ML20247D273
| ML20247D273 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1989 |
| From: | William Cahill TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| TXX-89473, NUDOCS 8907250130 | |
| Download: ML20247D273 (31) | |
Text
9 7,
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= = = = =
EE Log # TXX-89473
=-
File # 10010 10014 906.2 TUELECTRIC Ref. # 10CFR50.34(b)
July 17,-1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
20555
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET N05. 50-445 and 50-446 ADVANCE FSAR AND (ECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SUBMITTAL CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE TESTING Gentlemen:
The enclosures to this letter provide an advance submittal of FSAR and Technical Specification changes related to Appendix J testing of containment isolation valves, along with related supporting documentation.
These changes till be included in a future FSAR. amendment and should also be reflected in the CPSES Unit,1 Technical Specifications when issued.
In order to facilitate NRC staff review of these changes, information related to.the FSAR change (enclosure 1) is organized as follows:
1.
Draft revised FSAR pages, with' changed portions indicated by a bar in the margin (denoted as " draft"), as they are to appear in a future amendment (additional pages immediately preceeding and/or following the revised pages are provided.if needed to understand the change).
2.
Line-by-line description / justification of each FSAR item revised.
3.
.A copy v related SER/SSER sections.
4.
An index page containing the title of " bullets" which consolidate and categorize similar individual FSAR changes by subject and j'
related SER section.
5.
A discussion of each " bullet" which includes:
The line-by-line description / justification for each FSAR item related to the " bullet" which has been screened as a group 1 or 2 item or a group 3 or 4 item which impacts the existing SER/SSER's.
(The discussion of these groups is contained in TU Electric letter TXX-88467 dated June 1, 1988) 8907250130 890717 9
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'TXX-89473 it
' July.17, 1989' Page 2 of 2 m
The' bold / overstrike version of the revised FSAR pages referenced by the description / justification for each item 1
identified above. The bold / overstrike version facilitates review of the revisions by highlighting each addition of new text in bold type font and overstriking with a slash
(/) the portien of the text that is deleted.
In some-cases, where.the bold overst:ike version is unavailable, a hand marked-up version will be provided.
Information related-to the Technical Specification change (Enclosure 2) is organized as follows:
1.
Draft revised Technical Specification peges, with changed portions indicated by a bar in the ru ein (denoted as " draft").
2.
A line-by-line description / justification of each Technical Specification item revised.
3.
A hand marked-up version of the Final Draft of the CPSES Unit 1 1
Technical Specifications as certified on April 14, 1989.
~i In addition to the above changes to the Technical Specifications, related changes to the CPSES Technical Requirefaents Manual (TRM) will be transmitted
'under a separate letter.
fU Electric requests that the NRC perform an expedited review of the above FSAR and Technical b edification changes and
)
' inform us as to their acceptability.
4 Sincerely, William J. Cahill, Jr.
BSD/bsd Enclosures c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3)
A
____.m___
ap-4 to TXX-89473 July 17, 1989 Advance FSAR Change Related to Containment Isolation Valve Testing and Supporting Documentation Item 1 Draft Revised FSAR Pages 2 to 7 Item 2 Description / Justifications for All 8 to 12 FSAR Changes Item 3 Related SER/S$ER Pages 13 to 18 Item 4 Index Page for Bullet 19 Item 5 Description / Justification for 20 to 23 Bullets Markup of Existing FSAR Pages 24 to 29 i
Page 1 of 29
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1'Enclssure l' to TXX-8f;[ AILED DESCRIPTION S FSAR AMENDMENT
- July,17, 1989 y,
Page.8 of 29
.FSAR Page (a_a amended)
SrDun pnctiotion ru
' Table 6.2.4-2.
3-See Sheet No(s):04' Revises valve testing requirements for items 33 and 34..
Revision:
These valves (RHR from hot leg loops 1 and 4) were previously not Type C tested based on justification provided in Note 5.
These valves are now Type C tested and Note 5 is deleted.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-46F-01 1
Related SER'Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No Tabl e. 6. 2.4-2 2
See Sheet flo(s):04 and 05 091etes the Type C testing previously indicated for the check valves associated with items 35 and 36.
Revision:
. These RHR check valves (cold leg loops 1, 2, 3, and 4) were previously to be Type C tested (water or air) per discussion in Note 3.
These valves are no longer Type i
C tested per the justification in Note-11._
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.02 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):05 Deletes the Type C testing previously indicated for the valves associated with items 43 and 44.
Revision:
These valves (SI to hot leg loops 1, 2, 3 and 4) were previously indicated as Type-C tested (either air test or water test per Note 3).
These valves are no longer tested per the justification provided in Note.12.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.03 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No l
l.
Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):06 Deletes the Type C test previously indicated for the L
valves associated with item 45.
I-Revision:
l These valves (SI to cold leg loops 1, 2, 3 and 4) were l
previously to be Type C tested (either with air or with l-water per Note 3).
