ML20248D640
| ML20248D640 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1989 |
| From: | Greger L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Reed C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908110098 | |
| Download: ML20248D640 (1) | |
Text
7 AUG 041989
-Docket No. 50-10 Docket No. 50-237 Docket No. 50-249 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Senior Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:
We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter, dated June.30, 1989, which transmitted the revised FEMA Exercise Report from the September 1987 exercise at the Dresden Nuclear Generating Station.
No deficiencies were observed during that exercise.
Six Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) were identified.
FEMA intends to verify corrective actions on these ARCAs during the November 1989 exercise.
We understand that the successful completion of corrective actions on items identified by FEMA involves actions by organizations other than Commonwealth Edison Company.
Nevertheless, we expect that your staff will continue to devote the attention necessary to resolve these offsite emergency planning concerns.
If you have any questions, please have your staff contact Mr. T. Ploski of my staff at (312) 790-5529.
Sincerely, h$k kOO b
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F L. Robert Greger, Chief j
Reactor Programs Branch
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
T. Kovach, Nuclear Licensing Manager 1
l E. D. Eenigenburg, Station Manager DCD/DCB (RIDS)
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Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Richard Hubbard
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J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public N
Utilities Division
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r f,$.%.s.i Federal Emergency Management Agency ms e
Washington, D.C. 20472
. ; 1,l JUN 3 01989 Mr. Frank J.
Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection f
and Emergency Preparedness i
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Congel:
Enclosed is a copy of the final report for the September 2,
- 1987, exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
The Counties of Grundy and Kendall fully participated in the exercise, as well as the Commonwealth Edisen Company.
Will County was exempted from e
participation, as explained in our memorandum dated August 26, 1987, to the then Acting Director, Robert E. Connor, FEMA Region V.
A copy of this memorandum is included in the attachment section of the report.
The State of Illinois partially participated in the exercise.
The report, dated December 15, 1987, with revised pages dated June 28, 1989, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V staff.
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There were no deficiencies observed during the October-30, 1987, exercise.
The report identifies six Areas Requiring Corrective Action.
The FEMA Region V staff has reviewed the schedule of corrective actions provided by the State of Illinois in response to the exercise weaknesses identified and has forwarded a copy of this report to the State.
Additional verification of corrective actions will be provided by FEMA Region V during the next exercise for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, now scheduled for November 1, 1989.
Based on our review of the final exercise report and schedule of corrective actions, FEMA considers that offsite radiological emergency preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate offsite measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, in the event of a radiological emergency occurring at that site.
Therefore, the approval of the offsite plans for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station granted under 44 CFR 350 on October 14, 1982, continues to be in effect.
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If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me on 646-2871.
'ncerely, j
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Dennis H. Kw atkowski Assistant Msociate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards I'
Enclosure O
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b EXERCISE REPORT DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY-JOINT EXERCISE Facility Location: Dresden Nuclear Power Station,' Morris, Illinois o
Exercise Date:
September 2, 1987 Draft Report Date: ' September 23, 1987 Final' Report Date: December 15, 1987
Participants:
State of Illinois (partial) Grundy and Kendall Counties (full participation), Will County (exempted from participation), and Commonwealth-Edison Ccmpany (full participation).
s FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION V NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS DIVISION 175 WEST JACKSON BLVD, 4th FLOOR CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604
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TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS page i
. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
page 1 State of Illinois page 1 Grundy County page 2 Coal City page 3 Minnoka page 3 Kendall County page 3 Will County page 4 EXERCISE REPORT page 5
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Introduction page 5 1.
Exercise Background page 5 2.
Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments page 5 3.
List of Ev&1uators page 5 4.
Evalution Criteria page 6 5.
Exercise Objectives page 6 6.
Summary of Scenario page 8 7.
State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise page 8 8.
Weaknesses Noted In ?ast Exercises page 9 9.
Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved page 9 Narrative page 10 1.
State of Illinois page 10 2.
Grundy County page 13 3.
Coal City page 17 4.
Minnoka page 18 5.
Kendall County page 19
SUMMARY
LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS page 22 1.
Deficiencies page 23 2.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action page 24 3.
Areas Recommended For Improvement page 26 ATTACl1MENTS page 27 1.
Will County exercise exemption letter page 28 2.
Summary of the Dresden exercise scenario page 29 3.
JPIC objectives withdrawal letter page 31 j
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
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State of Illinois The State of Illinois effectively implemented their emergency response procedures through operation of the. Emergency Operations Centur (EOC) during the Dresden Nuclear Power Station exercise.
This was a
partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois.
Also, due to ongoing flood response activity in the northern part of the State, Illinois requested the withdrawal of the objectives portaining to their participation in the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC). This request was approved by FEMA.
The State EOC was activated following receipt of the Alert notification.
The State EOC staff effectively conducted the coordination of the emergency response support to the local governmental jurisdictions affected by the radiological emergency.
There was a delay in the verification of the Site Area Emergency notification from the utility because the State was unable to
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contact the appropriate utility personnel.
- However, the State took immediate action to establish contact utilizing the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) and rectified the problem.
Decisions were coordinated and well executed,by the executive gro up.
The State EOC has appropriate facilities and displays to support the response activities.
The NARS is the primary communications link between the State and the utility and the State and the Counties.
Problems were noted with the content and format of the information on the NARS messages.
A variety of other communications equipment was utilized during the exercise.
The State issued protective action recommendations to the Counties in a timely manner. One coordination problem was noted during the exercise. The Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) provided an interpretation of a trotective action recommendation on a NARS message but did not inform the State EOC prior to providing the interpretation.
An energency worker decontamination station was established by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) at the Bristol-Kendall Fire Department in Yorkville.
All of the equipment necessary to establish the decontamination station is contained in pre packaged kits maintained by IDNS.
The equipment and procedures for the radiological monitoring of potentially contaminated emergency workers, equipment and vehicles were successfully ' demonstrated.
- However, there is a need to establish a procedure for preserving the information from an emergency worker's personal dosimetry.
An emergency worker, his keys and his vehicle were simulated to be contaminated. Appropriate decontamination procedures for the worker and his keys were explained by IDNS staff while the IDNS and Bristol-Kendall Fire
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Department demonstrated decontamination of the vehicle.
Personnel assigned to the decontamination station were knowledgeable on the use of their equipment and the appropriate procedures for decontamination. They also had the appropriate dosimetry and established a protocol to minimize the j
potential for the spread of contamination within the facility.
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Grundy County The County EOC was activated utilizing phased staffing. Full EOC staffing occurred following receipt and verification of the Site Area Emergency notification. Two EOC positions were not staffed and one was only staffed briefly during the exercise. The ability to maintain around the clock staffing was demonstrated through a partial shift change, double staffing some positions and presentation of a staffing roster for the remainder.
