirements are 9 basically the same. Any programmatic requirement ends 10 up having to address things like who is in the 11 program? What's their training? What's the paperwork, 12 and so forth?
13 But laying it all out here, I think does 14 give the impression that this would be more than most 15 other programmatic controls, whereas my personal 16 belief is it's probably generally consistent with most 17 other programmatic areas at a site.
18 Our rules just don't generally lay it all 19 out like this. So, but in any case, so that would be 20 the trick, that this program would basically have a 21 threshold that is used. You identify a potential 22 contributor to risk, be it a new hazard, for example, 23 or a revised hazard, and then runs you through the 24 process of evaluating whether a risk reduction measure 25 is needed or appropriate. And again, that process is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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162 1 a cost benefit assessment.
2 So, even if the dose, even if you do meet 3 the threshold and evaluate a risk reduction measure, 4 the cost of the risk reduction measure in comparison 5 to the benefit is assessed very much like it is done 6 now for severe accident management alternatives or the 7 backfit process within the NRC or the regulatory 8 analysis that we do for a rulemaking. So the guidance 9 on how to do the cost benefit assessment is also 10 readily available. So, if we can go --
11 MEMBER BROWN: Bill, it could be argued 12 that the government always underestimates the cost to 13 do anything that the actual people that have to do it 14 end up paying.
15 It was terribly, I developed hundreds of 16 different, literally several hundred different systems 17 in 35 years. And estimating cost to accomplish things 18 as well as the things you put in place to make sure 19 that you monitor and keep track of how it's being 20 done, keeping it within scope was a major, major 21 undertaking.
22 I just really think, I don't want to 23 underplay it and think this is just stuff they do all 24 the time. It's just not, it's also, a bunch of this 25 stuff you can grab, and it looks like you're telling NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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163 1 them how to run their business as opposed to how to 2 stay safe.
3 MR. RECKLEY: Okay. That's a fair 4 observation. And again, you know, one potential 5 avenue is to take the detail out and let the guidance 6 pick up actually more of how such, if such a program 7 were kept, how the program would work. So --
8 MEMBER BROWN: Or things to consider. Not 9 necessarily that we expect to see in every program, 10 but things to consider and develop in your program so 11 that their -- they can just not do things without 12 being hammered. That's all.
13 MR. RECKLEY: Okay.
14 MEMBER KIRCHNER: And, Bill, this is Walt.
15 At a technical level I'm thinking through this. You 16 know, I'm looking at the specificity and the bounds 17 that you've used.
18 And I'm thinking this is not my area.
19 This is probably Vesna or Dennis's. But for an 20 advanced reactor is the PRA has the uncertainty bands 21 on the PRA results greater than the -- I just don't 22 know how much confidence I would put in that PRA. I 23 mean, they'll have a mean value. I suppose you're, 24 then you run your PRA calculations and then you see if 25 you exceed these thresholds.
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164 1 For some of these concepts, would they 2 have enough experience, data, and such to use a PRA 3 tool for this level of granularity? I'm struggling 4 with that. I get it for ALARA. But just across the 5 whole plant for all kinds of other changes in the 6 plant whether it's staffing or maintenance or 7 something. Is that really practicable?
8 MR. RECKLEY: I might defer to Dennis on 9 the PRA aspect. The thinking was this is a tool that 10 they've already used in the analysis that they've 11 already done to show, for example, that they've met 12 the QHOs, or that they've done to justify an 13 alternative threshold, again like the 1 rem at a fixed 14 distance to justify an emergency planning zone.
15 So then it only looks at would a hazard, 16 new information related to a hazard, or a new hazard, 17 if you put it into those assessments, change the 18 results? And so, the thinking was they already had 19 the tool. Yes, those tools may have high 20 uncertainties. But those same tools are being used to 21 justify the regulatory decisions on emergency planning 22 zone or siting or when we get to these other areas 23 staffing or so forth. So, those same tools are being 24 used to make those regulatory decisions. So, that was 25 the thinking.
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165 1 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: But this doesn't 2 mean that tool will necessarily be PRA, right? I 3 mean, because that would involve also, you know, risk 4 designation and how does it relate to safety goals and 5 things like that. Does it imply that the tool has to 6 be PRA?
7 MR. RECKLEY: Well, as we consider the 8 suggestions to move away from a requirement for a PRA 9 and using PRA as a primary tool, we may need to look 10 at this.
11 This wording was written on our first 12 development of the other subparts on design and 13 analysis and on the safety criteria, which do assume 14 that you're doing a PRA, and using it as justification 15 for your decisions.
16 So, yes, there may be alternatives. But 17 the current construct is based on having a PRA.
18 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay. So, this is 19 what -- and I'm surprised because this is so complex 20 and I don't really, I didn't form my opinion on so 21 many things.
22 But that's what I tried to bring the 23 beginning when you said that the safety goals, do 24 those safety goals directly correspond to the R, in 25 PRA? That was my question. What is the risk?
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166 1 And you just at this moment mentioned to 2 me the quantitative, the goal which I also have my 3 opinion about the ones which are proposed. But I'm 4 not sure really how, you know, relate to what you have 5 now in industry.