These valves are no longer fype C tested per the justification provided by Note 13.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.04 l
Related SER Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No
q
^
N
' to-TXX-8MS FSAR AMENDMENT
!r July 174 1989 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Page 9 of 29.
4 FSAR Pagei p
j(gg3 mended)
Group Desci:ntion
[ Table'6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):07
' Deletes the Type C testing previously indicated for the check valves associated with item 63. '
Revision:
These check valves (RHR to hot leg loops 2 and 3) were previously Type C water or air tested per Note 3.
These valves are no longer Type C tested per justification provided in Note 14.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.05 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 3
See Sheet No(s):13 Deletes Note 5.
Revision:
Note 5 provided justification for not performing Type C testing on RHR valves associated with items 33 and 34.
These valves ara now Type C tested and Note 5 is no longer necessa.;
FSAR Chantje Reque.
Number: 89-467.06 Related SER Sectioi 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):14 Adds new Note 11.
Addition:
Note 11 provides justification for not Type C testing the check valves associated witn items 35 and 36.
c These valves are a part of an ESF system supplying RHR pump flow to the cold legs of the RCS during cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation modes of operation i
During hot leg recirculation the penetrations are not i service but are pressurized by the RHR pumps in excess of 1.1 times containment pressure.
In addition the motor operated containment isolation valves outside q
containment are Type C tested thus ensuring that an uncontrolled leakage path for containment atmosphere does not exist. Also these penetrations have been analyzed for single failure considerations as follows:
During cold leg injection and hot leg recirculation the flow paths and pressurization are maintained even with the most limiting single active failure. During cold leg recirculation the penetrations do not meet the single failure criterion for maintaining RHR pressure against the isolation valves outside containment since the RHR pump discharge is not cross-connected in this mode. However, the safety injection pumps are cross-connected in this mode and will maintain flow to the discharge of the RHR system inside containment such that no leakage path for containment atmosphere exists.
1
t Enclosure I to TXX-8% FEES 'FSAR AMENDMENT Ouly.17, 1989 DETAILED DESCRIPTION Page 10 of 29 1
1 FSAR Page l
(31 amended)
GrouD Description Other considerations:
The RHR system outside i
containment meets the requirements for a closed system
?
(i.e., missle protected, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2, design temperature and pressure at least equal to containment and is tested per the requirements NUREG 0737 section III.D.1 thus ensuring a secondary protection against leakage, should any occur.
Based on the above considerations the containment
. isolation is assured in the event of an accident and thus meets the intent of Appendix J without Type C testing the inside containment isolation check valves.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.07 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):14 Adds new Note 12 providing justification for not perfor i
ming Type C testing on the valves associated with items 43 and 44.
Addition:
The valves for these penetrations are part of an ESF system supplying SI pump flow (valves open) to the hot legs during the hot leg recirculation mode. During cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation, these penetrations are not inservice (valves closed) but are pressurized by the safety injection pumps to a pressure in excess of 1.1 times containment design pressure.
This ensures no path for containment atmosphere leakage exists.
The pressurization of the penetrat-as discussed above is maintained even with the most limiting single active failure.
In addition the SI system meets the requirements for a closed system outside containment. (See similar discussion for Note 11.) Based on the above considerations these penetrations meet the intent of Appendix J (to prevent leakage of containment atmosphere in the event of an accident) without the performance of Type C testing.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.08 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):14 Adds new Note 13 providing justification for not perfor ming Type C testing on the valves associated with item 45.
Addition:
The valves for this penetration is part of an ESF system supplying SI pump flow (valves open) to the cold legs during the cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation.
During hot leg recirculation this
a l
Enclosure:
1 'to TXX-8MS FSAR AMENDMENT i 1
, July: 17, 1989 Page 11'of 29-.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION FSAR.Page f(p.s amended)
Group Description
-penetration is not in service (valves closed) but is pressurized by the safety injection pumps to a pressure in excess of 1.1 times the containment design pressure.
This ensures that no path for containment atmosphere leakage exists (in the event of an accident).
The pressurization of the penetration as discussed above is maintained even with the most limiting single active failure.
In addition the SI system meets the requirements for a closed system outside containment.
(See similar discussion under note 11.)
Based on the above considerations this penetration meets the intent of Appendix J (to-prevent leakage of containment atmosphere in the event of an accident) without performance of Type C testing.
l FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.09 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 i
SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):14 Adds new Note 14 providing justification for not performing Type C testing on the inside containment isolation check valves associated with item 63.
Addition:
The valves for this penetration are part of an ESF m
system supplying RHR pump flow (valves open) to the hot legs during the hot leg recirculation. During cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation this penetration is not inservice (valve closed) but is pressurized by the RHR pumps to a pressure in excess of 1.1 times the containment design pressure.
