ML20248E016
| ML20248E016 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/25/1989 |
| From: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-54FR39767, RULE-PR-51 PR-890925, NUDOCS 8910050040 | |
| Download: ML20248E016 (78) | |
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O 89 SEP 26 P3:28 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Waste Confidence Decision Review AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission ACTION: Review and Proposed Revision of Waste Confidence Decision
SUMMARY
On August 31, 1984, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) issued a final decision on what has come to be known as its " Waste Confidence Proceeding."
The purpose of that proceeding was "...to assess generically the degree of assurance now available that radioactive waste can be safely disposed of, to determine when such disposal or offsite storage will be available and to i
deternine whether radioactive waste can be safely stored onsite past the expiration of existing facility licenses until offsite disposal or storage is
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available." (49FR34658). The purpose of this notice is to'present for public coment the proposed fincings of a Comission review of that Decision.
The Comission noted in 1984 that its Waste Confidence Decision was unavoidably in the nature of a prediction, and comitted to review its conclusions
...should significant and pertinent unexpected events occur or at least every five years ~ until a repository is available."
lhe Comission has reviewed its five findings and the rationale for them in light of developments since 1984. This proposed revised Waste Confidence Decision supplements those 1984 findings and the environmental analysis supporting them. The Comission proposes that the second and fourth findings in the Waste Confidence Decision be revised as follows:
Finding 2: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that at least one mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and that sufficielt repository capacity will be available tnithin 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation of any reactor to dispose of the comercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time.
Finding 4: The Comission finds reasonable ass'urance that, if necessary, spent fue,1 generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term of a revised license) of that reactor at its spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations, in SC hO fpNoshe D
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I The Comission proposes to reaffirm the remaining findings.
Each finding, any proposed revisions, and the reasons for revising or reaffirming them are set forth in the body of the review below.
The Comission also issued two companion rulemaking amendments at the time it 1ssued the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision. The Consnission's reactor licensing rule,10 CFR Part 50, was amended to require each licensed reactor operator to submit, no later than five years before expiration of the operating license, I
plans for managing spent fuel at the reactor site until the spent fuel is I
l transferredtotheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE)fordisposalundertheNuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA).
10 CFR Part 51, the rule defining NRC's responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), was amended to provide that, in connection with the issuance or amendment of a reactor operating license or initial license for an independent spent fuel I
storage installation, no discussion of any environmental impact of spent fuel storage is required for the period following expiration of the license or amencment applied for.
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In keeping with the proposed revised Findings 2 and 4, the Comission is providing elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register proposed conforming an,endments to its 10 CFR Part 51 rule providing procedures for considering in licensing proceedings the environmental effects of extended onsite storage of spent fuel.
Finally, the Comission proposes to extend the cycle of its Waste Confidence reviews from every five years to every ten until a repository becomes available.. In its 1984 Decision, the Comission said that because its conclusions were "... unavoidably in the nature of a prediction," it would review them "...should significant and unexpected events occur, or at least every five years until a repository... is available." As noted below, the Comission now believes that predictions of repository availability are best expressed in terms of decades rather than years. To specify a year for the expected availability of a repositcry decades hence would misleadingly imply a degree of precision now unattainable. Accordingly, the Comission proposes to change its original comitment in order to review its Waste Confidence Decision at least every ten years. This would not, however, disturb the Comission's original comitment to review its Decision whenever significant and pertinent unexpected events occur.
DATE: The coment period expires @o4 ) 1989. Coments received after this f
date will be considered if it is practical to do 50, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except to comments received on or before this date.
ADD'RESSEES: Mail written coments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.
Deliver coments to One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. weekdays.
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3 FOR FURTilER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rob MacDougall, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C.
20555, telephone (202)492-3401; or John Roberts, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Comission, Washington, D.C.
20555, telephone (202)492-0608.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
InNovember1976,theNaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil(NRDC)petitionedNRC for a rulemaking to determine whether radioactive wastes generated in nuclear power reactors can be subsequently disposed of without undue risk to the public health and safety. The NRDC also requested that NRC not grant pending or l
future requests for operating licenses until the petitioned finding of safety was made.
On June 27, 1977, NRC denied the NRDC petition. The Comission said that in issuing operating licenses, NRC,must have assurance that wastes can be safely handled and stored as they are generated.
It also said that it is not necessary for permanent disposal to be available if NRC could be confident tnat permanent disposal could be accomplished when necessary. NRC added that Congress was aware of the relationship between nuclear reactor operations and the radioactive waste disposal problem, and that NRC would not refrain from 1ssuing reactor operating licenses until the disposal problem was resolved.
The Comission also stated that it "...would not continue to license reactors if it did not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can and will in due
~
course be disposed of safely."
Also in November 1976, two utility companies requested asiendments to their operating licenses to permit expansion in the capacity of their spent nuclear fuel storage pools:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation for the Vermont Yankee plant; and Northern States Power Company for its Prairie Island facility.
In both cases, the utilities planned to increase storage capacity through closer spacing of spent fuel assemblies in existing spent fuel pools.
The New England Coalition on Nuclear Power and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency intervened. The NRC staff evaluated the requests and found that the modifications would not endanger public health and safety. The staff did not consider any potential environmental effects of storage of spent fuel at the reactors beyond the dates of expiration of their operating licenses. NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) adopted the staff's safety and environmental findings and approved the license amendments for the two plants.
It too did not consider the effects of at-rea. tor storage beyond the expiration of The facility operating license.
The Boarc's decision was appealed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ASLAB). The ASLAB affirm d t~.e Licensing Board's decision, citing the Comission's "... reasonable conNdent e that wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely...." in the % mission's denial of the NRDC petition.
The decision of the ASLAB was appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
connercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time.
(3) High-level radioactive wast'e and spent fuel will be managed in a safe manner until sufficient repository capacity is available to assure the safe disposal of all high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel.
(4) If necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of that reactor's operating license at that reactor's spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.
I (5) Safe independent onsite or offsite spent fuel storage will be made available if such storage capacity is needed.
On the day the Decision was issued, the Consission also promulgated two rulemaking amendments:
(1) an amendment to 10 CFR Part 50, which required that no later than five years before expiration of reactor operating licenses, the licensee must provide NRC with a written plan for management of spent fuel onsite, until title for the spent fuel is transferred to the DOE; and (2) an amendment to 10 CFR Part 51 which provided that environmental consequences of spent fuel storage after expiration of facility licenses need not be addressed in connection with issuance of or amencment to a reactor operating license.
In issuing the Part 51 amendment, the Commission stated that although it had reasonable assurance that one or more repositories would be available by 2007-2009,'it was possible that some spent fuel would have to be stored beyond
~
those dates. The Part 51 amendment was based on the Consission's finding in the Waste Confidence Proceeding that it had reasonable assurance that no significant environmental impacts will result from storage of spent fuel for at least 30 years beyond expiration of reactor operating licenses.
Enactment of the NWPA contributed significantly to the basis for the Consission's 1984 Decision and companion rulemakings. The Act established a funding source and process with milestones and schedules for, among other things, the developnient of a monitored retrievable storage (HRS) facility and two repositories, one by early 1998 and a second, if authorized by Congress, at a later date, initially planned by DOE for 2006.
For each repository, the Act required DOE to conduct in-situ investigations of three sites and recommend one from among them to the President and Congress for repository development. The NWPA also required DOE to recommend, from among alternative sites and designs, a site and design for an MRS for spent fuel and high-level waste management bef, ore disposal.. The Commission's licensing and regulatory authority over both storage and disposal facilities was preserved by the Act.
In the four years after enactment of the NWPA, DOE met a number of the Act's early program requirements, but also encountered significant difficulties.
It published a final Mission Plan for the overall NWPA program, and followed with a Project Decision Schedule for DOE and other Federal agency actions.
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7-The Comission is also proposing elsewhere.in this issue of the Federal Register that 10 CFR Subsection 51.23(a) be amended to conform witt. the proposed revisions to Findings 2 and.4.
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'89 SEP 26 P3:28 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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UL Waste Confidence Decision Review AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Comission ACTION: Review and Proposed Revision of Waste Confidence Decision
SUMMARY
On August 31, 1984, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) issued a final decision on what has come to be known as its " Waste Confidence Proceeding."
The purpose of that proceeding was "...to assess generically the degree of assurance now available that radioactive waste can be safely disposed of, to determine when such disposal or offsite storage will be available and to detemine whether radioactive waste can be safely stored onsite past the expiration of existing facility licenses until offsite disposal or storage is available.* (49 FR 34658). The purpose of this notice is to present for public coment thTproposed fincings of a Comission review of that Decision.
The Comission noted in 1984 that its Waste Confidence Decision was unavoidably i
in the nature of a prediction, and comitted to review its conclusions
...should significant and pertinent unexpected events occur or at least every five years'until a repository is available."
the Commission has reviewed its five findings and the rationale for them in light of developments since 1984 This proposed revised Waste Confidence Decision supplements those 1984 findings and the environmental analysis supporting them. The Comission proposes that the second and fourth findings in the Waste Confidence Decision be revised as followc:
Finding 2: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that at least one mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and that sufficielt repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation of any reactor to dispose of the comercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel 2
originating in such reactor and generated up to that time.
Finding 4: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that, if necessary, spent l
fue.1 generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant i
environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term of a revised license) of that reactor at j
its spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.
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The Comission proposes to reaffirm the remaining findings. Each finding, any proposed revisions, and the re6 sons for revising or reaffirming them are set forth in the body of the review below.
The Comission also issued two companion rulemaking amendments at the time it issued the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision. The Consission's reactor licensing rule,10 CFR Part 50, was amended to require each licensed reactor operator to submit, no later than five years before expiration of the operating license, plans for managing spent fuel at the reactor site until the spent fuel is transferred to the Department of Energy (DOE) for disposal under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA). 10 CFR Part 51, the rule defining NRC's responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), was amended to provide that, in connection with the issuance or amendment of a reactor operating license or initial license for an independent spent fuel storage installation, no discussion of any environmental impact of spent fuel storage is required for the period following expiration of the license or amenoment applied for.
In keeping with the proposed revised Findings 2 and 4, the Comission is providing elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register proposed conforming anendments to its 10 CFR Fart 51 rule providing procedures for considering in licensing proceedings the environmental effects of extendec onsite storage of spent fuel.
Finally, the Comission proposes to extend the cycle of its Waste Confidence reviews from every five years to every ten until a repository becomes available., In its 1984 Decision, the Comission said that because its conclusions were "... unavoidably in the nature of a prediction," it would review them "...should significant and unexpected events occur, or at least every five years until a repository... is available." As noted below, the Comission now believes that predictions of repository availability are best expressed in terms of decades rather then years. To specify a year for the expected availability of a repository decades hence would misleadingly imply a degree of precision ncw unattainable. Accordingly, the Comission proposes to change its original comitment in order to review its Waste Confidence Decision at least every ten years. This would not, however, disturb the Comission's original comitment to review its Decision whenever significant and pertinent unexpected events occur.
DATE: The coment period expires @o A ] 1989. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is pract(ical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except to comments received on or before this date.
ADD'RESSEES: Mail written coments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch.
Deliver coments to One White Flint North,11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. weekdays.
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FOR FURTilER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rob MacDougall, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C.
20555, telephone (202)492-3401; or John Roberts, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Comission, Washington, D.C.
20555, telephone (202)492-0608.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In Novenber 1976, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) petitioned NRC for a rulemaking to determine whether radioactive wastes generated in nuclear power reactors can be subsequently disposed of without undue risk to the public health and safety. The NRDC also requested that NRC not grant pending or future requests for operating licenses until the petitioned finding of safety was made.
On June 27, 1977, NRC denied the NRDC petition. The Comission said that in l
1ssuing operating licenses, NRC must have assurance that wastes can be safely handled and stored as they are ' generated.
It also said that it is not necessary for permanent disposal to be available if NRC could be confident that permanent disposal could be accomplished when necessary. NRC added that i
Congress was aware of the relationship between nuclear reactor operations and the radioactive waste disposal problem, and that NRC would not refrain from 1ssuing reactor operating licenses until the disposal problem was resolved.
l The Comission also stated that it "...would not continue to license reactors if it did not have reasonable confidence that the wastes can and will in due
~
course be disposed of safely."
Also in November 1976, two utility companies requested anendments to their operating licenses to permit expansion in the capacity of their spent nuclear fuel storage pools: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation for the Vermont Yankee plant; and Northern States Power Company for its Prairie Island facility.
In both cases, the utilities planned to increase storage capacity through closer spacing of spent fuel assemblies in existing spent fuol pools.
The New England Coalition on Nuclear Power and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency intervened. The NRC staff evaluated the requests and found that the modifications would not endanger public health and safety. The staff did not consider any potential environmental effects of storage of spent fuel at the reactors beyond the dates of expiration of their operating licenses. NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) adopted the staff's safety and environmental findings and approved the license amendments for the two plants.
It too did not consider the effects of at-reactor storage beyond the expiration of the facility operating license.
The Boarc's decision was appealed to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ASLAB). The ASLAB affirmed the Licensing Board's decision, citing the Comission's "... reasonable confidence that wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely...." in the Comission's denial of the NRDC petition.
The decision of the ASLAB was appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
On May 23, 1979 the Court declined to stay or vacate the license amendments, but remanded to NRC the question of "...whether there is reascnable assurance that an offsite storage solution will be available by the years 2007-2009, the expiration of the plants' operating licenses, and if not, whether there is reasonable assurance thht the fuel can be safely stored at the reactor sites beyond those dates." In its decision to remand to NRC, for consideration in either a generic rulemaking or an adjudicatory proceeding, the Court observed that the issues of storage and disposal of nuclear waste were being considered by the Comission in an ongoing generic proceeding known as the "S-3 Proceeding" on the environmental impacts of uranium fucl cycle activities to support the operation of a light water reactor, and that it was appropriate to remand in light of a pending decision on that proceeding and analysis.
On October 18, 1979, NRC announced that it was initiating a rulemaking proceeding in response to the Appeals Court remand and as a continuation of the NRDC proceeding. Specifically, the purpose of the proceeding was for the Comission "...to reassess its degree of confidence that radioactive wastes produced by nuclear facilities will be safely disposed of, to determine when any such disposal will be available, and whether such wastes can be safely stored until they ar,e disposed of."
The Comission recognized that the scope of this proceeding would be broader than the Court's instruction, which required the Comission to address only storage-related questions. The Comission believed, however, that the primary public concern was the safety of waste disposal rather than the availability of an off-site solution to the storage problem. The Comission also committed j
itself to reassess its basis for confidence that methods of safe permanent
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disposal for high-level waste would be available when needed. Thus, the Commission chose as a matter of policy not to confine itself exclusively to the narrower issues in the court remand.
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Comission also stated that if the proceeding led to a finding that safe off-site storage or disposal would be available before expiration of facility operating licenses, NRC would promulgate a rule providing that the impact of onsite storage of spent fuel after expiration of facility operating licenses need not be considered in individual licensing proceedings.
The Waste Confidence Decision was issued on August 31, 1984 (49 FR 34658).
In the Decision, the Comission made five findings.
It f ound reasoiiable assurance j
that:
(1) Safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel in a
, mined geologic repository is technically feasible.
(2) One or more mined geologic repositories for comercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel will be available by the years 2007-2009, and sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond expiration of any reactor operating license to dispose of existing
e.
comercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time.
(3) High-level radioactive wast'e and spent fuel will be managed in a safe manner until sufficient repository capacity is available to assure the safe disposal of all high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel.
(4) If necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of that reactor's operating license at that reactor's spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.
(5) Safe independent onsite or offsite spent fuel storage will be made available if such storage capacity is needed.
On the day the Decision was issued, the Comission also promulgated two rulemaking amendments:
(1) an amendment to 10 CFR Part 50, which required that no later than five years before expiration of reactor operating licenses, the licensee must provide NRC with a written plan for management of spent fuel onsite, until title for the spent fuel is transferred to the DDE; and (2) an amendment to 10 CFR Part 51 which provided that environmental consequences.of spent fuel storage after expiration of facility licenses need not be addressed in connection with issuance of or amendment to a reactor operating license.
In issuing the Part 51 amendment, the Comission stated that although it had reasonable assurance that one or more repositories would be available by 2007-2009,'it was possible that some spent fuel would have to be stored beyond
~
those dates. The Part 51 amendment was based on the Comission's finding in the Waste Confidence Proceeding that it had reasonable assurance that no significant environmental impacts will result from storage of spent fuel for at least 30 years beyond expiration of reactor operating. licenses.
Enactment of the NWPA contributed significantly to the basis for the Consission's 1984 Decision and companion rulemakings. The Act established a funding scurce and process with milestones and schedules for, among other things, the development of a monitored retrievable storage (HRS) facility and two repositories, one by early 1998 and a second, if authorized by Congress, at a later date, initially planned by DOE for 2006. For each repository, the Act required DOE to conduct in-situ investigations of three sites and recommend one from among them to the President and Congress for repository development. The NWPA also required DOE to recommend, from among alternative sites and designs, a site and design for an MRS for spent fuel and high-level waste management bef, ore disposal. The Comission's licensing and regulatory authority over both storage and disposal facilities was preserved by the Act.
In the four years after enactment of the NWPA, DOE met a number of the Act's early program requirements, but also encountered significant difficulties.
It published a final Mission Plan for the overall NWPA program, and followed with a Project Decision Schedule for DOE and other Federal agency actions.
It
promulgated, with Commission concurrence, a set of guidelines for repository siting and development.
It published draft and final environmental assessments for nine candicate repository sites, and recommended three for characterization.
It completed and submitted to Congress an environtantal assessment, a program plan, and a proposal with a site and design for an MRS.
All these actions followed extensive interactions with interested Federal agencies, State, Indian tribal, and local governments, and other organizations.
In the course of these activities, however, DOE also slipped its schedule for operation of the first repository by five years, indefinitely postponed efforts toward a second repository, and had to halt further MRS siting and development activities pending Congressional authorization.
l In December, 1987, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA). The NWPAA redirected the high-level waste program by suspending site characterization activities for the first repository at sites other than the Yucca Mountain site, and by suspending all site-specific activities with respect to a second repository. The Amendments Act also authorized and set schedule and capacity limits on the MRS. The purpose of these limitations, according to sponsors of the legislation, was to assure that an MRS would not become a substitute for a geologic repository.
Consistent with its comitment to revisit its Waste Confidence conclusions at least every five years, the Comission has' undertaken the current review to assess the effect of these and other developments since 1984 on the basis for each of its five findings.
In this document, the Comission supplements the basis for its earlier finciings and the environmental analysis of the 1984 Decision. The Comission proposes to amend its second finding, concerning the timing of initial availability and sufficient capacity of a repository, and its fourth finding, concerning the duration of safe spent fuel storage. These proposed revisions are based on the following considerations:
- 1) the five-year slippage, from 1998 to 2003, in the DOE schedule for l
repository availability; 1
- 2) the additional slip of at least 18 months since Jsnuary 1987 in the DOE schedule for the next step in the repository program, the excavation of the exploratory shaft;
- 3) the need to continue accounting for the possibility that the Yucca Mountaiu site might be found unsuitable and that DOE would have to initiate efforts to identify and characterize another site for the first repository;
- 4) the statutory suspension of site-specific activities for the second repbsitory;
- 5) DOE's estimate that site screening for a second repository should start about 25 years before the start of waste acceptance; and 6) increased confidence in the safety of extended spent fuel storage, either at the reactor or at independent spent fuel storage installations.
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1 The Comission is also proposing elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register that 10 CFR Subsection 51.23(a) be amended to conform witt, the proposed revisions to Findings 2 and 4..
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Organization and Table of Contents l
In conducting this review, the Comission has addressed, for each of its 1984 l
Findings, two categories of issues..The first category consists of the issues I
the Comission considered in making each Finding at the time of the initial l
Waste Confidence Decision. For these issues, the Comission is interested in whether its conclusions, or the Finding these conclusions support, should be l
changed to address new or foreseeable developments that have arisen since the l
first Waste Confidence Decision. The second category of issues consists of those the Comission believes should be added to the 1984 issues in light of subsequent developments.
(To enable the reader to follow more easily, the lengthy discussions of Findings 1 ano 2 have been organized to address each original and new issue under subheadings.) The Comission seeks coment on whether it has identified all the issues relevant to its proposed findings, and on whether its analyses of these issues supports the conclusions and findings proposed.
Table of Contents j
l 1.
First Comission Finding A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 1.
1.
Identification of acceptable. sites 2.
Development of effective waste packages (a) considerations in developing waste package (b) effect of reprocessing on waste form and waste package 3.
Development of effective engineered barriers for isolating j
wastes from the biosphere (a) backfill materials (b)boreholeandshaftsealants B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Comission's Original Decisicn on Finding 1 1.
Termination of Multiple Site Characterization 2.
Relevance to NRC's "S-3 Table" proceeding 3.
International developments in spent fuel disposal technology
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C. Conclusion on finding 1 II.
Second Comission Finding
- A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 2 l
1.
Technical uncertainties (a) finding technically acceptable sites in a timely fashion (b) timely development of waste packages and engineered barriers
.g.
2.
Institutional uncertainties (a) measures for dealing with Federal-State-local concerns (b) continuity of the management of the waste program (c)continuedfunding6fthenuclearwastemanagementprogram (c) DOE's schedule for repository development B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Conr ission's Original Decision on Finding 2
- 1. Potential delay under the program of single site characterization
- 2. Potential limitations on timing of availability of disposal i
capacity (a) impact of possible limited disposal capacity at Yucca Mountain, indefinite suspension of second repository program (b) impact of uncertainty in spent fuel projections on need to consider second repository program
- 3. Impact of slippages in DOE program on availability of a repository when needed for health and safety reasons
- 4. Effect of HRC emphasis on completeness and quality C. Conclusion on Finding 2 III. Third Commission Finding A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 3:
Licensee compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions; Safe management of spent fuel past expiration of operating licenses; Availability of DOE interim storage B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Comission's Original Decision on Finding 3:
Responsibility for spent fuel storage beyond 1998; Delay in second repository; Potential for license renewals IV.
