ML20259A201

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Summary Report of Indian Point Unit 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 27 to Defueled Safety Analysis Report, Revision 0, Changes
ML20259A201
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/14/2020
From:
Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20259A199 List:
References
NL-20-066
Download: ML20259A201 (341)


Text

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 1.1 1.1 Introduction Modify This section is modified by eliminating discussions regarding the submittal of the FSAR, primary contractor and architect engineer, nuclear steam supply system, and plant power levels, and adding a discussion regarding the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2 and the compilation of the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

In addition, the summary discussion of the contents of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is replaced with a summary discussion of the contents of Section 1 of the DSAR. Also, the discussion regarding the General Design Criteria is modified to reflect the discussions that remain.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

The DSAR will be derived from Revision 27 of the IP2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The DSAR will be developed as a licensing basis document that reflects the permanently defueled condition of IP2 and supersedes the UFSAR. The DSAR is intended to serve the same function during SAFSTOR and decommissioning that the UFSAR served during operation of the facility. An evaluation of the systems, structures and components (SSCs) described in the UFSAR will be performed to determine the function, if any, these SSCs will perform in a defueled condition.

For the purposes of 10 CFR 50.59 screenings or other activities that reference the UFSAR, the DSAR will constitute the safety analysis report reflective of the permanently shut down and defueled facility following the docketing of the certifications required in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2).

The term DSAR will be utilized in lieu of the term UFSAR. The DSAR will be updated consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e).

1.2 1.2 Summary Plant Description Modify The title of this section is modified to replace the word Plant with the word Facility. This is an administrative change to reflect that IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled. As a result, power operations and electrical generation will no Page 1 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions longer occur. The principal activities will be the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel and the management of radioactive wastes. Given that status, IP2 is better described as a facility versus a plant.

1.2.1 1.2.1 Site Retain No proposed changes 1.2.1.1 1.2.1.1 Meteorology Modify This section is modified by replacing the discussion regarding the application of meteorological conditions to an operating plant and the associated postulated accidents with a discussion of the meteorological conditions and how they apply to the postulated fuel handling accident (FHA) and release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids that will be described in Chapter 6 of the DSAR.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

1.2.1.2 1.2.1.2 Geology and Hydrology Modify This section is modified to replace the references to plant with references to facility and update the discussion to reflect current conditions. These are administrative changes to reflect that IP2 will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation and the current status regarding groundwater contamination at the facility.

1.2.1.3 1.2.1.3 Seismology Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility. This is an administrative change to reflect that IP2 will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation.

1.2.1.4 1.2.1.4 Environmental Radiation Modify This section is modified to update the discussion to reflect current conditions. This is Monitoring an administrative change to reflect that IP2 was operated for several decades prior to it being permanently shut down and defueled.

1.2.1.5 1.2.1.5 Conclusions Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding containment design and engineered safety features, replacing the reference to plant with a reference to facility, and updating the discussion to replace the discussion of safe operation of IP2 with a discussion of the safe storage and handling of spent fuel at IP2.

Page 2 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Most of these changes are administrative changes to reflect that IP2 will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation and to denote the function of the facility in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The elimination of the discussion of the containment design and engineered safety features reflects the revised licensing and design bases for IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the spent fuel pit (SFP) or the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the Alternate Source Term (AST) methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to perform an active function and there are no engineered safety features in the permanently shut down and defueled state. The changes to the FSAR descriptions regarding the containment and the engineered safety features are discussed in more detail in the review tables for Chapters 5 and 6.

1.2.2 1.2.2 Plant Description Modify This section is modified by replacing the references to unit and plant with references to facility, eliminating the references to the nuclear steam supply system, turbine generator and their necessary auxiliaries, replacing the reference to a complete and operable nuclear power plant are provided for the unit with a Page 3 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions reference to the safe storage and handling of spent fuel, and replacing a reference to historical Figure 2.2-2 with a reference to facility drawing 504688 (Formerly Figure 2.2-2).

Most of these changes are administrative changes to reflect that IP2 will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation and to denote the function of the facility in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The elimination of the reference to the nuclear steam supply system, a turbine generator and their associated auxiliaries reflects the revised licensing and design bases for IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because it will no longer generate electrical power, After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

In addition, the status of Figure 2.2-2 is changed from historical to active, and it is replaced with a reference to Plant Drawing 504668. It is referenced in the PDTS and the depicted exclusion boundary is expected to change during decommissioning; thus, it needs to be maintained and updated.

1.2.2.1 1.2.2.1 Nuclear Steam Supply System Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions of the nuclear steam supply (NSSS) system and support systems and retaining the discussions of the auxiliary systems necessary to support the safe storage of spent fuel and the management of liquid, gaseous, and solid wastes. In addition, the title of the section is changed to Spent Fuel Storage to reflect the remaining content.

Page 4 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

1.2.2.2 NA Reactor and Plant Control Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor control systems are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.2.2.3 NA Turbine and Auxiliaries Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the turbine and its auxiliaries are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.2.2.4 1.2.2.2 Electrical System Modify This section is modified by revising the description of the electrical system to reflect the changes to the system described in the review table for Chapter 8.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no Page 5 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The review table for Chapter 8 provides additional discussion regarding the changes to the description of the electrical systems.

1.2.2.5 1.2.2.3 Control Room Modify This section is revised by replacing the reference to plant with a reference to facility, eliminating the reference to the reactor and turbine generator, replacing the discussion of the operation of the plant under normal and accident condition with a reference to safe wet storage of spent fuel and management of radioactive waste processing systems, and eliminating the requirement for the control room to possess adequate shielding and air conditioning facilities to permit occupancy during all operating or accident conditions.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids. Consequently, the term facility better describes IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 6 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, there is no requirement for the Control Room to be staffed to mitigate the FHA. The changes to UFSAR Section 9.9 regarding the Control Room ventilation system are discussed in more detail in the review table for Chapter 9.

1.2.2.6 1.2.2.4 Diesel Generators Modify This section is modified by revising the description of the diesel generator to reflect the changes to the diesel generators described in the review table for Chapter 8.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The review table for Chapter 8 provides additional discussion regarding the changes to the description of the diesel generators.

Page 7 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 1.2.2.7 1.2.2.5 Waste Disposal System Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to plant operation and plant site with references to facility activities and site, respectively. These are administrative changes to reflect that IP2 will no longer be capable of power operations or generating electricity in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.2.2.8 1.2.2.6 Fuel Handling System Modify This section is proposed to be modified by eliminating the discussions regarding refueling activities, identifying that the fuel handling system will continue to supply the handling of spent fuel in the SFP, and replacing the reference to operating personnel with facility personnel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, refueling activities will no longer be performed.

Additionally, the change in status regarding IP2 will result in changes to the IP2 staff.

Thus, an administrative change is made to eliminate the reference to specific department (i.e., operating) personnel with a more generic reference.

1.2.2.9 NA Engineered Safety Features Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the Page 8 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The review table for Chapter 6 provides additional discussion regarding the changes to the description of the engineered safety systems.

1.2.2.10 1.2.2.7 Structures Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the reactor containment interior components, replacing the reference to plant drawings with a reference to facility drawings, and other editorial changes.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids As previously discussed, the reactor containment no longer performs an isolation function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, it will continue to be required to maintain its structural integrity to ensure that it does not have any impact on the safe storage of spent fuel in the SFP.

Also, IP2 is better described as a facility in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because it will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation.

1.2.2.11 1.2.2.8 Containment Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions of the capability of the containment to withstand internal pressure associated with a loss of coolant accident, to provide shielding for normal operation and accident conditions, and to be isolated in the event of a loss of coolant accident. In addition, the section is updated to reflect Page 9 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions that the containment must maintain its structural integrity in the permanently shut down and defueled condition to ensure that it does not impact the safe storage of spent fuel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

As previously discussed, the reactor containment no longer performs an isolation function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, nor is it required to perform an active function following any of the remaining accidents. However, it will continue to be required to maintain its structural integrity to ensure that it does not have any impact on the safe storage of spent fuel in the SFP.

Figure 1.2-1 Figure 1.2-1 Indian Point Nuclear Retain No proposed changes.

Generating Units 1 & 2

[Historical]

Figure 1.2-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 1.2-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 1.2-4 Figure 1.2-2 Cross Section of Plant Retain No proposed changes

[Historical]

Figure 1.2-5 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 1.2-6 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 1.2-7 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 1.2-8 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 1.2-9 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

1.3 1.3 General Design Criteria (GDC) Modify The words more recently were deleted. These words are an unnecessary qualifier.

1.3.1 1.3.1 Overall Plant Requirements Modify This section is modified by replacing the references to plant and nuclear electric (GDC 1 - GDC 5) plant with references to facility, eliminating the discussion of GDC 4, eliminating Page 10 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions the discussions of reactor operation, safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor, eliminating the discussion of the loss of coolant accident, revising the section to discuss the safe storage and handling of spent fuel, eliminating the references to the reactor coolant system, containment system structures, electrical systems, and emergency systems, eliminating the discussion of shared systems between IP2 and IP3, and eliminating the discussions of initial tests and operation.

The definitions of the Seismic Classes I, II, and III are modified to match the revised definitions that are provided in Section 1.11.1. See the discussion of that UFSAR Section for the justification of this change. In addition, conforming changes are made to reflect UFSAR Sections 7.7 and 9.6.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The review tables for Chapters 4, 5, 8, 9 and 13 provide additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

Page 11 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Also, IP2 is better described as a facility in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because it will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation.

1.3.2 NA Protection by Multiple Fission Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Product Barriers (GDC 6 -

GDC 10) After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids. Consequently, the reactor, reactor protection system, and reactor coolant system are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The containment is required to remain structural sound, so as to not impact the safe storage of spent fuel in the SFP.

The review tables for Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7 and 14 provide additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

1.3.3 1.3.2 Nuclear and Radiation Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to plant with a reference to Controls (GDC 11 - GDC 18) facility, eliminating the reference to GDC 12 through 16, eliminating the discussions regarding operation of the reactor and turbine generator, eliminating the discussions regarding shielding, ventilation control and filtration, and containment integrity, eliminating the discussion of instrumentation and controls to monitor and maintain neutron flux, reactor coolant pressure, flow rate, temperature and control rod positions, eliminating the discussions of instrumentation systems for the reactor coolant system, steam systems, and containment, denoting that instrumentation systems are only required to ensure the safe storage and handling of spent fuel and radioactive wastes, eliminating the discussion regarding monitoring the operational status of the reactor, eliminating the discussion regarding instrumentation and control systems for reactor protection and containment isolation and operation of engineered safety features equipment, eliminating the discussion regarding Page 12 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions instrumentation to monitor reactor coolant system leakage, eliminating the discussion regarding the radiation monitoring system and portable survey equipment to monitor leakage from the reactor containment under accident conditions, and eliminating the discussion of containment isolation systems.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The review tables for Chapters 6, 7 and 9 provide additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

Also, IP2 is better described as a facility in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because it will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation.

1.3.4 NA Reliability and Testability of Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Protection Systems Page 13 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The review tables for Chapters 7 and 8 provide additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

1.3.5 NA Reactivity Control (GDC 27 - Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

GDC 32)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

Page 14 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions The review tables for Chapters 3, 7 and 9 provide additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

1.3.6 NA Reactor Coolant Pressure Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Boundary (GDC 33 - GDC 36)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

The review table for Chapter 4 provides additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

1.3.7 NA Engineered Safety Features Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

(GDC 37 - GDC 65)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Page 15 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The review tables for Chapters 5, 6 and 8 provide additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

1.3.8 1.3.3 Fuel and Waste Storage Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to the new spent fuel storage Systems (GDC 66 - GDC 69) racks, eliminating the discussion of refueling operations, refueling canal, reactor vessel head removal, and refueling system interlocks, denoting activities that are required for fuel handling activities, replacing the term operating personnel with the term facility personnel, and making a few editorial corrections or clarifications.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

The review tables for Chapters 9 and 11 provide additional discussion regarding the changes to the specific structures, systems, and components.

1.3.9 1.3.4 Plant Effluents (GDC 70) Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility and replace the reference to normal operation with normal activities.

These are administrative changes to reflect that IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled. IP2 is better described as a facility in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because it will no longer be capable of power operations and electrical generation.

1.4 1.4 Design Parameters and Plant Modify The title of this section is modified by eliminating the reference to plant Comparison comparison. This is an administrative change to reflect the elimination of Section 1.4.2 as discussed below.

1.4.1 NA Design Highlights Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Page 16 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

The majority of the systems associated with the original pressurized water reactor are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. This section no longer serves a purpose.

1.4.1.1 NA Power Level Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur. Thus, a discussion of power level is no longer relevant.

1.4.1.2 NA Reactor Coolant Loops Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

1.4.1.3 NA Peak Specific Power Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Page 17 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur. Thus, a discussion of peak specific power is no longer relevant.

1.4.1.4 1.4.1 Fuel Cladding Modify This section is proposed to be modified by replacing the reference to plant with a reference to facility, and eliminating the comparisons of the fuel cladding to other plants.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur.

1.4.1.5 1.4.2 Fuel Assembly Design Modify This section is proposed to be modified by eliminating the discussion regarding out-of-pile and in-pile tests and nuclear operating experience.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur.

1.4.1.6 NA Moderator Temperature Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Coefficient of Reactivity After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur.

Page 18 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 1.4.2 NA IP2 - IP3 Design Differences Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Given that IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled, there will be substantial differences between the licensing and design bases between IP2 and IP3. IP3 will continue to operate. As a result, a comparison of IP2 and IP3 features is no longer appropriate.

1.5 NA Research and Development Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Requirements After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur. Thus, the information in this section is obsolete.

1.6 NA Identification of Contractors Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

[Historical Information Only]

This section provided historical information regarding the contractors that constructed IP2. Given that IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled, this information is no longer relevant.

1.7 NA Project Reorganization - Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

December 1969 [Historical Information Only] This section provided historical information regarding the contractors that construed IP2. Given that IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled, this information is no longer relevant.

Figure 1.7-1 NA Functional Relationships Delete This figure is proposed to be deleted. See the discussion for Section 1.7.

[Historical]

1.8 NA Project Reorganization - Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

March 1970 [Historical Information Only] This section provided historical information regarding the contractors that construed IP2. Given that IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled, this information is no longer relevant.

Figure 1.8-1 NA Organization Chart WEDCO Delete This figure is proposed to be deleted. See the discussion for Section 1.7.

Reliability Group [Historical]

Page 19 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 1.9 1.5 Supplements and Revisions Modify An editorial change is made to include a hyphen in Off-Site.

to Original FSAR 1.9.1 1.5.1 Supplements Retain No proposed changes.

1.9.2 1.5.2 Revisions Modify This section is modified to discuss the latest revision of the IP2 UFSAR. This revision will establish the DSAR. In addition, historical information regarding Revision 2 of the UFSAR is deleted, because it is antiquated.

For the purposes of 10 CFR 50.59 screenings or other activities that reference the UFSAR, the DSAR will constitute the safety analysis report reflective of the permanently shut down and defueled facility following the docketing of the certifications required in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2).

The term DSAR will be utilized in lieu of the term UFSAR. The DSAR will be updated consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e).

1.10 1.6 Quality Assurance Program Retain No proposed changes 1.10.1 1.6.1 General Modify This section is modified to reflect that an IPEC Quality Assurance Program (QAP) specific to IP2 will be adopted once the facility is permanently shut down and defueled. This QAP will replace the Entergy QAP. The description is modified to state:

The IPEC Quality Assurance Program (QAP) for Indian Point Unit 2 is described in the IPEC Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM) and associated implementing documents provide for control of activities that affect the quality of safety-related nuclear plant structures, systems, and components. The QAP is also applied to certain quality-related equipment and activities that are not safety-related, and where other regulatory or industry guidance establishes program requirements. The changes to the QAP will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a).

1.10.2 1.6.2 Scope Modify The content of this section is replaced with the following: The QAPM applies to all activities associated with structures, systems, and components that are safety related or controlled by 10 CFR 72. The QAPM also applies to transportation packages controlled by 10 CFR 71. The methods of implementation of the requirements of the QAPM are commensurate with the items or activitys importance to safety. The applicability of the requirements of the QAPM to other items and activities is determined on a case-by-case basis. The QAPM implements 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, 10 CFR 71 Subpart H, and 10 CFR 72 Subpart G. All items and activities affecting safety addressed in Regulatory Guide 1.29 Seismic Design Classification revision 3, September 1978, are also governed by the Quality Assurance Program. A list of safety Page 20 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions related items is maintained. Elements of the Quality Assurance Program are also applicable to activities and items affecting safety as defined in Licensing commitments. (Reference 1) The changes to the QAP will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a).

1.10.3 1.6.3 Organization and Modify This section is modified to reflect that an IPEC Quality Assurance Program (QAP)

Responsibilities specific to IP2 will be adopted once the facility is permanently shut down and defueled. This QAP will replace the Entergy QAP. The changes to the QAP will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(a).

Table 1.10-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

1.11 1.7 Design Criteria for Structures Retain No proposed changes and Components 1.11.1 1.7.1 Definition of Seismic Design Modify This section is modified by modifying the definitions of Seismic Classes I, II, and III, Classifications eliminating the structures, systems, and components that no longer perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition and eliminating the discussions regarding loss of coolant accident, safe shutdown of the reactor, isolation of the reactor, reactor operation, chemical volume and control system, and waste disposal system.

The chemical volume control system and waste disposal system classifications are defined in Section 1.11.2. The discussions provided in this section are no longer necessary, because these systems are no longer required to be classified as Seismic Class I. EC# #83553 provides the evaluation of the reclassifications of structures, systems, and components.

The definitions of Seismic Class I, II, and III are modified to address the revised set of accident analysis provided in UFSAR Section 14 and the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The radioactivity dose release information quoted in Class I and Class II definitions of current IP2 UFSAR, Section 1.11.1 are based on the Technical Information Document (TID)-14844 dose methodology and Whole Body and thyroid dose criteria that is based on 10 CFR 100 guideline. The IP2 DSAR design basis radiological analyses were performed based on the AST dose methodology, and TEDE dose criteria -- based on 10 CFR 50.67 guideline. However, since the IP2 decommissioning design basis radiological analyses are based on the AST and TEDE Page 21 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions criteria, not TID-14844, the dose release information given in the current IP2 UFSAR are not applicable for the DSAR Section 1.11.1.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.2 1.7.2 Classification of Particular Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to the containment Structures and Equipment penetrations, airlocks, concrete shield, liner and interior structures, modifying the seismic Classifications for numerous systems to reflect the licensing and design bases for a permanently shut down and defueled facility, eliminating the references to the reactor control and protection system, reactor vessel and its supports, rod cluster control assemblies and drive mechanism (including supporting and positioning members), incore instrumentation structure, reactor coolant system (including all of its components), main steam system, engineered safety features (including safety injection system, containment spray system, containment air recirculation cooling system), condensate storage tanks, pressurizer relief tank, residual heat removal loop, containment penetration and weld channel pressurization system, isolation valve seal water system, fuel transfer tube, control equipment, facilities and lines for Seismic Page 22 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Class I items, eliminating the reference to essential sections regarding the instrument air system, eliminating the reference to components of the waste disposal system and chemical volume and control system, renaming the emergency power supply system as the standby power supply system, updating the discussion of the diesel generator to reflect changes made in Chapter 8, and making editorial enhancements.

The Seismic Classifications of structures, systems, and components are revised based on the evaluation provided in EC #83553.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Changes regarding the specific structures, systems, and components are addressed in the review tables for Chapters 3 through 11 and 14.

1.11.3 1.7.3 Design Criteria for Seismic Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to active components (such as Class I Structures and valves and relays), condensate storage tank, reactor coolant system and associated Equipment systems, and reactor vessel internals, eliminating the discussion of Generic Letter 87-Page 23 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 11 regarding pipe whip restraints and jet impingement shields, eliminating the discussion of leak before break, and making editorial enhancements After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Changes regarding the specific structures, systems, and components are addressed in the review tables for Chapters 3 through 11 and 14.

1.11.3.1 1.7.3.1 Piping, Vessels and Supports Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions of the nuclear steam supply system, safe operation of the nuclear reactor, shutting the plant down, maintaining the plan in a safe condition, main steam lines, reactor coolant pipe rupture, and adding a discussion regarding the capability to safely store and handle spent fuel After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 24 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Changes regarding the specific structures, systems, and components are addressed in the review tables for Chapters 3 through 11 and 14.

1.11.3.2, NA Reactor Vessel Internals Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

including subsections After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of 1.11.3.2.1 fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR and 1.11.2.2 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

1.11.3.3 NA Reactor Vessel Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 25 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 1.11.4 1.7.4 Models and Methods for Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the reactor and recirculating Seismic Class I Design pumps.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

1.11.4.1 1.7.4.1 Containment Building Modify This section is modified to denote that the Containment Building will be classified as seismic class III in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, the seismic class I discussion regarding the Containment Building is retained as bounding information.

1.11.4.1.1 1.7.4.1.1 Steel Retain No proposed changes.

1.11.4.1.2 1.7.4.1.2 Concrete Retain No proposed changes.

1.11.4.2 1.7.4.2 Control Building Modify This section is modified to reflect that the Control Building is no longer classified as seismic Class 1.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Page 26 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.3 1.7.4.3 Diesel Generator Building Modify This section is modified to reflect that the Diesel Generator Building is no longer classified as seismic Class 1.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.4 NA Fan House Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the Page 27 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids. Consequently, the fan house is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.5 NA Boric Acid Evaporator Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Building After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids. Consequently, the boric acid evaporator building is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.6 1.7.4.4 Intake Structure Modify This section is modified to reflect that the Intake Structure is no longer classified as seismic Class 1.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Page 28 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.7 1.7.4.5 Waste Holdup Tank Pit Retain No proposed changes.

1.11.4.8 1.7.4.6 Spent Fuel Pit Retain No proposed changes.

1.11.4.9 NA Electrical Penetration Tunnel Delete This section proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.10 NA Pipe Penetration Tunnel Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 29 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.11 NA Electrical Cable Tunnel Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 30 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 1.11.4.12 NA Shield Wall Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.13 NA Retaining Wall at Equipment Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Enclosure After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the Page 31 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.14 1.7.4.7 Primary Water Storage Tank Retain No proposed changes.

and Refueling Water Storage Tank Foundation 1.11.4.15 NA Condensate Water Storage Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Tank Foundation After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the change in IP2 status, the only remaining accidents are the FHA and the potential release of gaseous wastes or radioactive liquids.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.16 1.7.4.8 Class I Piping Systems Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the reactor coolant loop, safety injection system, main steam system, residual heat removal system, Page 32 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accumulator discharge, and containment spray system and noting that the discussion regarding the service water system and component cooling water system are maintained for historical purposes.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The service water system and component cooling water system continue to perform a support function to ensure the safe storage of spent fuel. However, it is no longer classified as Class I, because they are not required to mitigate any accidents.

1.11.4.16.1 1.7.4.8.1 Design Approach Retain No proposed changes.

1.11.4.16.2 1.7.4.8.2 Analysis Approach Modify This section is modified by making editorial enhancements.

1.11.4.17 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It was previously identified as Analysis for Combination historical information.

Loading of Design Basis Earthquake and Design Basis After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of Accident [Historical fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Information Only] 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 33 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

The reactor coolant system serves no purpose in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.18 1.7.4.9 Service Water Lines Modify This section is modified to indicate that the information is retained; however, the service water lines are no longer classified as Class I.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, no active structures, systems, or components that are electrically powered are required to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The services water lines continue to perform a support function to ensure the safe storage of spent fuel. However, it is no longer classified as Class I, because it is not required to mitigate any accidents.

1.11.4.19 NA Seismic Evaluation of the Fan Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Cooler and Passive Hydrogen Recombiner Systems After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 34 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

The fan house and passive hydrogen recombiner systems serve no purpose in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.4.20 1.7.4.10 Masonry Walls Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to the boric acid evaporator building and the fan house and making an editorial correction to reflect a historical action.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

The boric acid evaporator building and the fan house serve no purpose in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

1.11.5 1.7.5 Wind Effects Retain No proposed changes.

1.11.6 1.7.6 Structural Effects Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion regarding the Class I structures (i.e., the control building, main steam piping, and feedwater piping) that could be endangered by the failure of Class III structures, eliminating the discussion that the failure of the fuel storage building crane could have on a safe and orderly shutdown, and eliminating the discussion of the Class III manipulator crane in the containment building.

In addition, the name of the fuel storage building crane is revised to 40-ton fuel storage building overhead crane. There are several fuel storage building cranes; thus, it was necessary to specifically define the applicable crane.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 35 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions The discussions that are eliminated refer to postulated issues associated with the impact on power operations and associated postulated accidents. Thus, they may be eliminated from the DSAR.

1.11.6.1 1.7.6.1 Seismic Analysis of the Indian Retain No proposed changes.

Point Unit 2 Turbine Building 1.11.6.2 1.7.6.2 Seismic Evaluation of the Fuel Retain No proposed changes.

Storage Building Structure Above the Spent Fuel Pit 1.11.6.3, 1.7.6.3, Seismic and Wind Analysis of Modify This section is proposed to be modified by noting that the information is historical.

including including the Superheater Stack of subsections subsections Indian Point Unit 1 Failure of the superheater building and stack could not have an impact on storage of 1.11.6.3.1 1.7.6.3.1 spent fuel in the spent fuel pit.

through through 1.11.6.3.3 1.7.6.3.3 1.11.6.4 1.7.6.4 Seismic and Tornado Modify This section is proposed to be modified by noting that the information is historical.

Evaluation of the Superheater Building at Failure of the superheater building could not have an impact on storage of spent fuel Indian Point Unit 1 in the spent fuel pit.

1.11.6.5 1.7.6.5 Evaluation of Structural Modify This section is modified by making editorial enhancements.

Modifications 1.11.7 NA Seismic Qualification for Safe Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Shutdown After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, there are no longer any requirements for IP2 to be able to achieve safe shutdown.

Page 36 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 1.11.8 NA Protection from Flooding of Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Equipment Important to Safety After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

There is no longer the potential for flooding to impact the structures, systems, and components associated with the safe storage and handling of spent fuel. Thus, this section may be eliminated.

Table 1.11-1 Table 1.7-1 Damping Factors Modify This table is modified by eliminating the reference to the concrete support structure for the reactor vessel. After IP2 is permanently defueled, the reactor vessel will no longer be utilized for power operations. Fuel will no longer be placed in the reactor vessel.

Table 1.11-2 Table 1.7-2 Loading Combinations and Modify This table is modified by eliminating the column that provides the loading Stress Limits combinations and stress loads for vessels designed to ASME, Section III, Class A (or Class 1) rules.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and electrical generation can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 37 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 1.11-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 1.11-4 Table 1.7-3 Dynamic Characteristics of Retain No proposed changes.

the Turbine Building Table 1.11-5 Table 1.7-4 Relative Stiffness Retain No proposed changes.

Percentages Table 1.11-6 Table 1.7-5 Inertial Loads Retain No proposed changes.

Table 1.11-7 Table 1.7-6 Frequencies Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 1.11-1 Figure 1.7-1 Ten Percent of Gravity Retain No proposed changes.

Response Spectra Figure 1.11-2 Figure 1.7-2 Fifteen Percent of Gravity Retain No proposed changes.

Response Spectra Figure 1.11-3 Figure 1.7-3 Fuel Storage Building Retain No proposed changes.

North-South Model

[Historical]

Figure 1.11-4 Figure 1.7-4 Fuel Storage Building Retain No proposed changes.

East-West Model [Historical]

Figure 1.11-5 Figure 1.7-5 Indian Point Unit 1 Retain No proposed changes.

Superheater Building North-South Section Figure 1.11-6 Figure 1.7-6 Indian Point Unit 1 Retain No proposed changes.

Superheater Building East-West Section Figure 1.11-7 Figure 1.7-7 Column Line G Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 1.11-8 Figure 1.7-8 Representation of Lumped Retain No proposed changes.

Mass Model of Superheater Building Used in Dynamic Analysis 1.12, NA Inservice Inspection and Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The inservice inspection and including Testing Programs testing program is no longer applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled subsections condition.

1.12.1 Page 38 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions through 1.12.3 1.13 1.8 Control of Heavy Loads Modify This section is modified by simplifying the discussion. This section contains a reference to the DSAR section that addresses the control of heavy loads in the Fuel Storage Building. This is an administrative change to eliminate duplicative information.

Page 39 of 39

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 2.1 2.1 Summary and Conclusions Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to FSAR with a reference to DSAR. This change reflects that the IP2 UFSAR will be revised and re-issued as the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

This section is modified to replace the references to plant with references to facility. The term plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified to eliminate the statement that the leakage of plant water in to the ground is improbable. Ground water contamination has been detected at Indian Point; thus, this statement is no longer accurate.

The section is modified to denote that the analysis performed regarding the gaseous discharges associated with the loss of coolant accident and site meteorology is maintained as a bounding, historical discussion. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

2.2 2.2 Location Retain No proposed changes.

2.2.1 2.2.1 General Modify This section is modified by making an editorial correction regarding the unit of measure miles.

2.2.2 2.2.2 Access Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility. The term plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

2.2.3 2.2.3 Site Ownership and Control Modify This section is modified by resolving a few grammatical errors associated with values.

In addition, the status of Figure 2.2-2 is changed from historical to active, and it is replaced with a reference to Plant Drawing 504668. It is referenced in the PDTS and the depicted exclusion boundary is expected to change during decommissioning; thus, it needs to be maintained and updated.

Page 1 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 2.2.4 2.2.4 Activities on the Site Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 2.2-1 Figure 2.2-1 Aerial Photo of Indian Point Retain No proposed changes.

Site and Surrounding Area

[Historical]

Figure 2.2-2 Figure 2.2-2 Indian Point Building Modify The status of Figure 2.2-2 is changed from historical to active, and it is replaced with a Identification [Historical] reference to Plant Drawing 504688. It is referenced in the PDTS and the depicted exclusion boundary is expected to change during decommissioning; thus, it needs to be maintained and updated.

Figure 2.2-3 Figure 2.2-3 Algonquin Gas Transmission Retain No proposed changes.

Pipeline Hudson River Crossing & Indian Point Nuclear Generation Facility 2.3 2.3 Topography Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility. The term plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified by resolving a grammatical error associated with a value.

Figure 2.3.-1 Figure 2.3.-1 Topographical Map of Indian Retain No proposed changes.

Point and Surrounding Area

[Historical]

2.4 2.4 Population and Land Use Retain No proposed changes.

2.4.1 2.4.1 Overview Retain No proposed changes.

2.4.2 2.4.2 Population and Land Use Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility. The term plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

2.4.3 2.4.3 Low-Population Zone Retain No proposed changes.

2.4.4 2.4.4 Exclusion Area Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility. The term plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

2.4.5 2.4.5 Population Data Sources Retain No proposed changes.

Page 2 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 2.4-1 Table 2.4-1 Sector and Zone Designators Modify The table is modified by resolving typographical errors.

for Population Distribution Map Table 2.4-2 Table 2.4-2 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

For All Sectors Table 2.4-3 Table 2.4-3 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector A (North)

Table 2.4-4 Table 2.4-4 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector B (North-Northeast)

Table 2.4-5 Table 2.4-5 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector C (Northeast)

Table 2.4-6 Table 2.4-6 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector D (East-Northeast)

Table 2.4-7 Table 2.4-7 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector E (East)

Table 2.4-8 Table 2.4-8 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector F (East-Southeast)

Table 2.4-9 Table 2.4-9 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector G (Southeast)

Table 2.4-10 Table 2.4-10 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector H (South-Southeast)

Table 2.4-11 Table 2.4-11 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector J (South)

Table 2.4-12 Table 2.4-12 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector K (South-Southwest)

Table 2.4-13 Table 2.4-13 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector L (Southwest)

Table 2.4-14 Table 2.4-14 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector M (West-Southwest)

Page 3 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 2.4-15 Table 2.4-15 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector N (West)

Table 2.4-16 Table 2.4-16 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector P (West-Northwest)

Table 2.4-17 Table 2.4-17 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector Q (Northwest)

Table 2.4-18 Table 2.4-18 Population Estimates, 1990, Retain No proposed changes.

for Sector R (North-Northwest)

Table 2.4-19 Table 2.4-19 Estimated Land Use in 1960 Retain No proposed changes.

and Projected Land Use in 1980 Within a 55-Mile Radius Table 2.4-20 Table 2.4-20 Land Use Projection by Retain No proposed changes.

County for 1980 Figure 2.4-1 Figure 2.4-1 Schematic Sector/Zone Retain No proposed changes.

Diagram Figure 2.4-2 Figure 2.4-2 Indian Point Station, Ten and Retain No proposed changes.

Fifty Mile Radius Map Figure 2.4-3 Figure 2.4-3 Five Mile Sector/Zone Retain No proposed changes.

Diagram [Historical]

Figure 2.4-4 Figure 2.4-4 Ten Mile Sector/Zone Retain No proposed changes.

Diagram [Historical]

Figure 2.4-5 Figure 2.4-5 Fifty Mile Sector/Zone Retain No proposed changes.

Diagram [Historical]

Figure 2.4-6 Figure 2.4-6 Map and Description Retain No proposed changes.

Showing Land Usage

[Historical]

Figure 2.4-7 Figure 2.4-7 Map and Description of the Retain No proposed changes.

Area Showing Public Utilities Figure 2.4-8 Figure 2.4-8 Map and Description of the Retain No proposed changes.

Area Showing Sewage Systems Page 4 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 2.5 2.5 Hydrology Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility. The term plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified to replace the phrases normal plant operation and normal operations with the phrase the conduct of normal activities and the phrase will be operated with the phrase releases will be managed. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The new phrases better represent the site in a permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Table 2.5-1 Table 2.5-1 Water Surface Elevation at Modify The table is modified by resolving a typographical error.

Indian Point Resulting from Stated Flow and Elevation Conditions Figure 2.5-1 Figure 2.5-1 Map & Description Showing Retain No proposed changes.

Location of Sources of Potable & Industrial Water Supplies & Watershed Areas Figure 2.5-2 Figure 2.5-2 Hudson River Drainage Basin Retain No proposed changes.

2.6 2.6 Meteorology Retain No proposed changes.

2.6.1 2.6.1 General Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to FSAR with a reference to DSAR. This change reflects that the IP2 UFSAR will be revised and re-issued as the DSAR.

This section is modified by resolving a grammatical error.

2.6.2 2.6.2 Application of Site Modify This section is modified to denote that the information is historical. It is retained for Meteorology to Safety information, and eliminate the discussion regarding the application of the Analysis of Loss-Of-Coolant meteorology data to the loss-of-coolant accident, because that accident is no longer Accident possible in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 5 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions In addition, a reference to DSAR Section 6.2.1.4 is provided to address the application of meteorological data to the analysis of the FHA.

Figure 2.6-1 Figure 2.6-1 Diurnal Variation of Mean Modify The figure is modified to denote that the information is historical Vector Wind for Virtually Zero Pressure Gradient Conditions Figure 2.6-2 Figure 2.6-2 Diurnal Variation of Mean Retain The figure is modified to denote that the information is historical Vector Wind for 24 Hr Periods of Weak Pressure Gradient Conditions Figure 2.6-3 Figure 2.6-3 Steadiness of Wind as a Retain The figure is modified to denote that the information is historical Function of Time of Day for Indicated Pressure Gradient Conditions 2.7 2.7 Geology and Seismology Modify This section is modified by removing a reference to itself. This reference is unnecessary.

2.8 2.8 Environmental Radioactivity Modify This section is modified to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility. The term plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified to denote that the reference to previous plant releases are historical Unit 2 releases. This change clarifies the discussion.

Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Facility Safety Analysis Retain No proposed changes.

including including Report (FSAR), Consolidated Sections 1.0 Sections 1.0 Edison Company of New through 5.0 through 5.0 York, Incorporated, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Meteorological Update, September, 1981 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Tower and Instrumentation Retain No proposed changes.

Table 1 Table 1 Record Page 6 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Valid Data Log Retain No proposed changes.

Table 2 Table 2 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparison of Annual Retain No proposed changes.

Table 3 Table 3 Percent Occurrence of Stability Categories Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summary of Trajectory Retain No proposed changes.

Table 4 Table 4 End-Points Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summation of Trajectory End Retain No proposed changes.

Table 5 Table 5 Points - August, 1978 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summation of Trajectory End Retain No proposed changes.

Table 6 Table 6 Points - January, 1979 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summation Trajectory Retain No proposed changes.

Table 7 Table 7 Occurrences South of Indian Point Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Locations of Stations Relative Retain No proposed changes.

Table 8 Table 8 to Indian Point Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Valid Data for Trajectory Retain No proposed changes.

Table 9 Table 9 Wind Sites Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Frequency Distribution of 24 Retain No proposed changes.

Table 10 Table 10 Hour Resultant Wind Directions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summary of Two-Station Retain No proposed changes.

Table 11 Table 11 Wind Correlations Piermont (Site 1), Referenced to Selected Monitoring Locations (Site 2)

Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Concurrence of Two-Station Retain No proposed changes.

Table 12 Table 12 Wind Directions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Diurnal Distribution of Retain No proposed changes.

Table 13 Table 13 Occurrences of Eight-Hour Trajectories with On Grid Reversals Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summary of Trajectory Retain No proposed changes.

Table 14 Table 14 End-Point Counts Page 7 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summary of Trajectory Retain No proposed changes.

