ML20293A215
| ML20293A215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/15/2017 |
| From: | Stephanie Blaney Information Services Branch |
| To: | Lochbaum D Union of Concerned Scientists |
| References | |
| FOIA, NRC-2016-000664 | |
| Download: ML20293A215 (49) | |
Text
NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER I
(03-2017)
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.*"\ RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF 2016-0664 4 11 i, 'l INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST
RESPONSE
........ *" TYPE INTERIM 0 FINAL REQUESTER: DATE:
joavid Lochbaum 11 08/15/2017 I
DESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED RECORDS:
Request for 22 documents by ADAMS Accession Number.
PART I. -- INFORMATION RELEASED You have the right to seek assistance from the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison. Contact information for the NRC's FOIA Public Liaison is available at https:/!www.nrc,gpv/reading-rm/foia/contact-fojahtml
[ZJ Agency records subject to the request are already available on the Public NRC Website, in Public ADAMS or on microfiche in the NRC Public Document Room.
0 Agency records subject to the request are enclosed.
Records subject to the request that contain information originated by or of interest to another Federal agency have been referred to that agency (see comments section) for a disclosure determination and direct response to you.
We are continuing to process your request.
0 See Comments.
PART I.A -- FEES NO FEES AMOUNT' You will be billed by NRC for the amount listed.
0 Minimum fee threshold not met.
II l You will receive a refund for the amount listed. Due to our delayed response, you will
~see Comments for details Fees waived. not be charged fees.
PART 1.8 -- INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories of law 0 enforcement and national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exclusions"). 5 U.S.C. 552(c). This is a standard notification given to all requesters; it should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do, or do not, exist.
0 We have withheld certain information pursuant to the FOIA exemptions described, and for the reasons stated, in Part II.
Because this is an interim response to your request, you may not appeal at this time. We will notify you of your right to appeal any of the responses we have issued in response to your request when we issue our final determination.
You may appeal this final determination within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or e-mail to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov. Please be
[ZJ sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal." You have the right to seek dispute resolution services from the NRC's Public Liaison, or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). Contact information for OGIS is available at https://ogis.archive~.gov/abQut-ogis/Qontact-infor!I)ation.htm PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page if required)
We provided interim responses to you on 02/17/2017, 04/27/2017, and 05/01/2017. This final response addresses the remaining seven (7) records listed in your request. Since the date of your request, these records have been removed from ADAMS. However, because the NRC was able to locate them by the accession numbers when your request was received, we have processed the records, except as noted below.
[continued on next page}
Signature - Freedom of Information Act Officer or Desianee Stephanie A. Blaney NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017) IAdel'~,. ,
O!gitally $ienod by St&phat1ie A Blaney ON: e-=US. o=U.&. Goll!Jl"nlll&!'II, QU,,,1,1S. NI.Jofn1 R~lQry Commllm:m, 01PN!'U;..f1lv. Cll"stephanie A. Slaney. 09,2342 Hl200XX1 J00.1-1*200001997 Data: 20l70!U5 f.!*39:13 .0,f()O'-
Page 2 of3
NRC FORM 464 Part I U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER (03-2017)
RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION I 2016-0664 11 4
I ACT (FOIA) REQUEST Continued 0
RESPONSE
INTERIM FINAL TYPE REQUESTER: DATE:
joavid Lochbaum PART I.C COMMENTS (Continued) 11 08/15/2017 I
MLI6201A086 consists ofan email, dated May 19, 2016, from an NRC staff member, Lawrence Criscione (who has furnished a privacy waiver), forwarding to the Chairman's office an email he had previously sent to the Inspector General (IO) that served as a FOIA appeal ofa "no record' response he received in a prior FOIA request. Attached to this email is the FOIA response, as well as a copy of a December 18, 2012, letter from then-Senator Lieberman to the IG (to which Mr.
Criscione's letter to the Senator was attached). This letter was released by the OIG, in part, to Mr. Criscione in response to another FOIA request; however, it bears a typewritten annotation presumably added by Mr. Criscione before he included it in his email to the Chairman's office. The Chairman's office confirmed that it located this record within its record systems.
This record is enclosed; please note that the Senator's letter has a single redaction based on 7C, as the OIG released it. And, after consulting with another Federal agency having equity in the information contained in the record, we have made certain other redactions in reliance on FOIA exemptions 6, 7A, and 7C.
ML 1620 l A093 consists of an email, dated May 19, 2016, from Mr. Criscione that forwards to the Chairman's office earlier email communications he had with other NRC staff members and an external recipient about an ACRS-ACE Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The Chairman's office confirmed that it located this record within its record systems. The MOU was released in full in response to FOIA-2016-0455 and is publicly available as ML16125A53l. The email is enclosed.
ML16201A095 consists of an email, dated May 19, 2016, from Mr. Criscione that forwards to the Chairman's office earlier email communications he had with various NRC staff members about "need-to-know requirements for SUNS I" [Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information]. The Chairman's office confirmed that it located this record within its record systems. Exemption 6 is claimed for a few cell phone numbers. And, after consulting with another Federal agency having equity in the information contained in the record, we have made certain redactions on the enclosed record in reliance on FOIA exemptions 6, 7A, and 7C.
ML 1620 l Al 00 consists of an email, dated May 19, 2016, from Mr. Criscione that forwards to the Chairman's office earlier email communications he had with various NRC staff members, an outside guest speaker, and various congressional staff, about a Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir failure and its adverse affect on the Toops family. The Chairman's office confirmed that it located this record within its record systems. After consulting with another Federal agency having equity in the information contained in the record, we have made one redaction on the enclosed record in reliance on FOIA exemptions 6, 7A, and 7C.
ML l 6202A536 consists of an email, dated May 9, 2016, from Mr. Criscione to the Chairman's office, including four attachments containing multiple documents, concerning a personal matter. Although the Chairman's office confirmed that it received an email from Mr. Criscione on this date, the attachment received by, and maintained in, the Chairman's office includes many more pages than appear in this record. Given its personal nature, and the fact that the record is not identical (i.e., it is incomplete) to the copy located in the Chairman's office, we have determined that it is a personal record. As such, it is not subject to the FOIA and has not been processed.
MLl6202A537 consists of two emails, dated May 11 and 17, 2016, both from Mr. Criscione to the Chairman's office, concerning an upcoming interview concerning the same personal matter. The Chairman's office confirmed that it located this record within its record systems. This record is enclosed; please note that after consulting with another Federal agency having equity in the information contained in the record, we have made certain redactions in reliance on FOIA exemptions 6, 7A and 7C.
ML I 6202A538 consists of an email, dated May 20, 2016, from Mr. Criscione to the Chairman's office after the above-referenced interview had taken place. The Chairman's office confirmed that it located this record within its record systems.
This record is enclosed; please note that after consulting with another Federal agency having equity in the information contained in the record, we have made one redaction in reliance on FOIA exemptions 6, 7A and 7C.
NRC Form 464 Part I (03-2017) Page 3of 3
NRC FORM 464 Part 11 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION FOIA
,, I (03-2017) i.,._,,,y,"'"'t-G(,<.,
~ .
RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF 2016-0664#4 I
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST DATE:
I 0&/15/2017 I
PART II.A -APPLICABLE EXEMPTIONS Records subject to the request are being withheld in their entirety or in part under the FOIA exemption(s) as indicated below (5 U.S.C. 552(b}).
Exemption 1: The withheld information is properly classified pursuant to an Executive Order protecting national security information.
Exemption 2: The Withheld information relates solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of NRG.
Exemption 3: The Withheld information is specifically exempted from public disclosure by the statute indicated.
Sections 141-145 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data (42 U.S.C. 2161-2165).
Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act, which prohibits the disclosure of Unclassified Safeguards Information (42 U.S.C. 2167).
41 U.S.C. 4702(b), which prohibits the disclosure of contractor proposals, except when incorporated into the contract between the agency and the submitter of the proposal.
Exemption 4: The withheld information is a trade secret or confidential commercial or financial information that is being Withheld for the reason(s) indicated.
The information is considered to be proprietary because it concerns a licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material control and accounting program for special nuclear material pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(1).
The information is considered to be another type or confidential business (proprietary) information.
The information was submitted by a foreign source and received in confidence pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d)(2).
Exemption 5: The withheld information consists of interagency or intraagency records that are normally privileged in civil litigation.
Deliberative process privilege.
Attorney work product privilege.
Attorney-client privilege.
Exemption 6: The Withheld information from a personnel, medical, or similar file, is exempted from public disclosure because its disclosure would result
[Z] in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
[Z] Exemption 7: The withheld information consists of records compiled for law enforcement purposes and is being withheld for the reason(s) indicated.
[Z] (A) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with an open enforcement proceeding.
[Z] (C) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
(DJ The information consists of names and other information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to reveal identities of confidential sources.
(E) Disclosure would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or guidelines that could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.
(F) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.
Other I I PART 11.B - DENYING OFFICIALS In accordance with 10 CFR 9.25(g) and 9.25(h) of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, the offlcial(s) listed below have made the determination to withhold certain information responsive to your request APPELLATE OFFICIAL DENYING OFFICIAL TITLE/OFFICE RECORDS DENIED EDO SECY IRochelle Bavol II Exec Asst to the Secy to the Commission 11 third party PH; material pertaining to an I [Z]
I 11 I ongoing enforcement proceedmg I
I I
11 I Appeals must be made in writing within 90 calendar days of the date of this response by sending a letter or email to the FOIA Officer, at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or FOIA.Resource_@!lrc,99_'\l, Please be sure to include on your letter or email that it is a "FOIA Appeal."
NRC Form 464 Part II (03-2017) Page 1 of1
Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 7:34 AM To: Kirkwood Sara* Holahan Gary; Clark, Theresa Cc: (b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) 'LSCriscione@gmail.com'
Subject:
Failure to study Dam Security Attachme nts: Final Response.pdf; Senator Lieberman's letter to Hubert Bell--OIG Case 13-001.pdf Sara et. al.,
In his response to the FOIA appeal mentioned below, Hubert Bell confirmed that his agents have not reviewed a single study regarding whether or not the Lake Jocassee Dam is vulnerable to terrorist action or internal sabotage.
My he\"e concerns have always been about dams failing due to acts of nature and not from acts of sabotage. However, given the secretive silo-ing of flooding information, there are obviously many individuals within the NRC and the US Army Corp of Engineers who believe that there are credible security threats to dams. That being the case, after knowing about this problem for a decade should we not at least have studied the issue?
Is the Lake Jocassee Dam vulnerable to terrorist action? If so, should it not be guarded against the same Design Basis Threat (DBT} used for Oconee? If not, why are we being so secretive about flood heights and basic dam design? Is the Lake Jocassee Dam vulnerable to internal sabotage? If so, does Duke Energy screen individuals granted access to the dam to the same level as it screens individuals granted access to Oconee?
l~lr6J,rblnlW,rblr71rCI Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Lawrence Criscione [1]
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2016 10:16 PM To: Bell, Hubert <Hubert.Bell @nrc.gov>; Lee, David <David.Lee@nrc.gov>
Cc: Andoh, Roger <Roger.Andoh@nrc.gov>; Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>; Paul Gunter
<paul@beyondnuclear.org>;l(b)(6) I;._!
(b_)(_
6)_,(6_)(_7)_(A_),_
(6_
)(7_)(_C_
) _ _ _ _ _ _ __
!(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) !; Jim Riccio <jriccio@greenpeace.org>; FOIA Resource <FOIA.Resource@nrc.gov>;
William R. Corcoran, Ph.D., P.E.<william.r.corcoran@1959.usna.com>
Subject:
[External_Sender] Appeal of search adequacy for FOIA/PA-2016-0397 Mr. Bell, Please accept this emai l as a FOIA appeal.
On October 15, 2012 r wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HS&GA). That letter is attached for your reference (it follows the one page letter Senator Lieberman sent to you on Dec. 18, 2012).
On page 2 of my leller I requested that Lhe HS&GA verify that the NRC is ensuring access lo Jocassee Dam is adequately guarded and is ensuring personnel with access to the pump storage plant at Jocassee Dam are adequately screened for insider threats.
On page 4 of the 20 I 2-Oct-15 letter T requested that the HS&GA ensure that after five years of assuming there is a security threat lo Jocassee Dam, the NRC has adequately assessed the minimum required threat capable of jeopardiziJ1g the integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam.
Ln early December 2012 I reiterated m.y concerns to the HS&GA in a joint letter with Paul Blanch which also included Paul's concerns regarding the natural gas pipeline near Indian Point.
On December 18, 201 2 Senator Lieberman forwarded my 20 I 2-Oct- 15 letter onto you for your consideration.
On March 22, 201 6 I requested under the Freedom ofln forma tion Act:
- l. All studies reviewed by the Office ofthe b1spector General co11cer11i11g the security at the Lake Jocassee Dam.
- 2. All replies.fi'om the Office ofthe inspector General to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs concerning the 2012-Dec- 18 letterfrom Senator Lieberman to Hubert Bell.
On March 30, 20 16 I recei ved the attached response stating that no records could be found.
1 find it hard to believe that your agents have never reviewed any studies concerning whether or not the security at the Lake Jocassee Dam is adequate to protect the dam--and the downstream reactors at Oconee--from terrorist attack and/or internal sabotage. I am therefore appealing the 20 I 6-Mar- 16 FOlA response on the grounds of inadequate search.
I also find it hard to believe that neither the NRC nor any other federal agency has ever assessed the adequacy of the security of the Lake Jocassee Dam; however due to the regulatory gaps described in my 20 12-0ct- l 5 lelter (e.g. FERC regulates Lbe Lake Jocassee Dam but has no mandate to ensure it is protected to the same design basis threat as the downstrea1n nuclear reactor plants which it would flood) I do recognize it is possible that both FERC and the NRC have avoided addressing security issues surrounding the dam. However, if that is the case (i.e. if neither FERC nor the NRC has adequately studied whether the Lake Jocassee Dam poses a security threat to the Oconee reactors) I would expect that you would have repo.11ed back to the HS&GA that you found a gap in the regulatory domains of FERC and the NRC.
Therefore, I find it hard to believe that FOIA 20 16-0397 would find no records. I would expect either that your agents satisfactorily detem1ined the existence of at least one security study showing the Lake Jocassee Dam is adequately guarded against sabotage or that you reported back to the HS&GA that there is currently an outstanding concern regarding whether the security at the FERC regulated dam is adequate to enstu-e the security of the downstream NRC regulated reactors.
Please ensme your agents conduct an adequate search fo r the records requested under FOIA/PA 2016-0397.
Thank you, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959
From: foia.resource@nrc.gov To: LSCriscione@hotmail.com CC: N ina.Argent@nrc.gov Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2016 14:42:02 -0400
Subject:
FOIA/PA-2016-0397 Final Response
Dear Mr. Criscione:
Please fi nd attached NRC's final response to yo ur FOIA request, FOlNPA-2016-00397.
Please take a moment to help us improve our FOIA processes, and let us know what your experience has been. Just click on this embedded link: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-m1/foia/foia-user-sw-vey.htrn1. Once you have completed the survey, just click the "SUBMIT" button and your survey response will be returned to us.
Thank you, Freedom of Information, Privacy & Information Collections Branch Customer Service Division, Office of the Chieflnformation Officer Mail Stop: T-5F09 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washi ngton, D.C. 20555-0001 FOlA.Resource@mc.gov Ph: 301-4 15-7169 Fax: 301-415-5130
Nile FORM 4.. Pal'I I IOIGI U.S. NUCLEAR ftEGULATOR'i COMMIS510N FOIA RESPONSE NUMBER m-n,s:
/*
, ~. \;
- .; ' RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF I 2016*0397 11 I I
\ ....... -- '/ INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST RESPONSE TYPE INTERIM lL FlNA.l REQUESTER: DATE:
ILawrence Criscione II MAR 3 O 2911 I
DESCRIPTION OF REQUESTED RECORDS:
All studies reviewed by the 010 regarding sccurit:-, at Lake Jocassee Dam and all replies from the OIG to the Senate Comm ittcc on Itome land Security & GovcmmentJ I Affairs concerning the Dcccm bcr 18, 2012 lettcr from Senator Lieberman to llubert Bell.
