ML20246Q074
| ML20246Q074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109128, 07109126, 07109127 |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1989 |
| From: | AMERSHAM CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246Q035 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8903280388 | |
| Download: ML20246Q074 (80) | |
Text
..
O SAFETY.. ANALYSIS REPORT AMERSHAM CORPORATION MODEL C-8 SOURCE CHANGER
' TYPE B (U) PACKAGE
. USA /9128/B(U)
O REVISION O FEBRUARY-1989
I 1.0 General Information
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1.1 Introduction I
The Amersham Model C-8 Source Changer is designed for use as transport packages for Type B quantities of radioactive material in special form.
The C-8 conforms to the criteria for Type B(U) packaging in accordance with 10 CFR 71 and IAEA Safety Series No.
6, 1973 Revised Edition (as amended).
1.2 Package Description 1.2.1 Packaging The model C-8 is 406 millimeters (16.00 inches) long, 330 1
millimeters (13.0 inches) wide, and 660. millimeters (26.00 inches) high.
The total mass of the package is 228 kilograms (500 pounds).
The radioactive material is sealed in a source capsule which conforms to the requirements for special form radioactive material.
This source capsule is installed into a source holder assembly.
The source holder assemblies used in conjunction with the C-8 listed in the appendix.
The source holder assembly is housed in an
'S' shaped zircalloy
(~T or titanium source tube.
The source tube has an outside diameter
(_)
of 16.8 millimeters (0.663 inch) and an inside diameter of 15.1 millimeters (0.593 inch).
Both ends of the source tube is enclosed by means of a lockbox assembly which is welded to the I
rear plate of the device.
A bronze plug is attached to the threaded fitting on the lockbox.
This bronze plug may be drilled to provide a means for attaching a tamper-proof seal wire during transport.
The locking assembly is used to secure the l
radioactive source and source holder assembly in the shielded position during transport.
The source tube is surrounded by uranium metal as shielding material.
The uranium shielding is cast in place around the source tube.
The mass of the uranium shield is 159 kilograms (350 pounds).
The uranium shield is encased in a series 300 steel housing.
The steel housing is 6.4 millimeters (0.25 inches) thick.
The outer packaging is designed to avoid the collection and retention of water.
The package has a smooth, unpainted steel finish to provide for easy decontamination.
The radioactive material is sealed inside a stainless steel source capsule.
This capsule acts as the containment vessel for the radioactive material.
,,s As 1.2.2 Operational Features REVISION 0 1
FEBRUARY 1989
The source holder assembly'is secured in the proper shielded s,
storage position by means of the locking assembly.
With the.
source holder assembly in the proper' shielded st.orage position, a cap is installed over the source-holder assembly and attached to the lockbox.
This cap may be seal wired to prevent inadvertent
. loosening.
Inserting the shipping plug will insure that the-source holder assembly is in the proper shielded storage j
position.
1.2.3 contents of the Package
'1 i
The model C-8 Source Changer is designed for the transport of i
cobalt-60 in quantities up to 220 curies in the Amersham source assemblies listed in the appendix.
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REVISION 0 2
FEBRUARY 1989
1.3 APPENDIX Drawings:
180-01 811-1001-111 -
821-1001-117 -
821-1001-128 -
821-1001-129 -
811-1001-212 -
801-1001-159 O
l 9
REVISION 0 3
FEBRUARY 1989
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2.0 Structural Evaluation 2.1 Structural Design 2.1.1 Discussion The C-8 is comprised of five structural component 3:
a source capsule, source holder assembly, shield assembly, outer housing assembly and locking assembly.
The source capsule is the primary containment vessel.
It satisfies the criteria for special form radioactive material.
The shield assembly provides shielding for the radioactive material and, together with the source holder assembly and locking assembly, assures proper positioning of the radioactive source.
The outer housing is fabricated from 6.4 millimeter (0.25 inch) thick Type 300 series steel.
The housing provides the structural integrity of the package.
The lockbox assembly secures the source holder assembly in the shielded position at the center of the source tube and assures positive closure.
J2.1.2 Design criteria The C-8 is designed to comply with the requirements for Type B(U) packaging as prescribed by 10 CFR 71 and IAEA Safety Series No.