The County Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) Coordinator was effectively in charge of the EOC. He conducted periodic staff briefings and involved the EOC staff in the decision-making process. The EOC staff coordinated emergency activities with the State EOC and Kendall County, Minooks, Coal City, and Morris.
The EOC has sufficient amenities to support emergency operations. A status board was maintained, classification levels were posted and all of the necessary maps and displays were available to the EOC staff.
The primary communications link for the receipt of emergency information from the State EOC is the NARS. The system functioned effectively during the exercise. Commercial telephone, County Sheriff's radio, local fire and police radios and amateur radio were utilized during the exercise to communicate emergency information to the municipalities and coordinate with the State and adjacent Counties.
The EOC staff initiated public alerting and instruction upon receipt of protective action recommendations from the State. Coordinated siren sounding (simulated) and Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) activation were completed within the prescribed time limits.
Supplemental route alerting was accomplished by the police and fire departments in the municipalities.
EBS messages were written, using familiar landmarks and boundaries, and provided appropriate instructions to the public except information for the transient population and information on ad hoc respiratory protection. Ad hoc respiratory protection was.not required given the nature of the release. EBS messages were repeated periodically.
The EOC staff coordinated traffic and access control with the State, Kendall County and the municipalities. The EOC staff simulated the activation of reception and congregate care centers. The County was never notified by the utility when the evacuation of onsite personnel was to take place.
Therefore, the County could not assess the need for any special traffic control near the power station. A listing of mobility impaired individuals was available and utilized by the staff for planning their simulated evacuation.
Since the EOC is located within the plume exposure EPE, dosimetry kits were issued to each person at the E0C.
Each kit included a dosimeter, a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) and a record keeping card. Verbal instructions were provided upon issuance of the kits.
Press briefings were conducted in the County Board Committee Room by the County ESDA Coordinator. He provided information concerning activities 1
occurring within Grundy County. The media was referred to the JPIC for additional information. The County also provided information, particularly 1
the EBS messages, to the JPIC for inclusion in press releases. The EOC 4
staff demonstrated the ability to effectively respond to rumors.
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-F 11cwing receipt of a message from the State which terminated the " State Of Emergency", Grundy County initiated actions to allow unrestricted reentry to A discussion of reentry activities and unrestricted the evacuated area.
reentry conditions was conducted by the EOC staff.
An EBS message was prepared which would provide the appropriate instructions to the public.
Coal City The Coal. City dispatcher followed the procedures for notification and mobilization of staff.
The ESDA Coordinator, upon receiving the notification of the emergency, took all the necessary actions as per the procedures.
The EOC staff demonstrated the capability to operate the EOC a roster.
There was good around the clock through the presentation of cooperation among the staff in the decision-making process.
The escrgency facilities are good. The dispatch center, EOC, and operations room are located in the same building.
This makes for a very efficient operation.
. Coal City has the capability to communicate with all the Radio is appropriate locations through the use of the commercial telephone.
the backup communication system.
Minooka The entire staff in the Minooka EOC were involved in decision-making.
was directed During the implementation of protective actions the EOC staff to relocate to Plainfield.
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The emergency facilities are adequate and contain all the necessary amenities.
The village was able to communicate with the appropriate locations through use of commercial telephone and radio.
Kendall County The County EOC was activated following receipt and verification of the Alert notification.
The County Highway Department position in the EOC was not ongoing highway construction project.
The ability to staffed due to an a presentation maintain staffing around the clock was demonstrated through of a staffing roster.
This corrects a weakness noted during the previous exercise.
was in The County Board Vice-Chairman, assisted by the ESDA Coordinator, charge of the County EOC.
He conducted periodic staff briefings and involved.the EOC staff in the decision-making process.
The EOC staff coordinated emergency activities with the State EOC and Grundy County.
The EOC facility has sufficient amenities to support emergency operations.
A status board was maintained throughout the exercise.
Classification levels were posted and all the necessary maps and displays were available to the EOC staff.
The primary communications link for the receipt of emergency information from the State EOC is the NARS.
The system functioned effectively during a weakness the exercise.
The addition of a NARS drop in the EOC corrects indentified during the previous exercise.
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Commercial telephone, County Sheriff's radio and emateur radio were utilized durin8 the. exercise to contact traffic control points and coordinate emergency activities with the State and adjacent Counties.
The EOC staff initiated public alerting and instruction upon receipt of protective action recommendations. from the State.
Coordinated siren sounding and EBS activation were completed within the prescribed time limits.
EBS sessages were written using familiar landmarks and boundaries and provided the appropriate instructions to the public except information on sheltering procedures and ad hoc respiratory protection.
Although the EBS messages did not address the transient population,- the Sheriff's Department provided direct notification to the transient population in the two recreational parks located within the 10-mile EPZ.
The County EOC etaff simulated the establishment of traffic and access control for the affected sectors.
A recent survey has indicated that there are no mobility impaired individuals or individuals requiring special assistance, residing in the Kendall County portion of the Dresden EPZ.
Press briefings were conducted in which the EOC staff took part.
The briefings provided information concerning activities occurring in Kendall County.
The County also provided information, particularly the EBS messages,-
to the JPIC for inclusion in press releases.
As rumors were reported to the EOC they were assigned to staff members for resolution and the preparation of responses for the public.
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Following receipt of a message from the State which terminated the " State Of Emergency", Kendall County initiated actions to coordinate the return of evacuees being housed in the County as well as providing for reentry into sheltered areas.
An EBS message was prepared which would provide the appropriate instructions to the public.
Will County The third Dresden EPZ County,. Will County, applied for and was, granted an exemption by the FEMA from full participation during this exercise.
The County did maintain communications with the State EOC, Grundy and Kendall Counties, and the municipalities within the Will County portion of the Dresden EPZ.
These municipalities included: Wilmington, Elwood, Shorewood, Channahon and Joliet.
The County did effectively ^ relay emergency response instructions and information to these communities during the exercise.
Several officials who would otherwise be located at the Will County EOC toured the municipalities in the Will County portion of the Dresden 10-mile EPZ during the exercise.
This provided the opportunity for a " hands on" I
training session for both the municipal officials as well as the County officials.
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EXERCISE REPORT Introduction 1.
Exercise Background This was the cixth joint exercise for the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency and the Counties of Grundy, Kendall and Will resulting from a simulated accident at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The first joint exercise was conducted October 28, 1980 and involved partial participation by the State of Illinois and full participation by Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties and the Commonwealth Edison Company.
The second joint exercise was conducted September 30, 1981 and involved partial participation by the State of Illinois and full participation by Grundy, Kendall, and Will Counties and the Commonwealth Edison Company.