PART I. -INFORMATION RELEASED Agency records subject to the request are alrear;ly available in public ADAMS or on microf1die in the NRG Public DocJment
~ Room.
Agency records subjec:t !o the *eque51 are enclosed.
Records SLbject to 1he request that contain information or,ginated by or of interest 10 another Federal agency have been iJ referred lo that agency (see comments section) fo* a disclosure determ1nat1on and direct response to you.
Ii We are continuing to process your request.
Cl See Comments.
PART I.A - FEES Al.IOU~""
C You will be billed by IIIRC for the amount listed ~ No1e. Minimum fee threshold not met.
$ II i Ii
-s. . Cor-,r,e ..111, tn* i1111t,11I~
You will receive a refund for the amount listed. Fees waived.
PART 1.B - INFORMATION NOT LOCATED OR WITHHELD FROM DISCLOSURE
[71 We did not locate any agency records responsive to your request. Note: Agencies may treat three discrete categories ot law enforc.ement anr;l national security records as not subject to the FOIA ("exdus1ons"). 5 U SC. 552(c) This is c1 sta1dard notification given to all requesters. i1 should not be taken to mean that any excluded records do. or do not exist.
n We ha~e withheld certain information pursuant to lhe FOIA exemptions describer;l, and for the reasons stated, in Part II.
Because this is an interi'TI response to your request. you may not appeal at th*s lime We will notify you of your right to C appeal any of the responses we have issue:! 1n *esponse to ~*our request when we issue our final determination.
[71 You mar appeal this lrnal determination w1th1n 30 calendar days of the date of this response b¢i send ng a letter or email to the FOi Officer. at U.S. NJciear Regulatory Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555-0001, or OIA,Resource@nrc.gov, Please be sure to include on your letter or email that 1t is a "FOIA Appeal" PART I.C COMMENTS ( Use attached Comments continuation page If req11ired)
~IG~AT** ....
'""'"""CTOR GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS, OIG ci: ~jfi.-.Jt:- ~U:Mfffan --
I NRC F~nn ~6'1 ?art I (CIGl (12-2015) Page! of 2
ICopy included the redaction.
December 18. 2012 Mr. Hub.:n Dell Inspector General Instead of seriously Nuclear Regulatory Commission considering the safety Otl.11.:e ol tile lnspeclor General issues, the NRG Inspector l (bX,)(C) I General's agents went after I 1 555 Rockville Pih the person raising the Rockv1llc. MD 2085:?
concerns.
Dear Inspector (jcncral Ucll
- 1 am enclosing ~ cop~ of a letter I received from Mr. LrnTc ncc S.
Criscione regarding s afc1y conc erns by the U.S Nud.:ar Regulatory Comn1!;:\1on (NRC:.) Inc concerns are in regards 10 the Oconee Nuclear Station c1nd Jocd:;:,ec: Dam. The allegatton claims 1ha1 1he NRC is aware of safety issues at these two facilities, and has failed to act appropriately.
As I hav e no way of ascertaining the basis for the se allegations. I have enclosed 1hi~ letter for your considcralion.
Thank yo u for you r a11cntion to 1his matter.
Sincerely.
&.U::::Chnirmon
Monday, October 15. 20 12 1412 Dial Court Spr1ngfkld. IL 62704 Sen.Hor Joseph l.ieberman, Chairman U.S. Senate Comn11t1ee on Ilomeland Secunly & Governmental Affairs 706 Han Ol'hce Building W:ishtngton. DC 205 I 0
Dear Senator L1ebermc1n:
On September I 8, 2012 I sent a lettt>r to the Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerning the NRC's handling of a safety concern regarding Jocassee Dam and the Oconee Nuclear Station. I copied the letter to a member of your ltomeland Security &
Governmental Affairs Committee stafT as well as to the majority ;ind minority staffs ol olher Scnatt> and House commlltees who I believed might be Interested.
It has been nearly four weeks since I sent my letter and have not heard from either the NRC Chairman's office or the NRC Office of the Inspector General. The only offici;il communication I have recei11ed from the NRC was my branch chief informing me that he was directed to fill out a Form 183 for me failing to stamp my 201 2-09-18 letter J :. "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information".
I ,11n re.iching out to your committee because I have several concerns which I believe the NRC I:. incapabie of c1ddressmg.
for over 18 years the N RC h.is been aware that the flood wall surrounding the Standby Shutdown Facllity at Oconre Nuclear Station Is too short to protect the SSI-' fro m a failure of
)ocnssee D;un.1 Hcginnlng ln l.lH!f>l f ,1nd possibly earlier) staff personnel at the NRC recognized thdt a failure of Jocassce Dam could result In a nuclear accident 3t Oconee s~:1t1on.
Although I have seen no documents indicating th,1t there Is a security concern associated with the failure or loc11s~t'e Dam. since 2007 all NRC correspondence concerrlng locass<'e Dam hdS been stdmpcd *omclal Use Only - Saft ty*Rclated lnformallon* so it is obvious to me that tor at least the past five years the US NRC has believed there is ii security concrrn associated with JocassN' Dam.
' Letter from Albert F Gibson, NRC, to J W Haml)lon, Duke, "Notice or Vlola:*on ancl No:1,:e of Oevlanon (NRC 1,npectlon Report Nos. 50-269/93*25, 50-170/93-25, ,nc150-287/93-25)," dated February 11, 1994 1
Letter from Charles Casto, NRC, to Bruce H. Hamilton, Duke, "IR 0S000269-06-016, IR 05000270,06*016, IR osoonB7-06*016. on 03/31/2006, Oconee Nuclear St~ion Preliminary White Finding.* dated August 31. 2006
I c.lo not work 11111ucle<1r security and I l<now little about it. It is my understanding th:11 for the lOmmerrial nuclear industry the NRC has determined the maximum credible threat will' which a nuclear plant might be challenged, and the NRC requires the commercial nuclear reactors which 11 regulates t(I adequately guard rhctr plant against such a threat.
It srnnds to reason that if. as evident from the way the NRC Is stnmping information rcgard111g Jocass"t' Dam. there is a credible threat to /ocassee Dam then, becaust: of the dang~r a failure ofJocasscC' l>am poses to Oooding of the Standby Shutdown f'ac11lty :it the Oconee- Nuclear Station, access to Jocassee Dam should be guarded against the same design basis threat to which the Oconel' Nuclear Station and other reactor planes .ire guarded. I respentully request that the Senate Committee on lfomeland Security & Governmental Affairs verify that the NRC is ensuring access 10 jocasseo D:im 1s adequMcly gu:irdod.
Aside from external terrorist ,Htacks. commercial nuclear reactor plants are required to guard against Internal sabo'tage. Personnel at commercial nuclear facilities are req111retl to receive extensive background checks and, depending on their access to vital areas. arc also required to undergo periodic reassessment including inte1v!ews with psychologim.
IJuc to the danger a failure of Jocassee O.im poses to the Oconee Nuclear Station, it stands to rr.ason that the secumy, operations and maintenance personnel at the Jocassee D;irn pumped storage stc1tion should be held to the same background checks and periodic rr.tsscssmcnts as similar personnel at the Oronee Nuclear Station and other reactor plants.
I re~pectrully request that the Senate Committee on llomeland Security & Government;,!
Affairs verify that the NRC is ensuring personnel with access to the pump storage plant at jocassee Dam arc adequ;itely screened for insider threats.
As mentioned above, the US NRC decided S years ago (since at least 2007) thilt there i:, at lenst enough of a credible security threat to jocassec Dam to 1ustify withholding from the public all SiJ.Wl'. related concerns regnrdlng the dam. Although five years is more than enough time to adequately guard Jocassee Dam, the NRC continues to stnmp oil safety concerns regarding che darn as "Official Use Only- Securlty-Rel:ited Information". Thfs indic:nes to me that, after five years, the NRC has not heen able to adequately ensure the security of Jocassee Dam. This Is noc surprising to me since the NRC doe.snot regulate
)Ol.'.itssee Dam and therefore hns no nuthority to dictate ~ecurlty measures required ther~.
i\~ ;, pumped stora):le lmpo1.1ndme11t dam, Jocassee Dam Ii; regulated by the Federal Energy H~'g11latory Comm1ss1on (Fl::RC). I know linle about Fr:RC. but il is my understanding that PERC doe~ not require the racllitles it regulates to be guarded against the same des,cn basis threats th:H conimerc1al nude,1r reac-tors are guo1rded against. Although FFRC's security requirements arc likely adequ:itc for most of the facilities It regulates. In the case of a pumped storage dam who!-e sabot:ir;e is assumed to result In a nuclear occident the only adcquntc course of action is to require a level ofsecurity capable or guarding against a threat equivalent lO the design basis threat assumed for commercial nuclear facilittes.
2
Similarly ror internal sabotage, Fl::RC's regulations should require that the background checks and periodic reassessmentS conducted at the Lake Jocasi.ce Dam pumped stora~e mmon :ire equivalent to those conducted nt commercial nuclear facilities.
llowever, I ani not sure it Is reasonable to expect Ff.RC to be able to treat the Lake Jocassec Dam differently rrom thll other t'ac1htles It regulates. FF.RC might not have the expert1\e1 budget or stafnng levels to ( 1) write the regulations for the l.c1ke Jocassec guard rorce, (2) periodically Inspect the guard force including "Force 011 Force" exercises, (3) write the regulation~ 101 the background checks and periodic reassessments, (4) ensure the background checks were done .idequc1tely, and (5) Inspect an,d regulate the periodic reassessment program of the plant personnel including p:,yt.hological evaluJtions.
It Is npp.irent to me th:it during the past five years the NRC has bern unable to coordinate with r:imc to ensu1 c that the perceived security vulnerability regarding Jocassee Oam has been ,1ddres~cd. Despitt! this, the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclec1r Station continue lo operate.
In lune 2010, thr NRC issued Duke Energy a Confirmatory Action Lener (CAL) rcquinng Duke to upgrade the flood protenions at the Oconee Nuclear Station such that by November 30. 20 I I the flood barriers adequately protect the equipment at the Standby Shutdown 1:acility ag:11nst a failure of Jocassee Dam. This deadline has since been moved to 20 I 6. So for another three or four years Duke Energy is going to be allowed to operate the three reilctors at 1t~ Oconee Nuclear Station with a perceived security liability unaddressect.
This is unacccpr:ible.
If there 1s truly a security hab1liry posed by Jocassee Dam. Duke Enerl{}' can literally add~ess it within hours. L.ike Jocassee and Lake Keowee (the lake which Jocasse<' drains to) are pumped storagt: impounds. Within a matter of hours, Duke Energy can lower the volume of water impounded by the Lake Jocassee and Lake Keowee Dams such lhJt in the event of a failure of the Jocassee Dam the remaining volume of water impounded will not overtoµ the inadequately sized flood fall surTounding the Standby Shutdown Facility at the Oconee Nuclear St:it1on.
Thcr~ Is also nnNhe.r solurfon to chc sccunty concern: shut down the three reactors at the O('onee Nucle,,r St:itlon untll the flooding dctenscs surrounding the Standby Shutdown Fncllity are adequately improved.
It 1~ uncle, standable that the NRC cannot address the perceived securlt} vulncrab,htlcs .1t
)ocassre !Jam since it docs not regu late Jocassee Dam. Howc\*cr. the NRC rt'Ru!ates the Oconee Nucle.ir Station andl It is unconscionable that for nve years the NRC hos suspected a grave security concern and has nut addressed it by requ1r1ng the three reactors .lt the Oconee Nuclear Statton to be shutdown as long as the volume of water Impounded In Lake
- Joens~"" and Kcowet> pose a security threat to those reactors. And it I~ equally unconscionable th,H the NRC 1s going to allow this condition to continue for an additional three or four }'Car~.
3
I illl'I not convmrnd that there is a credible security concern regardmc Jornssec Dam.
Obviously, all man made structures can be demolished. But that fact In and of itself does not c;iuse ;i security threat 10 exist. For a security threat to exist, the minimum I equlred threat to the Slrucrur~ nef.'ds to be less than the maKimum credible threat. As mentioned above, the maximum credible threat to the Lake Jocassee Dam 1s - otr should be - assumetl to be equivalent to the desl~n basis lhreat for Oconee Nuclear StJtfon. But what Is the minimum reqwred threilt lo jeoparrll1.e the integrity of the dam? ls it a hair dozen drunken tPt'nuge v:ind::ils with ,;nme ~tolen dynamite .,nd a canoe? Or is 1t a platoon of tr.iincd underwater Jemol11ion ex per~~ from a technologlcally ad,*anced natron*state?
I do not know enough about dam consn urtion, terrorism or demolition to say wh.it the minimum required threat to Jocasscr Dam is. If it ls less than (e.g. teenage vandals) or equal to (e.g. a well-arrncd squad of terrorists) the design basis threat for tht! Oconee Nuclear Sti1tlon, then I agree with the NIK that there 1s a security concern with the l.ake JocJssec Dant. If however, it is greater than the design ba:;ls threat for the Oconet- Nuclear St:mon (e.g. underwater demolition experts from the CIA. KGB. Mossnd or Ml6). then I do not believe there is a credible threat to Jocassee Dam.
I respectfully request the following from the Senate Committec on Ilomeland Security &
Gov~rnmcmal Affairs:
. . En'iurc that after five years of assuming there is a security threat to Jocassec Dam.
the NRClrns adequately assessed the minimum required threat capable of jeop,1rdl1:ng the Integrity of the Lake Jocassee Dam.
- 2. If the minimum required threat capable of jeopardizing the integrity of the Lake Iorassee Oam is greater than the design basis threat for rhc Oconee Nuclear Station.
then request the NRC to cease withholding from the public the con-espondcnce, memos and studies concerning the safety llabilit1es which a failu re of the l.ak~
Jocassee Dam poses to the Oconee Nuclear Station.
- 3. If the minimum required threat capable of jeopardizing the integrity of the take Jocassee Dam is less than or equal to the design basis threat for the Oconee Nuclear Station. then request the NRC to ensure the thrre reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station .ire in a shutdown condition whenever the combined volume of water impounded by the Jocassce and Kcowec Dams 1s great enou~h to pose ii noodlng threat to the Oconee Nucle11r Station In the event of a failure of Jocas~ce Dam.
Enclosed with this letter is :i list of the correspondence, memos Md studies concerning the safNy ll,1blllties posed by a fallure of the Lake Jocassce Dam. Most of these documents have been stamped b~* the NRC as *omc1al Use Only- Security-Related Information" despite not containing any discus~lon or security concerns. It Is my perception that the *security*
related" concerns are merely assumed to exist; however it Is possible that the I\RC has do11e an actual assessment that shows there Is :i credible secur ity threat to the dam. If this Is the case, then It 1s unconscionable that In live years the NRC has not done anything to prevent the operation of the th ree reactors at ONS while an unaddressed vulnerability to thwr ~ecurity rt!mc1in~ outstanding.
4
Copii:d on this limcr ore sevcrnl indu.~try groups ond government watchdog org;rn1zations.