Fourth Comission Finding A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 4:
Long-term integrity of spent fuel under water pool storage conditions; Structure and component safety for extended facility operation for storage; Safety of dry storage of spent fuel; Potential risks of accidents and acts of sabotage of spent fuel storage facilities
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Institutional uncertainties (a) measures for dealing with Federal-State-local concerns (b) continuity of the management of the waste program (c)continuedfunding6fthenuclearwastemanagementprogram (d) DOE's schedule for repository development B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Comission's Original Decision on Finding 2 s
- 1. Potential delay under the program of single site characterization-
- 2. Potential limitations on timing of availability of disposal capacity j
(a) impact of possible limited disposal capacity at Yucca f
Mountain, indefinite suspension of second repository program (b) impact of uncertainty in spent fuel projections on need to consider second repository program
- 3. Impact of slippages in DOE program on availability of a repository when needed for health and safety reasons
- 4. Effect of NRC emphasis on completeness and quality C. Conclusion on Finding 2 III. Third Comission Finding A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 3:
Licensee compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions; Safe management of spent fuel pa.ct u piration of operating licenses; Availability of DOE interim storage B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Comission's Original Decision on Finding 3:
Responsibility for spent fuel storage beyond 1998; Delay in second repository; Potential for license renewals IV.
Fourth Comission Finding A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 4:
i Long-term integrity of spent fuel under water pool storage conditions; Structure and component safety for extended facility operation for storage; Safety of dry storage of spent fuel; Potential risks of accidents and acts of sabotage of spent fuel storage facilities 1
B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Commission's Original Decision on Finding 4:
Radiological and non-radiological consequences of extended spent fuel storage; Potential delay in first repository, license renewals, delay in second repository; Environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact of at-reactor storage beyond 30 years after reactor's licensed life for operation V.
Fifth Commission Finding A. Issues Considered in Commission's 1984 Decision on Finding 5:
Adequacy of NWPA for determining responsibility for timely spent fuel storage; Spent fuel discharge projections; Industry commitment to implement away-from-reactor storage B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Commission's Original Decision on Finding 5:
Responsibility for spent fuel storage beyond 1998; Advances in technology for dry storage; Benefits of monitored retrievable storege facility under NWPAA; License renewals; Options for offsite storage under NWPAA e
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11 Original finding 1: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that safe disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel in a mined geologic repository is technically feasible.
Proposed Finding 1: Same as ab?ve 1.A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 1 1.A.1.
The identification of acceptable sites Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), the Department of Energy (DOE) had responsibility for identifying candidate sites for a geologic repository and for repository development. The first requirement leading to recommendation of candidate sites was formal notification of States with one or more potentially acceptable sites for a repository within 90 days of enactment l
of the NWPA.
In February 1983, the DOE identified nine potentially acceptable sites for the first repository. Four of the sites were in bedded-salt formations, three were in salt domes, one in volcanic tuff, and one in basalt.
an environmental the NWPA required that each site nomination be accompanied by(DEAs) for each of assessment (EA).
In December 1984, DOE published Draft EAs the nine sites identified as potentially acceptable and proposed the following sites for nomination: the reference repository location at Hanford, WA; Yucca Mountain, NV; Deaf Smith County, TX; Davis Canyon, UT; and Richton Dome, MS.
In May 1986, DOE released Final EAs (FEAs) for the five sites nominated. At that time.. DOE recomended that the Yucca Mountain, Hanford, and Deaf Smith County sites uncergo site characterization. The President approved the I
recomniendation.
The NRC staft provided extensive comments on both the DEAs and the FEAs. NRC I
concerns on the FEAs related primarily to DOE's failure to recognize uncertainty inherent in the existing limited data bases for the recommended sites, ano the tendency of DOE to present overly favorable or optimistic conclusions. The primary intent of the coments was to assist DOE in preparing I
high-quality Site Characterization Plans (SCFs) for each site, as required under the NWPA, before excavation of exploratory shaf ts. NRC concerns can only l
be addressed adequately through the site characterization process, because one of the purposes of this process is to develop the data to evaluate the significance of concerns relative to site suitability.
l NRC did not identify any fundamental technical flaw or disqualifying factor which it believed would render any of the sites unsuitable for characterization.
Further, NRC did not take a position on the ranking of the sites in orcer of preference, because this could be viewed as a prejudgment of licensing issues. NRC was not aware of any reason that would indicate that any l
of the candidate sites was unlicenseable. Nor has NRC made any such finding to l
date with respect to any site identified as potentially acceptable.
In March 1987, Congress began drafting legislation to amend the repository program. NRC provided coments on a number of these draft amendments.
In i
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December 1987, the NWPAA was enacted.
In a major departure from the initial intent of the NWPA, the new law required that DOE suspend site characterization activities at sites other than the Yucca Mountain site. This decision was not based on a technical evaluation of the three recommended sites or a conclusion that the Hanford and Deaf Smith sites were not technically acceptable.
According to sponsors of the legislation, the principal purpose of the requirement to suspend characterization at these sites was to reduce costs.
In effect, the NWPAA directed DOE to characterize candidate sites sequentially, if necessary, rather than simultaneously.
If DOE determines at any time that the Yucca Mountain site is unsuitable, DOE is to terminate all site i
characterization activities and report to Congress its recommendations for i
further actions.
The NRC staff has identified numerous issues regarding the Yucca Mountain site q
that may have a bearing on the licenseability of that site. These issues will l
have to be resolved during site characterization. An example of a site issue that may bear on the question of suitability is tectonic activity, the folding or faulting of the e6rth's crust.
In the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, NRC l
noted that "...the potential sites being investigated by DOE are in regions of I
relative tectonic stability." The authority for this statement came from the l
Position Statement of the US Geological Survey (USGS). HRC has raised concerns regarding tectonic activity at the Yucca Mountain site in the comments on the draft and final EAs, and in the draft and final Point Papers on the Consultation Draft Site Characterization Plan.
If it appears during site characterization that the Yucca Mountain site will be unable to meet NRC requirements regardir.g isolation cf waste, DOE will have to suspend characterization at that site and report to Congress.
DOE's program of site screening in different geologic media was consistent with l
Section 112(a) of the NWPA, which required that DOE recommend sites in l
different geologic media to the extent practicable. This strategy was to ensure that if any one site were four.d unsuitable for reasons that would render other sites in the same geologic medium unacceptable, alternate sites in cifferent host rock types would be available. NRC referred to this policy in its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, when it said, in support of its argument on technical feasibility, that "... DOE's program is providing information on site characteristics at a sufficiently large number and variety of sites and geologic media to support the expectation that one or more technically l
acceptable sites will be identified."
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NRC recognizes that simultaneous site characterization is not necessary to identify a repository site that would meet NRC's technical criteria for l
isolating wastes. Sequential site characterization does not necessarily l
preclude or hinder identification of an acceptable site for a repository. NRC did express concern to Congress, on several occasions during deliberations over the proposed legislation, that sequential site characterization could delay considerably the schedule for opening a repository if the site undergoing characterization were found to be unlicenseable. NRC also indicated that this i
potential for delay would have to be considered by NRC in reevaluating the I
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findings in its Waste Confidence Decision. The impact of this redirection of the high-level waste program o.1 the Commission's Whste Confidence findings is not on the ability to identify technically acceptable sites, but on the timing of availability of technically acceptable sites. Because characterization of multiple sites appears to be more directly related to the timing of repository availability than to the feasibility of geologic disposal, consideration of the above statement in light of the NWPAA program redirection will be discussed under Finding 2.
Another question bearing on whether technically acceptable sites can be found is whether compliance with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) environmental standards for disposal of spent fuel and high-level waste can be demonstrated.
These standards, originally promulgated in final form in September 1985, were l
vacated in July, 1987, by the U.S. Court of Appeals, and remanded to EPA for further consideration (see NRDC v. EPA, 824 F. 2d 1258). As originally promu1 ated, the standards set limits on releases of radioactive materials from 5
the site into the accessible environment over a 10,000-year period following disposal. They also required that there be less than one chance in ten that the release limits wi11 be exceeded in 10,000 years, and less than one chance in 1,000 that releases will exceed ten times the limits over 10,000 years.
In past coments on draft and proposed EPA standards, and in related NRC rulemaking efforts, NRC has expressed concern that probabilistic analyses should not be exclusively relied on to demonstrate compliance with EPA release limits. NRC'scommentssaidinpartthat"...[t]henumericalprobabilitiesin Lthe standards] would require a degree of precision which is unlikely to be achievable in evaluating a real waste disposal system." The coments went on to explain that "... identification of the relevant processes and events affecting a particular site will require considerable judgment and will not be amenable to accurate quantification, by statistical analysis, of their probability of occurrence." NRC believed then, and continues to believe, that it must make qualitative judgments about the data and methodologies on which the numerical probabilities were based.
In response to NRC concerns, EPA incorporated language into its 1985 standards that appeared to allow flexibility to combine qualitative judgments with numerical probability estimates in a way that might have made implementation of the EPA standards practicable. The text of those standards recognized that
" proof of the future performance of a disposal system is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word" with the substantial uncertainties and very long performance period involved. The 1985 standards emphasized that a " reasonable expectation" -- rather than absolute proof -- is to be the test of compliance.
"What is required," the text of the standards said, "is a reasonable expectation, on the basis of the record..., that compliance... will be a chieved." In an additional attempt to provide flexibility for implementation of the standards, EPA also provided that numerical analyses of releases from a repository were to be incorporated into an overall probability distribution only "to the extent practicable." This phrase appeared to allow some discretion for NRC to incorporate qualitative considerations into its license
decision-making, rather than having to rely solely on numerical projections of repository performance. On the strength of these and other EPA assurances, the Commission did not object when the final standards were published in "E5.
Pursuant to the renand by the Federal court in 1987, EPA is currently revising its standards for disposal of spent fuel and high-level waste. The court's decision directed that the remand focus on the ground water and individual protection requirements of the standards. Although the EPA standards are still undergoing development at this time, the Commission does not currently see a sufficient basis to withdraw its confidence in the feasibility of evaluating complience with such standards. NRC staff will closely monitor the development of repromulgated standards to assure that EPA methodologies for demonstrating ccmpliance with them can be applied by NRC to evaluate DOE's demonstration of compliance.
In sum, considering both past and current programs for characterizing sites, the Commission concludes that technically acceptable sites for a repository can be found. The Commission is cor.fident that, given adequate tine and resources, such sites can be identified, evaluated, and accepted or rejected on their merits, even if no more than one site is undergoing site characterization.
This judgment does not rest on the acceptability of the Yucca Mountain site or any one future candidate site.
1.A.2.
The development of effective waste packages 1.A.2.a. considerations in developing waste packages The NWPA required NRC to promulgate technical requirements and criteria to be applied in licensing a repository for high-level radioactive waste. Under Section 121 of the Act, these technical criteria must provide for use of a system of multiple barriers in the design of the repository and such restrictions on the retrievability of waste as NRC deems appropriate. The system of multiple barriers incluces both er.gineered and natural barriers.
The waste package is the first engineered barrier in the system of multiple barriers to radionuclides escape. The waste package is defined as the " waste form and any containers, shieloing, packing and other absorbent materials innediately surrounding an individual waste container." Before sinking an exploratory shaft for site characterization, DOE is required to prepare an SCP including a description of the waste form or packaging proposed for use at the repository, and an explanation of the relationship between such waste form or
{
packaging and the geologic medium of the site.
I the multiple barrier approach to radioactive waste isolation in a geologic repository is implemented in KRC requirements by a number of perfont.ance objectives and by cetailed siting and design criteria. The NRC performance cbjective for the waste package requires substantially complete containment for a period of not less than 300 years nor more than 1000 years after permanent l
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closure of the repository. The technical design criteria for the waste package require that interaction of the waste package with the environment not compronise performance of the package, the underground facility, or the geologic setting. Therefore, the waste package design must take into account l
the complex site-specific interactions between host rock, waste package, and ground water that will affect waste package and overall repository performance.
Under the NWPAA, DOE was required to suspend site characterization activities at sites other than the Yucca Mountain, NV site.
Consequently, DOE has i
narrowed the range of waste package designs to a design tailored for i
unsaturated tuff at the Yucca Mountain site. This aspect of the high-level l
waste program redirection may facilitate and expedite the waste package design 1
process insofar as it enables DOE to concentrate its efforts on developing a single design for a single site instead of three designs for sites in bedded salt, basalt, and unsaturated tuff.
l Currently, DOE is evaluating uncertainties in waste package design related to j
waste form, container type, and environment. The current conceptual design for the waste package is based on several assumptions. The waste form is presumed to be ten-year-old spent fuel or high-level waste in the form of borosilicate glass in stainless-Steel canisters.
(In cddition to spent fuel and high-level waste, the waste form may include greater-than-Class C (GTCC) low-level waste.
This waste is not routinely acceptable for near-surface disposal under hkC regulations for disposal of low-level wastes, but is acceptable for disposal in l
a repository licensed for disposal of spent fuel and high-level wastes. This waste might include such materials as sealed sources and activated metals from the decommissioning of reactors and production facilities.)
i Six materials are being considered for fabrication of containers, including I
austenitic steel (316L), nickel-based alloys (Alloy 825), pure copper (CDA 102), copper-based alloys (aluminum-bronze, CDA-613, and 70-30 Cu-Ni, CDA-715),
and a container with a metal outer shell and ceramic liner. The reference 1
container for the spent fuel and high-level waste is a 1.0-tm thick cylinder to be made of American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) 304L stainless steel. This will be DOE's benchmark material, against which other materials are to be l
compared. DOE currently intends for spent fuel containers to be filled with an inert gas, such as argon, before being welded closed.
The reference repository location is in the unsaturated tuft of the Topopah Spring Formation underlying Yucca Mountain. According to DOE, little free-flowing water is thought to be present there to contribute to corrosion of the waste containers, although the degree of saturation in this tuff is estimated to be 65 19 percent of the available vold space in the rock. DOE has acknowledged, however, that the greatest uncertainties in assessing waste peckage performance at Yucca Mountain stem from difficulty in characterizing and modeling the coupled geochemical-hydrologic processes that represent the interactions between the host rock, waste package, and ground water. The final waste package design will depend on the results of site characterization and laboratory testing to reduce uncertainty in predicting these interactions in
. the reference repository horizon. The final cesign will also be shaped by research in understanding the degradation of candidate container materials, and the characteristics of the likely reference waste forms.
acka Regarding the state of technology for developing long-lived waste p(SKB)ge containers, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Comp 6ny
,the organization responsible for radioactive waste disposal in Sweden, has described a container for spent fuel rods that consists of a 0.1-m thick copper j
canister surrounded by a bentonite overpack. The design calls for pouring copper powder into the void spaces in the canisters, compacting the powder using hot-isostatic pressing with an ir.ert gas, and sealing the canisters. SKB estimates that the copper canister waste package has a million-year lifetime.
(Seealso1.B.3.below.)
As noted in NRC's Final Point Papers on the Consultation Draft Site Characterization Plan, the Comission does not expect absolute proof that 100 percent of the waste packages will have 100 percent containment for 300 to 1000 years. Since that time, the NRC staff has cosipleted its review of the December i
1988 Site Characterization Plan for Yucca Mountain. Although the Commission continues to have concerns about DOE's waste package program, nothing has occurred to diminish the Commission's confidence that as long as DOE establishes conservative objectives to guide a testing and design program, in tuft or in other geologic media if necessary, it is technically feasible to develop a waste package that meets the performance objective for substantially complete containment.
1.A.2.b.
effect of reprocessing on waste form and waste package the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment estimates that a total of about 77,800 netric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste will be available for disposal by the year 2020.
(This estimate is based on a "no new orders" assumption for commercial nuclear reactors and a 40-year reactor lifetime.) Of this 77,800 MTHM, about 9400 MTHli will consist of reprocessed defense waste and a small amount of consercial reprocessed waste from the West Valley Demonstration Project. The decision to locate the defense high-level waste in the repository for wastes from commercial power reactors resulted from the requirement in Section 8 of the NWPA that the President evaluate the possibility of developing a defense-waste-only repository.
In February 1965, DOE submitted a report to the President recommending a combined commercial.and defense repository.
In April 1985, the President agreed that no basis appeared to exist for a defense-only repository and directed DOE to dispose of defense waste in the commercial repository.
About 8750 MTHM of reprocessed high-level waste from defense facilities at savannah River, SC, Hanford, WA, and Idaho Falls, ID will be available by 2020 for disposal in the repository, according to the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment. This waste will likely be solidified into a borosilicate glass
i l l
natrix. About 640 HTHM of reprocessed high-level waste will come from the West Valley Derrnnstration Project, a facility for wastes from discontinued commercial reprocessing of spent fuel at that site. This reprocessed waste also will be i
solidified, probably in a borosilicate glass waste form.
(
l Waste-form testing for the Yucca Mountain site is focusing on both spent fuel and reprocessed high-level waste. The performance of the waste form in j
aroviding the first barrier to radionuclides migration is being evaluated on the aasis of the physical and chemical environment of the waste form after disposal, the performance of the waste container, and the emplacement configuration.
A major limitation on glass waste-form testing is that the actual waste glasses to be disposed of are not available, and their exact composition will not be establisteo until after further testing. Reference waste-glass compositions are being used for studies on the effect of variation in glass composition on performance.
(These glass compositions are designed by Savannah River Laboratory (SRL) for defense high-level waste, and by Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PHL) for the commercial high-level wastes to be vitrified under the West Valley Demonstration Project Act.) The reference compositions will be revised when better analyses of the composition of the wastes at SRL and West Valley are available. The test program will seek to establish upper bounds on leaching of important radionuclides, and the extent to which glass fracturing increases leach rate. Other factors influencing leach rate are temperature, pH of the leaching solution, formation of solid layers on the surface of the waste glass, irradiation, water volume, and chemistry.
It is possible that renewed reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors may result in a greater proportion of reprocessed waste to spent fuel than is currently anticipated. Although such a departure from the current plan to dispose of mostly unreprocessed spent fuel in the repository does not appear likely at this time, the Comission believes it is important to recognize the possibility that this situation eculd change.
The possibility of disposal of reprocessed waste as an alternative wastt: fonn j
to spent fuel assemblies was recognized by the Commission in the 1984 Waste a
Confidence Decision. The Commission noted that the disposal of waste from j
reprocessing had been studied for a longer time than the dispusal of spent I
O fuel, and that the possibility of reprocessing does not alter the technical feasibility of developing a suitable waste package. The Commission went on to say that there is evidence that the disposal of reprocessed high-level waste r.ay pose fewer technical challenges than the disposal of spent fuel. As long l
as DOE uses conservative assumptions and test conditions for evaluating the j
performance of different waste forms against NRC licensing requirements, the Comission has no basis to change its finding that there is reasonable j
assurance that reprocessing does not reduce conficence in the technical I
feasibility of designing and building a waste package that will meet NRC licensing requirements in a variety of geologic media.
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The development of effective engineered barriers for isolating wastes q
from the biosphere 1.A.3.a.
backfill materials At the time of the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, DOE was developing conceptual designs for backfill in several geologic media. Most candidate sites at that tirre were in saturated rock, and the conceptual designs included backfilling or packing around waste containers to prevent or delay ground water flow which could enhance corrosion and radionuclides transport near the waste containers. The conceptual design for the engineered barrier system at the Yucca Mountain site has different parameters because the site is unsaturated; instead of backfill or packing around the waste container, there is to be an air gap between sides of the waste canister and the host rock.
~
Backfill material around the container is not required under NRC regulations for the waste package. NRC regulations require that "... containment of high-level waste within the waste packages [which includes the container] will be substantially complete for a period to be determined by the Consission...
provided, that such period shall not be less than 300 years nor'more than 1000 years after p(ermanent closure of the repository" [10 CFR Subsection 60.113(a)(1 release rate performance objective of 1 part in 100,000 per year.
Backfill is also a component of the borehole, shaft, and ramp seals, which are not part of the engineered barrier system or the underground facility.
Boreholes, shafts, and ramps must be sealed when the repository is permanently closed. This aspect of backfilling is discussed below under " Development of Sealants." Backfill may also include crushed rock used to fill openings such as drifts in the undergrounti facility. At the Yucca Mountain candidate site, DOE currently plans to fill openings in the underground f acility at closure of the repository. Backfilling is not planned before repository closure because it is not needed for structural support for the openings, and it would make waste retrieval more difficult. At closure of the facility, however, openings will be backfilled with coarse tutf excavated for the facility.
In the conceptual design provided in'the SCP, the selection cf coarse tuff as backfill material is based on numerical simulations performed by DOE which suggest that coarse tuff would be a more effective barrier to capillary flow in the backfill matrix than fine materials.
DOE's design for the engineered barrier system submitted with the license application will have to contain information sufficient for NRC to reach a favorable conclusion regarding the overall system performance objective.
Backfill or packing around waste containers is not required by NRC regulations if SOE can demonstrate that applicable performance objectives can'be met withcut it.
If, on the basis of testing and experiments during site characterization, DOE decided that backfill would enhance engine:ered barrier system performance, the design would have to reflect this conclusion. DOE has already conducted research on a wide variety of candidate materials for
backfill around waste packages in a variety of geologic media. The Consission continues to have confidence that backfill or packing materials can be developed as needed for the underground facility and waste package to meet applicable NRC licensing criteria and performance objectives.
1.A.3.b.
borehole and shaft seals The engineered barrier system described above is limited to the weste package and the underground facility as defined in 10 CFR Part 60. The underground facility refers to the underground structure, including openings and backfill materials, but excluding shafts, bereholes, and their seals.
Containment and release-rate requirements are specified for the engineered barrier system, but not for the borehole and shaft seals.
Seals are covered under 10 CFR Section 60.112, the overall post-closure system performance objective for the repcsitory. Among other things, this provision requires that shafts, boreholes and their seals be designed to assure that releases of radioactive materials to the accessible environment following permanent closure conform to EPA's generally applicable standards fur radioactivity. Although the criteria for seals given in 10 CFR Part 60 do not specifically mention seals in ramps and the underground facility, it is reasonable to consider them together with borehole and shaft sealants, because the seals and drainage design in ramps ano the underground facility could also affect.the overall system performance of the geologic repository.