The third joint exercise was conducted June 29-30, 1982 and involved partial participation by the State of Illinois and full participation by Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties and the Commonwealth Edison Company.
The fourth joint exercise was conducted September 15, 1983 ar.d involved partial participation by the State of Illinois and full participation by Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties and the Commonwealth Edison Company.
The fifth joint exercise was conducted April 23, 1985 and included partial participation by the State of Illinois and full participation by Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties and the Commonwealth Edison Company.
2.
Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments The EPZ of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station impacts on both of the States of Illinois and Indiana. The inhalation EPZ encompasses most of Grundy County and portions of Kendall and Will Counties. In addition to these areas, there are 19 counties: 2 in Indiana and 17 in Illinois, which are within the Ingestion EPZ.
These Counties, Lake and Newton in Indiana and Bureau, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Ford, Grundy, Iroquois, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lee, Livingston, Marshall, McLean, Putnam, Will and Woodford in Illinois did not demonstrate the procedures for implementation of ingestion EPZ protective actions as this activity was beyond the scope of the planned exercise.
This was a full participation exercise for Grundy and Kendall Counties and a partial participation exercise for the State of Illinois. Will County was granted an exemption from full participation during this exercise.
(Attachment 1) 3.
List of Evaluators There was a total of six Federal evaluators observing offsite exercise activities. Onsite activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III. Of the offsite evaluators, five, including the Offsite Exercise Evaluation Team Director, were FEMA Region V staff and one was from Center for Planning and Research (CPR). The evaluator assignments were as follows:
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Exarcise Evaluation Team Director Wallace Weaver, FEMA Team Leader, State of Illinois Gordon L Wenger, FEMA
. Team Leader, Grundy County Woodie Curtis, FEMA Bill Small, CPR Ed Robinson, FEMA Team Leader, Kendall County Ray Kellogg, FEMA 4.
' Evaluation Criteria The plans being evaluated by this exercise were developed using the
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1).
Therefore, these criteria and the exercrit based on these criteria, " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983, were used for exercise evaluation.
5.
Exercise Objectives Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the FEMA thirty-five (35) standard objectives listed in TAB "M"
of the " Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations", dated June 1983. The objective numbers listed below correlate to Tab "M".
The State of Illinois selected the following eleven objectives, including those applicable to the JPIC, to be demonstrated during the exercise.
1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demons tra te ability-to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
10.
Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGs, (Protective Action Guides) available shelters, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.
13.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
24.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely I !
manner.
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25.
Damonstrata. ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
26.
Demonstrate ability to establish and. operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
29.
Demostrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.
Grundy County selected the following fourteen objectives for demonstration:
1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
13.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EpZ and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribate appropriate instructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
15.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EpZ.
18.
Demonstrated the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EpZ.
- 23. Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel.
24.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25.
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
26.
Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
- 35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and re-entry.
Kendall County selected the following fourteen objectives for demonstration:
1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.
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2.
D:monstrata ability to fully staff fccilities and m31ntain staffing around the clock.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
13.
Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14.
Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instrucitons to the public, in a timely fashion.
15.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
18.
Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals witbin the plume EPZ.
23.
Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel.
24.
Demonstrate ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25.
Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordination of information released.
26.
Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
35.
Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and re-entry.
6.
Summary of Scenario The summary of the exercise scenario is included in this report as.
7.
State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercisc The State of Illinois planned to use the State EOC in Springfield and the State REAC in Springfield.
They also planned to use the necessary communications systems to conduct emergency operations.
Crundy and Kendall Counties planned to use the County EOC in Morris and the County EOC in Yorkville, respectively, their emergency response staffs and communications systems and also, demonstrate their capabilities for access control.
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8.
Weakaesses Noted ia Past Exercises The State of Illinois had a total of three Areas Requiring Corrective Action during the April 23, 1985 joint exercise.
The State chose not to include the objectives relating to the JPIC and public information during this exercise.
(See Attachment 3.)
- However, the State of Illinois has
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successfully demonstrated the corrective actions for two of the we'aknesses l
(G.4.a and C.4.b) during other exercises, most recently Braidwood in March 1987.
The third weakness (G.3.a) will be corrected when the new JPIC facility is completed by the utility.
Will County had one Area Requiring Corrective Action during the April 23, 1985 joint Dresden Nuclear Power Station exercise. "ill County was exempted from full participation in this exercise.
(See attachment 1.)
However, the corrective action for this weakness (A.4) was demonstrated during the Braidwood exercise in March 1987.
Kendall County had three Areas Requiring Corrective Action during the April 23, 1985 joint exercise.
The corrective actions for all three weaknesses (A.4, F.1 and G.4.a) were demonstrated during this exercise.
9.
Exercise Objectives Still To Be Ef fectively Achieved a
This completes the current six year cycle for the Dresden Nuclear Power Statior.
There are weaknesses identified as Areas Requiring Corrective Action in this report. Appropriate action will be required to correct these weaknesses ead the objectives demonstrated during a luture exercise.
The following objective must be demonstrated at the next biennial exercise:
- 23. Demonstrate ability to ef fect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel.
Also the next biennial exercise must be an unannounced exercise as one was not conducted during the current exercise cycle.
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'Narrativt2 1.
State of Illinois Activation and Staffing The State ESDA EOC in Springfield was partially activated, by design of the scenario.
The exercise was partial participation for the State of Illinois.-
The IESDA dispatcher implemented the notification procedures as defined in the State General Plan.
' Ihe IDNS dispatcher simulated notification proceedures as defined in the State General Plan and in accordance with SOPS. The REAC in Springfield was partially activated.
The Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) was not activated for this exercise.
-The State EOC utilizes the NARS as the primary communications system between the State and the utility.
The system is continuously monitored by ESDA communications personnel, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.
The notification activating the State EOC was received at 0915 and car.a from the utility. The notification was verified.
Mobilization proceedutc? were demonstrated, however, personnel were not required to report due to the 4
scale of the exercise.
Current written call lists were used to no'.ify personnel. Present in the EOC were representatives from IESDA and IDNS.
Emergency Operations Management The Chief of Operations IESDA, was in charge of the State EOC and the emergency response.
This assignment is consistant with the State General Plan.
Briefings were held throughout the exercise which included those persons involved in the response.
Copies of the State General Plan and the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA), Dresden, were available and written procedures and check lists were utilized. Messages were effectively received, logged, copied and distributed in a efficient manner.
The State EOC was notified of the following evente at the given times:
Alert, 0915; Site Area Emergency, 0956; General Emergency, 1111.'
State notification of protective actions to take shelter was at 1117 and to evacuate at 1223.
Federal assistance was requested of FEMA Regicn V via teletype.
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assistance requested was for specialized equipment and personnel.
Assistance was requested by the Chief of Operations, IESDA.