There are some within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who will claim th:ir it Is irrc~pons,ble for me to share the information in this letter with members of the pubhc. To them I would note that there Is nothing in this letter - other than the list of documents enclosed - that I~ not alrrady publh. knowledge. With regard to the list of documents enclosed, :ilchnugh these doc11menrs nre scamped "Offlcial Use Only- Security-Related lnformationH. I do not believe that the mere mention of the cxlstence of these dorumenL~
constitutes the release of"Security-Related Information,
I have copied pollt1cally active organizations on thb lcttc1 because I believe their r,articlpotion is vital to the proper functioning of our dcmocrntic and republican p1oces~cs Although It nught not be appropriate to release specific Information to these or~aniz:itivns from documents stamped "Security-Related Information", merely informing them that alter five years the NRC has failed to adequately address a perceived security threat from the 1..1kP Jocassce Dam is crrtainly within my rights as a citizen and my duties as a licensed professional engineer.
Very r<.'sµectfu!"..
Lawrence S. Criscione, PE 573-230-3959 I '-~.< i1111~,-* ~li!il.CQID Enclosure - S pages Cc: Senator Susan Collins, Ranking Member, Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs Senator Richard Durbin, llllnols Congressman Pete King, Chairman, Homeland Security Congressman Bennie Thompson, Ranking Member. Homeland Security Congres<m:in Pred Upton, Chairman, Energy & Commerce Congressman lienry Waxman, Ranking Member, Energy & Commerce Chairman Allison Macf:lrlane, IJS Nuclear Regu!:11ory Commission Sperl.ti Counsel Carolyn Lerner, US Office of Special Counsel Michael Corradl11I, American Nuclear Socler>*
Admiral James F.llls. lnsmutc of Nuclear Power Oper,1tlons Leslie Bnrbnur. Nuclear F.nergy Institute David 1.ochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists Scott Amey, Project on Government Oversight l.ou1s Cbrk, Government Accountability Project Ken Bunting. National Fret'dotn or Information Coalition Tyson S,ocum, Publ!c Cit11.cn energy Proitr:11n Jim Ril;c10, Greenpeace s
Li~t of NRC Correspondenre, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure ofjoca~ce 0.1m Oate ADAMS Title 1994 FEB 11 Letter from Albert f Gibson, NRC, 10 J W Hampton, Duke, "No11ce of Vlolahon and Notice of Deviation (NRC Inspection Report Nos. S0-269/93-25. SO 270/93 25. and S0-287/93-25)." dated February 1 I, 1994 1%4 MAR 14 letter from J w. Hampton. Duke, dated MiHch 14, 1994 11)(14-0CT 6 Internal NRC memo documenting a meeting betwePn Reg,on II and NRR concern,ng a hypotht'tical Jor,mec Dam rallure.
1994-0E:-19 Letter from Albt'rt F. Gibson, NRC, to J. w, Hampton, Duke, "Notice of ViolahM and Noti<<' of Oev,atlon (NRC Inspection RPport Nos. S0-269/94-31, S0-270/94*3 l , ~nd S0-]1\7/94-31)." dated December 19, 1994 20C0-MAR-1S Letter from David E. LaBarge, NRC. tow, R. McCollum, Jr., "Ocont'l? Nuclt'ilr S1a1,on, Units I, 2, and 3 Re: Review of Individual Plant Examm.itloo of E~ternal Events (TAC NO\. M83649, M836SO, 1nd M83651)," doted Mitch I S, 2000 2006,APR 28 Ml0yll80;1~ I OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION* INTEGRA-f !) INSPECTION REPOlll OS000269/2006002, 05000270/200602,05000287/ 2006D02 W06 AUG 31 MLO~C,78011~ IR 05000269-06*016, IR 05000270-06*016, IR 05000287*06*016, on 03/ 31/ 2006, Oconee Nuclear Station
- Preliminary While Finding 2006*0* T.5 Ml06,890206 Ocont'e. Umts 1. 2 & 3 ** Response to Prellmlnary White finding 2006 NOV-22 /!'ll0u3:><i_O;>f:~ IR 0500026'1-06*017, IR05000270-06-017, IR 05000287-06-017, F,nal Sign1hcance Dete-rmmat1on for a White Finding and Nottce of Violation, Duke Energy Carolm.u, LLC 2006-0EC-20 MLOC u20092 Oconc!.', Units l , 2. & 3, Appeal of Final Significance Determinatton for White finding and Reply 10 Notice of Violation; EA-06-199 2007-JAN 29 ML07Q44034S Summary of Revised Fragility Evaluation Results for Jocassel" Dam 2007 FfB-5 timer r*om Bruce H. Hamilton, Duke, to NRC. *se,smic Frag,llty Study" 20,'.)J.rn .22 Ml070590329 Manual Chapter 0609.02 Appeal Panel Recommendat,or.s (OconPP Reply 10 a Notice ofV,oljtlon and White Finding (EA-06-199))
2(':i; MAR* l Ml070610460 Ocornee Appeal Panel Review or Manual Chapter 0&09.0Z Appeal Panel Review of Ocont'e Standby Shutdown Faclhty White Finding (EA-06* 199) 2007-M,W-3 ML072970510 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3
- Request for NRC to Review Appeal of Final s,gn,r,cance Oeterm,nation for SSF Flood Barrier White Finding 2007 IUN-22 ML07:580259 Consideration or New Information Associated w,th <1 Final Sign,ficance Oeterm,nalior for a White Finding. Oconee NS 2007-IUN,28 Phone call between the NRC and Duke Energy 2007 OCT l Ml07."7"07GS 10/01/200?, Slides with Notes lor Final Regu101ory Assessment o f Oconee FloOd Barri-er Issue 2007,0,T I Ml07277077S Dam f41lure lnforma11on 2007-0C- l MlCi:7707:7 Que~Uons and Answers Related to Oconel.! Flood Barrier
}007*NOV*20 ML0732'11045 Reconsideration or Flnal s1gn1ncance Oetermlnillon Assoclatt'd with Standby Shutdown Oconee Faclhtv Flood Barner Whtie F1nd1ng 2008-MAY 19 MLOB: 350689 Brtt'fmg P~rkage For Drop-lo V1s1t By Duke En12rgy Chief NuclP.ar Officer Wtth Chairm~n l(leln And Commlss,oner Jaciko On May 21, 2008 2008-JUN-23 Ml081390669 Propos~I for a Ri5k Analysis of the Failure of tht Jocam*t 3nd Kl'owee Dams to As~ess the Potential Effects on the Safe Shut Down Facihtv of the Ocon!'P Nucle.ir Station, South Carohna J.008-JUL-28 Ml082120390 Ocon Pl" Nuclear Station
- Revision~ 10 the Selected licensee Commitments Manual (SlC)
Enclosure, page l
Lf,;t of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Heg;irdmg Failure of Jocasscc Dam Date ADAMS Tit le 2008 AUG-IS Ml081640244 Inrormat1on Request Pursuant to 10 CFR SO 54(F) Related 10 E~trrnal Flooding, Including railure of the Jocasse!' Dam at Ocooee Nucledr Sliltion, Unit~ 1. ] , and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8724, Moans. and M08226I 20011 /\IJG 26 Ml08?3!l0690 Kick arr lor Risk Analysls of the Failure of 1hc Jocassee and Kcowee O;irrs 10 Amm the Poten1lal Effects on the Safe Shutdown Facility at the OconCf Nuclear Station 2008 AUG-28 ML083300427 08/28/2008
- Summary of Closeo l\lleellng to with Duke Energy Carolinas, llC to D,scuss the /lugust lS, 2008, 50,54(1) Le!l<'r on htern* I flood1na (TAC Nos MD8224, MD822S, and MD8226) 1008-AUG-28 ML082S50290 MPetlng with Duke Energy Carolinas, Oconte Flood Protecuon and the Jocas,,..,
Dilm Ha1ard 2008-SEP-6 ML0822S0166 OconPP Nuclear Station
- Communication Plain for lnfori,,a11on Request Related to Failure Frequencies for the Joca~si,t Pumped Storage Dam (Joca~,_.,. Oam) at thP Ocont~ NuclP;ir Station and Potl'ntial Gt'llen~ lmpl,c.allons 2008-ScP-26 Ml0827S0106 Oconee, Units 1, 2 and 3
- Response to 10 CFR SO.S4(1) Request 2008-NOV S ML09:0607ul 11/05/08 Summary of Closed Met>tlng with Duke on External Flooding lnues.
1ncluding failure of the Jocassee Dam. at Oconre Nucle~* St,mon, Unns 1, 2, and 3 2008-NOV-S ML0833906S0 l 1/0S/2008 Meeting Slides, "Oconee Site flood Protection; NRC Meeting w,r'i Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 2C08*DCC-4 ML09:420319 12/04/2008 Meeting Summary, Meeting to Discuss External Flooding al Ocoriee Nuclear Station (Reissuance, w,111 Error on Page 3 Corrected) 700!1 OEC-4 ML09(14/l()(\44 OconeP Nuclear Station, External Flood NRR M~etfng. Rockville, MD, Otcember 4, 2008 2009-Ff0-3 ML090280<:74 Brief ing Package for Commissioner Lyons VIs1t to Oconee on February 4. 2009 2009-Al'R-6 Ml09: 170104 Ocon!'t' NuclPar Starion. Unit s l, 2 And 3
- Non-concurrence on Evaluiltion of Oukt>
Energy Carollnas, LLC September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Lener Dated August 15, 2008 Related to External flooding 2009-APR-9 Ml09:030l n Oconee External Flooding Briefing for Comm,.ssioner Jacrko 2009-APR-30 MlO'JOS70779 Ocor,pp Nuclear Station Units l , 2, and 3, £11aluatlo'l of Duke Energy Carot,n*s Seotembcr 26, 2008, Response 10 External Flood1rig, lndud1ng Fa1lurt of the Jocassee Dam 2009 MAY*l 1 Ml092940769 05/1 1/2009 Summ,,v of Closed M11eung with Ouke Encri;y Carohn.is, tLC, 10 Discuss P1eliminary Results of tho Recent Inundation and 5ens1tiv,ty Stu~uu Concrrn,na Failure of the Joc~ssee D.im and Resultant Flooding at OconeP Nuclear sw,on. 1. ,,
Md3 2009-MAY 11 Ml090820470 S/11/ 2009 Notice of Forthcom,ng Closed Mertine wltll Duke Energv Cdruhn.S, LLC.
to Discuss Scnslt1v1tv Studies Concernlns Fallure of the Joc.is*PP Oam a, Resultant Floadlns; a l the Oconee Nuclear Stauon, Unit 1, 2, & 3 2009-MAY*l 1 Ml0913804,4 0C0111Pf' Nuclear Station. Slides for Closing MPPtlns May 11, 2009 WI\~ Duke on the Oconee Flooding Issue 2009*MAY 20 Ml091470265 Oconee, Units I, 2 & 3, Request for Ex1ensI0, of Duke Response Time to Reftrencec letter 7009*MAY*26 Ml091480116 E*mail re Bnefing Package for Visit to Jocauee Dam on JJne 23, 2009 2009 JUN I Ml091590046 Ocorite, UMs 1, 2, and 3, Request 10 Wlthho,d Sens111ve Information In Presentation Materials left with Staff 2009 JUN 10 ML09168019S Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3 Interim 30-0ay Rl'sponse to Refc1ence 2 Enclosure, page 2
Ll~l of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocarnie Dam Date ADAMS Title 2009 JUN* l l Ml 091620669 6/11/09 Summarv of Closed M~ltn& w1lh Duke Carolin~ 10 01\CUS) Eaternal Flooding at Oconee i009-JUN*25 Ml091760072 NRC Site V1s11 to the Oconee Nuclear StMlon on June l S, 2009 2C09 JLL-9 ML092020480 Oconet, Units t , 2, & 3, Final 60-0,w Responsie 10 Reference 2 2009-IUL-28 Ml092230608 Oconet. Submfual of Selected L,censiee Commitmtnts Manual SlC Revision 2009-AVG-12 Ml09CS701 l 7 Oconee Flood Protertlon and l hl' JOCU\f'I' Dam Hatard Basis tor NRC Allowing Continued Operation 2009-AVG 27 Ml09238030S Oconee, Slides for Clost-d Meeting Regarding External Flood Tl!chmcal Meeting On August 27, 2009 2009-SEP 2S MLO!l:7 l0344 Site V/s,1 ObseMJtion on 09/2'!>/2009 by Joel Munday for Ocon('r 2009 OCT-28 Ml093080034 10/:'R/09 Slidts ro, Ocone-e Nucliear Stallon, UM$ 1. 2. and 3
- Meetina Slides
- E1tttrn11I Flood NRC Technical Mef'!ing 2009-NOV-30 Ml093J80701 Ocon..* Nuclur Slalton, Units I, 2, and 3, Otonee E~ternal Flood Anolyscs and AHociated Corree1i~e Actton Plan 2009 UlC-4 Ml09C680737 12/04/09 Summary of Closed Mtttine to Discuss the Duke Enerey Carolinas, LLC..