Table 5 Table 5 End-Points (Percent)

Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Historical Comparisons of Retain No proposed changes.

Table 16A Table 16A Wind Frequency Distributions - March Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Historical Comparisons of Retain No proposed changes.

Table 16B Table 16B Wind Frequency Distributions - July Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Historical Comparisons of Retain No proposed changes.

Table 16C Table 16C Wind Frequency Distributions - December Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparison of Percent Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 17 Table 17 Frequency Distributions -

Summer Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparison of Percent Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 18 Table 18 Frequency Distributions -

Winter Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparison of Diurnal Retain No proposed changes.

Table 19 Table 19 Resultant Wind Directions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Indian Point (10M) Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 20 Table 20 Speed (MPH) - Summer Season Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Indian Point (10M) Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 21 Table 21 Speed (MPH) - Winter Season Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Indian Point (122M) Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 22 Table 22 Speed (MPH) - Summer Season Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Indian Point (122M) Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 23 Table 23 Speed (MPH) - Winter Season Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Maximum Diurnal Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 24 Table 24 Speed (MPH)

Page 8 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Annual Summary of Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Table 25 Table 25 Direction Percent Frequency Distribution as a Function of Stability - 10M Level Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summary of Wind Direction Retain No proposed changes.

Table 26 Table 26 Percent Frequency Distribution as a Function of Stability - Summer Season Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Summary of Wind Direction Retain No proposed changes.

Table 27 Table 27 Percent Frequency Distribution as a Function of Stability - Winter Season Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Historical Comparisons of Retain No proposed changes.

Table 28 Table 28 Percent Occurrence of Stability Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparison of Percent Retain No proposed changes.

Table 29 Table 29 Occurrence of Stability on 122 Meter Tower Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Diurnal Variation of Stability Retain No proposed changes.

Table 30 Table 30 Class and Wind Speed (10M)

Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Diurnal Variation of Stability Retain No proposed changes.

Table 31 Table 31 Class and Wind Speed (122M)

Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Diurnal Variation of Stability Retain No proposed changes.

Table 32 Table 32 Class and Wind Speed (Delta-T 400-200)

Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparisons of Average Retain No proposed changes.

Table 33 Table 33 Wind Speeds (MPH) as a Function of Stability Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Ground Contours at Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 1 Figure 1 Elevation 200 Feet Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Ground Contours at Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 2 Figure 2 Elevation 400 Feet Page 9 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Elevations in the Indian Point Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 3 Figure 3 Region Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Water Courses in the Indian Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 4 Figure 4 Point Region Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Existing and Historical Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 5 Figure 5 Meteorological Towers at Indian Point Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Indian Point Meteorological Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 6 Figure 6 Site Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Tower Configuration Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 7 Figure 7 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Station Configuration Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 8 Figure 8 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Indian Point - Meteorological Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 9 Figure 9 Support Systems Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Two Station Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 10A Figure 10A Correlation Data Period -

October 1973 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Two Station Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 10B Figure 10B Correlation Data Period -

December 1973 Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Position of One Mile Grid in Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 11 Figure 11 Relation to Topographic Features Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Position of Wind Files on Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 12 Figure 12 Grid Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Average March, 1980 East Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 13 Figure 13 and West Bank Diurnal Wind Distributions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Average June, 1980 East and Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 14 Figure 14 West Bank Diurnal Wind Distributions Page 10 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND ENVIRONMENT UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Average December, 1980 Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 15 Figure 15 East and West Bank Diurnal Wind Distributions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Locations of Monitoring Sites Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 16 Figure 16 in Relation to One Mile Grid Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparison of 10M Level Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 17 Figure 17 Diurnal Wind Distributions Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Comparison of 122M Level Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 18 Figure 18 Diurnal and Wind Distribution Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Diurnal Distribution of Wind Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 19 Figure 19 Speeds Appendix 2A, Appendix 2A, Percent Probability Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 20 Figure 20 Distribution of Wind Speeds Appendix 2B Appendix 2B Indian Point FSAR Retain No proposed changes.

Update, Revised Appendix 2B. Appendix 2B. Geologic Time Scale Retain No proposed changes.

Table 1 Table 1 Appendix 2B, Appendix 2B, Stratigraphic Correlation Retain No proposed changes.

Table 2 Table 2 Chart Appendix 2B, Appendix 2B, Geologic History in the Retain No proposed changes.

Table 3 Table 3 Croton Falls Area Appendix 2B, Appendix 2B, Location Map Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 1 Figure 1 Appendix 2B, Appendix 2B, Seismotectonic Map Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 2 Figure 2 Page 11 of 11

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3.0 3.1 Description Modify This section provides a summary description of the reactor core, fuel rods, fuel assemblies, rod cluster control assemblies, and control rod drive mechanisms. The title is changed from Description to Nuclear Fuel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

As a result, this section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the reactor core and the control rod drive mechanisms. The reactor vessel will never be loaded with fuel again. In addition, the control rod drive mechanisms perform no function in the defueled state.

The information regarding the fuel rods, fuel assemblies, rod cluster control assemblies, and burnable poison rods will be retained, because they will continue to be stored in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) or the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) until permanent removal from the site. The discussion is modified to denote that 15X15 upgraded fuel design assemblies were utilized in Cycles 17 through 24 to provide historical context regarding the fuel types utilized in the various operating cycles.

In addition, editorial or typographical corrections are made. In addition, the title is changed to permit reorganization of the material into a consolidated Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

3.1 NA Design Bases Delete This header is deleted. There are no sub-sections other than 3.1.3.4.2 and 3.1.3.4.3.

Subsections 3.1.3.4.2 and 3.1.3.4.3 will be incorporated into a separate section of the DSAR that addresses the fuel rods, fuel assemblies, and rod cluster control assemblies.

3.1.1 NA Performance Objectives Delete This section provides the performance objectives for the reactor core.

Page 1 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.1.2 NA Principal Design Criteria This section provides the principal design criteria associated with the reactor core. It Delete is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.1.2.1 NA Reactor Core Design Delete See the discussion above.

3.1.2.2 NA Suppression of Power Delete See the discussion above.

Oscillations 3.1.2.3 NA Redundancy of Reactivity Delete See the discussion above.

Control 3.1.2.4 NA Reactivity Hot Shutdown Delete See the discussion above.

Capability 3.1.2.5 NA Reactivity Shutdown Delete See the discussion above.

Capability 3.1.2.6 NA Reactivity Holddown Delete See the discussion above.

Capability 3.1.2.7 NA Reactivity Control Delete See the discussion above.

Systems Malfunction 3.1.2.8 NA Maximum Reactivity Delete See the discussion above.

Worth of Control Rods 3.1.3 NA Safety Limits Delete This section provides the safety limits associated with the reactor core. It is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections, with the exception of subsections 3.1.3.4.2 and 3.1.3.4.3, are proposed for deletion. Subsections 3.3.1.4.2 and 3.3.1.4.3 Page 2 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions will be incorporated into a separate section of the DSAR that addresses the fuel rods, fuel assemblies, and rod cluster control assemblies.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.1.3.1 NA Nuclear Limits Delete See the discussion above.

3.1.3.2 NA Reactivity Control Limits Delete See the discussion above.

3.1.3.3 NA Thermal and Hydraulic Delete See the discussion above.

Limits 3.1.3.4 NA Mechanical Limits Delete See the discussion above.

3.1.3.4.1 NA Reactor Internals Delete See the discussion above.

3.1.3.4.2 3.1.1 Fuel Assemblies Modify This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding the mechanical limits for the fuel assemblies. This section is modified to eliminate the information regarding nuclear fuel operation or emplacement in the reactor vessel and retain the information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI.

Other administrative changes are required to reflect the renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.1.3.4.3 3.1.2 Rod Cluster Control Modify This section provides the safety limits associated with the rod cluster control Assemblies assemblies. It is modified to retain the information regarding the rod cluster control assemblies that is pertinent to their storage as part of the fuel assemblies in the SFP and the ISFSI.

Page 3 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3.1.3.4.4 NA Control Rod Drive Delete This section provides the safety limits associated with the control rod drive Assembly assemblies.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The control rod drive assemblies will not be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

3.2 NA Reactor Design Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides a description of reactor design, including nuclear design and evaluation, thermal and hydraulic design, and mechanical design and evaluation. The majority of its subsections are proposed for deletion as discussed below, with the exception of specific information regarding fuel pellets, fuel rods, and fuel assemblies that will be reorganized into a section that addresses nuclear fuel.

This section header is proposed to be deleted. This is an administrative change.

3.2.1 NA Nuclear Design and Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides a description of the nuclear design of the Evaluation reactor core. It is proposed for deletion.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and the discussions regarding reactor core design are obsolete.

3.2.1.1 NA Nuclear Characteristics of Delete See the discussion above.

the Design 3.2.1.1.1 NA Reactivity Control Delete See the discussion above.

Aspects 3.2.1.1.1.1 NA Chemical Shim Control Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.1.1.2 NA Control Rod Delete See the discussion above.

Requirements Page 4 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3.2.1.1.1.3 NA Total Power Reactivity Delete See the discussion above.

Defect 3.2.1.1.1.4 NA Operational Delete See the discussion above.

Maneuvering Band 3.2.1.1.1.5 NA Control Rod Bite Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.1.1.6 NA Xenon Stability Control Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.1.1.7 NA Excess Reactivity Delete See the discussion above.

Insertion Upon Reactor Trip 3.2.1.1.1.8 NA Calculated Rod Worths Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.2 NA Reactor Core Power Delete See the discussion above.

Distribution 3.2.1.2.1 NA Definitions Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.2.2 NA Radial Power Delete See the discussion above.

Distributions 3.2.1.2.3 NA Axial Power Distributions Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.2.4 NA Local Power Peaking Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.2.5 NA Limiting Power Delete See the discussion above.

Distributions 3.2.1.2.6 NA Power Distribution Delete See the discussion above.

Anomalies 3.2.1.2.7 NA Reactivity Coefficients Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.1.2.7.1 NA Moderator Temperature Delete See the discussion above.

Coefficient 3.2.1.2.7.2 NA Moderator Pressure Delete See the discussion above.

Coefficient 3.2.1.2.7.3 NA Moderator Density Delete See the discussion above.

Coefficient 3.2.1.2.7.4 NA Doppler and Power Delete See the discussion above.

Coefficients 3.2.1.3 NA Nuclear Evaluation of Delete See the discussion above.

Current Core 3.2.2 NA Thermal and Hydraulic Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides a description of the thermal and hydraulic Design and Evaluation design of the reactor core. It is proposed for deletion.

Page 5 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and the discussions regarding thermal and hydraulic design of the reactor core are obsolete.

3.2.2.1 NA Thermal and Hydraulic Delete See the discussion above.

Characteristics of the Design 3.2.2.1.1 NA Central Temperature of Delete See the discussion above.

the Hot Pellet 3.2.2.1.2 NA Heat Flux Ratio and Data Delete See the discussion above.

Correlation 3.2.2.1.3 NA Definition of Departure Delete See the discussion above.

from Nuclear Boiling Ratio 3.2.2.1.4 NA Procedure for Using W-3 Delete See the discussion above.

L grid Correlation 3.2.2.1.5 NA The WRB-1 DN Delete See the discussion above.

Correlation 3.2.2.1.6 NA The W-3 DNB Correlation Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.2.1.7 NA Film Boiling Heat Delete See the discussion above.

Transfer Coefficient 3.2.2.2 NA Hot Channel Factors Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.2.2.1 NA Definition of Engineering Delete See the discussion above.

Hot Channel Factor 3.2.2.2.2 NA Heat Flux Engineering Delete See the discussion above.

Subfactor, F EQ 3.2.2.2.3 NA Enthalpy Rise Delete See the discussion above.

Engineering Subfactor, F EDH Page 6 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3.2.2.3 NA Core Pressure Drop and Delete See the discussion above.

Hydraulic Loads 3.2.2.4 NA Thermal and Hydraulic Delete See the discussion above.

Design Parameters 3.2.2.5 NA Hydraulic Compatibility Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.2.5.1 NA Transition Core Effects Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.2.5.2 NA DNB Performance When Delete See the discussion above.

Transitioning Cores 3.2.2.5.3 NA Compatibility Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.2.6 NA Effects of Rod Bow on Delete See the discussion above.

DNBR 3.2.3 3.1.3 and Mechanical Design and Modify This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding the mechanical design 3.1.4 Evaluation limits for the reactor internals and core components. It will be modified to eliminate the discussions regarding the reactor internals and reactor operations.

The title of the section is changed from Mechanical Design and Evaluation to Mechanical Design. Another subsection entitled Evaluation is created. This is to permit reorganization of the remaining material into the DSAR.

The discussions regarding the fuel pellets, fuel rods, fuel assemblies, and rod cluster control assemblies will be retained, but are modified to eliminate the information regarding nuclear fuel operation or emplacement in the reactor vessel and retain the information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI.

Other administrative changes are required to reflect the renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the discussions regarding the reactor internals (with the exception of the fuel rods, fuel assemblies, and rod cluster control assemblies discussions) and reactor operations are obsolete.

Page 7 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3.2.3.1 NA Reactor Internals Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.3.1.1 NA Design Description Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.3.1.1.1 NA Lower Core Support Delete See the discussion above.

Structure 3.2.3.1.1.2 NA Upper Core Support Delete See the discussion above.

Assembly 3.2.3.1.1.3 NA Incore Instrumentation Delete See the discussion above.

Support Structures 3.2.3.1.2 NA Evaluation of Core Barrel Delete See the discussion above.

and Thermal Shield 3.2.3.2 NA Core Components Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding the core components. It will be eliminated, with the exception of subsection 3.2.3.2.1.1 regarding the fuel assemblies. This section header will be eliminated. The DSAR will include a section that will address the fuel rods and fuel assemblies.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

The elimination of this section header is an administrative change.

3.2.3.2.1 NA Design Description Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.3.2.1.1 3.1.3.1 Fuel Assembly Modify This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding the mechanical limits for the fuel assemblies. It will be retained, but modified to eliminate the information regarding nuclear fuel operation or emplacement in the reactor vessel and retain the information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI.

Other administrative changes are required to reflect the renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR. Editorial and typographical corrections and enhancements are made. In addition, information that is duplicative is removed, and additional references to Figures added.

Page 8 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.2.3.2.1.2 3.1.3.2 Rod Cluster Control Modify This section provides the information regarding the rod cluster control assemblies. It Assemblies is modified to retain the information regarding the rod cluster control assemblies that is pertinent to their storage as part of the fuel assemblies in the SFP and the ISFSI, and to designate specific information as historic. In addition, editorial or typographical corrections are made.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The rod cluster control assemblies will not be required to perform a function in the reactor core in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

3.2.3.2.1.3 3.1.3.3 Neutron Source Modify This section provides information regarding the neutron source assemblies. It is Assemblies modified to retain the information regarding the neutron source assemblies that is pertinent to their storage as part of the fuel assemblies in the SFP and the ISFSI, and to designate specific information as historic.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The neutron source assemblies will not be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 9 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3.2.3.2.1.4 3.1.3.4 Plugging Devices Modify This section provides information regarding plugging devices. It will be modified to retain the information regarding the plugging devices that is pertinent to their storage as part of the fuel assemblies in the SFP and the ISFSI.

3.2.3.1.5 3.1.3.5 Burnable Absorber Rods Modify This section provides information regarding the burnable absorber rods. It is modified to retain the information regarding the burnable absorber rods that is pertinent to their storage as part of the fuel assemblies in the SFP and the ISFSI, and to designate specific information as historic. In addition, a reference to Figures is added and editorial changes are made.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The burnable absorber rods will not be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

3.2.3.2.2 3.1.4 Evaluation of Core Modify This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding the core components. It Components will be eliminated, with the exception of subsection 3.2.3.2.2.1 regarding the fuel assemblies. This section header will be retitled as evaluation. The DSAR will include a section that will address the fuel rods and fuel assemblies.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.2.3.2.2.1 3.1.4.1 Fuel Evaluation Modify This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding an evaluation of the fuel. It will be modified to eliminate the information regarding nuclear fuel operation or emplacement in the reactor vessel and retain the information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI. Other administrative changes are required to reflect the renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Page 10 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.2.3.2.2.2 NA Evaluation of Burnable Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding burnable absorber rods.

Absorber Rods It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The burnable absorber rods perform no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Information that continues to apply with regards to the description is provided in other sections of the IP2 UFSAR.

3.2.3.2.2.3 NA Effects of Vibration and Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding the performance of fuel Thermal Cycling on Fuel assemblies in the reactor core.

Assemblies After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The only information that needs to be retained regarding the fuel assemblies is the information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI.

3.2.3.3 NA Transition Cores Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding transition cores.

Page 11 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. No discussion regarding reactor cores is required to be maintained in the DSAR.

3.2.3.4 NA Control Rod Drive Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding control rod drive Mechanism Design mechanisms. It will be eliminated.

Description After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The control rod drive mechanisms perform no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

3.2.3.4.1, NA Full-Length Rods Delete See the discussion above.

including subsections 3.2.3.4.1.1 through 3.2.3.4.1.7 3.2.3.4.2 NA Part-Length Rods Delete The information in this section was previously deleted. The placeholder for the section will be deleted in the DSAR. This is an administrative change.

3.2.3.5 3.1.4.2 Fuel Assembly and Rod Modify This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides information regarding a mechanical evaluation Cluster Control Assembly of the fuel assemblies and rod cluster control assemblies. It will be modified to Mechanical Evaluation eliminate the information regarding nuclear fuel operation and emplacement of fuel in the reactor vessel. Information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI will be retained. Other administrative changes are required to reflect the renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Page 12 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

3.2.3.5.1 NA One-Seventh Scale Delete See the discussion above.

Mockup Tests 3.2.3.5.2 NA Loading and Handling Delete See the discussion above.

Tests 3.2.3.5.3 3.1.4.3 Axial and Lateral Bending Modify This section provides information regarding axial and lateral bending tests for the fuel Tests assemblies and the rod cluster control assemblies. It is retained, but modified by removing discussions of refueling operations. Given that the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled, the reactor will never be refueled.

The title of the subsection is eliminated, because it is the only remaining subsection for Section 3.2.3.5. This permits consolidation of the information into the compiled DSAR.

3.2.4 NA Fixed Incore Detectors Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides a description of the fixed incore detectors.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. The fixed incore detectors do not perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

3.2.4.1 NA Core Monitoring Delete See the discussion above.

3.2.5 NA Plant Computer Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR describes the plant integrated computer system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 13 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. The plant integrated computer system does not perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

3.2.6 NA Current Operating Cycle Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides a summary of the methodology utilized regarding the reactor core in cycle 24.

It will be eliminated, because the information is historical and not required to be retained in the DSAR.

Table 3.2-1 NA Nuclear Design Data Delete This table provides a summary of nuclear design data for cycle 1.

Cycle 1 Values It will be eliminated, because the information is historical and not required to be retained in the DSAR.

Table 3.2-1A NA Nuclear Design Data Delete This table provides a summary of nuclear design data for cycle 24.

Cycle 24 Values It will be eliminated, because the information is historical and not required to be retained in the DSAR.

Table 3.2-2 NA Reactivity Requirements Delete This table provides a summary of reactivity requirements for control rods for cycle 1.

for Control Rods for Cycle 1 It will be eliminated, because the information is historical and not required to be retained in the DSAR.

Table 3.2-3 NA Calculated Rod Worths, Delete This table provides a summary of rod worth requirements for cycle 1.

for Cycle 1 It will be eliminated, because the information is historical and not required to be retained in the DSAR.

Table 3.2-4 NA Deleted Delete This table was previously deleted. The deletion of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Table 3.2-5 NA Deleted Delete This table was previously deleted. The deletion of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Table 3.2-6 NA Thermal and Hydraulic Delete The references to this table in subsections 3.2.2.1.1, 3.2.2.4, and 3.2.3.2.2.1 have Design Parameters been deleted.

Table 3.2-7 Table 3.1-1 Core Mechanical Design Modify The information in this table regarding the fuel assemblies, fuel rods, rod cluster Parameters control assemblies, burnable poison rods is retained. The information regarding the fuel pellets and integral fuel burnable absorber rods is eliminated, because they only address the fuel pellets and integral fuel burnable absorber rods for the last core. In Page 14 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions addition, the information regarding the number of fuel assemblies, fuel rods, rod cluster control assemblies in a core, the core structure, and the number and pellet stack length for the wet annular burnable absorber rods is eliminated, because the information is representative of the core design or the information is only reflective of the last cycle. Administrative changes are made to eliminate unnecessary notes.

Editorial changes are made.

In addition, a correction is made to define that the VANTAGE+ fuel assemblies may have 12 or 13 grids per assembly. This is consistent with information in the text of the UFSAR.

Figure 3.2-1 NA Typical Power Peaking Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.1.1.6.

Factor Versus Axial Offset Figure 3.2-2 NA Rod Cluster Groups - Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.1.1.8.

Cycle 1 [Historical]

Figure 3.2-3 NA Assembly Average Power Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.2.

& Burnup, Cycle 1 Calculations, BOL, Unrodded Core

[Historical]

Figure 3.2-4 NA Assembly Average Power Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.2.

& Burnup, Cycle 1 Calculations, EOL, Unrodded Core

[Historical]

Figure 3.2-5 NA Assembly Average Power Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.2.

Distribution Cycle 1 Calculations, BOL, Group C4 Inserted [Historical]

Figure 3.2-6 NA Assembly Average Power Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.2.

Distribution Cycle 1 Calculations, BOL Part-Length Rods In

[Historical]

Page 15 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 3.2-7 NA Cycle 1 Maximum FQ X Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.5.

Power Versus Axial Height During Normal Operation [Historical]

Figure 3.2-7A NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted Figure 3.2-8 NA Burnable Poison & Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.7.1.

Source Assembly Locations - Cycle Figure 3.2-9 NA Burnable Poison Rod Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.7.1.

Locations - Cycle 1

[Historical]

Figure 3.2-10 NA Moderator Temperature Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.7.1.

Coefficient Vs Moderator Temperature - EOL, Cycle 1 [Historical]

Figure 3.2-11 NA Moderator Temperature Delete Previously deleted.

Coefficient Vs Moderator Temperature - BOL, Cycle 1 Full Power [Historical]

Figure 3.2-12 NA Moderator Temperature Delete Previously deleted.

Coefficient Vs Moderator Temperature - BOL, Cycle 1 Zero Power [Historical]

Figure 3.2-13 NA Doppler Coefficient Vs Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.7.4.

Effective Fuel Temperature - Cycle 1

[Historical]

Figure 3.2-14 NA Power Coefficient Vs Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.7.4.

Percent Power - Cycle 1

[Historical]

Figure 3.2-15 NA Power Coefficient - Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.1.2.7.4.

Closed Gap Model Figure 3.2-16 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-17 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Page 16 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 3.2-18 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-19 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-20 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-21 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-22 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-23 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-24 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-25 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-26 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-27 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-28 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-29 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-30 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-31 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-32 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-33 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-34 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-35 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-36 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-37 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 3.2-38 NA Typical Thermal Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.1.

Conductivity of UO2 Figure 3.2-39 NA High Power Fuel Rod Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.1.

Experimental Program Figure 3.2-40 NA Typical Comparison Of Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.2.

W-3 Prediction and Uniform Flux Data Figure 3.2-41 NA Typical W-3 Correlation Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.2.

Probability Distribution Curve Figure 3.2-42 NA Comparison of "L" Grid Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.2.

Typical and Thimble Cold Page 17 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Wall Cell Rod Bundle DNB Data for Non-Uniform Axial Heat Flux With Predictions of W-3 X F'SL Figure 3.2-43 NA Typical Comparison of Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.2.

W-3 Correlation with Rod Bundle DNB Data (Simple Grid without Mixing Vane)

Figure 3.2-44 NA Typical Comparison of Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.2.

W-3 Correlation with Rod Bundle DNB Data (Simple Grid with Mixing Vane)

Figure 3.2- NA Typical Measured Versus Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.5.

44A Predicted Critical Heat Flux-WRB-1 Correlation Figure 3.2-45 NA Typical Stable Film Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.2.1.7.

Boiling Heat Transfer Data and Correlation Figure 3.2-46 NA Core Cross Section Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.3.

Figure 3.2-47 NA Reactor Vessel Internals Delete See the discussion for subsections 3.2.3 and 3.2.3.1.1.

Figure 3.2-48 NA Core Loading Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.3 and 3.2.3.2.1.1.

Arrangement - Cycle 1

[Historical]

Figure 3.2-49 Figure Typical Rod Cluster Retain No proposed change.

3.1-1 Control Assembly Figure 3.2-50 Figure Rod Cluster Control Retain No proposed change.

3.1-2 Assembly Outline Figure 3.2-51 NA Core Barrel Assembly Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.3.1.1.1.

Figure 3.2-52 NA Upper Core Support Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.3.1.1.2.

Structure Figure 3.2-53 NA Guide Tube Assembly Delete See the discussion for subsection 3.2.3.1.1.2.

Page 18 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 3.2-54 Figure Fuel Assembly and Modify The figure will be retained. The title will be modified to read Fuel Assembly and 3.1-3 Control Cluster Cross Control Cluster Cross Section - HIPAR, LOPAR, OFA and VANTAGE. This change Section - HIPAR, LOPAR, removes an extra and. Other administrative changes are required to reflect the and OFA and VANTAGE+ renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-55 Figure HIPAR Fuel Assembly Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-4 renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-56 Figure LOPAR Fuel Assembly Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-5 renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2- Figure OFA Fuel Assembly Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 56A 3.1-6 renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2- Figure VANTAGE+ Fuel Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 56B 3.1-7 Assembly renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-57 Figure Guide Thimble to Bottom Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-8 Nozzle Joint renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-58 Figure LOPAR Top Grid to Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-9 Nozzle Attachment renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2- Figure OFA and VANTAGE+ Top Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 58A 3.1-10 Grid to Nozzle renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Attachment Figure 3.2-59 Figure Spring Clip Grid Assembly Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-11 renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-60 Figure Mid-Grid Expansion Joint Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-12 Design Plan View renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-61 Figure Elevation View - LOPAR Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-13 Grid to Thimble renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Attachment Figure 3.2- Figure Elevation View- Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 61A 3.1-14 VANTAGE+ Grid to renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Thimble Attachment Figure 3.2- Figure Vantage+ Fuel Assembly Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 61B 3.1-15 with Performance+ renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Enhancements Figure 3.2- Figure 15x15 Upgraded Fuel Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 61C 3.1-16 Assembly renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Page 19 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 3.2-62 Figure Cycle 1 - Neutron Source Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-17 Locations [Historical] renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-63 Figure HIPAR Burnable Poison Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-18 Rod renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-64 Figure LOPAR Burnable Poison Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-19 Rod renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Figure 3.2-65 NA Control Rod Drive Delete See discussion for subsection 3.2.3.4.1.

Mechanism Assembly Figure 3.2-66 NA Control Rod Drive Delete See discussion for subsection 3.2.3.4.1.7.

Mechanism Schematic Figure 3.2-67 NA Thimble Location - Fixed Delete See discussion for subsection 3.2.4.

Incore Detectors Figure 3.2-68 NA Cycle 14 Incore Detector, Delete See discussion for subsections 3.2.4.1 and 3.2.6 Thermocouple and Flow Mixing Device Locations Figure 3.2- NA Cycle 24 Region and Fuel Delete See discussion for subsection 3.2.6.

68A Assembly Locations Figure 3.2- NA Cycle 24 Core Delete See discussion for subsection 3.2.6.

68B Components and Fresh IFBA Locations Figure 3.2-69 Figure Comparison of Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-20 Borosilicate Glass renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

Absorber Rod with WABA Rod Figure 3.2-70 Figure Wet Annular Burnable Retain The figure will be retained. Only administrative changes are required to reflect the 3.1-21 Absorber Rod renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

3.3 NA Tests and Inspections Delete This section discusses the inspections and tests that were conducted regarding the reactor internals, including the fuel assemblies and control rod drive mechanisms. It is proposed for deletion, with the exception of subsections 3.3.3.1 and 3.3.3.2. These subsections will be consolidated in the DSAR into a section that discusses the fuel.

This section is modified to eliminate the information regarding nuclear fuel operation or emplacement in the reactor vessel and retain the information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI. Other administrative changes are Page 20 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions required to reflect the renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

The elimination of this section header is an administrative change.

3.3.1 NA Reactivity Anomalies Delete This section discusses the process of normalization between the predicted relation between fuel burnup and the boron concentration. It is proposed for deletion.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, reactivity anomalies in the reactor core are no longer a concern in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding reactivity anomalies in the reactor core in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

3.3.2 NA Thermal and Hydraulic Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides a description of the thermal and hydraulic Tests and Inspections tests and inspections of the reactor internals, including the fuel assemblies and the control rod drive mechanisms. It is proposed for deletion.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and the discussions regarding thermal and hydraulic design of the reactor core are obsolete.

Page 21 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3.3.3 NA Core Component Tests Delete This section of the IP2 UFSAR provides a description of the core component tests and and Inspections inspections. It is proposed for deletion.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and the discussions regarding core components are obsolete.

3.3.3.1 3.1.5 Quality Assurance Retain No changes.

Program 3.3.3.2 3.1.6 Quality Control Modify This section discusses the quality control regarding the fuel. This section is modified to eliminate the information regarding nuclear fuel operation or emplacement in the reactor vessel and retain the information regarding fuel design that is applicable to storage in the SFP or the ISFSI. Other administrative and editorial changes are made to reflect the renumbering of the Sections, Tables, and Figures to create the IP2 DSAR.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Appendix 3A NA Experimental Verification Delete This appendix provides data regarding experiments that were performed at the of Calculations for Boron Westinghouse Reactor Evaluation Center to investigate the reactivity worth of Pyrex Burnable Poison Rods glass tubing that is similar to that employed in the IP2 reactor core as burnable poisons rods.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the Page 22 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions burnable poison rods are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the experimental studies regarding burnable poison rods in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 3A-1 NA Calculations and Delete See the discussion above.

Burnable Poison Rod Worths Appendix 3B NA Power Distribution Delete Appendix 3B is proposed for deletion in its entirety, because all of its Sections are Control proposed for deletion.

3B.1 NA General Delete This appendix provides a summary of a Westinghouse investigation regarding the spatial stability of the xenon distribution in large Pressurized Water Reactors.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the information regarding analyzing, controlling, and monitoring power distribution in the reactor core in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

3B.2, NA Spatial Xenon Stability Delete This section discusses axial xenon stability, diametral xenon stability, analytical including techniques used to assess potential power distribution anomalies, and Subsections instrumentation and control to ensure that the reactor will be maintained within 3B2.1 thermal limits.

through 3B.2.4 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the information regarding analyzing, controlling, and monitoring power distribution in the reactor core in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 23 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 3 - REACTOR UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3B.3 NA Control Rod Positioning Delete This section provides a discussion regarding control rod positioning that includes discussion regarding rod misalignment, rod position indication, and control rod mispositioning.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the control rods are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the control rods in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 24 of 24

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.0 NA General Description Delete The reactor coolant system includes those systems and components that form the major portions of the nuclear system process barrier. These systems and components contained or transported the fluids coming from or going to the reactor core.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.1 NA Design Bases Delete This section is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are deleted.

4.1.1 NA Performance Objectives Delete This section provides the performance objectives of the reactor coolant system, including transferring heat from the core to the steam generators, achieving reactor core thermal-hydraulic performance, serving as a neutron moderator and reflector, serving as a solvent for the neutron absorber, providing a boundary for containing the coolant and radioactive materials, limiting the release of radioactivity to the secondary system, attenuating thermal transients, accommodating coolant volume changes, etc.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.1.2, NA General Design Criteria Delete This section addresses the general design criteria that apply to the reactor coolant including system. They are Quality Standards, Performance Standards, Records Requirements, Subsections and Missile Protection.

4.1.2.1 through The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the 4.1.2.4 permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 1 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.1.3, NA Principal Design Criteria Delete This section addresses the principal design criteria that apply to the reactor coolant including system. They are entitled Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, Monitoring Reactor Subsections Coolant Leakage, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Capability, Reactor Coolant 4.1.3.1 Pressure Boundary Rapid Propagation Failure Prevention, and Reactor Coolant through Pressure Boundary Surveillance.

4.1.3.5 The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.1.4, NA Design Characteristics Delete This section addresses the design criteria that apply to the reactor coolant system.

including They are Design Pressure, Design Temperature, and Seismic Loads.

Subsection 4.1.4.1 The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the through permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the 4.1.4.3 reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.1.5 NA Cyclic Loads Delete This section addresses the capability of the components of the reactor coolant system to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to reactor system temperature and pressure changes.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.1.6 NA Service Life Delete This section addresses the service live of the the reactor coolant system pressure components.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.1.7 NA Codes and Classifications Delete This section addresses the codes and standards that are applicable to the reactor coolant system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 2 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 4.1-1 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Sections 4.1.4, 4.2.1, and 4.4.3.

Pressure Settings Table 4.1-2 NA Reactor Vessel Design Data Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.1 and Subsection 4.2.2.1.

Table 4.1-3 NA Pressurizer and Pressurizer Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.1 and Subsections 4.2.2.2 Relief Tank Design Data and 4.2.2.6 and Section 4.2.3.

Table 4.1-4 NA Steam Generator Design Data Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.1 and Subsection 4.2.2.3.

Table 4.1-5 NA Reactor Coolant Pumps Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.1 and Subsection 4.2.2.4.

Design Data Table 4.1-6 NA Reactor Coolant Piping Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.1 and Subsection 4.2.2.7.

Design Data Table 4.1-7 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.1.4.

Design Pressure Drop Table 4.1-8 NA Thermal and Loading Cycles Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Sections 4.1.5, 4.1.6, and 4.2.6.

Table 4.1-9 NA Reactor Coolant System - Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.1.7.

Design Code Requirements 4.2 NA System Design and Operation Delete This section is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion.

4.2.1 NA General Description Delete This section provides a general discussion regarding the system design and operation of the reactor coolant system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2 NA Components Delete This section is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion.

Page 3 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.2.2.1 NA Reactor Vessel Delete This section discusses the design and operation of the reactor vessel.

The reactor vessel is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor vessel in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2.2 NA Pressurizer Delete This section discusses the design and operation of the pressurizer.

The pressurizer is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the pressurizer in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2.3 NA Steam Generators Delete This section discusses the design and operation of the steam generators.

The steam generators are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam generators in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2.4 NA Reactor Coolant Pumps Delete This section discusses the design and operation of the reactor coolant pumps.

The reactor coolant pumps are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant pumps in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2.5 NA Reactor Coolant Pump Delete This section discusses the design of the reactor coolant pump flywheels.

Flywheel Integrity The reactor coolant pump flywheels are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant pump flywheels in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2.6 NA Pressurizer Relief Tank Delete This section discusses the design and operation of the pressurizer relief tanks.

The pressurizer relief tank is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the pressurizer relief tank in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 4 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.2.2.7 NA Piping Delete This section discusses the design of the reactor coolant system piping.

The reactor coolant system piping is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system piping in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2.8 NA Valves Delete This section discusses the design of the reactor coolant system valves.

The reactor coolant system valves are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system valves in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.2.9 NA Component Supports Delete This section discusses the design of the support structures for the reactor coolant components by referring to Appendix 4B and Chapter 5.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the support structures for the reactor coolant system components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.3 NA Pressure-Relieving Devices Delete This section discusses the pressure-relieving devices that protect the reactor coolant system against overpressure.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the pressure-relieving devices that protect the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.4 NA Protection Against Delete This section discusses the methods employed to protect the reactor coolant system Proliferation of Dynamic from dynamic effects and missiles. This includes missile shielding or segregation of Effects redundant components.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, it is no longer required to be protected against dynamic effects and missiles. As a result, this information in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 5 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.2.5 NA Materials of Construction Delete This section discussion the materials of construction utilized in the reactor coolant system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.6 NA Maximum Heating and Delete This section discussion the maximum heating and cooling rates for the reactor coolant Cooling Rates system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.7, NA Leakage Delete This section and its subsections address the potential for leakage from the reactor including coolant system to the containment, including maximum leak rates that are permitted, Subsections leakage prevention measures, and methods to identify leaks.

4.2.7.1 through The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the 4.2.7.3 permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.8 NA Water Chemistry Delete This section addresses water chemistry requirements for the reactor coolant system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.9 NA Reactor Coolant Flow Delete This section addresses methods for monitoring the reactor coolant system flow rate.

Measurement The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.10, NA Reactor Coolant Vent System Delete This section and its subsections discuss the remote reactor coolant vent system that including allows for remote manual venting of gases from the reactor vessel head should they Subsections accumulate there.

4.2.10.1 Page 6 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions through After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of 4.2.10.4 fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant vent system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant vent system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.2.11, NA Reactor Vessel Level Delete This section and its subsections discuss the reactor vessel level indication system that including Indication System provided a means for the reactor operators to diagnose the approach of inadequate Subsections cooling and assess the adequacy of responses taken to restore cooling.

4.2.11.1 and 4.2.11.2 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor vessel level indication system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor vessel level indication system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 4.2-1 NA Materials of Construction of Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Subsection 4.2.2.1 and Section 4.2.5 the Reactor Coolant System Components Table 4.2-2 NA Identification of Indian Point Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Beltline Region Weld-Metal Table 4.2-3 NA Chemical Composition of Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Reactor Vessel Beltline Region Weld Metal Table 4.2-4 NA Mechanical Properties of Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Reactor Vessel Beltline Region Weld Metal Page 7 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 4.2-5 NA Maximum 32 EFPY Fluence at Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Vessel Inner Wall Locations Table 4.2-6 NA Identification of Reactor Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Vessel Beltline Region Plate Material Table 4.2-7 NA Chemical Composition of Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Reactor Vessel Beltline Region Plate Material, Weight Percent Table 4.2-8 NA Mechanical Properties of Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Reactor Vessel Beltline Region Plate Material Table 4.2-9 NA Summary of Charpy V-notch Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

and Drop Weight Tests Table 4.2-10 NA Reactor Vessel Beltline Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Fluence Figure 4.2-1 NA Reactor Coolant System Flow Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3.