Brought to the attention of the State EOC managers is the matter of including the notice to place milk producing animals not only on stored feed but on protected water.
Upon revision of the NARS form the IDNS plans to make that an inclusion.
AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(NUREG-0654 criteria item A.2.a)
The NARS form and the decision-making chain failed to address placing milk producing animals on protected water in addition to providing them with stored feed. The NARS form should include the order to place milk producing animals on protected water in addition to providing them with stored feed.
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'In varifying NARS messages a time elapse of fourteen minutes passed in trying to get ths utility on the commercial telephone.
The reason behind the matter is not clear,. but it could be a problem' if protective actions were to be issued.
The basis of. the problem is with the utility.
j Ultimately, the message was verified by the utility, but after the State
= contacted the utility via the NARS to establish contact.
A NARS equipment problem did arise with Will County where the telephone did not ring.. It was later checked and corrected.
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Also, in regard to the NARS,is a continuing problem with the. form.
The j
L problem came to light when the wind shif ted. in the scenario.
It was not clear if the five affected sectors required the same protective actions or only those a
the three down-wind sectors should implement the protective actions.
1, a result a decision was made at IDNS to implement pro tec tive actions in all five sectors.
IDNS notified the County EOC, but did not coordinate ti.s recommendation with IESDA.
AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(NUREG-0654 criteria item A.2.a)
The IDNS issued a clarifying statement concerning a protective action to the County EOC without coordinating with the State EOC. The two State Agencies, IESDA and IDNS should coordinate the recommendation for protective actions prior to the issuance for implementation.
, Facilities The State EOC, located in the sub level of the IESDA headquarters, has suf ficient furnishings to conduct emergency operations.
Furniture, space,
- lighting, telephones, power, displays and maps are sufficient and well positioned. Access and traffic flow is effective and adequate.
Communications Communications are well established. Communications systems are established between the State EOC and other EOCs and all field operations.
Landline telephone, NARS and radios are the main systems used to communicate.
Thereby, sufficient backup capability exists.
Decontamination An emergency worker decontamination station was established at the Yorkville Fire Station by personnel of the IDNS and the Bristol-Kendall Fire Department.
This decontamination station would provided services for both State and local emergency workers such as law enforcement personnel, fire departments, radiological monitoring teams, school bus drivers, highway departments, etc.
All of the equipment needed to establish the decontamination station is pre packaged and transported to the facility by the IDNS.
It was estimated that 30 to 35 people could be monitored per hour and 1 to 10 vehicles depending on size and contamination levels, if any.
During facility setup, traffic flow at the entrance and throughout the station was clearly marked. Clean and contaminated paths wihin the facility were identified to facilitate traffic flow.id covered with paper to reduce the potential for the spread of contamination within the facility.
Plastic was available in the kits, but paper was utilized to reduce expense.
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the facility would be maintained by local law enforcement.
Security for
- parsonnal._ Tha roads in the immediate vicinity of the decontamination
. station would also be controlled by local law enforcement personnel.
9 The procedures for determining.the need to decontaminate personnel, equipment and vehicles were demonstrated.
Background radiation levels were established for each of the survey instruments to be utilized at the facility.
The emergency action level for decontamination was set at cwice background.
As the emergency workers arrived in their vehicle it was directed to the monitoring point.
The exterior door was surveyed prior to opening.
The deputy's hands and feet were checked and his simulated contaminated hands gloved before he was permitted to exit the ' vehicle.
His keys,. also simulated to be contaminated, were double bagged and sent to the
' decontamination shower.
The two deputies were then directed to the recorder station where personal information was recorded while complete personnel monitoring was performed.
The information obtained during the survey was also recorded.
Appropriate monitoring equipment and procedures for external and thyroid contamination were demonstrated.
However, during processing the deputies were not asked' for their personal dosimetry. Since the clothing of the contaminated deputy was to be taken and bagged for disposal the dosimetry might have been forgot. ten and lost.
AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(NUREG-0654 criteria item P.3.b.)
The decontamination station procedures should address the need for the recorder to identify whether or not contaminated individuals have any personal dosimetry and the v.eans for preserving the radiological exposure information, particularly the TLD.
While the personnel monitoring was being conducted a second survey team conducted an exterior and interior survey of the vehicle.
If decontamination was required it would be conducted immediately at that location.
The vehicle survey point was located adjacent to the outside drain to facilitate the control and disposal of washwater runoff. Again the appropriate equipment and procedures for radiological monitoring were j
demonstrated.
Simulated decontamination of the emergency worker and his keys ves explained by the staff manning the shower station.
The staff explained the appropriate procedures for decontamination and then conducted personnel monitoring to determine if the decontamination was effective.
The kits contained all of the materials necessary to conduct personnel decontamination and decontamination of some of the smaller equipment such as the keys.
Larger equipment would be handled separately probably at the vehicle decontamination point.
Actual decontamination procedures were demonstrated for the vehicle.
The exterior of the vehicle was washed down by fire hose and then remonitored.
If necessary, it would be scrubbed with materials available in the kits.
These materials would also be used to decontaminate the interior of the vehicle.
Once the vehicle was determined to be clean, it was removed from the monitoring point.
The fireman and their fire hose were surveyed before returning inside of the fire stacion.
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As aforementioned the RAFT wcs not activsted for this partial participation exercise. However, the decontamination facility staff explained that all of the contaminated waste is double bagged and held at the decontamination
)
facility. The final disposal of the waste is coordinated by the RAFT. The J
facility staff explained that wash water for the vehicle and the shower j
runoff are flushed to a drain which also provides for dilution. The discharge point of the drain is the Fox River. The RAFT reportadly would l
establish river monitoring points upstream and downstream of the discharge point..If the contamination levels could not be effectively diluted at the facility, a pumper and storage tank system would be established to control the wash water runoff. The fccility cleanup would be conducted by the same personnel manning the decontamination station. Sume of the facility I
deactivation procedures were effectively demonstrated by the staff, the remainder were explained.
All of the personnel assigned to the facility were equipped with the appropriate dosimetry.
IDNS had additional dosimetry kits for local fire department personnel assigned to the decontamination of vehicles and equipment. The dosimetry kits included a low range (0-200 mR) and mid range (0-20 R) dosimeters, a TLD and record keeping cardc. Personnel were aware of the proper procedures for reading and recording their dose. All of the dosimeters were zeroed upon issuance and a sign in/ sign out log was maintained for the kits.
The personnel at the facility maintained appropriate procedures to prevent or minimize the spread of contamination to themselves, their equipment and the facility. Whenever contaminated equipment or personnel were identified, procedures were implemented to minimize the spread of contamination any further.