09/26/08 Response to NRC'i August l S. 2008 50.54(1) letter on Extern~! Flooding at Oconee-2C10*JAN*6 Ml l0C280954 01/06/2010 Briefing to the Execu1111e Tt>am on the Oconee Nuclear Slauon External Flooding Issue ZOlO*JAIHl MllOC*lS0066 Request Add1t1onal Information Regarding the Oconet External Floodu,g Issue 2010-JAN*lS ML100210199 Ocont>P. Vnits l , 2 and 3
- Additional lnformal,on Rega~ding Poslulated External flood Threat Issues 2010*JAN 29 Mll00271S91 Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolina, lLC (Duke), November 30, 2009, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter Dated April 30, 2009, Related to External f looding At Oconee Nuclear S1c111on. Units l, 2. And 3 (Oconee) 2010-FEB*B Mll004700S3 Oconee, Units l , 2, & 3, Exlernal Flood. Response to Request for Add1llonal lnformJt1on 2010*H8*26 ML100610674 Oconct. Untts 1, 2. & 3, £.eternal Flood Revlstd Commitment letter 2010-MAR*S MLl0:-4300~7 Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3, letter from Duke Energy Carohn.is, LLC Regordlng External Flood. Response to Request For Additional Information 2010* MAR* l 5 Mll00780084 Generic Faijure R.ie Evaluauon for Jocauee Oam Risk Analysis 20lO*MAR 18 ML100810388 Prepare Briefing Book and Material for Eric L~rd\ for 1he Ou~e Fleet MPPl1ng on March 18, 2010 i010*APR* l 4 Ml100760109 Gl'ne<nc Failure Rate Evaluation (Of Joecmee Dam 2010 MAY 27 ML101600468 Oconc-1', unns 1, 2 & 3, Response lo Requested information on the Protection Agaim1 fXtf'rnal flooding lnc!udrng a Postulated Failure of the Jocassen Dam lClO*IUN l ML JO! 750619 OUO
- Commun1cat1on Plan For Issuance ol Conhrm:itcrv Acuon Leller To Du~e For OconcP
- ENtPIO;JI Floodln8 lune 2010 2C 10 Jt.,N 3 Ml 101610083 OcontP Nudear Stillion, Uno\\ 1, 2, and 3,
- External Flood Comn1tmPnl*
2010*JU~ '2 Ml10~ 730329 OconPP, unns 1, 2 & 3, Conhrm11oryAct1on u:uer (CAl 2*10 0031, Comm11menu to Jlddress External Flooding Concerns 20 l0*JU~*29 Ml10~890803 06/29/2010 Summary of Closed Meeting w,1h Dute Energy Carolinas, UC, to 01scins E,cternill Floodins at Ocon...,
2010 JUL-7 ML101880768 OVO
- IR OS0002G9*10-002, 0S000210-J0-006, 05000287-10-006; Ol/01/2010
- 03/31/2010. Ocont>e Nucleir S1a11on Vr*ts 1. 2 and 3; lnte11m Compensaiorv Measures for External Flood 2010*1Ul -19 MLI0:900305 ldent iflcation of a Gentr,c h1erna1Flooding l~sue Due 10 Polential Dam f a,lurcs l;nclosu re. page :i
List of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Regarding Failure of Jocassee Dam Date ADAMS Title 20IO*AUG*2 ML102170006 Oconn UniU l , 2, & 3, Rl'sponse to Confirm.Cory Ae1lon Letlrr (CAL) 1 10*003 20JO*OCT 20 ML102910480 NRC AsSPssment of Oconee External Flooding Issue (OClober 18, 2010) 2010 ocr 2& ML102990064 NRC Staff A$$8Hment of Duke fnersv Carolinas, LlC, Oconee Ext('rn~I Flooding lssup (TAC NOS ME444 I, ME444t and Mf44"3) 2010-NO'll-79 Ml 103490330 O<l'n!!t Nuclear S11e, Units 1, 2, ,nd 3, Oconee Response t o Co.,l:rmJtory Ae11on Ll'IIN (CAL) 2*10*003 20ll*JA'I*~ Mlll0180609 Endosur, l, Ocone" Nud ear Stauon, MaJor Project Plans 20:1 JAtl-10 Ml 110260443 Non-concurrenc, on Oconee Auessment Lttter 2011 JAN-28 Mll l02801S3 Stafl Asses~ment of Duke's Response 10 Confirm~rorv Action Letter Regarding Duke's Commitments To Address f*tt'rn~I f lood1ns Concerns At The Oconee NuCIP~r Station, Units I, 2, And 3 (ONS) (TAC NOS ME306S, Mr !066. and ME3067) 20I 1-MAR*S Ml 103410042 Supplement to Techmc*I Ba!.ls for Allowing Oconee Nuclear Station to R<'main 10 Ope, at Ion Through November 2011, A$\QC1a\~d w,th th, Edl'rnal f looding ISSUPS 201 l MAR 1; Mll 10/40482 An31\ISIS Report for the P1oposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant S,tes Following Upstream Oam Failures 2011 *APR-29 Mll l 1460063 Oconee Nuclear Site, Units 1, 2, and 3, Response to Confirmarorv Action letter (CAL) 2* 10-003 2011 AUG* 16 Mll 1229A710 E-ma,I re Briefanil Package for Visit to Ocontt Nuclear Power Plant 0;1 September 12 13, 2011 2011 *AUo, 18 Mll ll 74A138 OconrP Nuclear Station, Units l , 2, ind 3, Assessment or Duke Energy Carolrnas. LLC April 29, 2011, Respon.se to Confirmatory Actl<>n Lener Regarding Modifications to Address External flooding Concerns (TAC Nos. ME6133, ME6134, and ME613S}
20ll-AUG 31 Ml ll2430114 Screening Analysis Report for the Proposed Gfonerk Issue on Flooding ot Nuclear Power Plant Sites following Upslrtam Oam Failures 2Cl l*SFP* 1 ML11?44A024 Briehnc Package for Visit 10 Oconee Nudear Power Plant on September 12 13, 2011 20ll*OCT*3 Mll 1278Al73 Oconl'e Nuclrar Station (ONS}, Units 1. 2, and 3. Response to Requests for Additional lnfor mation Regardillg Necessary Modifications to Enhance the Qipab11ity of the CNS Site to Withstand the Postulated Fallurt of the Joossee Oam 20: lo:; 17 Mll 1294A341 Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units l, 2. and 3, Respome to Requests for Addi! ional Information Regard1na Ne-cessary M odif,cattons to Enhan~~ t he Cacabil ty of the ONS Site to Withmnd the Postulattd F.illure of the Jocassee Dom 2011-0E:*16 Mll1350049S screening Analysis Report fort he Proposed Generic tuue on Flood1ne of Nuclear Power Pl1n1 Sito~ Following Upstre,m Oam Fallures_redacted 2012*1AN*2b ML12C26A549 Briefing Package for Commissioner Svinldtl VlSll to OConee on Ftbruarv 1. 201 2 2012-JAN 31 MLHC26A2S4 Commun1ca1,on Plan for OcoOl'c Nutlear StaUon IONS) Followtns issuance 0 1 GI 204 Wl2 *rn-3 Mll2C39A239 Oconel', Units 1, 2 and 3 Request for Withholding from Public 01sclosure Duke (nergv Lellcr Oaltd MiV 20, 2009 lnvolvms Postulated F.illure or the Jocas~~,. Oam 2012 rrn 9 Mll2C39A2 17 Briefing Package Request fo* Met'llng with Duke Enl.'rgy on February 16, 2012 Enclosure, page 1
1.i~t of NRC Correspondence, Memos and Studies Reg,uding Failure of Jocas~eP Dam Date ADAMS Title*
2012
- fi; 17 ML12053A016 Duke Entrgv C*rolinn, LLC
- Recommended Revls!oM 10 the o,one~ Nucleu Station Section of NRC's Screl'nlng Analvsis Report for the Proposl'<1 Gene11c Issue on Floodlns of Nuclt>ar Plant Sites Follow,ng UpStream Dam Fallure 2012 C[B. 2) Mll2058A236 02/23/12 Summary of a TeleconferPnce betwl'en the US NRC and Duke (oer.?v Regarding Comments made by Duke Energy Concerning ti-" Issuance of thP Screening Analv,ls Report for Generic Issue 204 2012 MI.R*S M.O<J0~l0,6~ NRC Information Notice 2012*002 Potentfallv Noncons,rvallvl' Scrf!ning Value For Dam ~a,lure frequency In Probablllstk Risk ~eumenu 201Z*MAY*1S ML12129Al86 Oconee Nucleilr Station, Units l, 2, and 3
- Request fo1 Addluon*I tnfo,m,uron Regarding Modifications to Addrtss the External Flcoding Concerns {TAC NOS.
ME7970, ME7971, ANO MC7972) 20:2-,u,~ 14 Mll2167A372 Oconee, Units 1, 2. and 3, Response to Requests for Add,t,on,11 rnformat10n Reg¥ding Mod1f1tatlons to Address External Flooding Concerns 2012*JUL* l l ML12215A327 07/11/2012 Licensee Non-Public Ml'l'ting Slides on Oconf'P Extetn*I Flood M,t,gauon J012 JUl*ll !:,-It l ~lt;!'./\07! Briefing PaclcagP for MePtlng with Ou~e Energy on July 11, 2012 2012 ALG*7 ~11 I i';>C,bAJ25 Briefmg Book for Meeting with Duke Enercv on Au11ust 7, 2012 2012-SEP-20 Mtl2268A404 Communication Plan for Flooding September 2012 2012-SEP*ZO ML12219A163 OconeP Nuclear Station, Units t, 2 and 3
- Response to Questions Ri-garding Modif1calion\ 10 Address hternal Flooding Hazards (TAC Nos ME7970. ME797l, AND ME7972J Enclosure. page S
ICopy included the redaction.
OFF ,C,AL U~E 014LY Memos to File Prtpond II), i ..,.l)CCI j OI/Va/10/J I
Case
Title:
Release or NRG Security Case Number: C 13 001 Related Documents by RES Employee Onginatlon Oodink: j
Subject:
OIG Receipt of Letter from U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. dated December 18, 2012, LIEBERMAN Report Date: 12/18/2012 Narrative:
Cl*
StlllUS: Closed /lkTw Olher Editors: Edit Authortzatlon:
Request Review Approval:
Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 8:00 AM To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa Cc: !(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) !'LSCriscione@gmail.com*
Subject:
FW: MOU between USACE and ACRS Attachments: 2016-Mar-1 MOU between ACRS and USACE.pdf Sara, et. al.,
The email below is just an example of how ridiculous we are being about keeping flooding information secret. The attached MOU between the ACRS and the USACE was not publicly released in ADAMS when it was implemented and now, after being released under the FOIA, is still not in ADAMS. And the NRC contact for that MOU will not even speak about it. Why? What kind of organization have we become?
I realize that the fact that Fort Calhoun could be flooded to beyond the height of the turbine building is embarrassing to both the NRC and the USACE, but if you lived in Omaha would you not like to know this?
Larry From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, May 05, 20161:13 PM To: Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>; Bley, Dennis <Dennis.Bley@nrc.gov>
Cc: 'Dennis Bley' (bley@buttonwoodconsulting.com) <bley@buttonwoodconsulting.com>
Subject:
RE: MOU between USACE and ACRS
- Brad, What does the email below mean? Are you telling me you do not want me to ever ask you anymore questions?
You are listed under section E of the attached MOU as the NRC interface for that MOU. Can you at least tell me whom at the NRC I should contact if I have any questions regarding the attached MOU?
I'm asking you because you are the only NRC staff member whose name appears in the MOU. If there is a better contact, I would appreciate knowing who it is.
R/
Larry From: Harvey, Brad Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 11:45 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence <Lawrence.Criscionc@nrc.gov>; Bley, Dennis <Dcnnis.Bley@nrc.gov>
Cc: 'Dennis Bley' (blcy@buttonwoodconsulting.com) <bley@buttonwoodconsulting.com>
Subject:
RE: MOU between USACE and ACRS Larry:
Please remove me from future emails.
Thank you.
Brad From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 2:41 PM To: Harvey, Brad <Brad.Harvey@nrc.gov>; Bley, Dennis <Dennis. Bley@nrc.gov>
Cc: 'Dennis Bley' (blcy@buttonwoodconsulting.com) <bley@buttonwoodconsulting.com>
Subject:
MOU between USACE and ACRS Brad/Dennis, Do you know the ADAMS accession numbers for the attached MOUs?
Are there any documents in ADAMS relating to Dr. Ballinger's review of flood hazard assessments (mentioned in the MOUs)?
- Thanks, Larry 573-230-3959 From: Stevens, Margo Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 1:49 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence <Lawrence.Criscione@nrc.gov>
Subject:
RE: FW: FOIA/ PA-2016-0455 Final Response I do not know the answers to your qu,estions. (After receiving the records from ACRS, I did a very quick search, using the Enterprise Search Tool, in ADAMS and did not locate them, but I am not particularly expert in ADAMS). As to the why, I don't know. That is not within my wheelhouse.
- Marao L Stevens
- fOIJl .'A.na[yst/'ieam Leaaer (Contractor)
OCIO/CS'D/j'PI'B
'U.S. Nucfear '.Regulatory Commission 11545 'R.ocivi<<e Ptke, Jvtai[Stoy 'i-2:J7
'Rocivi<<e, Jvtaryfana 20855
'J'efeyfume #: (3oi) 415-8148 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 1:47 PM To: Stevens, Margo <M argo.Stevens@m c.gov>
Subject:
FW: FW: FOIA/PA-2016-0455 Final Response
- Margo, I received the attached memoranda of understanding today in response to FOIA request 2016-0455.
Are these two MOUs in ADAMS? If so, what are the Accession numbers? If not, why not?
- Thanks, Larry 573-230-3959
Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscio ne, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 7:54 AM Kirkwo od, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa To:
Cc: l(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) I
Subject:
Need-to- Know regarding nuclear safety issues associat ed w ith flooding Sara, et. al.,
Please see the emails below from October 25, 2012 (the first five emails in the trail below).
I believe that flooding information is being handled as "need-to-know" for no other reason than because it is embarrassing.
It is embarrassing to the NRC that a significant proportion of the older nuclear plants are not adequately protected from flooding.
It is embarrassing to the USACE that their flooding predictions are often inaccurate.
The public living downstream of dams and vulnerable reactor plants have a right to know the hazard they are exposed to. It is the commission's statutory right to allow these reactors to continue to operate despite the hazards associated with them, but it is not their right to obstruct public awareness of these hazards. Since the beginning of my involvement in this issue, my primary concern was the lack of openness and transparency regarding how flooding hazards are handled. My 2012 letters to the Chairmen of the NRC, the E&PW and the HS&GA were attempts to bring these issues out into the open .
As part of your efforts, I hope your team addresses the abuse of "need-to-know" criteria regarding flooding issues and how such abuse is impeding scientific and engineering review of the problems.
To my knowledge there is no statutory or regulatory risk limit for nuclear accidents. My understanding is that it is up to the commission to decide if a license needs to be revoked due to unwarranted public risk. I personally do not have a problem with that system. My concern is that we are not being open with the public regarding what the risks are. We should undertake to determine flooding risks as best we can and ensure that the public are adequately informed. Instead, we are allowing licensees to make unwarranted assumptions in order to minimize their risks and are keeping our deliberations from the public-and even from our own staff-by inappropriately marking material pertaining to acts of nature as "Security-Related Information", by internally silo-ing records, and by regularly abusing FOIA exemption 7(F).
Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Se nt: Thursday, April 28, 2016 5:39 PM To: We ber, Michael <Michael.Weber@nrc.gov>; NTEU, Chapter 208 <NTEU@nrc.gov>
Cc: Hackett, Edwin <Edwin.Hackett@nrc.gov>; Correia, Richard <Richard.Correia@nrc.gov>; Peters, Sean
<Sean. Peters@nrc.gov>; Heard, Robert < Robert.Heard@nrc.gov>; Schwartz, Maria <Maria.Schwartz@nrc.gov>;
Campbell, Andy <Andy.Campbell@nrc.gov>; Bley, Dennis <Dennis.Bley@nrc.gov>
Subject:
Who Determines Need-To-Know for QUO?
Mike/Sheryl,
As can be seen from the email trail below, I have been trying to get an answer to the handling of Official Use Only information for quite some time.
1* 1(6),(b )[7J(A),0, )(71(C)
!(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) I over lunch today I met with seven colleagues from RES , NRR and NRO to discuss outstanding flooding concerns. At that meeting I was informed that certain supervisors in NRO have deemed certain flooding information and studies as sensitive information subject to strict need-to-know restrictions.
That is, my NRO colleagues told me they had to talk around certain concerns because I-and others present-were not formally assigned to work on those issues and to know those concerns.
Please note that none of the issues were related to nuclear security. These issue pertained entirely to nuclear SAFETY issues (e.g. Probabilistic Maximum Precipitation estimates for certain sites, flood inundation levels, etc.).
Please also see the attached OCWE flyer from Bill Borchardt.
To me, the restrictions placed on the NRO staff directly contradicts the work environment purported by Mr.
Borchardt.
But it is much worse than that.
r )(6).(b)(7 )(A),(b)(7)(C)
Think about that for a minute. l(b)(6),(bJ(7)(A),(b)(7 )(C) I (b)(b),(bJ(/)(A),(0)(1}\l,}
That's messed up. Waaaaaay messed up.
Today, I also found out that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards needed to agree to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) prior to being allowed to see certain flooding information.
Think about that for a minute. This is unclassified information. It is not safeguards. None of it has any value in determining how to breach a dam. These studies were done at the request of the NRC to aid in determining how dam failures will affect the viability of reactor plants. Yet the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards cannot automatically see these studies?????
I would appreciate it if I could get a definitive answer from Mike to the following:
- 1. Are bargaining unit employees allowed to discuss SUNSI (i.e. information that is neither unclassified nor Safeguards) with any colleague whose opinion they so choose to seek?
- 2. If not, how is the need-to-know determined? That is, how is an employee to determine which colleagues cannot know of SUNSI nuclear safety concern?
- 3. Is there any SUNSI material which NRC employees are prohibited from providing to Congressional Oversight Committees l (bJ(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) I?
- 4. If so, who makes that determmat1on ?
I recognize PII, allegation material, attorney/client privilege all fall under some definition of SUNSI. But in lieu of a better term, I am using SUNSI to refer to nuclear safety related information that is, for whatever reason, not public information. I am not at all confused on the prohibition of sharing PII, allegation material, attorney-client privilege, etc. so please restrict your answer to SUNSI that pertains solely to nuclear safety.
Please answer my questions directly. As can be seen below, I have for several years been bounced around between various NRC offices, web pages, 10 CFR references, and obtuse Management Directive references that do not address these questions.
This is an issue that gravely affects the Safety Culture of this agency. Imagine an individual with concerns regarding the flooding evaluation at Oconee being told that he cannot discuss the matter with fellow colleagues in his branch because they have no "need-to-know". Imagine the stress of being told by your superiors to sign off on an evaluation and not being able to discuss your concerns with your trusted peers. These are not hypotheticals; they have happened and are happening.