G 6, 1973 Revised Edition (as amended).
All design criteria are evaluated by a straightforward application of the appropriate section of 10 CFR 71 or IAEA Safety Series No.
6.
2.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity The total mass of the C-8 Source Changer is 227 kilograms (500 pounds).
The shield assembly consists of 159 kilograms (350 pounds) of depleted uranium.
The center of gravity is located approximately in the center of the device.
2.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials The outer housing of the Gammatrons is fabricated from Type 300 series steel.
This material has a yield strength of 207 MPa (30,000 psi).
Drawings for the source capsules used in conjunction with the Gammatrons are enclosed in Section 2.10.
These source capsules are fabricated from either Type 304 or Type 30'1 stainless steel.
2.4 General Standards for All Packages O
REVISION O 4
FEBRUARY 1989
y a
l 2.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions
)
The materials used in the construction of the C-8 are uranium 1
m metal, stainless steel, bronze, titanium, zircalloy, and l
polyurethane foam.
There will be no significant chemical or galvanic action between any of these components.
The possibility of the formation of the eutectic alloy iron uranium at temperatures below the melting temperatures of the individual metals has been considered.
The iron uranium eutectic alloy temperature is approximately 725 C (1337 F).
- However, vacuum conditions and extreme cleanliness of the surfaces are necessary to produce this alloy at this low temperature.
Due to the conditions in which the shield is mounted in the Gammatrons, sufficient contact for this effect would not exist.
l In support of this conclusion, the following test results are
)
presented.
On 28 November 1973, a thermal test of a sample of i
bare depleted uranium metal was performed by Nuclear Metals, l
l Inc., Concord, MA.
The sample was placed in a ceramic crucible and inserted in a furnace preheated to 800*C (1475*F) and remained there for thirty minutes.
The sample was then removed and allowed to cool. The nest indicated that the uranium sample oxidized such that the radial dimension was reduced by 0.18 millimeters (0.007 inch).
gs On 25 January 1974, a subsequent test was performed by Nuclear
?
i Metals, Inc.
In this test, a sample of bare depleted uranium metal was placed on a steel plate and subjected to the thermal test conditions.
The test revealed no melting or alloying characteristics in the sample and the degree of oxidation was the same as experienced in the earlier test.
2.4.2 Positive Closure The model C-8 Source Changer utilizes two locks to secure the source assembly in the shielded position.
The first lock is a plunger type lock described in drawing 801-1001-159 This plunger lock will fit directly over the locking ball of the source assembly thus locking the source assembly in place.
A shipping plug is then placed over the pigtail assembly securing it in place.
The lockbox is protected by a stainless steel chamber (fitting) that circles and extends over the lockbox.
This protective chamber has a hinged cover which is padlocked for transport to l
prevent access to the lockbox.
These locking configurations appear at each end of the source tube.
I t. the center of the source tube is a septum which divides the source tube in half.
This septum prevents the source I
assembly from passing all the way through the S-tube and secures
('}
the source in the center of the source changer.
U REVISION O 5
FEBRUARY 1989
2.4.3 Lifting Devices r
f
't'-
The C-8 is designed to be lifted by handling eyes.
Gamma Industries has stated that the handling eyes can withstand 3 times the weight-of the C-8 without generating stress in any material of the package in excess of its yield' strength.
This test result was previously submitted by Gamma Industries and accepted in May 1978.
Copy of test report in Section 2.10.
2.4.4 Tiedown Devices Gamma Industries has previously stated that there are no tiedown devices on the C-8.
The device would be strapped around the body of the device for transport.
Additionally, if the tiedown technique were to fail under excessive load, the ability of the package to maintain its structural integrity and shielding efficiency would not be impaired.
Therefore, the package tiedown design satisfies the criteria of 10 CFR 71.45 (b) (3).
2.5 Standards for Type B Packages 2.5.1 Load Resistance A Gammatron 50A was subjected to a compressive load of 2500
)
(g pounds which is five times the weight of the package.
This is
(_,/
greater than 1.85 lb/in2 times the vertically projected area of the package.
This load was distributed uniformally over the top surface of the Gammatron for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
As a result of this test there was no loss of structure integrity or shielding efficiency.
There was no visible or detectable damage as a result of this test.