6 But if it's the risk would be defined to 7 qualitative goal, that doesn't only apply to the Tier 8 2. I mean, this is so complex I don't even, don't 9 know how the staff are discussing it.
10 But obviously definition of the risk has 11 to be related to the safety goals, right?
12 MR. RECKLEY: That's what we're proposing.
13 And we've brought in, beyond the qualitative, we're 14 bringing in the quantitative.
15 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay. So, if the 16 safety goal is related to the dose of the exclusion 17 zone or, you know, the local population area, so the 18 safety, the risk is now measured through the dose 19 calculation in Level 3 PRA?
20 I mean this is how I don't see and how 21 this old PRA model relates to, that you mentioned 22 those standards for the non-light water reactors. I 23 don't know what level they will go, because I have to 24 check about the statuses currently on those.
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167 1 apply to risk?
2 MR. RECKLEY: They go to the equivalent of 3 Level 3.
4 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Okay. So, now we're 5 going to have so much more complex, the models trying 6 to define the risk reduction and, you know, and all of 7 these risk aspects.
8 So, this level of the complexity increases 9 30 times.
10 MR. RECKLEY: Potentially.
11 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Yes. The other side of it 12 we're not talking about now.
13 And to Walt's point, depending on how much 14 information the developers have and what the 15 uncertainties are, either you actually have a complete 16 PRA with very reasonably narrow uncertainty bounds; it 17 would still be fairly broad, or you need more defense-18 in-depth and the process has a way to identify that 19 and address it, or you need something equivalent to a 20 prototype development where you limit operations until 21 you gather enough information.
22 So, at least to me, those are the way it's 23 going to have to go. And whether you do PRA or more 24 traditional safety analysis, you've got to identify 25 what can go wrong. That's the hardest part.
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168 1 You've got to see how well you're 2 protected against it. And then whatever your 3 uncertainties are, you have to have some either 4 defense-in-depth or limitation approach to, so that 5 things go forward.
6 And, you know, we haven't seen everything 7 they've got yet. We've only seen just the hint of it 8 here.
9 MR. RECKLEY: So, if we can go to 39.
10 This is, of course I think the part that has worried 11 people, in that it looks like that this is quite 12 onerous.
13 But it does go through that the Facility 14 Safety Program would define the facility or facilities 15 for those operating multiple ones, what the program 16 covered with the scope of the facilities. A 17 discussion basically of how it would be implemented 18 within their organization. How they will address 19 training. How they will manage a hazard management 20 program.
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169 1 and cost effective to warrant consideration. And then 2 to periodically assess the performance of the program.
3 So, I can see how this came across.
4 But it will be, this will be one of the 5 areas of consideration, and also whether there might 6 be an opportunity to kind of take detail out of the 7 requirements and move it over to a guidance document.
8 So, that might also be a consideration.
9 Going to 40. Sorry, we haven't exactly worked out 10 this last part, which is the -- we have worked out 11 that we thought that the Facility Safety Program would 12 be submitted as part of the application or beforehand 13 possibly. That it would be an approved program. But 14 we haven't worked out all the details of how it 15 necessarily would be controlled during the operating 16 stage, in terms of evaluating plans, plan changes, 17 when such a plan might warrant review by the NRC and 18 so forth.
19 So, the last bullet in the section is kind 20 of an IOU, and we'll have to coordinate that with the 21 licensing section in Subpart H.
22 And so, that's the kind of preliminary 23 language on our proposal to incorporate a Facility 24 Safety Program into the Part 53 structure.
25 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thank you, Bill and Nan.
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170 1 In a second I'm going to call for public comments if 2 there are any. But I'm going to want to go around the 3 table, because I have a few questions for all of the 4 Members and a little bit we need to talk about.
5 Is there anything people want to ask or 6 say before I ask for public comments?
7 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Dennis, this is Walt.
8 May I ask Bill another question on this FSB?
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Of course.
10 MEMBER KIRCHNER: Bill, what in your 11 opinion is currently, in what you've laid out, and I 12 have to admit I haven't thoroughly digested it all of 13 what you proposed, the detail.
14 But what elements of this, if you raise it 15 to a higher level, what elements are already done in 16 the existing fleet that would be swept up in this? QA 17 comes to mind among others. Tech specs comes to mind.
18 Changes, you know, anything that would 19 change your tech specs. Obviously, there are 20 existing, you know, within 10 CFR 50 there are 21 existing requirements to address these kinds of 22 things.
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171 1 inspector and I appreciate that, you know, for a small 2 plant having a resident inspector at each plant may 3 not prove to be feasible especially if they don't even 4 provide room in the control room or facility for 5 operators.
6 But seriously, you know, what does the 7 resident inspector now look at to in effect, I get it 8 you want to put the ownership on the facility. That's 9 good. But what is it that a resident inspector would 10 look at now that's already, that would be included in 11 this program, so to speak, that's already done?
12 MR. RECKLEY: Well, it's probably a harder 13 question than you think. And I'll look at any of the 14 staff on to help me out with this.