I would appreciate it from Sheryl if she would assist me in getting answers to my questions above. This is an NRC issue not a RES issue (in fact, to my knowledge, there is nothing in RES restricted to a "need-to-know"). To me, this should be brought up at the ALMPC .
I am not saying there is no guidance. As can be seen from the email trail below, there is plenty of guidance. It's just not in a form that can be applied.
I would like the NRC to go on record stating that there are certain SUNSI documents that cannot be supplied to Congress (b)( ),(b (7)(A), r confirming that there are no prohibitions against providing SUNSI documents to Congress (b)(?)(C) And I would like the NRC to go on record stating that all employees can view discuss SUNSI nuclear safety concerns with their peers or confirming that there are certain prohibitions against sharing SUNSI material with peers not directly assigned to work on those materials.
V/r, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione RES/DRA/HFRB 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2015 10:41 AM To: Correia, Richard <Richard.Correia@nrc.gov>; West, Steven <Steven.West@nrc.gov>; Peters, Sean
<Sean.Peters@nrc.gov>
Subject:
Management 's Credibility There has been much discourse on this SUNSI issue both via email and in cubicle and cafeteria conversations. Much of it is stated less professionally and more cynically than Ed's email below. Ed's mention of a DPO is a sarcastic reference to one of Ron's responses; no one is going to waste their time attempting to address any of these items with a DPO.
Just because most of your staff is focused on doing their jobs and do not wish to ruffle anyone's feathers, please don't think that there are only two people (i.e. me and Richard Perkins) complaining about this. This has been a long-standing complaint amongst certain personnel at NRR long before I was ever hired at the NRC-my involvement in this issue came as a result of their complaints to me. And there is widespread dissatisfaction in RES regarding these matters and how our management has avoided addressing them.
There might be a large contingent of managers and staff who resent "open government", but there is a very concerned contingent of technical staff who are appalled at what we are not allowed to share with the public. And they are equally appalled by the lack of professionalism that has gone into resolving this
issue. We expect our leaders to lead and not to politically avoid the difficult questions they are well-paid to confront. Balancing open government and SUNSI is one such issue.
Ron Gagnon is the supposed SUNSI expert for the agency and it is his determination that many of these questions are the prerogative of the office. I say we run with that determination. I say that in the absence of agency ownership of SUNSI, we take ownership of the SUNSI policies for our office. If you would like me to (and if Sean will allow me time to work on it), I can draft some guidance on how to determine what is SUNSI, how to apply "need-to-know" and how to conduct "portion-marking".
I know Brian believes SUNSI is owned by ADM, but ADM-and specifically the SUNSI lead in ADM-believes that specific SUNSI guidance (vice the broad policies put out by ADM in MD 12.6) is the prerogative of the individual offices. This makes sense. Understandably ADM does not feel comfortable writing prescriptive guidance for NRR, RES, etc. We know our work and should be the ones translating the high-level ADM SUNSI policies into workable prescriptive guidance for our people.
V/r, Larry From: ODonnell, Edward Sent: Monday, March 02, 2015 1:53 PM To: Orr, Mark; Barr, Jonathan; Criscione, Lawrence
Subject:
FW: Need-to-Know requirements for SUNS!
The answers leave one hanging. Perhaps a differing professional opinion should be invoked regarding them.
From: Gagnon, Ronald Sent: Monday, March 02, 2015 1:49 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Janney, Margie; Correia, Richard; Sullivan, Randy; Perkins, Richard; Bensi, Michelle; Sancaktar, Selim; Philip, Jacob; Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante, Fernando; Barnes, Valerie; Desaulniers, David; ODonnell, Edward; Kanney, Joseph; Patterson, Malcolm; King, Mark; Burton, Thomas; Peters, Sean; Cardenas, Daniel
Subject:
RE: Need-to-Know requirements for SUNS!
- Larry, Please see my replies adjacent to your questions.
Thank you, Ron Ronald E. Gagnon OIS / PMPD / IPB United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11545 Rockville Pike, Mail Stop O-6H 11 Rockville, MD 20852 Office: 301-415-6873 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, February 27, 2015 3:23 PM To: Gagnon, Ronald Cc: Janney, Margie; Correia, Richard; Sullivan, Randy; Perkins, Richard; Bensi, Michelle; Sancaktar, Selim; Philip, Jacob;
Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante, Fernando; Barnes, Valerie; Desaulniers, David; ODonnell, Edward; Kanney, Joseph; Patterson, Malcolm; King, Mark; Burton, Thomas; Peters, Sean; Cardenas, Daniel
Subject:
RE: Need-to-Know requirements for SUNS!
Thanks Ronald. I've copied some colleagues on this email so they can see your answer below and so that they might contact you If they have their own questions about it.
I've highlighted two items below that are still unclear (subject matter expert and need-to-know determination):
1.a) Who are the subject matter experts for flooding and dam failures? Check with your office leadership.
1.b) What document designates them as such? Check with your office leadership.
1.c) What guidance do they use to determine what is sensitive and what is not? Check with your office leadership, (reference internal NRC SUNSI, SGI, Classified guidance).
1.d) If you disagree with their determination, is there an appeal process?
As you probably already know. NRC has a mechanism in place where differing professional opinions can be discussed and resolved. The NRC Differing Professional Opinions Program, Management Directive 10.159 states the following objectives: To foster informal discussions with peers and supervisors on issues involving professional Judgments that may differ from a currently held view or practice, To establish a formal process for expressing differing professional opinions (DPOs) concerning issues directly related to the mission of NRC, To ensure the full consideration and prompt disposition of DPOs by affording an Independent, impartial review by knowledgeable personnel, To ensure that ail employees have the opportunity to (a) express DPOs in good faith, (b} have their views heard and considered by NRC management, and (c) be kept fully informed of the status of milestones througlnout the process, To protect employees from retaliation in any form for expressing a differing opinion, To recognize submitters of DPOs when their DPOs have resulted in significant contributions to the mission of the agency, To provide for agency-wide oversight and monitoring, to ensure that implementation of these procedures accomplishes the stated objectives, and to recommend appropriate changes when required.
2.a) For SUNSI, do we (i.e. the technical staff) need to obtain our supervisor's permission prior to sharing information with a Congressional office? This question is outside the scope of SUNS!. Please check with your leadership for official NRC policies regarding communications with Congress. The Office of Congressional Affairs should be able to articulate current policies regarding this question.
2.b) For SUNSI that is related to nuclear safety issues or to agency policies on applying FOIA redactions (i.e. not PII, allegation material, or other highly specific forms of SUNSI that have nothing to do with typical NRC correspondence and reports) do we need our supervisor's permission prior to discussing the information with our NRC colleagues who are not formally assigned to work on the issue? That is, can I share nuclear safety information with my NRC co-workers even though that information has been designated SUNSI and they have not been formally assigned to work on the issue? Please check with your leadership and the FOIA office- (if you have a FOIA redaction question). As you are aware, in addition to having authorized access to SUNSI information there is a need to know component to SUNS!. In order to allow access to another party, an authorized holder of SUNSI information must make a determination that a prospective recipient requires access to specific information to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function.
2.c) If I can get to it in ADAMS, can I assume I have a de-facto right to know it? Perhaps, but not exclusively. For example, if a document has been mistakenly categorized / entered into ADAMS it does not give an employee the right to view or distribute it without the proper access credentials. If a government employee came across a classified document on-line through a Google search , that government employee is not authorized access unless they have the proper clearance and need to know, even though the document is easily available to anyone searching for it. If not, how do I determine that I have accessed a document that I have no right to see and to whom do I report it? One way to report a document spill would be by advising your supervisor and accessing the following link:
http://www.internal.nrc.gov/incident.html (please note that other notifications may be necessary depending on the type of spill).
R/
Larry From: Gagnon, Ronald Sent: Friday, February 27, 2015 2: 15 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Janney, Margie; Correia, Richard
Subject:
RE: Need-to-Know requirements for SUNS!
Good afternoon Larry, It was a pleasure speaking with you this afternoon. During our conversation we explored several topics including your questions below. We discussed the Controlled Unclassified Program (CU I) and how it would consolidate the SUNS! and SGI programs at the NRC, and how it would offer a government-wide, uniform way of handling sensitive unclassified information. Your asked the following SUNSI related questions:
- 1. If I am referencing a document marked SUNSI, since there are no portion markings how do I determine what material is SUNSI and what is not? If I reference anything in the document, must my new document now be marked as SUNSI?
Derivative products should always be marked to ensure that the sensitive information in the document is fully protected according to agency policy. If the document is not portion marked, then the entire document is considered SUNS! until such time as a subject matter expert determines otherwise. Documents that are marked SUNSI and not portion marked can be reviewed by the originator to determine which portion is sensitive, ie. 2.390 information. A derivative document using any information from a SUNSI document that is not portion marked must have the referenced portion marked as SUNSI.
- 2. How do I determine need-to-know with regard to SUNSI? If I come across an interesting nuclear issue (e.g. a nuclear site which some colleagues believe is inadequately protected from flooding), can I discuss that issue with my fellow employees or is there some type of vetting process I must use? That is, are unclassified and non-Safeguards nuclear safety concerns fair game for discussion with all NRC colleagues or must information be "silo-ed" into a tightly controlled group of individuals who are officially assigned to address the issue?
Need-to-know typically means a determination made by an authorized holder of information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific information to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function. This determination would be made by the leadership elements in the office where the work is performed.
Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.
Thank you for your questions, Ronald E. Gagnon OIS / PMPD / IPB United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11545 Rockville Pike, Mail Stop O-6H 11 Rockville, MD 20852 Office: 301-415-6873
From: SUNS! Resource Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2015 7:44 AM To: Gagnon, Ronald; Janney, Margie
Subject:
FW: Need-to-Know requirements for SUNSI From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2015 7:44:21 AM To: SUNS! Resource Cc: Correia, Richard; Peters, Sean; Perkins, Richard; Bensi, Michelle; Sancaktar, Selim; Philip, Jacob; Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante, Fernando; Barnes, Valerie; Desaulniers, David; ODonnell, Edward; King, Mark; Burton, Thomas; Patterson, Malcolm; Kanney, Joseph
Subject:
Need-to-Know requirements for SUNS!
Auto forwarded by a Rule SUNSI Resource:
I have some questions regarding SUNSI which my division director has been attempting to help me get answered. He provided me the following references but neither of them address the questions I have:
NRC's SRI guidance: http://www.internal.nrc.gov/sunsi/security.html FAQs available on the SUNS! website address commonly requested topics: http://www.internal.nrc.gov/sunsi/faq.html My questions are:
- 1. If I am referencing a document marked SUNSI, since there are no portion markings how do I determine what material is SUNSI and what is not? If I reference anything in the document, must my new document now be marked as SUNSI?
- 2. How do I determine need-to-know with regard to SUNSI? If I come across an interesting nuclear issue (e.g. a nuclear site which some colleagues believe is inadequately protected from flooding), can I discuss that issue with my fellow employees or is there some type of vetting process I must use? That is, are unclassified and non-Safeguards nuclear safety concerns fair game for discussion with all NRC colleagues or must information be "silo-ed" into a tightly controlled group of individuals who are officially assigned to address the issue?
Also, I have some comments about the "SUNSI Awareness Training" linked to from the SUNSI "Frequently Asked Questions" website (and attached to this email). On slide 6 a colloquial definition of SUNSI is provided as:
"Or put another way ... lf information appeared on the front page of the Washington Post and you cringe when you see it . ... lt's probably sensitive".
I believe that:
- The above definition is deleterious to our goals of openness and transparency
- Unfortunately, your colloquial definition is broadly used within the NRC. That is, it is my experience that most SUNSI material is marked that way because if it "appeared on the front page of the Washington Posf' it would make us cringe.
I'm not the only NRC employee who has been asking these questions. How we determine SUNS! is a concern shared by several of my colleagues.
Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Correia, Richard Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2015 3:48 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Peters, Sean; Madden, Patrick
Subject:
RE: OIG Case 13-001 and OUO-SRI
http://www.internal.nrc.gov/sunsi/security.html as a source of information. Please take a look at the information at the link and let me know if it has the information you are seeking.
Regards Rich Richard Correia, PE
- Director, Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research US NRC richard.correia@nrc.gov From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 11:28 AM To: Correia, Richard
Subject:
RE: OIG Case 13-001 and OUO-SRI Thanks Rich.
Daniel Cardenas referred me to Adm in but did not give me the name of a contact.
From: Correia, Richard Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2015 9:08 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence
Subject:
RE: OIG Case 13-001 and OUO-SRI Let me make some phone calls Larry Richard Correia, PE
- Director, Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research US NRC
richard.correia@nrc.gov From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 1:48 PM To: Correia, Richard
Subject:
OIG Case 13-001 and OUO-SR1 Rich ,
Attached is the transcript from your 2 012 interview with OIG concerning Case 13-001. It was provided to me 1
as part of a Privacy Act request and I'm sending it along to you in case you would like a copy.
Please see my email below to Daniel Cardenas. I still have a lack of understanding on OUO-SRI, mostly stemming from the fact that-unlike SGI and classified information-it (1) is not portion marked, (2) has no derivative classifiers, and (3) is applied to such broad topics that it has no well-defined need-to-know (e.g. who has a need-to-know about the Oconee flooding issues? Is ii only the narrow set of NRR employees addressing it? Or is it any concerned NRC employee who might have an opinion that adds to the discussion?).
V/r, Larry From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 1:37 PM To: Cardenas, Daniel
Subject:
OIG Case 13-001
- Dan, Attached is the transcript from your 2 012 interview with OIG concerning Case 13-001. It was given to me as 1
part of a Privacy Act request and I'm sending it along to you in case you would like a copy.
The investigation for Case 13-001 closed on September 11, 2013.
As part of the resolution to the PEER v. NRC lawsuit, the on September 13, 2013 the NRC publicly released the two documents which were the subject of the NRC Form 183 security incident which was filed against me on September 20, 2012. Those documents can be found at:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1325/ML13256A372.pdf http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1325/ML13256A370.pdf The only redactions to those documents are my home address, my cell phone number and my personal email account. This indicates-to me-that I was not in error when I failed to mark these documents as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information".
Given that OUO-SRI documents are not portion marked, I still have no understanding of:
- 1. How I am to determine what exactly in those documents is OUO-SRI
- 2. How-when I am preparing a downstream document which references information found in OUO-SRI documents-I am to determine the final designation of my document and who the authority is if I have questions
- 3. To whom do I appeal if I do not agree with the OUO-SRI designation of a document
- 4. How to determine who has a "need to know" with regard to OUO-SRI information R,
Larry From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2014 9:27 AM To: Correia, Richard; Weber, Michael; Sheron, Brian; Madden, Patrick; Peters, Sean; Sullivan, Randy; Burrows, Sheryl; ODonnell, Edward
Subject:
Who Determines Need-to-Know?
Thanks Rich.
I'd like to clarify though that even if we have a precise definition, a large part of my concern is "Who determines need-to-know?"
For example, if I am confident that a document marked "Not for Public Disclosure" can go to a congressional office, can I send it to them or must I first go through OGC and OCA?
Or, if I am confident that an INL contractor has a need to know proprietary information we got from INPO, can I directly send it to him or do I first need to consult with my supervisor, the NRC owner of the INPO MOU, OGC, etc.?
From: Correia, Richard Sent: Tuesday, June 10, 2014 7:02 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence; Weber, Michael; Sheron, Brian; Madden, Patrick; Peters, Sean; Sullivan, Randy; Burrows, Sheryl; ODonnell, Edward
Subject:
RE: Need Assistance from RES and NTEU
- Larry, I contacted folks in the Information Security Branch of NSIR and they pointed out that "need to know" is defined in 10CFR73.2 for handling safeguards information. I'm not certain if it would have a similar definit ion for SUNSI. I'll follow up with OGC on whether need to know has a definition for SUNSI.