Diagram - Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2738 Figure 4.2-2 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.7.

Schematic Flow Diagram Figure 4.2-3 NA Reactor Vessel Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.1.

Figure 4.2-4 NA Pressurizer Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.2.

Figure 4.2-5 NA Steam Generator Assembly Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.3.

Figure 4.2-6 NA Reactor Coolant Pump Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.4.

Figure 4.2-7 NA Reactor Coolant Pump Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.4.

Estimated Performance Characteristics Figure 4.2-8 NA Flywheel Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.5.

Figure 4.2-9 NA Reactor Coolant Pump Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.5.

Flywheel Tangential Stress vs Radius Figure 4.2-10 NA Pressurizer Relief Tank Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.2.6.

Page 8 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 4.2-11 NA Identification & Location of Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.5.

Beltline Region Material for the Indian Point Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Figure 4.2-12 NA Reactor Vessel Level Delete See the discussion for the proposed deletion of Section 4.2.11.2.

Instrumentation System Flow Diagram - Replaced with Plant Drawing 208798 4.3 NA System Design Evaluation Delete This section is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion.

4.3.1, NA Safety Factors Delete This section addresses that the safety of the reactor vessel and all other reactor including coolant system pressure-containing components and piping is dependent on several Subsections major factors including design and stress analysis, material selection and fabrication, 4.3.1.1 quality control, and operations control.

through 4.3.1.3 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.3.2 NA Reliance on Interconnected Delete This section addresses the reliance of the reactor coolant system on other Systems interconnected systems.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 9 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.3.3 NA System Integrity Delete This section address tests that were conducted regarding the reactor vessel, steam generator, pressurizer, and reactor coolant pumps.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.3.4, NA Overpressure Protection Delete This section and its subsections discuss that the reactor coolant system is protected including by an overpressure protection system.

Subsections 4.3.4.1 The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the through permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the reactor coolant system 4.3.4.3 overpressure protection system is no longer required and the information regarding it in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.3.5 NA Incident Potential Delete This section discusses the potential of the reactor coolant system to be the cause of accidents and refers to Sections 14.1 and 14.2.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer a potential source of accidents in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, this information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.3.6 NA Redundancy Delete This section discusses the redundancy requirements for components of the reactor coolant system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 10 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 4.3-1 NA Summary of Primary Plus Delete See the discussion of the proposed deletion of Section 4.3.1.1.

Secondary Stress Intensity for Components of the Reactor Vessel Table 4.3-2 NA Summary of Cumulative Delete See the discussion of the proposed deletion of Section 4.3.1.1.

Fatigue Usage Factors for Components of the Reactor Vessel Table 4.3-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 4.3-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

4.4 NA Safety Limits and Conditions Delete This section is proposed to be deleted, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion.

4.4.1 NA System Heatup and Delete This section discusses the operating limits for the reactor coolant system heatup and Cooldown Rates cooldown rates.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.4.2 NA Reactor Coolant Activity Delete This section discusses the limits for the reactor coolant system activity.

Limits The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.4.3 NA Maximum Pressure Delete This section discusses the limit for the reactor coolant system maximum pressure.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.4.4 NA System Minimum Operating Delete This section discusses the minimum operating conditions for the reactor coolant Conditions system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 11 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.5 NA Inspections and Tests Delete This section is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion.

4.5.1 NA Inspection of Materials and Delete This section summarizes the nondestructive tests and inspections that were required Components Prior to by Westinghouse specifications on reactor coolant system components and materials Operation prior to operation. This section is historical.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the historical information regarding the reactor coolant system tests and inspections in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.5.2 NA Reactor Vessel Surveillance Delete This section describes the reactor vessel surveillance program.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor vessel is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, this information regarding the reactor vessel in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.5.3 NA Primary System Quality Delete This section summarizes the tests and inspections that were performed by equipment Assurance Program suppliers and material manufacturers on reactor coolant system components and materials prior to operation. This section is historical.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the historical information regarding the reactor coolant system tests and inspections in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.5.4 NA Inservice Inspection Delete This section addresses inservice inspection considerations for the reactor coolant Considerations system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding inservice inspections of the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 12 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 4.5.5 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete This section addresses a preoperational and inservice structural surveillance program Surveillance for the reactor vessel and reactor coolant system boundary.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system, including the reactor vessel, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, this information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.5.6 NA Reactor Coolant Vent System Delete This section addresses the testing of the reactor head vent and power operated relief Testing valves system valves.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system, including the reactor vent heads and power operated relief valves systems, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, this information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 4.5-1 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete See the discussion regarding the proposed deletion of Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.3.

Quality Assurance Program 4.6 NA Metal Impact Monitoring Delete This section is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are proposed for System deletion.

4.6.1 NA General Delete This section discusses the metal impact monitoring system. It is designed to enable early detection of any debris, detached internal structural items, and hardware present in the reactor coolant system.

Page 13 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the metal impact monitoring system will not be required to perform a function, and the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

4.6.2 NA Description Delete This section discusses the metal impact monitoring system. It is designed to enable early detection of any debris, detached internal structural items, and hardware present in the reactor coolant system.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the metal impact monitoring system will not be required to perform a function, and the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Appendix 4A NA Determination of Reactor Delete This appendix establishes the NDTT for the reactor vessel.

Pressure Vessel Nil-Ductility Transition Temperature After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of (NDTT) fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor vessel is no longer required to perform a funciton in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, this information regarding the reactor vessel in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Appendix 4B NA Support Structures for Delete This appendix addresses the support structures for reactor vessel, steam generators, Reactor Coolant System reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, and piping. In addition, it addresses the Components applicability of the IP3 pipe break analyses to IP2 and the application of leak before break technology.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 14 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Appendix 4C NA Sensitized Stainless Steel Delete This appendix provides a summary of a Westinghouse evaluation regarding the use of sensitized stainless steel for reactor components in pressurized water reactors.

The reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete..

Figure 4C-1 NA Primary Nozzle Combustion Delete See the discussion regarding the proposed deletion of Appendix 4C Engineering Reactor Vessel Figure 4C-2 NA Primary Nozzle Tampa Steam Delete See the discussion regarding the proposed deletion of Appendix 4C Generators Figure 4C-3 NA Spray or Surge Nozzle Tampa Delete See the discussion regarding the proposed deletion of Appendix 4C Pressurizer Page 15 of 15

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 5.1 3.16 Containment Structures Retain No changes.

5.1.1 3.16.1 Design Basis Modify This section addresses the design basis for the reactor containment. It is modified to reflect that the reactor containment will not have any active safety functions in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, but that it must remain capable of withstanding seismic events so that it will not fail and cause damage to Class I structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the spent fuel pit (SFP) or the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). A Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the Alternate Source Term (AST) methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to perform an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. However, it must remain capable of withstanding natural phenomenon, so that it does not damage any Class I SSC.

5.1.1.1 3.16.1.1 Principal Design Criteria Retain No changes 5.1.1.1.1 3.16.1.1.1 Quality Standards Modify This section addresses how the containment system satisfies General Design Criterion

1. It is modified to reflect that the reactor containment will not have any active safety functions in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, but that it must remain capable of withstanding seismic events so that it will not fail and cause damage to Class I SSCs. In addition, typographical errors are corrected in the section.

Page 1 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to perform an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. However, it must remain capable of withstanding natural phenomenon, so that it does not damage any Class I SSC.

5.1.1.1.2 3.16.1.1.2 Performance Standards Modify The section is modified to reflect that the reactor containment has been re-classified as a Class III structure. See the discussion of the changes for Section 1.11.

5.1.1.1.3 3.16.1.1.3 Fire Protection Modify This section addresses how the containment system satisfies General Design Criterion

3. It is modified to eliminate the specific discussions regarding the containment liner thermal insulation and the reactor coolant pump motors and associated equipment.

In addition, A typographical error is corrected in this section.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 2 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

A FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, the reactor containment and is no longer required to perform an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. However, it must remain capable of withstanding natural phenomenon, so that it does not damage any Class I SSC.

5.1.1.1.4 3.16.1.1.4 Records Modify This section was modified to add an exception to address a likely exemption regarding records requirements.

5.1.1.1.5 3.16.1.1.5 Reactor Containment Modify This section addresses how the containment system satisfies General Design Criterion

10. It is modified to reflect that the reactor containment will not have any active safety functions in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, but that it must remain capable of withstanding seismic events so that it will not fail and cause damage to Class I SSCs.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

A FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Page 3 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to perform an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. However, it must remain capable of withstanding natural phenomenon, so that it does not damage any Class I SSC.

5.1.1.1.6 NA Reactor Containment Design Delete This section addresses how the reactor containment structure satisfies General Basis Design Criterion 49. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, General Design Criterion 49 is not applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

5.1.1.1.7 Nil-ductility Transition Deleted This section addresses how the containment system satisfies General Design Criterion Temperature Requirement 50. It is deleted in its entirety.

for Containment Material After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The primary containment is not required to perform any function to mitigate an accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.1.2 NA Supplementary Accident Delete This section addresses requirements regarding the maintenance of the containment Criteria leakage boundary and the capability of pressure retaining components. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 4 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to be a leakage boundary, and there will no pressure-retaining components maintained in the containment.

5.1.1.3 3.16.1.2 Energy and Material Release Modify This section described the impact on the design pressure of the containment regarding reactor transients and accidents. This section is modified to eliminate the discussions regarding reactor transients and accidents. In addition, the section is renamed as Loadings to reflect the remaining content.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents. Thus, structural loadings are the only remaining design basis consideration.

5.1.1.4 NA Engineered Safety Features Delete This section provides a generic discussion regarding engineered safety features and Contribution refers to Chapters 6 and 14 of the IP2 UFSAR. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

This change is an administrative change, because the changes to Chapters 6 and 14 of the IP2 UFSAR will be addressed in the review tables for those Chapters. In addition, the IP2 UFSAR sections will be consolidated when the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) is compiled.

5.1.1.5 3.16.1.3 Codes and Standards Modify This section is modified to denote that the information is historical.

5.1.2 3.16.2 Containment Structure Retain No changes.

Design 5.1.2.1 3.16.2.1 General Description Modify This section provides a general description of the containment structure design. It is modified to defined that the design objective of the containment structure is to retain Page 5 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions its structural integrity during normal conditions and natural phenomenon events, eliminate references to historical IP2 UFSAR Figures, and to correct an editorial error.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents or contain radioactive material released as a result of those events. Structural loadings are the only remaining design basis consideration.

The eliminated of the reference to historical IP2 UFSAR Figures and the editorial correction are administrative changes.

5.1.2.2 3.16.2.2 Design Load Criteria Modify This section describes the design load criteria for the containment structure. It is modified to eliminate the discussions regarding internal pressure transient and thermal expansion stresses due to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA).

5.1.2.3 3.16.2.3 Material Specifications Modify This section describes the materials that were utilized to construct the containment structure and the specifications for these materials. It is modified to eliminate the discussions of reactor related transients and accidents (including the LOCA), identify the historical context of a previous evaluation of the protective coatings, eliminate a Page 6 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions historical discussions regarding changes to the liner insulation, and make several editorial corrections.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA), and it will no longer be subjected to operating temperatures and pressures.

5.1.2.4 3.16.2.4 Design Stress Criteria Modify This section presents the design stress criteria for the containment structure. It is retained, but modified to reflect that it is conservative with respect to the structures function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA). The analysis has been retained, because it is conservative with respect to the conditions that the containment structure may be subjected to in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.2.5, NA Missile Protection Delete This section describes the missile protection provided to various systems and including components within the containment structure. It is proposed to be deleted in its Subsections entirety.

5.1.2.5.1 through Page 7 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the potential for energetic missiles resulting from reactor related transients and accidents are no longer possible.

5.1.2.6, 3.16.2.5, Quality Control Modify This section describes the quality control program and applicable organizations including including regarding the containment structure design, construction, workmanship, materials, subsections subsections and performance. It is retained, but modified to reflect that the information is 5.1.2.6.1 3.16.2.5.1 historical. This is an administrative change to reflect that the permanently shut down through through and defueled condition.

5.1.2.6.3 3.16.2.5.3 5.1.3 3.16.3 Containment Stress Analysis Retain No changes.

5.1.3.1 3.16.3.1 General Retain No changes.

5.1.3.2 3.16.3.2 Method of Analysis Modify This section is modified to make an editorial correction. This is an administrative change.

5.1.3.3 3.16.3.3 Dome Analysis Modify This section describes the stress analysis of the dome. It is retained, but modified to reflect that it is conservative with respect to the structures function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA). The analysis has been retained, because it is conservative with respect to the conditions that the Page 8 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions containment structure may be subjected to in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.3.4 3.16.3.4 Cylinder Analysis Modify This section describes the stress analysis of the cylinder. It is retained, but modified to reflect that it is conservative with respect to the structures function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA). The analysis has been retained, because it is conservative with respect to the conditions that the containment structure may be subjected to in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.3.5 3.16.3.5 Base Mat Analysis Modify This section describes the stress analysis of the base mat. It is retained, but modified to reflect that it is conservative with respect to the structures function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA). The analysis has been retained, because it is conservative with respect to the conditions that the containment structure may be subjected to in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 9 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 5.1.3.6 3.16.3.6 Analysis of Liner and Retain No changes.

Reinforcing Steel 5.1.3.7 3.16.3.7 Containment Interior Modify This section describes the stress analysis of the containment interior structures. It is Structure retained, but modified to reflect that it is conservative with respect to the structures function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA). The analysis has been retained, because it is conservative with respect to the conditions that the containment structure may be subjected to in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.3.8 NA Pressure Stresses Delete This section header is deleted. As described below, subsection 5.1.3.8.1 will be eliminated and subsection 5.1.3.8.2 will be retained. Thus, the section header for the retained subsection is adequate to describe the discussion.

5.1.3.8.1 NA Accident Pressure Delete This section describes the accident pressure effects on the containment structure.

This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA).

5.1.3.8.2 3.16.3.8 Soil Pressure Retain No changes.

Page 10 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 5.1.3.9 3.16.3.9 Thermal Stresses Modify This section describes the analyses regarding temperature effects on the containment structure. It is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the impacts of a rapid temperature rise on the liner due to accident conditions.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA).

5.1.3.10 3.16.3.10 Analysis of Openings Retain No changes.

5.1.3.11 3.16.3.11 Seismic and Wind Design Retain No changes.

5.1.3.12 3.16.3.12 Cathodic Protection Modify This section is modified to identify that it is historical information. In addition, the reference to the safety-related service water piping is modified to denote that this is a historical classification. Service water no longer serves a safety-related purpose in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.3.13 3.16.3.13 Containment - Shear Crack Retain No changes.

5.1.4 NA Containment Penetrations Delete This section header will be deleted to reflect the proposed elimination of all of its subsections.

5.1.4.1 NA General Delete This section provides a general discussion of the penetrations. It is proposed to delete this section in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 11 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions The discussions regarding penetrations are proposed for deletion as discussed below.

The containment structure, including its penetrations, are no longer required to be leak tight to address reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA). The fuel transfer canal will be isolated from the spent fuel pit via a welded shut valve.

5.1.4.2 NA Types of Penetration Delete This section header will be deleted to reflect that all of the subsections are proposed to be eliminated.

5.1.4.2.1 NA Electrical Penetrations Delete This section discusses the design of electrical penetrations. It is proposed to delete this section in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the electrical penetrations are not required to support an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The structural analysis of the containment, including the impact of openings, was previously discussed in the IP2 UFSAR.

5.1.4.2.2 NA Piping Penetrations Delete This section discusses the design of piping penetrations. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the piping penetrations are not required to support an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The structural analysis of the containment, including the impact of openings, was previously discussed in the IP2 UFSAR.

Page 12 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 5.1.4.2.3 NA Equipment and Personnel Delete This section discusses the design of the equipment and personnel access hatches. It is Access Hatches proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the equipment and personnel access hatches are not required to support an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The structural analysis of the containment, including the impact of openings, was previously discussed in the IP2 UFSAR.

5.1.4.2.4 NA Special Penetrations Delete This section provides a general discussion of the fuel transfer tube penetration, containment supply and exhaust purge ducts, and sump penetrations. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment supply and exhaust purge ducts and sump penetrations are not required to support an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The structural analysis of the containment, including the impact of openings, was previously discussed in the IP2 UFSAR. In addition, the fuel transfer tube will be isolated from the spent fuel pit via a welded shut valve; thus, it is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.4.3 NA Design of Containment Delete This section header is proposed to be deleted, because all of its subsections are Penetrations proposed to be deleted.

Page 13 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 5.1.4.3.1 NA Criteria Delete This section provides a discussion regarding the effects of penetrations on the liner. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the liner is no longer required to withstand the impacts of any reactor transients or accidents (including the LOCA).

5.1.4.3.2 NA Materials Delete This section discusses the materials for the piping, electrical, and access penetrations.

It is proposed to delete this section in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the piping, electrical, and access penetrations are not required to support an active function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The structural analysis of the containment, including the impact of openings, was previously discussed in the IP2 UFSAR.

5.1.4.4 NA Leak Testing of Penetration Delete This section discusses pre-operational leak testing of penetration assemblies. It is Assemblies proposed to delete this section in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 14 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment structure is no longer required to be isolated to address reactor transients or accidents.

5.1.4.5 NA Construction Delete This section discusses the qualification of welding procedures and welders and the repair of defective welds.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment structure is no longer required to be isolated to address reactor transients or accidents.

5.1.4.6 NA Testability of Penetrations Delete This section discusses the testability of penetrations and weld seams. It is proposed to and Weld Seams delete this section in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment structure is no longer required to be isolated to address reactor transients or accidents.

5.1.4.7 NA Accessibility Criteria Delete This section discusses the accessibility criteria to the containment with the reactor at power or with the primary system at design pressure and temperature at hot shutdown. It is proposed to delete this section in its entirety.

Page 15 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the reactor and reactor coolant system will never enter the modes and specified conditions of operations again. Thus, the discussion regarding containment accessibility during those times is obsolete.

5.1.4.8, NA Penetration Design - Delete This section provides a general discussion of the capability of penetrations to including its Computations withstand loading. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

subsections 5.1.4.8.1 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of through fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 5.1.4.8.3 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. In addition, the fuel transfer tube will be isolated from the spent fuel pit via a welded shut valve; thus, it is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.5 NA Primary System Supports Delete This section provides an analysis of the dynamic effects of postulated accidents regarding primary system supports, including steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, and reactor vessel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 16 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, the steam generators, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer, and reactor vessel are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The discussions regarding these components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

5.1.5.1 NA Steam Generator Delete See the discussion above.

5.1.5.2 NA Reactor Coolant Pump Delete See the discussion above.

5.1.5.3 NA Pressurizer Delete See the discussion above.

5.1.5.4 NA Reactor Vessel Support Delete See the discussion above.

Girder 5.1.5.5 NA Reactor Vessel Rupture Delete See the discussion above.

5.1.5.6 NA Circumferential Cracking Delete See the discussion above.

5.1.5.7 3.16.5 Longitudinal Splitting Modify This section is modified to identify that the analysis of the accident condition is historical. It is retained, because it bounds the conditions that exist in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.6 NA Containment Structure Delete This section header is deleted to reflect the changes to its subsections discussed Design Evaluation below. The section header is superfluous, given that only one subsection will remain.

This proposed change is an administrative change.

5.1.6.1 NA Reliance on Interconnected Delete This section discusses containment leakage and isolation provisions. This section is Systems proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment is not required to be leak tight or to be capable of isolation. Thus, the discussions regarding these containment functions in the IP2 UFSAR are obsolete.

5.1.6.2 NA System Integrity and Safety Delete This section provides a summary of the penetration integrity following a pipe rupture, Factors major component support structures, and containment structure components analyses.

Page 17 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the containment is not required to be leak tight or to be capable of isolation. Thus, the discussion regarding penetration integrity in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The discussions regarding the major component support structures and containment structure components analyses are high level overviews of previously evaluated sections. This information is deleted to support consolidation of the IP2 UFSAR when the IP2 DSAR is compiled.

5.1.6.3 3.16.6.1 Performance Capability Modify This section is modified by identifying that the evaluation of the containment Margin structure is based on historical postulated accident loads.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

5.1.7 NA Liner Insulation Delete This section identifies that insulation is provided on approximately the first 43 feet of the containment liner to limit the temperature rise in the liner under accident conditions. This section is proposed for deletion in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 18 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, the liner insulation is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, this information is obsolete.

5.1.8 NA Minimum Operating Delete This section states that containment integrity internal pressure limitations and Conditions (For leakage rate requirements are established in the facility Technical Specifications. This Containment Integrity) section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Following the implementation of the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications, there will be no requirements regarding containment integrity in the Technical Specifications. Thus, this information is obsolete.

5.1.9, NA Containment Structure - Delete This section addresses the initial and periodic containment leakage rate testing, including Inspection and Testing provisions for testing of penetrations for leak tightness at the peak pressure, and Subsections provisions for testing isolation valves. This section is proposed for deletion in its 5.1.9.1 entirety.

through 5.1.9.4 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment is not required to be leak-tight or capable of being isolated (with the exception of the fuel transfer tube penetration) in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information in this section is obsolete.

5.1.10 NA Construction Tests Delete This section defines the inspections and texts that were performed during erection of including the liner. This section is proposed for deletion in its entirety.

Subsections 5.1.10.1 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of through fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 5.1.10.3 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 19 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, the containment liner is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information in this section is obsolete.

5.1.11 3.16.7 Preoperational Tests Modify This section provides a summary of the preoperational tests performed for the containment building. It is retained, but modified to remove the discussion regarding the double barrier for the penetrations and the welds joining these penetrations to the containment liner and the liner seam welds and the capability to pressurize these barriers.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment is not required to be leak-tight in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

5.1.11.1 3.16.8 Strength Test Retain No changes.

5.1.11.2 NA Integrated Leakage Rate Delete This section discusses the initial Type A Integrated Leakage Rate Test.

Test: (Type A)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment is not required to be leak-tight in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information in this section is obsolete.

5.1.11.3 NA Sensitive Leak Rate Test: Delete This section discusses the initial Type B Sensitive Leak Rate Test.

(Type B)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 20 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment is not required to be leak-tight in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information in this section is obsolete.

5.1.11.4 NA Containment Isolation Valve Delete This section discusses the initial Type C containment isolation valve tests.

Test: (Type C)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment is not required to be isolated post-accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information in this section is obsolete.

5.1.12 NA Postoperational Tests Delete This section discusses the post-operational containment integrated leakage rate tests, air lock tests, and containment isolation valve operability tests.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the containment is not required to be leak tight or isolated post-accident in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information in this section is obsolete.

Table 5.1-1 Table 3.16-1 Flooded Weights - Retain No changes.

Containment Building Page 21 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 5.1-2 NA Containment Liner Delete See the discussion above for Section 5.1.7.

Insulation Properties Figure 5.1-1 Figure Containment Structure Retain No changes.

3.16-1 Figure 5.1-2 NA Containment Building Delete Previously deleted.

General Arrangement Plans, Sheet 1 - Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2501 Figure 5.1-3 NA Containment Building Delete Previously deleted.

General Arrangement Plans, Sheet 2 - Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2502 Figure 5.1-4 NA Containment Building Delete Previously deleted.

General Arrangement Plans, Sheet 3 - Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2503 Figure 5.1-5 NA Containment Building Delete Previously deleted.

General Arrangement Elevation - Sheet 1 -

Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2506 Figure 5.1-6 NA Containment Building Delete Previously deleted.

General Arrangement Elevation - Sheet 2 -

Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2507 Figure 5.1-7 NA Containment Building Delete Previously deleted.

General Arrangement Elevation - Sheet 3 -

Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2508 Figure 5.1-8 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 5.1-9 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 5.1-10 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted Page 22 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 5.1-11 Figure Cylinder and Dome-Load Retain No changes.

3.16-2 Condition (A) - 1.5P Figure 5.1-12 Figure Cylinder and Dome-Load Retain No changes.

3.16-3 Condition (B) - 1.25P Figure 5.1-13 Figure Cylinder and Dome-Load Retain No changes.

3.16-4 Condition (C) - 1.0P Figure 5.1-14 Figure Loading Diagram in Mat- Retain No changes.

3.16-5 Load Condition (A) - 1.5P Figure 5.1-15 Figure Loading Diagram in Mat- Retain No changes.

3.16-6 Load Condition (B) - 1.25P Figure 5.1-16 Figure Loading Diagram in Mat- Retain No changes.

3.16-7 Load Condition (C) - 1.0P Figure 5.1-17 Figure Weld Stud Connection at Retain No changes.

3.16-8 Panel Low Point Figure 5.1-18 Figure Weld Stud Connection at Retain No changes.

3.16-9 Panel Low Point Figure 5.1-19 Figure Weld Stud Connection at Retain No changes.

3.16-10 Panel Center Figure 5.1-20 Figure Wall Section Retain No changes.

3.16-11 Figure 5.1-21 Figure Cylinder Base Slab Liner Retain No changes.

3.16-12 Juncture Figure 5.1-22 Figure Typical Base Mat Liner Retain No changes.

3.16-13 Detail Figure 5.1-23 Figure Base Slab Reinforcing Detail Retain No changes.

3.16-14 Figure 5.1-24 Figure Reactor Cavity Pit Retain No changes.

3.16-15 Figure 5.1-25 Figure Equipment Hatch Personnel Retain No changes.

3.16-16 Lock, Main Steam and Feedwater, Air Purge -

Rebar Figure 5.1-26 Figure Torsional Effects Retain No changes.

3.16-17 Page 23 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 5.1-27 NA Typical Electrical Delete See the discussion above.

Penetration Figure 5.1-28 NA CONAX Penetrations - Delete See the discussion above.

Outside Containment Weld Figure 5.1-29 NA CONAX Penetrations - Delete See the discussion above.

Inside Containment Weld Figure 5.1-30 NA Typical Piping Penetration Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 5.1-31 NA Fuel Transfer Tube Delete This figure is proposed to be deleted. The fuel transfer tube will be isolated from the Penetration (Conceptual spent fuel pit via a welded shut valve; thus, it is no longer required to perform a Drawing) function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Figure 5.1-32 NA Containment-Stresses on Delete See the discussion above for Section 5.1.4.8.

Penetrations and Liner -

Sheet 6 Figure 5.1-33 NA Containment-Stresses on Delete See the discussion above for Section 5.1.4.8.

Penetrations and Liner -

Sheet 7 Figure 5.1-34 NA Assumed Pipe Rupture Delete See the discussion above.

Accident Break Locations Figure 5.1-35 NA Steam Generator Support- Delete See the discussion above.

Section 1-1 Figure 5.1-36 NA Steam Generator Support- Delete See the discussion above.

Section 2-2 Figure 5.1-37 NA Steam Generator Support- Delete See the discussion above.

Section 3-3 Figure 5.1-38 NA Steam Generator Support- Delete See the discussion above.

Section 4-4 Figure 5.1-39 NA Steam Generator Support- Delete See the discussion above.

Plan Location Elevation 60 and 63 Figure 5.1-40 NA Steam Generator Support- Delete See the discussion above.

Plan Location Elevation 60 and 63 Figure 5.1-41 NA Pump Support-Section 2-2 Delete See the discussion above.

and 3-3 Page 24 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 5.1-42 NA Pump Support-Section 3-3 Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 5.1-43 NA Isometric View-Steam Delete See the discussion above.

Generator Support Figure 5.1-44 NA Isometric View-Reactor Delete See the discussion above.

Coolant Pump Support Figure 5.1-45 NA Maximum Forces Acting on Delete See the discussion above.

a Reactor Vessel Support Figure 5.1-46 NA Plan View 60 Ft-0 In. Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 5.1-47 NA Typical Layer-Reactor Ring Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 5.1-48 NA Section 5-5 Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 5.1-49 NA Section 18-18 Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 5.1-50 NA Plan View at Elevation 19 Ft- Delete See the discussion above.

7 In.

Figure 5.1-51 NA Section A-A and Section B-B Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 5.1-52 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 5.1-53 NA Containment Equipment Delete See the discussion above.

Hatch Strain Gauge Test Locations Figure 5.1-54 NA Containment Temporary Delete See the discussion above.

Opening in NW Quadrant Strain Gauge Test Locations Figure 5.1-55 NA Containment Strain Gauge Delete See the discussion above.

Test Locations Figure 5.1-56 NA Containment Proof Test Delete See the discussion above.

Gross Deformation Measurements 5.2 NA Containment Isolation Delete This section addresses the containment isolation system. This section is proposed to System be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 25 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

A FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, the containment isolation system, with the exception of the fuel transfer tube penetration, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment isolation system, with the exception of the information regarding the fuel transfer tube penetration in Subsection 5.2.2.6 and Table 5.2-1, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete. In addition, this change supports the consolidation of the information in the IP2 UFSAR when the IP2 DSAR is compiled.

5.2.1 NA Design Basis Delete See the discussion above.

5.2.2 NA System Design Delete See the discussion above.

5.2.2.1 NA Class 1, Outgoing Lines, Delete See the discussion above.

Reactor Coolant System 5.2.2.2 NA Class 2, Outgoing Lines Delete See the discussion above.

5.2.2.3 NA Class 3, Incoming Lines Delete See the discussion above.

5.2.2.4 NA Class 4, Missile Protected Delete See the discussion above.

Lines 5.2.2.5 NA Class 5, Normally Closed Delete See the discussion above.

Lines Penetrating the Containment 5.2.2.6 NA Class 6, Special Service Lines Delete This section addresses the Class 6, Special Service Lines. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 26 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, the fuel transfer tube will be isolated from the spent fuel pit by a welded shut valve. Thus, it will no longer serve a purpose in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

A FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, the containment isolation system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment isolation system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

5.2.2.7 NA Class 7, Steam and Delete See the discussion above for Section 5.2.

Feedwater Lines 5.2.3 NA Isolation Valves and Delete See the discussion above for Section 5.2.

Instrumentation Diagrams 5.2.4 NA Valve Parameters Delete See the discussion above for Section 5.2 Tabulation 5.2.5 NA Valve Operability Delete See the discussion above for Section 5.2.

Table 5.2-1 NA Containment Piping Delete The table itemizes the containment piping penetrations and isolation valves. It is Penetrations and Valving proposed to be deleted.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 27 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, the fuel transfer tube will be isolated from the spent fuel pit via a welded shut valve. Thus, the fuel transfer tube penetration will not be required in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Consequently, the containment isolation system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment isolation system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Figure 5.2-1 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-2 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-3 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-4 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-5 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-6 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-7 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-8 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Page 28 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 5.2-9 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-10 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-11 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-12 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-13 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-14 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-15 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-16 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-17 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-18 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-19 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Page 29 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 5.2-20 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-21 NA Containment Isolation Delete Previously deleted.

System Penetration Schematics [Replaced with Plant Drawing 235296]

Figure 5.2-22 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-23 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-24 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-25 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-26 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-27 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-28 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics Figure 5.2-29 NA Containment Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

System Penetration Schematics 5.3 NA Containment Heating, Delete This section addresses the containment heating, cooling, and ventilation system. This Cooling and Ventilation includes the containment cooling and ventilation system, containment purge system, System purge system isolation valves, and containment pressure relief line.

Page 30 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

A FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, the containment heating, cooling, and ventilation system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Thus, the information regarding the containment heating, cooling, and ventilation system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

5.3.1 NA Design Basis Delete See the discussion above.

5.3.1.1 NA Performance Objectives Delete See the discussion above.

5.3.1.2 NA Design Characteristics - Delete See the discussion above.

Sizing 5.3.2 NA System Design Delete See the discussion above.

5.3.2.1 NA Piping and Instrumentation Delete See the discussion above.

Diagram 5.3.2.2 NA Containment Cooling and Delete See the discussion above.

Ventilation System Page 31 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 5 - CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 5.3.2.3 NA Containment Purge System Delete See the discussion above.

5.3.2.4 NA Purge System Isolation Delete See the discussion above.

Valves 5.3.2.5 NA Containment Pressure Relief Delete See the discussion above.

Line 5.3.2.6 NA Containment Purge and Delete See the discussion above.

Pressure Relief Isolation Reset Table 5.3-1 NA Containment Cooling and Delete See the discussion above.

Ventilation System -

Principal Component Data Summary Figure 5.3-1 NA Containment Cooling and Delete Previously deleted.

Ventilation System

[Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-4022]

Page 32 of 32

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.0 NA Introduction Delete This section defines that the engineered safety features systems at IP2 as the containment system, safety injection system, containment spray system, containment air recirculation cooling system, isolation valve seal-water system, and the containment penetration and weld channel pressurization system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the spent fuel pit (SFP) or the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). A Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the Alternate Source Term (AST) methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

The engineered safety features are no longer required to prevent the occurrence or to ameliorate the effects of an accident. Consequently, the engineered safety features are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the engineered safety features in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The information in this chapter of the UFSAR regarding leakage detection systems for the component cooling water, service water, and circulating water systems that remains applicable in the defueled condition will be retained. However, this Page 1 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions information will be relocated to another section as part of the restructuring of the content to compile the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

6.1 NA General Design Criteria Delete See the discussion above.

6.1.1, NA Engineered Safety Features Delete See the discussion above.

including Criteria Subsections 6.1.1.1 through 6.1.1.7 6.1.2 NA Related Criteria Delete See the discussion above.

6.2 NA Safety Injection System Delete See the discussion above.

6.2.1, NA Design Basis Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.2.1.1 through 6.2.1.7 6.2.2, NA System Design and Delete See the discussion above.

including Operation Subsections 6.2.2.1 through 6.2.2.5 6.2.3, NA Design Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.2.3.1 through 6.2.3.9 6.2.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete See the discussion above.

Conditions Page 2 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.2.5, NA Inspections and Tests Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.2.5.1 through 6.2.5.3 Table 6.2-1 NA Safety Injection System - Delete See the discussion above.

Code Requirements Table 6.2-2 NA Instrumentation Readouts Delete See the discussion above.

on the Control Board for Operator Monitoring During Recirculation Table 6.2-3 NA Quality Standards of Safety Delete See the discussion above.

Injection System Components Table 6.2-4 NA Accumulator Design Delete See the discussion above.

Parameters Table 6.2-5 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 6.2-6 NA Refueling Water Storage Delete See the discussion above.

Tank Design Parameters Table 6.2-7 NA Pump Design Parameters Delete See the discussion above.

Table 6.2-8 NA Residual Heat Exchangers Delete See the discussion above.

Design Parameters Table 6.2-9 NA Estimated External Delete See the discussion above.

Recirculation Loop Leakage Table 6.2-10 NA Single Active Failure Analysis Delete See the discussion above.

- Safety Injection System Table 6.2-11 NA Single Passive Failure Delete See the discussion above.

Analysis (Loss of Recirculation Flow Path)

Table 6.2-12 NA Shared Functions Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

Table 6.2-13 NA Accumulator Inleakage Delete See the discussion above.

Page 3 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 6.2-14 NA Residual Heat Removal Delete See the discussion above.

System, Design, Operation, and Preoperational Test Conditions Figure 6.2-1 NA Safety Injection System - Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 1 Flow Diagram, Sheet 1 -

Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2735 Figure 6.2-1 NA Safety Injection System - Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 2 Flow Diagram, Sheet 2 -

Replaced with Plant Drawing 235296 Figure 6.2-2 NA Primary Auxiliary Building Delete See the discussion above.

Safety Injection System Piping-Schematic Plan Figure 6.2-3 NA Primary Auxiliary Building Delete See the discussion above.

Safety Injection System Piping-Schematic Elevations Figure 6.2-4 NA Containment Building Safety Delete See the discussion above.

Injection System Piping-Plan Figure 6.2-5 NA Containment Building Safety Delete See the discussion above.

Injection System Piping-Elevation Figure 6.2-6 NA Safety Injection Pump Delete See the discussion above.

Performance Figure 6.2-7 NA Residual Heat Removal Pump Delete See the discussion above.

Performance Figure 6.2-8 NA Recirculation Pump Delete See the discussion above.

Performance Figure 6.2-9 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Page 4 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.3 NA Containment Spray System Delete The containment spray systems primary purpose was to spray cool water into the containment atmosphere when appropriate in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident to ensure that containment pressure did not exceed its design value.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the containment spray system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment spray system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.3.1, NA Design Bases Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.3.1.1 through 6.3.1.8 6.3.2, NA System Design and Delete See the discussion above.

including Operation Subsections 6.3.2.1 through 6.3.2.2 6.3.3, NA Design Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.3.3.1 through 6.3.3.6 Page 5 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.3.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete See the discussion above.

Conditions 6.3.5, NA Inspections and Tests Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.3.5.1 through 6.3.5.3 Table 6.3-1 NA Containment Spray System - Delete See the discussion above.

Code Requirements Table 6.3-2 NA Containment Spray System Delete See the discussion above.

Design Parameters Table 6.3-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 6.3-4 NA Single Failure Analysis - Delete See the discussion above.

Containment Spray System Table 6.3-5 NA Shared Functions Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 6.3-1 NA Containment Spray Pump Delete See the discussion above.