15 But the way I view the current structure 16 is that licensees may very well assess changes in the 17 environment, changes to the operating experience, and 18 they may incorporate those kind of observations into 19 a PRA.
20 And that kind of realism in terms of 21 putting new information in might keep the PRA up to 22 date and then if there is a regulatory issue, they 23 have an up to date PRA to use, for example. But from 24 a regulatory perspective, all of that is not really 25 included or addressed.
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172 1 From a regulatory perspective, the 2 requirements and the what is done to control risk 3 through either a tech spec, which is fairly firm and 4 established and prescriptive requirement, over to risk 5 assessments that might be done for the maintenance 6 rule or some other applications, the overall 7 regulatory program is relatively static. And we would 8 only require them to do something if we could prove 9 that it was cost effective or reasonable assurance.
10 I'll say none of this really affects something that 11 would reach the level of a decision on adequate 12 protection.
13 Those would be continued, adequate 14 protection will be controlled through programs like 15 tech specs and fairly well controlled regulatory 16 programs. So, this goes down into that second tier, 17 really talking about the second tier safety criteria 18 that's based on meeting the QHOs and using risk 19 assessments within the program.
20 So, that's what this was going to. And we 21 currently just, we don't really do that, because the 22 backfit process is -- we do it. We have the 23 capability to do it. It just doesn't come into play 24 very often.
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173 1 deal, right. You look at Fukushima or any other times 2 we have tried to make those kind of changes. It turns 3 into a big deal.
4 And so, I guess I'm stammering a little 5 bit here because I don't really -- this is a new 6 concept that we're bringing in here, and it is kind of 7 hard to say how existing licensees do it other than 8 they as being responsible people, they're going to 9 look around for new hazards and so forth.
10 But from a regulatory perspective, it's 11 not really required for them to do that. I don't 12 know. Nan or Marty or somebody if you want to unmute 13 and --
14 MS. VALLIERE: Yes, Bill. I guess I would 15 just say, yes. Clearly this is a case where burden is 16 being shifted from where it lies today for these kinds 17 of items Bill was describing whereas think of things 18 like, you know, the U.S. Geological Society 19 identifying new seismic hazard curves, you know. That 20 was the NRC's responsibility to take that information 21 and decide if that information could lead or should 22 lead to safety improvements that would be cost 23 justified.
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174 1 program would provide them to decide whether there was 2 a cost effective way to address, you know, changes in 3 something to that effect that didn't, again, that 4 these are changes that don't affect adequate 5 protection or compliance.
6 These are changes that would go to that 7 second tier as Bill mentioned.
8 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah, that's a good example 9 if you go to the seismic area. And, you know, we 10 opened a GSI and issued various things.
11 And then in theory, either there would be 12 a program in place where the Facility Safety Program 13 would include periodically checking with the U.S.
14 Geological Survey, or the NRC would put out an 15 information notice saying hey, USGS just put out new 16 seismic curves and evaluate it under your FSP.
17 So, I mean that is kind of in theory what 18 we were thinking about.
19 MEMBER KIRCHNER: But it seems to me, 20 though, that strikes at a much higher level. You 21 know, the -- well, I don't want to dwell on it 22 currently. But, you know, those structures, systems, 23 and components that are Seismic Category 1 are 24 related, are safety, related to safety directly, which 25 are related to your first tier, not your second tier.
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175 1 I just, just a concern that how far does 2 one go down and how much analysis would be necessary?
3 And again, as I initially posed I just have a question 4 about whether the tools are up to the task with the 5 granularity that is proposed or does one back off and 6 raise the bar but make it qualitative? Just a 7 thought.
8 MR. RECKLEY: Okay, thank you.
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: One thing I would raise 10 with you, Bill. Nan said this is really a shifting of 11 responsibility.
12 We've had issues come up where new things 13 have arisen at plants and licensees have said it's not 14 our responsibility to plan those, and the staff has 15 said it's not ours.
16 But staff has pointed out, and I think it 17 was the staff from the Center of Expertise on External 18 Events, that in fact that are places in the regulation 19 that require people to do that now, although it gets 20 fuzzy at times.
21 So, I like adding clarity to that. At 22 this point are there any other Members who want to 23 raise issues before we go to public comment? Thomas, 24 can we get the line open or Derek, somebody?
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176 1 line open, is there anybody on the Teams session who 2 would like to make a comment? If so, state your name 3 and give us your comment.
4 Sounds like the public line might be open.
5 Is it? Can somebody tell me? If there is anybody on 6 the bridge line who would like to make a comment, 7 please state your name and affiliation and give us 8 your comment.
9 MS. FELTUS: Hi. This is Madeline Feltus 10 from the Department of Energy.
11 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Go ahead.
12 MS. FELTUS: My one question would be how 13 much, okay, if a reactor vendor comes in and wants to 14 use a deterministic source term rather than a 15 mechanistic source term, would that still be allowed, 16 or are we going to have room to provide deterministic 17 source term data and provide that not only from 18 prototypical test results, but from fuel, taken out as 19 part of the safety program to, you know, examine as 20 the reactor is operated?
