ML20247J289
| ML20247J289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247J286 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8906010096 | |
| Download: ML20247J289 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES 4 -
.g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF-NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.
21 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF THE. CLEVELAND ELECTRIC. ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL.
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET.NO. 50-440
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated January 18, 1989, The Cleveland Electric 111usinating Company, et al..(licensees) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License NPF-58 for the' Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1.
The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification Table 3.6.4-1. Containment Automatic
. Isolation Valves, by adding two additional automatic containment isolation valves to the Table and one valve control switch to the Division 1 Remote Shutdown Panel Technical Specification Table 3.3.7.4-1.
This Technical System without resulting in one of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) p (SPCU Specification change would allow use of the Suppression Pool Cleanu subsystems becoming unavailable for performance of its safety functions.
The modification would be completed during the first refueling outage. The licensee requested the NRC approval of this change prior to May 12, 1989 in order to support the preparation for startup originally scheduled for May 22,1989.. The outage has been delayed due to emergent work and is currently scheduled to end in late June 1989.
t-2.0 EVALUATION Currently, the return line of the Suppression Pool Cleanup System (G42) ties suppressionpoolisolationvalve(E12-F024A/B).into either loop A or B of the RH stream of the respective During Suppression Pool Cleanup operations, it requires the opening of isolation valve E12-F024A/B. This drops the pressure in either A or B loop of the RHR system below the system low pressure alerm setpoint, rendering that loop inoperable.
l A modification is proposed for the first refueling outage to relocate the RHR System between the isolation salve (E12-F024A) point on the A loop of th return of the Suppression Pool Cleanup System to a and the nForession pool,
.thus allowing the E12-F024A valve to remain shut during Su)pression Pool Cleanupoperations(SeeFigure2). Both RHR loops could tien remain operable throughout Train A SPCU System operations (preferred configuration).
8906010096 890323 PDR ADOCK 05000440 P
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i 1 1 The proposed return line utilizes the same existing containment penetration and adds two automatic containment isolation valves (IE12-F609 and 1E12-F610) to the line.
(See Figure 2). Both valves will be located in the Auxiliary Building as close as possible to the outside of the containment, receiving Valve Group 1 containment isolation signals (Reactor Pressure Vessel low level 2, and high drywell pressure). The proposed isolation signal is more conservative than the existing isolation signal on Level 1 for valve IE12-F024A.
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The power supplies to the valves are independent (1E Division 1 power goes to i
1E12-F609, and IE Division 2 power goes to 1E12-F-610) so that any single failure would not prevent containment isolation.
Since the Suppression Pool Cleanup System Control will be operated from the control room, a control switch for Division 1 Valve IE12-F609 will be added to the Remote Shutdown Panel to close the new isolation valve in case of the need to perform a remote shutdown while the SPCU System is operating. This will prevent any possible interactions between RHR suppression pool cooling and the SPCU System following a control room evacuation. The modification j
will be installed in accordance with ASME Section III Class 2 up through both containment isolation valves, which are 6 inch 300 psig, ANSI rated carbon steel gate valves. The normal operational pressure for this line is approxi-mately 20 psig, with a design pressure of 150 psig. The design pressure of the proposed additional isolation valves is consistent with the previously-approved suppression pool cleanup system design. The valve closure times of 30 seconds are the same as the standard gate valve closure time. The staff finds this 30-seconds closure time acceptable because the previously-approved isolation valve (E12-F024A) on the system has a closure time of 90 seconds.
Also, the staff finds that the combination of the two automatic outside containment isolation valves, along with the piping inside containment submerged below the suppression pool, is an acceptable alternative to satisfy General Design Criterion (GDC) 56, of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A per Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.2.4.11.
Thesenewvalves(1E12-F609and1E12-F610) are to be classified as "normally closed" and open only during operation of the SPCU System. Based on the above review, the staff finds that the proposed modification meets the acceptance criteria of GDC 54 and 56 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as required by SRP Section 6.2.4.II.
The proposed piping and valves are designed to seismic Category 1, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29. The previous interconnection tee to the RHR System will be removed and replaced with a pipe segment in accordance with the established RHR System design criterien. The staff finds this to be acceptable in meeting the requirements of GDC 1, 2, and 4 cf Apperdix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as required by SRP Section 6.2.4.11.
The new containment isolation valves will be tested with eter at a pressure of 1.10 Pa in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.e.
This return line terminates below the minimum suppression pool drawdown level. Therefore, i
a water seal will be maintained in the pipe for at least a 30-day period between the new valves and containment atmosphere throughout the accident I
scenario.
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, These added valves are outside the scope of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J.
This means that E12-F609 and E12-F610 valves will be tested with water, and the leakage will be limited to that specified in TS 3.6.1.2.e and will not be added to the Type B and C total. Thfs is consistent with the present leak rate testing being performed on the 1E12-F024A valve and other valves using this penetration. Also, since a water seal will be maintained as described above, there is no potential for secondary bypass leakage through the two new containment isolation valves. The staff finds this to be acceptable in meeting GDC 16 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as required by SRP Section 6.2.4.11 to provide a leak-tight barrier against the uncontrolled release of
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radioactivity to the environment.
Based on the.above review and evaluation, the staff finds that the proposed 1
additicnal isolation valves and piping provide single failure proof, seismic Category I quality, appropriate valve closure time, remote control shutdown capability and leak tight barrier by a water seal for at least 30 days during an accident. Therefore, the staff has determined that the proposed modification to the system oesign meets SRP Section 6.2.4.II. acceptance criteria in satisfying GDC 1, 2, 4, 16, 54, and 56 to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A and that the proposed Technical Specification change is acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, 51.32, and 51.35 an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact has been prepared and published in the Federal Register on May 23,1989 (54 FR 22386 ).
Accordingly, based upon the environmental assessment, the Comission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) public such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Attachments:
Figures 1 and 2 Principal Contributor:
A. Chu Dated: May 23, 1989 1
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