Performance Objections 6.4 NA Containment Air Delete The containment air recirculation cooling systems purpose was to recirculate and Recirculation Cooling System cool the containment atmosphere in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident and thereby ensure that the containment pressure will not exceed its design value.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the Page 6 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions containment air recirculation cooling system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment air recirculation cooling system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.4.1, NA Design Basis Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.4.1.1 through 6.4.1.9 6.4.2, NA System Design and Delete See the discussion above.

including Operation Subsections 6.4.2.1 and 6.4.2.2 6.4.3, NA Design Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.4.3.1 through 6.4.3.6 6.4.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete See the discussion above.

Conditions 6.4.5, NA Inspections and Testing Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.4.5.1 through 6.4.5.4 Table 6.4-1 NA Single Failure Analysis - Delete See the discussion above.

Containment Air Recirculation Cooling System Page 7 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 6.4-2 NA Shared Functions Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 6.4-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 6.4-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 6.4-3 NA Containment Building Air Deleted See the discussion above.

Recirculation Fan Cooler Filter Unit - Plan and Section, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-4026 Figure 6.4-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

6.5 NA Isolation Valve Seal-Water Delete The isolation valve seal-water systems purpose was to ensure the effectiveness of System those containment isolation valves that are located in lines connected to the reactor coolant system or that could be exposed to the containment atmosphere during any condition, which requires containment isolation, by providing a water seal (and in a few cases a gas seal) at the valves.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the isolation valve seal-water system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the isolation valve seal-water system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.5.1 NA Design Bases Delete See the discussion above.

6.5.2, NA System Design and Delete See the discussion above.

including Operation Subsections 6.5.2.1 Page 8 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions through 6.5.2.3 6.5.3, NA Design Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.5.3.1 through 6.5.3.4 6.5.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete See the discussion above.

Conditions 6.5.5, NA Inspections and Tests Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.5.5.1 through 6.5.5.4 Table 6.5-1 NA Isolation Valve Seal-Water Delete See the discussion above.

Tank Table 6.5-2 NA Single Failure Analysis - Delete See the discussion above.

Isolation Valve Seal-Water System Table 6.5-3 NA Shared Functions Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 6.5-1 NA Isolation Valve Seal - Water Delete See the discussion above.

System - Flow Diagram -

Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2746 Figure 6.5-2 NA Double Disk Isolation Valve Delete See the discussion above.

with Seal-Water Injection 6.6 NA Containment Penetration Delete The purpose of containment penetration and weld channel pressurization system was and Weld Channel to continuously pressurize the positive pressure zones incorporated into the Pressurization System containment penetrations and the channels over the welds in the steel inner liner and certain containment isolation valves in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.

Page 9 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Although no credit is taken for operation of this system in the calculation of offsite accident doses as discussed in Section 14.3.6 of the UFSAR, it is designed as an engineered safety feature and provides assurance that the containment leak-rate in the event of an accident is lower than that assumed in the accident analysis.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the containment penetration and weld channel pressurization system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Thus, the information regarding the containment penetration and weld channel pressurization system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.6.1 NA Design Bases Delete See the discussion above.

6.6.2, NA System Design and Delete See the discussion above.

including Operations 6.6.2.1 through 6.6.2.6 6.6.3, NA Design Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.6.3.1 through 6.6.3.4 6.6.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete See the discussion above.

Conditions Page 10 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.6.5, NA Inspections and Tests Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsections 6.6.5.1 and 6.6.5.2 Table 6.6-1 NA Containment Penetration Delete See the discussion above.

and Weld Channel Pressurization Air Receivers Table 6.6-2 NA Single Failure Analysis Delete See the discussion above.

Containment Penetration and Weld Channel Pressurization System Table 6.6-3 NA Shared Functions Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

Figure 6.6-1 NA Weld Channel and Delete See the discussion above.

Penetration Pressurization System - Flow Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2726 6.7 3.12 Leakage Detection and Modify This section is modified to eliminate the references to primary coolant loops.

Provisions for the Primary and Auxiliary Coolant Loops The information in this chapter of the UFSAR regarding leakage detection systems for the component cooling water, service water, and circulating water systems that remains applicable in the defueled condition will be retained. However, this information will be relocated to another section as part of the restructuring of the content to compile the DSAR.

6.7.1 NA Leakage Detection Systems Delete This section provides a one-line introduction that defines the purpose of the leakage detections systems for the primary and auxiliary coolant loops.

The information in this chapter of the UFSAR regarding leakage detection systems for the component cooling water, service water, and circulating water systems that remains applicable in the defueled condition will be retained. However, this Page 11 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions information will be relocated to another section as part of the restructuring of the content to compile the DSAR.

This introductory statement is unnecessary, and will not be retained.

6.7.1.1 3.12.1 Design Bases Retain This section will be retained in the DSAR.

6.7.1.1.1 NA Monitoring Reactor Coolant Delete This section address monitoring reactor coolant leakage.

Leakage After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the leakage detection system for the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the leakage detection system for the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.1.2 3.12.1 Monitoring Radioactivity Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussions regarding the containment Releases atmosphere, the ventilation exhaust from the residual heat removal pump compartments, the containment fan cooler service water discharge, the liquid phase of the secondary side of the steam generator, and the condenser air ejector exhaust anticipated transients, and accident conditions. In addition, a discussion of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual is provided.

The component cooling loop liquid will continue to be monitored for radioactivity concentration during normal operation.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no Page 12 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. As a result, no operational transients can occur.

After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. A Fuel Handling Accident in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Consequently, there are no abnormal operations, transients or accidents that credit the containment for isolation. The ventilation exhaust from the residual heat removal pump compartments, the containment fan cooler service water discharge, the liquid phase of the secondary side of the steam generator, and the condenser air ejector exhaust are no longer required to be monitored in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information regarding the leakage detection system for the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The discussion regarding the ODCM is added to address a directly address a portion of the GDC that was not previously addressed in this section. It duplicates information from UFSAR Section 11.1.2.

6.7.1.1.3 NA Principles of Design Delete This section provides a discussion of the leakage detection systems regarding the residual heat removal and high head safety injection pumps.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 13 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the leakage detection systems for the residual heat removal and high head safety injection pumps are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the leakage detection system for the residual heat removal and high head safety injection pumps in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2 3.12.2 Systems Design and Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions of Class I systems, the residual Operation heat removal system and the auxiliary feedwater system and the reference to the reactor coolant system, and by utilizing leakage from the service water loop as an example instead of the residual heat removal pumps.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system, auxiliary feedwater system, and reactor coolant system are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the residual heat removal system and auxiliary feedwater system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

There are no Class I systems outside of containment in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

In addition, utilizing the service water loop as an example of how leakage would collect in sumps is appropriate given that the residual heat removal system will no longer be utilized in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

6.7.1.2.1, NA Reactor Coolant System Delete This section addresses leakage detection systems for the reactor coolant system.

including Subsections Page 14 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.7.1.2.1.1 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of through fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 6.7.1.2.1.4 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the leakage detection systems for the reactor coolant system are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the leakage detection system for the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.2 NA Containment Air Particulate Delete This section is proposed to be deleted.

Monitor After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the containment air particulate monitor is not required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, this information is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.3 NA Containment Radioactive Delete This section is proposed to be deleted.

Gas Monitor After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the containment radioactive gas monitor is not required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, this information is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.4 NA Humidity Detectors Delete This section addresses humidity detection instrumentation to detect leakage into the containment.

Page 15 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, humidity detectors are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the humidity detectors in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.5 NA Condensate Measuring Delete This section addresses leakage detection system for the condensate system.

System After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the leakage detection system for the condensate system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the leakage detection system for the condensate system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.6 3.12.3.1 Component Cooling Liquid Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussions of the reactor coolant system, Monitor the recirculation loop, and the residual heat removal loop, add a reference to the SFP cooling system, and replace the references to safety related display console with references to display console.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and Page 16 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system, recirculation loop, and residual heat removal are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding those systems in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The references to the safety related display console are replaced with a reference to the display console, because the console no longer serves a safety related function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

6.7.1.2.7 NA Condenser Air Ejector Gas Delete This section addresses the condenser air ejector gas monitor.

Monitor After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the condenser air ejector gas monitor is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the condenser air ejector gas monitor in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.8 NA Steam Generator Blowdown Delete This section addresses the steam generator blowdown liquid sample monitor.

Liquid Sample Monitor After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the steam generator blowdown liquid sample monitor is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam generator blowdown liquid sample monitor in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 17 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.7.1.2.9 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete This section addresses leakage detection system for the residual heat removal loop.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the leakage detection system for the residual heat removal loop is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the leakage detection system for the residual heat removal loop in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.10 NA Recirculation Loop Delete This section addresses leakage detection system for the recirculation loop.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the leakage detection system for the recirculation loop is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the leakage detection system for the recirculation loop in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.11 3.12.3.2 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of component cooling loop leakage in the containment. The discussion regarding leakage of the component cooling loop outside containment is retained.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 18 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the component cooling loop will no longer provide cooling to systems or components within the containment in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the detection of leakage from the component cooling loop within the containment in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.12 3.12.3.3 Service Water System Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of service water system leakage in the containment from the containment fan coolers or the containment air recirculation cooling system. The discussion regarding leakage of the service water system outside containment is retained.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the service water system will no longer provide cooling to the containment fan coolers or the containment air recirculation cooling system in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the detection of leakage from the service water system within the containment in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.13 NA Containment Sump Level and Delete This section addresses the containment sump flow detection system.

Discharge Flow After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the containment sump flow detection system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment sump flow detection system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 19 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.7.1.2.14 NA Recirculation Sump Level Delete This section addresses the control of recirculation sump level.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the recirculation sump is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the recirculation sump in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.1.2.15 NA Reactor Cavity Pit Level Delete This section addresses the control of reactor cavity pit level.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor cavity pit is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor cavity pit in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.2 3.12.4 Leakage Provisions Retain No changes.

6.7.2.1 3.12.4.1 Design Basis Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to the reactor coolant system and eliminating the methods of controlling leakage of auxiliary coolant water that are no longer applicable (i.e., isolation of the leak by valves, utilization of relief valves, utilization of redundant equipment). The only discussions that will be retained address the component cooling loop and service water loop in Subsections 6.7.2.2.4 and 6.7.2.2.5. The modified sections simply identify that leaks from these systems will be collected in tanks or sumps and routed to the waste holdup tank.

Page 20 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.7.2.2 3.12.4.2 Design and Operation Modify This section is modified by removing the reference to the primary coolant loops.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.2.2.1 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete This section addresses the reactor coolant system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.2.2.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete This section addresses the residual heat removal loop.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut Page 21 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the residual heat removal loop is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the residual heat removal loop in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.2.2.3 NA Recirculation Loop Delete This section addresses the recirculation loop.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the recirculation loop is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the recirculation loop in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.2.2.4 3.12.4.3 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of component cooling loop leakage in the containment. The discussion regarding leakage of the component cooling loop outside containment is retained.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the component cooling loop will no longer provide cooling to systems or components within the containment in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the detection of leakage from the component cooling loop within the containment in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.7.2.2.5 3.12.4.4 Service Water System Retain No changes.

Page 22 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 6.7.3 NA Minimum Operating Delete This section refers to the IP2 Technical Specifications regarding the limiting conditions Conditions regarding the operability of the leakage detection systems. The Defueled Technical Specifications will not include any limiting conditions for operation regarding leakage detection systems. Thus, this section is obsolete and may be deleted.

Table 6.7-1 NA Class 1 Fluid Systems for Delete This table is eliminated, because the discussions regarding the residual heat removal Which No Special Leak system and auxiliary feedwater system and the reference to Class I systems are no Detection is Provided longer relevant, and the references to UFSAR sections are not needed.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the residual heat removal system and auxiliary feedwater system are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the residual heat removal system and auxiliary feedwater system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

There are no Class I systems outside of containment in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

6.8 NA Post-Accident Hydrogen Delete The hydrogen control systems purpose was to control the hydrogen generated within Control Systems the containment following a LOCA.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the Page 23 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions post-accident hydrogen control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the post-accident hydrogen control system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

6.8.1 NA Design Basis Delete See the discussion above.

6.8.2 NA System Design and Delete See the discussion above.

including Operation Subsections 6.8.2.1 through 6.8.2.4 6.8.3, NA Post-Accident Hydrogen Delete See the discussion above.

including Generation Subsections 6.8.3.1 through 6.8.3.4 6.8.4, NA Evaluation Delete See the discussion above.

including Subsection 6.8.4.1 6.8.5 NA Inspections and Tests Delete See the discussion above.

6.8.6 NA Minimum Operating Delete See the discussion above.

Conditions Figure 6.8-1 NA Passive Hydrogen Delete See the discussion above.

Recombiners Figure 6.8-2 NA Containment Hydrogen vs Delete See the discussion above.

Time Post-LOCA - Replaced with Plant Drawings 9321-2568 & 9321-2569 Page 24 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 6.8-3 NA Post-accident Containment Delete See the discussion above.

Venting System - Flow Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208879 Figure 6.8-4 NA Post-accident Containment Delete See the discussion above.

Sampling System - Flow Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208479 Appendix 6A, NA Effectiveness of the Delete The containment spray system is one of the engineered safety features systems that including Containment Spray System would have been employed following a LOCA to reduce the pressure and temperature Subsections to Remove Airborne Activity in the containment. It would have also removed both elemental iodine vapor and 6A.1 through Following a LOCA aerosols from the containment atmosphere.

6A.3 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the containment spray system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment spray system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Appendix 6B, NA Primary System Leak Delete This appendix provides historical information regarding primary system leakage into including Detection into Containment the reactor containment for Indian Point Unit No. 1. This operational experience was Subsections Vessel, Indian Point Unit 1 utilized to design the leakage detection systems for the IP2 reactor coolant system as 6B.0 through described in Subsection 6.7.2.2.1 of the IP2 UFSAR.

6B.3 This historical information is not required to be maintained in the IP2 Defueled Safety Analysis Report. Reactor coolant system leakage will not be a concern, because IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled.

Appendix 6C, NA Post Accident Containment Delete This appendix provides a summary of an evaluation of the suitability of materials of including Environment construction for use in the reactor containment system.

Page 25 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Subsections 6C.1 through After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of 6C.9 fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the reactor containment is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor containment system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 6C-1 NA Review of Sources of Various Delete See the discussion above.

Elements in Containment and Their Effects on Materials of Construction Table 6C-2 NA Materials of Construction in Delete See the discussion above.

Reactor Containment Table 6C-3 NA Inventory of Aluminum in Delete See the discussion above.

Containment Table 6C-4 NA Corrosion of Aluminum Delete See the discussion above.

Alloys in Alkaline Sodium Borate Solution Table 6C-5 NA Corrosion Products of Delete See the discussion above.

Aluminum Following Design Basis Accident, Indian Point Unit 2 Table 6C-6 NA Summary of Unit 2 Delete See the discussion above.

Aluminum Corrosion Product Solubility Data Table 6C-7 NA Concrete Specimen Test Data Delete See the discussion above.

Page 26 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 6C-8 NA Evaluation of Sealant Delete See the discussion above.

Materials for Use in Containment Figure 6C-1 NA Containment Atmosphere Delete See the discussion above.

Temperature Design Bases Safety Injection Figure 6C-2 NA Indian Point Unit 2 Post- Delete See the discussion above.

accident Containment Materials Design Figure 6C-3 NA Post-accident Core Materials Delete See the discussion above.

Design Conditions Figure 6C-4 NA Indian Point Unit 2 Delete See the discussion above.

Containment Atmosphere Direct Gamma Dose Rate Figure 6C-5 NA Indian Point Unit 2 Delete See the discussion above.

Containment Atmosphere Integrated Gamma Dose Level Figure 6C-6 NA Titration Curve for TSP in Delete See the discussion above.

Boric Acid Solution Figure 6C-7 NA Temperature-Concentration Delete See the discussion above.

Relation for Caustic Corrosion of Austenitic Stainless Steel Figure 6C-8 NA Aluminum Corrosion in Delete See the discussion above.

Design-Basis-Accident Environment Figure 6C-9 NA Aluminum Corrosion as a Delete See the discussion above.

Function of pH Figure 6C-10 NA Solubility of Aluminum Delete See the discussion above.

Corrosion Products as a Page 27 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Function of pH at 77°F And 150°F Figure 6C-11 NA Boron Loss from Boron- Delete See the discussion above.

Concrete Reaction Following a Design-Basis Accident Figure 6C-12 NA Containment Pressure Delete See the discussion above.

Transient During Blowdown Phase Vs. Time Appendix 6D NA Spray Materials Delete This section is identified as historical information. It provided information regarding a Compatibility for Long-Term compatibility review of the containment spray additive tank and associated Storage of Sodium Hydroxide equipment during long-term storage of sodium hydroxide.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. Consequently, the containment spray system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment spray system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 6D-1 NA Exposure Conditions NA See the discussion above.

Table 6D-2 NA Component Materials NA See the discussion above.

Table 6D-3 NA Corrosion Rates NA See the discussion above.

Figure 6D-1 NA Temperature - NA See the discussion above.

Concentration Relations for Caustic Corrosion of Austenitic Stainless Steel Page 28 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 6 - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 6D-2 NA Effect of Carbon Dioxide on NA See the discussion above.

Corrosion of Iron in NaOH Solution Page 29 of 29

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7 NA Instrumentation and Control Delete This section header will be deleted. The remaining sub-sections of Chapter 7 will be relocated to other sections of the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

7.1 NA General Design Criteria Delete This summary description is no longer necessary. The information that remains in Section 7 will be relocated to other sections of the DSAR.

7.1.1 NA Instrumentation and Control Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addressed IP2 compliance with Systems Criteria General Design Criteria 12 which requires: Instrumentation and controls shall be provided as required to monitor and maintain within prescribed operating ranges essential reactor facility operating variables.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

As a result, no instrumentation and controls are required to monitor and maintain neutron flux, primary coolant pressure, flow rate, temperature, and control rod positions within prescribed operating ranges.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the spent fuel pit (SFP) or the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). A Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the Alternate Source Term (AST) methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no instrumentation and control systems are required to mitigate the FHA.

7.1.2 NA Related Criteria Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It refers to Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the IP2 UFSAR for discussions of compliance with specific general design criteria. A review table exists for each of those UFSAR Chapters that defines and justifies the changes to those sections. Thus, this section of the IP2 UFSAR is superfluous.

Page 1 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7.1.3, NA Environmental Qualifications Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

including - Original Plant Design subsections After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of 7.1.3.1 fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR through 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no 7.1.3.4 longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Thus, no instrumentation and control systems are required to mitigate the FHA. Thus, the requirements regarding environmental qualification for instrumentation and controls is obsolete.

7.1.4 NA Environmental Qualifications Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the justification provided for Section 7.1.3.

7.1.5 NA Regulatory Guide 1.97 Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. No instrumentation and control Compliance systems are required to mitigate the remaining DBAs. See the justification provided for Section 7.1.1 Table 7.1-1 NA Postaccident Equipment Delete This table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the justification provided for (Inside Containment Section 7.1.3.

Operational and Testing Requirements)

Table 7.1-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 7.1-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 7.1-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 7.1-5 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 7.1-1 NA Environmental Conditions for Delete This figure is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the justification provided for Equipment Testing - Pressure Section 7.1.3.

Vs Time Page 2 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 7.1-2 NA Environmental Conditions for Delete This figure is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the justification provided for Equipment Temperature Vs Section 7.1.3.

Time Figure 7.1-3 NA Instantaneous Gamma Dose Delete This figure is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the justification provided for Rate Inside the Containment Section 7.1.3.

as a Function of Time after Release - TID - 14844 Model Figure 7.1-4 NA Integrated Gamma Dose Delete This figure is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the justification provided for Level Inside the Containment Section 7.1.3.

as a Function of Time after Release - TID - 14844 Model Figure 7.1-5 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 7.1-6 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 7.1-7 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 7.1-8 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

7.2 NA Protection Systems Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses the reactor protection system (RPS) and the engineered safety features (ESF).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the RPS is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate Page 3 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions the FHA. Consequently, ESF are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Given the above, the information regarding the RPS and the ESF in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

7.2.1, NA Design Bases Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including Subsections 7.2.1.1 through 7.2.1.11 7.2.2, NA Principles of Design Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including Subsections 7.2.2.1 through 7.2.2.14 7.2.3 NA System Design Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

7.2.3.1 NA Reactor Protection System Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Design 7.2.3.2, NA Engineered Safety Features Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including Instrumentation Design subsections 7.2.3.2.1 through 7.2.3.2.3 and subsections 7.2.3.2.3.1 through 7.2.3.2.3.9 7.2.4 NA System Safety Features Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

7.2.4.1, NA Separation of Redundant Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including Protection Channels subsections Page 4 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7.2.4.1.1 through 7.2.4.1.7 7.2.4.2, NA Electrical Equipment Design Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including subsections 7.2.4.2.1 and 7.2.4.2.2 7.2.4.3, NA Reactor Trip Signal Testing Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including subsections 7.2.4.3.1 and 7.2.4.3.2 7.2.4.4 NA Bypass Breakers Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

7.2.4.5 NA Engineered Safety Features Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Actuation Instrumentation Description 7.2.4.6 NA Engineered Safety Features Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Logic Testing 7.2.5 NA Protective Actions Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

7.2.5.1, NA Reactor Trip Description Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including subsections 7.2.5.1.1 through 7.2.5.1.20 7.2.5.2, NA Rod Stops Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including subsections 7.2.5.2.1 through 7.2.5.2.3 7.2.6 NA System Evaluation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Page 5 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7.2.6.1, NA Reactor Protection System Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including and Departure from Nucleate subsections Boiling 7.2.6.1.1 and 7.2.6.1.2 7.2.6.2, NA Interaction of Control and Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

including Protection subsections 7.2.6.2.1 through 7.2.5.2.5 7.2.7 NA Current Technical Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Specifications 7.2.8 NA References Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Table 7.2-1 NA List of Reactor Trips and Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Causes for Reactor Trips Table 7.2-2 NA Interlock and Permissive Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Circuits Table 7.2-3 NA Rod Stops Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Figure 7.2-1 NA Index and Symbols - Logic Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225094 Figure 7.2-2 NA Reactor Trip Signals - Logic Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225095 Figure 7.2-3 NA Turbine Trip Signals - Logic Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225096 Figure 7.2-4 NA 6900 Volt Bus Automatic Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Transfer - Logic Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225097 Page 6 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 7.2-5 NA Nuclear Instrumentation Trip Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Signals - Logic Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225098 Figure 7.2-6 NA Nuclear Instrumentation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Permissives And Blocks -

Logic Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225099 Figure 7.2-7 NA Emergency Generator Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Starting - Logic Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225100 Figure 7.2-8 NA Safeguard Sequence - Logic Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225101 Figure 7.2-9 NA Pressurizer Trip Signal - Logic Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225102 Figure 7.2-10 NA Steam Generator Trip Signals Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

- Logic Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225103 Figure 7.2-11 NA Primary Coolant System Trip Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Signals and Manual Trip -

Logic Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225104 Figure 7.2-12 NA Safeguard Actuation Signals - Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Logic Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225105 Figure 7.2-13 NA Feedwater Isolation - Logic Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 225106 Figure 7.2-14 NA Rod Stops and Turbine Loads Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Cutbacks - Logic Diagram, Page 7 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Replaced with Plant Drawing 225107 Figure 7.2-15 NA Safeguards Actuation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Circuitry and Hardware Channelization, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243318 Figure 7.2-16 NA Simplified Diagram for Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Overall Logic Relay Test Scheme, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243319 Figure 7.2-17 NA Analog and Logic Channel Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Testing, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243320 Figure 7.2-18 NA Reactor Protection Systems - Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Block Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243321 Figure 7.2-19 NA Core Coolant Average Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Temperature Vs Core Power Figure 7.2-20 NA Pressurizer Level Control and Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Protection System, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243313 Figure 7.2-21 NA Pressurizer Pressure Control Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

and Protection System, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243314 Figure 7.2-22 NA Steam Flow DP Vs Power, Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Replaced with Plant Drawing 243315 Figure 7.2-23 NA Design Philosophy to Achieve Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Isolation Between Channels Figure 7.2-24 NA Cable Tunnel - Typical Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Section, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243317 Page 8 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 7.2-25 NA Typical Analog Channel Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Testing Arrangement, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243322 Figure 7.2-26 NA Typical Simplified Control Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Schematic, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243323 Figure 7.2-27 NA Analog Channels, Replaced Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

with Plant Drawing 243324 Figure 7.2-28 NA Analog System Symbols, Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Replaced with Plant Drawing 243311 Figure 7.2-29 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 7.2-30 NA Reactor Trip Breaker Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Actuation Schematic Figure 7.2-31 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 7.2-32 NA Steam Generator Level Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Control and Protection System, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243328 Figure 7.2-33 NA Illustrations of Overpower Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Sh. 1 and Temperature DT Trips High Temperature Operation Figure 7.2-33 NA Illustrations of Overpower Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Sh. 2 and Temperature DT Trips Low Temperature Operation Figure 7.2-34 NA Tavg/DT Control and Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.2.

Protection System, Replaced with Plant Drawing 243330 7.3 NA Regulating Systems Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses the reactor control system which was designed to limit nuclear plant transients for prescribed design load perturbations, under automatic control, within prescribed limits to preclude the possibility of a reactor trip in the course of these transients.

Page 9 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information in the IP2 UFSAR regarding the reactor control system is obsolete.

7.3.1 NA Design Basis Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.3.

7.3.2, NA System Design Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.3.

including subsections 7.3.2.1 (with subsections 7.3.2.1.1 through 7.3.2.1.7) and 7.3.2.2 (with subsections 7.3.2.2.1 through 7.3.2.2.6) 7.3.3, NA Evaluation Summary Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.3.

including subsections 7.3.3.1 through 7.3.3.5 7.3.4, NA System Design Evaluation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.3.

including subsections 7.3.4.1 Page 10 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions through 7.3.4.5 Figure 7.3-1 NA Simplified Block Diagram of Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.3.

Reactor Control Systems Figure 7.3-2 NA [Deleted] Delete Previously deleted.

7.4 NA Nuclear Instrumentation Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses the nuclear instrumentation system which monitors the reactor power from source range through the intermediate range and power range up to 120-percent full power. The system provides indication, control, and alarm signals for reactor operation and protection.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the nuclear instrumentation system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information in the IP2 UFSAR regarding the nuclear instrumentation system is obsolete.

7.4.1, NA Design Basis Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

including subsection 7.4.1.1 7.4.2, NA System Design Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

including subsections 7.4.2.1 (with subsections 7.4.2.1.1 through 7.4.2.1.3) through 7.4.2.2 (with subsections Page 11 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7.4.2.2.1 through 7.4.2.2.5) 7.4.3, NA System Evaluation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

including subsections 7.4.3.1 through 7.4.3.4)

Table 7.4-1 NA Deleted Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

Table 7.4-2 NA Deleted Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

Figure 7.4-1 NA Neutron Detectors and Range Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

of Operation Figure 7.4-2 NA Nuclear Instrumentation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

System Figure 7.4-3 NA Plan View Indicating Detector Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.4.

Location Relative to Core 7.5 NA Process Instrumentation Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The non-nuclear process instrumentation measures temperatures, pressures, flows, and levels in the RCS, steam system, reactor containment, and auxiliary systems required for the startup, operation, and shut down of the unit.

The parameters that are addressed in Table 7.5-1 are RCS temperature and flow, pressurizer pressure and level, main steam flow and pressure, feedwater flow, steam generator level, containment pressure, and steam header pressure. In addition, the section addresses instrumentation requirements for the ESF.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the parameters defined in Table 7.5-1 are no longer required to be Page 12 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions monitored. Thus, the information in the IP2 UFSAR regarding those parameters is obsolete.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA. Consequently, the ESF instrumentation are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Given the above, the information regarding the RPS and secondary system parameters and the ESF in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

7.5.1 NA Design Bases Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.5.

7.5.2 NA System Design Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.5.

7.5.2.1, NA Engineered Safety Features See the above discussion for Section 7.5.

including subsections 7.5.2.1.1 through 7.5.2.1.18 7.5.3 NA System Evaluation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.5.

Table 7.5-1 NA Process Instrumentation, Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.5.

Indication, and Safeguards Functions Figure 7.5-1 NA Reactor Coolant Wide Range Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.5.

Pressure Instrument System

- Flow Diagram 7.6 NA Incore Instrumentation Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses incore instrumentation system which information on the neutron flux distribution and fuel assembly outlet temperatures at selected core locations.

Page 13 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the incore instrumentation is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information in the IP2 UFSAR regarding the incore instrumentation is obsolete.

7.6.1 NA Design Basis Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.6.

7.6.2, NA System Design Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.6.

including subsections 7.6.2.1 and 7.6.2.2 7.6.3 NA System Evaluation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.6.

7.6.4 NA System Operation Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.6.

Figure 7.6-1 NA Typical Arrangement of Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.6.

Moveable Miniature Neutron Flux Detector System, Replaced with Plant Drawing 1999MC3880 Figure 7.6-2 NA Arrangement of Incore Flux Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.6.

Detector, Replaced with Plant Drawing 1999MC3881 Figure 7.6-3 NA Incore Instrumentation - Delete See the above discussion for Section 7.6.

Details, Replaced with Plant Drawing 1999MC3882 7.7 NA Operating Control Stations Delete This section header is proposed to be deleted. The header will not be required in the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

Subsections 7.7.1 and 7.7.3 are proposed to be deleted in their entirety as discussed below.

Page 14 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Subsections 7.7.2 and 7.7.4 will be retained and modified as discussed below. In addition, they will be relocated to a new chapter in the reformatted DSAR.

7.7.1 NA Station Layout Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses that the control station design and layout ensure that all controls, instrumentation displays, and alarms required for the safe operation and shutdown of the plant are readily available to the operators in the central control room.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

No actions are required to be taken from the control room to mitigate the FHA.

Consequently, the information regarding the layout of the control room is no longer required to be maintained in the IP2 UFSAR.

7.7.2 3.13 Information Display and Retain No proposed changes Recording 7.7.2.1 3.13 Operational Information Modify The section header is eliminated, because the other subsection is deleted. Thus, it is no longer necessary.

This section is modified to eliminate the displays, alarms, and annunciators regarding control rod position and group, nuclear instrumentation, secondary side operation, RCS operation, ESF, containment purge and exhaust, containment isolation valves, isolation valve seal water system, reactor building alarms, RCS hot let temperature, main steam line radiation monitors, high-range containment radiation monitors, high-Page 15 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions range noble gas monitors, containment sump level indication, hydrogen and oxygen containment air analyzers, containment high-range pressure indication, reactor vent valve position indication, reactor vent temperature monitor, reactor vessel level indication, power-operated relief valve block valve position indication, subcooling monitor system indications, and wide-range hot-leg RCS temperature indication.

In addition, the references to the operators and operating plant or plant are replaced with a reference to site personnel and facility, as appropriate. These are administrative changes to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition and that IP2 will no longer be a plant that generates electricity.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Given the above, the displays, alarms, and annunciators for the control rod position and group, nuclear instrumentation, secondary side operation, RCS operation, ESF, containment purge and exhaust, containment isolation valves, isolation valve seal water system, reactor building alarms, RCS hot let temperature, main steam line radiation monitors, high-range containment radiation monitors, high-range noble gas monitors, containment sump level indication, hydrogen and oxygen containment air analyzers, containment high-range pressure indication, reactor vent valve position indication, reactor vent temperature monitor, reactor vessel level indication, power-Page 16 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions operated relief valve block valve position indication, subcooling monitor system indications, and wide-range hot-leg RCS temperature indication are no longer required in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information regarding these displays, alarms, and annunciators in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

7.7.2.2 NA Safety Parameter Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the system that Information monitors safety parameter information in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. The critical safety functions that are monitored are reactivity control, reactor core cooling, RCS heat sink, RCS integrity, containment conditions, and RCS inventory control.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Given the above, the system for monitoring the safety parameter information is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information in the IP2 UFSAR regarding this system is obsolete.

7.7.3, NA Emergency Shutdown Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the features that are including Control require to ensure that the functionality capacity of the central control room is subsections maintained at all times inclusive of accident conditions. In addition, the section 7.7.3.1 (with discusses the provisions that have been to ensure that the plant can be shut down subsections and maintain in a safe condition by means of controls located outside the control 7.7.3.1.1 room.

through Page 17 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7.7.3.1.3), After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of 7.7.3.2, and fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 7.7.3.3 (with 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no subsections longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in 7.7.3.3.1 accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

through 7.7.3.3.7) After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

No actions are required to be taken from the control room to mitigate the FHA. In addition, the plant will be permanently shut down, so there is no longer a need to maintain the capability to shut down and maintain the plant outside of the control room. Consequently, the information regarding emergency shut down control of the plant from the control room and outside the control room is no longer required to be maintained in the IP2 UFSAR.

7.7.4 3.14 Communications Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to plant with a reference to facility. The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified by replacing the reference to system operators with a reference to site personnel and the reference to in-plant personnel throughout the plant with site personnel, and eliminating the term safe shutdown.

Replacing the references to system operator and in-plant personnel throughout the plant with the term site personnel are administrative changes that reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

In addition, the term safe shutdown is no longer applicable, because IP2 is in a permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 18 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7.7.4.1 3.14.1 Central Control Room Modify This section is modified by removing a reference to previously deleted material. This Communication Facilities is an administrative change.

7.7.4.2 3.14.2 Radio Communication Retain No proposed changes.

7.7.4.3 3.14.3 Page/Party Line Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to plant with a reference to Communication facility. The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

7.7.4.4 3.14.4 Emergency Backup Power for Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to plant with a reference to Communications facility. The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified by eliminating the replacing the reference to emergency backup power with a reference to backup power, and the reference to the emergency bus with a reference to a bus.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for any active components or operator actions to mitigate the consequences of the accident. As a result, the electrical power requirements regarding the communications systems are no longer considered to be emergency backup power, but simply backup power.

Page 19 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 7.7.4.5 3.14.5 In-house Radio System Retain This section is modified by replacing the reference to in-plant personnel with a reference to personnel at the facility. The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Figure 7.7-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

7.8 NA Limiting Safety System Delete This section defines that settings for reactor protection, engineered safety features, Settings and Limiting and other plant actuating actuation systems, and their associated plant interlocks and Conditions for Operation permissive circuits are provided in the IP2 Technical Specifications and the Technical Requirements Manual. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

The Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications do not include any limiting safety system settings of limiting conditions for operation regarding reactor protection, engineered safety features, and other plant actuating actuation systems, or their associated plant interlocks and permissive circuits. In addition, the Technical Requirements Manual will be incorporated as part of the DSAR. The review table for the Technical Requirements Manual defines and justifies the changes to it.

7.9 NA Surveillance Requirements Delete This section provides a generic overview of the surveillance requirements for instrumentation channels that are covered in the IP2 Technical Specifications and the Technical Requirements Manual. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

The Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications do not include any operability requirements regarding instrumentation systems. In addition, the Technical Requirements Manual will be incorporated as part of the DSAR. The review table for the Technical Requirements Manual defines and justifies the changes to it.

7.10, NA Anticipated Transient Delete This section discusses the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) mitigation including Without Scram Mitigation system actuation circuitry (AMSAC). It provides a means, diverse from the reactor subsections System Actuation Circuitry protection system, to trip the turbine, start the auxiliary feedwater pumps, and 7.10.1 and initiate closure of the steam generator blowdown isolation valves. This section is 7.10.2 proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and Page 20 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 7 - INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the AMSAC is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the feedwater control system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 21 of 21

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 8.1 3.15 Design Bases Modify This section is modified to reflect the simplified electrical requirements to support the safe storage of spent fuel in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, the section title is changed to Electrical Systems to support the consolidation into the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the spent fuel pit (SFP) or the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). A Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the Alternate Source Term (AST) methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

8.1.1 NA Principal Design Criteria Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion. See the discussions below.

8.1.1.1 NA Performance Standards Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. As discussed above, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA.

8.1.1.2 NA Emergency Power Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. As discussed above, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA.

8.1.2 NA 1980 Review of 10 CFR 50 Delete This section is proposed to be deleted. It provided a historical discussion regarding Appendix A GDC 17 and GDC compliance with the general design criteria 17 and 18. This information is no longer 18 relevant in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. As discussed above, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA Page 1 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 8.1.2.1 3.15 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion discussing general design General Design Criterion 17 - criterion 17, defining the simplified electrical requirements required to support the Electric Power Systems safe storage of spent fuel in the permanently shut down and defueled condition as defined in the subsequent subsections of Chapter 8, and replacing the term plant with the term facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced. The electrical power systems that were historically vital to plant safety are no longer required to be classified as Seismic Class 1.

The term facility is a more accurate description of IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The facility will be maintained to ensure the safe storage of spent fuel.

8.1.2.2 NA 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

General Design Criterion 18 -

Inspection and Testing of After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of Electric Power Systems fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 2 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

8.2 3.15.1 Electrical System Design Retain No proposed changes.

8.2.1 3.15.1.1 Network Interconnections Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion regarding the startup and normal shutdown of the plant, eliminating the discussion of power generation by the plant, describing the simplified electrical requirements to support the safe storage of spent fuel in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, and replacing the term plant or station with the term facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and power generation and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, Page 3 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

The term facility is a more accurate description of IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The facility will be maintained to ensure the safe storage of spent fuel.