Therefore the C-8 will withstand the normal conditions of transport compression condition.
2.5.2 External Pressure The C-8 is open to the atmosphere.
Thus there will be no differential pressure acting on it.
The collapsing pressure of j
the source capsule is calculated assuming that the capsule is a thin wall tube with a wall thickness equal to the minimum depth of weld penetration which is 0.5 mm (0.020 inch).
The collapsing l
pressure is calculated from:
P = 597.6 t/d - 9.556 where P:
Collapsing Pressure in MPa t:
Wall Thickness (o.5 mm or 0.02 inch) d:
Outside Diameter (6.4 mm ar 0.250 inch) j (Ref:
Machinery's Handbook, 22nd Edition, p. 330) i REVISION 0 6
FEBRUARY 1989
From this relationship, the collapsing pressure of the source e
capsule is calculated to be 37.1 MPa (5548 psi).
Therefore, the source capsule could withstand an external pressure of 0.17 Mpa (25 psi).
2.6.0 Normal Conditions of Transport 2.6.1 Heat The thermal evaluation of the C-8 is presented in Section 3.
From this evaluation, it is concluded that the C-8 will maintain their structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport heat condition.
2.6.2 Cold i
The metals used in the manufacture of the C-8 can all withstand a temperature of -40'C (-40*F).
The outer package housing and.the primary containment are all fabricated from Type 300 series steel.
Gamma Industries has conducted a drop test of 30 feet at
-40*C, without impairing the structural integrity of the camera.
A copy of the test report is included in Section 2.10.
'he epoxy used in the C-8 have an operating temperature range of
-43'c to 104*C.
From this data, it is concluded that the Gammatrons will maintain its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport cold condition.
2.6.3 Reduced Pressure The C-8 is open to the atmosphere.
Thus there will be no differential pressure acting on it.
A demonstration of the ability of the source capsules to withstand an external pressure of 0.5 atmosphere is presented in Section 3.5.4.
On the basis of this data, it is concluded that the Gammatrons will maintain their structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport pressure condition.
2.6.4 Vibration The C-8 has been in use for more than fifteen years.
In this period, there has been no evidence of vibration-induced failure.
On the basis of this history, it is concluded that the C-8 will maintain their structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport vibration condition.
2.6.5 Water Spray G
The water spray test was not actually performed on the C-8.
The materials used in the construction of the C-8 are highly water REVISION 0 7
FEBRUARL' 1989
resistant.
Therefore,.it is concluded that the C-8 will maintain l)
its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the
\\ss' normal transport water spray' condition.
2.6~.6' Free Dqog A prototype Gammatron 200 weighing 500 pounds, was.. subjected to
'the hypothetical accident free fall condition.
This is described in Section'2.7.1.
On the basis of this test, it is concluded that the C-8 will maintain its structural' integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport free drop condition.
The C-8 is manufactured cut of the same materials as the Gammatron 200 and is the same weight.
2.6.7 Corner Drop Not applicable.
2.6.8 Penetration A prototype Gammatron 200 was subjected to a puncture test by I
Gamma Industries which is more severe than the penetration test.
The package was impacted by the penetration bar in two different attitudes.
As a result of these impacts, there was no loss of structural integrity nor reduction of shielding efficiency.
A.
report of this test is presented in the initial Type B-application from Gamma Industries in May 1978.
A copy of this report is included'in Section 2.10.
On the basis of this test it is-concluded that the C-8 will also maintain its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the normal transport penetration condition.
2.6.9 Compression A compression test was performed on a Gammatron 50; results are listed in Section 2.5.1.
2.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions 2.7.1 Free Drop The Gammatron 200 was sub]ected to the conditions-of the free drop by Gamma' Industries, Inc.
The target used in this free drop test consisted of a solid concrete slab.
A steal plate with a thickness of 25.4 mm (1.0 in.) was placed in intimate contact with the concrete slab.
During the test, the package fell from a height of 10 meters (30 feet) onto the target.
As a result of this test, there was no loss of structural O'
integrity nor loss of shielding efficiency.
A report of this test in( Gamma Industries dated 20 May 1978 is presented in REVISION 0 8
FEBRUARY 1989 l
Section 2.10.