21 I just needed some clarification on how 22 we're going to develop mechanistic source terms since 23 fuel is the longest lead item to qualify.
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177 1 for your comment and we'll make sure that stays in the 2 agenda.
3 I don't think the staff is ready to 4 address that at this point unless they are. So, Bill, 5 go ahead.
6 MR. RECKLEY: Yeah, we thought that most 7 advanced reactor developers would use a mechanistic 8 source term model, which is a scenario specific source 9 term evaluation.
10 There is provisions and discussions that 11 if they want to be conservative, this is an area where 12 they could be conservative.
13 But, you know, for many designs they're 14 going to have to still point back to test programs 15 like the programs at Idaho National Laboratory or 16 other places to get the performance of any particular 17 barrier or, as we talked about earlier, if the 18 inventory is sufficiently small that they want to say 19 they're going to come up with some conservative 20 estimate, and they'll have to justify that it is in 21 fact conservative, that is going to get by any one or 22 multiple barriers. They would be free to do that.
23 If you want to say a conservative approach 24 is a deterministic approach, then they would be free 25 to do that.
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178 1 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Are there any other 2 comments from people on the Teams meeting or on the 3 bridge line? If so, give your name and your comment, 4 please.
5 Okay, I think we're finished with the 6 bridge line. For the Members, we've had discussions 7 with the staff about how we're going to proceed.
8 And at least for the time being, they're 9 expecting to come to us on a monthly basis with new 10 material and updates. They asked, did we want to 11 write letters at specific intervals, like quarterly or 12 every six months.
13 My indication to them was probably only 14 when disagreements occur and we don't see a path 15 forward, we would like to get those on the record.
16 So, that's kind of the way we're headed.
17 But we can revisit that as we go along.
18 When I go around the table, your comments on when we 19 ought to write letters or if we should even write one 20 today are welcome.
21 I suggest, though, we give the staff a 22 chance to make some improvements. And finally, if you 23 have any other comments on what went on today those 24 will be welcome.
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179 1 just to make sure everybody gets a chance. Ron 2 Ballinger?
3 CHAIRMAN BALLINGER: Yes. I think I agree 4 with what you're saying about when to write a letter.
5 So, I guess I'm in general agreement with what your 6 proposal is.
7 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thanks. Any other 8 comments? Charlie?
9 MEMBER BROWN: I've got nothing else.
10 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thanks. Thanks for what 11 you added. Vesna?
12 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: I was thinking that 13 would be actually in this process, you know, when they 14 give us what they send now if we can, if they can 15 indicate for decisions where their decision making 16 process where decisions were made to get there via the 17 moment when we are, you know, looking in about this 18 data.
19 You know, because there must be a lot of 20 underlining decisions, you know, in that. What level 21 of deciding to include does it consider for separate 22 PRA that needs to be completed, things like that?
23 You know, some underlining in the next 24 presentation if they can also show us what important 25 decision they made to get where they are in this one.
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180 1 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. Well, I'll try to 2 remind them. But if the staff will pay attention to 3 that one, maybe we can include that in the discussions 4 the next time around. Walt?
5 MEMBER KIRCHNER: I've made too many 6 comments today. Thank you, Dennis. I focused more 7 for today on Subpart B than F.
8 So, I have to admit I look forward to 9 going back and looking at F in more detail. But I 10 think I've made enough comments. I will provide some 11 more to you in writing, Dennis.
12 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay, good. And my 13 understanding is more is coming on F, a lot more.
14 Jose?
15 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes, thank you. Yes, 16 I didn't realize we were reviewing LMP, the SAFDL 17 issue, that we were removing the SAFDL requirement and 18 calling it something from AOOs.
19 I thought this morning we've had some 20 discussion about, meaning it wouldn't be SAFDL. It 21 would be a requirement that the containment structures 22 that maintain fission products from the environment 23 that are created should be maintained intact for AOOs.
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181 1 don't kill anybody is an extreme relaxation of the 2 acceptance criteria that we have lived with for 60 3 years and have kept us safe.
4 So, I feel very strongly about that.
5 Whenever we write a letter, I would like to add a 6 paragraph on that.
7 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. And we'll see what 8 the staff comes back with. They did hear you.
9 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: They hear us and they 10 agree with this, I don't remember the boundaries or 11 the layers or whatever is protecting the fission 12 products from the environment must remain intact for 13 eight hours. Thank you.
14 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thank you. Dave Petti?
15 MEMBER PETTI: No, nothing. The thing 16 that strikes me is how important the conversation is 17 with the staff.
18 It's stuff that when you look at the words 19 on the page and you look at the presentations that 20 were given, it's just, I guess, endemic in the process 21 that we have here. But the nuances just don't come 22 through until you, you know, you're talking directly 23 with you guys.
24 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Yes. Thanks for bringing 25 that up, Dave. And I would add on that we will try to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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182 1 get our minutes and transcripts out as quickly as 2 possible, in case staff and others want to look at 3 what went on.