8.2.1.1 3.15.1.1.1 Reliability Assurance Modify This section is modified by describing the simplified electrical requirements to support the safe storage of spent fuel in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, eliminating the discussion of the Appendix R fire or a loss of all AC (Station Blackout) power generation by the plant, eliminating the 72-hour (i.e., at least 3 days) requirement for fuel for the SBO/Appendix R Diesel, replacing the terms operable and inoperable with functional and non-functional, eliminating the reference to the 200,000-gallon storage tank located at the Buchanan substation site, and eliminating the discussion of the alternate safe shutdown power supply system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and power generation and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

Page 4 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Given that there is no requirement for electric-powered SSCs to mitigate an accident, the Appendix R / SBO Diesel Generator simply serves as a standby power source.

Thus, there is no minimum run-time.

Appendix R / Station Blackout requirements do not apply in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Given that IP2 is permanently shut down and defueled, there is no need for an alternate safe shutdown power supply system.

8.2.2 3.15.1.2 Station Distribution System Modify This section is modified by replacing the term station with the term facility, eliminating the references to the main generator, and eliminating the term plant from the term plant drawings. Replacing the reference to the 345-kV system with a reference to the 13.8-kV system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and power generation and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the main generator no longer performs a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The term facility is a more accurate description of IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The facility will be maintained to ensure the safe storage of spent fuel.

8.2.2.1 3.15.1.2.1 Unit Auxiliary, Station Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the unit auxiliary and Auxiliary, and Station Service station auxiliary transformers, adding a discussion of the gas turbine autotransformer, Transformers eliminating the discussion of the plant turbine generator, and eliminating the discussion of plant startup, shutdown, and unit trip.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 5 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and power generation and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

8.2.2.2 3.15.1.2.2 6.9-kV System Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the station auxiliary transformers, adding a discussion of the gas turbine autotransformer, and eliminating the discussion of the turbine generator trips.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and power generation and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are Page 6 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

8.2.2.3 3.15.1.2.3 480-Volt System Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the electrical requirements associated with engineered safety features, i.e., safeguards equipment, eliminating the discussions regarding the emergency diesel generator supply to those loads, eliminating the requirement for the 480-V switchgear buses to be safety-related, and revising the DC control power requirements.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

8.2.2.4 3.15.1.2.4 125-V DC Systems Modify This section is modified by revising the description of the 125-V DC system DC system to reflect the alignment that will exist in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 7 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

8.2.2.5 3.15.1.2.5 118-V AC Instrument Supply Modify This section is modified to describe the 118-V AC instrument supply systems Systems configuration in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the 118-V AC instrument supply systems is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 8 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 8.2.2.6 3.15.1.2.6 Evaluation of Layout and Modify This section is modified by rewriting the section to address the requirements that Load Distribution remain applicable to IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition that will ensure the safe storage of spent fuel. This includes the elimination of discussions regarding electrical requirements during accidents, the station auxiliary, unit auxiliary, main transformers, surge arresters, automatic deluge systems for oil filled transformers, safety injection signal, unit trip, sequencing logic and emergency diesel generator start circuitry, trip of the 480-V breaker to the safeguards buses, DC control power, rod power supply M-G set, reactor trip breakers, 480-V motor control centers associated with the turbine generator auxiliary system, load separation on trains, shielded conductors of instrumentation cables, reactor containment vessel penetration cables, fire stops, seals and barriers for cable and cable trays passing through walls and flows, separation requirements for impulse lines and cables, dynamic affects of postulated primary loop ruptures, essential switchgear, cable insulation in the reactor building, and protections afforded the compressed instrument air system.

In addition, the separation discussions are replaced with the following: The Indian Point Unit 2 Cable Raceway System is comprised of 4 raceway systems. 6.9kV cables are routed in their own raceway system independent of the other raceway systems.

480 VAC and 125 VDC cable 350 mcm and larger are routed in the heave Power Raceway. Those cables smaller than 350 mcm and over 65VAC are routed in the Small Power and control Raceway. Instrument cables 65VAC and less are run in the Instrument Raceway. Instrument cables less than 65VAC are typically routed in the Instrument Raceway. On a case by case basis, cables have been routed in an alternate raceway however there is no mixing between the 6.9kV raceway and cables of lower voltages. Certain other cables such as thermocouple cable, public address, instrument power and fiber optics are routed in raceway as convenient.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 9 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component or engineered safety features are required to mitigate the FHA. Consequently, the electrical power and distribution requirements are significantly reduced in the permanently shut down and defueled states.

This section is modified by replacing the reference to operator with a reference to site personnel. This change reflects that the organization and number of personnel required to maintain a permanently shut down and defueled facility is substantially reduced as compared to that for an operating facility. A number of departments will be combined or eliminated. As a result, the generic term of site personnel is preferred over the use of the term operator.

This section is modified by replacing the reference to plant with facility. IP2 will be permanently shut down and defueled. Reactor operations and electric power generation will no longer occur. The use of the term facility is more appropriate in this condition.

In addition, the historical discussion regarding differences in cable raceway separation between IP2 and IP3. This discussion is not relevant to the permanently shut down and defueled condition for IP2. The licensing and design bases for a permanently defueled facility is substantially different than an operating plant (i.e., IP3).

The reference to UFSAR Figure 1.2-3 is eliminated, because the Figure was previously deleted from the UFSAR.

Other miscellaneous editorial changes are made in the section.

Page 10 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 8.2.3 3.15.1.3 Emergency Power Modify This section is modified by revising the title from Emergency Power to Standby Power. Given that there are no requirements for electric-powered SSCs to mitigate the FHA, there are no emergency power requirements in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

8.2.3.1 3.15.1.3.1 Source Descriptions Modify This section is modified by rewriting the section to address the requirements that remain applicable to IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition that will ensure the safe storage of spent fuel. The section is retitled as Standby Power.

The changes include describing the remaining source of offsite power, defining that a single standby diesel generator will be maintained as functional in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, eliminating the requirement to automatically start the diesel generator, eliminating the discussion of the safety injection signal, and eliminating the minimum fuel volume requirements.

The change to the offsite power source was previously discussed in the changes to Section 8.2.1.1.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, there is no need to maintain more than one standby diesel generator, for the diesel generator to automatically start, or to define specific minimum fuel volumes.

Page 11 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 8.2.3.2 3.15.1.3.2 Emergency Fuel Supply Modify This section is modified to reflect that there will only be a single standby diesel generator that is maintained as functional in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, the section is modified to eliminate the minimum fuel volume requirements.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, there is no need to maintain more than one standby diesel generator or to require specific fuel volumes.

8.2.3.3 3.15.1.3.3 Emergency Diesel Generator Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of three emergency diesel Separation generators. In the permanently shut down and defueled condition, only a single standby diesel generator will be maintained as functional. Thus, there are no separation requirements regarding the diesel generators. As a result, the section of the title is changed to Standby Diesel Generator Location.

In addition, the reference to 10 CFR 50.48 is modified to refer to 10 CFR 50.48(f). IP2 will be required to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(f) in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

8.2.3.4 3.15.1.3.4 Loading Description Modify This section is modified by replacing the term emergency diesel generator with standby diesel generator, defining that the standby diesel generator will be started manually versus automatically, eliminating the discussion of a safety injection signal, Page 12 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions blackout conditions, automatic load sequencing, recirculation phase, loss of coolant accidents, cold shutdown, and technical specifications, and denoting that the deenergized buses may be connected locally.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the 118-V AC instrument supply systems is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

8.2.3.5 3.15.1.3.5 Batteries and Battery Modify This section is modified to reduce the 125-V DC system alignment to a single battery, Chargers battery charger, and AC power panel, and simplify the discussion to reflect the minimum requirements regarding the 125-V DC system in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 13 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the requirements for the 125-V DC system are significantly reduced in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

8.2.3.6 3.15.1.3.6 Reliability Assurance Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions of ESF (i.e., safeguards equipment) and eliminating the requirements for the electrical system to be single-failure proof, eliminating the requirements for redundant trains to receive power from different sources or the emergency diesel generators, and eliminating the discussion regarding the battery installations associated with a loss of AC power incident.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA.

Page 14 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 8.2-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 8.2-2 NA Diesel Generator Loads Delete The table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the safety injection pumps, residual heat removal pumps, containment air recirculation cooling fans, auxiliary feedwater pumps, and containment spray pumps perform no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

The electrical loads will be manually supplied power by a diesel generator in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Table 8.2-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 8.2-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 8.2-1 Figure 13.2-1 Electrical One-Line Diagram, Retain No proposed changes.

Replaced with Plant Drawing 250907 Page 15 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 8.2-2 Figure 13.2-2 Electrical Power System Retain No proposed changes.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 250907 Figure 8.2-3 Figure 13.2-3 Main One-Line Diagram, Retain No proposed changes.

Replaced with Plant Drawing 208377 Figure 8.2-4 Figure 13.2-4 345-KV Installation at Retain No proposed changes.

Buchanan Figure 8.2-5 Figure 13.2-5 6900-V One-Line Diagram, Retain No proposed changes.

Replaced with Plant Drawing 231592 Figure 8.2-6 Figure 13.2-6 480-V One-Line Diagram, Retain No proposed changes.

Replaced with Plant Drawing 208088 Figure 8.2-7 Figure 13.2-7 Single Line Diagram 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

Motor Control Centers 21, 22, 23, 25, 25A, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-3004 Figure 8.2-7a Figure Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-7a Motor Control Centers 24 and 24A, Replaced with Plant Drawing 249956 Figure 8.2-8 Figure 13.2-8 Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

Motor Control Centers 27 and 27A, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-3005 Figure 8.2-9 Figure 13.2-9 Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

Motor Control Centers 28 and 210, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208507 Figure 8.2-9a Figure Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-9a Motor Control Centers 29 Page 16 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions and 29A, Replaced with Plant Drawing 249955 Figure 8.2-10 Figure Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-10 Motor Control Centers 28A and 211, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208241 Figure 8.2-11 Figure Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-11 Motor Control Centers 26A and 26B, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-3006 Figure Figure Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

8.2-11a 13.2-11a Motor Control Center 26C, Replaced with Plant Drawing 248513 Figure 8.2-12 Figure Single Line Diagram - 480-V Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-12 Motor Control Centers 26AA and 26BB and 120-V AC Panels No. 1 and 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208500 Figure 8.2-13 Figure Single Line Diagram - 118- Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-13 VAC Instrument Buses No. 21 thru 24, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208502 Figure 8.2-14 Figure Single Line Diagram - 118- Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-14 VAC Instrument Buses No.

21A thru 24A, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208503 Figure 8.2-15 Figure Single Line Diagram - DC Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-15 System Distribution Panels No. 21, 21A, 21B, 22, and 22A, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208501 Figure 8.2-16 Figure Single Line Diagram - DC Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-16 System Power Panels No. 21 Page 17 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions thru 24, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-3008 Figure 8.2-17 Figure Single Line Diagram of Unit Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-17 Safeguard Channeling and Control Train Development, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208376 Figure 8.2-18 Figure Cable Tray Separations, Retain No proposed changes.

13.2-18 Functions, and Routing, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208761 8.3 NA Alternate Shutdown System Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, there is no need for an alternate safe shutdown system.

Figure 8.3-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

8.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Conditions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. 10 CFR 50.65 is no longer applicable in this condition.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose Page 18 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

The Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications do not contain any operability requirements associated with electrical power. The Technical Requirements Manual will include any requirements regarding the functionality of the electrical power systems.

8.5 3.15.3 Tests and Inspections Modify This section is modified by replacing the term Emergency Diesel Generator with the term Standby Diesel Generator, replacing the reference to TS requirements with a reference to TRM requirements, eliminating the requirement to supply safeguards equipment automatically in the event of a loss of all normal 480-V AC station service power, eliminating the reference to 10 CFR 50.65, eliminating the testing requirements for the standby diesel generator and eliminating the discussion regarding the station batteries.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur, and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. 10 CFR 50.65 is no longer applicable in this condition.

In addition, after permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, Page 19 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 8 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Thus, no active or electric-powered structures, systems, or component are required to mitigate the FHA. As a result, the electrical power system requirements are substantially reduced.

The Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications do not contain any operability requirements associated with electrical power. The Technical Requirements Manual will include any requirements regarding the functionality of the electrical power systems.

Page 20 of 20

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Chapter 9 3.0 Auxiliary and Emergency Modify The title is modified to Auxiliary Systems. This change is an administrative change to Systems reflect the changes presented below. The summary will be incorporated into an overview section in Chapter 3 of the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

9.0 3.0 Introduction Modify This section provides a summary of auxiliary and emergency systems that support the safe operation of the reactor coolant system. This section is modified to reflect the systems that are required to support the storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel pit and to reflect their functions in that state. The discussion regarding the residual heat removal system are eliminated. In addition, the terms reactor plant and plant are replaced with the term facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system and residual heat removal system, are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding these systems in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The term reactor plant is no longer utilized, because IP2 will no longer generate electricity. The term facility better represents the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

In addition, the section is revised to reflect that several auxiliary systems will continue to support the storage of spent fuel. The title of the section is eliminated to support consolidation of information into the DSAR.

9.1 NA General Design Criteria Delete This section header is deleted, because all of its subsections are proposed to be deleted as described below.

9.1.1 NA Applicable Criteria Delete This section provides a generic discussion that refers to other sections regarding the various auxiliary and emergency systems. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The discussion adds no value, and its removal is an administrative change.

Page 1 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Any proposed changes to the specific subsections regarding the auxiliary and emergency systems will be described and justified in the discussions regarding their applicable subsections.

9.1.2 NA Related Criteria Delete This section header is deleted, because all of its subsections are proposed to be deleted as described below.

9.1.2.1 NA Reactivity Control System Delete This section defines how IP2 complies with the general design criterion regarding a Malfunction reactivity control system malfunction. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, reactivity control system malfunctions are no longer possible. Thus, the information regarding reactivity control system malfunctions in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.1.2.2 NA Engineered Safety Features Delete This section defines how IP2 complies with the general design criterion regarding the Performance Capability performance capability for engineered safety features. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the spent fuel pit (SFP) or the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). A Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the Alternate Source Term (AST) methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident Page 2 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

The engineered safety features are no longer required to prevent the occurrence or to ameliorate the effects of an accident. Consequently, the engineered safety features are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the engineered safety features in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.1.2.3 NA Containment Heat Removal Delete This section defines how IP2 complies with the general design criterion regarding the Systems containment heat removal systems. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

As a result, no accidents or transients can occur with the containment. The containment heat removal systems are no longer required to prevent the occurrence or to ameliorate the effects of an accident. Consequently, the engineered safety features are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the engineered safety features in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2 3.2 Chemical and Volume Control Modify This section is modified to define the function of the chemical and volume control System system in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. It will be utilized to process liquid radwaste. It is no longer utilized to: 1) adjust the concentration of boric acid for nuclear reactivity control, (2) maintain the proper water inventory in the reactor coolant system, (3) provide the required seal water flow for the reactor coolant pump shaft seals, (4) maintain the proper concentration of corrosion inhibiting chemicals in the reactor coolant, (5) maintain the reactor coolant and Page 3 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions corrosion product activities within design levels, and (6) Fill and hydrostatically test the reactor coolant system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.1, NA Design Bases Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. In the permanently shut down including and defueled condition, the chemical and volume control system will be utilized to Subsection process liquid radwaste. It is no longer utilized to: 1) adjust the concentration of boric 9.2.1.1 acid for nuclear reactivity control, (2) maintain the proper water inventory in the through reactor coolant system, (3) provide the required seal water flow for the reactor 9.2.1.5 coolant pump shaft seals, (4) maintain the proper concentration of corrosion inhibiting chemicals in the reactor coolant, (5) maintain the reactor coolant and corrosion product activities within design levels, and (6) Fill and hydrostatically test the reactor coolant system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 4 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.2.2, 3.2.1 System Design and Operation Modify This section is modified to define the function of the chemical and volume control including system in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. It will be utilized to Subsections transfer and store liquid radwaste. It is no longer utilized to: 1) adjust the 9.2.2.1, concentration of boric acid for nuclear reactivity control, (2) maintain the proper 9.2.2.2 water inventory in the reactor coolant system, (3) provide the required seal water (including flow for the reactor coolant pump shaft seals, (4) maintain the proper concentration Subsections of corrosion inhibiting chemicals in the reactor coolant, (5) maintain the reactor 9.2.2.2.1 coolant and corrosion product activities within design levels, and (6) Fill and through hydrostatically test the reactor coolant system. In addition, other portions of the 9.2.2.2.4), Waste Disposal System are discussed in this section.

9.2.2.3, 9.2.2.4 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of (including fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Subsections 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no 9.2.2.4.1 longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in through accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and 9.2.2.4.5 core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical (including its and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the subsections), permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the 9.2.2.4.7 chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste through processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.2.4.20 ,

and 9.2.2.4.23 9.2.2.4.6 3.2.1 Resin Fill Tank Modify This section is modified to reflect that the resin fill tank will be utilized to process resins from the demineralizers. The title of this subsection is eliminated to support consolidation of information in the DSAR.

9.2.2.4.21 3.2.1 Valves Modify This section is modified to reflect that the chemical and volume control system will continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer Page 5 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The title of this subsection is eliminated to support consolidation of information in the DSAR 9.2.2.4.22 3.2.1 Piping Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion regarding heat tracing for lines containing concentrated boric acid. The chemical and volume control system will continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The title of this subsection is eliminated to support consolidation of information in the DSAR 9.2.2.5 NA Recycle Process Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It contained a historical discussion of the boron recycle process. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Page 6 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.2.5.1 3.2.2 Purpose Modify This section is modified to reflect that the chemical and volume control system will continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.2.5.2 3.2.2 Holdup Tanks Modify This section is modified to reflect that the chemical and volume control system will continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The title of this subsection is eliminated to support consolidation of information in the DSAR 9.2.2.5.3 NA Holdup Tank Recirculation Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The chemical and volume control Pump system will continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 Page 7 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.2.5.4 3.2.2 Holdup Tank Transfer Pump Modify This section is modified to remove a historical discussion regarding the original purpose of the pump. This is an administrative change.

The title of this subsection is eliminated to support consolidation of information in the DSAR 9.2.2.5.5 NA Evaporator Feed (Cation) Ion Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The chemical and volume control Exchangers system will continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.2.5.6 NA Ion Exchanger Filters Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.7 NA Gas Stripper Equipment Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.8 NA Boric Acid Evaporator Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, Equipment because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

Page 8 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.2.2.5.9 NA Evaporator Condensate Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, Demineralizers because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.10 NA Condensate Filters Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.11 NA Monitor Tanks Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.12 NA Monitor Tank Pumps Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.13 3.3.2.3.6 Primary Water Storage Tank Modify This section describes the primary water storage tank. While the primary water storage tank will not be required to provide make-up to the reactor coolant system, it will continue to serve as the make-up source for the component cooling water system in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. This section is modified to reflect that function.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.2.2.5.13.1 3.3.2.3.6.1 Primary Water Storage Tank Retain No proposed changes.

Level Measurement 9.2.2.2.5.13.2 3.3.2.3.6.2 Primary Water Storage Tank Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion regarding the reactor coolant Temperature Control pumps.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 9 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the reactor coolant system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.2.2.5.14 3.3.2.3.7 Primary Water Makeup Modify This section describes the primary water makeup pumps. This section is modified to Pumps eliminate the discussion that the pumps are automatically controlled by the chemical and volume control system, and to replace the reference to plant with a reference to facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, primary water makeup pumps are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding these pumps in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The term facility better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because IP2 will no longer be a plant that generates electricity.

9.2.2.5.15 NA Concentrates Filter Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.16 NA Concentrates Holding Tank Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

9.2.2.5.17 NA Concentrates Holding Tank Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This is an administrative change, Transfer Pumps because the discussion was historical to address equipment that was no longer utilized, retired in place or removed.

Page 10 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.2.3, NA System Design and Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The chemical and volume control including Evaluation system will continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and Subsections defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and 9.2.3.1 permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in through accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 9.2.3.6 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.2.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. There will no requirements Conditions regarding the chemical volume and control system presented in the Technical Requirements Manual.

9.2.5 NA Tests and Inspections Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. There will no testing, calibrating, or checking requirements regarding the chemical volume and control system presented in the Technical Requirements Manual.

Table 9.2-1 Table 3.2-1 Chemical and Volume Control Modify This table is modified to reflect that the chemical and volume control system will System Code Requirements continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 9.2-2 NA Chemical and Volume Control Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

System Letdown Requirements Page 11 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 9.2-3 NA Chemical and Volume Control Modify This table is modified to reflect that the chemical and volume control system will System Principal Component continue to process liquid radwaste in the permanently shut down and defueled Design Data Summary condition. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the chemical and volume control system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the chemical and volume control system, with the exception of the liquid radwaste processing function, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 9.2-4 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

Activities (576°F)

Table 9.2-5 NA Parameters Used in the Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

Calculation of Reactor Coolant Fission Product Activation Table 9.2-6 NA Tritium Production in the Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

Reactor Coolant System Table 9.2-7 NA Malfunction Analysis of Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.3.

Chemical and Volume Control System Figure 9.2-1 NA Chemical and Volume Control Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

Sh. 1 System - Flow Diagram, Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2736 Figure 9.2-1 NA Chemical and Volume Control Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

Sh. 2 System - Flow Diagram, Sheet 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 208168 Figure 9.2-1 NA Chemical and Volume Control Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

Sh. 3 System - Flow Diagram, Sheet Page 12 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 3, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2737 Figure 9.2-1 NA Chemical and Volume Control Delete See the discussion for Section 9.2.2.

Sh. 4 System - Flow Diagram, Sheet 4, Replaced with Plant Drawing 235309 Figure 9.2-2 Figure 3.3-2 Primary Water Makeup Retain No proposed changes.

System - Flow Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2724 9.3 3.3 Auxiliary Coolant System Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.1 3.3.1 Design Basis Modify This section introduces the three loops of the auxiliary coolant system, i.e., the component cooling loop, the residual heat removal loop, and the spent fuel pit cooling loop. It is modified to eliminate the discussions regarding the residual heat removal loop.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.3.1.1 3.3.1.1 Performance Objectives Retain No proposed changes 9.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.1 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section addresses the performance objectives for the component cooling loop. It is modified to reflect that it will continue to support the storage of spent fuel in the SFP, and eliminate the references to the reactor coolant system, chemical and volume control system, engineered safeguards components, and safe shutdown components.

The requirement for the system to be redundant is eliminated. In addition, the term primary plant is replaced with the term facility.

Page 13 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system, chemical volume control system, engineered safeguards, and safe shutdown components are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding these systems and components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The term facility better represents IP2 in the shut down and defueled condition.

9.3.1.1.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete This section addresses the residual heat removal loop. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.3.1.1.3 3.3.1.1.2 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Loop Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.1.2 3.3.1.2 Design Characteristics Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.1.2.1 3.3.1.2.1 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section addresses the performance objectives for the component cooling loop. It is modified to reflect that it will continue to support the storage of spent fuel in the SFP, and eliminate the references to components located in the reactor containment building and requirements following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). In addition, the term plant is replaced with the term facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 14 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the reactor coolant system, chemical volume control system, engineered safeguards, and safe shutdown components are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding these systems and components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.3.1.2.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

9.3.1.2.3 3.3.1.2.2 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Loop Modify This section is modified to eliminate the reference to TRM 3.9.A and to denote how it will be met in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. This requirement will be met prior to the implementation of the original version of the Defueled Technical Specifications and Defueled Safety Analysis Report. Thus, it will essentially be a historical requirement, because the facility will be permanently shut down and defueled.

An editorial change is made to correct the spelling of dependent.

9.3.1.3 3.3.1.3 Codes and Classification Retain No proposed changes 9.3.2 3.3.2 System Design and Operation Retain No proposed changes 9.3.2.1 3.3.2.1 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section addresses the performance objectives for the component cooling loop. It is modified to eliminate the references to components of the residual heat removal system, reactor coolant system, chemical and volume control system, sampling system, reactor vessel support pads, and safety injection system. In addition, the section is revised to eliminate references to full power operation and plant shutdown.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual Page 15 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions heat removal system, reactor coolant system, chemical and volume control system, sampling system, reactor vessel support pads, and safety injection system are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding these systems and components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.3.2.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

9.3.2.3 3.3.2.2 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Loop Modify This section addresses the spent fuel pit cooling loop. It is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the reactor containment, refueling activities, the fuel transfer tube, and the circulation of refueling water storage tank water.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and refueling activities can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

The reactor containment and fuel transfer tube serve no purpose in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Consequently, these structures are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Thus, the information regarding these structures in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

In addition, the refueling water storage tank is no longer required to be purified in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.3.2.4 3.3.2.3 Component Cooling Loop Retain No proposed changes.

Components 9.3.2.4.1 3.3.2.3.1 Component Cooling Heat Retain No proposed changes.

Exchangers 9.3.2.4.2 3.3.2.3.2 Component Cooling Pumps Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.2.4.3 NA Auxiliary Coolant Water Delete This section discusses the auxiliary cooling water pumps function to supply the safety Pumps injection system during a LOCA with or without a loss of offsite power. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Page 16 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the safety injection system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.3.2.4.4 3.3.2.3.3 Component Cooling Surge Retain No proposed changes.

Tank 9.3.2.4.5 3.3.2.3.4 Component Cooling Valves Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.2.4.6 3.3.2.3.5 Component Cooling Piping Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.2.5 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

Components 9.3.2.5.1 NA Residual Heat Exchangers Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

9.3.2.5.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

Pumps 9.3.2.5.3 NA Residual Heat Removal Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

Valves 9.3.2.5.4 NA Residual Heat Removal Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

Valves 9.3.2.5.5 NA Low Pressure Purification Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

System 9.3.2.6 3.3.2.4 Spent Fuel Pit Loop Retain No proposed changes.

Components 9.3.2.6.1 3.3.2.4.1 Spent Fuel Pit Heat Retain No proposed changes.

Exchanger 9.3.2.6.2 3.3.2.4.2 Spent Fuel Pit Pumps Retain No proposed changes.

Page 17 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.3.2.6.3 NA Refueling Water Purification Delete This section discusses the refueling water purification pump. This section is proposed Pump to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the refueling water purification pump is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this pump in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.3.2.6.4 3.3.2.4.3 Spent Fuel Pit Filter Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.2.6.5 3.3.2.4.4 Spent Fuel Pit Strainer Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.2.6.6 3.3.2.4.5 Spent Fuel Pit Demineralizer Modify This section is modified by eliminating the option to use the spent fuel pit demineralizer to purify the refueling water storage tank water.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the refueling water storage tank is no longer required to be purified in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.3.2.6.7 NA Spent Fuel Pit Skimmer Delete Previously deleted.

[Deleted]

9.3.2.6.8 3.3.2.4.6 Spent Fuel Pit Valves Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.2.6.9 3.3.2.4.7 Spent Fuel Pit Piping Retain No proposed changes.

Page 18 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.3.3 3.3.3 System Evaluation Modify This section provides a generic introduction regarding the evaluation of the auxiliary cooling systems performance. It is modified to eliminate the reference to the operating modes and the loss of coolant accident.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

9.3.3.1 3.3.3.1 Availability and Reliability Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.3.1.1 3.3.3.1.1 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section discusses the availability and reliability of the component cooling loop. It is modified by defining the portions of the system that is permanently isolated and the portions of the system that will remain in service. The section is revised to define the electrical power requirements in the permanently shut down and defueled condition and eliminate the discussion regarding the Station Blackout / Appendix R diesel generator and to define that the system and the structures that house it are no longer required to be seismic Class I.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system, reactor coolant system, and the majority of the chemical and volume control system (with the exception of waste processing components) are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room Page 19 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for any active components to mitigate the consequences of the accident. As a result, the electrical power requirements regarding the component cooling loop are significantly reduced in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, there are no requirements for the component cooling water system or the structures that house it to remain classified as seismic Class I.

9.3.3.1.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

9.3.3.1.3 3.3.3.1.2 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Loop Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.3.2 3.3.3.2 Leakage Provisions Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.3.2.1 3.3.3.2.1 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section addresses the leakage provisions for the component cooling loop. This section is modified by revising the discussion to reflect the remaining portions of the system that will perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified to replace the reference to operator with a reference to site personnel. This is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

It is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding leakage within containment, leakage from the chemical and volume control system, the sampling system, the reactor coolant system, and the residual heat removal system. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system, reactor coolant system, sampling system, and chemical and volume control system, are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and Page 20 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions defueled state. Thus, the information regarding these systems and their components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

In addition, the references to the Technical Specifications are eliminated. The Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications do not contain any leakage requirements.

9.3.3.2.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

9.3.3.2.3 3.3.3.2.2 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Loop Modify This section addresses the leakage control provisions of the spent fuel pit cooling loop. It is modified to eliminate the discussion regarding the transfer of fuel assemblies via the fuel transfer canal, and the capability to provide makeup water from the refueling water storage tank.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, refueling activities will no longer occur.

Thus, all fuel assemblies will have been transferred from the reactor to the SFP, and the fuel transfer tube will serve no purpose in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, makeup water to the spent fuel pit cooling loop will no longer be supplied by the refueling water storage tank.

9.3.3.3 3.3.3.3 Incident Control Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.3.3.1 3.3.3.3.1 Component Cooling Loop Modify This section addresses various breaks on the component cooling loop inside and outside the containment. It is modified to eliminate the discussion of a component cooling water line break inside containment, references to containment isolation valves, components of the reactor coolant system, chemical volume and control system, sampling system, safety injection system, and residual heat removal system.

In addition, the makeup source for the component cooling loop is changed from the reactor makeup water tank and primary makeup water pumps to the primary water storage tank and primary water pumps.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no Page 21 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system, reactor coolant system, sampling system, safety injection system, the majority of the chemical and volume control system (with the exception of waste processing equipment) and containment isolation valves, are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Thus, the information regarding these systems and their components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.3.3.3.2 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

9.3.3.3.3 3.3.3.3.2 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Loop Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the spent fuel transfer tube. It will be permanently isolated from the spent fuel pit in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, the section is modified by replacing references to the spent fuel storage pool or pool with references to the SFP. This is an administrative change to establish a consistent reference to the SFP.

9.3.3.4 3.3.3.4 Malfunction Analysis Retain No proposed changes.

9.3.4 NA Minimum Operating Delete This section states that minimum operating conditions for the auxiliary coolant Conditions system are specified in the Technical Specifications. There are no requirements for the auxiliary coolant systems in the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications.

9.3.5 NA Tests and Inspections Delete This section provides a discussion of the tests and inspections of the auxiliary coolant system. It refers to the Technical Specifications and defines specific testing requirements for the residual heat removal system. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

There are no testing requirements for the auxiliary coolant systems in the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently Page 22 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 9.3-1 Table 3.3-1 Auxiliary Coolant System Modify This table provides the code requirements for auxiliary coolant system components. It Code Requirements is modified by eliminating the references to residual heat removal components.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the residual heat removal system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 9.3-2 Table 3.3-2 Component Cooling Loop Modify This table provides data regarding various component cooling loop components. It is Component Data modified by eliminating the data regarding the auxiliary component cooling water pumps and the component cooling water circulating water pumps.

See the previous discussion regarding Subsection 9.3.1.2.1.

Table 9.3-3 NA Residual Heat Removal Loop Delete This table provides data regarding the residual heat removal system components. It is Component Data proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

See the discussion for Subsection 9.3.1.1.2.

Table 9.3-4 Table 3.3-3 Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Loop Modify Component Data This table is modified to replace a reference to the spent fuel storage pool with a reference to spent fuel pit. This is an administrative change to provide a consistent reference regarding the SFP.

This table is modified to eliminate references to the SFP skimmers, skimmer strainer, and skimmer filter that were previously deleted or retired in place. This is an administrative change.

This table is modified to eliminate the reference to the refueling water purification pump. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent Page 23 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the refueling water purification pump is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this pump in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 9.3-5 Table 3.3-4 Failure Analysis of Pumps, Modify This table addresses failures of components of the component cooling water loop. It Heat Exchangers, and Valves is modified by eliminating the statement that two of the three pumps are need to carry the pumping load, replacing the reference to emergency core cooling during recirculation with a reference to SFP cooling and the discussion of long-term recirculation with a discussion of safe storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel pit.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Figure 9.3-1 Figure 3.3-1 Auxiliary Coolant System - Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 1 Sh. 1 Flow Diagram, Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 227781 Figure 9.3-1 Figure 3.3-1 Auxiliary Coolant System - Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 2 Sh. 2 Flow Diagram, Sheet 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2720 Figure 9.3-1 Figure 3.3-1 Auxiliary Coolant System - Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 3 Sh. 3 Flow Diagram, Sheet 3, Replaced with Plant Drawing 251783 9.4 3.4 Sampling System Retain No proposed changes.

9.4.1 3.4.1 Design Basis Retain No proposed changes.

Page 24 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.4.1.1 3.4.1.1 Performance Requirements Modify This section is modified by eliminating discussions of post-accident conditions, the containment atmosphere post-accident sampling system, the primary sampling system (with the exception of the references to the holdup tanks, chemical volume and control system (CVCS) holdup tank transfer and the chemical drain pump 21 discharge) , secondary sampling system, and the reference to NUREG-0737.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

In addition, the reference to operator is replaced with a reference to site personnel. This is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Other editorial and format changes are made to reflect the major rewrite to this subsection and other modifications to Section 9.4 subsections.

Page 25 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.4.1.2 3.4.1.2 Design Characteristics Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of post-accident conditions, requirements to perform inline measurement of the reactor coolant system, cool and depressurize all high temperature-high pressure fluids, utilize shielded transfer casks, and separation of the sampling equipment for secondary and nonradioactive fluids from the equipment provided for reactor coolant samples.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

In addition, the reference to operator is replaced with a reference to site personnel. This is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Other editorial and format changes are made to reflect the major rewrite to this subsection and other modifications to Section 9.4 subsections.

Page 26 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.4.1.3 3.4.1.3 Primary Sampling Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the high temperature - high pressure RCS and steam generator blowdown samples.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

Other editorial and format changes are made to reflect the major rewrite to this subsection and other modifications to Section 9.4 subsections.

9.4.1.3.1 NA High Pressure - High Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses the high pressure -

Temperature Samples high temperature sample connections.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the high pressure - high temperature sample connections are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.1.3.2 NA Low Pressure - Low Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses low pressure - low Temperature Samples temperature sample connections for the letdown demineralizers inlet and outlet header, residual heat removal loop, volume control tank gas space, (safety injection Page 27 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions system) accumulators 21, 22, 23, and 24, and recirculation pumps 21 and 22 discharge.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the low pressure - low temperature sample connections discussed in this section are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.1.4 NA Expected Operating Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses that the high Temperatures pressure - high temperature samples and the residual heat removal loop samples are cooled.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, samples the high pressure - high temperature samples and the residual heat removal loop are not required be taken in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the need to cool those samples no longer exists.

9.4.1.5 NA Secondary Sampling Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It addresses the secondary sampling system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 28 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.1.6 3.4.1.4 Codes and Standards Modify This section is modified by revising the code requirements to reflect those that remain applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. This includes eliminating the discussions regarding post-accident conditions, NUREG-0737, diverting stored sample fluid to the containment, and pressurized samples.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

9.4.2 3.4.2 System Design and Operation Retain No proposed changes.

9.4.2.1 3.4.2.1 Primary Sampling System Modify This section is modified by rewriting the section to reflect the portions that will continue to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. This includes the elimination of the discussions regarding post-accident conditions, reactor coolant system samples, mixed bed demineralizers, full power operations, cold shutdown conditions, steam samples, and steam generator blowdown samples.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 29 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

In addition, a reference to Figure 9.4-1 is added. This is an administrative change.

9.4.2.1.1 3.4.2.1.1 Components Modify This section header is retained, but the text in the section is eliminated. It refers to Table 9.4-2. The only component that this table refers to is the sample heat exchanger. As defined in the discussion for Subsection 9.4.2.1.1.1, this component no longer serves a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.2.1.1.1 NA Sample Heat Exchangers Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the sample heat exchangers.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the sample heat exchangers are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.2.1.1.2 NA Delay Coil and Restriction Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the delay coil and Orifice restriction orifice in the high-pressure RCS sample line.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 30 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the delay coil and restriction orifice in the high-pressure RCS sample line are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.2.1.2 3.4.2.1.1.1 Liquid Sampling Panel Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the reactor coolant sampling module, specialized equipment for sampling under accident conditions (e.g., carts and shielded casks), RCS samples, post-accident samples, and routing of purge flow back to the containment.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

In addition, editorial and grammatical corrections are made to improve legibility following incorporation of changes made to this subsection.

9.4.2.1.3 3.4.2.1.1.2 Isotopic Analyzer Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the reactor coolant sampling module, RCS samples, post-accident samples, and Ge(Li) detector gamma spectroscopy system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 31 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

In addition, editorial and grammatical corrections are made to improve legibility following incorporation of changes made to this subsection.

9.4.2.1.4 3.4.2.1.1.3 Boron Analyzer Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the reactor coolant sampling module, specialized equipment for sampling under accident conditions (e.g., carts and shielded casks), RCS samples, and post-accident samples.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

In addition, editorial and grammatical corrections are made to improve legibility following incorporation of changes made to this subsection.

9.4.2.1.5 NA Cart and Casks Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses carts and shielded casks that would be utilized during accident conditions.

Page 32 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the carts and shielded casks are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, there are portions of the primary sampling system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel.

9.4.2.1.6 NA Chemical Analysis Panel Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the chemical analysis panel that receives an undiluted liquid sample stream and stripped gas from the reactor coolant module.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the chemical analysis panel is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.2.1.7 NA Chemical Monitor Panel Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the chemical monitor panel that supports the chemical analysis panel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 33 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Given the above, the chemical monitor panel is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.2.1.8 NA High Radiation Sampling Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the high radiation System Collection Tank sampling system collection tank.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the high radiation sampling system collection tank is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.2.1.8.1 3.4.2.1.1.4 Chemical Drain Tank Retain No proposed changes.