On the basis of this test, it is concluded that
(~')
the C-8 will maintain its structural integrity and shielding
\\d effectiveness under the hypothetical free drop accident condition.
2.7.2 Puncture At the conclusion of the free drop test, two prototype Gammatrons were each subjected to the puncture condition by Gamma Industries.
The target for the puncture test was a steel billet 152 mm (6 inches) in diameter and 203 mm (8 inches) high mounted on the target used in the free drop test.
During this test, the packages dropped from the height of one
)
meter (40 inches) onto the billet.
{
As a result of.this test, there was no loss of structural integrity nor reduction in shielding efficiency.
A report of this test by Gamma Industries dated 20 May 1978 is presented in Section 2.10.
On the basis of these tests, it is concluded that
]
the C-8 will also maintain its structural integrity and shielding effectiveness under the hypothetical puncture accident condition,
].
based on its similarity to the Gammatron 200.
)
1 l
2.7.3 Thermal i
The thermal analysis is presented in Section 3.5 It is shown O'
that the melting temperatures of the materials used in the construction of the Gammatron except the polyurethane foam are all in excess of (1475'F) 800*C.
To demonstrate that the radioactive source assemblies will remain in a shielded position following the hypothetical accident condition, the following analysis is presented.
At the conclusion of the thermal test it is assumed that the polyurethane foam has completely escaped from the package.
The shield assembly is prohibited from movement by the front housing, rear plate and shield plates that are welded to the inside of the housing to secure the shield in place.
Thus it is concluded that C-8 satisfactorily meets the requirements of the hypothetical thermal accident conditions of 10 CFR Part 71.
2.7.4 Water Immersion Not applicable.
2.~.5 Summary of Damage The test designed to induce mechanical stress (free drop, puncture) caused minor deformation but no reduction in structural O'
integrity nor impairment of any safety features.
The thermal test would have no adverse affect on the package.
REVISION 0 9
FEBRUARY 1989
[]
As a result of these tests, there was no loss of structural V
integrity nor release of any contents.
1 Prior to the conduct of these tests and subsequent to the conduct of these tests, measurements of the radiation intensity in the vicinity of the package were made.
The results of these measurement = demonstrate that there was no reduction in shielding efficiency as a result of these tests.
2.8 Special Form The C-8 is designed to transport Amersham source capsules.
These j
source capsules have been certified as special form radioactive material under IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority Number l
USA /0166/S.
These certificates are presented in section 2.10.
2.9 Fuel Rods Not applicable.
O tb l
1 l A 1 G 1
l REVISION 0 10 FEBRUARY 1989
3 2.10 Appendix IAEA Certificate of Competent-Authority USA /0166/S Drawings: 188 capsules 189 270 271 Test Reports:
Application to NRC dated 20 May 1978 from Harry Richardson, Gamma Industries
- 1) Free Drop Test
- 2) Puncture Test
- 3) Lifting Handles
- 4) Shielding Efficiency 1
l l
O O
REVISION O 11 FEBRUARY 1989 L
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/
oO Q" 7c" E USDeponmers
====pomaan essearchens AemWS IAEA CERHFICATE OF COMPFFEIFF AUTEOErrf SPECIAL FORM EADICACTIVE MATERIAIS EBICAPSULATION CtanricATs NUMsma ssA/uss/s.,asvutos s This eartifies that the cocapsulated sources, as doomrtbed, when leaded with the authorised radionettre contents, have been demonstamted to meet the regulatory requirements for speels3 form radionettve material as prescribed in IAEA y and USA y regulations for the transport of radionettve materians.
L Source Description - The sources described by this certifloate are identitled as the foBowing Gamma Industries models wblah are constructed secording to the listed drawing numberm Model No.
Drawint No.
VD and VD(HP) 602-7001-004 MB, NBG and NB(HP) 402-7001-005 i
Single Encapsulation Universal Source 501-7001-006 Double Encapsulation Universal Source 601-7001-007 Single Encapsulation Side Wald 602-7001-008 O
_ All models are welded encapsulations constructed of 300 series stainless steel or ARMCO Type 17-4PH stainless steet 1.
Radioactive Contents
'!he authorized radiometive contents of these sources f
consist or not more than:
Model No.