In general, the decontamination scenario provided a good setting for the demonstration of the knowledge, skills, procedures and equipment necessary
^
to establish and operate an ef f ective emergency worker decontamination station. Because of the need to simulate contamination, the personnel conducting radiological monitoring were informed in advance of the readings to be encountered. This precluded the demonstration of information flow th roughout the facility as the contaminated individual was processed.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Rather than pre-identifying for the monitors the contamination icycls to be f ound, a controller should provide the readings at the time that the activity is being demonstrated.
2.
Grundy County Activation and Staffing The NARS is the direct communications link between the Counties of Grundy, Will and Kendall, the State IESDA and 1DNS and the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The call initiating activation of the Grundy County EOC was received by the County Sheriff's dispatch center via NARS f rom the IESDA dispatcher at 1023. The call was verified by telephone by the Sheriff's dispatcher.
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Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated when the dispatch center notified the County lESDA Coordinator and the County Sheriff via telephone upon receipt of the initial notification of the Unusual Event at 0748..The County ESDA Coordinator and County Sheriff reported to the County EOC and communications center, respectively. Mobilization of the remaining County-EOC staff was implemented by the County ESDA Coordinator. Staff mobilization.was achieved through use of up to date written call lists.
The County EOC was not fully staffed due to the absence of representation by the County Board and the County Highway Department. The Regional Superintendent of Schools.put in an appearance and departed after explaining to the evaluators his responsibilities. However, telephone contact was maintained with the offices of the respective aforementioned. County officials as_necessary throughout the exercise.
AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: (NUREG-0654 criteria item A.2.a)
The County did not fully demonstrate the capability to staff the Cuenty EOC.
The County Board of Commissioners and the County Road Commission should have a representative present in the Emergency Operations Center during the complete exercise.
Emergency Operations Management The Grundy County ESDA Coordinator was the individual in charge of the EOC as designated in the County Plan. The EOC staff was involved in decision making and kept up to'date on the situation through briefings by the ESDA Coordinator and members of the EOC staff regarding the involvement of their respective orgainzations. Copies of the plan and SOPS were available for reference. The staff had excerpts of the plan and SOPS that pertained to their respective responsibility:ies. Message logs were kept. Messages were reproduced and efficiently distributed by EOC presonnel assigned that responsibility. Access to the EOC was controlled by security police of the County ESDA. The County was notified by the IESDA dispatcher of the Alert classification of the utility at 0916, the Site Area Emergency, 1023; and the General Emergency at 1119.
The County received initial protective action orders to take shelter at 1119 and to evacuata at 1225. Subsequent orders for expanded sheltering and evacuation were issued at 1243. Calls were placed to activate reception and congregrate care centers at the Plano Junior / Senior High School, Pontiac, Illinois at 1140 for the potential receipt of evacuees f rom Grundy County.
Facilities The EOC contained all the necessities for operations including: f urnitu re,
communications, and lighting. The Sheriff's dispatch center is located in an adjoining building, accessible through a covered walkway. This provides easy, protected access to the dispatch center and the County jail kitchen which would provide meals in an extended operation. Back-up power is available to both the EOC and the Sherif f's spaces. All necessary maps were wall mounted and acetate covered and the emergency classification levels visibily posted. The status board, with major events posted, was visible throughout the EOC. The recent addition of a NARS drop in the EOC contributed to the efficiency of operations. The only factor detracting l
from the facilities was the noise of the telephone bells at the departmental dasks. This distraction will be eliminated when funds become availabic to Jnrtall the planned telephone light system.
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JUN 28 '8911:42 FD1A CHICAGO REGION 5 P.2 Cdhmunications
!.f
- The County EOC staff demonstrated primary and back-up means of communications with State ESDA, Kendall and Will Counties, the V111'ges of a
Minooka, and Coal City by use of th( NARS, commercial telephone, radio and facsimilie. The State ESDA notified *.he County of conditions at the utility via the NARS. EOCs at Will and Kendal.1 Counties, Minooks, and Coal City were kept abteast of conditions at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station by use of commercial telephone and radio. The two way radio between the County, Minooka and Coal City were operated by members of the local ESDA Amateur Radio Club.
The coordination of the activation of the siren system and EBS between the State and Counties of Grundy, Will and Kendall was by use of commercial telephone with radio as a back-up capability. The EBS was contacted by commercial telephone. Emergency response conditions allow for radio as a back-up means of communications between the County EOC and the EBS station, the JPIC, reception and congregate care centers, field teams and other locations as necessary.
Support hospitals and ambulances can be contacted through the Shoriff's dispatch center by use of the Medical Emergency Response Communications of the Illinois net (MERCI). Conferencing is available between IESDA, the Counties and the Villages of Minooka, coal City and Morris.
Alerting and Instruction i
The EOC participated in alerting and instructing the public. Actions were initiated following notification of the plant going to General Emergency at 1119. Sirens and the EBS messages were ordered to be activated at 1128, advising the population to take shelter. Sirens and the EBS were again activated at 1225 in response to an evacuation recommendation from the State. According to EOC staff transients in recreational areas, etc., were provided verbal instructional messages via the public address units of the siren system. The Morris Police and Fire Departments augmented the alert by route alerting which was completed by 1220. Sirens and EBS messages were activated at 15 minute intervals throughout the shelter and evacuation periods.
Prescripted messages were used from the County plan for EBS announcements.
The content of the mossages were clear and described the affected area in known geographic terr.s familiar to the populace. At 1445 an EBS message was released terminating the " State of Emergency" and permitting unrestricted reentry to the evacuated areas. No written instructions were given for the transient population. No instructions were provided for ad hoc respiratory protection, however, the nature of the release did not warrant ad hoc respiratory protection.
AREA REQUIRING CORRECT *iVE ACTION:
(NUREG-0654 criteria item E.5)
Messages nhohld include written instructions for transients, and for ad hoc respiratory protection. Change prescripted messages to include written instructions for transie.its, and for ad hcc respiratory protection.
(The State of Illinois' rehedt le of corrective actions indicates their po.sition t
on prescripted ad hoc respiratory protection information).
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Protective Action
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Emergency Operations Center personnel of the County Sheriff's Department simulated the coordination and activation of personnel to man traffic and access control points into the evacuated areas. The EOC staff were prepared to simulate traffic control in the vicinity of the Station, but due to the' fact that the utility nevar notified the County of the simulated evacuation the County was unable to demonstrate traf fic and access control measures.
This is not considered an. area requiring corrective action on the part of the County because it was an omission on the part of the utility.