Rich Richard Correia, PE
- Director, Division of Risk Analysis Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research US NRC richard.correia@nrc.gov From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Monday, June 02, 2014 5:50 PM To: Weber, Michael; Sheron, Brian; Correia, Richard; Madden, Patrick; Peters, Sean; Sullivan, Randy; Burrows, Sheryl; ODonnell, Edward
Subject:
Need Assistance from RES and NTEU Please see my October 25, 2012 email below to Dan Cardenas. I've highlighted several questions in that email which I never received answers to.
On October 25, 2012 I was directed to review our SUNSI guidance and to discuss it with the chief of the Facilities Security Branch. I reviewed the guidance but had some questions which, 19-months later, I still do not know the answers to.
I would like the assistance of RES management and the NTEU in obtaining answers from Mr. Cardenas. I believe I am not the only one at the NRC who is unclear as to what exactly constitutes a "need to know' and "conducting official government business". Better clarifying these terms, especially with regard to OIG Case 13-001 which led to a criminal referral to the Department of Justice, is in the interest of the NRC staff.
If you have advice for me as to how to obtain answers from the requisite SUNSI experts, please let me know.
Thank you, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Monday, June 02, 2014 5:35 PM To: Cardenas, Daniel; Ross-Lee, MaryJane Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Peters, Sean; Correia, Richard; Sullivan, Randy; NTEU, Chapter 208; Burrows, Sheryl
Subject:
FW: Questions
- Dan, Attached to this email is a document entitled "Exhibit 3 to 0/G Case 13-001" which I received today in response to FOIA 2014-0236. The memo is undated. Could either you or MaryJane please tell me the date on which MaryJane sent this memo to Rich Correia? Was it before or after our correspondence in the email trail below?
On February 4, 2013 agents of the NRC's Inspector General approached the Assistant US Attorney's office in Springfield, IL and requested of them that I be indicted on federal felony charges (18 USC § 1030) for obtaining supposed security-sensitive information from a government database (i.e. NRC internal ADAMS) and supposedly colluding to distribute that information to the public (e.g. via a Congressional hearing). The information of concern was my September 18, 2012 letter to the NRC Chairman, the email distributing it, and the nine reference documents. These are the same documents of concern in our email trail below.
In an October 25, 2012 email (included immediately below) I asked you a series of questions regarding MD 12.6, various guidance you directed me to review (found at http://www.internal.nrc.gov/sunsi/), and an explanation of what exactly constitute "need to know" and "conducting official government business. I have highlighted those questions in the email below. The documents attached to this email refer to some of those questions.
I never received any answers to the questions I posed to you 19 months ago in the email below. And after being the subject of an OIG criminal investigation for the distribution of supposed security related documents to individuals without a supposed "need to know", I still do not know the answers to the questions I pose below. OIG Case 13-001 has been closed for over 9 months. Please provide me answers to my questions below as I am still uncertain what exactly I can and cannot share with our Congressional overseers and the precise channels I am required to follow.
I look forward to your answers.
Thank you, Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:37 PM To: Cardenas, Daniel Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Coe, Doug; Ross-Lee, MaryJane; Pretzello, Andrew; Skidmore, Karen; ODonnell, Edward; Sullivan,
Randy
Subject:
Questions
- Dan, I have some questions regarding the guidance on the 015 SUNS! website and MD 12.6.
- 1) In the attached document "2005-10-26 guidance.pdf" I've highlighted a sentence stating that portion markings are not required. However, in the document "2010-04-27 guidance.pdf' I've highlighted where it states:
When is portion or page marking required? On documents that may be released following redaction of sensitive information. If an entire page is not sensitive, place marking adjacent to the sensitive information.
I am a big believer in portion markings. It frustrates me to no end that none of the 2008-2012 OUO correspondence between the NRC and Duke Energy regarding Jocassee Dam is portion marked. This correspondence clearly meets the instructions above for requiring that the documents be portion marked. That is, the overwhelming majority of the pages in the NRC/Duke correspondence have portions that are not sensitive and this NRC correspondence with a licensee concerning a serious safety concern should certainly be released following redaction of sensitive information. Yet there are no portion markings. Which guidance is correct: the 2005-10-26 or the 2010-04-27 guidance? Should NRR's correspondence with Duke Energy from May 2010 through the present have been portion marked?
- 2) On page 2 of the attached "NRC Policy for Handling Marking and Protection SUNSl.pdf" I have highlighted a paragraph on " Need-To-Know Access". This paragraph contains the words:
" ... no person, including employees of the U.S. Government, NRC, ....... may have access to SUNS/ unless that person has an established need-to-know the information for conducting official business."
I am unclear what exactly constitutes "an established need-to-know the information for conducting official business." Some of my co-workers (particularly Richard Perkins, but many others as well) expressed concern to me that flooding issues at Oconee Nuclear Station and Fort Calhoun were not being adequately addressed. Although it is my job (and the job of all NRC employees) to take allegations from licensees, I do not believe it is my job (i.e. "conducting official business") to take allegations from my fellow NRC co-workers. Nonetheless, I reviewed some of the source documents regarding Jocassee Dam because I was concerned with the opinions I was hearing expressed from my co-workers. It was not my job to review these documents. Most of the review of these documents occurred after normal working hours, including times when - although allowed to be in the office or on Citrix - I am not allowed to formally work (i .e. beyond 8 pm, Sundays, while using annual leave/credit hours). Since I was reviewing this Information on my own time and not "for conducting official business", was I violating the "Need-to-Know".
Although I have only shared SUNSI with "employees of the U.S. Government", I am not certain all of them had "an established need-to-know the information for conducting official business":
- Does a staffer on the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs have "an established need-to-know the Information for conducting officml business"? If he does, must I send him through the Office of Congressional Affairs? Am I violating "Need-to-Know" by directly sending him references he requested?
- Does the intern for Representative Duncan of South Carolina's 3r d congressional district have "an established need-to-know the information for conducting offic1al business" when she is not investigating any matter for a congressional oversight committee and I am merely copying her as a courtesy to keep her representative abreast of a concern regarding a nuclear plant in his district?
- Does the Downstate Director (i .e. Springfield, IL office chief) of Senator Durbin have "an established need-to-know the information for conducting official business" when I am merely meeting with him to get his advice as to whether or not my senator wou ld be willing to write the NRC Chairman regarding the NRC's SU NSI policies?
(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) lt4) If I am writing a letter regarding how the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is inappropriately stamping safety related correspondence as "Security-Related Information", and if I am sending that letter to the US NRC Chairman and copying it to concerned congressional offices, and if I do not believe that marking the letter is essential to ensure proper handling and to ensure all persons having access to the letter will be aware that it (1) must not be publicly released and (2) must be distributed only to those who have a need-to-know to conduct official business, then am I in violation of M D 12.6 because I did not stamp the letter " Official Use Only - Security-Related Information"?
I was asked by a congressional staffer last month whether I believed the "Security-Related Information" stamps were hindering the open discussion of the Jocassee Dam/Oconee Issue amongst the NRC staff. His concern was based on the fact that some of NRR's Jocassee Dam correspondence contain the stamp "Limited Internal Distribution Permitted". My answer to him was that, although I believed these stamps were inappropriately keeping a serious safety concern from public scrutiny, these markings were not in any way hindering the professional internal discussion of concerns regarding Jocassee Dam. Based on what I have read in MD 12.6 tonight, I do not know if I still agree with that answer. When possible, I would like to meet with you regarding the four questions above. Also, I have had people within t he NRC request to see my 2012-09-18 letter to the chairman but I have been unwilling to share it with anyone since being told I was violating SUNSI guidance by not properly stamping it OUO- SRI. I would like to review that letter wit h you and get your assessment as to how it should be stamped.
R, Larry From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:50 PM To: Cardenas, Daniel
Subject:
RE: Information Release The version of MD 12.6 t hat is linked t o in the SUNSI website is from December 20, 1999. Is this t he version I am supposed to review or is there a more current revision?
From: Cardenas, Daniel Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:39 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Coe, Doug; Ross- Lee, MaryJane; Pretzello, Andrew; Skidmore, Karen; ODonnell, Edward; Sullivan, Randy
Subject:
Re: Information Release Larry-If you have read and understand the SUNSI guidance, then a meeting may not be necessary. I will contact you if a meeting is necessary. In regards to transmission of SUNS! outside the NRC, please contact your supervisor as identified
in MD 12.6 and follow applicable guidance located on the OIS SUNSI website.
Regards.
Dan
- Sent from an NRG Blackberry -
Daniel Cardenas, Chief Facilities Security Branch Division of Facilities and Security Office of Administration U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
______1 Office Email: Daniel.Cardenas@nrc.gov Office Numb~r: {301) 415-618 Cell Numberl(5)(m-Fax Number: (301) 415-5132 From: Criscione, Lawrence To: Cardenas, Daniel Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Coe, Doug; Ross-Lee, MaryJane; Pretzello, Andrew; Skidmore, Karen; ODonnell, Edward; Sullivan, Randy Sent: Thu Oct 25 17:31:31 2012
Subject:
RE: Information Release Daniel, My Outlook calendar is up to date through the end of the year. I should be able to review MD 12.6 and the other guidance by tomorrow morning.
I' 1,,1.( I<7XAI.( 1(7,!:1 b b b Please send me a copy of the NRC Form 183 mentioned below so that I may review it prior to our meeting.
Is my union steward allowed to accompany me to the meeting?
V/r, Larry Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Cardenas, Daniel sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 5:01 PM To: Criscione, Lawrence Cc: Beasley, Benjamin; Coe, Doug; Ross-Lee, MaryJane; Pretzello, Andrew; Skidmore, Karen
Subject:
Information Release Importance: High Mr. Criscione-I have received a NRC Form 183 "Report of Security Incident" indicating that you have released information (Official Use Only - Security Related Information, etc) to personnel outside of the NRC. This release of information must "stop" immediately. The guidance for handling Sensitive Unclassified non-Safeguards Information (SUNSI) is identified in MD
12.6 and on the 015 webpage. Please see the following link, which provides detailed information on the handling of this type of information.
http://www.internal.nrc.gov/sunsi/
If you have released any other information, you must cease these activities, and report the releases to the Director, Division of Facilities and Security.
Please schedu le a time to discuss this matter with me.
Regards.
Daniel Cardenas Chief, Facilities Security Branch Division of Faci lities and Security, Office of Administration Location: T6-E3 1 Office Emuil: Dnnicl.Cnrdcnns@lnrc.gov Office Number: (3011,4 15-6184 NKC Ulnckbcny: .., l(b_.).._!6_,l....,.._,...-
NRC Fax: (30 1) 415-5 132
ML16201A100, as added by LCrlsclone.
Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2016 8:13 AM To: Kirkwood, Sara; Holahan, Gary; Clark, Theresa Cc: !(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) !'LSCriscione@gmail.com'
Subject:
Keeping inundation levels from the public Attachments: Toops' Interview.pdf Sara, et. al.,
The Toops family was washed out of their home when the upper reservoir at Taum Sauk failed on 2005-Dec-14.
Although this has nothing to do with nuclear power, I encourage you to read the short 21/2 page transcript of the their interview with the Missouri State Highway Patrol. On the third page Jerry Toops mentions how Ameren's emergency action plan for a failure of the upper reservoir "showed the water stooping short of his house".
In actuality, most of the water did stop short of his house. The flooding models accurately predicted the course of the bulk of the water. However, a rouge splash demolished his house and flushed him and his family out into the night.
Had Ameren's emergency action plan been in the public domain, it Is possible that some group (e.g. an environmental group, a university) might have studied the plan and found its inadequacies. I admit that it Is likely that, had this plan been public, no one would have reviewed it and found its flaws. But you will never convince me that making it public would have caused Jerry Toops and his family to be the victims of an Al-Qaeda plot to destroy the reservoir. There are very valid reasons for inundation studies to be in the public domain; the only reason for keeping these studies from the public are-as termed by the President-
- speculative or abstract fears".
Larry Lawrence S. Criscione 573-230-3959 From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2016 4:24 PM To: Desaulniers, David <David.Desaulnie1rs@nrc.gov>
Subject:
FW: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure - December 14, 2005 Attached is the Missouri State Highway Patrol interview of the Toops family. It's 21/2 pages long and a real easy read; reads like a newspaper article.
Somewhere in the lengthy emall trail below is a link to a very damning (pun intended) report by the staff of the Missouri Public Service Commission. I could have written a much worse assessment of Ameren's failed safety culture, but given the political influence that can be exerted on the MoPSC, the report is pretty good.
This made the national news the night it happened but even in Missouri was forgotten about within a month. Had it occurred in July instead of December, it would be one of the seminal disaster we all know about-maybe not up there with the Titanic and TMI but well discussed in engineering circles. With hundreds of dead campers, the production-over-safety of the Ameren officials and the wholesale destruction of incriminating emails on the part of some managers would have seen scrutiny in criminal courts instead of a stern rebuke by some Public Service Commission staffers.
From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 9:08 AM To: Hiland, Patrick <Patrick.Hiland@nrc.gov>
Cc: joseph.ehasz@wgint.com
Subject:
RE: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure - December 14, 2005 FERC leveled their largest fine to date against Ameren ($15 million) due to the organizational failing that led to the Upper Reservoir failure. I am not aware of what changed in FERC's regulations, but Joseph Ehasz was one of the contractors who either reviewed or performed the FERC assessment of the event and could likely inform you of all the regulatory enhancements which occurred.
To my knowledge though, dams do not have "Tech Specs" like nuclear plants do. When the Taum Sauk disaster occurred, there was a common mode failure affecting both channels of level indications that were used to shut off the pumps during a reservoir fill. At a nuclear plant, we would never allow continued operation with a known common mode failure of two channels of safety equipment.
What had happened was the stand pipes for the level indications were known to be moving in their brackets in a manner which caused indicated level to read lower than actual level. While waiting for an outage to fix the stand pipe brackets, the temporary "solution" was to recalibrate the level channels so that indicated level matched actual level. The problem with this "solution" is that it did not address the root cause - the movement of the standpipes. That is, the newly calibrated level could (and did) still drift if the standpipes again moved. I am confident that few nuclear plants would ever continue to operate in such a reckless situation, but we aren't dealing with nuclear plant operators and managers - we are dealing with hydro.
I'm not willing to take on faith that Duke Energy's non-nuclear management is any better than Ameren's, but even If I were there are still concerns regarding the workers. I've worked the back shift at power plants and know what goes on. The items Duke Energy committed to are excellent t hings to do, but as barriers to a nuclear accident they do not even begin to compare to building a flood berm.
Note in Jerry Toops' testimony to the Missouri State Highway Patrol (last page of the attached 4 page document) that Ameren's calculations prior to the Taum Sauk Disaster showed the flood waters stopping just shy of his house and Ameren's emergency plan committed to giving him a 12 minute warning. The only warning he got was the tremendous rumble of boulders, trees and water rushing down Proffit Mountain. And the "steady state" flood volume might have stopped just shy of his house, but a dynamic wave demolished his home a,nd nearly killed him, his wife and three children. I think a noble effort has been done by Duke Energy to estimate the flooding effects due to a dam break, but like Ameren their estimation could be a little off.