In addition, the outside containment motor operated isolation valve for this penetration is Type _C tested thus ensuring Bat an uncontrolled leakage path for containment atmosphere does not exist. Also this penetration has been evaluated for single failure considerations as follows:
During cold leg injection and hot leg recirculation the flow paths and pressurization of the penetration discussed above is maintained even in the event of the most limiting single active failure. During cold leg-recirculation, pressurization of this penetration could be lossed as a result of a single active failure (e.g.,
loss of a train). However, the SI pumps are cross-connected during' this mode and will maintain flow to the discharge of the RHR system inside containment such that no leakage path for containment atmosphere exists.
Also, as discussed under Note 11, the RHR system outside containment meets the requirements for a closed system which provides secondary protection against potential containment leakage.
Based on the above considerations the containment isolation is assured in the event of an accident and l
If l
' Enclosure.'l~ to TXX-8% MIS FSAR: AMENDMENT - c h
July 17,:1989 DETAILED DESCRIPTION' 3-
- Page 12 of 29;
, y FSAR Page.
L ~ -
-(As amended).
Group Description.
thus meets the intert of Appendix J without Type C' testing the inside' containment isolation check valves.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.10 Related SER Sectioni 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: 'No m
i
,,_mm_
~____.-._____m_-
^'
" to TXX-89473
' July 17, 1989 i
Page.13 of 29 The staff has performed a similar analysis of hydrogen generation and hydrogen accumulation in the containment following a LOCA, and the staff's results are I
in agreement with the applicant's.
Based on.its review, the staff concludes that the combustible gas control system design meets the requirements of GDC 41, 42, and 43 and the provisions of Regulatory' Guide 1.7, and is, therefore, acceptable.
6.2.5 Containment Leakage Testing Program The containment design includes the provisions and features necessary to satisfy the testing requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.
The design of the containment penetrations and isolation valves will permit periodic leakage rate testing at the pressure specified in Appendix J.
Included are those penetrations i
that have gasketed seals and electrical penetrations.
l The containment leakage testing program complies with the requirements of Appendix J.
Such compliance provides adequate assurance that containment leak-tight integrity can be verified throughout service lifetime and that the leakage rates will be periodically checked during service on a timely basis to maintain such leaka The plant'ges within the specified limits of the Technical Specifications.
s Technical Specifications will contain appropriate surveillance requirements for containment leak testing, including test frequencies.
I Maintaining containment leakage rates within such limits provides reasonable assurance that, in the event of any radioactivity releases within the contains the loss of the containment atmosphere through leak paths will not be in excess of acceptable limits specified for the site; that is, the resultant doses will be well within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines in the event of a design-basis LOCA.
The staff concludes that the applicant's program comp 1ks with the requirements of Appendix J, and provides an acceptable basis for satisfying the requirements of GDC 52, 53, and 54.
6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System 6.3.1 Design Basis The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) is designed to cool the reactor core and to provide shutdown capability for accident conditions that result in significant depressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS).
These accident conditions include mechanical failure of the RCS piping up to and including instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe in the RCS, ejection of a rod cluster control assembly, pipe breaks in the steam system, and steam generator tube rupture.
i The design bases for selecting ECCS functional requirements are derived from Apaendix K limits for fuel cladding temperature as delineated in 10 CFR 50.46.
Su> system functional parameters have been selected so that Appendix K require-ments are met over the range of anticipated accidents and single-failure 1
assumptions.
The applicant states that the requirements will be met with minimum engineered safeguards available, such as loss of one emergency power bus with loss of offsite power.
1 6-13
o'W 3nclosure 1 to TXX-89473
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JJuly 17, 1989 q
9
'Page 14 of 29
-j 1
.6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES' i
' 6. 2 Containment-Systems'
-6'2.3 Containment Isolation System 6.2.3.1' Containment Isolation Provisions for Containment Emergency Sump.
Recirculation Lines The containment emergency sump recirculation lines are provided with a single, remote, manual gate valve outside the containment.
The valve is enclosed in a valve isolation tank.
The piping from the sump to the valve is enclosed in a concentric guard pip,e.
In Section 6.2.3 of the SER, it is stated that the valve isolation tank and the concentric ' guard pipe are leaktight at containment design conditions.
In FSAR Amendment 38, the applicant stated the following:
"The guard pipe and valve isolation tank are not considered part of the barrier between containment and external environment and are not tested at containment design conditions.
The'reasoi, for this is that these moderate energy lines are designed to meet-the requirement of Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1 (SRP 3.6.2)."
In light of this information, the staff finds it acceptable to forego leak testing of the guard pipe and valve isolation tank at containment design condition.
6.2.3.2 Elimination of Type C Leakage Tests for Certain. Containment Isolation Valves-By letters. dated August 19 and December' 16, 1983,' and April 6, 1984, the appli-cant requested that a number of containment isolation valves be eliminated from the Type C leak testing program.
The-isolation valves involved and the asso-ciated justification are.provided in Table 6.2.4.2 of FSAR Amendments 42, 46, and 51.
The staff has reviewed this information and finds it acceptable.
A' discussion of these valves follows:
(1) Safety injection valves 1-8802 A, 1-8802 B, and.1-8840 are normally closed and are required to open during postaccident conditions.