4 And I guess along the line Dave was 5 saying, if we hit a month here in the future where the 6 staff doesn't really want to bring new language, but 7 has several issues they want to come and talk about, 8 that would be fine too. Joy Rempe?
9 MEMBER REMPE: Yes, thank you. I want to 10 thank the staff and especially Bill for his patience 11 as he went through our comments and questions.
12 There were several points raised today 13 that I feel are important. And I think I heard Bill 14 say that he's planning to have revised language based 15 on stakeholder comments as well as our comments.
16 And so, I'm not sure how you're planning 17 to organize the subsequent meetings. But I would like 18 to have a beginning section of our meetings that says, 19 you know, actions taken and have an opportunity to 20 discuss resolution.
21 Today's, the thing about the barriers that 22 Jose emphasized, I actually think that wording changes 23 could do a lot to take care of that. The evaluation 24 period to a safe stable condition without any ongoing 25 degradation, I feel strongly about. And then the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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183 1 point that was raised about or the ongoing discussion 2 about whether occupational doses should be removed or 3 not, and I feel strongly about that.
4 So, I'm very interested in seeing how that 5 gets resolved, and we might want to discuss that and 6 we might want to have a letter earlier, if we can have 7 those discussions and understand what the resolution 8 is.
9 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Thank you. And I guess I 10 would comment that too with the staff. I still think, 11 you know, eventually you will have statements of 12 consideration.
13 We don't usually see justification and 14 explanatory language in regulations. But often they 15 show up in SOCs.
16 And what strikes me, the earlier you could 17 get things together on that would help us, would help 18 the public and would help yourselves in moving this 19 thing forward.
20 Maybe that's a White Paper for now if it's 21 something along those lines. Matt Sunseri?
22 MEMBER SUNSERI: I like to say, I think 23 Bill and Nan and the team has done an excellent job on 24 this. And I agree with Dave that hearing it talked 25 out is very much helpful.
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184 1 The words are sometimes hard to get 2 through just reading through all the details. But 3 talking it out made it much more clear for me. So, 4 thank you all for that hard work.
5 And, Dennis, I support your approach to 6 letter writing. I think, you know, as needed is the 7 best way to go.
8 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. Thanks very much.
9 Our consultant, Mike Corradini, any comments?
10 DR. CORRADINI: I thought you were going 11 to go to Pete Riccardella, excuse me.
12 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Is he here? I didn't 13 think he was here.
14 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: Yes. No, I'm here.
15 I don't have any additional comments.
16 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay, thank you.
17 MEMBER RICCARDELLA: But I am here.
18 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Sorry, I missed you.
19 DR. CORRADINI: So, Dennis, just to be, 20 just to finish off, I think your approach by 21 essentially coming back and seeing how staff has 22 modified the rule language would be good.
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185 1 the staff consider things.
2 The one thing though that I think Bill 3 said we'll hear about in maybe not the next meeting 4 but the subsequent meeting following that is if the 5 size of the reactor starts shrinking to the point 6 where there might be another approach to dealing with 7 it versus the LMP is something that's really of 8 interest to me.
9 And I guess I want to go back and review 10 the NPF rule, because that seems to be the most 11 applicable thing as I shrink the size of this to 12 something that looks like a research reactor. So, 13 that's my only technical comment.
14 Other than that, I think your approach 15 going forward makes perfect sense to me.
16 CHAIRMAN BLEY: Okay. Thanks very much, 17 Mike. And if you have any notes please send them to 18 me. I would appreciate it. That goes for all the 19 Members as well, and I try to keep track of those as 20 we go.
21 I want to thank Bill Reckley and Nan 22 Valliere for very good presentations and discussions.
23 And I do want to thank Derek Widmayer as our 24 designated federal official and for organizing this 25 meeting.
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186 1 And Ken Howard, thank you for being our 2 backup just in case. And I'm glad we didn't lose 3 Derek along the way.
4 So, thanks to everyone, and we'll get back 5 together. There is another meeting getting scheduled 6 for next month. We'll have schedules out pretty soon, 7 I think.
8 There are quite a few changes in our 9 schedules, so look forward to that. And look forward 10 to our next meeting and these discussions. At this 11 point, we are adjourned.
12 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 13 off the record at 3:57 p.m.)
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ACRS Future Plant Designs Subcommittee 10 CFR Part 53 Licensing and Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors Subparts B and F Preliminary Proposed Rule Language January 14, 2021 1
Agenda 9:30-9:40 am Opening Remarks/Speaker Introductions 9:40-11:00 am Background and Part 53 Rulemaking Strategy
& Schedule 11:00 am - 1:00 pm Subpart B - Technology-Inclusive Safety Requirements 1:00-2:00 pm BREAK 2:00-3:00 pm Subpart B - Technology-Inclusive Safety Requirements 3:00-4:30 pm Subpart F - Requirements for Operation (Facility Safety Program) 4:30-6:00 pm Discussion 2
Background
- Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA; Public Law 115-439) signed into law in January 2019 requires the NRC to complete a rulemaking to establish a technology-inclusive, regulatory framework for optional use for commercial advanced nuclear reactors no later than December 2027 o (1) ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTORThe term advanced nuclear reactor means a nuclear fission or fusion reactor, including a prototype plant with significant improvements compared to commercial nuclear reactors under construction as of the date of enactment of this Act, 3
SECY-20-0032 Rulemaking Plan
- In SECY-20-0032, Rulemaking Plan on Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors, (ADAMS ML19340A056), dated April 13, 2020, NRC staff proposed:
o Developing a new 10 CFR part that could address performance requirements, design features, and programmatic controls for a wide variety of advanced nuclear reactors throughout the life of a facility o Focusing the rulemaking on risk-informed functional requirements, building on existing NRC requirements, Commission policy statements, and recent activities o Building upon activities such as those described in SECY-19-0117, Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors, dated December 2, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18311A264), to develop the associated performance criteria.