Construction of the exploratory shaft facility (ESF) will be the first major site char 6cterization activity. The ESF will consist of two vertical shafts, one for testing and the other for support, and underground excavations for at-depth testing. The repository surface f acilities will be connected to the underground facility by two additional shafts (a men-and-materials shaf t and the emplacement area exhaust shaft) and two ramps, a waste ramp for bringing radioactive waste and spent fuel into the repository, and a tuff ramp for removing rock from the underground f acility to a tuff pile.
In addition to these shafts and ramps, there will be exploratory boreholes for obtaining samples of rock, water, and gases in strata at varying depths.
Exploratory bereholes have the potential to provide information on hydrologic properties of the Yucca Mountain site, with emphasis on movement of ' water in unsaturated tuff. Other properties which will be studied using exploratory boreholes are lithologic, structural, mechanical, and thermal properties of the host rock.
When the repository is decommissioned, NRC expects that most, if not all, st.afts, ramps, and boreholes will probably have to be sealed to reduce the possibility that they could provide preferential pathways for radionuclides l
migration from the underground facility to the accessible environment. DOE estimates that as many as 350 shallow and 70 deep exploratory boreholes may be emplaced by the time site characterization has been completed at the Yucca Mountain site.
Decommissioning may not occur for up to 100 years after commencement of repository operations. Because the final design for seals will likely have been modified from the initial license application design (LAD),
DOE is viewing the seal LAD as serving two primary functions. As set forth in DOE's SCP for the Yucca Mcuntain candidate site, the seal LAD is to establish that: (1) "... technology for constructing seals is reasonably available;" and (2) "...there is reasonable assurance that seals have been designed so that, following permanent closure, they do not become pathways that compromise the geologic repository's ability to meet the post-closure performance objectives."
To establish the availability of technology for seal construction, DOE has identified at least 31 site properties that need to be characterized in determining necessary seal characteristics. These properties include saturated hydraulic conductivity of alluvium near shafts, the quantity of water reaching the seals due to surface-flooding events, and erosion potential in the shaft i
vicinity. The SCP also discusses material properties that need to be l
identified to determine sealing components such as initial end altered j
nydrologic properties of materials.
The SCP indicates that DOE is planning to use crushed tuff and cements in the sealing program at the Yucca Mountain candidate site. The stated advantages of
)
using tutt include minimizing degradation of seal material and avoiding i
disruption of ambient ground-water chemistry.
DOE's current design concept for meeting the overall performance objectives includes a combination cf sealing and drainage. Seal requirements may be reduced in part by: (1) limitin the amount of surface water that may enter boreholes, shafts, and ramps; (g) selecting borehole, shaft, and ramp locations 2
i and orientations that provide long flow paths from the emplaced waste to the accessible environment above the repository; and (3) maintaining a sufficient l
rate of drainage below the repository horizon level so that water can be shunted past the waste packages without contacting them.
Although DOE's program is focusing on seals for the Yucca Mountain candidate site, the Commission finds no bcsis for diminished confidence that an acceptable seal can be developed for candidate sites in different geologic media. The Commission finds no evidence to suggest that it can not continue to have reasonable assurance that borehole, shaft, ramp, and repository seals can be developed to meet 10 CFR Part 60 performance objectives.
1.B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Commission's Original Decision 1.B.I.
In support of its argument on technical feasibility, the Commission stated in its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision that "... DOE's program is providing information on site characteristics at a sufficiently large number and variety of sites and geologic media to support the ex p ctation that one or more technically acceptable sites will be identified." The NWFAA required, however, that DOE suspend site-specific site characterization activities under the Nuclear l
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Waste Policy Act of 1982 at all sites other than the Yucca Mountain, NV site.
Under the NWPAA, the DOE program has been redirected to characterize candidate repository sites in sequence rather than simultaneously.
If the Yucca Mountain site is found to be unsuitable, DOE must terminate site characterization activities there and provide Congress with a recommer.dation for further action, such as the characterization of another site. Because characterization of multiple sites now appears to be more directly related to the timing of repository availability than to the technical feasibility of geologic disposal as a concept, consideration of the Comission's aforementioned 1984 statement in light of the NWPAA will be discussed under finding 2.
1.B.2, What is the relationship, if any, of the "S-3 Proceeding" to the current review of the Comission's 1984 Waste Confidence findings?
Would the planned revision of the S-3 rulemaking be effected if the Comission had to qualify its current confioence in the technical feasibility of safe disposal?
In its decision to remand to NRC the questions of whether safe offsite storage would be available by 2007-2009, or, if not, whether spent fuel could be safely stored onsite past those dates, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the issues of storage and disposal of nuclear waste were being considered by the Comission in an ongoing generic proceeding known as the "S-3" Proceeding.
The S-3 Proceeding was the outgrowth of efforts to address generically the NEPA requirement for an evaluation of the environmental impact of operation of a iight water reactor (LWR). Table S-3 assigned numerical values for environmental costs resulting from uranium fuel cycle activities to support one year of LWR operation. NRC promulgated the S-3 rule in April 1974.
In July 1976, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found that Table S-3 was inadequately supported by the record regarding reprocessing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management, in part because the Comission, in reaching its assessment, had relied heavily on testimony of NRC staff that the problem of waste disposal would be resolved.
When the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals issued the remand on what were to become the " Waste Confidence" issues in May 1979, NRC had pending before it the final amended S-3 rule. The Court regarded the resciution of the issue of waste disposal in the S-3 proceeding as being related to the issue raised by the petitioners in the appeals of the NRC decisions on the expansion of spent fuel storage capacity. The Court said that the "... disposition of the S-3 proceeding, though it has a somewhat different focus, may have a bearing on the pending cases."
The Comission approved the final S-3 rule in July 1979.
In October 1979, the Comission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) on the Waste Ccnfidence
issues in response to the remand by the Court of Appeals.
In the NPR, the Commission stated thut the proceeding would "... draw upon the record compiled in the Commission's recently concluded rulemaking on the environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle, and that the record compiled herein will be available for use in the general fuel cycle rule update discussed in that rulema king."
In the final Table S-3 rule issued in 1979, the Comission had said that
"... bedded salt sites can be found which will provide effective isolation of radioactive waste from the biosphere." When the Comission issued the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, part of the basis for the discussion of waste canagement and disposal in the August 1979 final S-3 rule had changed. For example, in 1984 the repository program was proceeding under the NWPA, which required that DOE recommend three sites for site characterization.
Although NRC is preparing to amend the S-3 Table, and add a new appendix to explain the basis for and significance of the data in the table, it is unlikely that the revision will have any impact on the Commission's generic findings in the Waste Confidence proceeding. Nor is it likely that this reexamination of the Waste Confidence findings will affect the S-3 rule; the Waste Confidence Proceeding is not intended to make quantitative judgments about the environmental costs of waste disposal. Unless the Comission, in a future review of the Waste Confidence decision, finds that it no longer has confidence in the technical feasibility of disposal in a mined geologic repository, the Comission will not consider it necessary to review the S-3 rule when it reexamines its Waste Confidence findings in the future.
To what extent do developments in spent fuel disposal technology )
1.B.3.
outside of the United States (e.g., Swedish waste package designs enhance NRC's confidence in the technical feasibility of disposal of high-level waste and spent fuel?
Spent fuel disposal technology is the subject of extensive research investigation in both Europe and North America. Advances in this technology are being communicated to the NRC staff both through bilateral agreements and the presentation of research results at international meetings.
Outside the U.S., studies of spent fuel as a waste form are now being conducted primarily in Canada and Sweden, although both France and West Germany have small programs in this area. The Swedish studies have been mainly concerned with boiling water reactor (BWR) spent fuel, whereas the Canadian studies focus on spent fuel from that country's CANDU reactors, which use unenriched uranium in a core ir.nersed in " heavy" water made from deuterium. BWR and CANDU fuel, like pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel, are uranium dioxide fuels clad in zircaloy. However, the burnup rates for these three fuel types vary l
considerably. Ongoing research studies on spent fuel include: work on the characterization of spent tuel as a waste form; the corrosion of spent fuel and its dissolution under oxidizing and reducing conditions; the radiolysis of
ground water in the near vicinity of the spent fuel, and its effects on the dissolution of the fuel; and the development of models to predict the leaching of spent fuel over long time periods. The results of this work are steadily increasing our understanding of spent fuel as a waste form.
High-level radioactive waste, whether it is spent reactor fuel or waste from reprocessing, must be enclosed in an outer canister as part of the waste package. The canister surrounding the waste is expected to prevent the release of radioactivity during its handling at the repository site before emplacement.
Af ter emplacement in the repository, it is expected to prevent the release of radioactivity for a specified period of time after the repository is closed, by providing a barrier to protect the waste from coming into contact with ground water.
For practical reasons, canister materials may be divided into the following classes: 1) completely or partially thermodynamic 11y stable materials such as copper; 2) passive materials such as stainless steel, titanium, Haste 11oy, inconel, and aluminum; 3) corroding or sacrificial materials such as lead and steel; and 4) non-metallic materials such as alumina and titanium dioxide ceramics and cement.
Sweden has been conducting an extensive canister research program over the past several years. The main canister material of interest is copper, but titanium, carbon steel, and alumina and titanium dio.xide are also being studied as reasonable alternatives, should unexpected problems be discovered with using pure copper.
The present Swedish canister design is a 100-mm thick copper container (as described previously in Section A.2.a.), which is claimed to provide containment, in conjunction with an appropriate backfill material, for a period on the order of one million years. The critical factors for the isolation as sulphide ions in the ground water;)(2) presence of corro period for copper canisters are: (1) the the possibility of these substances reaching the canister surface; and (3 the degree of inhomogeneity, or pitting, of the resulting corrosion.
Studies are continuing to obtain more information on pitting corrosion of copper and on techniques for welding thick-walled copper containers.
Several conceptual designs for canisters for the safe disposal of unreprocessed spent fuel have also been oeveloped in Canada. One canister design option is the supported-shell, metal-matrix concept, which involves packing the spent tuel bundles into a thin corrosion. resistant shell and casting the remaining space with a low melting point metal or alloy. Structural support for the shell would be proviced by the resulting metal matrix. Lead is a possible matrix material because of its favorable casting properties, cost, and low melting point.
Other supported shell canister concepts include the packed-particulate and structurally-supported designs.
In these designs, a thin outer shell is
. ground water in the near vicinity of the spent fuel, and its effects on the dissolution of the fuel; and the development of models to predict the leaching of spent fuel over long time periods. The results of this work are steadily increasing our understanding of spent fuel as a waste form.
High-level radioactive waste, whether it is spent reactor fuel or waste from reprocessing, must be enclosed in an outer canister as part of the waste package. The canister surrounding the waste is expected to prevent the release of radioactivity during its handling at the repository site before emplacement.
After emplacement in the repository, it is expected to prevent the release of radioactivity for a specified period of time after the repository is closed, by providing a barrier to protect the waste from coming into contact with ground water.
For practical reasons, canister materials may be divided into the following classes: 1) completely or partially thermodynamically stable materials such as copper; 2) passive materials such as stainless steel, titanium, Hastelloy, Inconel, and aluminum; 3) corroding or sacrificial materials such as lead and steel; and 4) non-metallic materials such as alumina and titanium dioxide ceramics and cement.
i Sweden has been corducting an extensive canister research program over the past i
several years. The main canister material of interest is copper, but titanium, l
carbon steel, and alumina and titanium dioxide are also being studied as reasonable alternatives, should unexpected problems be discovered with using pure copper.
The present Swedish canister design is a 100-m thick copper container (as described previously in Section A.2.a.), which is claimed to provide containment, in conjunction with an appropriate backfill material, for a period on the order of one million years. The critical factors for the isolation period for copper canisters are: (1) the as sulphide ions in the ground water;)(2) presence of corros the possibility of these substances reaching the canister surface; and (3 the degree of inhomogeneity, or pitting, of the resulting corrosion. Studies are continuing to obtain more information on pitting corrosion of copper and on techniques for welding thick-walled copper containers.
Several conceptual designs for canisters for the safe disposal of unreprocessed spent fuel have also been oeveloped in Canada. One canister design option is the supported-shell, metal-matrix concept, which involves packing the spent fuel bundles into a thin corrosion-resistant shell and casting the remaining space with a low melting point metal or alloy. Structural support for the shell would be provioed by the resulting metal matrix. Lead is a possible matrix material because of its favorable casting properties, cost, and low i
melting point.
Other supported shell canister concepts include the packed-particulate and structurally-supported designs.
In these designs, a thin outer shell is
.h
n
. - I supported by a particulate material packed around a steel internal structure that contains the spent fuel bundies. Several materials have been identified for the fabrication of the corrosion resistant outer shell, including commercially pure and low-alloy titanium, high nickel-based alloys such as Inconel 625, and pure copper. Detailed designs have been produced for all three types of supported shell canisters incorporating either a titanium or
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nickel alloy shell less than 6-mm thick. A conceptual design has. also been produced for a copper-shell structurally-) supported canister and a metal-matrix contair.er with a relatively thick (25-mm copper shell and a lead matrix material. This last canister is intended to contain 72 used CANDU fuel bundles in four layers of 18 bundles each.
Both the Canadian and Swedish conceptual designs for the disposal of spent fuel l
in canisters provide for surrounding the canister with backfill material as
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part of the waste package when it is emplaced in the repository. This backfill material would be packed arcund the canister to retard the movement of ground water and radionuclides.
Investigations of backfill material at the Stripa j
mine in Sweden have shown that bentonite and silica sand can be employed i
successfully as backfill, both around the canister and in repository tunnels.
4 A bentonite-silica mixture is the reconnended backfill material on the basis of its thermal and mechanical properties. Bentonite backfills have been shown to produce hyoraulic conductivities that are very similar to the surrounding i
granite at Stripa. Problems concerning the variability of bentonite samples from different geographic locations can be eliminated if material from.a single source is used. The presence cf sulfur and some organic material, including bacteria, in many bentonites poses some problems related to microbially-accelerated corrosion. Treatment with hydrogen peroxide may be used to oxidize these organics. Heating the bentonite to 400 degrees C can also be effective, although this may alter the crystal structure of the bentonite.
Many countries intend to dispose of their high-level radioactive waste by first converting the wastes into a solid, vitrified form after reprocessing. Since the leaching of the waste form by circulating ground water after disposal is the most likely mechanism by which the radionuclides might be returned to the biosphere, the waste form must be composed of a highly stable material with an extremely low solubility in ground water. Thus, the waste form itself should function as an immobilization agent to prevent any significant release of radionuclides to the biosphere over very long time periods. The two primary materials currently being considered for use as solidified waste forms are borcsilicate glass and SYNROC, a man-made titanate ceramic material.
SYNROC was initially developed in Australia as an alternative material to borcsilicate gicss.
It is composed primarily of three minerals (hollandite, zirconolite, and perovskite) which collectively have the capacity to accept the great majority of radioactive high-level waste constituents into their crystal lattice structure. These three minerals, or closely relateo forms, occur naturally, and have been shown to have survived for many millions of years in a wide range of natural environments. SYNROC has the property of being extremely b
resistant to leaching by ground water, particularly at temperatures above 100 degrees C.
In adcition, the capacity of SYNROC to inmobilize high-levei wastes is not markedly impaired by high levels of radiation damage.
the high leach-resistance of SYNROC at elevated temperatures increases the range of geologic environments in which it may be used, such as deep geologic repositories it,both continental 6nd niarine environments.
Research and development work on improving SYNROC production technology is currently being done jointly in Australia and Japan. New methods of using metal alkoxides in the fabrication of SYNROC to obtain high homogeneity and lowered leachatility have recently been developed in Australia. The Japanese have recently developed a new method that uses titanium hydroxide, as a reducing ageht to produce SYNROC with a high density and low leach rate. A pilot facility for the production of non-radioactive SYNROC is now in operation in Australia, and a small pilot facility for producing SYNROC with radioactive constituents is being completed in Japan.
On the basis of current information from the foreign studies just described on canisters, spent fuel as a waste form, backfill materials, and alternatives to borosilicate glass weste forms, the Commission concludes that there is no basis for diminished confidence that an acceptable waste package can be developed for safe disposal of high-level waste and spent fuel.
1.C. Conclusion on Finding 1 The Commission has reexamined the basis for its First Finding in the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision in light of subsequent program developments, and concludes that Finding 1 should be reaffirmed.
The technical feasibility of a repository rests initially on identification of acceptable sites. At this time, the Commission is not aware of any evidence indicating that Yucca Mountain is not acceptable for site characterization.
There are many outstanding questions regarding the licenseability of the site, however, and they must be answered satisfactorily in order for NRC to issue a construction authorization for that site.
If data obtained during site characterization indicate that the Yucca Mountain site is not suitable for a repository, DOE is required by the NWPAA to terminate site characterization activities and report to Congress. Within six months of that determination, DOE must make a recommendation to Congress for further action to assure the safe, permanent disposal of spent fuel and high-level waste. DOE could recommend, for example, that Congress authorize site characterization at other sites. Considering DOE's investigations of other potentially acceptable sites before its exclusive focus on Yucca Mountain, the Commission has no reason to believe that, given adequate time and program resources, a technically acceptable site can not be found.
i l
- 4 The technical feasibility of geologic disposal also depends on the ability to develop effective engineered barriers, such as waste packages. DOE is i
currently evaluating six candidate materials for waste containers, including i
austenitic steel and copper-and nickel-based alloys, and is planning waste-form testing based on both spent fuel and high-level waste in borosilicate l
glass. On the basis of DOE's program, and results from Swedish investigations of a copper waste container, the Comission is confident that, given a range of waste forms and conservative test conditions, the technology is available to i
l design acceptable waste packages.
In addition to the materials testing for the waste container and waste form, there may be acditional measures that can be taken to improve the effectiveness of the engineered barriers.
It is known, for example, that the heat-loading characteristics of the wastes diminish with time. Also, the longer wastes are
- l stored before disposal, the smaller will be the quantities of radionuclides available for transport to the accessible environment.
It is also technically feasible to separate from radioactive wastes the radionuclides that constitute the principal source of heat from the nuclides of j
greatest long-tenn concern. The former radionuclides, mainly fission products i
such as cesium-137 and strontium-90, could then be stored for a period of years while the fission products decay to the point where they could be disposed of either in a manner that does not require the degree of confinement provided by a geologic repository, or in a repository 'with less concern for thermal disturbance of the host rock's expected waste isolation properties. Meantime, j
the longer-lived remaining radionuclides, such as transuranic wastes with
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elements heavier than uranium, could be disposed of in a repository away from the fission products and without the high thermal loadings that would otherwise have to be considered in predicting the long-term waste isolation performance of the geologic setting. France, Great Britain, and Japan are currently pursuing this waste management strategy or a variant of it.
The Comission emphasizes here that it does not believe that recycling technologies are required for the safety or feasibility of deep geologic disposal in the United States. Other countries, such as Canada, the Federal Repuolic of Germany, and Sweden are pursuing cisposal strategies based on a similar view. ' Reprocessing, if employed in its current stage of development, would result in additional exposures to radiation and volumes of radioactive wastes to be disposed of. For the purpose of finding reasonable assurance in the technical feasibility of geologic disposal, however, it is worth noting that technology is currently available to permit additional engineering control of waste forms if, for reasons not now foreseen, such control were deemed desirable at some future time. Meanwhile, the Comission continues to have confidence that safe geologic disposal is technically feasible for both spent fue'l and high-level waste.
DOE's current reference design for the waste package does not include backfill or packing around waste containers in the emplacement boreholes. Neither is required unoer NRC rules so long as DOE can show that applicable regulatcry
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. criteria and objectives will be met. An air gap between the container and the host rock is currently one of the barriers in DOE's design for meeting the performance objective. DOE has conducted investigations on a variety of candidate materials for backfill in a variety of geologic meaia, and the Commission finds no basis to qualify its past confidence that backfill materials can be developed, if needed, to meet applicable NRC requirements.
The current reference design for sealing boreholes, shafts, ramps and the underground facility at the Yucca Mountain candidate site employs crushed tuff and cement. Regardless of the geologic medium of the candidate site, DOE will have to show that the license application design meets NRC post-closure performance objectives. The Commission continues to have reasonable assurance that DOE's program will lead to identification of acceptable sealant materials for meeting these objectives.
Overall, from its reexamination of issues related to the technical feasibility of geologic disposal, the Commission concludes that there is reasonable assurance that safe disposal of high-level waste and spent fuel in a mined geologic repcsitory is technically feasible.
e4 e
0 4
. Original Finding 2: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that one or more mined geologic repositories for comercial high-level waste and spent fuel will be available by the years 2007-2009, and that sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond exp'iration of any reactor operating license to dispose of existing comercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in that reactor and generated up to that time.
Proposed Finding 2: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that at least one mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and that sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation of any reactor to l
dispose of the commercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time.
2.A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 2 2.A.I.
Finding Technically Acceptable Sites in a Timely Fashion In order for the Comission to find that any candidate site for a repository is technically acceptable (that is, in conipliance with NRC licensing requirements), the site must undergo comprehensive site characterization to assess its hydrologic, geologic, geochemical, and rock mechanics properties.
It is possible that a site may be found unacceptable on the basis of early in-situ testing or other site characterization activities.
It will not be possible, however, for the NRC staff to take a position before a licensing board that a site will meet NRC requirements for construction authorization until the results of all site characterization activities are available.
Even then, the staff may conclude. that the evidence from site characterization does not constitute reasonable assurance that NRC performance objectives will be met. Also, the results of the licensing hearings on construction authorization l
canr.ot be precicted.
If construction is authorized and when it is i
substantially complete, DOE is required to obtain, in addition to the construction authorization permit, a license to receive and possess waste at the geologic repository operations area in order to comence repository operations. These considerations argue for maintaining the ready availability of alternative sites if, af ter several years, site characterization or licensing activities bring to light difficulties at the leading candidate site.
In support of its argument on technical feasibility, the Comission stated in its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision that "... DOE's program is providing information on site characteristics at a sufficiently large nunber and variety of sites and geologic media to support the expectation that one or more technically acceptable sites will be identified." At the time, DOE was required under the NWPA to characterize three candidate repository sites.