Contents VD and VD(HP) 11.1 TBq (300 Cl) of:
j Barium-131 Manganese-54 l
Cadmium-109 Phosphorse-32 l
Caletum-45 Rubidium-SS
}
Calcium-47 Selenium-75 Cesium-137 Strontium-85 l
Chlorine-36 Tha111um-104 Chromium-51 Thulium-170
)
Iridium-192 Tin-113 -
I Cobalt-80 Ytteablum-169 Iron-59 Eino45 i
O 17 %rety serles No. 6, Regulations for the Befe Transport of Radioactive Materials, l
It73 Revised Edition", published by the International Atomic Energy Agency GAEA),
Vienna, Austria.
3/ Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 170-178 USA.
N(\\
--- ;,--y
,,-g ----, ;--
a S
Certifleste Number USA /9888/B, Revision 8 S.
Radlonettve Contenta (eontinued i
Nodel No, (eent'd Contents (eent'd NB, NBC and N30lP) 6.93 TBq (15 CD Amerlelum-241 Lt O S q (30 m C D R e-126 18.5 GBq (800 mCD Amerleum-241 and Coelum-187 misture Single Encapsulation Universa15ouree 18.6 TBq ((500 CD tridium-192 0.74 TBq 30 CD Cebalt-60 Double Encapsulation Universal Bource 18.5 T5q(5000 C0lrldlum-192 74 TBq (2000 CD Cobalt-60 Single Encapeutstion Side Weld 18.6 TBq (500 CD leidium-191 0.74 TBq (20 CD Cobalt-60 3.
This certifloate, unless renewed, espires July 30,1991.
This certificate is lasued in accordance with paragraph 803 of the IAEA Regulations, and in response to the May 8,1987 petition by Gamma industries, Baton Rouge, Loulslana, and in consideration of the associated information therein.
Certified by:
-f Midhael E. Wattgler
/J DateT,_
Chief, Radioactive Matert(WBranch Offlee of Har.ardous Matarlais Transportation Revision 5 lasued to extend expiration date.
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APPLICATION for NRC CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE l
authorizing SHIPMENT OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL j
1 in GAMMA INDUSTRIES' GAMMATRON TYPE-B CONTAINERS
]
Model 20 Model' 100 i
Model 20A Model 100A Model 50 Model 200 Model 50A Model 200A 1
and GAMMATRON
% ])
l g-Model C-8 Source Exchanger l
l 1l 1
l May 20, 1978 GAMMA INDUSTRIES Div. of Nuclear Systems, Inc.
P. O. Box 2543 2255 Ted Dunham Avenue Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821 1
?
"vt U
Harry D.(Richar'dson, Gen. Mgr.
i AkL Amersham corporation 40 North Av:nui Burlington, Massachusetts 01803 Telephone (617) 272-2000 NOPJiAL CONDITIONS OF TRANSPORT 1)
Lifting Devices 2)
Tie Down Devices 3)
Compression Test i
O i
O Amersharn e1
q i
1
)
-1.1-CHAPTER 1.0 1.0 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION (10CF R71. 23 )
. l.1 Structural Design 1.1.1 Discussion l
GAMMATRONS have been used for many years.
Even though no significant dif ficulties have been reported by licensed users, minor changes have been made in the structure of GAMMATR0NS.
I Radioact-ivity is contained within capsules as the " primary 4
protection" against release of contamination.
Source assemblies are made from 300 series stainless steel.
Descriptions of these
~
are on drawings in Appendix C'and selected Sources &-Dev. Catalog sheets as evaluated by appropriate regulatory agencies.
These capsules and contents have been designed to qualify as."special form" radioactive materials.
Chapter 3.0 and Chapter 7.0 provide data attesting that test criteria have been successfully attained.
I
" Secondary protection ' against gamma radiation is provided by the depleted uranium castings rigidly supported within the GAMMATRON.
During operations and transportation the capsule source assembly has been adequately secured in the proper shield location by the lock box assembly.
There are no incidents related.
to transportation reported to Camma Industries to indicate failures have occurred in existing co' figurations.
I
- ~ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. - _. - _. _._.