If this was 1971 we would be requiring Duke Energy to deterministically show that they could protect again st a catastrophic failure of the Lake Jocassee Dam. I recognize that "that ship has sailed" - that based on the poor understanding of dam failure frequencies that was present in the 1970s we gave them a license without requiring a deterministic evaluation. To be quite honest, I do not have an issue with them abandoning their plans for a flood wall. We cannot live with a 2.8E-4/year risk at 104 US reactors, but we can certainly live with that risk at 3 reactors in South Carolina. My concerns are:
- We haven't been transparent and open with the public about this issue
- As an agency we haven't dealt effectively with this issue over the past six years and there are important lessons to be learned from that but for some reason, unlike the utilities we regulate, we have no method for capturing poor organizational performance and analyzing it for ways to improve
- I see no security concerns surrounding Oconee/Jocassee, but others do (particularly in NRR) and yet I am not aware of any formal study or evaluation that has been done to determine whether or not the Lake Jocassee Dam is adequately protected from sabotage
The decision on what to allow at Oconee is ultimately up to the Commissioners. I can be satisfied with whatever decision they come up with as long as they and the public are fully aware of the risks and are aware of the limitations/uncertainties of the various studies and assessments. Jeff Mitman is the first to admit that his 2.8E-4/yr number might not be the actual number for Jocassee - it's merely the most accurate estimate he can provide from the available data. Likewise, any assessment we do on Duke Energys evaluations and contingencies must acknowledge the limitations of what we can estimate and the limited confidence we can place on human barriers (e.g. procedures, policies).
I've copied Joseph Ehasz. Hopefully he can inform us of what changes occurred at FERC regulated facilities as a result of Taum Sauk or point us to the FERC documents which discuss those changes. I am certain there were many improvements.
I appreciate NRR holding public meetings on the Jocassee/Oconee concerns.
From: Hiland, Patrick Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 8:12 AM To: Criscione, Lawrence
Subject:
RE: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure - December 14, 2005 If my memory cells are stil l working, I believe FERC imposed requirements/expectations on a number of hydro units they regulate including DUKE's Jocasee? Believe I recall their normal operating pool level was lowered in response to Taum Sauk? Not sure if I recall all the facts.
From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 5:11 PM To: Boska, John; Wilson, George; Miller, Ed; Bensi, Michelle; Monninger, John; Hiland, Patrick; Mitman, Jeffrey; Ferrante, Fernando; Kanney, Joseph; Chung, Donald; jriccio@greenpeace.org: joseph.ehasz@wqint.com
Subject:
FW: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure - December 14, 2005 Attached is some of the information on Taum Sauk. The "loops' Interview" is only three pages but is an excellent example of the important role engineers and technicians (and the federal bureaucrats who regulate them) have in ensuring the safety of the public. Most of the other documents are all either one or two pages. One of them is an Ameren press release from the day of the accident.
A more detailed discussion of the event i s found in the attached 85 page 2007-10-24 report from the staff of the Missouri Public Service Commission to the commissioners, which can be found at:
http://psc.mo.gov/ CMSlnternetData/Electric/Taum%20Sauk%20Report%2010-24-07.pdf The staff report has some good details on the Safety Culture failures at Ameren which led to the event. Duke Energy might be right to discount the engineering aspects of Taum Sauk, but it is my experience from working at four utilities and seven reactor sites that the organizational aspects of the Taum Sauk event cannot be discounted. I think it is excellent that they once a shift check turbidity of leaks through the dam and that they have a video camera on it. And I think it is excellent that they have procedures to shut down the reactors based on Incoming storms, rising turbidity, or high water levels. And I think they have every right to brag about these measures and to credit them in their analyses. But keep in mind that not all the workers operating these plants behave as they are supposed to and when they need to. Probabilistic Risk Assessment does not model human errors well and ignores errors of commission altogether.
Larry Criscione From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Saturday, July 24, 2010 12:17 AM To: 'gbaecher@umd.edu'
Cc: Philip, Jacob; Beasley, Benjamin; Kauffman, John; Perkins, Richard; Kanney, Joseph
Subject:
FW: Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure - December 14, 2005 Dr. Baecher, I enjoyed the seminar today.
You mentioned the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir failure. In 2005 I was working for the utility which owned Taum Sauk and as a teenager in Missouri I spent four summers working in a town near where the disaster occurred. Except during the six summers I spent in the navy, I have visited Johnson Shut-ins State Park at least once a summer since I was 11 and have camped there on four occasions. I even visited it in 2006 &
2007 when it was closed to swimming because of the disaster.
The pumps/turbines at the Taum Sauk Plant are controlled by the operators at Bagnell Dam 100 miles away (as the crow flies - it's about 200 miles on Missouri winding highways). Although there is security and maintenance at Taum Sauk (and maybe an equipment operator) the control room operators are at Bagnell Dam.
Taum Sauk was built in the early 1960s by shaving the top off of Proffit Mountain (a fitting name) and building an earthen/rock reservoir with the rubble. There was no spill way. As far as I know, water only ent ered and left through a tunnel at the bottom of the reservoir which led to the pumps/turbines at the bottom of the mountain.
Taum Sauk was meant for occasional summer peaking and was never expected to be in service 12 months a year. However, it was a very profitable plant for Ameren and they did some upgrades to it since the 1960s. By 2005 it was being used most days of the year. Like all hydro, it had become an extremely important generation asset now that MISO has financial penalties for members who both overbid and underbid their daily power (since hydro plants can be placed on and off the grid in minutes, Taum Sauk became a treasured "jewel" when the new MISO rules were implemented early last decade).
Taum Sauk had a major outage early last decade and a liner was installed in it along with a new level sensing system. The stand pipes for the level system moved upward for some reason. This affected multiple channels on both the primary and backup sensors (redundant electrical trains , but a common mode failure in the stand pipes which all used the same mounting brackets). Ameren was aware of this problem but continued to operate the plant.
In October 2005, the faulty levels sensors caused the water level in the upper reservoir to be filled too high causing there to be not enough "free board" at the top of the reservoir. Although this had probably been occurring for a while, it was not really noted because the loss of "free board" had no yet caused any problems (more water might be bad for the dam, but it's good for the dam operator). However, on the day in question in October 2005, high winds from Hurricane Rita caused waves in the upper reservoir which were high enough to overtop the walls at the point of lowest free board. Enough water overtopped to cause significant "wash out" of the road to the reservoir. Some engineers from Ameren were at the top of the reservoir and witnessed the overtopping. This led to some emails being generated between engineering, operations, l&C and dispatching (in their Investigation the MSHP uncovered some of these emails, but most were only known because they were alluded to in other emails having themselves been deleted from a server in the week following the accident). Some l&C technicians had been complaining for a while about the faulty level indications and wanted it fixed. Some engineers agreed with them . Upper management gave them lip service, but whenever an outage window was decided it was postponed due to generation commitments.
I can't remember all the details (it's in the Missouri State Highway Patrol's 1000+ page mind numbing report),
but some "band aid" to the level problem was implemented without an outage. I believe it involved merely changing the electrical calibration to account for the believed movement of the standpipes which, of course, did nothing to address the fact that the stand pipes were still liable to move further.
In the early morning of December 14, 2005, I was the Shift Technical Advisor in the Control Room of the Callaway Nuclear Plant when the Generation Supervisor from St. Louis (who had been promoted from the Callaway Plant Senior Reactor Operator ranks just a year earlier) told us that the level at Taum Sauk had rapidly dropped to zero and they think the Upper Reservoir may have failed.
The operators at Bagnell Dam had been filling Taum Sauk for several hours (I believe it took 9 to fill) when electric prices were low in the middle of the night. The level controls had all drifted to the point that the pumps did not automatically shut off. Had he been paying attention, the operator may have noticed that indicated level had quit rising (even though indicated level was reading low. if it's not rising but the turbines are still pumping this should clue you in that there is a problem).
With the dam overtopping, it was merely a matter of time before the earthen/rock wall decayed to the point that it catastrophically failed sending a wall of water down the side of Proffit Mountain.
The wall of water stripped all the trees, boulders and soil from the mountainside leaving a bedrock scar. At the base of the mountain, it overshot the banks of the Black River and flowed up the gradual slope of the flood plain on the opposite bank cutting down the forest in its path. Many of the boulders were deposited in this area . Once sufficient water had pooled in the flood plain, it flowed down the Black River in a huge torrent. The Johnson Shut-ins camp ground is along the river banks and for the most part about ten vertical feet above the river (maybe less). The restrooms and showers were built away from the river where the flood plain meets the base of the hills. These brick structures were demolished by the water and tree trunks. The camp grounds were the tents and RVs set up was completely demolished.
In one sense the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure is not a "near miss" because ii is an event that actually happened. However, to me it is a "near miss". Johnson Shut-ins is possibly the most popular state park in Missouri. It's located where the Black River falls through a granite field. The river diverges into dozens of side channels all with little pools and waterfalls. It is a very popular day and overnight destination. The main reason I have only camped there four times is because of the difficulty in getting a camp site - you need to know your plans a year in advance. It is not an exaggeration to state that had the Taum Sauk failure occurred in the early morning hours of July or August instead of December, there would have been hundreds of corpses littered amongst the debris in the shut-ins and floating in the lower reservoir (many of whom would be young children).
The only humans whose lives were threatened by the catastrophe were the Toops family. You can read their harrowing ordeal for yourself in the three page MSHP interview I've attached.
Jerry Toops was the superintendent of Johnson Shut-ins State Park. His house was in the forest at the far edge of the flood plain from Proffit Mountain. In all my years going to Johnson Shut-ins (and I literally went every weekend some summers as a teenager) I never knew a house was there because of all the trees. None of those trees are still standing. As the main torrent of water was pooling in the flood plain, a couple stories high "splash" travelled up the gentle contours of one of the feeder creeks, losing many of its boulders and tree trunks along the way. This splash hit the Toops house, knocking it off its foundation and causing it to float "upstream" and break apart. Jerry Toops, his wife and seven month old son , his three year old daughter and his five year old son were all flushed out into the night. They could do nothing but "go with the flow". Jerry ended up in a tree that was high enough that he could not climb out of it when the water receded. His wife was sent swimming in the frigid water while trying to hold her seven monith old son's head above water. She could hear her five year old son in the darkness but could do nothing to help him. She had no idea where her three year old daughter was.
Miraculously, all of the Toops survived. Tanner Toops (the 5 year old) "died" but in the cold water the emergency responders were able to revive him. No one knows how, but the three year old girl was alive when found by the rescuers.
Ameren paid the Toops $20 million dollars and had them sign a draconian confidentiality statement; you'll only hear their story from the MSHP report - they are very leery to discuss the incident with their friends in the state park service for fear of violating the terms of their settlement.
The "Rizzo" engineering firm did the failure report of the incident. They blame it on a number of causes, but chiefly place the blame on poor construction. Although it is true (at least I have always assumed so, but your lecture today seemed to point to the opposite) that an earthen reservoir like that could never be built today on a mountain top without a spillway, that was not the cause of the accident. The accident was entirely preventable and was a result of what we in the nuclear industry call a poor "Safety Culture":
- 1. Production over safety (postponement of non-commercially lucrative projects which require a plant outage)
- 2. Not listening to technicians and engineers
- 3. Cutting back on personnel (a $15/hour security guard with a walkie talkie assigned to watch the reservoir fill could have prevented the entire incident)
- 4. Technicians and engineers afraid to make a stand against upper management Had one of the engineers demanded his way and got the outage scheduled to fix the level sensors, the reservoir failure would have never happened. Unfortunately though, no one would have known what catastrophe was averted - including the engineer who would have torpedoed his career if he took that stand. At the utilities, Safety Culture begins and ends at the top. 100 engineers complaining about something will not result in any safety if the management refuses to listen to the ones brave enough to stand up to them . And what of the engineer who does risk his career? If the accident is avoided he's viewed as nothing more than a "Chicken Little" who claimed the sky was falling when actually nothing happened.
Originally the State of Missouri demanded that Ameren re-plant the mountainside which was ruined, but later reversed the decision. Geology professor have been taking students to Taum Sauk since the 1960s to see the rock formations exposed where the tunnels were cut for the power house. These same professors convinced the state to leave the bedrock scar in place; Missouri has millions of acres of forest but only one bedrock scar. It's a pretty impressive sight if you ever get a chance to see it. The trees trunks were harvested and the debris was cleared from the shut-ins, but the debris in the flood plan is still there.
The new Taum Sauk from your power point slide show looks pretty impressive. My friends back at Ameren tell me that insurance companies picked up the entire tab.
Larry Criscione From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Friday, March 19, 2010 3:32 PM To: Kanney, Joseph Cc: Perkins, Richard
Subject:
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure - December 14, 2005
- Joe, Here's some information on the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure we discussed earlier today. I don't know If it's pertinent to any of the studies you guys are doing (it was essentially a "man-made" event and not an act of nature) but it makes for some interesting reading if nothing else.
I certainly believe that there is a calculable probability of "man-made" dam failure for any pump storage unit. A nuclear plant susceptible to flooding from a reservoir with pump make-up capability should be required to calculate the probability of the catastrophic failure of the reservoir from a human/equipment performance event.
Larry From: Criscione, Larry S.
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2005 2:57 PM To: 'jhodges@mozona.net'; 'atimperm@wvu.edu'
Subject:
FW: Johnson Shut-Ins Tsunami
Email ls public as ML16125A522 (FOIA-2015-0018#3)
Importance of Stewardship and Responsibility From: Lawrence Criscione (lscriscione@hotmail.com)
Sent: Fri 1/30/09 12:28 AM To: Will Kraus (will.kraus@house.mo.gov); Jeanette Oxford (jeanette.oxford@house.mo.gov)
Cc: Jeff Davis (jeff.davls@psc.mo.gov); Jeanette Oxford (jmo4rep@juno.com); casey Exendine (casey.exendine@house.mo.gov); Sheryl Gregory (sheryl.gregory@psc.mo.gov); Michael Taylor (michael.taylor@psc.mo.gov); William Jones (william.jones@nrc.gov); Marty Gelfand (marty.gelfand@mail.house.gov); Houlihan Bill {blll_houllhan@durbin.senate.gov); Llona Weiss (llona_weiss@mccaskill.senate.gov); Wess Henderson (wess.henderson@psc.mo.gov)
Attachments: MSHP interview ofToops.PDF (287.0 KB)
Representative Kraus and Oxford, Attached to this email are the notes which Missouri State Highway Patrol Sergeant Wiedemann took when he interviewed Jerry and Lisa loops following the Taum Sauk disaster.
I am sure you are aware that Jerry loops was the superintendent of Johnson Shut-Ins State Park when the upper reservoir at Taum Sauk was over-topped and subsequently failed.
The three page interview summary is pretty Intense. Imagine you were Lisa Toops when, on a cold December morning, you heard the deafening noise of the wall of trees and water as your house began to fill with water and break apart. Imagine hearing your five year-old son calling for you as he attempts to swim in the frigid water and you can do nothing to help him because you are fighting to swim yourself while keeping your 7 month-old son's head above water. You have no idea where your three-year-old daughter Is.
Imagine spending the weeks before Christmas praying that your three children, in the intensive care unit of the hospital, survive.
As tragic as the loops' ordeal was, anyone who has visited Johnson Shut-ins State Park in July knows how lucky we were that the accident happened in December, when just the Toops were in the path of the water. It is not an exageratlon to state that there would have been hundreds of dead campers floating in the lower reservoir had the disaster occurred in the early hours of July vice December.
The wall of water which destroyed the Toops home was just a fraction of the roughly 3000 MW-hr of energy released down the mountainside in the torrent of water. The reactor core at Callaway Plant has more than 12,000 times as much energy stored In it as the Taum Sauk upper reservoir had.
Although not required, having an operator (or even just a night watchman) present at the top of the reservoir to monitor the filling evolution would have prevented the disaster. Ameren's Emergency Action P1an for the reservoir stated that the Toops would have 12 minutes warning If the upper reservoir were to break, however Ameren made no attempt to meet this commitment by assigning someone to visually monitor the reservoir for failure. The only warning the loops had was the deafening sound of the torrent, stripping trees and boulders from the mountainside as It swept towards their house.