The NWPAA had a major impact on DOE's repository program, however. Under the NWPAA, DOE was required to suspend site-specific activities at the Hanford, WA and Deaf Smith County, TX sites, which haa been approved by the President for site characterization for the first repository. Redirection of the repository
program to single-site characterization (or, if necessary, sequential site characterization if the Yucca Mountain site is found to be unsultable) will permit DOE to concentrate its efforts and resources on information gathering at a single site, as opposeo to spreading out its efforts over a range of sites.
the possible schedular benefits to single-site characterization, however, must be weighed for the purposes of this Finding against the potential for additional delays in repository availability if the Yucca Mountain site is found to be unsuitable. By focusing DOE site characterization activities on Yucca Mountain, the NWPAA has essentially made it necessary for that site to be found suitable it the 2007-2009 timeframe for repository availability in the comission's 1984 Decision is to be met. Clearly, the Commission cannot be certain at this time that the Yucca Mountain site will be acceptable.
Although the Comission has no reason to believe that another technically acceptable site can not be found if the Yucca Mountain site proves unsuitable, several factors raise reasonable doubts as to the availability of even one repository by 2007-2009. These include:
(1) the current reliance on a single site with no concurrently available alternatives; (2) the probability that site characterization activities will not proceed entirely without problems; and (3) the history of schedular slippages since passage of the NWPA.
For example, DOE's schedule for the first repository slipped five years (from 1998 to 2003) between January 1983, when the NWPA was enacted, and January 1987, when the first Draft Mission Plan Amendment was issued. The schedule for excavation of the exploratory shaft for the Yucca Mountain site slipped by more than three years since the issuance of the PDS in March 1986.
DOE has cited numerous reasons for past program slippages, including the need for a consultation process with States and Tribes, Congressional actions (e.g., the barrin funds in the 1987 budget appropriation for drilling exploratory shafts)g of
, and DOE's recognition that the EIS and license application would require more technical information than previously planned.
Given this history of delays, and given its understanding of current developments, the Commission can not be sure that current milestones for the repository program will be met, at least in the foreseeable future. For example, DOE has taken the position, with which NRC agrees, that sinking of exploratory shafts should not occur before it has a qualified quality assurance (QA)programinplace. The Comission believes that the aggressive, success-oriented schedule for this milestone has not allowed for unexpected developments.
Indeed, the effort to develop an approvable QA program has in itself identified problems in design control and other processes that must be i
l resolved in order to establish a fully-qualified program that addresses all l
applicable NRC licensing requirements.
Thus, although the NWPAA is a clear and strong reaffirmation of Congressional support for the timely development of a repository, the Comission in this Waste Confidence review cannot ignore the potential for delay in repository availability if the Yucca Mountain site, or any other single site designated for site characterization, is found to be unsuitable. Without alternative sites undergoirg simultaneous characterization or even surface-based testing, I
00E will have to begin characterizing another site if the site currently selected for characterization proves unsuitable. The earlier a determination j
of unsuitability can be made, the smaller the impact of such a finding would be i
on the overall timing of repository a' availability.
DOE has estimated conservatively that it would require approximately 25 years to begin site screening for a second repository, perform site characterization, submit an EIS and license applications, and await authorizations before the repository could be ready to receive waste.
In its June 1987 Mission Plan amendment, DOE stated "It... seems prudent to plan that site-specific screening leading to the identification of potentially acceptable sites should start about 25 years before the start of waste acceptance for disposal." DOE went on to say that it considered this estimate to be conservative because it does not account for expected schedular benefits from the first repository program, including improveraents in such areas as site screening, site characterization, and performance assessment techniques.
Although DOE's estimate was premised on the successful completion of a program for the first of two repositories, schedular benefits from improvements in the understanding of waste isolation processes woulo still be available. The glass waste form from the Deferse Waste Processing Facility now under construction at Savannah River, SC, for example, will be available for testing under sinulated repository conditions well before the turn of the century under current DOE schedules, and improvements in the modelling of spent fuel behavior within waste canisters can be applied in performance assessments largely irrespective of the geology of a site.
It may also be pertinent that when DOE made its l
25-year estimate for the second repository program in mid-1987, the law at the time required the simultaneous characterization of three sites, so that DOE
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could not proceed to develop one site for a repository until the completion of characterization at the site that required the most time.
Although it is still possible for a repository to be available by 2007-2009 if the current schedule does not incur major additional delays, the Conmission does not believe it would be prudent to reaffirm the Agency's 1984 finding of reasonable assurance that the 2007-2009 timetable will be met. As the Court of Appeals nuted in remanding this issue to NRC, the ultimate determination of whether a disposal facility will be available when needed "...can never rise above a prediction." The Commission is in the position of having to reach a definitive finding on events which are almost two decades away. We believe that the institutional timescale for this question can more realistically be framed in decades than in years. As the program proceeds into the next century, it will become easier for I;RC to make more definitive assessments, if necessary, of the time a repository will be available.
It 'should be noted here that the basis for the 2007-2009 timeframe in the Court remand on the " Waste Confidence" issues has changed in the past five years.
l These dates no longer represent the expected dates of expiration of the Vermont I
Yankee and Prairie Island facilities. When the operating licenses were l
originally issued for nuclear power reactors, license durations were computed 1
. 1 on the basis of a 40-year operating lifetime starting from the date of the construction permit (CP) for the facility. For many facilities, five years or i
more elapsed from the date of issuance of the CP until issuance of the operating license (OL).
In response to requests from utilities, the NRC staff has agreed to extend the dates of expiration of the OLs by computing the 40-year period of the license from the date of issuance of the OL instead of from the date of the CP. The HRC staff has already changed the expiration date for Prairie Island Units 1 and 2 from the year 2008 to the years 2013 and 2014.
The staff currently expects Vermont Yankee to request a change in its current expiration date of December 11, 2007. On the basis of the date of issuance of l
the OL for Vermunt Yankee, it is eligible for extension of its operating l
license expiration to March 2012. Therefore, if the remand were to occur today, HRC would likely be evaluating the availability of a repository by l
2012-2014, as these years are expected to represent the timeframe in which the j
OLs of the Vermont Yankee and Prairie Island facilities are due to expire.
l In light of all these considerations, the Commission believes it can have reasonable essurance that at least one repository will be available within the l
first quarter of the twenty-first century. This estimate is based on the time 1
it would take for DOE to proceed from site screening to repository operation at a site other than Yucca Mountain, if this should prove necessary. Assuming for i
the sake of conservatism that Yucca Mountain would not be found suitable for repository development, it is reasonable to expect that DCE would be able to l
reach this conclusion by the year 2000. This would leave 25 years for the attainment of repository operations at another site.
2.A.2.
Timely Development of Waste Packages and Engineered Barriers DOE's current conceptual oesign for the waste package is oiscussed in the SCP for the Yucca Mountain site. As information is obtained from site characterization activities and laboratory studies, the conceptual design will evolve in successive steges into the Advanced Conceptual Design (ACD), the LAD, and the final procurement and construction design. DOE has identified four areas of investigation related to the waste package Lt.D:
(1) waste package environment; (2) waste form and materials testing; (3) design, anslysis, fabrication, and prototype testing; and (4) performance assessrent. Numerous uncertainties exist in each of these areas. DOE's testing program will attempt to reduce uncertainties in these areas where possible.
For example, in-situ testing is expected to decrease significantly uncertainties regarding the repository host rock mass in which the waste packages will be emplaced.
In the area of performance assessment, however, where results of relatively short-term testing of complex rock-waste-ground water interactions must be extrapolated over as many as 10,000 years, it may be necessary to rely more heavily on the use of simplifying assumptions anc bounding conditions than in other areas of investigation.
As discussed under Finding 1, the Commission continues to have reasonable assurance that waste packages and engineered barriers can be oeveloped which
l l
will contribute to meeting NRC performance objectives for the repository. The timing of availability of a complete and high quality waste package and engineered barrier LAD, specifically their availability on a schedule which would permit repository operation by 2007-2009, is more difficult to assess at this time.
In contrast with the technical feasibility issues discussed under Finding 1, development of acceptable waste packages and engineered barriers for i
a repository in the 2007-2009 timeframe coes depend on the overall accepta-I bility of the Yucca Mountain site.
If the site is found to be unsuitable, I
waste package and engineered barrier development will have to begin for a different site, because, under the NWPAA, DOE may not carry out site characterization and waste package development work at sites other than the Yucca Mountain site.
1 l
Although much of the work related to waste form, materials, and performance l
assessment for the waste package can proceed independently of in-situ testing, the investigations related to waste package environment depend on the schedule for this testing. DOE's current schedule calls for completing the ACD for the waste package in 1992, and the waste package LAD in 1994 The ability to meet i
these dates will depend on whether DOE is able to resolve outstanding QA issues which have impeded shaft sinking and in-situ testing.
In sum, the Comission is not aware of any scientific or technical problems so difficult as to preclude development of a. waste package and engineered barrier for a repository at Yucca Mountain tc be available within the first quarter of the twenty-f trst century. Moreover, even given the uncertainty regarding the ultimate finding of site acceptability, and the uncertainty concerning the l
range of site-related parameters for which the engineered facility anc waste package will have to be designed, the Ccmmission finds reasonable assurance that waste package and engineered barrier development can be completed on a scheoule that would permit repository operation within the first quarter of the i
twenty-first century.
If necessary (that is, if Yucca Mountain were found unsuitable late in the program), DOE could initiate site characterization and develop waste packages and engineered barriers at another site or sites and still commence cperation before the end of the first quarter of that century.
2.A.3.
Institutional Uncertainties 2.A.3.a.
Measures for dealing with Federal-State-local concerns In its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, the Comission found that the NWPA should help to minimize the potential that differences between the Federal Government and States and Indian tribes will substantially disrupt or delay the repository program. The Comission noted that the NWPA reduced uncertainties regarding the role of affected States and tribes in repository site selection and evaluation. The Comission also said that the decision-making process set up by the NWPA provides a detailed, step-by-step approach that builds in regulatory involvement, which should also provide confidence to States and tribes that the program will proceed on a technically sound and acceptable l
l l,
basis. Despite the expected and continuing State opposition to DOE siting activities, the Comission has found no institutional developments since that time that would fundamentally disturb its 1984 conclusions on this point.
NHC regulatory involvement, for example, has indeed been built into the process. DOE has continued its interactions with NRC regarding repository program activities since the Comission's 1984 Waste Confidence decision was issued. NRC provided comments to DOE on major program documents such as the Siting Guidelines and the PDS as required by the NWPA, and NRC concurred on those documents. NRC also reviewed and provided coments to DOE on the DEAs and FEAs.
In the December 22, 1966 letter to DOE on the FEAs, the NRC staft noted that "...significant efforts were mace by DOE to respond to each of the fiRC staff major comments on the DEAs, and in fact, many of these comments have been resolved." hRC provided comments to DOE on the 1987 Uraft Mission Plan Amencment, and DOE responded to most of these comments in ti.e Final hission Plan Amendment provided to Congress on June 9, 1987.
Since enactment of the NWPAA in December 1987, DOE-ftRC interactions have focused on the Yucca Mountain site.
In January 1988, DOE issued the Consulta-tion Draft Site Characterization Plan (CDSCP) for the Yucca Mountain site. The NRC staff provided comments in the form of draft and final " point papers" on the CDSCP. The hRC comments included several objections related to: (1) the 9ailure to recognize the range of alternat.ive conceptual models of the Yucca Mct.ntain site; (2) the status of the quality assurance (QA) plans for site characterization activities; and (3) concerns related to the exploratory shaf t facility. Although the December 1988 SCP shows improvement over the CDSCP, NRC continues to have an objection involving the need for implementing a baselined QA program before beginning site characterization and an objection involving the need for DOE to demonstrate the acequacy of both the ESF design and the design control process. DOE is committed to having a qualified QA program in place before sinking the exploratory shaft at the Yucca Mountain site.
DOE has also taken measures to clarify and institutionalize the roles of other Federal agencies in addition to !!RC.
In the Draft 1986 Mission Plan Amendment, DOE described interactions with these agencies. DOE has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Mine Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor for technical support and oversight for shaft construction and other site characterization activities, and with the Department of Transportation to define the respective responsibilities of the two agencies in the waste disposal program. DOE also has interagency agreements with the Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior.
DCE!s efforts to address the concerr.s of States, local governments, and Indian finalizinganyconsultationandcooperation(C&C)DOEhasnotsucceededin tribes have met with mixed results. For example agreements as required under Section 117(c) of the NWPA, as amended. These agreements were to help resolve l
State and Tribal concerns about public health and safety, environmental, and economic impacts of a repository. Publication of the Siting Guidelines unoer i
. Section 112(a) of the NVPA resulted in numerocs lawsuits challenging the validity of the Guidelines. Similarly, the FEAs were challenged in the Ninth Circuit by affected States and tribes.
The NWFAA did nct curtail financial assistance to affected States and tribes, except to redefine and redistribute it if DOE and a State or tribe enter into a benefits agrecrent. The State of Nevada and affected local governments are currently receiving financial assistance.
DOE has attenpted to negotiate an agreement with the State of Nevada for monetary benefits under Section 170 of the NKPAA. This Section would provide for payments of 510 million per year l
before receipt of spent fuel, and $20 million per year after receipt of spent fuel until closure of the repository. These payments would be in addition to certain monetary benefits for which the State is eligible under the NWPA, as anended. Also under a benefits agreement, a Review Panel would be constituted f or the purpose of advising DOE on matters related to the repository, and for assisting in the presentation of State, tribal, and local perspectives to DCE.
The beneficiary to a benefits agreement must waive its right to disapprove the recorrendation of the site for a repository and its rights to certain impact assistance under Sections 116 and 118 of the NWPA, as amended. To date, the State of hevada has declined DOE's offer to negotiate a benefits agreement.
The NWPAA introduced several new organizational entities to the repository program with responsibilities that may contribute to resolving concerns of Federal St6te, and local governments involved in the program. Under Section 503 of the NWPAA, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB) is to evaluate the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities under the NWPAA, including site characterization ar.d activities related to packaging or
)
transportation of spent fuel. The NWPAA also established the Office of Nuclear
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Waste Negotiator, who is to seek to negotiate terms under which a State or Indian tribe would be willing to host a repository or MRS facility at a I
technically qualified site. Among the duties of the Negotictor is consultation with Federal agencies such as NRC on the suitability of any potential site for site characterization.
At the time of this writing, the President has not appointed the Negotiator.
On February 24, 1989 Congressman Morris K. Udall and Senator J. Dennett Johnston requested that the President take action to appoint an individual to this office. A Negotiator could contribute to the timely success of the repository program by providing an alternative site to the Yucca Mountain site that would still have to be technically acceptable, but th6t woula enjoy the advantage of reduced institutional uncertainties resulting from opposition of State or affectec Irdian tribes.
1 An additional measure which may 1acilitate documentation and communication of concerns related to a repository is the Licensing Support System (LSS). The l
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LSS is to provide full text search capability of and easy access to oocuments related to the licensing of the repository. Although the prirary purpose of the LSS is to expedite NRC's review of the construction, authorization application for a repository, it will be an effective mechanism by which all
LSS participants, including the State and local governments, can acquire early access to documents relevant to a repository licensing decision. DOE has the responsibility for designing the LSS.and bearing the costs associated with it, and NRC will be responsible for implementing it.
Procedures for the use of the LSS are part of revisions to 10 CFR Part 2, NRC's Rules of Practice for the adjudicatory proceeding on the application to receive and possess waste at a repository. These revisions were the result et a
" negotiated rulemaking" process in which affected parties meet to reach concensus on the proposed rule. The members of the negotiating connaittee included: DOE; NRC; State of Nevada; coalition of Nevada local governments; coalition of industry groups; and a coalition of national environmental groups.
The coalition of industry groups dissented on the final text of the proposed rule, but the negotiating process enablec !!RC to prodece a proposed rule reflecting the consensus of most of the interested parties on an important repository licensing issue.
NRC is ccmmitted to safe disposal of radioactive waste and the protection of public health and safety and the environment. Any State with a candidate site for a repository should be assured that a repository will not be licensed if it does not meet NRC criteria. NRC has its own program for interaction with the State of Nevada and affected units of local government, and will continue to provide information to Nevada and consider State concerns as requested.
Given the difficult nature of siting a repository, the Commission believes that the NWPA, as amended, has achieved the proper balance between providing for participation by affected parties and providing for the exercise of Congressional authority to carry out the national program for waste disposal.
The NKPAA provides acequate opportunity for interaction between COE and other Federal agencies, States, tribes, and local governments such that concerns can be presented to DOE for appropriate action. Both the NRC and the State or tribe can exercise considerable prerogative regarding repository development.
The State or tribe may disapprove the recommendation that the site undergo repository development. This disapproval can be overridden only by vote of both houses of Congress within 90 days of continuous session. If the State disapproval is overridden, DOE may submit an application for authorization to construct the repusitory, and, if approved, a subsequent application to receive and possess waste for emplacement. NRC will make decisions on the license applications according to the requirements of its statutory mission. Despite the complexity of the overall process and the strong views of the participants in it, the Comission sees no compelling reason to conclude that current institutional arrangements are inadequate to the task of resolving State, Federal, and local concerns in time to permit a repository to be available j
within the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
2.A.3.b.
Continuity of the management of the waste program
l l I At the time the Commission issued its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, the possibility that DOE functions would be transferred to another Federal agency t:as cited as the basis for concerns that the resolution of the radioactive weste disposal problem would likely undergo further delays. The Comission responded thht in the years since the Administration had proposed to dismantle l
DOE in September 1981, Ccngress had not acted on the proposal. The Commission further stated that even if DOE were abolished, the nuclear waste program would j
simply be transferred to another agency. The Comission did not view the potential transfer in program managec.ent as resulting in a significant loss of momentum in the waste program. The Comission also concluded that the enactment of the NWPA, which gave DCE lead responsibility for repository development, further reduced uncertainties as to the continuity of management of the weste program.
Section 303 of the NWPA did, however, require the Secretary of Energy to l
... undertake a study with respect to alternative approaches to managing the l
construction and operation of all civilian radioactive waste facilities, including the feasibility of establishing a private corporation for such purpose." To carry out this requirement, DOE established the Advisory Panel on l
Alternative Means of Financing and Managing Radioactive Waste Facilities, which j
came to be known as the "AMFN" Panel. The Panel's final report, issued in l
December 1984, cencluded thbt several organizational forms are more suited than DOE for managing the waste program, includ.ing an independent Federal agency or comission, a public corporation, ano a private corporation. The report identified a public corporation as the preferred alternative on the basis of 1
criteria developed by the Panel for an acceptable waste management organization.
In particular, the report indicated that a public corporation would be stable, nighly mission-oriented, able to maintain credibility with stakeholder, and more responsive to regulatory control than a Federal executive agency.
l Commenting on the ANFM Panel's report in April 1985, DOE recomended retaining the present managenent structure of the waste program at least through the siting and licensing phase of the program. Congress did not take action to implement the Panel's recommendations, and DOE's managenent of the waste program has remained uninterrupted.
l By enacting the NWPAA, Congress effectively reaffirmed DOE's continued management of the waste program. Congress did not revise DOE's role as the lead agency responsible for development of a repository and an MRS. Congress did establish several new entities for the purpose of advising DOE on matters l-related to the waste program, such as the NWTRE and the Review Panel, to be l
established if DOE and a State or tribe enter into a benefits agreement under l
Sec. tion 170 of the NWPAA.
Congress provided further indication of its intent l
that DOE maintain management control of the waste program for the foreseeable l
future in requiring, under Section 161, that the Secretary of DOE "... report to the President end to Congress on or af ter January 1, 2007, but nut later than January 1, 2010, on the need for a second repository."
1
4 O,
This is not to say, hoveser, that there have been no management problems in the DOE program. Since the enactment of the NWPA in 1983, only one of the five Directors of DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (0CRWM) has held the position on a permanent basis.
Inadequate progress toward an operating repository has concerned several Congressional observers, including Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural l
Resources Committee.
In February 1989 confirmation hearings for then-Secretary-of-Energy-designate James Watkins, Senator Johnston strongly criticized mounting cost projections and lack of progress in the program, and called for new and stronger management.
Whether the management structure of the repository development program should in fact be changed is a decision best left to others. The Comission believes that a finding on the likely availability of a repository should take management problems into account, but finds no basis to diminish the degree of assurance in its 1984 conclusion on this issue. Events since the submission of the AMFM Panel report do not indicate that there will be a fundamental change in the continuity of the management structure of the program any time soon.
In addition, it cannot be assumed that the program would encounter significantly less difficulty with a new management structure than it would continuing under the present one. Under either scenario, however, the Commission believes it would be more prudent to expect repository operations after the 2007-2009 timefrane than before it. Neither the problems of a new management structure l
nor those of the existing one are likely to prevent the achievement of l
repository operations within the first quarter of the next century, however.
2.A.3.c.
Continued funding of the nuclear waste management program Section 302 of the iNPA authorized DOE to enter into contracts with generators of electricity from nuclear reactors for payment of 1.0 mill (0.1 cent) per kilowatt-hour of net electricity generated in exchange for a Federal Government ccomitment to take title to the spent fuel from those reactors.
In the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, the Commission noted that all such contracts with utilities had been executed. After the 1984 Decision, then-President Reagan I
decided that defense high-level wastes are to be collocated with civilian wastes from commercial nuclear power reactors. DOE's Office of Defense Programs is to pay the full cost of disposal of cefense waste in the repository.
DOE is required under Section 302(a)(4) of the NWPA, as atended, "... annually
[to] review the amount of the fees...to evaluate whether collection of the fees will provide sufficient revenues to offset the costs...."
In the June 1987 Nuclear Waste Fund Fee Adequacy Report, DOE recommended that the 1.0 mill l
per kilowett-hour fee remain unchanged. This assessment was based on the j
assumption that an NRS facility would open in 1998, the first repository would open in 2003, and the second repository in 2023. These assumptions do not reflect changes in the waste program brought abcut by the NWPAA. enacted in i
December 1987.
T.<o such changes with significar.t potential impacts were the l
l l
l l
1
. suspension of site-specific activities related to the second repository until at least 2007, and the linkage between MPS construction and operation and the
)
granting of a repository construction, authorization, which will probably occur j
no earlier than 1998.