o Seeking extensive interactions with external stakeholders and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) on the content of the rule 4
Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) -
SECY-20-0032, Rulemaking Plan
- In SRM-SECY-20-0032, dated October 2, 2020 (ADAMS ML20276A293), the Commission:
o Approved the staffs proposed approach for the rulemaking o Directed the staff to provide:
a schedule with milestones and resource requirements to achieve publication of the final Part 53 rule by October 2024 key uncertainties impacting publication of the final rule by that date options for Commission consideration on licensing and regulating fusion energy systems o Directed the staff to develop and release preliminary proposed rule language intermittently, followed by public outreach and dialogue 5
30-Day Commission Memo
- On November 2, 2020, staff submitted a Commission memorandum responding to the SRM direction to provide a schedule with milestones and resources to complete the final rule by October 2024 (ADAMS ML20288A251).
- The memorandum included a discussion of key uncertainties that could impact publication of the final rule by that date.
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30-Day Commission Memo Milestone Schedule Major Rulemaking Activities/Milestones Schedule Public Outreach, ACRS Interactions and October 2020 to April 2022 Generation of Proposed Rule Package (19 months)
Submit Draft Proposed Rule Package to May 2022 Commission Publish Proposed Rule and Draft Key Guidance October 2022 Public Comment Period - 60 days November and December 2022 Public Outreach and Generation of Final Rule January 2023 to February 2024 Package (14 months)
Submit Draft Final Rule Package to Commission March 2024 Office of Management and Budget and Office of July 2024 to September 2024 the Federal Register Processing Publish Final Rule and Key Guidance October 2024 7
30-Day Commission Memo
- Key uncertainties in meeting the Commission directed rulemaking schedule:
o NRC-stakeholder alignment on the scope of the rulemaking o Engagement on key issues within the NRC and communication with external stakeholders and ACRS o Timing of guidance document development o Ability of the public to review the proposed rule within the proposed 60-day public comment period o Ability to include the regulatory framework and requirements for fusion facilities 8
NRC Staff Plan to Develop Part 53 Subpart B Subpart C Subpart D Subpart E Subpart F Subpart G Project Life Cycle Design and Siting Construction Operation Retirement Analysis Requirements Facility Safety Definition System External Construction/ Program
- Fundamental Safety & Component Hazards Manufacturing Design Surveillance Functions Site Ensuring Maintenance
- Prevention, Mitigation, Analysis Characteristics Capabilities/
Performance Criteria Requirements Configuration (e.g., F-C Targets) Reliabilities Environmental Control
- Normal Operations Safety Change Control (e.g., effluents) Considerations Categorization Design
- Other & Special Environmental Changes Treatment Considerations Staffing &
Programs Plant/Site (Design, Construction, Configuration Control)
Clarify Controls Analyses (Prevention, Mitigation, Compare to Criteria) and Distinctions Between Plant Documents (Systems, Procedures, etc.)