9.4.2.1.8.2 3.4.2.1.1.5 Piping and Fittings Retain No proposed changes.

9.4.2.1.8.3 3.4.2.1.1.6 Valves Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding remotely operated stop valves that are used to isolate sample points and route sample fluids and isolation valves that trip upon generation of the containment isolation signal.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the remotely operated stop valves and isolation valves are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.2.2 NA Secondary Sampling System Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the secondary sampling system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 34 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system is not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.4.3 NA System Evaluation Delete This section header is proposed to be deleted. This is an administrative change.

9.4.3.1 NA Availability and Reliability Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This discusses the availability of the sampling system post-accident.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition during post-accident conditions.

9.4.3.2 NA Leakage Provisions Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the secondary sampling system and the majority of the primary sampling system are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the discussion regarding leakage provisions is no longer applicable.

Page 35 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.4.3.3 NA Incident Control Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses the operation of the system of a continuous basis.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Thus, the information in this section of the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.4.3.4 NA Malfunction Analysis Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. It discusses an analysis of failures or malfunctions of the sampling system concurrent with a LOCA.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Thus, the information in this section of the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.4.3.5 NA High Radiation Sampling Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

System Evaluation After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Given the above, the high radiation sampling system is not required to perform during and following an accident or to monitor high radiation samples.

Table 9.4-1 Table 3.4-1 Sampling System Code Modify This table is modified by eliminating the reference to the sample heat exchanger. As Requirements defined in the discussion for Subsection 9.4.2.1.1.1, this component no longer serves a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 36 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Table 9.4-2 NA Primary Sampling System Delete This table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The only component addressed in Components the table is the sample heat exchanger. As defined in the discussion for Subsection 9.4.2.1.1.1, this component no longer serves a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Table 9.4-3 NA Malfunction Analysis of Delete This table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the discussion for Subsection Sampling System 9.4.3.4.

Figure 9.4-1 Figure 3.4-1 Primary Sampling System - Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 1 Sh. 1 Flow Diagram, Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2745 Figure 9.4-1 Figure 3.4-1 Primary Sampling System - Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 2 Sh. 2 Flow Diagram, Sheet 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 227178 Figure 9.4-2 NA Secondary Sampling System - Delete See the discussion for Subsection 9.4.2.2.

Flow Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-7020 9.5 3.5 Fuel Handling System Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the reactor cavity and the fuel transfer system and the reference to unirradiated fuel. The reference to operating personnel is replaced with a more generic reference to personnel. In addition, the term plant is replaced with the term facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. In addition, there will no need for the plant to acquire any unirradiated fuel.

In the permanently shut down and defueled condition, the term operating personnel is obsolete; thus, utilizing a more generic term of personnel is appropriate. Also, the term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 37 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.5.1 3.5.1 Design Basis Retain No proposed changes.

9.5.1.1 3.5.1.1 Prevention of Fuel Storage Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding storage fuel in the Criticality reactor, utilization of new spent fuel racks, the reactor cavity, and the refueling canal.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. The reactor cavity and refueling canal have no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, there will no need for the plant to acquire any unirradiated fuel.

9.5.1.2 3.5.1.2 Fuel and Waste Storage Modify This section is modified to replace the phrase refueling water with the phrase Decay Heat spent fuel pit cooling water. In the permanently shut down and defueled condition, the term refueling is obsolete; thus, utilizing referring to the water in the spent fuel pit as the spent fuel pit cooling water is appropriate.

9.5.1.3 3.5.1.3 Fuel and Waste Storage Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to reactor refueling. In addition, Radiation Shielding the reference to operating personnel is replaced with a more generic reference to personnel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI.

In the permanently shut down and defueled condition, the term operating personnel is obsolete; thus, utilizing a more generic term of personnel is appropriate.

9.5.1.4 3.5.1.4 Protection Against Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the reactor cavity, Radioactivity Release from and refueling canal. In addition, the seismic classification for the waste disposal Spent Fuel and Waste system is revised to match the re-classification provided in UFSAR Section 1.11.

Storage Page 38 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. The reactor cavity and refueling canal have no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.5.2 3.5.2 System Design and Operation Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the reactor cavity, refueling canal, and new fuel storage. In addition, the reference to operating personnel is replaced with a more generic reference to personnel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. The reactor cavity and refueling canal have no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, there will no need for the plant to acquire any unirradiated fuel.

In the permanently shut down and defueled condition, the term operating personnel is obsolete; thus, utilizing a more generic term of personnel is appropriate.

9.5.2.1 3.5.2.1 Major Structures Required Retain No proposed changes.

for Fuel Handling 9.5.2.1.1 NA Reactor Cavity Delete This section describes the reactor cavity. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. The reactor cavity has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 39 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.5.2.1.2 NA Refueling Canal Delete This section describes the refueling canal. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. The refueling canal has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.5.2.1.3 NA Refueling Water Storage Delete This section describes the refueling water storage tank. It is proposed to be deleted in Tank its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. The refueling water storage tank has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.5.2.1.4 3.5.2.1.1 Spent Fuel Storage Pit Retain No proposed changes.

9.5.2.1.5 3.5.2.1.2 Storage Rack Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to new fuel assemblies, and replacing references to spent fuel storage pool or pool with SFP.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. There will no need for the plant to acquire any new unirradiated fuel.

The change to the nomenclature regarding the SFP is to provide consistency in the language utilized in the DSAR. This is an administrative change.

9.5.2.1.6 NA New Fuel Storage Delete This section addresses the storage of new unirradiated fuel assemblies. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Page 40 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. There will no need for the plant to acquire any new unirradiated fuel.

9.5.2.2 3.5.2.2 Major Equipment Required Retain No proposed changes.

for Fuel Handling 9.5.2.2.1 NA Reactor Vessel Stud Delete This section describes the reactor vessel stud tensioner. It is proposed to be deleted Tensioner in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The reactor vessel stud tensioner has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.5.2.2.2 NA Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Delete This section describes the reactor vessel head lifting device. It is proposed to be Device deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The reactor vessel head lifting device has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition with regards to fuel handling.

9.5.2.2.3 NA Reactor Internals Lifting Delete This section describes the reactor internals lifting device. It is proposed to be deleted Device in its entirety.

Page 41 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The reactor internals lifting device has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition with regards to fuel handling.

9.5.2.2.4 NA Manipulator Crane Delete This section describes the manipulator crane. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The manipulator crane has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition with regards to fuel handling.

9.5.2.2.5 3.5.2.2.1 FSB Fuel Handling Bridge Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to spent fuel pool with a reference Crane to spent fuel pit. This is administrative change that provides consistency regarding the references to the SFP.

9.5.2.2.6 NA Fuel Transfer System Delete This section describes the fuel transfer system. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel, and all spent fuel will be stored in the SFP or the ISFSI. The fuel transfer system has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.5.2.2.7 NA Rod Cluster Control Changing Delete This section describes the rod cluster control changing fixture. It is proposed to be Fixture deleted in its entirety.

Page 42 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The rod cluster control changing fixture has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition with regards to fuel handling.

9.5.2.2.8 NA Lower Internals Support Delete This section describes the lower internals support stand. It is proposed to be deleted Stand in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The lower internals support stand has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition with regards to fuel handling.

9.5.2.2.9 3.5.2.2.2 Shield Transfer Canister (STC) Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to UFSAR with a reference to and HI-TRAC Transfer Cask DSAR. This change reflects that the IP2 UFSAR will be revised and re-issued as the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

9.5.3 3.5.3 System Evaluation Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to refueling operations with storage and handling operations. This change reflects that the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled, with the spent fuel stored in the SFP or the ISFSI.

In addition, the section is modified by eliminating the reference to the containment gamma radiation monitors, reactor neutron flux monitors, containment integrity, and reactor core.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and Page 43 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. Consequently, the containment will not be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the containment and the reactor core in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

9.5.3.1 NA Incident Protection Delete This section addresses communication between the control room and the refueling cavity manipulator crane. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The manipulator crane has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition with regards to fuel handling.

9.5.3.2 3.5.3 Malfunction Analysis Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion regarding drainage from the refueling cavity. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The reactor cavity has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition with regards to fuel handling.

In addition, the section is modified to replace the term fuel storage pool with SFP to provide consistency and the section header is eliminated. These are administrative changes.

9.5.4 3.5.4 Minimum Operating Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussion regarding the Technical Condition Specification requirement regarding the reactor coolant system temperature when fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor head bolts are less than fully tensioned.

This requirement will no longer exist in the Defueled Technical Specifications.

9.5.5 NA Tests and Inspections Delete This section describes a pre-operational test of the Presray seal that sealed the reactor vessel flange to the bottom of the reactor cavity. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Page 44 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the reactor will no longer be utilized to store spent fuel. The Presray seal has no function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.5.6 3.5.5 Control of Heavy Loads Retain No proposed changes.

9.5.6.1 3.5.5.1 Introduction / Licensing Retain No proposed changes.

Background

9.5.6.2 3.5.5.2 Safety Basis Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to the auxiliary fuel pump building monorail, primary auxiliary building monorail, and containment polar crane.

In addition, the discussion of the postulated drop of the reactor head onto the reactor vessel is eliminated.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled. As a result, auxiliary fuel pump building monorail, primary auxiliary building monorail, and containment polar crane cannot result in an accident involving fuel or have any impact on core cooling or the ability to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown configuration.

9.5.6.3 3.5.5.3 Scope of Heavy Load Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to the containment polar crane, Handling Systems primary auxiliary building monorail, auxiliary fuel pump building monorail, and diesel generator building overhead crane.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 45 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled. As a result, the containment polar crane, primary auxiliary building monorail, auxiliary fuel pump building monorail, and diesel generator building overhead crane cannot result in an accident involving fuel or have any impact on core cooling or the ability to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown configuration.

9.5.6.4 3.5.5.3 Control of Heavy Loads Modify This section is merged with Section 9.5.6.3. This is an administrative change.

Program 9.5.6.4.1 3.5.5.4 Response to NUREG 0612, Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the containment Phase I Elements polar crane, auxiliary hoist of the polar crane, reactor vessel head lifting rig, internals lift rig, reactor vessel inservice inspection tool, auxiliary fuel pump building monorail, and primary auxiliary building monorail. The discussions regarding safe shutdown of the plant and movement of fresh fuel to the new fuel elevator are eliminated. In addition, the references to the term operable are replaced with references to the term functional, and the reference to plant is replaced with a reference to facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled. As a result, the containment polar crane, auxiliary hoist of the polar crane, reactor vessel head lifting rig, internals lift rig, reactor vessel inservice inspection tool, auxiliary fuel pump building monorail, and primary auxiliary building monorail cannot result in an accident involving fuel or have any impact on core cooling or the ability to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown configuration.

In the permanently shut down and defueled state, IP2 will no longer acquire new fuel and will be in a permanent state of safe shutdown with fuel removed from the reactor vessel and stored in the SFP and ISFSI.

Page 46 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Additionally, the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications will not contain any operability requirements. Thus, it is appropriate to replace the term operable with the term functional. Also, the term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.5.6.4.2 NA Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Delete This section addresses the reactor pressure vessel head lifting procedures to ensure (RPVH) Lifting Procedures that core cooling will not be compromised and the core will remain covered.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Thus, a drop of the reactor pressure vessel head will have no impact on critical components, core cooling, or the reactor core.

9.5.6.4.3 3.5.5.5 Single Failure Proof Cranes Retain No proposed changes.

for Spent Fuel Casks 9.5.6.5 3.5.5.6 Safety Evaluation Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion regarding the risk to redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment during spent fuel transfer activities. In addition, the term plant is replaced with the term facility.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled. As a result, no equipment is required to achieve or maintain safe shut down of the reactor.

The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 47 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.5.7 3.5.6 Fuel Storage Building (FSB) Retain No proposed changes.

Dry Cask Storage (DCS)

Operations 9.5.7.1 3.5.6.1 FSB 110-Ton Ederer Single Retain No proposed changes.

Failure Proof Gantry Crane 9.5.7.2 3.5.6.2 FSB Low Profile Transporter Retain No proposed changes.

(LPT) System 9.5.8 3.5.7 Inter-Unit Spent Fuel Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to UFSAR with a reference to Transfer Operations DSAR. This change reflects that the IP2 UFSAR will be revised and re-issued as the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

Table 9.5-1 Table 3.5-1 Fuel Handling System Data Modify This table is modified by eliminating the data regarding new fuel storage, the refueling canal, and the amount of water required for refueling.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, refueling operations will never occur again, and the spent fuel will be stored either in the SFP or the ISFSI. Additionally, IP2 will never have a need to acquire any new unirradiated fuel.

Table 9.5-2 Table 3.5-2 NUREG-0612 Compliance Modify This table is modified by removing the reference to the containment polar crane and Matrix its list of heavy loads. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled. As a result, a failure of the containment polar crane cannot result in an accident involving fuel.

Figure 9.5-1 NA Fuel Transfer System Delete See the discussion provided for Subsection 9.5.2.2.6.

Figure 9.5-2 Figure 3.5-1 Spent Fuel Storage Rack Retain No proposed changes.

Layout Page 48 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 9.5-3 Figure 3.5-2 Spent Fuel Storage Cell Retain No proposed changes.

Region 1 Figure 9.5-4 Figure 3.5-3 Region I Cell Cross-Section Retain No proposed changes.

Figure 9.5-5 Figure 3.5-4 Region II Cross-Section Retain No proposed changes.

9.6 3.6 Facility Service Systems Retain No proposed changes.

9.6.1 3.6.1 Service Water System Retain No proposed changes.

9.6.1.1 3.6.1.1 Design Basis Modify This section is modified to state the design basis for the service water system in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In the permanently shut down and defueled condition, there is no need to maintain separate essential and non-essential headers; thus, these headers will be merged.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Given the above, the essential portion of the service water system is not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. Thus, the service water system is no longer required to be single failure proof, nor is there any need for the system to be operated in an automatic manner. However, there are portions of the service water system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel. The operation of the service water system will be controlled manually.

Page 49 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions In addition, the intake structure is no longer required to be maintained as seismic Class I.

9.6.1.2 3.6.1.2 System Design and Operation Modify This section is modified to provide an evaluation for the service water system in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The minimum flow requirements for the service water system are met by one or more pumps supplying at least 5000 gpm.

This ensures that the following loads will be provided with sufficient cooling:

  • Spent fuel cooling via the CCW heat exchangers
  • TWS wash water and CWP bearing cooling
  • 22 Standby Diesel Generator
  • Condenser waterbox degassing pumps
  • Appendix R/SBO Diesel Generator
  • Zurn strainer blowdown
  • 13 FWCHX for CENTAC cooling In the permanently shut down and defueled condition, there is no need to maintain separate essential and non-essential headers; thus, these headers will be merged. In addition, the discussion is revised to denote that the standby diesel generator and Appendix R / SBO diesel generator will be supplied cooling water from the service water header on a manual basis. The evaluation regarding the containment fan cooler units and their associated service water piping susceptibility to water hammer or two-phase flow is eliminated.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room Page 50 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Given the above, the essential portion of the service water system is not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. Thus, the service water system is no longer required to be single failure proof, nor is there any need for the system to be operated in an automatic manner. However, there are portions of the service water system that will continue to be maintained to support the storage and handling of spent fuel. The operation of the service water system will be controlled manually.

9.6.1.3 3.6.1.3 Design Evaluation Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussion regarding the essential portion of the service water system, and the discussion regarding compliance with NRC Generic Letter 96-06 as it pertains to the containment fan cooler units and their associated service water piping. The discussion is simplified to state that the system has sufficient pump capacity to support storage of spent fuel in the SFP.

The essential portion of the service water system was designed to provide cooling water in the event of a single failure of any active component during the injection phase of the safety injection system. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the containment fan cooler units are no longer required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Page 51 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Given the above, the essential portion of the service water system is not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. However, the non-essential portion is maintained as a support system for the storage and handling of spent fuel.

9.6.1.4 3.6.1.4 Tests and Inspections Modify This section is modified by eliminating the requirement to test electrical components of the service water system.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time.

Given the above, the essential portion of the service water system is not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. However, the non-essential portion is maintained as a support system for the storage and handling of spent fuel.

Given the operation of the system, there is no need to test the electrical components, because they no longer perform a safety function.

9.6.2 3.6.2 Fire Protection Modify This section is modified to reflect that the licensing basis for fire protection changes to 10 CFR 50.48(f) after the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) are docketed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2).

License Condition 2.K of Facility License DPR-26 for IP2 regarding the Fire Protection Program was eliminated in License Amendment No. XXX. This license condition is deleted to reflect the permanently defueled condition of the facility. After the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1) are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer authorize operation of the reactor or placement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, the fire protection program will be revised to take into account the decommissioning facility conditions and activities. IP2 will continue to utilize the defense-in-depth concept, placing special emphasis on detection and suppression in order to minimize the potential for radiological releases to the environment.

Page 52 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions This condition, which is based on maintaining an operational fire protection program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48, with the ability to achieve and maintain safe shut down of the reactor in the event of a fire, will no longer be applicable at IP2. In addition, Appendix R of 10 CFR 50 will no longer be applicable to IP2. However, many of the elements that are applicable for the operating plant fire protection program continue to be applicable during facility decommissioning. During the decommissioning process, a fire protection program is required by 10 CFR 50.48(f) to address the potential for fires that could result in a radiological hazard.

IP2 will no longer need to maintain the IP2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report or systems credited to provide the safe shutdown capability including the Alternate Safe Shutdown System.

9.6.3 3.6.3 City Water System Modify This section is modified to: 1) eliminate the components that will no longer be served by the city water system in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. These components are the house service boilers, steam and water analysis station, expansion tanks of the diesel generator jacket water cooling system, expansion tank of the instrument air compressor closed cooling system, expansion tank of the instrument air compressor closed cooling system, isolation valve seal water supply tank, and the steam generator blowdown tank; and 2) eliminate the discussion regarding emergency city water connections to be used by the charging pumps, residual heat removal pumps, and safety injection pumps.

The elimination of the steam generator, safety injection system, containment isolation seal water system, chemical and volume control system, residual heat removal system, steam and water analysis station, and instrument air compressors is addressed in the discussions for UFSAR Sections 5.1.5.1, 6.2, 6.5, 9.2, 9.3.1.1.2, 9.4.2.2, 9.6.4, respectively.

9.6.4 3.6.4 Compressed Air Systems Retain No proposed changes.

9.6.4.1 3.6.4.1 Instrument Air System Modify This section is modified to define that the instrument air system will be supplied by the IP1 service air system and to eliminate the reference to operating conditions.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 53 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the requirements for the instrument air system are substantially reduced in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. As a result, an operational decision was made to eliminate the IP2 instrument air system and utilize the IP1 service air system. This alternative previously existed and was described in the IP2 UFSAR.

9.6.4.2 3.6.4.2 Station Air System Modify This section is modified to define that the station air system will be supplied by the IP1 service air system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the requirements for the station air system are substantially reduced in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. As a result, an operational decision was made to eliminate the IP2 station air system and utilize the IP1 service air system. This alternative previously existed and was described in the IP2 UFSAR.

9.6.5 3.6.5 Heating System Modify This section discusses the heating systems for IP2. This section is modified by eliminating the requirement to heat the containment building and the air makeup steam tempering units.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The containment building environment is no longer required to be maintained in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, the steam supply to the air makeup steam tempering units is isolated; thus, they no longer serve a function.

Page 54 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.6.6 NA Plant Communications Delete This section refers to Section 7.7.4 of the IP2 UFSAR for a discussion of the plant Systems communications system. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

This is an administrative change, because the remaining information in the IP2 UFSAR will be consolidated in the DSAR. As a result, this section will serve no purpose in the DSAR.

Table 9.6-1 NA Minimum Essential Service Delete This table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The minimum flow requirements Water Requirement for the service water system are met by one or more pumps supplying at least 5000 Under Accident Conditions gpm. This ensures that the following loads will be provided with sufficient cooling:

  • Spent fuel cooling via the CCW heat exchangers
  • TWS wash water and CWP bearing cooling
  • 22 Standby Diesel Generator
  • Condenser waterbox degassing pumps
  • Appendix R/SBO Diesel Generator
  • Zurn strainer blowdown
  • 13 FWCHX for CENTAC cooling This information has been incorporated in to Section 9.6.1.2. Therefore, Table 9.6-1 is superfluous and may be deleted.

Figure 9.6-1 Figure 3.6-1 Service Water System - Flow Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 1 Sh. 1 Diagram, Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2722 Figure 9.6-1 Figure 3.6-1 Service Water System - Flow Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 2 Sh. 2 Diagram, Sheet 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 209762 Figure 9.6-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 9.6-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 9.6-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 9.6-5 Figure 3.6-2 City Water System - Flow Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 1 Sh. 1 Diagram, Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 192505 Page 55 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure 9.6-5 Figure 3.6-2 City Water System - Flow Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 2 Sh. 2 Diagram, Sheet 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 192506 Figure 9.6-5 Figure 3.6-2 City Water System - Flow Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 3 Sh. 3 Diagram, Sheet 3, Replaced with Plant Drawing 193183 Figure 9.6-6 Figure 3.6-3 Instrument Air - Flow Retain No proposed changes.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2036 Figure 9.6-7 Figure 3.6-4 Station Air - Flow Diagram, Retain No proposed changes.

Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2035 9.7 3.7 Equipment and System Retain No proposed changes.

Decontamination 9.7.1 3.7.1 Design Basis Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to normal plant operation, reactor cool-down, and reactor coolant system operation and maintenance and clarifying that the activity can occur from SFP components.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

9.7.2 3.7.2 Methods of Decontamination Modify The term plant is replaced with the term facility. This better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

9.7.3 3.7.3 Decontamination Facilities Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion regarding the decontamination of shipping casks. This change is appropriate, because IP2 will not receive any new fuel in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

In addition, the section is modified by correcting the locations of the decontamination facilities, decontamination shower and washroom, and personnel decontamination kits. These changes improve the accuracy of the IP2 UFSAR.

Page 56 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 9.8 3.8 Primary Auxiliary Building Retain No proposed changes.

Ventilation System 9.8.1 3.8.1 Design Basis Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to filters and normal operation of the plant.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. The DBAs that remain applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition do not credit the use of any air filtration to ensure that the resultant dose consequences remain within limits. Thus, the filters in the primary auxiliary building ventilation system are no longer required to serve a purpose.

9.8.2 3.8.2 System Design and Operation Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to filters and the containment building purge system and revising the section to address only operation of the primary auxiliary building ventilation system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the containment building purge system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The DBAs that remain applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition do not credit the use of any air filtration to ensure that the resultant dose consequences remain within limits. Thus, the filters in the primary auxiliary building ventilation system are no longer required to serve a purpose.

Page 57 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions In addition, the section is modified by eliminating a reference to previously deleted material, including Figure 5.3-1. This is an administrative change to clean-up the section.

Table 9.8-1 Table 3.8-1 Primary Auxiliary Building Modify This table is modified by eliminating the references to filters and the containment Ventilation System building purge system.

Component Data After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the containment building purge system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The DBAs that remain applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition do not credit the use of any air filtration to ensure that the resultant dose consequences remain within limits. Thus, the filters in the primary auxiliary building ventilation system are no longer required to serve a purpose.

In addition, the table is modified by eliminating references to previously deleted material. This is an administrative change to clean-up the table.

9.9 3.9 Control Room Ventilation Retain No proposed changes.

System 9.9.1 NA Design Basis Delete This section addressed the design basis requirements for the control room ventilation system that ensured that the control room would remain habitable. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 58 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for the filtration of control room air to mitigate the consequences of the accident. In addition, there are no requirements to maintain the habitability of the control room, because the DBAs may be mitigated via actions taken outside of the control room.

9.9.2 3.9.1 System Design and Operation Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to filters, the safety injection signal, and the need to maintain the control room envelope during a chemical release. In addition, the reference to Section 7.2 of the UFSAR is eliminated, because that section is deleted in its entirety (see the Review Table for Chapter 7).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Consequently, the safety injection system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding this system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of Page 59 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for the filtration of control room air to mitigate the consequences of the accident. In addition, there are no requirements to maintain the habitability of the control room, because the DBAs may be mitigated via actions taken outside of the control room.

Figure 9.9-1 Figure 3.9-1 Central Control Room HVAC Retain No proposed changes (Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning), Replaced with Plant Drawings 252665 &

138248 9.10 3.10 Fuel Storage Building Retain No proposed changes.

Ventilation System 9.10.1 3.10.1 Design Basis Modify This section is modified by replacing reference to spent fuel pool with SFP, eliminating the discussions regarding air filtration, and eliminating the discussion regarding the two supply systems that had been retired in place.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for the filtration of fuel storage building air to mitigate the consequences of the accident.

Page 60 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions In addition, the elimination of the discussion of the two supply systems removes historical information regarding equipment that had been retired in place.

The change to the nomenclature regarding the SFP is an administrative change to ensure consistent references throughout the DSAR.

9.10.2 3.10.2 System Design and Operation Modify This section is modified by replacing reference to spent fuel pool with SFP and eliminating the discussions regarding air filtration. After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for the filtration of fuel storage building air to mitigate the consequences of the accident.

In addition, the change to the nomenclature regarding the SFP is an administrative change to ensure consistent references throughout the DSAR. Also, references to previously deleted material, including Figure 5.3-1, are deleted 9.10.3 3.10.3 Limiting Conditions for Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to Fuel Storage Building Air Operation (Fuel Storage Filtration System in the title. This is an administrative change.

Building Air Filtration System) 9.10.4 3.10.4 Surveillance Requirements Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to Fuel Storage Building Air (Fuel Storage Building Air Filtration System in the title, the references to refueling operations, and the Filtration System) discussions regarding filtration requirements. In addition, the reference to the term operable is replaced with a reference to functional.

Page 61 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 9 - AUXILIARY AND EMERGENCY SYSTEMS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations and refueling activities can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

After permanent shut down and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for the filtration of fuel storage building air to mitigate the consequences of the accident.

Additionally, the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications will not contain any operability requirements. Thus, it is appropriate to replace the term operable with the term functional.

Page 62 of 62

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 10.1 3.11 Design Basis Modify This section is proposed for deletion, because the vast majority of the information in subsection 10.1.1, and all of the information in subsections 10.1.2 through 10.1.4 are proposed for deletion. The information regarding Condenser #22 will be located to a summary discussion regarding the circulating water system in Chapter 3 of the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion systems, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion systems, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.1.1 3.11 Performance Objectives Modify This section defines over-arching performance objectives for the turbine-generator systems, steam and feedwater system, the electrical generator, radiation monitors, and the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Condenser #22 will continue to perform a function in the defueled condition, and the information regarding it in Table 10.1-1 will be retained.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion systems, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion systems, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 1 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions In addition, the section header is eliminated to support consolidation of the information in the DSAR.

10.1.2 NA Load Change Capacity Delete This section addressed the capability of the reactor, reactor coolant system, and turbine bypass and steam systems to withstand various load changes.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear power and nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the reactor, reactor coolant system, and the turbine bypass and steam systems are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the load change capability of these systems in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.1.3 NA Functional Limits Delete This section defines that the steam and power conversion system possess backup means (power relief and code safety valves) of heat removal under any loss of normal heat sink (e.g., condenser isolation, loss of circulating water flow) to accommodate reactor shutdown heat rejection requirements.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion systems, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion systems, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.1.4 NA Secondary Functions Delete This section identifies secondary functions of the steam and power conversion system including providing steam for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and Page 2 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions operation of the air ejectors, the capability of the turbine bypass system to dissipate the heat in the reactor coolant following a full-load trip.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 10.1-1 Table 3.11-1 Steam and Power Conversion Modify See the discussion for Section 10.1.1. The information regarding Condenser #22 will System Component Design be retained.

Parameters In addition, the table will be retitled as Design Parameters for Condenser #22. This is an administrative change.

Figure 10.1-1 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Figure NA Uprate PEPSE Model with Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.1.1.

10.1-1a New HP Turbine High Pressure Turbine Expansion Figure NA Uprate PEPSE Model with Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.1.1.

10.1-1b New HP Turbine Moisture Separator Reheater Train A Figure NA Uprate PEPSE Model with Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.1.1.

10.1-1c New HP Turbine Moisture Separator Reheater Train B Figure NA Uprate PEPSE Model with Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.1.1.

10.1-1d New HP Turbine Low Pressure Turbine Expansion Page 3 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Figure NA Uprate PEPSE Model with Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.1.1.

10.1-1e New HP Turbine Main Condensers Figure NA Uprate PEPSE Model with Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.1.1.

10.1-1f New HP Turbine Notes and Significant Results Figure 10.1-2 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Figure NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative 10.1-2a change.

Figure 10.1-3 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Figure 10.1-4 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Figure 10.1-5 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Figure 10.1-6 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative change.

Figure 10.1-7 NA Load Heat Balance Diagram Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.1.1 at 1,034,072 kWe 10.2 NA System Design and Operation Delete This Section is deleted, because all of its Subsections are proposed for deleted.

10.2.1, NA Main Steam System Delete The main steam system conducted steam from the steam generators to the turbine including generator unit.

Subsections 10.2.1.1 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of through fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 10.2.1.5 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the main steam system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the main steam system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 4 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 10.2.2 NA Turbine Generator Delete The turbine generator received steam from the main steam system and generated electrical power.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the turbine generator is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the turbine generator in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.2.3 NA Turbine Controls Delete This section describes the controls for the turbine generator.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the turbine generator is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the turbine generator and its controls in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.2.4 3.11 Circulating Water System Modify The circulating water system provided the condensers with a continuous supply of cooling water, for removing the heat rejected by the turbine generator, and the ability to inject sodium hypochlorite. The circulating water system will continue to be utilized in the permanently shut down and defueled state. The section is revised to reflect the new function to provide dilution flow for liquid waste discharges.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced Page 5 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the circulating water system function will be different and simplified in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

10.2.5 3.11 Condenser and Auxiliaries Modify The condensers and their auxiliaries provided a heat sink for the turbine generator.

Condenser #22 will continue to perform a function in the permanently defueled state.

The section is modified to reflect the revised function for Condenser #22, After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the condensers, with the exception of Condenser #22, and their auxiliaries are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the condensers and their auxiliaries, with the exception of Condenser #22 and its auxiliaries, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete. The description of Condenser #22 is updated to reflect the simplified function for Condenser #22 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

In addition, the section header is eliminated to support consolidation of information in the DSAR.

10.2.6 NA Condensate and Feedwater Delete The condensate and feedwater system provided feedwater to the four steam System generators. It is composed of a condensate system, condensate makeup and surge system, heater drain system, feedwater system, and auxiliary feedwater system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the condensate and feedwater system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut Page 6 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the condensate and feedwater system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.2.6.1 NA Condensate System Delete The condensate system transfers condensate and low-pressure heater drains from the condenser hotwell through five stages of feedwater heating to the suctions of the main feedwater pumps.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the condensate system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the condensate system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.2.6.2 NA Main Feedwater System Delete The main feedwater system supplied feedwater to the steam generators to maintain water inventory.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the main feedwater system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the main feedwater system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.2.6.3 NA Auxiliary Feedwater System Delete The auxiliary feedwater system supplied high-pressure feedwater to the steam generators to maintain water inventory. This was needed to remove decay heat energy from the reactor coolant system by secondary-side steam release in the event that the main feedwater system was inoperable.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 7 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the auxiliary feedwater system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the auxiliary feedwater system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.2.6.4 NA System Chemistry Delete This section describes the system chemistry for the steam and power conversion system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.2.7 3.11 Codes and Classifications Modify This section provides the codes and classifications for the steam and power conversion system. The information is retained as it pertains to the circulating water system and Condenser #22. The information regarding the steam generator vessel is eliminated.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down Page 8 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

In addition, the section header is eliminated to support consolidation of information in the DSAR.

Table 10.2-1 Table 3.11-2 Codes and Classifications Modify This table provides the codes and classifications for the steam and power conversion system. It is modified to eliminate the discussion of the steam generator vessel, turbine generator, crossover, crossunder, and lube oil piping, and feedwater heater extraction steam inlet nozzles. Information that pertains to Condenser #22 and its auxiliaries is maintained.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Figure 10.2-1 NA Main Steam Flow Diagram, Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.1.

Sh. 1 Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 227780 Figure 10.2-1 NA Main Steam Flow Diagram, Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.1.

Sh. 2 Sheet 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2017 Figure 10.2-1 NA Main Steam Flow Diagram, Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.1.

Sh. 3 Sheet 3, Replaced with Plant Drawing 235308 Figure 10.2-2 NA Turbine Generator Building Delete This figure is not referred to in the IP2 UFSAR. Thus, the removal of the figure is an General Arrangement, administrative change.

Page 9 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Operating Floor, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2004 Figure 10.2-3 NA Turbine Generator Building Delete This figure is not referred to in the IP2 UFSAR. Thus, the removal of the figure is an General Arrangement, Cross administrative change.

Section, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2008 Figure 10.2-4 Figure 3.11-1 Condenser Air Removal and Retain No changes.

Water Box Priming - Flow Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2025 Figure 10.2-5 NA Condensate and Boiler Feed Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.6.1.

Sh. 1 Pump Suction - Flow Diagram, Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2018 Figure 10.2-5 NA Condensate and Boiler Feed Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.6.1.

Sh. 2 Pump Suction Flow Diagram, Sheet 2, Replaced with Plant Drawing 235307 Figure 10.6 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative Sh. 1 change.

Figure 10.2-6 NA Deleted Delete This Figure was previously deleted. Removal of the placeholder is an administrative Sh. 2 change.

Figure 10.2-7 NA Boiler Feedwater Flow Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.6.2.

Diagram, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2019 Figure 10.2-8 NA Steam Turbine-Driven Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.6.3.

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Estimated Performance Characteristics Figure 10.2-9 NA Motor-Driven Auxiliary Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.2.6.3.

Feedwater Pump Estimated Performance Characteristics Page 10 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 10.3 NA System Evaluation Delete This section is deleted, because all of its subsections are proposed to be deleted.

10.3.1 NA Safety Features Delete This section describes the trips, automatic control actions, and alarms for the steam and power conversion system that permit appropriate corrective action to be taken to protect the reactor coolant system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the steam and power conversion system, with the exception of Condenser #22 and the circulating water system, in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

10.3.2 NA Secondary-Primary Delete This section describes the secondary to primary interactions regarding a turbine trip, Interactions failure of a main feedwater pump, failure of both main feedwater pumps, main steam line pressure relief, and steam generator tube leaks.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the events described above cannot occur in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information is obsolete.

10.3.3 NA Single Failure Analysis Delete This section provides a single failure analysis of the auxiliary feedwater system, steam line isolation system, and the turbine bypass system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no Page 11 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 10 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, the auxiliary feedwater system, steam line isolation system, and the turbine bypass system are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state.

Thus, the information regarding the auxiliary feedwater system, steam line isolation system, and the turbine bypass system in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Table 10.3-1 NA Single Failure Analysis Delete See the discussion for Subsection 10.3.3.

10.4 NA Tests and Inspections Delete This section defines the tests and inspections for the main steam isolation valves, auxiliary feedwater pumps, and piping and fittings in the extraction steam, turbine crossunder, heater drain pump discharge, condensate, feedwater and auxiliary feedwater systems.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, nuclear steam cannot be produced and electrical power cannot be generated. Consequently, systems and components described above are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding those systems and components in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Page 12 of 12

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 11.1 4.1 Waste Disposal System Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.1 4.1.1 Design Bases Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to normal operation and the discussion of the evaporators.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, normal operations of the primary system will no longer occur.

The waste evaporators were previously retired as identified in UFSAR Section 11.1.2.2.9. Thus, the information regarding the evaporators in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

11.1.2 4.1.2 System Design and Operation Modify This section is modified by eliminating discussions regarding normal operation of the primary system, replacing a reference to primary plant and plant site with a reference to facility, and correcting the title of the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, normal operations of the primary system will no longer occur.

In addition, referring to IP2 as a plant in the defueled condition is inappropriate, because it is no longer a generation unit. Thus, the term facility is considered to be more appropriate.

The report title Annual Effluent and Waste Disposal Report was incorrect. The correct title is the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

11.1.2.1 4.1.2.1 System Description Retain No proposed changes.

Page 1 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 11.1.2.1.1 4.1.2.1.1 Liquid Processing Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to normal plant operation, the discussions of steam generator blowdown, demineralizer regeneration, waste condensate pumps, and primary to secondary leakage. The discussions regarding the reactor coolant drain tank and the distillate storage tanks are revised to reflect how they will be operated and the remaining sources that will be collected in or transferred by the reactor coolant drain tank in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, the term plant is replaced with the term facility, the term distillate is replaced with processed water, and the term technical specifications with ODCM.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, normal operations of the primary system will no longer occur. Consequently, steam generator blowdown and primary to secondary leakage will no longer be possible and the waste condensate pumps are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, the information regarding these processes and equipment in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

In addition, referring to IP2 as a plant in the defueled condition is inappropriate, because it is no longer a generation unit. Thus, the term facility is considered to be more appropriate.

IP2 no longer utilizes distillation for demineralizer water processing. Thus, the term distillate is replaced with the term processed water to improve the accuracy of the UFSAR.

The reference to the technical specifications is replaced with a reference to the ODCM to correct a historical error.