The safety injection' system is a closed system outside containment that operates at a pressure in excess of containment design pressure.
In the event the valve fails to open, leakage'of containment atmosphere is prevented by the pump pressure on the system side and a water seal on the containment side of the valve.
The combination of the valve disc seal and the double stem seals preclude the possibility of significant stem leakage.
Instead of Type C testing, the applicant has committed to conduct quarterly stem leakage measurements. The staff finds this is acceptable.
The surveil-lance requirements and acceptance criteria should be included in the plant's Technical Specifications.
(2) Containment isolation valves HV-4776, HV-4777, ICT-142, and ICT-145 on the spray systems are normally closed and are required to operate during postaccident conditions.
The applicaot indicated in FSAR Amendment 42 that there is a water-filled loop seal on the containment side of the i
I Comanche Peak $SER 6 6-1 4W
l Enclosure'l to TXX-89473 i
July 17,1989 Page 15 of 29 valves that woulf exist for a period greater than 30 days following onset of an accident.
Instead of Type C testing, the applicant has committed to conduct leakage cesting with water.
The staf f finds this to be in accor-dance with the provisions of Section III.C.3(b) of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50.
1hc surveillance requirements and acceptance criteria should be included in the plant's Technical Specifications.
6.2.5 Containment Leakage Testing During its continuing review, the staff was asked if two procedural variations used by the applicant during conduct of the integrated leak rate test (ILRT) were acceptable.
The procedures questioned were as follows:
(1) The applicant conducted the ILRT with three penetrations isolated because they were leaking (penetrations E-49, E-62 and E-68).
After the ILRT was completed, the applicant inspected these penetrations and determined that the gaskets were improperly installed.
Reinstallation of the gaskets miti-gated the leakage.
A local leak rate test was conducted on each repaired penetration and the results were integrated into the ILRT analysis, and the test results found acceptable.
(2) The applicant committed to conduct the ILRT to follow the methodology of ANSI N45.4-1972 in the FSAR; however, the methodology of ANSI 56.8-1981 was actually used.
On the basis of its review of the Test Summary Report submitted by letter from H. C. Schmidt, TUGCO, to H. R. Denton, dated May 6, 1984, the staff confirmed that three electrical penetrations (E-49, E-62, and E-68) were isolated during the ILRT because of excessive leakage.
The measured leak rate (Ltm) at the reduced pressure (Pt) was 0.02026% per day, ar.d the measured leakage rate (Lam) at the peak pressure (Pa) was 0.05579% per day.
The maximum allowable leakage rate (La) is 0.10% per day.
Subsequent to the test, the applicant repaired the three electrical penetrations and performed local leak rate test.
The result-ing local leakage rate was 6 standard cubic centimeters per minute, or 4 x 10 o%
per day.. This leakage is negligibly small compared to the measured values of Ltm and Lam, and will not affect the integrated leak rate test results.
Since only three penetrations are involved, and the impact on the ILRT results is insignificant, the staff concludes that the measured values of Ltm and Lam are acceptable.
However, the staff finds that additional information is needed before it can determine the acceptability of the applicant's approach in using the methodology of ANSI 56.8-1981 instead of ANSI N45.4-1972, as committed to in the FSAR.
Until a satisfactory response is received, the staff considers this matter an outstanding issue which is being added to the list of issues contained in Section 1.7 of this report.
The applicant was advised of this new issue by letter dated August 27, 1984 (B. J. Youngblood to M. D. Spence).
6.2.5.1 Relaxation of Airlock Leakage Testing from Technical Specification Requirement (Section III.D.2(b)(ii) of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50)
By letter dated August 23, 1984, the applicant requested an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, paragraph III.D.2(b)(ii), which bidtes:
" Air locks opened during periods when containment integrity is not Comanche Peak SSER 6 6-2 L
v f'
'N
. Enclosure I to TXX-89473 L
.' July 17, 1989 Page 16 of-29; re' quired by the plant's; Technical Specifications shall be tested at the end of i
such period at not less than Pa."
Whenever the plant is in Mode 5 (cold shutdown), containment integrity is not-required.
Thus, if an air lock is-opened during Mode 5 operations, para-graph III.D.2(b)(ii) requires that an overall air lock leakage test at not.less than Pa be conducted before entry into Mode 4.
Even if the-periodic 6-month test required by paragraph III.D.2(b)(i) of Appen-dix J has been satisfied, to meet the requirement of paragraph-III.D.2(b)(ii),
no access to the containment can be allowed while preparing to leave Mode 5 until an air lock that has been opened in Mode 5 is first tested.
The test would effectively be required every time Mode 5 was entered.
The containment would have to be cleared of personnel during performance of this test or they would be required to remain inside containment during the test and until the-plant reached Mode 4.
Often there are several minor operational and mainte-o nance problems that require containment entry just before entering Mode 4; the special. air lock test wous" have to wait until all problems requiring contain-ment' entry were first corrected.
This is a very restrictive. requirement and would slow the process of returning to operation.