.The simulation of traffic and access control points were coordin'ated between the IESDA, Crundy and Kendall Counties, the Village of Minooka, Coal City and the town of Morris. There are adequate resources in terms of personnel and equipment to keep evacuation routes clear during inclement weather to remove stalled or vrecked vehicles e.nd to cover all designated traffic and access control functions simultaneously.
l The County EOC staff simulated the activacion of reception and congregrate care. centers at the Plano Junior / Senior High School and the Pontiac High School for receipt of the simulated evacuees. The EOC staff of the County Sheriff's Department has a list of the mobility impaired individuals residing in the County. The list includes names, addresses, telephone numbers and the needs of each individual. Arrangements are made for transportation of the mobility impaired through the Sheriff's Office, the County Fire Department and the Police / Fire Departments in the local municipalities. The County EOC staff simulated the coordination and evacuation of all mobility impaired individuals with Minooka, Coal City and the City of Morris. EOC staff coordinated and responded to rumor control with the Counties and the municipalities.
Exposure Control Not an objective of the exercise.
Media Relations The County Board Committee Room in the County Courthouse was designated for press briefings.
In the absence of the County Board Chairman the briefing was conducted by the County ESDA Coordinator. The briefing was accurate and complete. Technical jargon was avoided. Map displays were used to augment j
the briefing. In the absence of representation from the media the initial briefing was conducted in the presence of a Federal evaluator and an j
observer f rom Ogle County. The Federal evaluator and observer role played as representatives from the press. The ESDA Coordinator reputted on events occurring in Crundy County as a result of the radiological accident at the Dresden Station. He referred the role playing news media representatives to
.the JPlc for further information, providing them information of the address and location of the JPIC.
Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry followed a message from IESDA that the " State of Emergency" was terminated and that because there was no particulate contamination, no decontamination was necessary in the evacuated areas and 4
unrestricted reentry was authorized. Immediately after receipt of this
?
message, and prior to the release of the final EBS message, the representatives of IESDA and the utility explained to the EOC staf f the reasons why decontamination was not necessary in this instance and why unrestricted r,eentry was permissibic.
.c i
hN 2B '89 11:43 FEMA CHICAGO RE'4 ION 5 P. 3,
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3._
Coal City l
,fActivation and Staffing
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Coal City received a message from Crndy County at 0756 informing them of an Unusual Event at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. Tha notification was.
received by the Coal City dispatcher over he radio using.the NARS form. The message was recorded and verified in a professional 3 ma)hner.
The ESDA Coordinator was notified immediately by the dispatcher 4 He in turn notified the Mayor of I
Coal City at 0814. The procedures for notification of the emergency staff were available to the dispatcher. She. was. knowledgeable of how to use the procedures and did so in an expedious manner.
The EOC staff consisted of the ESDA Coordinator [(who,is also Chief of Police), the Mayor of Coal City, tha Emergency Squad, the Fire Chief, the Police Department, the City of Diamond, the City of Carbon Hill, the Superintendent of Schools,,the Superintendent of Maintenance, and the manager of the bus company. The capability to staff the EOC around the clock was demonstrated by the presentation of i roster.
Emergency Management o
The Mayor of Coal City was in charge of operations in the IOC.
In his
' absence the ESDA Coordinator is the designated official to be in charge.
It was most evident that the ESDA Coordinator had a good working relationship with the Mayor. The interaction of the emergency workers within the IOC was good; everyone being involved in the decision-making.
The plans, SOPS and procedures were available to all of the staff. It was apparent the staff knew how to use their individual procedures., The NARS message declaring the plant was at the Alert status was received at 0925 and the NARS message declaring the plant at Site Area Emergency status was received at 1032. The NARS message declaring the plant at General Emergency status was received at 1136. This message indicated to shelter people in the 0-2 mile radius, the 2-5 mile and 5-10 mile areas in sectors L, M and N.
Facilities The facilities were good with all of the necessary amenities to carry out the mission. The dispatch center and the EOC operations room are located in the City Hall which is much better than the previous arrangement when the EOC was in the Fire Barn which is located several blocks away f rom the dispatch center. There is an emergency generator available for continuous operation in case there should be a power failure. It was not tested during the exercise.
There was a status board which was kept up to date on the significant events. It was not visib:.e to the entire staff unless they turned around to look behind them. All of the necessary maps were posted and used.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPRO'/EhENTt It is recommended that Coal City and the County work together to mai. a d itional space eva11able in the operations It is also suggested that the status boud be placed on the opposite room.
t side of the room so it is mc.e in line of sight.
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A,* { d Communications The primary communications system is the commercial telephone with radio as -
a back up system.
The dispatcher was very knowledgeable of her -job.
The procedures-were available to her and she used them in a very' professional manner.
.4.-
Minooka Activation and Staffing The activation and staffing of the EOC. was completed prior to.the evaluator's arrival'at the Minooka EOC.
Emergency Operations Management The exercise had' escalated to the General Emergency classification by the time the evaluator arrived at the EOC.
It was evident the Mayor of Minooka was in charge of the overall operation of the EOC. The Mayor, Police Chief and Fire Chief were discussing the evacuation of the handicapped people and after they'made their decision on how they were going to move these-people they called the Grundy County E0C and informed.them of their decision.
The staff was very much involved with the decision-making.
It was a-informal e
operation but was very impressive with the constant interplay among the EOC staff.
I The' State P'an, County Plan and Standard Operating Procedures were available for use in addition to the precedures and checkliste for each individual participant.
Access to the EOC.was controlled by a Police Officer stationed at the front door to the-building.-
Entrants were required to show identification and sign-in befarc entering into the EOC Operations Room.
The receipt of the-NARS messages was not observed, however, they were posted and available for reference.. They were correctly filled out with the time the message was received and the time they.were verif*ad.
Although the evaluator was. unable to observe the.r><t.. ' es surrounding the l
simulated evacuation of the schools and gener.a population, the Mayor explained that the children and faculty were simulated evacuated to the Carl Sandberg High School.
The general population was simulated evacuated to Plano Junior High School and Arura West High School.
1 At 1409 the Minooka y,0C staff was ordered by Grundy County to evacuate and j
relocate to Plainfield EOC because of a potential release from the power l
station.
Upon receiving this order the Mayor asked the Police Chief to check the schools, day care centers anC other special facilities to make sure they had been evacuated.
This was a good decision on the part of the Mayor.
There is a small section of Kendall County that is in the fire district under the jurisdiction of the Minooka Fire Department that had not been evacuated. The Fire Chief felt that those people (50 or 60) should not be lef t there without protection.
In consultation with the Mayor and Police Chief it was decided to contact these peop.te on an individual basis and request them to evacuate.
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- JUN IB '89 11
- 44 FEMA CHICAGO REGION
- p.4 Fgcilities.
'*The facilities were adequate for the situ of the staff and contained all the y
necessary amenities for the operation.
=
Communications The communications system was adequate. The primary communications system is commercial telephone and radio the backup vystem.
5.
Kendall County
-Activation and Staffing The direct communicattuns link with the utility is the NARS. The County EOC is tied into the network in addition to the other Counties and the State.
