ML20247M814

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-4 Re Reactor Trip Sys Instrumentation Setpoints & ESFAS Instrumentation

ML20247M814
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Site:	Summer
Issue date:	07/21/1989
From:	SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
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ML19292J364	List: ML20247M808 ML20247M814 ML20247M828 ML20247M850
References
NUDOCS 8908020234
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Attachment'2 to Document Control Desk Letter

-July 21, 1989 Page 1 of 2 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS EVALUATION FOR VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION RTD BYPASS ELIMINATION 1

Description of amendmentrequest: j i

The proposed amendments to Table 2.2-1 of Technical Specification Section l 2.2.1,." Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Setpoints," and Table 3.3-4 of  !

Technical Specification Section 3.3.2, " Engineered Safety feature Actuation p: -System Instrumentation," reflects revised instrumentation setpoints associated with the removal and. replacement of the existing resistance temperature detector (RTD) bypass manifold system with fast response RTDs located in the reactor coolant hot and cold leg piping.

Basis forproposed no significant hazards consideration:

The original RTD bypass system utilized an arrangement which directs a sample of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) flow from the main coolant piping to an

~ independent temperature measurement manifold. Coolant is redirected by scoops from the hot leg at three locations, 120 degrees apart in the same plane around the pipe circumference, in order to obtain a representative sample. A cold leg sample is also taken, at the discharge of the reactor coolant pump, which provides sufficient mixing such that nultiple sampling is ,

not necessary. After temperature measurement, the sample is then returned to the main coolant flow. The narrow range RTDs provide the temperature to calculate loop delta-T and Tave. In order to eliminate operating obstacles associated with the bypass system (such as leakage through valves and flanges and radiation exposure during reactor building maintenance), SCE&G is proposing to. install a fast response system which measures loop temperature via thermowell mounted RTDs protruding into the main reactor coolant flow

.thereby eliminating the bypass piping network.

SCE&G has evaluated the proposed changes against the Significant Hazards Criteria of 10CFR50.92. The results of SCE&G's evaluation demonstrate that the changes do not involve any significant hazards as described below.

a. The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is

.not significantly increased. The loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) and non-LOCA accident analyses were reviewed verifying that the variations

-in uncertainty associated with certain reactor trip functions, reflected

.in the Technical Specifications changes, do not invalidate the current Reload Transition Safety Report (RTSR) analyses of record. Therefore, the design basis conclusions are still met. Additionally, it was determined that sufficient allowance exists in the current RTSR assumptions such that the total temperature measurement uncertainty and i protection system response time for the new RTDs do not impact the RTSR l results. With respect to a LOCA, conservative nominal input values were l assumed in the analysis and not plant specific input valves; therefore, slight variation in uncertainties do not affect the RTSR results. These conclusions are based upon calculations supporting the revised Tables

r Attachment 2 to Document Control Desk Letter

July 21, 1989-Page 2 of 2 2.2-1 and 3.3-4 provided in the attached WCAP-12189. The new values were obtained using methodology consistent with the Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems, WCAP-11770, which was previously submitted to the Commission.

b. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis reports is not created.

At V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, the three hot leg RTDs and one cold leg RTD will utilize the existing penetrations into the RCS piping from the bypass system with only slight modifications. Caps and welds sealing the crossover leg bypass return piping nozzle, as well as the modification and welding for the existing penetrations, will be qualified in accordance with the ASME code consistent with current plant designs. Consideration has been given to plant response in the remote possibility that a thermowell would be ejected from its boss. It has been concluded that the affect of this flow area is insignificant on the results of the large break LOCA analyses and bounded by the results for the small break LOCA analyses. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident does not exist.

The function of the delta-T/Tave protection channels is not changed because of the bypass elimination. The newly installed fast response RTDs perform the same function in both Thot and Tcold applications. The three Thot signals are electronically averaged, with the capability to manually add an electronic bias to a two-RTD average should one RTD fail. These measured temperature values will still serve as input to two-out-of-three voting logic for protection functions. Spare RTOs are installed and can be manually activated should the on-line RTD fail.

The basis for the instrumentation and control design mee'3 the criteria of applicable IEEE standards, regulatory guides and ganeral design criteria which satisfy electrical separation, seismic and environmental qualification and single failure criteria,

c. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of the Technical Specifications is not significantly reduced by the affect of the change of the response time and setpoint uncertainties. The investigation of the affect of these variables on non-LOCA and LOCA transients has verified that plant operation will be maintained within the bounds of safe, analyzed conditions as defined in the RTSR with the revised Technical Specifications. Conclusions presented in the RTSR remain valid. The specific analyses and supporting calculations supporting these conclusions are provided in the attached WCAP-12189. As such, no reduction in the margin of safety between the RTSR acceptance limit and the ultimate safety limit (such as departure from nucleate boiling ratio) has taken place for operation with the new RTD system.

u_____

Attachment 5 Document Control Desk Letter July 21, 1989 Contents Contents Westinghouse Letter CAW-89-065 Affidavit CAW-89-131

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