-1.2-O While no difficulties have been experienced, it is presumed that a sufficiently intense impact upon the lock box could cause shearing _ or tensile rupture of bolts which secure the lock box to the cylindrical housing.
If-this were to occur, the source could be moved from its optimum shielded 1ccation.
To_ alleviate I
any reasonable possibility that this might occur, a guard ring and reinforcing gussets'have been added to-protect the lock. box.
i Test results prove this adequately protects the-lock box-in the prescribed tests.
~
')
jl All GAMMATRONS manufactured after May 1, 1978 will incorporate this design change.
This simple attachment can become a
(}
RETROFIT oppo~rtunity for all licensees to qualify existing Gammatrons as Type B Packages.
Subsequent material presents information concerned with design criteria and performance-standards which assure GAMMATRONS satisfy 10CFR Subpart C-Package Standards.
i 1.1.2 Design Criteria - The major design criteria was to establish structural capacity and fabrication techniques that would assure-safe conditions during operations and transportation.f specified quantit'ies of special form radioactive materials.
The main purpose of qualifying the GAMMATRONS as Type B Packages is to l
)
i
-1.3-assure that in hypothetical accident conditions-during trans-portation would not be likely to cause (1) release of radioactive materials into uncontrolled environments nor (2) to permit 1
1 undesirable high intensity beams of gamma radiation to be released.
Significant areas of concern in the prescribed tests are:
1.
Tests upon GAMMATR0NS a.
Impact from 30 foot drop b.
Thermal exposure at 14'50F c.
Penetration when dropped 40. inches upon a steel pin 2.
Tests upon capsules a.
Thermal exposure at 14750F n
b.
Crushing by dropping a 3 pound weight upon the capsule through a 40 inch distance c.
Leak tests GAMMATRONS have irregular configurations.
Dropping these I
devices, which weigh -several hundred pounds,--upon unyielding l
l surfaces would cause stresses which would be very dif ficult j
(probably impossible) to predict because of the lack of uniformity.
~
Due to limited internal space, it was not anticipated that the~
'l uranium casting.could move a distance sufficient to cause signifi-cant changes in the external gamma radiation intensity.
O E
-1.4-I~D The capsule.is within the casting S-tube in such position that no L) stresses could bear upon the capsule.
To verify this, Model 200 GAMMATR0NS were dropped - presuming the heaviest casting would cause most damage.
Several drops were made so damage assessments could be made from (1) different structural arrangements and (2) different impact directions.
1.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity - Weights of each GAMMATRON are shown on Table 1 Appendix B.
Each GAMMATRON Model has its center of gravity approximately at the geometric center of steel housing. Re:
Drawings, Appendix C.
1.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials a.
Stainless steel items are fabricated from those in the 300 series.
l b.
All steel parts providing structural support would be classed as mild steel.
c.
Brass parts have been specified to have melting temperatures 0
exceeding 1,500 F.
(Note - There are no exotic environments anticipated for I
these devices.
Therefore materials which are readily available have been selected with the major criteria to withstand conditions of industrial plant and common carrier environments.)
)
[\\
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n-(
u--_------__-------------------__---------__-------_--
-1.5-
/~I 1.4 General Standards for Packaging (10CFR71.31)
V 1.4.1 Chemical and' Galvanic Reactions (10CFR71.31 (a)
)-
GAMMATRON Type B packages have been designed and' constructed of such materials that there will be no-significant chemical, galvanic, or other reaction between packaging components or between packaging components and the package contents Re:
Table I.
'{
i
- 1. 4. 2 Positi ve Closu re (10CFR71. 31 (b))
GAMMATRON Type B packages have been equipped with a lock box assembly which provides a positive closure upon the locking ball of the source assembly.
A key operated plunger lock prevents inadvertent relea_se of the source assembly from its locked position.
1 1.4.3 Lifting Devices ( 10 C F R71. 31 (c))
Lifting Devices (1)
Lif ting eyes or ' lugs have been provided on GAMMATRONS.
They have been designed--so that there is capability to support three times--the weight of the loaded GAMMATRON with-out generating stress in any material of the package in
. excess of its yield strength.