Thersfore, for the reasons stated above, the staff accepts the applicant's request to relax air lock leakage testing as a Technical Specification requirement.
I Comanche Peak SSER 6 6-3
m A to TXX-89473
~ July 17,.1989
.Page 17 of 29 4
)
6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES
- 6. 2 Containment Systems t
6.2.5 Containment Leakage iesting Program In Section 6.2.5 of Supplement 6, the staff noted that it had been asked if two l
procedural variations used by the applicant curing conduct nf the integrated leak rate test (ILRT) were acceptable.
Both of these issues were prompted by a finding of the staff's Technical Review Team (TRT).
The first issue related to a finding that the applicant had conducted the ILRT with three penetrations iso-lated because they were leaking.
The three penetrations were subsequently re-paired and tested.
The local leak rate test results were integrated into the ILRT analysis.
The TRT questioned whether the isolation of the three electri-cal penetrations was an acceptable procedural variation.
The staff found the effect of this procedural variation on the measured values negligibly small and concluded in Supplement 6 that the test results wer.e acceptable.
The second issue related to a finding by the TRT that the applicant committed to conduct the ILRT.by following the methodology of American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N45.4-1972 in the FSAR; however, the methodology of ANSI 56.8-1981 was actually used.
In Supplement 6, the staff noted that additional information was needed before it could determine the acceptability of the appli-cant's approach in using the methodology of ANSI 56.8-1981 instead of ANSI N45.4-1972, as committed to in the FSAR.
This request for additional informa-tion had been transmitted to the applicant by a letter dated August 27, 1984, which requested the applicant to identify any other deviations from ANSI N45.4-1972.
By a letter dated December 21, 1984, the applicant informed the staff that the use of the mass plot method for calculating the containment leakage rate and the isolation of the three electrical penetrations were the only deviations from FSAR commitments; by Amendment 54 the applicant revised FSAR Sections 14.2 and 3.8 to reflect these revised practices.
The staff found these limited deviations acceptable because the effect on the results of the ILRT were negligible.
On the basis of its findings in the above review, the staff concludes that the resolution of the outstanding issues regarding the ILRT methodology is accept-able and Outstanding Issue (36) in Section 1.7 of this supplement has been
, wolved.
6.2.5.1 Relaxation of Airlock Leakage Testing From Technical Specification Requirement (Section III.D.2(b)(ii) of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50)
In Section 6.2.5.1 of Supplement 6, the staff reported that the applicant re-quested an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Para-graph III.D.2(b)(ii), which states, " Air locks opened during periods when con-i tainment integrity is not required by the plant's Technical Specifications shall be tested at the end of such period at not less than Pa."
Supplement 6 f urther stated, "...the staff accepts the applicant's request to relax air lock leakage testing as a Technical Specification requirement."
Comanche Peak SSER 12 6-1 AW_
~
Enclosure I to TXX-09473 l
' July 17,-1989 Page 18 of 29 l.
The staff's evaluation and acceptance of the applicant's request in Supple-ment 6 did not fulfill the regulatory procedures, mandated for the issuance of an exemption to the regulations (10 CFR 50.12) which is required in the processing of this request.
Whether the action will result in a significant adverse effect on the environment needs to be evaluated before the exemption can be granted.
For that reason, the staff's statement concerning the accept-ability of the applicant's request was incomplete and is withdrawn.
The staff is reevaluating the applicant's request and will report on this issue in a future supplement to the SER.
- 6.6 Inservice Inspection of Class 2 and 3 Components This section was prepared by the staff with the technical assistance of its consultant, PNL.
This evaluation supplements that contained in Section 6.6 of the SER and addresses the definition of examination requirements for the appli-cant's compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g).
6.6.1 Evaluation of Compliance for Unit 1 to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)
In Section 6.6.1 of Supplement 4, the staff determined that the preservice in-spection (PSI) program was acceptable with the exception of the chapter on relief requests, which was incomplete.
In letters dated October 7, 1982, March 10, May 6, and November 8, 1983, and August 29, 1984, the applicant requested relief from ASME Code,Section XI, requirements that have been determined to be impractical to perform.
These relief requests were supported by information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3).
Therefore, the staff's evaluation consisted of reviewing these submittals and determining if relief from the Code requirements was justified.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3), " relief has been allowed for (i) proposed alternatives that provide an acceptable level of quality and safety or (ii) requirements if implemented, that would result in hardships or unusual difficulties without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety." The detailed evalu-ation'of relief requests is inciv'ed as Appendix S to this report.
On the basis of its review of the applicant's E'Jbmittals, the staff has determined that the Comanche Peak Unit 1 PSI program is acceptable and that the review is considered to be completed.
The applicant has not submitted the initial inservice inspection program.
The staff will evaluate this program after its submittal, but before the first refueling outage when inservice inspection commences.
The applicable ASME Code edition and addenda should be determined on the basis of 10 CFR 50.55a(b) and 50.55a(g)(4).