The County's drop is located in the Sheriff's communications center and is continuously monitored.. Mobilization of the County EOC staff was initiated following the Alert notification message from IESDA at 0915. An up to date call list was used to contact EOC staff. All staff except the utility and County Board representative had aigned in by 1004. The utilitys.
representative signed in at 1025 and the Vice-Chairman of the County Board was present by 1045. Representation in the EOC in addition to the County Board and the utility were: the County Health Department, the Sheriff, County ESDA and support personnel. Because of a bridge washout, the Highway Department was not represented.. Around the clock staffing was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster. This corrects a weakness noted in the last exercise.
Emergancy Operations Management The County Board Vice-Chairman was in charge of operations. The staff was involved in decision-making and participated in periodic briefings. The County plan and procedures were available. NARS messages were posted on the status board, reproduced and distributed.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Additional support personnel in message
~ center could improve message reproduction, posting and distribution.
Security was maintained throughout the period of emergency operations.
Kendall County was notified of the Alert at 0915; site Area Emergency,1024; General Emergency,1120; Evacuation,1225 and 1243.
Facilities The IOC it located in the lower level of a building in the Kendall County Governmental Complex on Fox Road in Yorkville. The operations room is sufficient for emergency response operations. 'The necessary tables, chairs, telephones etc. are available. The room was in its normal standby mode and set up for emergency operations as staff arrived. A natural gas generator is available to provide power should commercial service fail.
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4 Tha'erargsney classification levels ware posted.
Tha status board was clearly visible to all and was kept up to date on significant events.
EPZ maps, with labeled sectors, showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points, population by evacuation area, parks and rceraation areas, and industrial locations were posted in the EOC.
Communications The NARS provides the primary means of communication between the County, State and the utility.
Drops are located in the Sheriff's communications center and.the EOC communications room. This corrects a weakness identified during the last exercise. Commercial telephone, including telefax, is the secondary means of communication. Emergency government radio backs up these land line systems.
Commercial telephone is the primary means of contact with adjoining Counties.
Emergency government radio and law enforcement radio are available to these locations. Commercial telephone is the primary communications link with the media center and the schools and the sole link with the EBS station.
Alerting and Instruction Kendall County activated the Frompt Alert and Notification System following the receipt of the General Emergency classification at 1120. Kendall County provided a message to EBS radio station WJOL, at 1126.
The County also instructed the Lisbon-Seward Fire Department to initiate route alerting at 1127.
The sirens were simulated activated by Grundy County at 1128.
The sirens were activated two additional times.
A total of five EBS messages were issued. At 1322, when sheltering was recommended for that part of the County within the EPZ, Sheriff officers went to the two forest preserves in the area, alerted and moved campers and others and locked the park gates.
The two industrial facilities in the area were also notified and closed.
The County used prescripted messages in preparing their announcements for EBS broadcast. The areas impacted by the sheltering order were described in terms of familiar boundaries.and landmarks.
The messages did not include instructions for transients, for residents on converting their homes to shelters or ad hoc respitory protection.
The messages did noc include instructions to the EBS station concerning the need for frequence of rebroadcast.
AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:
(NUREG-0654 criteria item E.5) EBS broadcast announcements should include instructions for transiente and residents for converting their homes into shelters cud ad hoc respiratory protection.
Develop prescripted messages to include instructions for transients and residents for converting their homes into shelters and ad hoc respiratory protection.
Protective Action Kendall County simulated the establishment of their assigned asscess control points.
When the area to be sheltered was extended these points were withdrawn and reestablished at new locations in the new control area.
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' Equipment and personnel to maintain thass locations for cn extendsd period are available. Discussion with the staff indicated that there is sufficient equipment and personnel to maintain evacuation routes during bad weather and to clear normal impediments to evacuation traffic.
There are no schools located in the Kendall County portion of the Dresden EPZ. Also, no persons living in the area have reported impariments'to their mobility or requested assistance in relocation.
The County Health Department personnel referred all protective actions relating to the ingestion pathway to the Department of-Agriculture.
Agriculture was not represented in the EOC.
Exposure Control Kits containing low and mid range dosimenters, TLDs, KI and record keeping cards were distributed to personnel assigned to traffic, control and other duties in the risk area.
All personnel were given instructions concerning the reading of dosimeters and the recording and reporting of readings as well as the maximum allowable dose.
At the time of shift change or withdrawl, personnel would be given instructions concerning the need for and location of decontamination stations.
Media Relations An area on the gound floor of the EOC building has been designated for press briefings.
Although no media appeared, two briefings were held.
This corrects a weakness noted during a previous exercise.
Maps and other audio / visual aids were availabic to assist the briefers.
Information released concerned the actions of local government and was consistant with that being released in other locations.
The County Board representative chaired the briefings.
Presentations were made by County ESDA, IDNS, and the utility.
Media representatives were directed to the Media Center for complete information.
As rumors were reported to the EOC they were assigned to staff for resolution and prepration of a response to the public or the person reporting a rumor.
These responses should be transmitted to the JPIC for distribution to media to gain the widest coverage.
AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
It is recommended that the response to a rumor be transmitted to the JPIC for distribution to the media, thus making for wider distribution of the information.
Recovery and Reentry Protective actions were cancelled upon instructions received from the State ESDA.
Instructions to the public were consistant with those issued by the State.
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SUMMARY
LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS 1
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1 Federal Emergency Management Agency 0
Washington, D.C. 20472
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AUS 2 6 $87 MDiOIWJDQ4 FOR: Robert E. Connor Acting Regional Director Region V FRQ4:
McLoughlin Deputy Associate Director State and Iocal Programs and Support SUBJECI':
Approval of Will County, Illinois Exemption from Full Participation during the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Joint Exercise This memorandum is in response to the July 13, 1987, recommendation for an exercise exemption by Hallace J. Weaver, ChairTnan of the Federal Emer-gency Management Agency (FD4A) Region V Regional Assistance Committee to the Assistant Associate Director, FDM Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs. 'Ibe Region recommends that FDM approve an exemption for Will County, Illinois from full participation in the September 2, 1987 joint exercise of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station. The reason for the request is that the County has an intensive emergency exercise and training program in support of its local chemical industries and the natural hazards component of its new emergency plan, both of which must be completed by November 30, 1987. The Will County Office of Emergency Services requested the exenption on June 16, 1987, and this request was endcrsed by Illinois Energency Services and Disaster Agency in its letter to you dated July 2,1987.