(2), (3)
NA (10CFR71.31 ( 2), (3))
(4)
Lif ting Device Failure -(10CFR71.31 (4))
Failure of GAMMATRON lifting eyes or lugs would not impair O
g-1
1
-1.6-
{
)-
containment or. shielding properties of GAMMATRON.
i 1.4.4 Tie Down Devices'(10CFR71.31)
(d),-(1), (2), (3) - NA l
1.5 Standards for Type B Packages (10CFR71.32) l.5.1 Load Resistance -(10CFR71.32 (a))
The GAMMATRON, regarded as a simple beam supported at its ends along any major axis, will withstand a static load,' normal-to and uniformly distributed along its. length, equal.to' 5 times its fully loaded weight, without generating stressiin any material of the packaging.in excess of its yield strength.
>-\\d Example:
The following calculations demonstrate that the GAMMATRON will resist any load. equal to;5 times its weight distributed over-the length.
D G
O n -s
-1.7-O Bending Movement M - WL/8 where:
W= (5) (500)
= 2,500f l
L = 13" M = 2,500 x 13/8
= 4,060 in-lbs Stress f = Mc/I where:
C = 6.5 in.
3 I=rt (6.5)3(0.25)
=
4
= 216 in
()
f=
(4,060 in.lbs)(6.5 in)/(216 in4)
~
f = 122 psi Since the Shell is Stabilized by the Internal Structure, Buckling Is Not an Appreciable Concern. (Re:
7.3.2 (9) )
Margin of Safety M.S. =Fty/f'I (33,000)/122 psi-1 M.S.
=
M.S.
= +targe Therefore, the Package Can Safely Resist the Uniformly Distributed Load Without: Loss of Integrity.
1.5.2 External Pressure (10CFR71.32(b))
(}
The Gammatron is vented to the atmosphere through openings around each end of the S-tube.
Decomposition products ii di
-1.8-O from the polyurethane can readily escape and avoid pressure increases in the housing.
1.6 Normal conditions of Transport (10CFR71.35)
(a)
GAMMATRONS have been designed and fabricated to accept-ably contain radioactive materials and shield gamma radiation during transport.
Performance tests and results are included in Chapter 7.0.
During transportation and performance testing it is anticipated that:
(1)
There will be no release of radioactive material from the containment vessel.
(2)
The effectiveness of the package will not be sub-(}
stantially reduced.
(3)
There will be no mixture of gases or vapors in the package which could, through any credible increase of pressure or an explosion, significantly reduce the effec tiveness of the package.
(4)
NA (5)
NA (b)
NA (c)
The containment vessel, radioisotope capsule, is not anticipated to be vented directly to the atmosphere.
O Il - t c
-1.9-(
1.6.1 Heat Refer to Chapter 2.0 for a thermal evaluation of GAMMATRONS.
Containment vessels were subjected to Type B Therm ~al Tests.
Re:
Sec.~7.3.3.
1.6.2 Cold Refer to Sec.'7.3.2.1.
(No liquids.nor gases'are l
involved so. phase changes would not occur nor have any effect.
1.6.3 pressure 1
()
Refer to Sec. 7.312.lfor effects of 0.5 atmosphere external pressure.
The capsules were subjected to 25 in. mercury vacuum.
No adverse effects were observed.
1.6.4 Vibration Refer-to Sec.-7.3.2.lfor-discussion of vibration.
1.6.5 Water Spray Water spray would have no effect upon the GAMMATR0NS.
1.6.6 Free Drop NA.
More severe 30 ft. drop required by 10 CFR 71 Appendix B.
Re:
Sec. 7.3.2.2.
-(:)
ll-11
-1.10-1.6.7 Corner Drop NA 1.6.8 Penetration NA.
More severe test. performed in accord with 10CFR71,-Appendix B, 2.
Re:
Sec.
7.3.2.2.
l 1.6.9 Compression Refer to 1.5.1 for stress and calculated margin of safety as substitute for physicci test. -Also, Re: 7.3.2.1.
1.7 Hypothetical Accident Conditions (10CFR71' Appendix B)
'Re:
Chapter 7.0, Sec. 7.3.2.2.