According to the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment, DOE should currently be preparing the 1988 fee-adequacy analysis on the basis of the changes to the waste program brought about by the NWPAA. The new fee adequacy report will reflect overall program cost savings to the utilities resulting from: (1) 1 limiting site characterization activities to a single site at Yucca Hountain, IW; and (2) the DOE Office of Defense Programs' sharing other program costs with generators of electricity "...on the basis of numbers of waste canisters handled, the portion of the repository used for civilian or defense wastes, and the use of various facilities at the repository," in addition to paying for activities solely for disposing of defense wastes. An additional factor which may eventually also contribute to the overall adequacy of Nuclear Waste fund fees is the likelihood that a significant number of utilities will request renewals of reactor operating lifetimes beyond their current OL expiration cates. OL renewaI would provide additional time during which Nuclear Waste Fund fees could be adjusted, if necessary, to cover any future increase in per-unit costs of waste management and disposal.
The Comission recognizes the potential for program cost increases over estimates in the 1987 liuclear Waste Fund Fee Adequacy Report.
If there is a significant delay in repository construction, for example, it is reasonable to assume that construction costs will escalate. There may also be additional costs associated with at-reactor dry cask storage of spent fuel, if DOE does not have a' facility available to begin accepting spent fuel by the 19S8 date specified in the NWPA. These costs would be further increased if one or more licensees were to become insolvent and DOE were required to assume responsibility for storage at affected reactors before 1998.
The full impact of the program redirection resulting from the NWPAA and the outlook for the timing of repository availability will continue to be assessed annually.
If it does appear that costs will exceea available funds, there is provision in the NWPA for DOE to request that Congress adjust the fee to ensure full-cost recovery. Thus, the Commission finds no reason for changing its basic conclusion that the long-term funding provisions of the Act should provide adequate financial support for the DOE program.
1 2.A.3.d.
DOE's schedule for repository development At.the time that the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision was issued, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, enacted in January 1963, had been in effect for less than 20 months. The NWPA had established numerous deadlines for various repository program milestones.
UnderSection112(b)(1)(B),theNWPAsetthe 4
schedule for recommendation of sites for characterization no later than January 1, 198b. Section II4(a)(2) specified that no later than March 31, 1987, with t
1 provision for a 12-month extension of this deadline, the President was to recommend to Congress one of the three characterized sites qualified for an application for repository construction authorization. Under Section 114(d),
NRC was to issue its decision approving or disapproving the issuance of a construction authorization not later than January 1,1989, or the expiration of three years after the cate of submission of the application, whichever occurs later. Section 302(a)(5)(B) required that contracts between DOE and utilities for payments to the Waste Fund provide that DOE will be91n dispcsing of spent tuel or high-level raste by January 31, 1998.
In little more than a year after enactment, the schedule established by the NWPA began proving to be optimistic.
In the reference schedule for the repository presented in the April 1984 Draft Mission Plan, for example, DOE showed a slip from January 1989 to August 1993 for the decision on construction authorization.
In the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, the Comission recognized the possibility of delay in repository availability beyond 1998, and did not define its task as finding confidence that a repository would be available by the 1998 milestone in the NWPA. The Commission focused instead on the question of whether a repository would be available by the years 2007-2009, the date cited in the court remand as the expiration of the OLs for the Vermont Yankee and Prairie Island reactors. The NRC believed that the NWPA increased the chances for repository availability within the fir'st few years of the twenty-first century, by specifying the means for resolving the institutional and technical issues most likely to delay repository completion, by establishing the process for compliance with NEPA, and by setting requirements for federal agencies to cocperate with DOE in meeting program milestones.
Finding that no fundamental technical breakthroughs were necessary for the repository program, the commission predicted that "... selection and characterization of suitable sites and construction of repositories will be accomplished within the general time frame established by the Act [1998) or within a few years thereafter."
In January 1987, DOE issued a Draft Mission Plan Amendment to apprise Congress of significant developments and proposed changes in the repository program.
In the Draft Amendment, DOE anncunced a five-year delay in its schedule for repository availability from the first quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2003. DOE's reasons for the delay included the need for more time for consultation and interaction with States and Tribes, the requirement in DOE's 1987 budget thet funds not be used for drilling exploratory shafts in 1987, and l
the need for more information than previously planned for site selection and the license application. The 1987 Draft Mission Plan Amendment set the second quarter of 1968 as the new date for exploratory shaft construction at the Yucca Mountain site. When the final 1987 Mission Plan Amendment was submitted to Congress in June 1987, the schedule for shaft sinking at the Yucca Nountain site hao slipped six months to the fourth quarter of 1988. Congress did not take action to approve the June 1987 Mission Plan Amendment as DOE had requested.
. On December 22, 1987, the NWPAA was enacted. The NWPAA had its major impact on the repository program in suspcnding site characterization activities at the Hanford and Deaf Smith County sites and authorizing DOE to characterize the Yucca Mountain site for development 6f the first repository.
DOE subsequently issued the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment in June 1968, to apprise Congress of its plans for implementing the provisions of the NWPAA.
In the Draft 1958 Mission Plan Amendment, DOE's schedule for shaft sinking at l
Yucca Mountain had slipped another six months to the second quarter of 1989.
At this writing, the schedule for shaft sinking is November 1989, but NRC and DOE have agreed that DOE must first have a qualified QA program in place. DOE efforts to date to qualify 9 s QA program have revealed issues requiring DOE attention before shaft exca.ation can begin, and it is possible that additional issues affecting DOE's readiness will come to light.
Realistically, as the date for shaft sinking slips, the date for repository operation nust be adjusted to reflect this slip. This might not be the case if the original schedule had provided for periods of time between, critical milestones that could absorb delays without affecting the schedule for repository operation. This is not the case with the schedule for the repository. The repository scheoule has always been agressive and highly success-oriented.
In corr.ments on the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment, the Comission r40ted that the schedule has not allowed adequately for contingencies, and that, given the compression in the scheoule for near-term program milestones, DOE has not shown how it will be able to meet the 2003 milestone for repository operation.
Another potential source of delay in repository availability may arise from NRC regulations. The Comission believes that current 14RC rules are fully adequate to permit DOE to proceed to develop and subnitt a repository license application, but further clarification of these rules is desirable to reduce the time needed to conduct the licensing proceeding itself.
In order to meet the three-ye6r schedule provided in the NWPA for a Comission decision on repository construction authorization, the NRC staff has undertaken to refine its regulatory framework on a schedule that woula still permit DOE to prepare and submit an application for repository construction authorization under its current schedule. The Comission fully expects to avoid delaying DOE's program, while working to reduce the uncertainties in NRC regulatory requirements that could become contentions in the licensing proceeding.
Even if there are eny delays resulting from a need for DOE to accomodate more specific regulatory requirements in its site characterization or waste package development )rograms, however, the Comission is confident that the time savings in tie licensing proceeding will more than compensate for them.
In' view of the delays in exploratory shaft excavation since the 2003 date for repository availability was set, it may be optimistic to expect that Phase 1 of repository operations will be able to begin by 2003. As DOE's schedule for repository availability has slipped a year and a half since the date was
i l l changed from 1998 to 2003, the earliest date for repository availability would probably be closer to 2005.
i An institutional issue that may furth'er affect DOE's schedule is the status of EPA standards for disposal of spent fuel and high-level waste. These standards are required under Section 121(a) of the NWPA. Under 10 CFR Section 60.112, NRC's overall postclosure system performance objective, the geologic setting l
l shall be selected and the engineered barrier system, which includes the waste package, must be designed to assure that releases of radioactive materials to the accessible environment, following permanent closure, conform to EPA's standards. 40 CFR Part 191, the EPA standards, first became effective in hovember 1985.
In July 1987, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated anc rem 6nded to EPA for further proceedings Subpart B of the high-level radioactive waste disposal standards. As noted under the aforementioned 1.A.I., the standards have not been reissued.
A significant modification in the reissued EPA standard may affect the schedule j
for completing the oesign of the waste package and engineered barrier to the extent that design testing is planned to demonstrate compliance with the standards. DOE's current site characterization plans for demonstrating compliance with 40 CFR Part 191 are based on the standards as promulgated in 1985. DOE is proceeding to carry out its testing program developed for the 1
original EPA standards. DOE has stated that if the EPA standards are changed i
I significantly when they are reissued, DOE will reevaluate the adequacy of its testing program.
4 The Commission believes that DOE's approach is reasonable. Much of the information required to demonstrate compliance with the EPA standards is i
expected to remain the same regardless of the numerical level at which each standard is set. Considering the importance of developing the repository for waste disposal as early as safely practicable, it would be inappropriate for DOE to suspend work on development of engineered barriers pending reissuance of the standards, unless EPA had given clear indications of major changes in them.
Another possibility is that, regardless of any changes in the repromulgated EPA standards, they will be litigated in Federal court. Even if this proves to be the case, however, the Cor rission believes that any such litigation will still j
permit EPA to promulgate final standards well within ths time needed to enable D0E to begin repository operations at any site within the first quarter of the I
twenty-first century.
l 1
Given the current pace of the DOE program, and assuming that the QA program can
{
be qualified and shaft excavation begun within the next year, the Commission finds it is still possible, though less likely, that a repository at Yucca Modhtain will be available by 2007-2009. To the extent that the expiration of the OLs for Prairie Island and Vermont Yankee continue to be relevant in this I
proceeding, the Commission believts it is more likely that a repository will be l
available by the anticipated dates of extension of the OLs for those plants in 2012-2014.
If DOE determines that the Yucca Mounta1n site is unsuitable, the i
O
l 1 !
Consission considers it reasonable to expect that DOE could make this 1
determination by the year 2000 and have a repository at another site available l
within the first quarter of the next. century.
(
l 2.B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Comission's Original Decision 2.B.1.
NRC stated in 9-14-87 correspondence to Sen. Breaux on pencing nuclear waste legislation that under a program of single site characterization, "...there may be a greater potential for delay of ultimate operation of a repository than there is under the current j
regime where three sites will undergo at-cepth characterization l
before a site is selected." To what extent does the NWPAA raise uncertainty about the identification of a technically acceptable site l
and potential delay in repository availability by limiting site characterization to a single candidate site (Yucca Mt.) and by I
raising the possibility that a negotiated agreement might influence repository site selection? Does this uncertainty affect confidence in the availability of a repository by 2007-20097 i
i In providing coments to Cor.gress on proposed amendments to the NWPA, NRC tock l
the position that simultaneous site characterization of three sites, as required by the NWPA, was not necessary to, protect public heulth and safety.
NRC further stated that the adequacy of a site for construction authorization i
wculd ultimately be determined in a licensing proceeding, and that NRC would only license a site that satisfied NRC licensing requirements. As described l
next, the Conmiission believes that the NWPAA contains numerous provisions to ensure thet a technically acceptable site will be identified.
The NWPAA coes not reduce the scope of site characterization activities that DOE is authorized to uncertake. The Amendments Act establishes a Nuclear Waste Technical Review Boarc composed of individuals recommended by the National l
Academy of Sciences and appointed by the President to evaluate the scientific validity of DOE activities, including site characterization activities, and to repcrt its findings at least semiannually to Congress and DOE. The Amendments Act also provides funding for technical assistance tc States, tribes, and l
affected units of local government. Finally, Section 160(1) of the NWPAA provides that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to amend or otherwise detract from the licensing requirements of the NRC established in Title II of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5841 et seq.)."
In providing j
for these reviews and in reaffirming NRC's licensing authority, the NWFAA i
ensures that a candicate site for a repository must satisfy all NRC requirements and criteria for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes in licensed geologic repositories.
Section 402 of the NWPAA establishes the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, The duty of the Negotiator is to attempt to find a Sthte or tribe i
willirg to host a repository or MRS at a technically qualified site. The Negotiator may solicit coments from NRC, or any other Federal agency, on the l
suitability of any potentiEl site for site characterization.. Section403(d)(4) strengthens the Comission's cor.fidence that a technically acceptable site will be identified by providing that DOE may construct a repository at a negotiated site only if authorized by NRC. Given these safeguards on selection of a technically acceptable site, the Comission does not consider that the possibility of a negotiated agreement reduces the likelihood of finding a technically qualified site.
The Commission raised the concern as early as April 1987 that under a program l
of sir.gle-site characterization, there could be considerable delay while characterization was completed at another site or slate of sites if the initially chosen site were found inadequate. By terminating site characterization activities at alternative sites to the Yucca Mounthin site, the NhPAA has had the effect of increasing the potential for delay in repository availability if the Yucca Mountain site proves unsuitable. The provision in the NWPAA for a Negotiator could reduce the uncertainty and associated delay in restarting the repository program by offering an alternate to the Yucca Mountain site; but at the time of this writing, a Negotiator has i.ot been appointed.
It should be noted here that the repository progran, redirection under the f;hPAA does not, per se, have a significar.t impact on the Comission's assurance of repository availability by 2007-2009. The Comission's reservations about reaffiming this timeframe derive from other considerations, including delays in sinking shafts and the potential for other delays in meeting program milestones, that would have arisen without the NWPAA.
The Amendments Act does, however, effectively make it necessary that Yucca Mount 6fn be found suitable if the 2007-2009 timefrain. is to be met; this target period would alocst certainly be unachievable if DOE had to begin screening to characterize 6nd license another site. Thus, confidence in repository availability by 2007-2009 implies confidence in the suitability of Yucca flountain. The Comission does not want its findings here to constrain in any way its regulatory discretion in a licensing proceeding. The Comission has therefore concluded that even if the program were on schedule, it would be inappropri6te to reaffirm the 2007-2009 timeframe in the 1984 Decision.
2.B.2.
In the Draft 1988 Mission P16n Amendment, DOE stated that "...the data indicate that the Yucca Mountain site has the potential capacity to accept at least 70,000 MTHH [ metric tons heavy metul equivalent]
of waste, but only after site characterization will it be possible to determine the total quantity of waste that could be accommodated at this site."
a.
Do the issues of limited spent fuel capacity at Yucca Mountain, i
indefinite suspension of the second repository program, and the likelibced that no more than one repository will be available by A--
_a___---_-
_a_
_-------2
' 2007-2009 undermine the IRC's 1984 assurance that " sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond expiration of any reactor operating license to dispose of existing commercial high level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time 7" b.
Is there sufficient uncertainty in total spent fuel. projections (e.g., from extension-of-life license amendments, renewal of operating licenses for an additional 20 to 30 years, or a new generation of reactor designs) that this Waste Confidence review should consider the institutional uncertt.inties arising from having to restart a second repository program?
2.B.2.a.
Although it will not be possible to determine whether Yucca Mountain can accomodate 70,000 MTHM or more of spent fuel until af ter site characterization, the Comission does not believe that the question of repository capacity at the Yucca Mountain site should be a major factor in the analysis of Finding 2.
This is because it cannot be assumed that Yucca Mountain will ultimately undergo development as a repository. The generic issue of repository capacity does add to the potential need for more than one repository, however.
As noted earlier, the h'WPA established deadlines for major milestons.s in the development of the first and the second repository progran.s. The Act also required !!RC to issue a final decision on the construction authorization, application by January 1,1989 for the first repository, and January 1,1992 tor the second (or within three years of the date of submission of the applications, whichever occurred later). The July 1984 Draft DOE Mission Plan set January 1998 and Octot,er 2004 as the dates for commencement of waste emplacement in the first and second repositories, assuming that Congressional authorization was obtained to construct the second repository.
Thus, at the time the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision was issued, DOE was authorized and directed to carry out two repository programs under a schedule to make both facilities operational by 2007-2009. DOE and NRC were also working under the constraint, still in force under the NWPA as 6 mended, that no more than 70,000 MTHM may be emplaced in the first repository before the second is in operation. Because DOE estimated at the tism that commercial U.S.
nuclear power plants with operating licenses or construction permits woule discharge a total 100,000 MTHM of spent fuel, it appeared that at least two rep'esitories would be needed.
In the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, reactors were assumed to have a 40-year operating lifetfre, and because the earliest licenses were issued in 1959 and the early 1960's, the oldest plants' licenses were due to expire as early as 1999 and 2000, as discussed in more detail below. Although it was expected l
that at leest one repository would be available by this time, there was also a limit as to how quickly spent fuel could be accepted by the repository. DOE had estimated that waste acceptance rates of 3400 MTHM per year could be achieved after the completion of Phase 2 of the first repository. This rate could essentially double if two repositories were in operation. At 6000 MTHM/ year, it was estimated that all the anticipated spent fuel could be emplaced in the two repositories by about the year 2026. This was the basis for the Comission's position that sufficient repository capacity would be available within 30 years beyond expiration of any reactor OL to dispose of existing commercial high level waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor I
and generated up to that time.
In May 1986, hcwever, DOE announced an incefinite postponement of the second repository program. The reasons for the postponement included decreasing forecasts of spent fuel discharges, as well as estim6tes that a second repository wculd not be needed as soon as originally supposed. With enactment of the flWPAA in December 1987, DOE was required to terminate all site-specific activities with respect to a second repository unless such activities were specifically authorized and funded by Congress. The NWPAA required DOE to j
report to Congress on the need for a second repository on or after January 1, 2007, but not later than January 1, 2010.
current DOE spent fuel projections, based on the assumption of no new reactor orders, call for 87,000 MTHM to have been ' generated by the year 2036, inclucing approximately 9000 MTHM of defense high-level waste. With the likelihood that there will te reactor lifetime extensions and renewals, however, the no-new-orders case probably underestimates total spent fuel discharges. Also, the NWPAA did net change the requirement that no more than 70,000 MTHM could be emplaced in the first repository before operation of the second.
It therefore appears likely that two repositories will be needed to dispose of all the spent 9uel and high-level wsste from the current generation of reactors, unless Ccngress provides statutcry relief from the 70,000 MTHM limit, and the first site has adequate capacity to hold all of the spent fuel and high-level waste generated. The Commission believes that if the need for an additional repository is established, Congress will provide the needed institutional support and funding, as it has for the first repository.
For a11 but a few licensed nuclear power reactors, OLs will not expire until l
some time in the first three decades of the twenty-first century. Several utilities are currently planning to have their OLs renewed for ten to 30 years beyond the original license expiration. At these reactors, currently available spent fuel storage alternatives effectively remove storage Capacity as a potential restriction for safe operations. For these reasons, a repository is not,needed by 2007-2009 to provice disposal capacity within 30 years beyond j
expiration of most OLs.
If work is begun on the second repository program in l
2010, the repository could be available by 2035, according to DOE's estimate of 25 years for the time it will take to carry out a program for the second repository. Two repositories available in approximately 2025 and 2035, each with acceptance rates of 3400 MTHM/ year within several years after commencement
~
~
. of operations, would provide assurance that sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years of OL expiration for reactors to dispose of the spent fuel generated at their sites up to that time.
There are several reactors, however, whose OLs have already expired or are due to expire within the next few years, and which are now licensed or will be licensed only to possess their spent fuel.
If a repository is not available until about 2025, these reactors may be exceptions to the second part of the Commission's 1984 Finding 2, which was that sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond the expiration of any reactor OL to dispose of the commercial high-level waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time.
The basis for this seccnd part of Finding 2 has two components: 1)atechnical or hardware component; and 2) an institutional component. The technical component relates to the reliability of storage hardware and engineered structures to provide for the safe storage of spent fuel. An example would be the ability of spent fuel assemblies to withstand corrosion withir, spent fuel storage pools, or the ability of concrete structures to maintain their integrity over long periods.
In the 1964 Decision, the Comission found confidence that available technology could in effect provide for safe storage of spent fuel for at least 70 years.
Tho Comission's use of the expression "30 years beyond expiration of any reactor operating license" in the 1984 Finding was based on the understanding that the license expiration date referred to the scheduled expiration date at the time the license was issued.
It was also based on the understanding that, in order to refuel the reactor, some spent fuel would be discharged from the reactor within twelve to eighteen months after the start of full power operation.
Thus, the Comission understood that, depending on the date of the first reactor outage for refueling, some spent fuel would be stored at the reactor site for most of the 40-year term of the typical CL.
In finding that spent fuel could be safely stored at any reactor site for at least 30 years after expiration of the OL for that reactor, the Comission indicated its expectation that the total curation of spent fuel storage at any reactor would be about 70 years.
Taking the earliest licensed power reactor, the Dresden 1 facility licensed in 1959, and adding the full 40-year operating license duratir>n for a scheduled license expiration in the year 1999, the Comission's finding would therefore entail removal of all spent fuel from that reactor to a repository within the succeeding 30 yeers, or by 2029. Even if a repository were not available until the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century, DOE would have at least four years to ship the reactor's 683 spent fuel assemblies, totalling 70 metric tons initini heavy metal (MTIHM), from Dresden I without exceeding the -
Comission's 30-year estimate of the maximuni time it would take to dispose of the spent fuel generated in that reactor up to the time its OL expired.
(MTIHM
I
- 47 is a measure of the mass of the uranium in the fuel (or uranium and plutenium if it is a mixed oxide fuel) at the time the fuel is placed in the reactor for irradiation.)
Considering'the experience from the 1984 and 1985 campaigns to return spent tuel from the defunct West Valley reprocessing facility to the reactors of origin, 70 metric tons of BWR spent fuel can easily be shipped within four years. The first campaign, involving truck shipments of 20 metric tons from West Valley, NY, to Dresden 1 in Morris, IL, took eleven months. The second, l
involving truck shipments of 43 tons from West Valley to the Oyster Creek reactor in Toms River, NJ, took six months.
(See Case Histories of West l
Valley Spent Fuel Shipments, Final Report, NUREG/CF-TB47 WPR-86(6811)-1,
- p. 2-2.)
This estimate assumes, moreover, that no new transportation casks, designed to ship larger quantities of older, cooler spent fuel, for example, would be available by 2025.
The institutional part of the question concerning the availability of sufficient repository capacity required the Ccmission to make a finding as to whether spent fuel in at-reactor storage would be safely maintained after the expiration of the facility OL. This question related to the financial and managerial capability for continued safe storage and monitoring of spent fuel, rather than to the capability of the hardware involved. The Comission determined, in Finding 3 of its 1984 Decis' ion, that spent fuel will be managed in a safe manner until sufficient repository capacity is available to assure safe disposal, which was expected under Finding 2 to be about 30 years after the expiration of any reactor OL.