This portion of Outstanding Issue (7) remains unresolved.
l Comanche Peak SSER 12 6-2 L
'* - to TXX-89473
" July 17, 1989 Page 19 of 29 6.'2.3 Containment Isolation System SPLB
- 11. FSAR Table 6.2.4-2 has been revised to modify certain ESF system containment isolation valve testing requirements.
l l
1
y'- to T G -89473 i
' July.17, i 1989,
Page 20-of 29 I
6.2.3 Containment Isolation System SPLB
- 11. FSAR Table 6.2.4-2 has been revised to modify certain ESF system containment isolation valve testing requirements.
1 Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):04 arr. 05 Deletes the Type C testing previously indicated for the check valves associated with. items 35 and 36.
Revision:
These RHR check valves (cold leg loops 1, 2, 3, and 4) were previously to be Type C tested (water or air) per discussion in Note 3.
These valves are no longer Type C tested per the justification in Note 11.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.02 Related SER Section: 6. 2. 5/ 4.2. 3 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No-(s):05 Deletes the Type C testing previously indicated for the valves associated with items 43 and 44.
Revision:
These valves (SI to hot leg loops 1, 2, 3 and 4) were previously indicated as Type C tested (either air test or water test per Note 3).
These valves are no longer tested per the justification provided in Note 12.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.03 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 / 4.2. 2 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):06 Deletes the Type C test previously indicated for the valves associated with item 45.
Revision:
These valves (SI to cold leg loops 1, 2, 3 and 4) were previously to be Type C tested (either with air or with
. water per Note 3).
These valves are no longer Type C tested per the justification provided by Note 13.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.04 Related SER Section: 6.2. 5/4.2. 2 SER/SSER Impact: No
__,__-_n-..
.C
' Enclosure 1 to TXX-89473
~
' July 17,-1989 4
Page 21.of 29
- Table ' 6.2.'4-2 2-See' Sheet No(s):07 Deletes the Type C testing previously indicated for the check vaives associated with item 63.
Revision:
These check' valves (RHR to hot leg loops 2 and 3) were e o previously Type C water or air tested per Note 3.
These valves are no longer Type C tested per justification provided in Note 14.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.05 Related SER Section: 6.2.5/4.23 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s): 14 Adds new Note 11.
Addition:
Note'11 provides justification for not Type C testing the check valves associated with items 35 and 3C.
These valves are a part.of an ESF system supplying RHR pump flow to the cold legs of the RCS during cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation modes of operation During hot leg recirculation the penetrations are not i service but are pressurized by the RHR pumps in excess of 1.1 times containment pressure.
In addition the motor operated containment isolation valves outside containment are Type C tested thus ensuring that an uncontrolled leakage path for containment atmosphere does not exist. Also these penetrations have been analyzed for single failure considerations as follows:
During cold leg injection and hot leg recirculation the flow paths and pressurization are maintained even with the most limiting single active failure. During cold leg recirculation the penetrations do not meet the single failure criterion for maintaining RHR pressure against the isolation valves outside containment since the RHR pump discharge is not cross-connected in this mode. However, the safety injection pumps are cross-connected in this mode and will maintain flow to the discharge of the RHR system inside containment such that no leakage path for containment atmosphere exists.
Other considerations: The RHR system outside.
containment meets the requirements for a closed system (i.e., missle protected, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2, design temperature and pressure at least equal to containment and is tested per the requirements *"lREG 0737 section III.D.1 thus ensuring a secondary protection against leakage, should any occur.
Based on the above considerations the containment isolation is assured in the event of an accident and
.thus meets the intent of Appendix J without Type C testing the inside containment isolation check valves.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.07 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 SER/SSER Impact: No
'o-to TXX-89473
' July 17, 1989 Page 22 of 29 4
Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):14 Adds new Note 12 providing justification for not perfor ming Type C testing on the valves associated with items 43 and 44.
Addition:
The valves for these penetrations are part of an ESF system supplying SI pump flow (valves open) to the hot legs during the hot leg recirculation mode. During cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation, these penetrations are not inservice (valves closed) but are pressurized by the safety injection pumps to a pressure in excess of 1.1 times containment design pressure.
This ensures no path for containment atmosphere leakage exists. The pressurization of the penetrations as discussed above is maintained even with the most limiting single active failure.
In addition the SI system meets the requirements for a closed system outside containment. (See similar discussion for Note 11.)
Based on the above considerations these penetrations meet the intent of Appendix J (to prevent leakage of containment atmosphere in the event of an accident)'without the performance of Type C testing.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.08 Related SER Section: 6.2. 5/4. 2. 3 SER/SSER Impact: No Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):14 Adds new Note 13 providing justification for not perfor ming Type C testing on the valves associated with item 45.
Addition:
The valves-for this penetration is part of an ESF system supplying SI pump flow (valves open) to the cold legs during the cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation.
During hot leg recirculation this penetration is not in service (valves closed) but is pressurized by the safety injection pumps to a pressure in excess of 1.1 times the containment design pressure.