11.1.2.1.2 4.1.2.1.2 Gas Processing Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to normal operation, plant operations, and the discussions regarding degassing the reactor coolant, purging the volume control tank, and supplying hydrogen to the primary system. The section is revised to reflect how it will be utilized in the permanently shut down and defueled condition and replace the term operator with the term site personnel. In addition, Page 2 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM the section is revised to correct the reference to the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report and its contents.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, degassing the reactor coolant, purging the volume control tank, and supplying hydrogen to the primary system will no longer occur. Thus, the information regarding these processes in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

In addition, replacing the term operator with the term site personnel is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The report title Annual Effluent and Waste Disposal Report was incorrect. The correct title is the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report. In addition, this report contains the actual amounts of gas activity (by isotope) released to the environment, not the maximum expected annual gaseous release by isotope.

11.1.2.1.3 4.1.2.1.3 Solids Processing Modify The term plant is replaced with the term facility. The term facility better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.1.2.2 4.1.2.2 Components Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.2.2.1 NA [Deleted] Delete Previously deleted.

11.1.2.2.2 4.1.2.2.1 Chemical Drain Tank Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.2.2.3 4.1.2.2.2 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.2.2.4 4.1.2.2.3 Waste Holdup Tank Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.2.2.5 4.1.2.2.4 Sump Tank and Sump Tank Retain No proposed changes.

Pumps 11.1.2.2.6 4.1.2.2.5 Spent Resin Storage Tank Modify The term plant is replaced with the term facility. The term facility better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.1.2.2.7 4.1.2.2.6 Gas Decay Tanks Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to operation with 1 percent fuel defects, normal operation, and cold shutdown. In addition, the term operator is replaced with the term site personnel.

Page 3 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, the terms operation with 1 percent fuel defects, normal operation, and cold shutdown are no longer relevant.

In addition, replacing the term operator with the term site personnel is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.1.2.2.8 4.1.2.2.7 Compressors Modify This section is modified by replacing the term plant with the term facility.

Referring to IP2 as a plant in the defueled condition is inappropriate, because it is no longer a generation unit. Thus, the term facility is considered to be more appropriate.

11.1.2.2.9 NA Waste Evaporator Package Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety, because the waste evaporator package was previously retired.

11.1.2.2.10 4.1.2.2.8 Distillate Storage Tanks Retain No proposed changes 11.1.2.2.11 NA Waste Condensate Tanks Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The waste condensate tanks will not perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.1.2.2.12 NA Balers Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety, because the balers were previously retired and removed from the facility.

11.1.2.2.13 4.1.2.2.9 Nitrogen Manifold Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.2.2.14 NA Hydrogen Manifold Delete This section is proposed to be deleted. Hydrogen was supplied to the volume control tank to maintain the hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, supplying hydrogen to the primary system will no longer be required. Thus, the information regarding the hydrogen manifold in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

11.1.2.2.15 4.1.2.2.10 Gas Analyzer Modify This section is modified by replacing the term operator with the term site personnel. This is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 4 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 11.1.2.2.16 4.1.2.2.11 Pumps Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.2.2.17 4.1.2.2.12 Piping Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.2.2.18 4.1.2.2.13 Valves Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.3 4.1.3 Design Evaluation Retain No proposed changes.

11.1.3.1 4.1.3.1 Liquid Wastes Modify This section is modified by replacing the term plant with the term facility. In addition, an editorial change is made and correcting the title for the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

Referring to IP2 as a plant in the defueled condition is inappropriate, because it is no longer a generation unit. Thus, the term facility is considered to be more appropriate.

The report title Annual Effluent and Waste Disposal Report was incorrect. The correct title is the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

11.1.3.2 4.1.3.2 Gaseous Wastes Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions of gaseous waste sources that will no longer exist in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, and correcting the title of the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, boron dilution of the reactor coolant, degassing the reactor coolant, and depressurizing the containment atmosphere will no longer occur. Thus, the information regarding these processes in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

The term plant is replaced with the term facility. The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The report title Annual Effluent and Waste Disposal Report was incorrect. The correct title is the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

11.1.3.3 4.1.3.3 Solid Wastes Modify This section is modified by eliminating discussions regarding changes and processes that are or could be utilized to reduce the amount of solid waste. These are good practices, but they do not need to be specifically addressed in the UFSAR. In addition, the discussions regarding the solidification of waste liquid concentrates and the Page 5 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM process for solidifying waste liquid concentrates and sludges in liners are eliminated, because these activities are no longer conducted.

11.1.4 4.1.3.4 Minimum Operating Retain No proposed changes.

Conditions Table 11.1-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.1-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.1-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.1-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.1-5 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.1-6 Table 4.1-1 Waste Disposal System Modify This table is modified to eliminate the references to the waste condensate tank. Refer Components Code to the discussion provided for UFSAR Subsection and 11.1.2.2.11.

Requirements Table 11.1-7 Table 4.1-2 Component Summary Data Modify This table is modified to eliminate the references to the waste condensate tank, waste condensate pump, and waste evaporator feed pump. Refer to the discussions provided for UFSAR Subsections 11.1.2.2.9 and 11.1.2.2.11.

Table 11.1-9 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11.1-1 Figure 4.1-1 Waste Disposal System Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 1 Sh. 1 Process Flow Diagram, Sheet 1, Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2719 Figure 11.1-1 Figure 4.1-1 Waste Disposal System Retain No proposed changes.

Sh. 2 Sh. 2 Process Flow Diagram, Sheet

2. Replaced with Plant Drawing 9321-2730 11.2 4.2 Radiation Protection Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.1 4.2.1 Design Bases Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussion regarding operational and design ALARA training programs that are provided to station and support engineering and technical groups. This is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The term plant is replaced with the term facility. The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition 11.2.1.1 4.2.1.1 Monitoring Radioactivity Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding monitoring the Releases containment atmosphere, the containment fan cooler service water discharge, the condenser air ejectors, and steam generator blowdown. In addition, the discussion Page 6 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM regarding anticipated transients and containment accident conditions are eliminated.

The references to plant procedures, plant emergency plan, and plant personnel are replaced with references to procedures, emergency plan, and personnel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, accidents within the containment and operational transients can no longer occur. Chapter 14 is revised to reflect the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The only remaining applicable design basis accidents (DBAs) are the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) and a gaseous or liquid waste release. In addition, there is no longer a need to monitor the containment atmosphere, the containment fan cooler service water discharge, the condenser air ejectors, or steam generator blowdown.

The replacement of the references to plant procedures, plant emergency plan, and plant personnel with references to procedures, emergency plan, and personnel are administrative changes.

11.2.1.2 4.2.1.2 Monitoring Fuel and Waste Retain No proposed changes.

Storage 11.2.1.3 4.2.1.3 Fuel and Waste Storage Retain No proposed changes.

Radiation Shielding 11.2.1.4 4.2.1.4 Protection Against Retain No proposed changes.

Radioactivity Release from Spent Fuel and Waste Storage 11.2.2 4.2.2 Shielding Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.2.1 4.2.2.1 Design Basis Modify This section is modified by eliminating the references to reactor operation, normal operation, safe shutdown, and reactor operating modes, replacing the reference to operating personnel with a reference to site personnel, the reference to plant with a reference to facility, the reference to operating procedures with a reference to procedures, and eliminating a discussion regarding a historical review of radiation and shielding design. In addition, the discussion regarding shielding and its role to limit offsite doses in the event of a hypothetical accident is eliminated, Page 7 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM along with the references to primary shielding, secondary shielding, and accident shielding.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the plant will never be operated again. The mission of the site is no longer power operations or electrical power generation but the safe maintenance and storage of spent fuel.

Replacing the term operating personnel with the term site personnel is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Referring to IP2 as a plant in the defueled condition is inappropriate, because it is no longer a generation unit. Thus, the term facility is considered to be more appropriate.

The replacement of the reference to operating procedures with a reference to procedures, is an administrative change. The discussion regarding the radiation and shielding design review was eliminated, because it is historical. It does not pertain to the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

These analyses do not credit shielding to limit offsite dose consequences.

The primary shield, secondary shield, and accident shield will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. As a result, the discussions of the primary shield, secondary shield, and accident shield in the UFSAR are obsolete.

11.2.2.1.1 NA Primary Shield Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its The DBAs that remain applicable in the defueled condition are the FHA and release of gaseous or liquid waste. entirety. The primary shield will not be required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 8 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the primary shield will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

As a result, the discussions of the primary shield in the UFSAR are obsolete.

11.2.2.1.2 NA Secondary Shield Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The secondary shield will not be required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the secondary shield will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

As a result, the discussions of the secondary shield in the UFSAR are obsolete.

11.2.2.1.3 NA Accident Shield Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The accident shield will not be required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the accident shield will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

As a result, the discussions of the accident shield in the UFSAR are obsolete.

11.2.2.1.4 4.2.2.1.1 Fuel Handling Shield Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of removal and transfer of spent fuel assemblies and control rod clusters from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pit.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the spent fuel assemblies and control rod clusters will be removed as part of the permanently defueled condition.

Page 9 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 11.2.2.1.5 4.2.2.1.1 Auxiliary Shield Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to the residual heat removal system and discussions regarding normal operations and accident conditions. In addition, the section is modified by replacing the term operator with the term site personnel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Consequently, the residual heat removal system does not perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Also, the DBAs that remain applicable in the defueled condition (FHA and release of gaseous or liquid waste) do not credit operator action; thus, there would be no actions that would require personnel to be shielded in those events.

Replacing the term operator with site personnel is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.2.2.2 4.2.2.2 Shielding Design Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.2.2.1 NA Primary Shield Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The primary shield will not be required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the primary shield will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

As a result, the discussions of the primary shield in the UFSAR are obsolete.

11.2.2.2.2 NA Secondary Shield Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The secondary shield will not be required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Page 10 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the secondary shield will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

As a result, the discussions of the secondary shield in the UFSAR are obsolete.

11.2.2.2.3 NA Accident Shield Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The accident shield will not be required to perform any function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the accident shield will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

As a result, the discussions of the accident shield in the UFSAR are obsolete.

11.2.2.2.4 4.2.2.2.1 Fuel Handling Shield Modify The section is modified by eliminating the discussions regarding the fuel transfer canal, the conditions required for fuel transfer from the vessel to the spent fuel pit, and the conditions required for refueling. In addition, the refueling shield is retitled the fuel handling shield to be consistent with the section title.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the spent fuel assemblies and control rod clusters will be removed as part of the permanently defueled condition.

Renaming the refueling shield as the fuel handling shield is an administrative change.

11.2.2.2.5 4.2.2.2.2 Auxiliary Shield Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussions regarding access to the auxiliary building during reactor operation.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 11 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled.

11.2.3 4.2.3 Radiation Monitoring System Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.3.1 4.2.3.1 Design Bases Modify This section is modified by replacing references to plant with references to facility and a reference to safe operation of the plant with a reference to safe maintenance of the facility.

Referring to IP2 as a plant in the defueled condition is inappropriate, because it is no longer a generation unit. Thus, the term facility is considered to be more appropriate.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the plant will be permanently shut down and defueled. As a result, the facility will be maintained to ensure safe storage of spent fuel.

11.2.3.2 4.2.3.2 Radiation Monitoring Modify This section is modified by eliminating a discussion regarding the replacement of the Betterment Program original process radiation monitoring system. This is an administrative change. The paragraph is unnecessary, and reflects a historical information that is not relevant to the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

In addition, this section is revised to denote that the Appendix R / SBO diesel generator will be the source of power in the event of a loss of other power sources.

This is consistent with changes made to Chapter 8, as discussed in that Chapters review table.

11.2.3.2.1 4.2.3.2.1 Service Water from Retain No proposed changes.

Component Cooling Heat Exchangers Monitors 11.2.3.2.2 NA Containment Air Monitors Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Monitors R-41 and R-42 monitor the containment atmosphere for particulate and gaseous activity, respectively.

Page 12 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). These monitors will not be required in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because there will be no DBAs that can occur in the containment.

11.2.3.2.3 4.2.3.2.2 Plant Vent Air Monitors Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussion of R-43 and the requirement for R-44 to initiate containment ventilation isolation. In addition, the section is modified to denote that the plant vent air monitors were historically seismically qualified and as class IE.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). There will be no DBAs that can occur in the containment; thus, there is no need to isolate containment. R-43 has been retired. R-44 will be retained in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. However, they are not credited as part of mitigation of any of the remaining DBAs. Thus, it is no longer required to be maintained as seismically qualified or class IE.

11.2.3.2.4 NA Condenser Air Ejector Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. There will be need to monitor Discharge Monitor the gas removed from the condenser by the air ejector.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). The condenser air ejector will not be required to function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. As a result, there will be no air to monitor.

11.2.3.2.5 NA Service Water Return from Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Monitors R-46 and R-53 monitor Containment Fan Cooler the service water return from the containment fan cooler units.

Units After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 13 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). There will be no DBAs that can occur in the containment. Thus, these monitors will not be required in the permanently shut down and defueled condition, because the containment fan cooler units are not required to perform any function in that condition.

11.2.3.2.6 4.2.3.2.3 Component Cooling Modify This section is modified to eliminate the reference to the reactor coolant system and Radiation Monitor the residual heat removal loop. In addition, the requirement for the system to be capable of performing its function after a safe shutdown earthquake is eliminated.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, the reactor coolant system and the residual heat removal loop are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, given that the plant is permanently shut down, the capability to achieve safe shutdown following an earthquake is no longer required.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for any active components to mitigate the consequences of the accident.

11.2.3.2.7 NA Waste Condensate Tank Delete This section is proposed for deletion in its entirety, because it was previously Discharge Line removed from service and retired in place.

11.2.3.2.8 NA Steam Generator Blowdown Delete This section is proposed for deletion. There is no need to monitor steam generator Monitor blowdown in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 14 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, steam generator blowdown will not be generated any longer. Thus, eliminating the need to monitor that process fluid.

11.2.3.2.9 4.2.3.2.4 Waste Gas Decay Tank Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.3.2.10 NA Secondary Boiler Blowdown Delete This section is proposed for deletion. There is no need to monitor secondary boiler Purification System blowdown in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, secondary boiler blowdown will not be generated any longer. Thus, eliminating the need to monitor that process fluid.

11.2.3.2.11 NA Steam Generator Blowdown Delete This section is proposed for deletion. There is no need to monitor steam generator Purification System Cooling blowdown in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Water Monitor After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, steam generator blowdown will not be generated any longer. Thus, eliminating the need to monitor that process fluid.

11.2.3.2.12 4.2.3.2.5 Liquid Waste Distillate Modify The name of the monitor is changed from Liquid Waste Distillate Radiation Monitor to Radiation Monitor Liquid Waste Effluent Radiation Monitor to match the ODCM.

11.2.3.2.13 NA Steam Generator Secondary Delete This section is proposed for deletion in its entirety, because these monitors were System Monitors previously removed from service and retired in place.

11.2.3.2.14 NA Effluent Discharge to ENIP3 Delete This section is proposed for deletion. R-57 monitors the contents of the sewage ejector pit, located in IP1. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, this monitor will no longer be required to perform a function.

11.2.3.2.15 NA House Service Boilers Delete This section is proposed for deletion. R-59 monitors the condensate return. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, this monitor will no longer be required to perform a function.

Page 15 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 11.2.3.2.16 4.2.3.2.6 Stack Radiation Monitor Modify This section is modified by correcting the information regarding the R-60 monitor. Tt is the Unit 1 Stack Radiation Monitor and to denote that it only monitors noble gas.

Particulates and iodines are collected on filters and analyzed in the count room.

11.2.3.2.17 NA Maintenance and Outage Delete This section is proposed for deletion. R-5976 monitors the air exhausted from the 95 Building Ventilation Exhaust elevation of the Maintenance and Outage Building. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, this monitor will no longer be required to perform a function.

11.2.3.2.18 4.2.3.2.7 Sphere Foundation Sump Modify The name of the Sphere Foundation Sump monitor is changed to Sphere Foundation Liquid Effluent Drain Sump monitor to match the ODCM.

11.2.3.2.19 NA Main Steam/Steam Delete This section is proposed for deletion. R-61A, R-61B, R-61C, and R-61D are N-16 Generator Tube Leakage monitors located near the main steam lines in the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Building. They will alarm in the event of a steam generator tube leak.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, the possibility of a steam generator tube leak is eliminated. Thus, these monitors are not required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.2.3.3 4.2.3.3 Original Radiation Monitoring Retain No proposed changes.

System 11.2.3.3.1 4.2.3.3.1 Control Room Cabinet Modify This section is modified to eliminate the historical discussion regarding the installation of R-11, R-12, R-13, R-14, R-15, R-16, R-17, R-18, R-19, R-20, and R-23 have been installed in a new radiation recorder panel SA-1. As discussed in UFSAR Subsections 11.2.3.3.4.1 through 11.2.3.4.9, the referenced monitors are no longer functional.

Thus, this discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.2 4.2.3.3.2 Monitor Channel Output Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.3.3.3 4.2.3.3.3 Operating Conditions Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to plant with a reference to facility. Referring to IP2 as a plant in the defueled condition is inappropriate, because it is no longer a generation unit. Thus, the term facility is considered to be more appropriate.

In addition, the section is revised by eliminating the discussion of the portable alarming area radiation monitors and continuous are monitors that were utilized in Page 16 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM the Unit 1 area for interim storage of dry active wastes. These monitors are no longer in use.

11.2.3.3.4 NA Original Process Radiation Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsections 11.2.3.3.4.1 Monitoring System through 11.2.3.3.4.11 define that the monitors and detectors are no longer functional. As a result, the entire discussion regarding the original process radiation monitoring system is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.1 NA Containment and Plant Vent Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.1 Air Particulate Monitors identifies that these monitors are no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is (R-11 and R-13) obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.2 NA Containment Radioactive Gas Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.2 Monitor (R-12) identifies that this monitor is no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.3 NA Plant Vent Gas Monitor Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.3 (R-14) identifies that this monitor is no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.4 NA Condenser Air Ejector Gas Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.4 Monitor (R-15) identifies that this monitor is no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.5 NA Containment Fan Cooling Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.5 Water Monitors (R-16 and identifies that these monitors are no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is R-23) obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.6 NA Component Cooling Loop Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.6 Liquid Monitor (R-17) identifies that this monitor is no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.7 NA Waste Disposal System Liquid Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.7 Effluent Monitor (R-18) identifies that this monitor is no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.8 NA Waste Disposal System Gas Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.8 Analyzer Monitor (R-20 identifies that this monitor was replaced by another monitor. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.9 NA Steam Generator Liquid Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.9 Sample Monitor (R-19) identifies that this monitor is no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.10 NA Gross Failed Fuel Detector Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.10 identifies that this detector is no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

Page 17 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 11.2.3.3.4.11 NA Iodine-131 Monitors Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsection 11.2.3.3.4.11 identifies that these monitors are no longer functional. As a result, the discussion is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.4.12 NA Calibration of Process and Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. UFSAR Subsections 11.2.3.3.4.1 Effluent Monitors through 11.2.3.3.4.11 define that the monitors and detectors are no longer functional. As a result, the entire discussion regarding the original process radiation monitoring system is obsolete.

11.2.3.3.5 4.2.3.3.4 Original Area Radiation Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the IP1 area radiation Monitoring System monitoring system and the containment, charging pump room, sampling room, and incore instrument area channels of the IP2 area radiation monitoring system.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). As a result, the IP1 area radiation monitoring system and the containment, charging pump room, sampling room, and incore instrument area channels of the IP2 area radiation monitoring system will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.2.3.4 4.2.3.4 NUREG-0737 Monitors Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.3.4.1 NA Containment High Range Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Radiation Monitors (R-25 and R-26) After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, accidents within the containment can no longer occur. Chapter 14 is revised to reflect the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The only remaining applicable DBAs are the FHA and a gaseous or liquid waste release. As a result, the containment high range radiation monitors are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.2.3.4.2 4.2.3.4.1 High-Range, Noble Gas Modify The name of the R-27 monitor is changed from High Range, Noble Gas to Wide Range Monitor (R-27) Gas. R-27 has 3 detectors to cover low, mid, and high ranges.

Page 18 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 11.2.3.4.3 NA Main Steam Line Radiation Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Monitors (R-28, R-29, R-30, and R-31) After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, an accident regarding the primary systems can no longer occur. Chapter 14 is revised to reflect the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The only remaining applicable DBAs are the FHA and a gaseous or liquid waste release. As a result, the main steam line radiation monitors are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.2.3.4.4 NA [Deleted] Delete Previously deleted.

11.2.3.4.5 NA PAB Breaker Service Access Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Area Radiation Monitor R-5987 After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the majority of DBAs can no longer occur. Chapter 14 is revised to reflect the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The only remaining applicable DBAs are the FHA and a gaseous or liquid waste release. These DBAs do not require access to service accident mitigation equipment. As a result, the PAB breaker service access area radiation monitor is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.2.3.4.6 NA Post Accident Sampling Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

System Monitors After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the majority of DBAs can no longer occur. Chapter 14 is revised to reflect the permanently shut down and defueled condition. The only remaining applicable DBAs are the FHA radiation monitors are no Page 19 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

11.2.3.4.7 4.2.3.4.2 Control Room Air Intake Modify This section is modified by eliminating the requirement to switch the Control Room ventilation system to the pressurization mode in the event of a high radiation condition.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI.

An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down. After permanent shut down and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. Based on this analysis, there are no requirements for any active components to mitigate the consequences of the accident.

11.2.4 4.2.4 Environmental Monitoring Retain No proposed changes.

Program 11.2.5 4.2.5 Radiation Protection and Modify The title of this section is retained to support consolidation of material into the DSAR.

Medical Programs The content of this section is proposed for deletion in its entirety. It provided a historical discussion regarding action that was taken to upgrade the stations radiological controls by Consolidated Edison circa 1986. This information is historical and obsolete.

11.2.5.1 4.2.5.1 Personnel Monitoring Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.5.2 4.2.5.2 Personnel Protective Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to arising from plant Equipment operations.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, plant operations will no longer occur.

11.2.5.3 4.2.5.3 Facilities and Access Modify This section is modified by replacing a reference to plant procedures with Provisions procedures. This is an administrative change to eliminate an unnecessary adjective.

Page 20 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM 11.2.5.4 4.2.5.4 Radiation Instrumentation Modify This section is modified by replacing a reference to plant radiation protection program with radiation protection program. This is an administrative change to eliminate an unnecessary adjective.

Additionally, this section is modified by replacing the discussion of the means to control access to high radiation areas with a reference to Technical Specifications 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 of the IP2 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications. These specifications provide the details associated with controlling entry into high radiation areas. This eliminates a potential issue associated with modifying information in the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, while the information resides in the technical specifications and is controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.

11.2.5.5 4.2.5.5 Onsite Treatment Facilities, Retain No proposed changes.

Equipment and Supplies 11.2.5.6 4.2.5.6 Treatment Procedures and Retain No proposed changes.

Techniques 11.2.5.7 4.2.5.7 Qualifications of Medical Retain No proposed changes.

Personnel 11.2.5.8 4.2.5.8 Transport of Injured Retain No proposed changes.

Personnel 11.2.5.9 4.2.5.9 Hospital Facilities Retain No proposed changes.

11.2.6 4.2.6 Evaluation of Radiation Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussion of the Loss of Coolant Accident Protection (LOCA), containment shielding, and the dose to the Control Room operators resulting from the LOCA and to eliminate the Liquid Waste Release header.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, a LOCA is no longer possible.

In addition, the header is unnecessary following the elimination of the LOCA discussion.

11.2.7 4.2.7 Tests and Inspections Modify This section is modified to eliminate the discussion of the radiation surveys that were conducted during the initial phases of plant startup and to replace the frequency for testing specific monitors from each refueling shutdown to every two-years.

Page 21 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM The discussion regarding the radiation surveys that were conducted during the initial phases of plant startup are historical. They do not pertain to the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The frequency of every two years is equivalent to each refueling shutdown. It is an administrative change to eliminate an obsolete term, i.e., refueling shutdown.

11.2.8 4.2.8 Handling and Use of Sealed Modify This section is modified by eliminating the note and test requirement regarding Special Nuclear, Source and startup sources.

By-Product Material After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, startup sources are no longer required to be utilized at IP2.

Table 11.2-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.2-2 NA Primary Shield Neutron Delete This table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the discussion provided for Fluxes and Design UFSAR Subsections 11.2.2.1.1 and 11.2.2.1.2.

Parameters Table 11.2-3 NA Secondary Shield Design Delete This table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the discussion provided for Parameters UFSAR Subsections 11.2.2.1.2 and 11.2.2.2.2 Table 11.2-4 NA Accident Shield Design Delete This table is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. See the discussion provided for Parameters UFSAR Subsections 11.2.2.1.3 and 11.2.2.2.3 Table 11.2-5 Table 4.2-1 Refueling Shield Design Modify This table is retitled as the fuel handling shield design parameters to be consistent Parameters with the section title, and the parameters associated with the reactor core are eliminated.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the reactor core parameters are no longer relevant in the permanently defueled condition.

Table 11.2-6 Table 4.2-2 Principal Auxiliary Shielding Modify This table is modified to eliminate the specific concrete shield thicknesses for equipment that will no longer be required to perform a function in the permanently Page 22 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM shut down and defueled condition and to eliminate process parameters that are no longer relevant.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Consequently, the residual heat removal system does not perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

Also, the DBAs that remain applicable in the defueled condition (FHA and release of gaseous or liquid waste) do not credit operator action; thus, there would be no actions that would require personnel to be shielded in those events.

Table 11.2-7 Table 4.2-3 Radiation Monitoring Modify This table is modified to eliminate the references to the radiation monitors that will Channel Data no longer perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

For the specific monitors, a discussion providing the rationale for its elimination is provided for one of the UFSAR Subsections. In addition, the footnote is revised to remove unnecessary information.

The term plant is replaced with the term facility. The term facility better represents IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The name for the Liquid Waste Distillate Radiation Monitor is changed to Liquid Waste Effluent Radiation Monitor to match the ODCM.

The listing for R-60 is corrected to denote that it is the Unit 1 Stack Radiation Monitor and to denote that it only monitors noble gas. Particulates and iodines are collected on filters and analyzed in the count room.

The name of the Sphere Foundation Sump monitor is changed to Sphere Foundation Drain Sump monitor to match the ODCM.

Page 23 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM The name of the R-27 monitor is changed from High Range, Noble Gas to Wide Range Gas. R-27 has 3 detectors to cover low, mid, and high ranges.

Table 11.2-7a NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.2-8 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.2-9 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.2-10 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.2-11 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.2-12 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 11.2-13 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11.2-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11.2-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11.2-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11.2-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11.2-5 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11.2-6 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Appendix NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

11A Appendix Appendix 4B Determination of River Water Modify This appendix is modified by eliminating the discussion of the accidental loss of the 11B Dilution Factors Between the entire primary coolant, including one-percent failed fuel, in a burst release. In Indian Point Site and the addition, the remaining portions of Appendix 11B are identified as historical.

Nearest Public Drinking Water Intakes After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Therefore, the postulated event regarding the accidental loss of the primary coolant while the reactor is fueled is no longer possible.

Table 11B-1 Table 4B-1 Concentrations of Primary Retain No proposed changes.

Coolant Isotopes in the Hudson River at Indian Point and Chelsea Table 11B-2 NA Concentrations of Delete This table is proposed for deletion in its entirety. See the discussion of the proposed Radioisotopes in the Hudson change to Appendix 11B.

Page 24 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 11 - WASTE DISPOSAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM River at Indian Point and Chelsea Figure 11B-1 Figure 4B-1 Iodine-131 Concentration vs Retain No proposed changes.

Days After Burst Release from Indian Point for 1 Curie Release Figure 11B-2 Figure 4B-2 Iodin-131 Concentration vs Retain No proposed changes.

Chelsea vs Days After Burst Release from Indian Point for 1 Curie Release Figure 11B-3 Figure 4B-3 Maximum Concentration vs Retain No proposed changes.

Distance Upstream for 1 Curie Release Figure 11B-4 Figure 4B-4 Maximum Concentration at Retain No proposed changes.

Chelsea vs Half-Life for 1 Curie Release Figure 11B-5 Figure 4B-5 Time to Reach Peak Retain No proposed changes.

Concentration at Chelsea vs Half-Life for 1 Curie Release Appendix NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

11C Appendix NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

11D Table 11D-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11D-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11D-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Appendix NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

11E Figure 11E-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 11E-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Page 25 of 25

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 12 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 12 5 Conduct of Operations Modify The title of this chapter is modified by replacing the term Operations with the phrase Facility Activities. This term better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

12.1 5.1 Organization and Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to the Quality Assurance Program Responsibility Manual (QAPM) with a reference to the IPEC QAPM. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the site will transition to a site specific QAPM, instead of utilizing the generic Entergy QAPM. In addition, the reference to Section 1.10.3 of the is modified to clearly indicate that the reference is to the UFSAR (DSAR) section.

12.1.1 5.1.1 Facility Staff Modify This section is modified by replacing the current responsibilities for the corporate officer and the general manager with the responsibilities for the corporate officer and plant manager as defined in the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS). In addition, the reference to reactor operational and refueling personnel is replaced with a reference to site personnel. This is an administrative change to reflect the changes in staff that will occur in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

12.1.2 5.1.2 Facility Staff Qualifications Modify This section is modified to reflect the revised facility staff qualification requirements addressed in PDTS 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. These proposed changes are consistent with those in the PDTS.

Table 12.1-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 12.1-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 12.1-2 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

12.2 5.2 Training Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to operator training, the Nuclear Training Manager, and ANSI-3.1 adding a reference to the NRC approved training and retraining program for Certified Fuel Handlers, and modifying the reference for the security force training requirements.

10 CFR 55 and operating training requirements are no longer applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Listing ANSI-3.1 is not necessary in this section, because UFSAR Section 12.1.2 provides a reference to ANSI-3.1 and exceptions to it per the QAPM. In addition, the title Nuclear Training Manager will not exist in the organization in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

The changes to this UFSAR section are consistent with the new training requirements in the PDTS.

Page 1 of 4

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 12 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions The term plant is replaced with the term facility. This term better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

In addition, the FSAR reference regarding the training requirements for the security force is modified to reflect the appropriate document, i.e., the Indian Point, Physical Security, Training and Qualification, Safeguard Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Program.

12.3 5.3 Written Procedures Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to the QAPM with a reference to the IPEC QAPM. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the site will transition to a site specific QAPM, instead of utilizing the generic Entergy QAPM. In addition, a reference to the Renewed Facility License and the Appendices A through C Technical Specifications are added, because they also address procedural requirements.

12.3.1 5.3.1 Emergency Operating Modify This section is modified to provide a generic discussion of the emergency plan Procedures implementing procedures. This term replaces the term emergency operating procedures. The Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures define the requirements for the Emergency Response Facilities. They are maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). The requirements in the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures will be modified as the status of the plant changes from an operating plant to a permanently shut down and defueled facility, after the zirconium fire scenario milestone has expired, and following the transition to a facility with all of the nuclear fuel stored at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

12.4 5.4 Records Modify This section is modified by replacing the terms plant, facility operations, and operating with the terms facility or facility activities, as applicable. These terms better reflect IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. In addition, this section is modified to reflect that the records include those associated with historical operations.

This section is modified by changing the references to the groups and individuals that maintain logbooks and records. These changes reflect that the staffing requirements for IP2 will change through-out the decommissioning period. The first set of changes to the staffing requirements is addressed in the PDTS. The changes to this UFSAR section are consistent with the new requirements in the PDTS.

Page 2 of 4

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 12 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 12.5 5.5 Review and Audit of Modify This section is modified by replacing the terms operations, facility operations, Operations operating, and station operating with the terms facility or facility activities, as applicable. These terms better reflect IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

This section is modified by replacing the reference to the QAPM with a reference to the IPEC QAPM. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the site will transition to a site specific QAPM, instead of utilizing the generic Entergy QAPM.

12.5.1 5.5.1 On-Site Safety Review Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to the QAPM with a reference to Committee (OSRC) the IPEC QAPM. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the site will transition to a site specific QAPM, instead of utilizing the generic Entergy QAPM.

12.5.2 5.5.2 Safety Review Committee Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to the QAPM with a reference to (SRC) the IPEC QAPM. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the site will transition to a site specific QAPM, instead of utilizing the generic Entergy QAPM.

The term plant is replaced with the term facility. This term better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

12.5.3 5.5.3 Qualification of Inspection, Modify This section is modified by replacing the term plant operations with the term Examination, Testing, and facility activities. This term better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and Audit Personnel defueled condition.

This section is modified by replacing the reference to the QAPM with a reference to the IPEC QAPM. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the site will transition to a site specific QAPM, instead of utilizing the generic Entergy QAPM.

12.6 5.6 Plant Security Modify This section is modified by replacing the reference to the facility operating license with a reference to the 10 CFR 50 facility license. This reflects the fact that the IP2 facility license will no longer permit operations.

This section is modified by correcting editorial errors. These are administrative changes. In addition, the term plant is replaced with the term facility. This term better reflects IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

12.7 NA Emergency Preparedness Delete This section header is proposed to be deleted. This is an administrative change to reflect that the only remaining subsection is 12.7.1. The header for that subsection will be maintained.

Page 3 of 4

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 12 - CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 12.7.1 5.7 Emergency Plan Modify No proposed changes.

12.7.2 NA Emergency Response Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The Emergency Plan and its Facilities implementing procedures are maintained in accordance with10 CFR 50.54(q) will define the requirements for the Emergency Response Facilities. The requirements in the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures will be modified as the status of the plant changes from an operating plant to a permanently shut down and defueled facility, after the post-zircaloy fire time period has expired, and following the transition to a facility with all of the nuclear fuel stored at an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Page 4 of 4

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 13 - TESTS AND OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 13.0 NA Introduction Delete This section provides a summary of the testing and startup operation of the plant systems prior to full power operation of the unit. The purpose of the program was to test and operate the reactor and its various systems (1) to make certain that the equipment was installed and would operate in accordance with the design requirements, (2) to provide procedures for safe initial fuel loading or fuel reloading and to determine zero power values of core parameters significant to the design and operation, and (3) to bring the unit to its rated capacity in a safe and orderly fashion.

The information in this section is identified as historical information.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial testing and startup operation of IP2 is obsolete.

13.1 NA Tests Prior to Initial Reactor Delete This section provides a summary of the initial tests was a comprehensive testing that Fuel Loading ensured equipment and systems performed in accordance with design criteria prior to fuel loading. The information in this section is identified as historical information.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial testing of IP2 equipment and systems is obsolete.

Table 13.1-1 NA Objectives of Tests Prior to Delete See the discussion for Section 13.1.

Initial Reactor Fuel Loading (Historical Information) 13.2 NA Final Plant Preparation Delete This section is proposed for deletion, because all of its subsections are proposed for (Historical Information) deletion.

13.2.1 NA Core Loading Delete This section describes the initial core loading process. It is identified as historical information.

Page 1 of 5

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 13 - TESTS AND OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial core loading of IP2 is obsolete.

13.2.2 NA Precritical Tests (Historical Delete This section describes mechanical and electrical tests that were performed after the Information) initial core load and prior to initial criticality. It is identified as historical information.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial precritical testing of IP2 is obsolete.

13.3 NA Initial Tests in the Operating Delete This section describes initial criticality, low-power testing, and power level escalation.

Reactor (Historical It is identified as historical information.

Information)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial operations testing of IP2 is obsolete.

13.3.1 NA Initial Criticality (Historical Delete This section describes initial criticality. It is identified as historical information.

Information)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial criticality of IP2 is obsolete.

13.3.2 NA Zero-Power Testing Delete This section describes a prescribed program of reactor physics measurements was (Historical Information) undertaken to verify that the basic static and kinetic characteristics of the core were Page 2 of 5

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 13 - TESTS AND OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions as expected and that the values of kinetic coefficients assumed in the safeguards analysis were indeed conservative. It is identified as historical information.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial zero-power testing of IP2 is obsolete.

13.3.3 NA Power Level Escalation Delete This section describes a power escalation test program to carry the plant from (Historical Information) completion of zero-power physics testing through full-power operation. It is identified as historical information.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial power escalation of IP2 is obsolete.

Table 13.3.-1 NA Initial Testing Summary Delete See the discussion for Subsection 13.3.

(Historical Information) 13.4 NA Operating Restrictions Delete This section is deleted, because all of its subsections are proposed for deletion.

13.4.1 NA Safety Precautions Delete This section describes precautions that were in-place during zero-power and power escalation phases. It is identified as historical information.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the safety precautions that were used during the initial testing of IP2 is obsolete.

13.4.2 NA Initial Operation Delete This section describes the organizations and individuals that were responsible for the Responsibilities testing of equipment and systems and system operations. It is historical information.

Page 3 of 5

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 13 - TESTS AND OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial responsibilities for testing of IP2 equipment and systems is obsolete.

13.5 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete This section identifies the test programs that were initially performed on the IP2 Vibration Testing Program reactor coolant system. It is identified as historical information.

(Historical Information)

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, this historical information regarding the initial testing of reactor coolant system testing is obsolete.

13.5.1 NA Reactor Coolant System Delete See the discussion for Section 13.5.

Impedance Test 13.5.2, NA Steady-State and Transient Delete See the discussion for Section 13.5.

including Internals and Loop Vibration 13.5.2.1 Measurements through 13.5.2.6 Table 13.5-1 NA [Historical Information] Delete See the discussion for Section 13.5.