(See discussion of Finding 3 below for additional' discussion of the institutional aspects of spent fuel storage pending the availability of sufficient disposal capacity.)
The availability of a repository within the first quarter of the twenty-first century holds no significant adverse implications for the Comission's i
institutional concern that there be an organization with adequate will and I
wherewithal to provide continued long-term storage after reactor operation.
This could be a concern if a significant nurter of reactors with significant quantities of spent fuel onsite were to discontinue operations indefinitely between now and 1995, and the utility-owners of these reactors did not appear to have the resources to manage them safely for up to 30 years pending the assumed availability of a repository in 2025.
No such development is likely.
No licenses for currently operating commercial nucle 6r reactors are schedulcd to expire until the year 2000, and most such licenses will expire during the first two decades after 2006.
(SeeNuclear Regulatory Comission 1989 Information Digest, NUREG-1350, Vol.1, p. 33.) The ava'ilability of the first repository by 2025, and of~ a second repository within one or two decades thereafter, would provide adequate disposal capacity for timely removal of the spent fuel generated at these reactors.
1
\\
. There are severr.1 licensees, however, whose authority to operate their comercial reactors has already been terminated. These are Indian Point 1 Dresoen 1, Humboldt Bay, and Lacrosse. They are also the only licensed power reactors that are retired with spent fuel being stored onsite. ' Assuming l
conservatively that a repository does not become operational until 2025, it l
appears likely that spent fuel will remain at these sites for more than 30.
years beyond the time their reactors were indefinitely shut down, at which point their operating licenses could be considered to have effectively expired, although they will continue to hold a pcssession license for the storage of the spent fuel.
In considering the means and motivation of the owner of an indefinitely retired reactor to provice safe long-term storage, the Comission believes it is useful to distinguish between the owner with cnly one reactor, and the owner of a reactor at a multi-unit site or an owner with operating reactors at other sites.
In the case of a retired reactor at a multi-unit site, the owner would have a clear need to maintain the safety of storage at the retired reactor sufficiently to permit continued generation at the site.
If the owner of the retired reactor also owned other reactors at other sites, the spent fuel at the retired reactor could be transferred, if necessary, to the storage facilities of other units still under active management. Of the four reactors just cited, Indian Point I and Dresden 1 fit this description, and the sibling reactors at their sites are operating under licenses that do not expire until well beyond the year 2000 -- that is, well within the post-OL period during which the comission has found that spent fuel could be safely stored pencing the availability of a repository.
For the Lacrosse and Huniboldt Bay reactors, the Comission is confident that.
even if a repository is not available within 30 years following their retirement, the cverall safety and environmental acceptability of extended spent fuel storace will also be maintained for these exceptional cases.
Because there will still be an NRC possession license for the spent fuel at these facilities, the Comission will retain ample regulatory authority to require any measures, such as removal of the spent fuel remaining in storage pools to passive dry storage casks, that might become necessary until the time that DOE assumes title to the spent fuel under contracts pursuant to the NWPA.
It should also be borne in mind that Humbolot bay and Lacrosse are both small early reactors, and their combined spent fuel inventory totals 67 metric tons of initial heavy metal.
(See Spent Fuel Storage Requirements (DOE /RL 88-34)
October 1988, Table A.3b., pp. A.15-A.17.)
If for any reason not now foreseen, this spent fuel can no longer be saanaged by the owners of these reactors, and DOE must assume responsibility for its management earlier than currently planned, this quantity of spent fuel is well within the capability of DOE to manage onsite or offsite with available technology financed by the utility either directly or through the Nuclear Waste Fund.
Nor does the Comission see a significant safety or environmental problem with i
premature retirements of additional reactors.
In the Comission's origir.a1 Waste Confidence Decision, it found reasonable assurance that spent fuel would
3 have to spend no more than 30 years in post-operational storage pending the availability of a repository. For a repository conservatively assumed to be available in 2025, this expected 30-y. ear maximum storage duration remains valid for most reactors, and would be true for all reactors that were prematurely retired after 1995. Based on the past history of premature shutdowns, the j
Comission has reason to believe that their likely incidence during the next 4
six years will be small as a proportion of total reactor-years of operation.
Historically, 14 of the 125 power reactors that have operated in the U.S. over the past 30 years have been retired before the expiration of their operating licenses. These early retirements included many low-power developmental reactors, which may make the ratio of 14 to 125 disproportionately high as a basis for projectirg future premature shutdowns.
I The Comission is aware of currently operating reactors that may be retired before the expiration of their OLs, including:
the recently-licensed Shoreham reactor, which has generated very littie spent fuel; the Fort St. Vrain nigh-temperature gas-cooled reactor, which its owner plans to decommission; and the Rancho Seco reactor, which has operated for the past 12 years and may or may not be retired. Assuming that all these and perhaps a few more reactors do retire in the next several years, their total spent fuel storage requirements would not impose an unacceptable safety or environmental problem, even in the unlikely event that all these reactors' owners were rendered financially or otherwise unable to provide adequate care,'and DOE were required to assume custody earlier than currently envisior,ed under the NWPA.
Licensed non-pcwer research reactors provide an even more manageable case. DOE owns the fuel for almost all of these reactors, many of which have been designed with lifetime cores thct do not require periodic refueling.
For those reacto s that do discharge spent fuel, DOE accepts it for storage or r
reprocessing, and not more than ar estimated 50 kilogranis of such spent fuel are generated annually.
Thus, given these worst-case projections, which are not expectations but bounding estimates, the Comission finds that a delay in repository availability to 2025 will not result in significant safety or environmental impacts due to extended post-operational spent fuel storage. To put it another way, the Comission is confident that, even it a repository were not available within 30 years after the effective expiration of the OLs for both currently retired reactors and potential future reactor retirements through 1995, the overall safety and environmental impacts of extended spent tuel storage would be ir,significant.
2.B,.2.b.
Although it is clear that there is uncertainty in projections of total future spent tuel discharges, it is not clear that the institutional uncertainties arising from having to restart a second repositcry program should be considered in detail in the current Waste Confidence Decision review.
. License renewals would have the eff ect of increasing requirements for spent fuel storage. The Comission understands that some utilities are currently planning to seek renewals for 30 years. Assuming for the sake of establishing a conservative upper bound that the Comission does grant 30-year license renewals, the total operating lite of some reactors wculd be 70 years, so that the spent fuel initially generated in them would have to be stored for about 100 years if a repository were not available until 30 years after the expiration of their last Ots.
Even under the conservative bounding assumption of 30-year license renewals for all reactors, however, if a repository were available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the oldest spent fuel could be shipped off the sites of all currently operating reactors well before the spent fuel initially generated in them reached the age of 100 years. Thus, a second repository, or aoditional capacity at the first, would be needed only to accorroodate the additional quantity of spent fuel generated during the later years of these reactors' cperating lives. The availability of a secono repository would permit spent fuel to be shipped oftsite well within 30 years after expiration of these reactors' OLs.
The same would be true of the spent fuel discharged from any new generation of reactor designs.
In sum, although sonic uncertainty in total spent fuel projections does arise from such developments as utilities' planning renewal of OLs for an additional 20 to 30 years, the Comission believes th'at this Waste Confidence review need not at this time consider the institutional uncertainties arising from having to restart a second repository program.
Even if work on the second repositury program is.not begun until 2010 as contemplated under current law, there is sufficient assurance that a second repository will be available in a timeframe that woulo not constrain the renoval of spent fuel from any reactor within 30 years of its licented life for operation.
2.B.3.
Are early slippages in the DOE repository program milestones significant encugh to affect the Comission's confidence that a repository will te available when needed for health and safety reasons?
The 2007-2009 timeframe imposed on the Ccomission by the May 23, 1979 remand by the Court of Appeals was based on the scheduled expiration of the OLs for the Vermont Yankee and Prairie Island nuclear reactors. The specific issues remanded to the Comission were: 1) whether there is reasonable assurance that an offsite storage solution will be available by the years 2007-2009(the expiration of the plants' operating licenses); and, if not, 2) whether there is i
rea,sonable assurance that the fuel can be stored safely at t'ne sites beyond l
those cates.
j There was no finding by the Court that public health and safety required offsite storage or disposal by 2007-2009.
In directing the Commission to address the safety of at-reactor storage beyond 2007-2009, the Court recognized
, l the possibility that an offsite storage or disposal facility might not be available by then.
In any case, the years 2007-2009 no longer have che same meaning for this proceeding as they had in 1984; the OLs for Prairie Island and Vermont Yankee have been or will scon' be extended to 2012-2014, on the basis of hRC's past willingness to approve a 40-year operating lifetime from the date of issuance of the OL.
The Comission has not identified a date by which a repository must he available for health and safety reasons. Taking into account institutional requirements for spent fuel storage, the Comission found, under Finding 3 in the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, that spent fuel would be safely managed until sufficient repository capacity is available. The Comission also found, however, that in effect, under the second part of Finding 2, safe management woulo not need to continue for more than 30 years beyond expiration of any I
reactor's 0L, because sufficient repository capacity was expected to become available within thcse 30 years. Considering that spent fuel would not have to be stored more than 30 years af ter any reactor's 40-year OL expiration, and taking into account the technical requirements for such storage, the Ccmission went on to determine under Finding 4 that, in effect, spent fuel could be safely stored 1or at least 70 years after discharge from a reactor. Thus, the Commission's 1984 Decision did not establish a time when sufficient repcsitory capacity would be required; it established a minimum period during which 1
storage would continue to be safe and environmentally acceptable pending the expected av611 ability of sufficient repository capacity.
Bearing in mind that reactor facilities were originally designed and OLs issuec for a licensed life for operation of 40 years, the Comission is proposing elsewhere in this Federal Reoister not ici a clarifying revision of Finding 4 to i
say that spent f uel can be safely stor d at a reactor for at least 30 years l
~
after the " licensed life for operation" of that reactor.
Implicitly, the l
proposed use of the phrase " licensed life for operation" clarifies that the Comission found in 1984 that NRC licensing requirements for reactor facility design, construction, and operation provide reasonable assurance that spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for et least the first 40 years of the reactor's life.
The Comission's proposed finoing also implies that, barring any significant and pertinent unexpected developments, neither technical nor institutional constraints would adversely affect this assurance for at least another 30 years af ter that first 40 years.
Another implication of this revised finding is that, where a utility is able to meet NRC requirements to extend that reactor's operating lifetime by license renewal, spent fuel storage for at least 30 years beyond the end of the period of extended life will also be safe and without significant environmental impacts.
In' assessing the effect of early slippages in DOE repository program milestones, therefore, the most important consideration is not the earliest date thtt an operating license actually expired, but the earliest date that an OL was issued. Thc earliest OL to be issued was for Dresden 1 in 1959, follcwec by a number of reactors licensed for operation in 1962.
The OLs for
l i all of the 111 power reactors now licensed to operate are currently scheduled to expire sometime within the first three decades of the twenty-first century, which is also the period in which their currently licensed life for operation would end.
(See Nuclear Regulatory Comission 1989 Information Digest, NUREG-1350, Vol. 1, p. 33.) Thus, conservatively assur..ing here that there will be no license renewals, the earliest timeframe when a repository might be needed to dispose of spent fuel from the majority of reactors is 2029-2050.
)
As proposed in the first part of Finding 2, the Comission has reasonable
{
assurance that a repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
Even if a repository were not available until 2025, this would be several years before the beginning of the earliest timeframe within which, based on an assumed 30-year storage after an assumed 40-year licensed life of reactor operation, a repository might be needed for spent fuel disposal. Thus, early slippages in DOE's program milestones do not affect the Comission's confidence that a repository will be available within that timeframe.
2.B.4 NRC has stated that the 3-to 4-year license application review schedule is optimistic, and that for NRC to meet this schedule, DOE must submit a complete ano high-quality license application.
In the September 16, 1988 HRC comments.to DOE on the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment, the Comission requested that DOE acknowledge its comitment to develop this complete and high-quality application,
even if this woulo result in longer tines to collect the necesshry information and subsequent delays in submitting the license application."
Will NRC's emphasis on the completeness and quality of the license application have a significant effect on the timing of the submittal of the license application and subsequent licensing proceeding to grant construction authorization in time for repository availability by 2007-20097 As the flRC indicated to DOE in NRC's October 25, 1985 coments on the draft PDS, the three-year statutory schedule for the NRC licensing proceeding on the application for construction authorization is optimistic. The Comission has sought ways to improve the prospects for meeting this schedule, for example by develcping the LSS for expedited cocument discovery during the licensing proceecing, j
In the same correspondence on the PDS, NRC also stated that the adequacy of the three-year review period depends on DOE's submittal of a complete and high-quality application. A license application supported by inadequate data may lead to findings during the licensing proceeding that the results of certain tests cannot be admitted as part of the license application.
If it is not possible to repeat the tests in question, NRC may have no alternative but i
to deny the application -- with a consequent loss of program momentum and considerable financial cost.
NRC recognizes that emphasis on a complete and high-quality license application ray cause sonie near-term delays that could make it difficult to achieve the i
current schedule calling for submittal of the construction authorization i
application in 1995. Notwithstanding any such delays, the Commission has I
reasonable assurance that if the Yucca Mountain site is not found unsuitable, a repository at that site could be available by the 2012-2014 timeframe, consistent with the rescheduled OL expiration dates for Prairie Island and Vermont Yankee. For reasons discussed previously, this timeframe now appears more relevant to the Waste Confidence proceeding than the 2007-2009 timeframe.
In any case, the Commission remains convinced that the benefits to the repository program of submitting a high-quality license application would outweigh the cost of delay in preparing the application. NRC has always placed great emphasis on early resolution of potential licensing issues in the interest of expeditious review of the license application and timely repository availability.
It is in the sane spirit of timely repository operation that the Commission is urging greater attention to quality than to meeting the schedule for submittal of the license application. NRC believes that a complete and high-quality license application offers the best available assurance that timely repository licensing and operation can be achieved.
In addition to expediting the review of th'e application, a high-quality license application and site characterization program should enhance overall confidence that any site granted a construction authorization will prove to be reliable curing the. period of performance confirmation.
It will also increase public confidence that the program is being carried out in a thorough and technically sound nwnner.
2.C. Conclusion on Finding 2.
In reexamining the technical and institutional uncertainties surrounding the timely development of a geologic repository since the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, the Commission has been led to question the conservatism of its expectation that a repository. would be available by 2007-2009.
At the time of the 1984 Decision, the Commission said that timely attainment of a repository did not require DOE to adhere strictly to the milestones set out in the NWPA, and there would be delays in some milestones.
It did not appear to the Commission at the time that delays of a year or so in meeting any of the milestones would delay the date of repository availability by more than a few years beyond the 1998 deacline specified in the Act.
Since then, however, several developments have made it apparent that delays of scre than a few years are to be the norm rather than the exception in the early years of this program. There has been a five-year slip in DOE's estimate of I
repository availability from 1998 to 2003, and DOE has been unable to meet such near-term repository program milestones as excavation of the exploratory shaft and the start of in-situ testing. There remains the possibility that potential repository availability at the Yucca. Mountain site will be further delayeo oue 4
to unforeseen problems during site characterization. These developments do not I
in themselves rule out the possibility that DOE will still be able to achieve repository operation by 2007-2009, but they do suggest that to expect repository operation by then may be optimistic.
In the Comission's view, 2012-2014 is now a more relevant timeframe than 2007-2009. When the Court issued its 1979 remand, 2007-2009 was when the OLs for Vermont Yankee and Prairie Island were scheduled to expire. The operating licenses for the two Prairie. Island units have since been extended to 2013 and 2014, and the operating license for Vermont Yankee is eligible for extension to 2012. These extensions have been made available under the Commission's policy that the allowable operating life of a licensed reactor shoulo not be foreshortened because of construction delays.
It therefore seems reasonable for NRC to make its finding on the timing of repository availability by 2012-2014, rather than by 2007-2009. The Comission has a greater degree of assurance that if the Yucca hountain site is suitable, a repository would be available there by 2012-2014.
For the sake of conservatism, however, the suitability of Yucca Mountain should not be assumed. Yucca Mountain is now the only candidate site available; the
!!WPAA required that DOE terminate site cha'racterization activities at all sites other than the Yucca Mcuntain site.
In effect, the 2007-09 schedule for repository availability could be met only if Yucca Mountain survived the repository. development process as a licensed site.
If this site were found to be unlicenseable or otherwise unsuitable, characterization would have to begin at another site or suite of sites, with consequent further delay in repository availability. The final decision on the suitability of the site to proceed to licensing and repository development will rest with DOE, but the position et the NRC staff will figure in that decision. The staff will nct be able to make l
l a recommendation to a licensing board to authorize repository construction at l
Yucca Mountain until all site characterization activities have been completed.
DOE might thus be unable for several more years to determine whether there will in fact have to be a delay to find and characterize another site.
Another reason the Commission is unwilling to assume the suitability of Yucca Mountain is that NRC must be mindful of preserving all its regulatory options
-- including a recommendation of license application denial -- to assure adequate protection of public health and safety from radiological risk.-.In our view, it is essential to dispel the notion that for schedular reasons there is no alternative to the currently preferred site. This view is consistent with pas,t Comission statements that the quality of DOE's preparations for a license application should take precedence over timeliness where the two conflict.
It is also consistent with the view that because we are making predictions about completion dates for a unique and complex enterprise at least some 20 years 4
hence, it is more reasonable to express the timescale for completion in decades rather than years.
In order to obtain a conservative upper bound for the timing of repository availability, the Commission has made the assumption that the Yucca Mountain site will be found to be unsuitable.
If DOE were authorized to initiate site screening for a repository at a different site in the year 2000, the Comission believes it reasonable to expect that a repository would be available by the year 2025. This estimate is based on the DOE position that site screening for a second repository should begin 25 years before the start of waste acceptance.
the consideration of technical and institutional issues presented here has found none that would preclude the availability of a repository within this timeframe.
For the second part of its 1984 finding on repository availability, the Commission found reasonable assurance that sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond expiration of any reactor OL to dispcse of existing comercial high level waste and spent fuel originating in that reactor and generated up to that time. The Connission believes that this finding should also be modified in light of developments since 1984.
When the Commission made this finding, it took into consideration both technical and institutional concerns. The. technical concern centered on the ability of the spent fuel and the engineered at-reactor storage facilities to meet the requirements for extended post-operational storage before shipment for dispcsal. The institutional question concerned whether the utility currently responsible for post-operational at-reactor storage, or some substitute organization, would be able to assure the continued safety of this storage.
The principal new developments since 1984 that bear on these questions are: 1) that dry spent fuel storage technologies have become operational on a comercial scale; and 2) that several utilities are proceeding with plans to seek renewals of their OLs, with appropriate plant upgrading, for an additional period up to 30 years beyond the 40-year term of their current licenses. The accumulation of operating experience with ory-cask storage, a technology requiring little active long-term maintenance, provides adriitional assurance that both the technical and institutional requirements for extended post-0)erational spent fuel storage will be met. License renewals, however, would inve the effect of increasing requirements for both the quantity and possibly the duration of storage.
If the Comission were to grant 30-year license renewals, the total operating life of some reactors coulo be 70 years, l
so that the spent fuel initially generated in such reactors would have to be stored for about 100 years, if a repository were not available until 30 years l
ditbr the expiration of their last OLs. This raises the question as to whether that spent fuel, and the hardware and civil engineering structures for storing it, can centinue to nieet NRC requirements for an additional 30 years beyond the period the Comission supported in 1984.
tor all the reasons cited In the discussion of Finding 4, the Comission believes there is ample technical basis for confidence that spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmental impact at these reactors for at least 100 years.
If a repository were available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the oldest spent fuel could be shipped off the sites of all currently operating reactors well before the spent fuel initially generated in them reached the age of 100 years.
The need to consider the institutional aspects of storage beyond 30 years after OL expiration was nut in evidence in 1984 because the Commission was confident that at least one repository would be available by 2007-2009. On that schedule, waste acceptance of spent fuel from the first reactor whose operating license had expired (Indian point 1, terminated in 1980) could have begun within 30 years of expiration of that license.
If a repository does not prove to be available until 2025, however, it would not be available within 30 years of the time that OLs could be considered effectively to have expired for Indian Point I and the three other plants with spent fuel onsite that were retireo before the end of their licensed life for reactor operation. The same would be true of any additional reactors prematurely retired between now and 1995, when the 30-year clock starts for the availability of a repository by 2025.
Premature shutdowns notwithstanding, the Comission has reasons to be assured that the spent fuel at all of these reactors will be stored safely and without significant environmental impact until sufficient repository capacity becomes available.
Considering first the technical reaso~ns for this assurance, it is important to recognize that each of these reactors and its spent fuel storage installation were originally licensed in part on the strength cf the applicant's showing that the systems and components of concern were designed and built to assure
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safe operation for 40 years under expected normal and transient severe conditions. All of the currently retired reactors have a significant portion of that 40-year expected life remaining, and all have only small quantities of spent fuel onsite in storage installations that were licensed to withstand 1
considerably larger thermal and radiation loadings from much greater quantities of spent fuel. Of the four reactors currently retired with spent fuel onsite, i
the two with far the longest terms of operation, Lacrosse and Dresden, were operated for 19 and 18 years, respectively.
For the continued safe management of the spent fuel and storage installations at any existing or potential prematurely retired plant, the Ccmission believes it can reasonably rely on the continued structural and functional integrity of the plant's engineered storage installations for at least the balance of its originally licensed life as if the OL were still in effect. This is to say that for the purposes of Finding 2, no foreseeable technical constraints have artsen to disturb the Comission's assurance that spent fuel storage at any reactor will remain safe and environmentally acceptable for at least 30 years ef ter its licensed life for operation, regardless of whether its OL has been terminated at an earlier date.
I
The Comission also sees no insurmountable institutional obstacles to the continued safe management of spent fuel during the remainder of any shutdown reactor's initially licensed lite for operation, or for at least 30 years thereafter.
Because there will still be an NRC possession license for the spent fuel at any reactor that has indefinitely suspendeo operations, the Comission will retain ample regulatory authority to require any measures, such I
as removal of the spent fuel remaining in storage pools to passive dry storage casks, that might appear necessary after an OL expires.