This ensures that no path for containment atmosphere leakage exists (in the event of an accident). The pressurization of the penetration as discussed above is maintained even with the most limiting single active failure.
In addition the SI system meets the requirements for a closed system outside containment.
(See similar discussion under note 11.)
Based on the above considerations this penetration
- meets the intent of Appendix J (to prevent leakage of containment atmosphere in the event of an accident) without performance of Type C testing.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.09 Related SER Section: 6.2.5 / 6. 2.3 SER/SSER Impact: No
+
1
. Enclosure 1 to TXX-89473-
-July 17,' 1989 Page 23 of 29
.(
.s i
Table 6.2.4-2 2
See Sheet No(s):14 i
Adds new Note 14 providing justification for not performing Type C testing on the inside containment isolation check valves associated with item 63.
Addition:
The valves for this penetration are part of an ESF system supplying RHR pump flow (valves open) to the hot legs during the hot leg recirculation.
During cold leg injection and cold leg recirculation this penetration is not inservice (valve closed) but is pressurized by the RHR pumps to a pressure in excess of 1.1 times the i
containment design pressure.
In addition, the outside containment motor operated isolation valve for this penetration is Type C tested thus ensuring that an uncontrolled leakage path for containment atmosphere does not exist.
Also this penetration has been evaluated for single failure considerations as follows:
During cold leg injection and hot leg recirculation the flow paths and pressurization of the penetration discussed above is maintained even in the event of the most limiting single active failure.
During cold leg recirculation, pressurization of this penetration could be lossed as a result of a single active failure (e.g.,
loss of a train). However, the SI pumps are cross-connected.during' this mode and will maintain flow to the discharge of the RHR system inside containment such that no leakage path for containment atmosphere exists.
Also, as discussed under Note 11, the RHR system outside containment meets the requirements for a closed system which provides secondary protection against potential containment leakage.
Based on the above considerations the containment isolation is assured in the event of an accident and thus meets the intent of Appendix J without Type C testing the inside containment isolation check valves.
FSAR Change Request Number: 89-467.10 Re1ated SER Section: 6.2.5 / 4. L 3 SER/SSER Impact: No i
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- to TXX-89473 July 17, 1989 i
Advance Technical Specification Changes Related to Containment Isolation Valve Testing and Supporting Documentation i
Item 1 Draft Revised Technical Specification 2 and 3 Pages Item 2 Description / Justifications of 4
Technical Specification Changes Item 3 Markuo of Certifiec Technical 5 and 6 Specifications Page 1 of 6
" to TXX-89473
- ~.
' July 17, 1989 Page 2 of 6 e
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE'RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) e.
Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.3; f.
Containment ventilation isolation valves with resilient material seak shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.7.2 or 4.6.1.7.3, as applicable; g.
Safety injection valves 1-8809A,1-88098, and 1-8840 sha'll be leak tested with gas at a pressure not less than Pa,.
48.3 psig, or with water at a pressure not less than 1.1 D#
Pa, at intervals no greater than 24 months; h.
Containment spray valves 1HV-4776, 1HV-4777, ICT-142, and F
ICT-145 shall be leak tested with water, at a pressure not less than 1.1 Pa, at intervals no greater than 24 months; and i.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.
i l
l I
I COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 3/4 6-4 DRAFT
E to TXX-89473 e
L
' July 17, 1989 Page 3 of 6 1
3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY encures that the release of radioactive materials from the containaant atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses.
This retriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the EXCLUSION AREA B0UNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values limits of 10CFR100 during accident conditions.
3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, Pa. As an added C
l conservatism, the measured overali integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 La or 0.75 L, as t
applicable, during performance.of the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.
For spe:ific system configurations, credit maybe taken for a 30 day water stal that will be maintained to prevent containment atmosphere 1 akage through the penetrations to the environment.
The following is a list of the containment isolation valves that meet this system configuration and the Maximum Allowed Leakage late (MALR) required to maintain the water seal for 30 days.
Valve No, MALR Valve No.
MALR Valve No.
MALR 1-8809A 77 cc/hr 1-88u9B 77 cc/hr ICT-142 4734 cc/hr 1-8840 2577cc/hr ICT-145 4734 cc/hr DAAPT IHV 1776 4734 cc/hr 1HV-4777 4734 cc/hr The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1 DRAFT
~
'o Enclosure'2'to TXX-8s473
[r1,'
' July 17, 1989 CPSES TS-REVISION
- : g y.
Page 4 of.6
~ DETAILED DESCRIPTION
)
TSL Page (as amendedl.
Group Description 1
'3/4.6-4 2
-Deletes 17 Safety Injection Valves from the' list of valves that could be Type C tested with either water at 1.1Pa or air at Pa.
Revision:
Valves 1-8818A,B,C and D are no longer tested per the justification provided for FSAR Table 6.2.4-2 Note 11.
Valves 1-8802A and B ind 1-8905A,B,C and D.are'no longer tested per the justification provided for FSAR Table 6.2.4-2 Note 12, Valves 1-8819A, B, C a.d D and 1-8835 are no longer r
1 tested per the justification provioed for-FSAR Table 6.2.4-2 Note 13.