The Region's menorandum; stated that Hill County fully participated in the April,1985 Dresden Exercise, and in the November,1985 and March 1987 Braid-wood exercises. In the Braidwood exercises, Will County reredied two deficien-cies (noa equivalent to Areas Requiring Corrective Action) that had been identified in the Dresden exercise; namely, the County successfully deron-strated timely EOC activation and 24-hour. staffing in both exercises. Addition-ally, the Region V menorandum stated that no deficiencies were identified for Will County durirg either of the Braidwood exercises and the County has successfully demonstrated each of the 35 exercise objectives which pertain to this local jurisdiction. Finally, Will County has participated in two off hours exercises.
Therefore, under the authority granted to to under 44 CFR 350.9(c)(3) I approve the recommendation of FD4A Region V that Will County be exempt from full participation in the September 2,1987, joint exercise of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station.
By a copy of this memorandum I am advising the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of this FD4A action.
If you have any questions please don't hesitate to contact me or Richard W.
Prim at FTS 646-2871.
l 23 9
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3.0 EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
Initial Conditions Iprior to T = 0 (0730)1 l-The Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator is Out of Service for its' annual inspection and due to be returned to service in approximately twelve (12) hours.. The Unit 2. "B" operator has reported that the Unit 2 l,
Isolation Condenser water level is higher than usual and that banging l
noises are coming from the area.
Surveillance on U-2 LpCI, Core Spray, and Containment Cooling Service Water pumps are in progress due to the 2/3 Diesel Generator outage.
Both Units 2 and 3 are operating steady state at approximately 750 MWe each.
For the past several days, nitrogen addition to the Unit 2 Drywell has been higher than normal.
Containment vent or purge valve leakage is suspected and investigation is on-going.
UNUSUAL EVENT IT = 0 to T = 45 (0730 TO 0815)1 while performing the Unit 2 cesw Pump operability test, a large non-repairable leak developes in the core of the "C"
CCSW Pump Room cooler. Pe.r Technical Specification 3.5.B, this condition defines the "C"
CCSW Pump to be inoperable.
Thin situation requires Unit 2
~
Reactor to be in hot shutdown within twelve (12) hours and cold shutdown within the following twenty-four (24) hours per Technical Specification 3.0.
An orderly Unit 2 Reactor shutdown is initiated.
These conditions constitute an Unusual Event per EAL #3)(a).
ALERT IT = 45 to T = 150 (0815 to 1000)1 During the reactor shutdown and load reduction, Transformer 22 "B" phase bushing fails. This mechanical failure results in a transformer fire and subsequen.t trip.
When Transformer 22 trips, all auxiliary power to the Unit 2 plant is transferred automatically to Transformer 21.
This condition qualifies as an Alert per EAL #6(B). In addition, the transformer fire will be severe enough to require offsite assist-ance.
This is an Unusual Event classification under EAL #6)(a).
Forty-five minutes later, at T =
90 (0900), the following events occur. A damaged cable from Transformer 22 falls on the Unit 2 main transformer.
The result is a Transformer 2 phase to phase fault and immediate trip.
Additionally, Unit 2 Turbine and Generator trips and Unit 2 Reactor automatically scrams.
All normal auxiliary power to Unit 2 is now lost. The Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator immediately starts due to undervoltage on its' emergency bus and closes into the l
bus.
At the time of the reactor scram, T = 90 (0900), a hydraulic lock in the CRD System prevents all the control rods from fully inserting.
Attempts to manually scram the reactor from the Control Room are not successful.
The APRMS indicate recctor power to be > 40%.
The failure to scram, (ATWS) is an Alert per F4L #3)(C).
A l 29 3
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SITE'NIERGENCY IT = 150 to T = 230 (1000 to 1120)1 Drywell pressure increases due to the loss of the drywell coolers. At 2 psi, drywell' pressure, the LpCI and Core Spray pumps start but do not inject.
Shortly after the Unit 2 Diesel Generator has picked up the LpCI and Core Spray pumps, a Unit 2 Diesel Generator Hi Coolant temperature alarm is received. The cause of the coolant high tempera-ture cannot be readily corrected. The continued operation of the Unit 2 Diesel Generator in this condition, forces it to be shutdown to prevent its total failure.
When the drywell pressure had reached 2 psi, HpCI's operation.
The reactor water level will continue to-decrease due to no make up water being available.
At -59" reactor water level, a Group I Isolation will occur.
The relief valves will then cycle to control the reactor's pressure.
The "B" electromatic relief valve will stick open and in addition will have a leak in its discharge tailpipe.
This condition will accelerate the rises in drywell pressure and radiation levels.
By T = 150 (1000), drywell radiation will have increased to 400 R/ hour. This is a Site emergency classification per EAL #11)(b).
During this time frame, with reactor power >6% and torus water temper-ature approaching 110F, procedures will require that Stand-By Liquid e
Control is,to be injected.
SBLC is initiated, however, it fails to inject because the squib valves will not fire.
GENERAL EMERGENCY TT = 230 to 390 (1120 to 1400)1 Containment radiation levels continue to increase. At T = 230 (1120),
the Reactor Operator notices that DW Vent Valve 2-1601-23 is shoving a duel indication and that the drywell radiation level has reoched 2000 R/ hour. A General Emergency is declared based on EAL #11)(b). At T =
290 (1200), the Reactor Operator notices that vent valve 2-1601-24 is also ' showing a duel indication.
Drywell pressure, causing leakage past the vent valves initiates the open release pathway to the environ-ment through the ' Standby Gas Treatment System.
During this time frame, HpCI is eventually successfully injected and Control Rods are inserted thus shutting the reactor down.
By T = 365 (1335), drywell pressure has decreased significantly, allowing the vent valves to reseat, thus terminating the release pathway.
RECOVERY iT = 390 to T = 420 (1400 to 1430)1 At T = 390 (1400), a two (2) week time jump occurs. The Reactor is in Cold Shutdown with all rods fully inserted.
Containment radiation levels have substantially decayed off.
Repair work is still underway on Transformer 22 and adequate temporary auxiliary power has been established on Unit 2.
The Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator has been success-fully returned to service and the Unit 2 Diesel Generator cooling problems have been found and corrected.
The "C" CCSW Room cooler is replaced.
A through investigation for the CRD System hydraulic lock is ongoing.
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0 lilinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency OA 110 East Adams Street, Springfield,lilinois 62706 August 31, 1987 Mr. Wallace Weaver Chief, Technical Hazards Branch Region V. Federal Emergency Management Agency 175 West Jackson Blvd., 4th Floor Chicago, IL 60604
Dear Mr. Weaver:
d Due to this Agency's involvement in response to the floo i
disaster in Cook and DuPage Counties, the Agency Public Informat o i
Officer will not be able to participate at the Dresden Jo nt Public Information Center during the September 2 h
State of Illinois.
If you have any questions, please call Jana Fairow.
Sincerely,
.n
,q.,
Avid L. Smith Chief, Field Services DLS/jf Andrea Pepper, IDNS Gordon Wenger, FEMA Battle Creek cc:
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