Even if a licensed utility were to become insolvent, and responsibility for spent fuel management were transferred to DOE earlier than is currently plar.neo, the Comission has no reason to believe that DOE would have insufficient Nuclear Waste Fund resources or otherwise be unable to carry out any safety-related measures NRC considers necessary. Thus, in the case of a premature reactor retirement, the Comission has an adequate basis, on both technical and institutional grounds, for reasonable assurance that spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond not only the actual end of that reactor's OL, but the end of its originally licensed life for operation.
In sum, considering developments since 1984 in the repository development program, in the operating performance of LI.S. power reactors, and in spent fuel storage technology, the Comission finds that: (1) the overall public health, safety, and environmental impacts of the possible unavailability of a repository by 2007-200g would be insign1ficant; and (2) neither 30-year renewals of reactor licenses nor a delay in repository availability to 2025 will result in significant safety or environmental impacts from extended post-operational spent fuel storage.
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The Comission finds ample grounds for its proposed revised findings on the expecteo availability of a repository. The institutionni support for the repository program is well-established. A mechanism for funding repository program activities is in place, and there is a provision in the NWPA tor adjusting, if necessary, the fee paid by utilities into this fund. Congress has continued to provide support for the repository program in setting milestones, delineating responsibilities, establishing advisory bodies, and providing a mechanism for dealing with the concerns of States and affected Indian tribes.
Technical support for extended spent fuel storage has improved since 1984.
Considering the growing availability, reasonable cost, and accumulated l
operating experience with new dry cask spent fuel storage technology since l
then, the Comission now has even greater assurance that spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmental impact for at least 30 I
years af ter the expected expiration of any reactor's OL. Where a reactor's OL has been terminated before the expected expiration date, the Comission has an adequate basis to reaffirm what was implicit in its initial concept, namely:
that regardless of the actual date when the reactor's operating authority effectively ended, spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond that reactor's licensed life for operation.
There is thus no foreseeable health and safety or environmental requirement that a repository be maos available within the 2007-2009 timeframe at issue in the Comission's original proceeding. Nor does the Comission see a radiological safety or environmental requirement for repository availability at the end of the expected revised timeframe of 2012-2014 for the expiration of
+he Prairie Island and Vermont Yankee OLs.
l Indeed, the Comission sees important NRC mission-related grounds for avoiding any statement that repository operation by 2007-2009 is required. Geologic disposal of high-level radioactive wastes is an unprecedented endeavor.
It requires reliable projections of the waste isolation performance of natural and engineered barriers over millennia. After the repository is sealed, retrieval of the emplaced wastes will no longer be practicable, and the comitment of I
wastes to that site will, by design, be irreversible.
In DOE's testing, both in the laboratory and at the candidate repository site, in its development of facility and waste-package designs, and in all other work to demonstrate that NRC requirements will be met for a repository at Yucca Hountain, the Comission believes that the confidence of both NRC and the public depenas less on meeting the schedule for repository cperation than on meeting safety requirements and doing the job right the first time. Thus, given the Comission's assurance that spent fuel can safely be stored for at least 100 years if necessary, it appears prudent for all concerned to prepare for the better-bucerstood and more manageable problems of storage for a few more years in order to provide additional time to assure the success of permanent geologic disposal.
This is not to say that the Comission is unsympathetic to the need for timely progress toward an operational repository.
It is precisely because NRC is so confident of the national commitment to achieve early repository operation that the Comission believes it no longer need add its weight to the considerable pressures alreacy bearing on the DOE program. There is ample institutional 1mpetus on the part of others, including Congress, the nuclear power inoustry, State utility rate regulatory bodies, and consumers of nuclear-generated power, toward DOE achievement of scheduled program milestones. With continuing confidence in the technical feasibility of geologic disposal, the Comission has no reason to doubt the institutional comitment to achieve it in a timeframe well before it might beconie necessary for safety or environmental reasons.
Indeed, the Comission believes it advisable not to attempt in this review a more precise NRC estimate of the point at which a repository will be needed for radiological safety or environmental reasons, lest this estimate itself undermine the comitment to earlier achievement of repository operations. The Comission continues to hope that a repository will in fact be available by 2007-2009, and has found nothing to date that would conclusively prevent this achievement.
l To find reasonable assurance that a repository will be available by 2007-2009, however, is a different and more consequential proposition in the context of l
this review.
In light of the delays the program has encountered since its iriception, and the regulatory need to avoid a prenature committent to the Yucca Mountain site, the Commission cannot prudently describe a basis for assurance that the current DOE schedule for repository operation in 2003 will ret slip another tour to six years under any reasonably foreseeable circumstances. The Commission could more easily substantiate a finding that a repository will be available within the revised 2012-2014 timeframe that would be created by extending the OLs of the reactors in question when the Waste Confidence proceeding began. Even this revised estimate, however, could too easily be misir.terpreted as an NRC estinate of the time at which continued spent fuel storage at these sites would be unsafe or environmentally significant. The Commission's enhanced confidence in the safety of extended spent fuel storage provides adequate grounds for the view that NRC need rot at this tine define more precisely the period when, for reasons related to NRC's mission, a permanent alternative to post-operational spent fuel storage will be needed.
The Commission therefore proposes the following revision of its original Finding on when sufficient repository capacity will be available:
The Commission finds reasonable assurance that at least one mined geologic repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century, and sufficient repository capacity will be available within 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation of any reactor to dispose of the commercial high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel originating in such reactor and generated up to that time.
em 0
9 l
)
Original Finding 3: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel will be managed, in a safe manner until sufficient repository c6pacity is available to assure the sate disposal of ali high-level waste and spent fuel.
Proposed Finding 3: Same as above 3.A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 3 In the Comission's discussion of Finding 3 in its Waste Confidence Decision (49FR 34658, August 31,1984), in Section 2.3 ' Third Comission finding,' the l
Comission stated, Nuclear power plants whose operating licenses expire after the years 2007-09 will be subject to NRC regulation during the entire period between their initial operation and the availability of a waste repository. The Comission has reasonable assurance that the spent fuel generated by these licensed pbnts will be managed by the licensees in a safe manner.
Compliance with the NRC regulations and any specific license conditions that may be imposed on the licensees will assure adequate protection of I
the public health and safety. Regulations primarily addressing spent fuel storage include 10 CFR Part 50 for storage at the reactor facility and 10 CFR Part 72 for storage in independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). Safety and environr. ental issues involving such storage are i
addressed in licensing reviews under both Parts 50 and 72, and continued I
storage operations are audited and inspected by NRC. NRC's experience in more than 80 individual evaluations of the safety of spent fuel sturage shcws that significant releases of radioactivity from spent fuel under licensed storage conditions 6re extremely remote.
Some nuclear power plant operating licenses expire before the years 2007-09.
For technical, economic or other reasons, other plants may choose, or be forced to terminate operation prior to 2007-09 even though their operating licenses have not expired.
For example, the existence of a safety problem for a particular plant could prevent further operation of the plant or could require plant modifications that m6ke continued plant operation uneconomic. The licensee, upon expiration or termination of its license, may be granted (uncer 10 CFR Part 50 or Part 72) a license to retain custody of the spent fuel for a specified term (until repository l
capacity is available and the spent fuel can be transferred to DOE unoer Sec.123 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982) subject to NRC regulations and license conditions needed to assure adequate protection of the public. Alternatively, the owner of the spent fuel, as a last resort, may 6pply for an interim storage contract with DOE, under Sec.135(b) of
. the Act, until not later than 3 years after a repository or monitorec retrievable storage facility is available for spent fuel. For the reasons discussed above, the Comission is confident that in every case the spent fuel generated by those plants will be managed safely curing the period 4
1
. between license expiration or termination and the availability of a mined waste repository for disposal.
Even if a repository does not become available until 2025, nothing has occurred during the five years since its original Decision to diminish the Comission's confidence that high-level waste and spent fuel will be managed in a safe manner until a repository is available. The same logic just stated continues to apply through the first quarter of the twenty-f trst century. NRC regulations remain adequate to assure safe storage of spent fuel and radioactive high-level waste at reactors, at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), and in an MRS until sufficient repository capacity is available.
10 CFR Subsection 72.42(a) provides for renewal of licensed storage at ISFSIs j
for additional 20-year periods for interim storage, or for seditional 40-year periods for monitored retrievable storage of spent fuel and solidified radioactive high-level waste if an MRS facility is constructed, licensed, and operated. This would ensure that spent fuel and solidified high-level waste, if any were to be delivered to an HRS facility, would ren;ain in safe storage under NRC regulation throughout its storage. The Comission has also published for public coment a proposed amendment to Part 72, to issue a general license to reactor operating licensees to use approved spent fuel storage casks at reactor sites.
If this proposed amencment is promulgated, no specific Part 72 license would be required, Operating license holders would register with NRC to use approved casks on their sites.
Spent fuel may ccntinue to be stored in the reactor spent fuel pool under a Part 50 " possession only" license after the reactor has ceased operating.
In addition, DOE's policy of disposing of the oldest fuel first, as set forth in its Annual Capacity Report, makes it unlikely that any significant fraction of total spent fuel generated will be stored for longer than the 30 years beyond the expiration of any operating reactor license. This expectation, established in the Comission's original proceeding, continues to be reasonable, even in the event that a repository is not available until sone time during the first quarter of the twenty-first century. Even in the case of premature shutdowns, where spent fuel is most likely to remain at a site for 30 years or longer beyond OL expiration (see Finding 2, previously discussed), the Comission has confidence that spent fuel will be safely managed until safe disposal is available.
Until the reactor site has been fully decommissioned, and spent fuel has been transferred from the utility to DOE as required by NRC regulations, the licensee remains responsible to NRC. Furthermore, under 10 CFR Subsection 50.54bb, originally issued in final form by the Comission with its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, a reactor licensee must provide to NRC, five years before expiration of an OL, notice of plans for spent fuel disposition. Accordingly, the Comission concludes that nothing has changed since the enactment of the i
Nuclear Kaste Policy Act of 1982 and the Waste Confidence Decision in August 1984 to diminish the Comission's "... reasonable assurance that high-level
. radioactive waste and spent fuel will be managed in a safe manner until sufficient repository capacity is available...."
Pursuant to the NWPA, the Comission. issued in final form 10 CFR Part 53, I
" Criteria and Procedures for Determining Adequacy of Available Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity," addressing the determination of need, if any, for DOE interim storage. No applications were received by the June 30, 1969 NWPA I
deadline incorporated into the Comission's rule, and it seems unlikely that cny applications will be made to NRC for interim storage by DOE. Even if HRC were to mcke an exception for a late application, a determination must be made before January 1,1990 to comply with the NWPA.
3.B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since the Comission's Original Decision on Finding 3.
Although a DOE facility will not be available to enable the Department to begin accepting spent fuel in 1998, as provided in the contracts under the NWPA, the l
Comission's confidence in safe storage is unaffected by any potential contractual dispute between DOE and spent fuel generators and owners as to responsibility for spent fuel storage.
In the event that DOE does not take title to spent fuel by this date, a licensee under either 10 CFR Part 50 or Fart 72 cannot abanden spent fuel in its possession. Further, the Comission notes that only two reactors are currently ~ scheduled for shutoown before 2003, DOE's anticipated repository startup date.
(See Nuclear Regulatory Comission 1509 Informaticr. Digest, NUREG-1350, Vol. 1, p.33). To resolve any continuing uncertainties, however, it would be helpful if DOE and utilities and other spent fuel. generators and owners could reach an early and amicable resolution to the question of how and when DOE will accept responsibility for spent fuel.
This would facilitate cooperative action to provide for a smoothly operating system for the ultimate disposition of spent fuel.
The Comission recognizes that the NWPA limitation of 70,000 NTHit for the first I
repositcry will not provide adequate capacity for the total amount of spent fuel projected to be generated by all currently operating licensed reactors.
The NWPAA effectively places a moratorium on a second repository program until 2007-2010. Either the first repository must be authorized ano able to provide expanded capacity sufficient to accommodate the spent fuel generated, or there must be more than one repository. Since Congress specifically provided in the NWPAA for a first repository, and required DOE to return for legislative authorization for & second repository, the Comission believes that Congress will continue to provide institutional support for adequate repository capacity.
The. Commission's confidence about the availability of repository capacity is not affected by the possibility that some existing reactor licenses might be renewed to permit continued generation of spent fuel at these sites. Because only two reactor licenses are scheduled to expire before 2003, the impact of license renewals (a matter not considered in the Comission's 1984 Decision) l
will have no significant effect within the first quarter of the twenty-first century on scheduling requirements for a second repository. Renewals may slightly alleviate the need for a second repository in the short term, because spent fuel storage cepacity will be expanded for extended storage at these reactor sites. Over the longer term, renewals might increase spent fuel generation well into the latter half of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, nothing in this situation diminishes the Commission's assurance that safe storage will be made available as needed.
In summary, the Commission finds no basis for changing the Third Finding in its Waste Confidence Decision. The Commissicn continues to find "... reasonable assurance that high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel will be canaged in a safe manner until sufficient repository capacity is available to assure the safe disposal of all 'uth-level waste and spent fuel."
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. original Fincing 4: The Comission finds reascnable assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of that reactor's operating license at that reactor's spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.
Propcsed Finding 4: The Comission finds reasonable assurance that, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be storec safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the licensed lite for operation (which may include the term of a revised license) of that reactor at its spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations.
4.A. Issues Considered in Comissior's 1984 Decision on Finding 4.
In the Commission's discussion of Finding 4 in its Weste Confidence Decision (49 FR 34658, August 31,1984) Section 2.4 " Fourth Comission Finding," the Comission said that:
Although the Comission has reasonable assurance that at least one mined geclogic repository will be available by the years 2007-09, the Comission also realizes that for various reasons, including insufficient capacity to imediately dispose of all existing spent fuel, spent fuel may be stored in existing or new storage facilities for some periods beyond 2007-09.
The Comissien believes that this extended storage will not be necessary for any period longer than 30 years beyond the term of an operating license.
For this reason, the Comission hos addressed on a generic basis in this decision the safety and environmental impacts of extended spent tuel storage at reactor spent fuel basins or at either onsite or offsite
~
spent fuel storage installations. The Comission finds that spent fuel ccn be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of reactor operating licenses. To ensure that spent fuel which remains in storage will be managed properly until transferred to DOE for disposal, the Cc mission is proposing an amencment to its regulations (10 CPR Part 50). The amendment will require the licensee to notify the Comission, five years prior to expiration of its reactor operating license, how the spent fuel will be managed until disposal.
The Comission's finding is based on the record of this proceeding which indicates that significant releases of radioactivity from spent fuel under licensed storage conditions are highly unlikely.
It is also supported by the Comission's experience in conducting more than 80 individual safety
, evaluations of storage facilities.
The safety of prolonged spent fuel storage can be considered in terms of tour major issues:
(_ a) The long-term integrity of spent fuel under water l
pool storage conditions, (b) structure and component safety for extended 4
1
facility operation, (c) the safety of dry storage, and (d) potential risks I
of accidents and acts of sabotage at spent fuel storage facilities."
For reasons discussed above, the Comdission arrived at a provisional figure of
/0 years or more for storage (i.e., a 40-year reactor OL span, plus 30 years or ms.~ c).
The 70-year-plus estimate is supported by oral testimony from the nuclear industry to the Comission in the Waste Confidence Proceeding.
(See Transcript of Commission Meeting, "In the 11atter of: Meeting on Waste Confidence i
Proceeding," January 11, 1982, Washington, DC, pp. 148-160). This testimony specifically addressed safety issues related to water pool storage of spent fuel and supported the po!,ition that spent fuel could be stored for an indefinite period, citing the industry's written submittal to the Comission in the proceeding.
(See "The Capability for the Safe Interim Storage of Spent Fuel" (Dccument 4 of 4), Utility Nuclear Waste Management Group and Edison Electric Institute, July 1980). Some of this material alluded to in the oral l
testimony was subsequently referenced by the Comission in its discussion of water pool storage issues and its Fourth Finding of reasonable assurance that spent fuel and high level waste "...will be tranaged in a safe manner."
(See 49 FR 34658 at pp. 34681-2, August 31,1984).
l If a reactor with a 40-year initial license were to have that license renewed for another 30 years, the Corsission believes that the spent fuel generatt;d at that reactor can be safely stored for at least several decades past the end of the 70-year operating period. Adding to these 70 years the expected 30-year post-OL period during which the Comission believes, under Finding 2, that sufficient repository capacity will be mace available for any reactor's spent fuel, the total storege time would be about 100 years.
In making the original Fourth Finding, the Comission did not determine that for technical or regulatory reasons, storage would have to be limited to '70 years. This is apparent from the Comission's use of the words "... ter at least 30 years beyeno the expiration of that reactor's operating license...
[errphasis added]." Similarly, in using the words "at least in its proposed revised Finding Four, the Comission is not suggesting 30 years beyond the licensed life for operation (which may include the term of a revised license) represents any technical limitation for safe ano environmentally benign storage. Degradation rates of spent fuel in storage, for example, are slow l
enough that it is hard to distinguish by degradation alone between spent fuel in storage for less than a decade and spent fuel stored for several decades.
The Comission's proposed revised Finding here is meant to apply both to wet storage in reactor pools and dry storage in engineered facilities outside the reattor containment building. Both dry and wet storage will be discussed in detail next.
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Since the original Waste Confidence Decision, which found that material degradation processes in dry storage were well-understood, and that dry-storage systems were simple, passive, and easily maintained, NRC and ISFSI operators have gained experience with dry storage which confirms the Commission's 1984 conclusions. NRC staff safety reviews of topical reports on storage-system designs, the licensing and inspection of storage at two reactor sites, and NRC promulgation of the Part 72 amendment for MRS, have significantly increased the agency's understanding of and confidence in dry storage.
Under NWPA Section 218(a), DOE has carried out spent fuel storage research and development as well as demonstration of dry cask storage at its Idaho National
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Engineering Laboratory. Demonstration has been carried out for metal casks under review or previously reviewed by HRC staff. DOE has also provided support to utilities in dry storage licensing actions (see Godlewski, N.Z.,
" Spent Fuel Storage -- An Update," Nuclear News, Vol. 30, No. 3 March 1987, i
I pp.47-52).
Dry storage of spent fuel has become an available option for utilities, with at-reactor cry storage licensed and underway at two sites: the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, in Scuth Carolina, and the Surry Nuclear Station in Virginia. NRC has received an application for dry storage at Duke Power Con:pany's Oconee Power Station site as well. This application is still under review, but the environmental review is completeo and an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact have been issued (see 53 FR
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44133, November 1,1988). Based on ut1111;y statements of intent, and projections of need for additional storage capacity at reactor sites, the NRC statf expects numerous applications from utilities over the next decade (see l
" Final Version Dry Cask Storage Study," DOE /RW-0220, February 1989).
i Since the original Waste Confidence finding, the Commission has reexamined long-term spent fuel storage in issuing an amendment to 10 CFR Part 72 to aedress the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste in an MRS, as envisioned by Congress in Section 141 of the NWPA.
Under this rule, storage in an MRS is to be licensed for a period of 40 years, with the possibility for renewal. The Commission determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 72, however.
(See 53 FR 31651, p. 31657, August 19,1988.) An environmental assessment and finding 7 f no significant impact were issued because the Commission found trat the consequences of long-term storage are not significant. The environmental assessment for 10 CFR Part 72, " Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," NUREG-1092, assessed dry storage of spent fuel for a period of 70 years after receipt of spent fuel from a reactor:
- The basis chosen for evaluating license requirements for the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in an MRS is an installation having a 70-year design lifetime and a 70,000 MTU storage capability. This assessment focuses on the potential environmental consequences for a long-term storage period, a period for
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I which the Comission needs to assure itself of the continued safe storage i
of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste and the performance of materials of construction. This means the reliability of systems important to safety needs to be established to ensure that long-ters; storage of spent fuel and HLW does not adversely inipact the environment.
For example, the staff reeds to establish that systems, such as concrete shielding, have been evaluated to determine how their physical properties withstand the consequences of irradiation and heat flux for about a 70-year period. The Consission addressed structure and component safety for extended operation for storage of spent fuel in reactor water pools in the matter of waste confidence rulemaking proceeding. The Comission's preliminary conclusion is that experience with spent fuel storage provices an adequate basis for confidence in the continued safe storage of spent fuel for at least 30 years after expiration of a plant's license. The Comissior is therefore confident of the safe storage of spent fuel for at least 70 years in water pools at facilities designed for a 40-year lifetime. The Consission also stated that its authority to require continued safe management of spent fuel generated by licensed plants protects the public and assures them the risks remain acceptable.
In preliminary conclusions were that [its] ge of spent fuel, the Commission's consideration of the safety of dry stora l
confidence in the extended cry storage of spent fuel is based on a reasonable understanding of the n.aterial degradation processes, together with the recognition that dry storage systems are simpler and more readily maintained.
In response to Nuclear Waste Policy.Act of 1982 authorizations, the Comission noted;
...the Consissien believes the inforation above [on dry spent fuel storage research and demonstration.is sufficient to reach a conclusion on the safety and environmental effects of extended cry storage. All areas-ofsafetyandenvironmentalconcern(e.g.,maintenanceofsystemsand components, preventien of material degradation', protection against-accidents and Labotage) have been addressed and shown to present no more potential for adverse impact on the environmental and the public health and safety than storage of spent fuel in water poc1s.' At this time, the Comission is confident it can evaluate the long-tern integrity of material for constructing an installation and provide the needed assurance for safe storage of spent fuel and HLW to establish the licensibility of an MRS over extended periods of time. The HRS fuel storage. concepts discussed here for revision of 10 CFR Part 72 covers only dry storage concepts. [Referencesomitted]
]
The Comission believes that its 1984 Fourth Finding should be changed to reflect the environmental assessment in the 10 CFR Part 72 MRS rulemaking and other evidence that spent fuel can be stored, safely and without significant environmental impact, for extended periods. Although the Comission does not bel.ieve storage in excess of a century to be likely, with or without an MRS, there is the potential for storage of spent fuel for times longer than 30 years beyond the expiration of an initial, extended, or renewed reactor OL, if a reactor operating under such a license were prematurely shut down. The i
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Commission does not, however, see any significant safety or environmental problems associated with storage for at least 30 years after the licensed life for operation of any reactor, even if this effectively means storage for at least 100 years, in the case of a reactor with a 70-year licensed life for operation.
