ML20248C912

Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-219/89-16. Corrective Actions:Containment Analysis Performed to Ascertain Impact of 90 F Intake Canal Water Temp on Containment Response Curves

ML20248C912
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	09/27/1989
From:	Fitzpatrick E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 8910040060
Download: ML20248C912 (5)

Text

.-. ._.

e- . .

l.*  ?. * ,

\

L i

~

GPU Nuclear Corporation

. Nuclear  :::: = = 888 Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388 609 971-4000 Writer's Direct DialNumber:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission S eptenber 27. 1989 Attn Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Inspection Report 89-16 Response to Notice of Violation In accordance with 10CFR2.201, the enclosed provideo GPU Nuclear's response to the violations identified in NRC's Inspection Report 50-219/89-16.

As discussed with and agreed to by the Oyster Creek Senior Resident Inspector, an extension of the due date for this response until September 29, 1989 has been granted.

If further information is required, please contact Brenda DeMerchant, OC Licensing Engineer at.(609) 971-4642.

Very truly yours, C$

E.E. Fitzp trick Vice President and Director Oyster Creek EEF/BDeM/jc Enclosure cct Mr. William T. Russell, Administrator Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Mr. Alexander Dromerick U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail' Station Pl-137 Washington, DC 20555

/

1*,p '

8910040060 890927 1 PDR ADOCK 05000219 V1 G PNV (

GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation

f , ,

• + ' *.*

r VIOLATION:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI and GPU Nuclear Operational Quality Assurance Plan, Section 8 require that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected. For a significant conditions adverse to quality, the cause shall be determined and appropriate action taken to prevent recurrence.

Contrary to the above, during July 1988 and July 1989, appropriate action was not taken to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. The plant was operated with intake canal water temperature above 85 degrees F. This condition changed the containment response curves as presented in the Safety Analysis Review and resulted in the plant being in an unanalyzed condition. The Licensee's failure to take~

prompt cossective action resulted in a repetition for a similar event that occurred in July 1988, as reported in inspection report 88-23.

RESPONSE

GPUN concurs in the violation.

1. Corrective Actions which have been taken and the results achieved:

a) During July 1988, a containment analysis was performed to ascertain the impact of 90*F intake canal water temperature on the containment Response curves. The analysis concluded that the  ;

peak drywell and torus pressures, and drywell temperature were not' impacted. The only change noted was a higher torus pool temperature. The higher torus pool temperature was not considered a significant change to the net positive suction head available to the Core Spray pumps. The results of this analysis were verbally communicated to the plant personnel. These results  !

were not formally documented, due to the short duration when the canal water intake temperature exceeded 85'F.

b) GPUN has performed a containment response analysi s for 100% power ]

and an intake canal water temperature of 90*F. The peak torus l water temperature is 157'F with an assumed heat transfer i coefficient of 65% of tbs design value. Assuming a core spray pump maximum flow oI 4100 gpm as used in the Appendix K analysis, the available NPSH exceeds that which is required for the pump.

The analyses performed to ascertain containment response and the NPSH available for the core spray pumps during a design basis accident with an initial intake canal temperature of 90*F will be documented per GPUN procedure 5000-ADM-7311.01, " Calculations".

A safety review in accordance with procedure 1000-ADM-1291.01, (Procedure for Nuclear Safety and Environmental Impact Review and Approval of Documents), will be completed to determine if the FSAR should be updated.

i i

l l ._ _ ______.______________________U

7c .,' ,,.":

2. correct'ive steps which will be taken to avoid further violations 2 ,

~

.In the future, for existing conditions that both deviate from that described in the FSAR and for which GPUN proposes to operate permanently, the existing condition will be evaluated and reviewed in l.. accordance with procedure.1000-ADM-1291.01.

13. Date when full compliance will be achieved.

The safety review and calculations will be completed.in accordance-with the referenced procedures by October 30, 1989.

is

., ,e * " .

• VIOLATION:

B.- 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI and GPU Nuclear Operational Quality I Assurance Plan, Section 8 requires that the cause of significant conditions adverse to quality shall be determined and appropriate action taken to prevent recurrence.

Contrary to the above, appropriate action was not taken to prevent the recurrence of uncontrolled / unguarded high radiation areas which'was previously reported in 88-23. During the period August 30, 1988 through July 1, 1989, nine additional incidents of uncontrolled / unguarded high radiation areas occurred.

This violation is Severity Level IV (Supplement IV).

RESPONSE

GPUN concurs with the violation as stated:

1. Corrective actions which have been taken

a. As a short term immediate corrective action, a revision to the procedure governing entry into high locked high radiation areas has been released to closely govern the issuance of keys to unlock doors leading to such areas. The Radiological Controls Department has hired a new staff whose responsibility is that of

" key controller". Using the key controller concept, a work crew will obtain approval for a job from Radiological Controls who will then assign a Key controller to take the key and escort the group to the work site. Once the Locked High Radiation Door has been opened, the Key Controller can turn over responsibility for the area to a senior person at the location. When the job has been completed, the senior person will lock the door and then notify the Key Controller that the work is complete and the door has been locked. The Key Controller will physically report to the door, check to ensure everyone has left the area, and verify that the door is locked.

l This action will continue until hardware concerns and other l response issues are resolved.

l

2. Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violatons.

a. Four entry doors involved in 70% of the events involving improper closure will be outfitted with large handle locking devices and clearly visible signs that will indicate open or locked at a casual glance.

This action will be completed by April, 1990.

b. For those areas in which part of the root cause involves difficulties associated with double step-off pad controls, the Radiological Controls Department will evaluate re-design of the entry arrangement to facilitate the ability to close, lock and 1

verify door status.

This action will be completed by December 1, 1989.

1

ri-y p [. , . , . ; . . ' * * *- c . -

'4,~

3. . c.. . Padlocks with hasps or chains will-be replaced with locking cores that F require the padlock to be closed and locked in. order to remove the

, key. - This action is. designed to enhance ' control over such areas -

.-This n'etion will be completed by Dec=har 31, 1989.

.;ii

.li .)

e b'

L

4. .

f:

t:

L l' C320311

_ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _________________________ _ _ __ - -