ML20247A549
| ML20247A549 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1989 |
| From: | Gad R ROPES & GRAY, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247A487 | List: |
| References | |
| OLA, NUDOCS 8903290138 | |
| Download: ML20247A549 (8) | |
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- l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g g y q q ,_
NUCLEA9 REGULATORY COMMISSION GFV! c..
before the DOCK! .
3d l ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I
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In the Matter of )
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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR ) Docket No. 50-271-OLA 1 POWER CORPORATION )
) (Spent Fuel Pool (Vermont Yankee Nuclear ) Expansion)
Power Station) ) !
)
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION'S REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW SWORN WRITTEN REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF DONALD A. REID, JOIIN T. IIERRON, JAY K. TIIAYER, i CIIRISTOPIIER II. HANSEN, AND PAUL A. BERGERON, ;
SUBMITTED BY VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION l PURSUANT TO 10 C.F.R. 2.1113(A)
John A. Ritsher l
' R. K. Gad tn C Ropes & Gray G903290138 890320 One International Place PDR ADOCK 05000271 G PDR >
Boston, Massa'chusetts 02110 Telephone: 617-951-7000 March 20,1989.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 1
)
In the Matter of )
)
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR ) Docket No. 50-271-OLA !
POWER CORPORATION )
) (Spent Fuel Pool (Vermont Yankee Nuclear - ) Expansion)
Power Station) )
)
L VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION'S REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW' Pursuant '.to ,10 C.F.R. Q 2.115(a), Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation requests that this Board dispose of this contested proceeding, insofar as it involves Contention 1, on the basis of the following findings and rulings:
- 1. Effect of the Proposed Amendment. This proceeding, and hence any contention admitted in it, is limited to matters that result from the proposed operating license amendment. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-245,8 AEC 873,875 (1974);
Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 3 and 4), LBP-81-14,13 NRC 677, 697 (1981). The only effect of the pro-posed amendment, insofar as it is relevant to Contention 1, is an increase in the heat load imposed by the offloading of spent fuel into the reactor.
Specifically, the only effect of the proposed amendment is that, at 10 days following shut down of the nuclear reaction, and using extremely conserva-tive assumptions (and in one case an impossibly conservative assumption), the heat loads imposed by normal (i.e., approximately one-third of the core) refuelings will increase from 8.12 MBtu/hr. (refueling resulting in a spent fuel pool inventory of 2,000 spent fuel assemblies) to 9.1 MBtu/hr. (refueling resulting in a spent fuel pool inventory of 2,870 spent fuel assemblies).
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Discussion: l These facts' are established by the sworn written testimony of the '
Vermont Yankee witnesses and not contested by NECNP or its. witnesses.
While the NECNP witnesses refer to a corresponding value of 10.1 MBtu/hr. j for the normal refueling (2,870 spent fuel assembly inventory), NECNP Memo f
at 10 n.18, NECNP Affidavit at 6 n.10, their reference is to an NRC Staff l calculation of the same heat loads at 6 days after shutdown of the nuclear reaction, not 10 days; thus there is no difference. Rebuttal Testimony par. )
5.1 Neither NECNP nor its witnesses offer any other calculation of the relevant heat load.
Though not stated explicitly, it is apparent from the NECNP submission that neither NECNP nor its witnesses base their support of Contention 1 on the use of the RHR system to cool the combined reactor and spent fuel pool j when the plant is not operating. - Nor could any such contention be made, !
since the VYNPS design does not rely upon the spent fuel pool cooling system to maintain pool water bulk temperature except when the reactor is operating.
- 2. The Single Active Failure Mode of the Existing Spent Fuel Pool l Cooling System. The existing spent fuel pool cooling system consists of two pumps and two heat exchangers, configured so that either or both of the heat exchangers can be supplied by either of the pumps. On the other side of the heat exchangers, both heat exchangers are supplied by the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system, from which heat is removed by the service water system (to be distinguished from the RHR service water system). Each of the spent fuel pool cooling system heat exchangers can be supplied by either of the RBCCW pumps from either of the RBCCW heat exchangers. Each of the RBCCW heat exchangers can be serviced by any of the four service water system pumps. Consequently, the most limiting single active failure (i.e.. a failure of a spent fuel pool cooling system purap and a failure of an RBCCW pump and two service water system pumps) results in a 1" Sworn ' Written Rebuttal Testimony of Donald A. Reid, Johti T. Herron, Jay K. Thayer, Christopher H. Hansen, and Paul A. Bergeron, Submitted by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
Q 2.ll3(a)," submitted herewith and hereinafter " Rebuttal Testimony."