Under the environmental assessment for the MRS rule, the Comission has found confidence in the safety and environmental insignificance of dry storage of spent fuel for 70 years following a period of 70 years of storage in spent fuel storage poc1s. Thus, this environmental assessment supports the proposition that spent fuel may be stored safely and without significant environmental impact for a period of up to 140 years if storege in spent fuel pools occurs first and the period of dry storage does not exceed 70 years.
The Commission has also found that experience with water-poc1 storage of spent fuel continues to confirm that pool storage is a benign environment for spent fuel that does not lead to significant degradation of spent fuel integrity.
Since 1984, utilities have continued to provide safe additional reactor pool storage capacity through reracking, with over 110 such actions now completed.
j The safety of storage in pools is wicely recognized among cognizant
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professionals. Specifically, the Commission notes one expert's view that:
During the last 40 years there has been very positive experience with the handling and storing of irradiated fuel in water; thus wet storage is now considered a proved technology. There is a substantial technical basis for allowing spent fuel to remain in. wet storage for several decades. For the past two decades, irradiated Zircaloy-clad fuel has been handled and stored in water. There coatinues to be no evidence that Zircalcy-clac fuel degrades significantly during wet storage -- this includes: fuel with burr.ups as high as 41,000 mwd /HTU; continuous storage of low-burnup fuel for as long as 25 years; arid irradiation of fuel in reactors for periods up to 22 years. Cladding defects have had little impact during wet storage, even if the fuel is uncanned.
[Referencesomitted.] [See Bailey, W.J. and Johnston, Jr. A.B., Tc F6wer Research Institute (EPRI),
et al., " Surveillance of LWR Spent Fuel in Wet Storage," HP-3765, Electr October 1984,pp.2-10.]
This last conclusion has been reaftirmed by the same authors, who recently wrote: "There continues to be no evidence that LWR spent fuel with Zircaloy or stainless steel cladding degrades significantly during wet storage [EPRI 1986; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 1982)." (See "Results of Studies on the Behavior of Spent Fuel in Storage," Journal of the Institute of Nuclear
)
Haterials Management," Vol. XVI, No. 3, April 1988, p. 27.IY A).
j In addition to the confidence that the spent fuel assemblies themselves will not degrade significantly in wet storage, there is confidence that the water poo1s in which the assemblies are stored will remain safe for extended periods:
t i
As noted in the recent IAEA wcrld survey, the 40 years of positive experience with wet storage illustrates that it is a tully-developed technology with no associated major technological problems. Spent fuel storage pools are operated without substantial risk to the public or the plant personnel. There is substantial technical basis for allowir.g spent fuel to remain in wet storage for several decades. Hinor, but repairable, problems have occurred with spent fuel storage pool components such as liners, racks, and piping. [See Bailey, W.J., and Johnson, Jr., A.B., et al. " Surveillance of LWR Spent Fuel in Wet Storage," EPRI NP-3765, iWep,ared by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Final Report, October 1984,p.6-1.]
The studies just cited support the view that rates of uniform corrosicn of spent fuel cladaing in storage pools are icw over time. Localized corrosion on cladding surfaces has also been gradual and can be expected to remain so.
I Clacding that has undergone damage while in the reactor core has not resulted in significant releases of radioactivity when stored in pools. Furthermore, the operational experience accumulated since the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision and NRC experience in licensing and inspection reinforce the conclusions in that Decisicn that wet storage involves a relatively benign environment. There are no driving mechanisms, such as temperature and pressure, to degrade storage structures or components or the fuel itself, or to spread contamination.
degradation mechanisms are gradual and well understood; they allow a ple time for remedial action, including repair cr r.eplacement of any failing systems.
This extensive experience adequately supports predictions of long-term integrity of storage basins.
The Comission also notes the endorsement of this basic confidence by cognizant i
professional organizations:
The American Nuclear Society issued a policy statement [ANS 1966] in 1986 regarding storage of spent nuclear fuel. The statement indicates that 1
continued wet storage of spent fuel at nuclear power plant sites until the federal government accepts it under existing contrccts with the utilities is safe, economical and environmentally acceptable.
[SeeGilbert,E.R.,
Bailey, W.J., and Johnson, A.B., "Results of Studies on the Behavior of l
Spent Fuel in Storage," Journal of the Institute of Nuclear Materials I
Management,Vol.XVI,No.3, April 1988,p.27.IVA).]
Thus, supported by the consistency of NRC experience with that of others, the Commission has concluded that spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmental impact, in either wet storage or in wet storage followed by dry storage, for at least 100 years. The Cormassion considers it unlikely, however, that any fuel will actually remain in wet storage for 100 years or even for 70 years. We anticipate that, consistent with the currently developing trend, utilities will move fuel rods out of spent fuel pools and into dry storage to make room in pools for freshly-discharged spent fuel.
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. 1 Although the Comission has concluded that reactor spent fuel pools can safely
{
be used to store spent fuel for 100 years, there is no technically compelling reason to use them that long.
If reactor licenses are renewed for as long as 30 years, making a total of 70 years of operation, it will be necessary to i
store the spent fuel discharged at the end of the reactor's operation in a spent fuel pool for several years to allow for radioactive decay and thermal cooling. After this period, the fuel could be placed in dry storage and the spent fuel pool decommissioned. Thus, for most reactors, the most likely maximum period of storage will be well within the extended 30-year post-operational period under the Comission's proposed revision to Finding 4.
Moreover, considering that under certain conditions spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmen'tal impacts for up to 140 years, the l
Comission believes there is ample basis for confidence in storage for at least 100 years.
l In its 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, the Comission also concluoed that "there are no significant additional non-radiological impacts which could adversely affect the environr.;ent if spent fuel is stored beyond the expiration l
of operating licenses for reactors" (see 49 FR 34658 at p. 34686, August 31, 1984). The Comission did not find anything to contradict this conclusion in its 1988 rulemaking amerding 10 CFR Part 72 for long-term spent fuel and high-level waste storage at an MRS:
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In August 1984, the NRC published an' environmental assessment for this propcsed revision of Part 72 NUREG-1092, ' Environmental Assessment for 10 CFR Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Fuel anc High-Level Radioactive Waste.' NUREG-1092 discusses the major issues of the rule and the potential impact on the environment. The findings of the environmental assessment are '(1) past experience with l
water pool storage of spent fuel establishes the technology for long-term I
storage of spent fuel without affecting the health and safety of the public, (2) the proposed rulemaking to include the criteria of 10 CFR Part 72 for storing spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste does not significantly affect the environment, (3) solid high-level waste is comparable to spent fuel in its heat generation and in its radioactive j
meterial centent on a per metric ton basis, and (4) knowledge of material degradation mechanisms under dry storage conditions and the chility to
[and safety] pairs in a reasonable manner without endangering the health l
institute re of the public shows dry storage technology options do not significantly impact the environment.' The assessment concludes that, l
among other things, there are no significant environmental impacts as a result of promulgation of these revisions of 10 CFR Part 72.
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Besed on the above assessment, the Comission concludes that the rulemaking action will not have a significant incremental environmental l
impact on the quality of the human environment.
[53 FR 31651 at pp. 31657-31658, August 19,1988.]
71 Thus, the 1988 amendments to 10 CFR Part 72 provide the basis for the i
Commission to conclude that the environmental consequences of long-term spent fuel storage, including non-radiologi, cal impacts, are not significant.
Finally, no considerations have arisen to affect the Comission's confidence since 1984 that the possibility of a major accident or sabotage with offsite radiological impacts at a spent-fuel storage facility is extremely remote. NRC has recently reexamined reactor pool storage safety in two studies, " Seismic i
Failure and Cask Drop Analyses of the $ pent Fuel Pools at Two Representative I
Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG/CR-5176) and "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools" (NUREG-1353). These studies reaffirmed that there are no safety considerations that justify changes in regulatory requirements for pool storage. Both wet-and dry-storage activities have continued to be licensed by the Comission.
In its recent rulemaking amending 10 CFR Part 72 to establish licensing requirements for an MRS, the Comission did choose to eliminate an exemption regarding tornado missile impact "...to assure designs continus to address maintaining confinement of particulate material." (53 FR 31651, p.
31655, August 19,1988). However, NRC staff had previously considered tornado i
missile impacts in safety reviews of design topical reports and in licensing reviews under 10 CFR Part 72.
4.B. Relevant Issues That Have Artsen since the Comission's Original Decision on Finding 4 In its original Finding 4, the Comission found reasonable assurance of safe storage without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond reactor OL expiration. Delays and uncertainties in the schedule for repcsitory availability since the 1984 Decision have convinced the Comission to allow some margin beyond the scheduled date for repository opening currently cited by L0E. As noted in Finding 2, the Comission has reascnable assurance that at least one repository will be available within the first quarter of the twenty-first century. For all currently operating reactors, this would still be within the period of 30 years from expiration of their OLs, which the Comission previously found to be the minimum period for which spent fuel storage could be considered safe and without significant environmental impact.
1 Under the NWPA as amended DOE 1s authorized to dispose of up to 70,000 MTHM in the first repository before granting a construction authorization for a second.
Under existing licenses, projected spent fuel generation could exceed 70,000 MThM as early as the year 2010. Possible extensions or renewals of OLs also need.to be considered in assessing the need for and scheduling the second j
repository.
It now appears that unless Congress lifts the capacity liniit on the first repository -- and unless this repository has the physical capacity to dispose cf all spent fuel generated under both the original and extended or renewed licenses -- it will be necessary to have at least one additional repository. Assuming here that the first repository is available by 2025 and has a capacity on the order of 70,000 MTHM, additional cisposal capacity would prcbably not be needed before about the year 2040 to avoid storing spent fuel at a reactor for more than 30 years after expiration et reactor OLs.
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l Although acticn on a second repository before the year 2007 would require Congressional approval, the Comission believes that Congress will take the necessary action if it becomes clear that the first repository site will not have the capacity likely to be needed.
If DOE were able to address the need J
for a second repository earlier, for example by initiating a survey for a I
second repository site by the year 2000, DOE'might be able to reduce the i
I potential requirement for extended spent fuel storage in the twenty-first l
century. The Consission does not, however, find such action necessary to concluce that spent fuel can be stored safely and without significant 4
environmental impact for extended periods.
The potential for generation and onsite storage of a greater amount of spent fuel as a result of the renewal of existing OLs does not affect the Comission's findings on environmental impacts.
In Finding 4, the Comission did not base its determination on a specific number of reactors and amount of i
spent fuel generated. Rather, the Comission took note of the safety of spent fuel storage and lack of environmental impacts overall, noting that individual actions involving such storage would be reviewed.
In the event there were J
applications for renewal of existing reitetor Ols, each of these actions would be subject to safety and environmental reviews, with subsequent issuance of an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement, which would cover storage of spent fuel at each reactor site during the period of the renewed license.
The Comission also notes that the amount of spent fuel expected to be discharged by reactors has continued to decline significantly, a trend alreacy noted in the Ccmission's discussion of its Finding 5 (49 FR 34658 at p. 34687, August 31,1984). At the time of the Comission's decision, "...the cumulative
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onount of spent fuel to be cispos g af in the yeLr 2000 [was] expected to be 58,000 metric tons of uranium" (see " Spent Fuel Storage requirements" (Update of DOE /RL-82-17) DOE /RL-83-1, January,1983). Today, that figure has declined to 40,384 metric tons (see " Spent Fuel Storage Requirements" (DOE /RL-88-34),
October 1988, p. A.17). Thus, the amount of spent fuel considered likely to be discharged by the year 2000 in the Comission's 1984 decision will not be attained until well into the second decade of the twenty-first century, if then.
The Comission believes that its 1964 Finding 4 should be revised to acknowledge the possibility and assess the safety and environmental impccts of extended storage for periods longer than 70 years. The principal reasons for i
this proposed revision are that:
(1) the long-term material and s l
degradation effects are well understood and known to be minor; (2)ystemthe ability I
to maintain the system is assured; and (3) the Comission maintains regulatory authority over any spent fuel storage installation.
1 On tha basis of experience with wet and dry spent fuel storage and related rulemaking and licensing actions, the Comission concludes that spent fuel can be safely stored without significant environmental impact for at least 100 l
years, if necessary. Therefore, the Comission proposes to revise its original
4
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a Fourth finding thus: "The Comission finds reasonable assurance tnat, if necessary, spent fuel generated in any reactor can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for at least 30 years beyond the licenseo life for operation (which may include the term of a revised license) of that reactor at its spent fuel storage basin, or at either onsite or offsite independent spent fuel storage installations."
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- 74 Original Finding 5: The Comission finas reasonable assurance that safe independent onsite spent fuel storage or offsite spent fuel storage will be made available if such storage capacity is needec.
l Proposed Finding 5: Same as above 5.A. Issues Considered in Comission's 1984 Decision on Finding 5 i
In its discussion of Finding 5 of its Waste Confidence Decision (49 FRN 34658, August 31,1984), the Comission said that:
The technology for independent spent fuel storage installations, as discussed under the fourth Comission Finding,1s available and demonstrated. The regulations and licensing procedures are in place.
Such installations can be constructed and licensed within a five-year time interval. Before pz.ssage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 the Comission was concerned about who, if anyone, would take responsibility for providing such installations on a timely basis. While the industry was hoping for a government comitment, the Administration had discontinued efforts to provide those storage facilities.... The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 establishes a national policy for providing storage facilities and thus helps to resolve this issue and assure that storage capacity will be available.
Prior to March 1981, the DOE was pursuing a program to provide temporary storage in off-site, or away-from-reactor ( APR), storage installations.
The intent of the program was to provide flexibility in the national waste disposal program anc; an alternative for those utilities unable to expand their own storage capacities.
Consequently, the participants in this proceeding assumed that, prior to the availability of a repository, the Federal government would provide for storage of spent fuel in excess of that which could be stored at reactor sites. Thus, it is not surprising that the record of this proceeding i
prior to the DOE policy chtnge did not indicate any direct comitment by the utilities to provide AFR storage. On March 27, 1561, DOE placed in j
the record a letter to the Comission stating its decision 'to discontinue its efforts to provide Federal government-owned or controlled away-from-reactor storage facilities.' The primary reasons for the change in policy i
were cited as new and lower projections of storage requirements and lack of Congressional authority to fully implement the original policy.
the record of this proceeding indicates a general comitment on the part
- of industry to do whatever is necessary to avoid shutting down reactors or cerating them because of filled spent fuel storage pools. While industry's incentive for keeping a reactor in operation no longer applies after expiration of its operating license, utilities possessing spent fuel are required to be licensed and to maintain the fuel in safe storage until removed from the site.
Incustry's response to the change in DOE's policy
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on federally-sponsored away-from-reactor (AFR) storage was basically a commitment to do what is required of it, with a plea for a clear unequivocal Federal policy.....The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 has now provided that policy.
j The Nuclear Waste policy Act defines public and private responsibilities tor spent fuel storage and provides for a limited amount of federally-supported interim storage capacity. The Act also includes i
provisions for monitored retrievable storage facilities and for a research development and demonstration program for dry storage. The Comission believes that these provisions provide added assurance that safe independent onsite or oftsite spent fuel storage will be available if needed. [Referencesosiittedj The policy set forth in the NWPA regarding interim storage remains in place.
Therefore, the Comission's confidence remains unchanged. The only policy change affecting storage involves long-term storage in an KRS. The NWPAA sets schedule restrictions on an MRS by tying it to the repository siting and licensing schedule. These restrictions effectively delay implementation of an MRS. Consequently, its usefulness in providing storage capacity relief to utilities is likely to be lost.
Although the Comission's confidence in its 1984 Decision did not depend on the availability of an MRS facility, the possibility of such a facility, as provided for in the NWPA, was one way in which needed storage could be made available. The NWPAA makes an MRS facility less likely by linking it to repository. development. The potential impact of the decreased likelihood of an MRS on the Comission's confidence is, however, more than compensated for by j
operational and planned spent fuel pool expansions and cry-storage investments by utilities themselves -- developments that had not been made operational at the time of the original Waste Confidence Decision. Consequently, the
.j statutory restrictions that may make an ERS ineffective for timely storage capacity relief are of no consequence for the Comission's finding of confidence that adequate storage capacity will be made available if needed.
1 Although the NWPAA limits the usefulness of.an MRS by linking its availability l
to repository development, the Act does provide authorization for an MRS facility. The Comission has remained neutral since its 1984 Waste Confidence i
Decision with respect.to the need for authorization of an MRS facility. The Comission does not consider the MRS essential to protect public health and safety.
If any offsite storage capacity is required, utilities may make application for a license to store spent fuel at a new site. Consequently, while the NWPAA provision does affect MRS development and therefore can be saio to be limiting, the Comission believes this should not affect its confidence in'the availability of safe storage capacity.
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. 5.B. Relevant issues That Have Arisen since the Comission's Original Decision on Finding 5 DCE will not be able to begin operation of a repository before 2003 under l
current plans, and operation might begin somewhat later. Given progress to date on an NRS, the link between NRS facility construction and repository construction authorization established by the NWPAA, and the absence cf other concrete DOE plans to store the spent fuel, it seems unlikely that DOE will meet the 199E deadline for taking title to spent fuel.
(UncerSection 302(a)(5)(S) of the NWPA, "...the Secretary, beginning not later than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel [ subject to disposal contracts).") This potential problem does not, however, affect the Comission's confidence that storage capacity will be made available as needed.
The possibility of a dispute between DOE and utilities over the responsibility for providing spent fuel storage will not affect the public hecith and safety or the environment. Uncertainty as to contractual responsibilities raises questions concerning: (1) who will be responsible; (2) at what point in time responsibility for the spent fuel will be transferred; (3) how the fuel will be managed; (4) how the transfer of management responsibility from the utilities to DOE will take place; and (5) how the cost of DOE storage might differ, if at all, from utility storage. Utilities possessing spent fuel in storage unoer NRC licenses cannot abrogate their safety responsibilities, however. Until DOE can safely accept spent fuel, utilities or some other licensed entity will remain responsible for it.
If DOE and the utilities can amicably resolve their respective' responsibilities for spent fuel storage in the interest of efficient
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er.d effective administration of the overall waste management system, including the Nuclear Waste Fund, NRC would gain added confidence in the institutional arrangements for spent fuel management (see also Finding 3 on this issue).
Estimates of the amount of spent fuel generated have continued to decline. At the time of the Comission's Decision, the Comission cited in Finding 5 the cumulative figure of 58,000 metric tons uranium of spent fuel generated in the year 2000 (See 49 FR 34658, p(. 34697, August 31,1984.) More recently, DOE estimated 40,584 mHric tons See " Spent Fuel Storage Requirements,"
DOE /RL-88-34, October 1988, p. A. 17). Although estimates may show an increase at some date well into the twenty-first century if licenses of some reactors are renewed or extenced, this possibility coes not affect the Comission's confidence in the availability of safe storage capacity until a repository is operational. The industry has made a general comitment to provide storage capacity, which could include away-from-reactor (AFR) storage capacity. To dat,e, however, utilities have sought to meet storage capacity needs at their regective reactor sites. Thus, a new industry application for AFR storage remains only a potential option, which currently seems unnecessary and uniikely.
Utilities have continued to add storage capacity by reracking spent fuel pools, and NRC expects continued reracking where 1t is physically possible and represents the least costly alternative. Advances in dry-storage technologies
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ano utility plans both have a positive effect on NRC's confidence. At the time the Comission reached its original findings, dry storage of LWR spent fuel was, as yet, unlicensed under 10 CFR Part 72, and DOE's dry-storage demonstrations in support of dry-(cask storage were in progress at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEL).
Today, DOE's demonstration efforts have been successful (See Godlewski, N. Z..
47-52, at p. 47.)ge-An Update," Nuclear News, Vol. 30, No. 3. March 1987, pp
" Spent Fuel Stora Dry storage has been TiH nsed at two reactor sites, and a third application is under review. Dry cask storace is licensed at Virginia Electric Power Company's Surry Power Station site {see License, SNM 2501 under l
Docket No. 72-2), and dry-concrete module and stainless-steel canister storage l
is licensed at Carolina Power and Light Company's (CP&L's) H. B. Robinson, Unit' 2, site (see License SNM 2502, under Docket No. 72-3). An application is under review for a similar modular system at Duke Power Company's Oconee Nuclear Station site (See Letter to Director, Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NRC, from Hal B. Tucker, Duke Power Company, dated March 31, 1988, under Docket No. 72-4). A new application has been received in 1989 for CP&L's Brunswick site, and another is expected ir.1989 for the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company's Calvert Cliffs site. Applications are also expected for CP&L's Robinson 2 site (at another or. site location to allow for greater storage capacity), Wisconsin Electric Power Company's Point Beach site, and Consumer Power's Palisades site. The Tennessee Val. ley Authority has indicated that it will apply for its Sequoyah plant site.
Thus, the successful demonstration by DOE of dry cask technology for various l
cask types.at INEL, utilities' actions to forestall spgnt fuel storage capacity l
shortfalls, and the continuing sufficiency of the licensing record for the l
Comission to authorize increases in at-reactor storage capacity all strengthen the Comission's confidence in the availability of safe and environmentally sound spent fuel storage capacity.
Renewal of reacter OLs will involve consideration of how additional spent fuel generated during the extended term of the license will be stored onsite or offsite. There will be sufficient time for construction and licensing of any additional storage capacity needed.
In sumary, the Comission finds no basis to change the Fifth Finding in its I
Waste Confidence Decision. Changes by the NWPAA, which lessen the likelihood of an MRS facility, and the potential for some slippage in repository availability to the first quarter of the twenty-first century (see our.
1 discussion of Finding 2) are more than offset by the continued success of utilities in providing safe at-reactor-site storage capacity in reactor pools and,their progress in providing independent onsite storage. Therefore, the l
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4 Comission continues to find "... reasonable assurance that safe independent onsite spent fuel storage or offsite spent fuel storage will be made available if such storage is needed."
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of September,1989 For the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
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(/ John C. Hoyle Assistant Secretary of the Comission
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