LB Documents (Applications, SAR, TS, etc.) Subparts H & I 9
NRC Staff Engagement Plan Stakeholder Interactions Framework Safety Criteria Design Siting Construction Operations Decommissioning Licensing General/Admin Nov 20 Dec 20 Jan 21 Feb 21 Mar 21 Apr 21 May 21 Jun 21 Jul 21 Consolidated Technical Sections Aug 21 Sep 21 Oct 21 Nov 21 Consolidated Rulemaking Package Dec 21 Jan 22 ACRS Full Committee Feb 22 Mar 22 Apr 22 May 22 Draft Proposed Rulemaking Package to the Commission Jun 22 Jul 22 Aug 22 Sept 22 Oct 22 Concept Discussion Closure 10
NRC Staff Engagement Plan ACRS Interactions Framework Criteria Design Siting Construct Operation Decom Licensing Gen/Adm Subpart B Subpart C Subpart D Subpart E Subpart F Subpart G Subparts H, I Subparts A, J Nov 20 Dec 20 Jan 21 Feb 21 Mar 21 Apr 21 May 21 Jun 21 Jul 21 Aug 21 Sept 21 Oct 21 Nov 21 Consolidated Rulemaking Package Dec 21 Jan 22 ACRS Full Committee Feb 22 Mar 22 Apr 22 May 22 Draft Proposed Rulemaking Package to the Commission Jun 22 Jul 22 Aug 22 Sept 22 Oct 22 Concept 11 Discussion
Advanced Reactor Concepts
- Light-Water Small Modular Reactors
- Non-Light-Water Reactors
- Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Reactors
- Gas Cooled Reactors
- Molten Salt Cooled Reactors
- Molten Salt Fueled Reactors
- Heat Pipe Reactors o Microreactors
- Accelerator Driven Systems
- Fusion Reactors
- Note that fusion energy systems to be subject of separate paper with specific ACRS interactions 12
Non-LWR Landscape 13
First Principles See: SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria for Non-Light-Water-Reactors, and INL/EXT-20-58717, Technology-Inclusive Determination of Mechanistic Source Terms for Offsite Dose-Related Assessments for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Facilities 14
Integrated Approach (Background)
Bow-Tie Risk Management Figure 15
Integrated Approach (NRC Activities)
Note that a goal of the current effort is to build from the Licensing Modernization Project and have that guidance (NEI 18-04, RG 1.233) be one acceptable way of meeting the requirements to be developed and incorporated into Part 53 16
Licensing Modernization Project Licensing Basis Events Event Sequences
- Design Basis Events
- Beyond Design Basis Events Design Basis Accidents (relying on safety-related structures, systems, and components)
See: NEI-18-04 (NRC ADAMS ML19241A336) and Regulatory Guide 1.233 (NRC ADAMS ML20091L698) 17
Licensing Modernization Project Classification & Defense in Depth
- Safety Classification and Performance Criteria
- Safety Related (based on needed capabilities and reliabilities)
- Non-Safety Related With Special Treatment
- Non-Safety Related With No Special Treatment
- Defense in Depth Assessment See: NEI-18-04 (NRC ADAMS ML19241A336) and Regulatory Guide 1.233 (NRC ADAMS ML20091L698) 18
Part 53 General Layout
- Subpart A, General Provisions
- Subpart B, Technology-Inclusive Safety Requirements
- Subpart C, Design Requirements
- Subpart D, Siting
- Subpart E, Construction and Manufacturing Requirements
- Subpart F, Requirements for Operation
- Facility Safety Program
- Subpart G, Decommissioning Requirements
- Subpart H, Applications for Licenses, Certifications and Approvals
- Subpart I, Maintaining and Revising Licensing Basis Information
- Subpart J, Reporting and Administrative Requirements 19
10 CFR Part 53 Subpart B Layout
- § 53.200 - Safety Objectives
- § 53.210 - Safety Functions
- § 53.220 - First Tier Safety Criteria
- § 53.230 - Second Tier Safety Criteria
- § 53.240 - Licensing Basis Events
- § 53.250 - Defense in Depth
- § 53.260 - Protection of Plant Workers 20
Subpart B Flowchart ATOMIC ENERGY ACT Safety Objectives Adequate Protection (Sec. 182) and Minimize Danger (Sec. 161)
First Tier Second Tier Two Tiers § 20.1301 - Normal Ops ALARA for Normal Ops
§ 50.34/52.79 - Unplanned NRC Safety Goals for unplanned of Safety Criteria Events events Retention of radionuclides (1) Retention of radionuclides (2)
Safety Functions - Control heat generation - Control heat generation
- Control heat removal - Control heat removal
- Control chemical interactions - Control chemical interactions Design Features and Safety Classification Special Treatment Programmatic Tech Specs Licensee Programs Controls Chapter 15 21
§§ 53.200 & 53.220/53.230 Objectives and Criteria
- Safety Objectives o Reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety and the common defense and security o Additional measures to minimize danger to life and property, when considering various factors
- Safety Criteria o Two-Tiered structure 22
§ 53.220 - First Tier Safety Criteria (Adequate Protection)
- Normal operations (§ 20.1301) o Contribution to total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to individual members of the public from normal plant operation does not exceed 0.1 rem (1 mSv) in a year o Contribution to dose in any unrestricted area does not exceed 0.002 rem (0.02 millisievert) in any one hour
- Licensing basis events (§§ 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D) & 52.79(a)(1)(vi))
o Upper bound frequency > once per 10,000 years o An individual located at exclusion area boundary for any 2-hour period following the onset of release would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem (250 mSv) TEDE o An individual located at outer boundary of the low population zone exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) would not receive a radiation dose in excess of 25 rem (250 mSv) TEDE
- Additional requirements established by the NRC for reasonable assurance of adequate protection 23
§ 53.230 - Second Tier Safety Criteria (Substantial Additional Protection)
- Estimated TEDE to the public from effluents during normal plant operation are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) o Performance objectives for liquid and gaseous effluents (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I)
- Design features and programmatic controls must:
o Ensure plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs), personnel, and programs provide necessary capabilities & reliabilities to address licensing basis events o Provide measures for defense-in-depth o Maintain overall cumulative plant risk from licensing basis events within NRC safety goals 24