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, i configuration of one pump-two heat exchangers available to remove heat- .
from the spent fuel pool.
Discussion:
These facts are contested by NECNP, which contends that a more limit-ing single active failure than- the failure of one spent fuel pool cooling-system pump could limit the spent fuel pool cooling system to a one pump-one heat exchanger configuration. However, the thesis on which this contest is based can be demonstrated to be in error by simple reference . to the 1
' VYNPS designi the testimony of NECNP's witnesses is based on the design of' some other plant.
The argument of NECNP and its witnesses is based on the proposition that, given the failure of one service water pump (or its associated power supply), one of the spent fuel pool cooling system heat exchangers would be left without flow. NECNP A//idavit at 10. Tnis assertion by NECNP's wit-J nesses, however, is critically based upon the erroneous understanding of the' NECNP witnesses that the pumps and heat exchangers that supply the spent fuel pool cooling system heat exchangers are not similarly cross-headered. ;
. As is Demonstrated by the Rebuttal Testimony of Vermont Yankee's wit- !
nesses, with citations to' the appropriate sections of, and drawings of the
' VYNPS design contained in, the VYNPS FSAR, the RBCCW heat exchangers, lik'e the spent fuel pool cooling system heat exchangers, are cross-headered, and, therefore, so long as either (of the two)' spent fuel pool cooling system pumps, either (of the two) RBCCW pumps and any (of the four) service water pumps are available, both of the spent fuel pool cooling system heat exchangers receive the required flow. Rebuttal Testimony pars. 9,10 and 14.
No single active failure can disable both of the spent fuel pool pumps, or both of the RBCCW pumps, or all four of the service water system pumps.
Id. Consequently, even given the failures postulated by NECNP's witnesses (i.e., a failure of one train of safety-related AC power or a failure of one train of safety-related DC power), the spent fuel pool cooling system capacity available is one pump-two heat exchangers.' Id. The correction of this mistake or the part of NECNP's witnesses leaves NECNP's contention groundless.
An additional error by the NECNP witness is their assertion that it is i
the RHR service water system (which is distinct from the service water !
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s k system) that cools the RBCCW heat exchangers. Rebuttal Testimony par. 4.
The error by the NECNP witnesses in even identifying the relevant systems 1
demonstrates a lack of attention to detail that diminishes the credibility of l l
their testimony.
- 3. The Single Active Failure Mode of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System after the Addition of the Emergency Standby Sub-system. The proposed Emergency Standby Sub-system to be added to the spent fuel pool cooling system consists of two pumps and two heat exchangers. As with the existing spent fuel pool cooling system, either pump can supply either or both heat exchangers. The design parameters of the proposed additional sub-system is that each of the two trains are completely redundant, such that no single active failure could reduce the proposed additional sub-system to less than a one pump-two heat exchanger mode.
Discussion:
This fact is established by the testimony of the Vermont Yankee witnesses and not contradicted by any evidence supplied by NECNP.
- 4. The llent Removal Capacity of the Degraded Existing Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System. The heat removal capacity of the existing spent fuel pool cooling system in the one pump-two heat exchanger mode is 9.1 MBtu./hr.
Discussion:
This fact is established by the testimony of Vermont Yankee's witnesses and not challenged by NECNP.
- 5. The IIeat Removal Capacity of the Degraded Enhanced Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System. The heat removal capacity of the spent fuel pool cooling system, after the addition of the Emergency Standby Sub-system, will be 11.0 MBtu/hr. in the one pump-one heat exchanger mode and between 11.0 and 22 MBtu/hr. in the one pump-two heat exchanger mode.
Discussion:
This fact is established by the testimony of Verment Yankee's witnesses and not challenged by NECNP.
NECNP apparently urdes this Board to ignore the 1.roposed Emergency Standby Subsystem to be added to the spent fuel pool cooling system, on the ground that the design process is not sufficiently advanced and "{i]t is standard NRC practice to requ4re final design details for a safety-related
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f plant system prior to issuing an operating license." NECNP A//idavit at 14.
. This argument should be rejected for' two reasons: first,- this is not an operating license proceeding and no permission, in'the' form of an operating license or fotherwise, . is required to install the new sub-system. More fundamentally, while/ additional design' detail; might '.be required to review some ' of the' other qualification requirements. that NECNP ' earlier tried, unsuccessfully, to inject'into'this proceeding, no additional detail ~is required in order to verify the h' eat removal capacities of. the 'new sub-system'in' its various modes. Even in' one pump-one heat exchanger . mode the heat removal capacity of the new sub-system exceeds the heat load that the-spent
' fuel pool cooling system would ever'be required to deal with. In any event, the asserted inadequacy. of the June 8,1988 submission is invalid; as is demonstrated in the Rebuttal Testimony. Rebuttal Testimony par 16.