Transducer Locations for Vibration Experiments 13.6 NA Tests Following Reactor Delete This section describes a series of tests are carried out on the new core that are Refueling conducted during the initial return to power following a refueling shutdown or following a cold shutdown where fuel assemblies have been handled (inspection for example).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in Page 4 of 5

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 13 - TESTS AND OPERATIONS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Given that IP2 will never be refueled again, there is no need to retain the information regarding the tests to perform following the initial return to power.

13.6.1 NA Reload Startup Physics Test Delete This section describes a typical reload startup physics test program that could include Program precriticality tests, hot zero power and beginning of core life condition tests, and power ascension tests.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Given that IP2 will never be refueled again, there is no need to retain the information regarding the reload startup physics tests program.

13.6.2 NA Test Results Delete This section discusses the development and submittal to the NRC of a startup report.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Given that IP2 will never be refueled again, there is no need to retain the information regarding the startup report.

Page 5 of 5

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions 14.0 NA Introduction Delete This section provides a general overview of the analyses presented in Chapter 14 of the IP2 UFSAR. It is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

The analyzed accidents that remain applicable to IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition are the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) in the Fuel Handling Building (i.e., Fuel Storage Building (FSB)), accidental release-recycle of waste liquid, and the accidental release of waste gas. They are discussed in Sections 14.2.1.1, 14.2.2 and 14.2.3 of the IP2 UFSAR. Proposed modifications to those sections are discussed below. The fuel cask drop accident was deemed to not be credible in Section 14.2.1.3 of the IP2 UFSAR. This UFSAR section will be retained. In addition, a new discussion regarding the drop of a High Integrity Container will be added.

The transients and accidents analyzed in Sections 14.1, 14.2.4, 14.2.5, 14.2.6, 14.3, and 14.4 of the IP2 UFSAR will be eliminated as discussed below.

Based on the above, this introduction section will not be retained, because the IP2 UFSAR sections will be consolidated when the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) is compiled. The introduction provided in Section 14.2 of the IP2 UFSAR will be modified to reflect the remaining analyses.

14.0.1 NA Accident Classification Delete See the above discussion.

14.0.2 NA General Assumptions Delete This section introduces the fact that there were some parameters and assumptions that are common to various accident analyses when IP2 was in operation. This section is proposed for deletion in its entirety, because all of its subsections are proposed for deleted as discussed below.

14.0.2.1 NA Steady-State Errors Delete This section addresses steady state errors and assumptions regarding core power, average reactor coolant system temperature, pressurizer pressure, reactor coolant flow, and nominal full power vessel average temperature. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 1 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Consequently, these steady state errors and assumptions are no longer relevant in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, this information is obsolete.

14.0.2.2 NA Power Distribution Delete This section addresses assumptions regarding reactor core power distribution.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, assumptions regarding reactor core power distribution are no longer relevant in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, this information is obsolete.

14.0.2.3 NA Reactor Trip Delete This section addresses assumptions regarding reactor trip. This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, assumptions regarding reactor trip are no longer relevant in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. Thus, this information is obsolete.

Figure 14.0-1 NA Reactivity Insertion vs Delete See the discussion for Subsection 14.0.2.3.

Time for Reactor Trip 14.1 NA Core and Coolant Delete This section provides a summary of the analysis for specific plant abnormalities and Boundary Protection transients for which the reactor coolant and protection systems are relied upon to Boundary protect the core and reactor coolant boundary from damage.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR Page 2 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, the abnormalities and transients analyzed in this section cannot occur.

Thus, the discussions regarding them in the UFSAR is obsolete.

14.1.1, including NA Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Delete See the discussion above.

Subsections Control Assembly 14.1.1.1 through Withdrawal from a 14.1.1.4 Subcritical or Low Power Startup Condition 14.1.2, including NA Uncontrolled Rod Cluster Delete See the discussion above.

Subsections Control Assembly Bank 14.1.2.1 through Withdrawal at Power 14.1.2.3 14.1.3 NA Incorrect Positioning of Delete See the discussion above.

Part-Length Bods 14.1.4, including NA Rod Cluster Control Delete See the discussion above.

Subsections Assembly Drop 14.1.4.1 through 14.1.4.3 14.1.5, including NA Chemical and Volume Delete See the discussion above.

Subsections Control System 14.1.5.1 through Malfunction 14.1.5.3 14.1.6, including NA Loss of Reactor Coolant Delete See the discussion above.

Subsections Flow 14.1.6.1 through 14.1.6.5 14.1.7 NA Startup of an Inactive Delete See the discussion above.

Reactor Coolant Loop 14.1.8, including NA Loss of External Electrical Delete See the discussion above.

Subsections Load 14.1.8.1 through 14.1.8.4 Page 3 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS 14.1.9, including NA Loss of Normal Delete See the discussion above.

Subsections Feedwater 14.1.9.1 through 14.1.9.4 14.1.10, NA Excessive Heat Removal Delete See the discussion above.

including Due to Feedwater Subsections System Malfunctions 14.1.10.1 through 14.1.10.3 14.1.11, NA Excessive Load Increase Delete See the discussion above.

including Incident Subsections 14.1.11.1 through 14.1.11.3 14.1.12, NA Loss of All AC Power to Delete See the discussion above.

including the Station Auxiliaries Subsections 14.1.12.1 through 14.1.12.4 14.1.13, NA Likelihood and Delete See the discussion above.

including Consequences of Subsections Turbine-Generator Unit 14.1.13.1 Overspeed through 14.1.13.2 Table 14.1-1 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-2 NA Uncontrollable RCCA Delete See the discussion above.

Bank Withdrawal at Power Time Sequence of Events Page 4 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Table 14.1-3 NA Complete Loss of Flow Delete See the discussion above.

(Undervoltage) Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-4 NA Partial Loss of Flow Delete See the discussion above.

Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-5 NA Locked Rotor Event - Hot Delete See the discussion above.

Spot Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-6 NA Loss of External Electrical Delete See the discussion above.

Load Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-7 NA Loss of Normal Delete See the discussion above.

Feedwater Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-8 NA Feedwater Malfunction Delete See the discussion above.

Event Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-9 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-10 NA Loss of All AC Power to Delete See the discussion above.

the Station Auxiliaries Time Sequence of Events Table 14.1-11 NA Deleted Delete See the discussion above.

Table 14.1-12 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-13 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-14 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-15 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-16 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-17 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-18 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-19 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-20 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.1-21 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-1 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from a Page 5 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Subcritical Condition Nuclear Power vs. Time Figure 14.1-2 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition Heat Flux vs. Time, Avg.

Channel Figure 14.1-3 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition Fuel Average Temperature vs.

Time at Hot Spot Figure 14.1-4 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition Clad Inner Temperature vs. Time at Hot Spot Figure 14.1-5 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Bank Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from Full Power with Minimum Reactivity Feedback (70 pcm/sec Withdrawal Rate)

Figure 14.1-6 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Bank Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from Full Power with Minimum Reactivity Feedback (70 pcm/sec Withdrawal Rate)

Figure 14.1-7 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Bank Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from Full Power with Minimum Reactivity Feedback (70 pcm/sec Withdrawal Rate)

Page 6 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Figure 14.1-8 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Bank Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from Full Power with Minimum Reactivity Feedback (1 pcm/sec Withdrawal Rate)

Figure 14.1-9 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Bank Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from Full Power with Minimum Reactivity Feedback (1 pcm/sec Withdrawal Rate)

Figure 14.1-10 NA Uncontrolled RCCA Bank Delete See the discussion above.

Withdrawal from Full Power with Minimum Reactivity Feedback (1 pcm/sec Withdrawal Rate)

Figure 14.1-11 NA Minimum DNBR Versus Delete See the discussion above.

Reactivity Insertion Rate, Rod Withdrawal From 100 Percent Power Figure 14.1-12 NA Minimum DNBR Versus Delete See the discussion above.

Reactivity Insertion Rate, Rod Withdrawal From 60 Percent Power Figure 14.1-13 NA Minimum DNBR Versus Delete See the discussion above.

Reactivity Insertion Rate, Rod Withdrawal From 10 Percent Power Figure 14.1-14 NA Dropped Rod Incident Delete See the discussion above.

Manual Rod Control Nuclear Power and Core Heat Flux at BOL (Small Negative MTC) for Page 7 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Dropped RCCA of Worth

- 400 PCM Figure 14.1-15 NA Dropped Rod Incident Delete See the discussion above.

Manual Rod Control Core Average and Vessel Inlet Temperature at BOL (Small Negative MTC) for Dropped RCCA of Worth

- 400 PCM Figure 14.1-16 NA Dropped Rod Incident Delete See the discussion above.

Manual Rod Control Pressurizer Pressure at BOL (Small Negative MTC) for Dropped RCCA Worth of 400 PCM Figure 14.1-16a NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-17 NA Dropped Rod Incident Delete See the discussion above.

Manual Rod Control Nuclear Power and Core Heat Flux at EOL (Large Negative MTC) for Dropped RCCA of Worth

- 400 PCM Figure 14.1-18 NA Dropped Rod Incident Delete See the discussion above.

Manual Rod Control Core Average and Vessel Inlet Temperature at EOL (Large Negative MTC) for Dropped RCCA of Worth

- 400 PCM Figure 14.1-19 NA Dropped Rod Incident Delete See the discussion above.

Manual Rod Control Pressurizer Pressure at EOL (Large Negative Page 8 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS MTC) for Dropped RCCA Worth of 400 PCM Figure 14.1-20 NA Loss of One Pump Out of Delete See the discussion above.

Four Nuclear Power and Core Heat Flux vs. Time Figure 14.1-21 NA Loss of One Pump Out of Delete See the discussion above.

Four Total Core Flow and Faulted Loop Flow vs.

Time Figure 14.1-22 NA Loss of One Pump Out of Delete See the discussion above.

Four Pressurizer Pressure and DNBR vs. Time Figure 14.1-23 NA Four Pump Loss of Flow - Delete See the discussion above.

Undervoltage Nuclear Power and Core Heat Flux vs. Time Figure 14.1-24 NA Four Pump Loss of Flow - Delete See the discussion above.

Undervoltage Total Core Flow and RCS Loop Flow vs. Time Figure 14.1-25 NA Four Pump Loss of Flow - Delete See the discussion above.

Undervoltage Pressurizer Pressure and DNBR vs.

Time Figure 14.1-26 NA Four Pump Loss of Flow - Delete See the discussion above.

Underfrequency Nuclear Power and Heat Flux vs.

Time Figure 14.1-27 NA Four Pump Loss of Flow - Delete See the discussion above.

Underfrequency Total Core Flow and RCS Loop Flow vs. Time Figure 14.1-28 NA Four Pump Loss of Flow Delete See the discussion above.

Underfrequency Pressurizer Pressure and DNBR vs. Time Page 9 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Figure 14.1-29 NA Locked Rotor Nuclear Delete See the discussion above.

Power and RCS Pressure vs. Time Figure 14.1-30 NA Locked Rotor Total Core Delete See the discussion above.

Flow and Faulted Loop Flow vs. Time Figure 14.1-30a NA Locked Rotor Fuel Clad Delete See the discussion above.

Inner Temperature vs.

Time Figure 14.1-31 NA Loss of Load With Delete See the discussion above.

Pressurizer Spray and PORV - Nuclear Power and Pressurizer Pressure vs. Time Figure 14.1-32 NA Loss of Load With Delete See the discussion above.

Pressurizer Spray and PORV - Average Coolant Temperature and Pressurizer Water Volume vs. Time Figure 14.1-33 NA Loss of Load With Delete See the discussion above.

Pressurizer Spray and PORV - DNBR vs. Time Figure 14.1-34 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-35 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-36 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-37 NA Loss of Load Without Delete See the discussion above.

Pressurizer Spray and Power Operated Relief Valves - Nuclear Power and Pressurizer Pressure vs. Time Figure 14.1-38 NA Loss of Load Without Delete See the discussion above.

Pressurizer Spray and Power Operated Relief Page 10 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Valves - Average Coolant Temperature and Pressurizer Water Volume vs. Time Figure 14.1-39 NA Loss of Load Without Delete See the discussion above.

Pressurizer Spray and Power Operated Relief Valves - Steam Pressure vs. Time Figure 14.1-40 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-41 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-42 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-43 NA Loss of Normal Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 1 Feedwater, Offsite Power Available, High Tavg Program, Pressurizer Pressure and Pressurizer Water Volume vs. Time Figure 14.1-43 NA Loss of Normal Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 2 Feedwater, Offsite Power Available High Tavg Program, Nuclear Power and Core Heat Flux vs.

Time Figure 14.1-43 NA Loss of Normal Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 3 Feedwater, Offsite Power Available, High Tavg Program, Loop 21 Temperature and Loop 23 Temperature vs. Time Figure 14.1-43 NA Loss of Normal Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 4 Feedwater, Offsite Power Available, High Tavg Program, Steam Generator 21 Pressure Page 11 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS and Steam Generator 23 Pressure vs. Time Figure 14.1-43 NA Loss of Normal Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 5 Feedwater, Offsite Power Available, High Tavg Program, Total RCS Flow and Pressurizer Relief vs. Time Figure 14.1-44 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted Sh. 1 through Sh. 5 Figure 14.1-45 NA Feedwater System Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 1 Malfunction Excessive Feedwater Flow - HFP Conditions Manual Rod Control Nuclear Power, and Core Heat Flux vs.

Time Figure 14.1-45 NA Feedwater System Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 2 Malfunction Excessive Feedwater Flow - HFP Conditions Manual Rod Control Pressurizer Pressure and DNBR vs.

Time Figure 14.1-45 NA Feedwater System Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 3 Malfunction Excessive Feedwater Flow - HFP Conditions Manual Rod Control, Loop Delta - T, and Core Tavg vs. Time Figure 14.1-46 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Sh. 1 and Sh. 2 Figure 14.1-47 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Sh. 1 and Sh. 2 Page 12 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Figure 14.1-48 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Sh. 1 and Sh. 2 Figure 14.1-49 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Sh. 1 and Sh. 2 Figure 14.1-50 NA Loss of all AC Power, Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 1 High Tavg Program, Pressurizer Pressure and Water Volume vs. Time Figure 14.1-50 NA Loss of all AC Power, Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 2 High Tavg Program, Nuclear Power and Core Heat Flux vs. Time Figure 14.1-50 NA Loss of all AC Power to Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 3 the Station Auxiliaries, High Tavg Program, Loop 21 Temperature and Loop 23 Temperature Figure 14.1-50 NA Loss of all AC Power to Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 4 the Station Auxiliaries, High Tavg Program, Steam Generator 21 Pressure and Steam Generator 23 Pressure Figure 14.1-50 NA Loss of all AC Power to Delete See the discussion above.

Sh. 5 the Station Auxiliaries, High Tavg Program, Total RCS Flow and Pressurizer Relief vs. Time Figure 14.1-51 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Sh. 1 through Sh. 5 Figure 14.1-52 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-53 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-54 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-55 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Page 13 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Figure 14.1-56 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-57 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-58 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-59 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Sh. 1 and Sh. 2 Figure 14.1-60 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-61 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.1-62 NA Tracking BB-95/96 Stop Delete See the discussion above.

Valve (SV) Type 1 Failures, Stop Valve Disc Fails Figure 14.1-63 NA Tracking BB-95/96 Stop Delete See the discussion above.

Valve (SV) Type 2 Failures, Stop Valve Spring Fails Figure 14.1-64 NA Tracking BB-95/96 Stop Delete See the discussion above.

Valve (SV) Type 3 Failures, Stop Valve Sticks Open Figure 14.1-65 NA Tracking BB-95/96 Delete See the discussion above.

Control Valve (CV) Type 4 Failures, CV Spring Bolt Fails Figure 14.1-66 NA Tracking BB-95/96 Delete See the discussion above.

Control Valve (CV) Type 5 Failures, Control Valve Sticks Open Figure 14.1-67 NA Annual Frequency of Delete See the discussion above.

Destructive Overspeed for Various BB-95/96 Turbine Valve Test Interval 14.2 6.1 Standby Safety Features Modify This section introduces the analyses that are summarized in Section 14.2. This section Analysis is rewritten to address the analyzed accidents that remain applicable to IP2 in the permanently shut down and defueled condition. These are the FHA in the Fuel Page 14 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Handling Building (i.e., FSB), accidental release-recycle of waste liquid, and the accidental release of waste gas. They are discussed in Sections 14.2.1.1, 14.2.2 and 14.2.3 of the IP2 UFSAR. Proposed modifications to those sections are discussed below. The fuel cask drop accident was deemed to not be credible in Section 14.2.1.3 of the IP2 UFSAR. This UFSAR section will be retained. In addition, a new discussion regarding the drop of a High Integrity Container will be added. The section is retitled as Introduction.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible. Thus, the discussions regarding the rupture of steam generator tube, rupture of a steam pipe, and rupture of a control rod drive mechanism housing, and rod cluster control assembly ejection in UFSAR Sections 14.2.4, 14.2.5, and 14.2.6 are no longer possible.

The proposed rewrite of this section is administrative change to reflect the remaining contents of the section. The changes to the specific subsections are discussed and justified below.

14.2.1 6.2 Fuel-Handling Accidents Modify This section provides a discussion regarding the various types of fuel handling accidents that are possible. It is modified to eliminate the discussions regarding refueling operations, source range nuclear instrumentation, operations in the containment, reactor cavity and spent fuel transfer tube. In addition, the term operating is eliminated when utilized to describe personnel.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

In addition, refueling operations will no longer occur. The spent fuel will be stored in the SFP or the ISFSI. It will never be transferred to the reactor core again.

Page 15 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS 14.2.1.1 6.2.1 Fuel-Handling Accident Modify This section provides a summary of the analysis of the FHA in the fuel handling in Fuel-Handling Building building (i.e., the FSB). This postulated accident remains applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

An analysis of the FHA utilizing the AST methodology described in Regulatory Guide 1.183 was previously approved by the NRC in License Amendment No. 211 (Reference

5) on July 27, 2000. It consisted of changes to the TSs which resulted from implementation of an alternate radiological source term as permitted by 10 CFR 50.67 and allowed implementation of plant modifications to the containment air handling systems and the control room air handling systems related to the use of the AST.

Later, as part of the IP2 power uprate project, a re-analysis of the FHA was performed utilizing the AST methodology, that is currently the analysis of record as presented in Section 14.2.1.1 of the IP2 UFSAR.

Concurrent with implementation of the PDTS, this UFSAR section is revised to reflect the results of the Normal case analyzed in Calculation IP-CALC-11-00073, as summarized in Calculation IP-CALC-19-00003. This FHA analysis utilizes the AST methodology and concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, and Control Room filtration assuming 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

In addition, the section is modified to add an analysis to determine how many hours or days of decay are required for FHA EAB TEDE to be less than the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guideline recommended threshold for evacuation of 1 Rem.

14.2.1.2 NA Refueling Accident Inside Delete This section addresses a refueling accident inside the containment. It is proposed to Containment be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 16 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS 14.2.1.3 6.2.2 Fuel Cask Drop Accident Modify This section is modified by eliminating the subsection titles. This change supports the consolidation of information into the Defueled Safety Analysis Report.

In addition, the term crane operator is changed to crane operators. This is a non-technical change to reflect that multiple individuals are qualified as crane operators.

14.2.2 6.4 Accidental Release- Modify This section addresses the accidental release of waste liquid. It is proposed to be Recycle of Waste Liquid modified to denote that a separate liquid-specific release accident evaluation is not required to be performed with regard to removal of supporting systems such as PAB ventilation, station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, and Control Room filtration.

A potential liquid waste release collects in building sumps or is retained in building vaults. It is not released to the environment. As such, the hazard from these releases is derived only from any volatilized components. The volatilized components are what comprise the waste gas accident and are evaluated as described in Section 14.2.3.

Therefore, a separate liquid-specific release accident evaluation is not required to be performed with regard to removal of supporting systems such as PAB ventilation, station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, and Control Room filtration.

14.2.3 6.3 Accidental Release - Modify This section evaluates the accidental release of waste gas. Concurrent with Waste Gas implementation of the PDTS, this UFSAR section is revised to reflect the results of Calculation IP-CALC-19-00003, Post-Permanent Shutdown Analyses of Fuel Handling, Waste Handling, and High Integrity Container Drop Accidents for Indian Point Units 2 and 3.

The waste gas decay tanks receive the radioactive gases from the radioactive liquids from the various laboratories and drains processed by the waste disposal system. The 50,000 Ci dose-equivalent Xe-133 waste gas tank activity assumed in this calculation bounds the current Xe-133 dose-equivalent limit of 29,761 Ci, as well as the administrative Xe-133 dose-equivalent limit of 6,000 Ci.

Other tanks that contain waste gas during operations (the volume control tank and liquid holdup tank) were not considered in this analysis, since gaseous products from these liquid tanks are collected and compressed in the waste gas decay tanks for decay prior to release. Potential liquid waste releases are considered from these tanks; however, any liquid releases are retained in the building or sumps and only Page 17 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS volatilized components would be released to the environment. These volatilized components are evaluated as part of the waste gas decay tank accident.

This calculation includes the determination of the dose consequences for a waste gas decay tank rupture accident using a 50,000 Ci dose-equivalent Xe-133 waste gas tank activity limit without any credit for mitigating systems. The dose consequences following a waste gas decay tank rupture are less than the dose consequences following an FHA. They are also less than the 10 CFR 50.67 limit of 5 rem TEDE to the control room operators, the 500 mrem EAB dose limit following a waste gas tank accident as referenced in the IP2 and IP3 FSARs and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and the 1 rem EPA Protective Action Guideline. The resulting EAB and LPZ dose consequences are essentially the same as the 0.32 rem (EAB) and 0.12 rem (LPZ) reported in Section 14.2.3 of the IP2 UFSAR.

14.2.4 NA Steam-Generator Tube Delete This section summarizes the analysis of a steam generator tube rupture.

Rupture After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, a steam generator tube rupture is no longer possible in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding a steam generator tube rupture in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

14.2.5, including NA Rupture of a Steam Pipe Delete This section summarizes the analysis of the rupture of a steam pipe.

Subsections 14.2.5.1 through After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of 14.2.5.7 fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 18 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Consequently, the rupture of a steam pipe is no longer possible in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the rupture of a steam pipe in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

14.2.6, including NA Rupture of a Control Rod Delete This section summarizes the analysis of the rupture of a control rod mechanism - rod Subsections Mechanism Housing - cluster control assembly ejection.

14.2.6.1 through Rod Cluster Control 14.2.6.12 Assembly Ejection After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Consequently, rupture of a control rod mechanism - rod cluster control assembly ejection is no longer possible in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding rupture of a control rod mechanism - rod cluster control assembly ejection in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

NA 6.5 High Integrity Container Add This section is added to establish a limit on the dose-equivalent Xe-133 activity for a Drop Event High Integrity Container (HIC), so that the release resulting from a potential HIC drop event remain below the EPA PAG of 1 Rem. The event was analyzed in Calculation IP-CALC-19-00003, Post-Permanent Shutdown Analyses of Fuel Handling, Waste Handling, and High Integrity Container Drop Accidents for Indian Point Units 2 and 3.

For the HIC drop accident, the new dose equivalent activity limits are calculated to ensure the results are bounded by the analyzed FHA, both for the defueled Technical Specifications when the mitigating support systems can be taken out of service and when they meet the Emergency Plan exemption requirements. The limiting activity will become the new post-permanent shut down limit.

Table 14.2-1 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.2-2 Tables Fuel Handling Accident - Modify See the previous discussion for Subsection 14.2.1.1 6.2-1, 6.2-2 Design Basis Case and 6.2-3 Table 14.2-2a NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.2-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Page 19 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Table 14.2-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Table 14.2-5 NA Volume Control Tank Delete See the previous discussion for Section 14.2.3 Activity Table 14.2-6 NA Time Sequence of Events Delete See the previous discussion for Section 14.2.5.

for the Rupture of a Main Steamline Table 14.2-7 NA Parameters Used in the Delete See the previous discussion for Section 14.2.6.

Analysis of the Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection Accident Table 14.2-8 NA Results of the Analysis of Delete See the previous discussion for Section 14.2.6.

the Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection Accident Table 14.2-9 NA Time Sequence of Events Delete See the previous discussion for Section 14.2.6.

for Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection Figure 14.2-0 NA Steam Generator Tube Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.4.

Rupture, Break Flow and Safety Injection Flow vs.

Reactor Coolant System Pressure Figure 14.2-1 NA Steam Line Valve Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.5.

Arrangement Schematic Figure 14.2-2 NA Steam Line Rupture Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.5.

Sh. 1 Offsite Power Available, EOL, Core Heat Flux and Core Reactivity vs. Time Figure 14.2-2 NA Steam Line Rupture Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.5.

Sh. 2 Offsite Power Available, EOL, Reactor Coolant Pressure and RV Inlet Temperature vs. Time Page 20 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Figure 14.2-2 NA Steam Line Rupture Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.5.

Sh. 3 Offsite Power Available, EOL, Steam Flow and Steam Generator Pressure vs. Time Figure 14.2-2 NA Steam Line Rupture Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.5.

Sh. 4 Offsite Power Available, EOL, Core Boron Concentration vs. Time Figure 14.2-3 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-4 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-5 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-6 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-7 NA Containment Pressure Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.5.

Time History (Double -

Ended Main Steam Line Break Main FCV Failure Maximum Containment Safeguards)

Figure 14.2-8 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-9 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-10 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-11 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

BOL-HFP, Nuclear Power vs. Time Figure 14.2-12 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

BOL-HFP, Fuel Temperatures vs. Time Figure 14.2-13 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

BOL-HZP, Nuclear Power vs. Time Figure 14.2-14 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

BOL-HZP, Fuel Temperatures vs. Time Page 21 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Figure 14.2-15 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

EOL-HZP, Nuclear Power vs. Time Figure 14.2-16 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

EOL-HZP, Fuel Temperatures vs. Time Figure 14.2-17 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

EOL-HFP, Nuclear Power vs. Time Figure 14.2-18 NA Rod Ejection Accident, Delete See the discussion above for Section 14.2.6.

EOL-HFP, Fuel Temperatures vs. Time Figure 14.2-19 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-20 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-21 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

Figure 14.2-22 NA Deleted Delete Previously deleted.

14.3, including NA Loss-of-Coolant Delete This section summarizes the analyses of loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs). After Subsections Accidents certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel 14.3.1 through from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 14.3.6, Tables 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no 14.3-1 through longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in and 14.3-52, and accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and Figures 14.3-1 core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

through 14.3-129 Consequently, LOCAs are no longer possible in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding the LOCAs in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

14.4.4, including NA Anticipated Transients Delete This section summarizes the analysis of anticipated transients without scram. After Tables 14.4-1 Without Scram certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel through 14.4-8, from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR and Figures 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no 14.4-1 through longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in 14.4-37 accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur and core related design basis accidents are no longer possible.

Page 22 of 23

IP2 UFSAR CHAPTER 14 - SAFETY ANALYSIS Consequently, anticipated transients without scram are no longer possible in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the information regarding anticipated transients without scram in the IP2 UFSAR is obsolete.

Appendix 14A NA Delete Previously deleted.

Page 23 of 23

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions A.1 A.1 Introduction Modify This section is modified by eliminating the discussion of the time limited aging analyses and providing a clarification regarding how the information from Appendix B of the IPEC License Renewal Application continues to be utilized in the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR).

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the period of extended operation has ceased and the evaluations of time-limited aging analyses associated with the period of extended operation are no longer required.

In addition, the UFSAR will be replaced with the DSAR to reflect the SSCs and accident analyses that remain applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

A.2 A.2 New UFSAR Section for Unit 2 Modify The title of this section is changed from New UFSAR Section for Unit 2 to Aging Management. This is an administrative change to reflect the consolidated of material into the DSAR.

This section is modified by replacing the term UFSAR with DSAR, eliminating the discussion of the time limited aging analysis.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the period of extended operation has ceased and the facility has entered a period where aging management for SSCs utilized for wet fuel storage will Page 1 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions continue until the fuel is transferred to the ISFSI. The evaluations of time-limited aging analysis is no longer required.

In addition, the UFSAR will be replaced with the DSAR to reflect the SSCs and accident analyses that remain applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

A.2.0 A.2.0 Supplement for Renewed Modify This section is modified by replacing the term UFSAR with DSAR. eliminating Operating License the discussion of the time limited aging analysis, and adding a discussion regarding how the aging management programs will apply in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the period of extended operation has ceased and the facility has entered a period where aging management for SSCs utilized for wet fuel storage will continue until the fuel is transferred to the ISFSI. The evaluations of time-limited aging analysis is no longer required.

In addition, the UFSAR will be replaced with the DSAR to reflect the SSCs and accident analyses that remain applicable in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

A.2.1 A.2.1 Aging Management Programs Modify This section is modified by eliminating the reference to the period of and Activities extended operation, denoting that the aging management programs were implemented prior to entering the period of extended operation, eliminating the adjective existing from describing the IPEC corrective action program, replacing the Entergy Quality Assurance Program with the IPEC Quality Assurance Program. and eliminating the reference to the Entergy fleet.

Page 2 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the period of extended operation has ceased and the facility has entered a period where aging management for SSCs utilized for wet fuel storage will continue until the fuel is transferred to the ISFSI.

The aging management programs were implemented prior to entering the period of extended operation. The change reflects this fact. Eliminating the adjective existing is an administrative change that doesnt alter the meaning of the statement.

Due to the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the facility will adopt a site-specific Quality Assurance Program. Its name will be the IPEC Quality Assurance Program. In addition, operating experience from the Entergy fleet will be addressed just like any other industry operating experience.

A.2.1.1 NA Aboveground Steel Tanks Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.2 NA Bolting Integrity Program Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.3 NA Boraflex Monitoring Program Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. The Boraflex Monitoring Program has been discontinued, because a revision to TS 3.7.13 has been implemented and Boraflex is no longer credited in the criticality analysis of the spent fuel racks.

A.2.1.4 NA Boric Acid Corrosion Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Prevention Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies Page 3 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.5 NA Buried Piping and Tanks Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Inspection Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.6 NA Containment Leak Rate Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the Containment is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the Containment Leak Rate Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.7 NA Containment Inservice Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Inspection (CII) Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the Containment is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the Containment Inservice Inspection Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.8 NA Diesel Fuel Monitoring Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies Page 4 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.9 NA Environmental Qualification Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

(EQ) of Electric Components Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA.

Consequently, the environmental qualification of electric components is no longer required to be maintained. Thus, the Environmental Qualification of Electric Components Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.10 NA External Surfaces Monitoring Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.11 NA Fatigue Monitoring Program Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Page 5 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function.

Thus, the Fatigue Monitoring Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.12 NA Fire Protection Program Delete This section is deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the Fire Protection Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated. However, IP2 shall maintain a Fire Protection Program in accordance with 10CFR50.48(f).

A.2.1.13 NA Fire Water System Program Delete This section is deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the Fire Water System Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated. However, IP2 shall maintain a Fire Protection Program in accordance with 10CFR50.48(f).

Page 6 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions A.2.1.14 NA Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA.

Consequently, the Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.15 NA Flux Thimble Tube Inspection Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the Flux Thimble Tube Inspection Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

Page 7 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions A.2.1.16 NA Heat Exchanger Monitoring Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.17 NA Inservice Inspection - Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Inservice Inspection (ISI)

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA. Consequently, the Inservice Inspection Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.18 NA Masonry Wall Program Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.19 NA Metal-Enclosed Bus Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Inspection Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

Page 8 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions A.2.1.20 NA Nickel Alloy Inspection Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA. Consequently, the Nickel Alloy Inspection Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.21 NA Non-EQ Bolted Cable Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Connections Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent Page 9 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA. Consequently, the Non-EQ Bolted Cable Connections Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.22 NA Non-EQ Inaccessible Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Medium-Voltage Cable permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies Program to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.23 NA Non-EQ Instrumentation Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Circuits Test Review Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA. Consequently, the Non-EQ Instrumentation Circuits Test Review Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

Page 10 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions A.2.1.24 NA Non-EQ Insulated Cables and Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Connections Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA. Consequently, the Non-EQ Insulated Cables and Connections Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.25 NA Oil Analysis Program Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.26 NA One-Time Inspection Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program The One-Time Inspection Program was completed prior to the period of extended operations. Consequently, the One-Time Inspection Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.27 NA One-Time Inspection - Small Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Bore Piping Program Page 11 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions The One-Time Inspection - Small Bore Piping Program was completed prior to the period of extended operations. Consequently, the One-Time Inspection - Small Bore Piping Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.28 NA Periodic Surveillance and Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Preventive Maintenance permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies Program to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.29 NA Reactor Head Closure Studs Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the Reactor Head Closure Studs Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.30 NA Reactor Vessel Head Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Penetration Inspection Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Inspection Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

Page 12 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions A.2.1.31 NA Reactor Vessel Surveillance Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.32 NA Selective Leaching Program Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. This was a one-time inspection that was required to be completed prior to the period of extended operation. Consequently, the Selective Leaching Program may be eliminated.

A.2.1.33 NA Service Water Integrity Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.34 NA Steam Generator Integrity Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the Steam Generator Integrity Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.35 A.2.1.35 Structures Monitoring Modify This section is modified by eliminating the adjective existing from the Program term existing program, eliminating the discussion regarding the Page 13 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions procedures that were revised, denoting enhancements to the structures monitoring program that were implemented prior to the period of extended operation, eliminating enhancements that are no longer applicable during the aging management period, and replacing the phrase period of extended operation with aging management period.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the period of extended operation has ceased and the facility has entered a period where aging management for SSCs utilized for wet fuel storage will continue until the fuel is transferred to the ISFSI.

These changes reflect the completion of activities, the permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, and the compilation of the DSAR.

A.2.1.36 NA Thermal Aging Embrittlement Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

of Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel (CASS) Program After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

The CASS Program only applies to the reactor coolant system and reactor vessel internals. Consequently, the Thermal Aging Embrittlement of CASS Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.37 NA Thermal Aging and Neutron Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Irradiation Embrittlement of Page 14 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent (CASS) Program removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

The CASS Program only applies to the reactor coolant system and reactor vessel internals. Consequently, the Thermal Aging and Neutron Irradiation Embrittlement of CASS Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.38 NA Water Chemistry Control - Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Auxiliary Systems Program permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.39 NA Water Chemistry Control - Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. Following the Closed Cooling Water permanent shut down and defueling of IP2, the program no longer applies Program to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal.

A.2.1.40 NA Water Chemistry Control - Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Primary and Secondary After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the Water Chemistry Control - Primary and Secondary Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.1.41 NA Reactor Vessel Internals Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Aging Management Activities Page 15 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the Reactor Vessels Internals Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.2 NA Evaluation of Time-Limited Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Aging Analyses After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the period of extended operation has ceased and the facility has entered a period where aging management for SSCs utilized for wet fuel storage will continue until the fuel is transferred to the ISFSI. The time-limited aging analyses are no longer relevant. Thus, the analyses may be eliminated.

A.2.2.1, NA Reactor Vessel Neutron Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

including Embrittlement subsections After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent A.2.2.1.1 removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in through accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, A.2.2.1.4 the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Page 16 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions Consequently, there is no need to continue to address reactor vessel neutron embrittlement.

A.2.2.2 NA Metal Fatigue Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety, because its subsections are proposed for deletion.

A.2.2.2.1 NA Class 1 Metal Fatigue Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Consequently, the Fatigue Monitoring Program for the Class 1 components is no longer required in the permanently shut down and defueled condition.

A.2.2.2.2 NA Non-Class 1 Metal Fatigue Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety. No non-class 1 piping and in-line components were identified with projected cycles exceeding 7000.

A.2.2.2.3 NA Subsection NG Fatigue Delete See the discussion above for Section A.2.2.1 Analysis of Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals A.2.2.2.4 NA Environmental Effects on Delete See the discussion above for Section A.2.2.1.

Fatigue A.2.2.3 NA Environmental Qualification Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

of Electrical Components After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur.

Page 17 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions After permanent shutdown and full core offload, all fuel will be in the SFP or the ISFSI. An FHA in the SFP is analyzed utilizing the AST methodology. It concludes that the dose consequences of the FHA will remain within the licensing basis dose limits without crediting FSB ventilation, the station vent radiation monitors, Control Room isolation, or Control Room filtration if the accident were to occur after 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of decay time following shut down.

After permanent shutdown and full core offload, the decay time for fuel assemblies in the SFP will be longer than the assumed decay time. No instrumentation and control systems or active systems are required to mitigate the FHA.

Consequently, the environmental qualification of electric components is no longer required to be maintained. Thus, the Environmental Qualification of Electric Components Program no longer applies to a plant system, structure, or component that is within the 10 CFR 54.4 Scope for License Renewal and may be eliminated.

A.2.2.4 NA Containment Liner Plate and Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Penetrations Fatigue Analyses After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the Containment is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the Containment Liner Plate and Penetrations Fatigue analyses discussion is obsolete.

A.2.2.5 NA Leak before Break Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or Page 18 of 19

IP2 UFSAR APPENDIX A - LICENSE RENEWAL UFSAR Ref # DSAR Ref # Title Action Conclusions placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the reactor coolant system is no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the Leak before Break discussion is obsolete.

A.2.2.6 NA Steam Generator Flow- Delete This section is proposed to be deleted in its entirety.

Induced Vibration and Tube Wear After certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and (ii) and they are docketed for IP2, the 10 CFR Part 50 license will no longer permit operation of the reactor or placement of fuel in the reactor vessel in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2). Thus, power operations can no longer occur. Consequently, the Steam Generators are no longer required to perform a function in the permanently shut down and defueled state. Thus, the Steam Generator Flow-Induced Vibration and Tube Wear discussion is obsolete.

A.2.3 A.2.3 References Retain No proposed changes.

Page 19 of 19