§ 53.210 - Safety Functions
- Safety Functions o Primary safety function is to limit the release of radioactive materials from the facility o Additional functions supporting the retention of radioactive materials must be defined o Design features and programmatic controls fulfill the safety functions 25
Safety Functions Concept NGNP Concept 26
§ 53.240 - Licensing Basis Events
- Licensing basis events must address combinations of malfunctions of plant SSCs, human errors, and the effects of external hazards
- Licensing basis events must be used to o Confirm the adequacy of design features and programmatic controls needed to satisfy first and second tier safety criteria o Establish related functional requirements for plant SSCs, personnel, and programs 27
§ 53.250 - Defense in Depth
- Measures must be taken to ensure appropriate defense in depth is provided to compensate for uncertainties
- Measures can include increased safety margins and provide alternate means to accomplish safety functions
- No single design or operational feature should be exclusively relied upon 28
§ 53.260 - Protection of Plant Workers
- Ensure radiological dose to plant workers does not exceed occupational dose limits from 10 CFR Part 20
- Use procedures and engineering controls to keep occupational dose levels ALARA 29
Additional Discussion Topics
- Consideration of unmitigated consequences from event scenarios to support Part 53 o Department of Energy Orders & American Nuclear Society Standard 2.26 (Seismic design)
- Embedded mechanisms to apply analytical safety margins to gain operational flexibilities o Example is alternative offsite dose thresholds being considered for emergency planning zones and siting o Look ahead to associated Section in Subpart C, Design and Analysis Requirements 30
Integrated Approach Siting near densely populated Functional areas EP for SMRs Containment and ONTs Licensing Modernization Project Insurance and Liability Environmental Reviews Consequence Based Security 31
Key Public Comments on Subpart B, Technology-Inclusive Safety Objectives
- Adequate protection standard o Avoid regulations that are not needed to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of health and safety o Could we add some text to the rule language to help clarify exactly what reasonable assurance of adequate protection means?
- Safety case o Flexibility is important for applicants to use different approaches to define their safety case (dont require a PRA)
- Numerical probabilities in rule vs. guidance o Consider replacing with qualitative probability
- Licensing basis event categories o Clarify how rule addresses specific event categories such as beyond design basis events 32
Key Public Comments on Subpart B, Technology-Inclusive Safety Objectives
- Requirements for beyond design basis events o Should approach focus on mitigation, like § 50.155?
o Is inclusion of the QHOs necessary? Are there other options to address cumulative risk?
QHOs don't specify the dose value for prompt fatalities and latent health effects
- Additional requirements for adequate protection o Is § 53.220(c) necessary and, if so, in the right subpart?
- The two-tier concept is complex and difficult to understand. Is there a more efficient way to organize it?
- Do you really need a requirement to maintain doses ALARA to meet adequate protection or to minimize danger to the public in Part 53?
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Key Public Comments on Subpart B, Technology-Inclusive Safety Objectives
- A requirement for limitations on effluent releases during normal operations may not be needed.
- Defense-in-depth requirement should allow more flexibility o Concerns with its deterministic nature
- Avoid uses of the term "high confidence" in the rule language
- Remove requirements for occupational dose from safety criteria o Consider moving to radiation protection program 34
Part 53 General Layout
- Subpart A, General Provisions
- Subpart B, Technology-Inclusive Safety Requirements
- Subpart C, Design and Analysis
- Subpart D, Siting
- Subpart E, Construction and Manufacturing Requirements
- Subpart F, Requirements for Operation
- Facility Safety Program
- Subpart G, Decommissioning Requirements
- Subpart H, Applications for Licenses, Certifications and Approvals
- Subpart I, Maintaining and Revising Licensing Basis Information
- Subpart J, Reporting and Administrative Requirements 35
10 CFR Part 53 Subpart F Layout -
Facility Safety Program
- § 53.800 - Facility Safety Program
- § 53.810 - Facility Safety Program Performance Criteria
- § 53.820 - Facility Safety Program Plan
- § 53.830 - Review, Approval, and Retention of Facility Safety Program Plans 36
§ 53.800 - Facility Safety Program
- Establish a facility safety program (FSP) using a risk-informed, performance-based process to proactively identify new or revised hazards and performance issues
- Routinely evaluate potential hazards, operating experience, human actions, and programmatic controls
- Consider measures to mitigate or eliminate the resulting risks 37
§ 53.810 - Facility Safety Program Performance Criteria
- Take measures to protect public health and minimize danger to life or property as may be reasonably achieved when considering costs o Assess risk reduction measures related to radionuclide release during normal operation o Assess risk reduction measures for contributors to the overall cumulative risk from unplanned events
- Need to integrate with licensing and recordkeeping processes (e.g., updating safety analysis reports) 38
§ 53.820 - Facility Safety Program Plan
- FSP must use written plan and address:
o Scope of facilities covered o How FSP will be implemented o How personnel will be trained in FSP o Risk-informed hazard management program o Technology assessment program o Internal facility safety program assessment 39
§ 53.830 - Review, Approval, and Retention of FSP
- FSP plan is part of the application
- NRC to review/approve FSP plan
- Will define staff process for reviewing FSP plan changes and amendments 40
Part 53 Rulemaking 41