- 6. .The Heat Loads Required to be' Removed by.the Spent Fuel Pool
~ Cooling System. The heat load required to be removed by the spent fuel pool cooling system depends upon the amount' of time .that elapses between (i) shutdown of the nuclear reaction and (ii) when' reliance is pikced upon the. spent fuel pool cooling system to maintain spent fuel pool water bulk temperature. In the case of a normal refueling, this interval will not be less i than 10 days. The most rapid normal refueling in the operating history of Vermont Yankee took 25 days and.the average normal refueling time has been 44 days. In the case of a normal refueling, using extremely conserva-tive assumptions (and in one case an impossibly conservative assumption), the maximum heat load in the pool at 10 ' days after shutdown of the nuclear reaction is 9.1 MBtu/hr. Therefore, the heat load at the point where -
L reliance is placed upon the spent fuel pool cooling system will always be less than 9.1 MBtu/hr. In the case of a full core offload, the reactor will not normally be restarted until completion of whatever repairs or inspections required the offload, followed by restoration of two-thirds or more of the offloaded core and readiness to restart. Reliance is not placed upon the spent fuel pool cooling system to maintain the pool water temperature until 1 the reactor is ready to restart.
Discussion:
These facts are established by the testimony of Vermont Yankee's ;
witnesse.* and not contested by NECNP or its witnesses.
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- 7. Adequacy of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System. With either the existing or the enhanced spent fuel pool cooling system, the heat removal capacity available after the most critical single active failure is equal to or greater than the heat load imposed by the offload of spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool following a normal. refueling. Because heat removal capacity is equal to or greater than heat load,, the systems are capable of maintaining the te'mperature of the pool water from exceeding 150*F. l Discussion:
Neither NECNP nor its witnesses contest the proposition, which is true as a matter of the law of physics, that so long as heat removal capacity is n equal to or greater than heat load, the cooling system has the capacity to maintain the temperature of the water in the spent fuel pool.
- 8. The Issue of Seismic Qualification of Elther the Existing or the !
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Enhanced Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Systems. Whether or not a spent fuel i pool cooling system is required to be qualified to withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake, that issue is not within the scope of Contention 1 in this proceeding, nor, insofar as it relates to the existing spent fuel pool cooling system, within the scope of the proposed operating license amend-ment. Consequently, assertions regarding the effect of such an earthquake on the capacity of either system are legally irrelevant to Contention 1.
Discussion:
This Board has previously ruled that, whether or not the concept of the
" single failure criterion" implicates matters as seismic qualification, environ-mental qualification, missile and fire protection requirements, conformance with requirements concerning testing, inspection, and surveillance, and 3 corrosion, these matters are not within the scope of Contention 1. Afemo-randum and Order (NECNP hiotion to Compel) at 2-5 (September 27, 1988).
Consequently, no issue concerning the effect, if any, of any of these items is permissible.
In addition, insofar as NECNP's witnesses appear to contend that the f existing spent fuel pool cooling system fails to comply with the Commission's regulations because it is not seism!: ally qualified to wittistand the SSE, any I such contention is necessarily beyond the scope of the proposed operating license amendment and would be impermissible even if supported by an admitted contention. Whether or not the existing spent fuel pool cooling
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system can withstand the SSE, or is required to, is not dependent upon any_ l increaae in the permissible' spent fuel pool inventory or the heat loads associated therewith.
Finally, we point out strictly for the Board's information that NECNP's witnesses are clearly in error on this point. As the Staf f's Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) makes clear (and as these witnesses may be conceding), )
there is no requirement that a spent fuel pool cooling system, itself, be seismically qualified so long as a seismically qualified makeup supply is-available, and the rebuttal testimony of Vermont Yankee's witnesses demon-strates that VYNPS does in fact have a seismically qualified makeup capacity (through the RHR system). Rebuttal Testimony pars,11-13, While NECNP's witnesses are prepared to voice doubt on the point, doubt is not an accept--
able substitute for snorn, competent, direct evidence.
espectt submitted, j lx ,
k . .
John A. Ritsher R. K. Gad III I
Ropes & Gray One International Place Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Telephone: 617-951-7000 March 29,1989.
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