Valves 1-8841A and B are no longer tested per the justification provided for FSAR Table 6.2.4-2 Note 14.
'Related-SER Section: 6.2.5; SSER6 -6.2.3 SER/SSER Impact: No
.B3/4.6-1 2
Deletes the maximum allowable water leakrate for each of the SI valves which are no' longer listed as testable with water.
Revision:
The 17 SI valves were previously listed as capable of being tested with' water at pressure 1.1Pa.
These valves were deleted from the list (See discussion.under 3/4.6-4) and thus water leakrate for each is no-longer required.
Related SER Section: 6.2.5:
SSER6 6.2.3 SER/SSER Impact: No
o Erilosure 2 to TXX-89473
,7 32 5 A"'
FIs% &ctsr CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) b.
If any periodic Type A test fails to meet either 0.75 L, or 0.75 L,
g the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission.
If two conse'cutive Type A tests fail to meet either 0.75 L, or 0.75 L, a Type A test shall be performed at g
least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet either 0.75 L, or 0.75 L at which time the above test schedule may be resumed; t
The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental c.
test which:
1)
Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the supple-mental test result, L, is in accordance with the appropriate g
following equation:
lL - (L,, + L,) I 1 0.25 La or l L ~ Ilu + l ) I 1 0.25 L e
e o
t where L,, or L, is th.* measured Type A test leakage and L, g
_d is the superimposed leak; 2)
Has a duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in
.!b leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test;
(
Ind 7
3)
Requires that the rate at which gas is injected into the contaire ment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test is between 0.75 L, and 1.25'L,; or 0.75 L and 1.25 L.
s g
g dd.
Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at a pressure not less than P,, 48.3 psig, at intervals no greater than 24 months J
except for tests involving:
1)
Air locks, 4
2)
Containment ventilation isolation valves with resilient material j
- seals, s
3)
Safety Injection Valves as specified in Specification 4.6.1.2.g, i
and f
4)
Containment Spray Valves as specified in Specification 4.6.1.2.h.
f Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERA 8LE by the require-e
-t.
ments Y Specification 4.6.1.3; f.
Containment,yent444 tion-4so14tjon1TTv4tyith Pesilient-meta (ial
.,(
seals shalf be test d and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements f Specification 4.6.1.7.2 or 4.6.1.7.3, as applicable; e
y y j
@y in.iection Valves d-8802A,1-8802b8809A,1-8809 Safet f
r5 BB. 1-8818C. 1-88180, 1-8819A, 1-am198, 1-8819c, 1-190, 1-r 1
1-8840,(1-8841A.1-8ii4115,1-8905A,1-?9058,1-8905C. and_1-890 hall N-0 4
~
leakteste$withwEarar.apressurenotlessthan1.1 ps at intervals no greater than 24 months; (h.
Containment Spray Valves 1HV-4776, 1HV-4777, ICT-142, and ICT-14 hall be leak tested with water, at a pressure not less than 1.1 Pa, 3.1
@ at intervals no greater than 24 months; and i
provis, ions of) specification 4.0.2 are not appli COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1
~
3/4'6 /
l
~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
hn/g 1 89 a
,g 3/4.'6 CONTAINME'NT SYSTEMS BASES i
3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
{
3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses.
This restric-tion, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.
3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAuE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value essumed'in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, P,.
As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 L, or 0.75 L, as applicable, during performance of the periodic t
test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.
TS
'*
- Y N gs.e 1 o For specific system configurations, cred j( t en for a 30-day water seal that will be maintained to prevent contains atmosphere leakage through tne penetrations to the environment.
The following is a list of the containment isolation valves that meet this system configuration and the Maximum Allowed Leakage Rate (MALR) required to maintain the water seal fo MA
~
MALR Valve No.
(cc/hr)
Valve No.
(cc/hr)
Valve No.
(cc/hr)y TS 1-8802A 43
)
(1-19)(
114 A C 68905A 17 Wo76 8802B 119 9 88 98
.u P8J02 /
/4 T
1-A 7.0 9C 07.
1 3-905 V
/
1-88098.-
77.0 1-lon 114 50
_ 22 0 1
I
-8818A/tfl1A l$.'O s 1-ss36 36ff p ICT-142
.0 4734 1-881BB/sta 6 165.0Q 1-2577.0 ICT-145 4680.0
't 7 34 1-8818C/ttlic 207. 01,
-8841A/Mo58 43X 1HV-4776 Ig.0 M'734 4680 1-8818D/ trig b 114y.
1-8841B/g,osc 43 1HV-4777 473'l s
The surveillance testing for measuripg eakae"ratesdsc'onsistenGTth NWrequireme n t s31/10 ' CFR.50 Abp,e ndix2 l
l 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS l
The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment hak rate.
Surveillance testing of.the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage
_ _. curing the intervals between air lock leakage tests.
COMANCHE PEAK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-1