Many of the causes of the Taum Sauk disaster are also present at the Callaway Nuclear Plant: minimal staffing of operators, management Ignoring the concerns of craft personnel, postponement of maintenance on equipment not necessary for the production of electricity, reluctance of engineers to agressively challenge management.
I believe that a new nudear plant in mid-Missouri is the best option we have to meet our future electricity demands. However, we need to ensure that any new nuclear reactors, as well as the current one, will be operated by a utility which is willing to forego some of Its profits in the interest of safety. Ameren might operate Callaway Plant in strict compliance to bureaucratic processes, but that does not In and of Itself make It safe. Callaway Plant must be staffed with workers who recognize what Is right and are willing to challenge their superiors when allowed practices are inadequate. I once flt that description, and the management of the Operations Department drove me away because of it.
Please read the attached summary of the Toops' interview and consider the importance of stewardship and responsibility when entrusted with operating a power plant.
Blackened text in copy received by NRC.
MISSOURI STATB HIGHWAY PATROL REFORT OF INVESTIGATION S'l'ATE CONTROL ~O.: 05 362 024 001 REPORT DATE: 01 / 31 / 06 REPORTING OFFICER: SERGEANT ~J. W. WIEDEMANN 0696 TROOP OF OCCURRENCE: G OCC TYPE: TAlJM SAUK RESERVOIR BREACH COUNTY: REYNOLDS SCENE PROCESSED: N DATE/TIME: DECEMBER 14 , 2005 OFFENSE STATUS: INVESTIGATION CONTINUING DOCC AT SCENE: N LOCATION: LESTERVILLE YIC:TIM ~ w.
ADDRES$i MIDDLEBROOK, MO
- 63656
~
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~ y~~*--C c-lcf DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
-, ... ,.... ,,, o IA INTERVIEW Of THE TOOP$
- l. On January 31 , 2006, I continued the in~estigation into the failure of t:he Taum Sauk upper res ervoir. During this investigation. I interviewed Jerry W. Toops and Lisa A. Toops at the Reynolds county Sheriff's Department.
- 2. On January 31, 2006, at 1333 hours0.0154 days <br />0.37 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.072065e-4 months <br />, I met: with Jerry and Lisa Toops at the Reynolds County Sheriff's Department. They also bad cheir attorney with them, Steve D. Burmeister, telephone number 816-3i3-5590. The Toops agreed to talk to me about what had occurred on the mo+ning of De cember 14, 2005, wbe~ the Tauin Sauk upper Reservoir broke. The Toops are identified as follows :
- a. ~ pa, dat e of birth
- - - - - Missou~i 63656, te
- b. ~ s, date of birth
- - - - - ldissou.r i 63656,
- 3. Lisa Toops told me that present in their house tbat night was her husband, Jerry, and their three childxen. ~ were identified as Tanner ~ of birth
- Tara R.
Toops, dat e of birth . _ . _ . and Tucker . oops a_ of birth
- 4. Lisa had gotten UD around 040 O hours and fed 'l'ucker on the couch in their living room. Sbe had then laid down on the coucb and gone to sleep with Tucker. Lisa was awakened by a loud rumbling like a t r ain.
She at first thought i t was a tornado and quic kly got up wi t h Tucker.
She yelled to Jerry to help her gee the kids. Lisa started down the hall to Tanner's room. The house began to fill with wate~ as she got into the bedroom. Lisa helped Tanner to the top bunk and told him to 0 say a prayer and hold his breath. The room rapidly filled wit~ water completely covering t:l~e three of them. Lisa was trying to figure out how to get out of the water when the roof ~cracked open*. The three of
them were washed out of the hbuse at this time.
- 5. Lisa was able to hold T,.;cker' s head above water ,~nile they were
) washed away from the house. She was able to touch bottom after several minutes of floating in the waters . Lisa was able to g*e t llP and walk out of the water. She then heard Tanner calling to her . S,he answered him encouraging him t.o swim. Lisa then carried '!1uck!:!r wi th her as she waded back into the water. She was able to swim to Tanner , who was still s-wimroing in the water. $he was abl e to get to him and pull him back co the shallow water. Lisa was too cold, tired, and numb a c this t ime to. walk. She pulled the children nexc to her and sat down i n the shallow wat er. Lisa heard voi-ces but lost consciousness. She woke up in t he ambul ance and was told they were working on he:r: son. Lisa did rJot recall anything else until slie was in the .hospital. She was tolc1 that her entire family had been found. Lisa described her injuries as ssver e hypothermia and a serious case of poison ivy.
6 . Jerry Toops began to tell me what had happened to him on tfue morning of D~cember 14, 2005. Jerry had beer. sleeping in his bed when he heard Li sa scream. He he~rd a l oud noise like a jet engin~ . He immediately recognized it. to be ru*s hing water. Jerry knew they were in danger from the reservo ir . Je.r:ry got oµt of bed and made it about:
t wo feet towards the baby's crib when the room exp l oded . Jerry said he r0llea ~,itb it and found himself covered witb water outside the house. He was a:ble to swim to the surface and could only see water, crees, amd boul ders. He was able to swim to the house and c1imb on top of the* roof. He ran around the ~oof of the house looking for his family, but was unable to f ind anybody. He then f.elt the roof began to move as the bouse floated off t he foundation. Jerry continued to look for his family, but was unable co see anybody in the dark . The house began breaking up, and Jerry dropped into the water. He continued to swim with the debris fr<!>m the house . The house eventually completely l:>roke up. Jerry grabbed the tops of several trees, trying to climb out of the wti.t er, but each i::ime tl)e tree came uprooted and washed away with hirn. He l ater saw a line of cedar trees and was able to grab one of the.m, Jerry climbed into the tree and waited unt il help arrived. Jerry thought he wai.ted in the tree for approximatel y one and one-half hours.
'?. While in the tree, Jen-y heard someone calling. He answered and was told to wait; t hey couldn't get to him. Approximately fifteen minutes later. a second person g.ot to him and hel_ped him wal k tco the ambul~ice. Jerry to ld them the names of his family and about the intern who was l iving in temporary quarters near the Shue Ins. While he was in the ambulance, rescuers brought his son, Tucke1*, into the ambulance , Jerry heard Tucker crying and knew he was alive. They next brought Tara i n . and she was unconscious. Rescuers later t old 1';lim t hey had found t he rest of his fanu l y; and they were a live. They we:re then transported to the hospita l.
- Jerry described ni.s injuries as hypothermia, a bulglng oi sc, a puncture in his right foot , and his fe.at ha.v:e been numb since the incident. He stated the chi l dren a ll suffered severe hypothermia. Tucke::: also had scratches al l ove:r his body . Tanr1e:r had to be :iresusci tated as he had stopped breatlung.
During the re-wa.crning process. he also suffered four separate burns on his thighs. Lisa and .::Jerry were released from the hospital later that 0 day. The children r e.quired more extensive hospital stays.
- 8. Jerry said he had bee n the superint endent at the park for Page 2
\...n..:..LII * \..1 -1 . ; '.J ~* w-"'C '\,, ~ -
appi:o:ximately six year s. Puring this time , he was aware of the previous leaking problems at tne upper reservoir . He was also aware the Jiner had been put in the reservoir. He had never been told of
) any overtopping o= problems that were occu=ring at the reservoir.
Jerry had received an emergency action plan .from Ameren UE . This :plan included a diagram s howing the areas t.hat. would be inundated by water in the event of a breach. The plan showed the water stopping short of his house. tie had also been told in the event of a breach, he would be immediately called giving him approximately twelve minutes to evacuate his fa.'ll.ily before the water would .reach bis r&s idence. Jerry was upset that he had not received dny warnlng that the dam had broken. H e ~vas also una\<1are the reservoir was remotely pumped and no one was watching the reservoir to see it breaking and notify him.
l'hiE he felt caused him not to be notified before the water struck his re.sidence . The interview was conclu.de.d at approximately 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />.
- 9. This investigation is continuing.
- w. W, Wiedeman.,, Sergeant ~\lW:klb Division oE Dn1g and Crime Cont:rol 0
Page J
Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscione, Lawrence Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2016 8:49 AM To:
Cc: ~______
~~~!-,,,.L!~~,IQ,U;IIJ.lo..l.l,'a,y. Clark. Theresa
....... _, Mitman, Jeffrey; Bensi, Michelle; Philip, Jacob; Perkins,
Subject:
RE: RE: Meeting next week Sara,
! look forward to meeting with you this morning.
Several colleagues of mine have expressed concerns regarding how the agency is handling flooding issues and have indicated they would like to meet with your team to discuss their concerns. Their concerns relate to the two bulleted items in your email below. Jeff Mitman, Michelle Bensi, Jake Philip and Richard Perkins are all willing to meet with your team Jeff Mitman has specific concerns regarding Jocassee/Oconee in that the flooding analysis being used does not take into account the Lake Jocassee Dam failing from overtopping. These concerns fall under the first bulleted item in your email below.
Jeff Mitman, Michelle Bensi and Jake Philip have expressed concerns regarding the agency's response to Section 402 of Public Law 112-074. Their concerns were expressed in an October 2014 non-concurrence that was primarily authored by Dr Bensi. Jake has also expressed concerns regarding water-tight seals for power plant penetrations. These concerns fall under the second bulleted item in your email below, although they are not necessarily limited to the plants mentioned.
Richard Perkins has concerns regarding the manner in which the screening analysis report for Generic Issue 204 (flooding at nuclear power plant sites due to upstream dam failures) was redacted . Mr. Perkins' concerns were the primary motivation behind my 2012-Sep- 18 letter to the NRC Chairman.
In a 2012-0ct-15 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs I noted that there is no interagency process for ensuring that dams upstream of nuclear reactor plants are guarded to the same design basis threat (DBT) that the NRG requires nuclear power plants (NPP} to be guarded to. I reaJJze that it is not within the NRC's authority to dictate the guard force required at dams regulated by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or maintained by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). However, since the catastrophic failure of the Oconee Nuclear Station would lead to a reactor accident at Oconee. it is illogical to require that Oconee be guarded against a specific DBT yet to not-after 8 years of claiming the flood height at Oconee due to a Jocassee Dam failure is non-public security-related information-have done any study to determine whether or not the same DBT that we believe could cause an accident at Oconee could also breach the Lake Jocassee Dam.
That is. to my knowledge no one has studied what the design basis threat to the Lake Jocassee Dam is and whether or not that dam is adequately guarded against that threat. If the same DBT that could threaten Oconee could also be capable of destroying the Lake Jocassee Dam, then reason dictates that the Lake Jocassee Dam must be guarded against that DBT. I recognize this is an interagency problem the NRC would like to avoid . But we have a duty to address it for Oconee and for all other susceptible reactors. What is the design basis threat capable of destroying the dam? Is that threat less than or equal to the DBT for Oconee? If so, then the Lake Jocassee Dam needs to be guarded against that DBT. Just because this is an interagency problem does not mean the NRC can ignore it.
A similar concern exists regarding insider threats. When I worked in the nuclear industry. I needed to be screened into PADS (Personnel Access Data System?) to ensure there was nothing adverse in my
background . Can an insider threat at the Jocassee Dam pump storage station cause the dam to fail? If so, are the requirements for background checks and fitness-for-duty at the Jocassee Dam pump storage station the same or greater than the requirements at Oconee?
I don't know if you consider my concerns regarding external and internal security threats at the Lake Jocassee Dam to fall within the two bulleted items in your email below, but they certainly need to be addressed.
Also, I did not menhOn the silo-ing issue ~b)(6J,(b)(7J(AJ(b)(7J(CJ !because t only became aware of it recently . You should address what is driving the NRC to silo flooding information and the potential impact of that silo-ing upon the agency's Open and Collaborative Work Environment.
V/r, Larry 573-230-3959 From: Kirkwood, Sara Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 4:27 PM To: LSCriscione@gmail.com; Criscione, Lawrence <Lawrence.Criscione@nrc.gov>; j<b)(5),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) 1<6)(6),(b)(7)(A),(6)(7)(C) I
Subject:
RE: RE: Meeting next week
Dearl<b)(6),
(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)
This note is lo confirm lhat members of the Flooding Working Group will interview your client, Mr. Criscione, on Tuesday, May 17th , I 0:00 a.m., at NRC Headquarters, Room O I r22. The interview will be transcrihed.
NRC Headquarters One White flint North Building (OWfN) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852.
The purpose is to interview Mr. C riscione about the allegations he presented (b)(5),(b)( )(A),(b)( )( >
....__ _----:~----:----.!!"!'!!!!!"!!"!'!!!!!'!"""""~=-.
(b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7) regarding the risk of flooding at 19 specific plants located downstream from dams, (b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(Cl (b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) Chairman Bums convened a work ing group to conduct an investigation (b)(6),(b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C)
(b ( ),( ( )(A),(b)( )( )
- Whether the NRC has failed to require the Oconee Nuclear Station in South Carolina to take corrective measures to safeguard the plant from potential flooding should the Lake Jocassee Dam fail.
- Whether the NRC has also failed to require the following nuclear power stations (Arkansas Nuclear, Beaver Valley, Browns Ferry, Columbia, Cooper, Fort Calhoun , H.B. Robinson. Hope Creek/Salem, Indian Point, McGuire, Peach Bottom, Prairie Island, Sequoyah , South Texas , Surry, Three Mile Island, Waterford, and Watts Bar) to take appropriate measures to protect against the risk of flooding in the event of upstream dam failures.
You will be registered in the visitor access system. Upon arrival to the building, your vehicle will be subject to 11 routine screen ing, the security officer will direct you to a parking space, once parked, please walk around to the front of the OWi:N building to check in at the secur ity desk with a valid ID.
The following link provides directions to N RC Headquarters http://www.nre.gov/about-n rc/locations/hg.html Map for Visitor vehicle entrance
Criscione, Lawrence From: Criscione. Lawrence Sent: Friday, May 20, 2016 6:00 AM To: Kirkw Sar
- H I h Gary; Clark, Theresa Cc: (b)(6) (b)(7)(A),(b)(7)(C) 'LSCriscione@gmail.com'; Mitman, Jeffrey
Subject:
Clarification regarding pumps at Peach Bottom Sara, et. al.,
Yesterday I made the argument that if the NRC was going to allow certain plants to not be protected against credible floods and instead rely on mitigation efforts to prevent core damage and containment failure, then we should treat mitigation equipment at those plants in a manner similar to how we treat the FSAR required protective equipment (e.g. write the required mitigation equipment into the licensing basis).
As an example as to how we have limited control over mitigation equipment, I pointed to some pumps at Peach Bottom which are stored under a staircase attached to a block wall. Jeff Mitman informed me that those pumps are not necessarily part of FLEX since his encounter with them was pre-Fukushima. They might have been purchased as b.5.B equipment. an enhancement to improve MSPI or due to some other commitment to the NRC but pre-date FLEX and might or might not be included in FLEX.
But my point still stands . Throughout the industry, improvements to safety have been made by licensees purchasing and installing mitigative equipment either to improve their MSPI score, as part of b.5.B initiatives, or as part of FLEX. This equipment is not surveilled and maintained in the same manner as the protective equipment included in the plant's Technical Specifications nor are these plants restricted from operating when this equipment is unavailable. My point yesterday was for those plants that have credible flooding risks for which the equipment required by their operating license is insufficient to protect against, ifwe are going to aHow them to continue to operate based on the assumption that post-flood mitigative efforts will satisfactorily prevent core damage and/or release, then we need to ensure positive controls are in place to ensure the required mitigative equipment is kept in a location and state of repair that ensures its availability when needed.
Also , I encourage you to speak to Jeff in that-in addition to his concerns that the impoundment level used in the flooding calculations at Oconee is non-conservative-he makes an argument that mitigative strategies at Oconee are not viable to prevent core damage Larry Lawrence S. Criscione Reliability & Risk Engineer RES/DRA/HFRB TI0*B44 (S73) 230-3959