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l Am:rsham Corporation 40 North Avenue Burlington, M2ssachusetts 01003 Telephone (617) 272-2000 9
MEMORANDUM TO: Cathleen Roughan FROM: Richard Pert DATE: March 14, 1989
SUBJECT:
Compression test on model Gammetron 20 exposure device On Merch 13, 1989 e compression test was performed on a model Gammetron 20 exposure device. The test consisted of placing 2500 pounds on the exposure device fer twenty-four hours. An ettempt was made to place this weight on the device with the entire device intact (ie.-the wheels in place ). There was no safe way to accomplish this set-up, therefore the test was performed with the wheels removed. Af ter the twenty-four hour period the weight was removed and there was no visible damage to the unit.
O
~
S Amersham g
?
,5 ce Ibs cm N
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1 ll ~ J
lN 3.0 Thermal Evaluation d
The C-8 is a completely passive thermal device and has no mechanical cooling system nor relief valves.
All cooling of the package is through free convection and radiation.
The maximum heat source is 220 curies of cobalt-60.
The corresponding decay heat generation rate is approximately 4.0 watts.
3.2 Summary of Thermal properties of Materials The melting temperatures of the metals used in the construction of the Gammatron:
Bronze 1005'C (1841*F)
Uranium 1133*C (2070*F)
Steel 1345*C (2453*F)
Copper 1083*C (1981*F)
Titanium 1820*C (3308"F)
Zircalloy II 1845"C (3350*F)
The polyurethane used in this device has an operating temperature range of -43*C to 104*C (-45"F to 220*F).
3.3 Technical Specifications of Components g-Not applicable.
~#
3.4 Normal Conditions of Transport
{
3.4.1 Thermal Model The heat source in the C-8 is a maximum of 220 curies of cobalt-60.
Cobalt-60 decays with a total energy liberation of 2.5 MeV per disintegration or 14.8 milliwattu per curie.
Assuming all the decay energy is transformed into heat, the heat generation rate for the 220 curies of cobalt-60 would be approximately 4.00 l
watt.
I l
To demonstrate compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71.43 (g) and paragraph 230 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, a separate analysis is presented in Section 3.6.
The thermal model employed is described in that analysis.
To depenstrate compliance with the requirements of paragraph 240 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 for Type B (U) packaging, a separate i
analysis is presented in Section 3.6.
The thermal model employed l
is described in that analysis.
l l
l
(_,
REVISION 0 12 FEBRUARY 1989 t
3.4.2 Maximum Temperatures The maximum temperatures encountered under normal conditions of transport will have no adverse effect on the structural integrity or shielding efficiency of the package..As presented in Section 1.6, the maximum temperature in the shade would not exceed 43*C
-(119*F) and the maximum temperature when insulated would not 3
exceed 62*C (144*F).
3.4.3 Minimum Temperatures The minimum normal operating temperature of the Gammatron is -
40*C (-40*F).
This temperature will have no adverse effect on the structural integrity or shielding efficiency of the package.
3.4.4 Maximum Internal Pressures Normal operating conditions will generate negligible internal pressures.
Any pressure generated is significantly below that I
which would be generated during the hypothetical thermal accident condition, which is shown to result in no reduction in structural integrity or shielding efficiency.
3.4.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses The maximum temperatures which will occur during normal transport are sufficiently low to assure that thermal gradients will cause qj no significant thermal stresses.
3.4.6 Evaluation of Package Performance under Normal Conditions of Transport The normal transport thermal condition will have no adverse effect on the structural integrity or shielding,fficiency of the package.
The applicable conditions of IAEA Safe *.y Series No. 6 for Type B (U) packages are shown to be satisfi-d by the Ganmatron.
3.S.0 Hypothetical Thermal Accident Evaluation 3.5.1 Thermal Model 3.5.2 Package conditions and Environment The prototype Gammatron package which was subjected to the free drop test and puncture test, and had suffered minor structural l
deformation during these mechanical tests, but suffered no l
reduction in structural integrity or shielding efficiency.
l l
O l
REVISION 0 13 FEBRUARY 1989 E-_____________
~
3.5.3 Package Temperatures
'\\ -)
As indicated in Section 3.2 the entire package is assumed to
)
reach a temperature of 800*C.
Examination of the melting temperatures of the materials used in construction of the C-8, l
indicates there will be no damage to the package as a result of l
this temperature.
l The possibility of the formation of an iron-uranium eutect:c alloy was addressed in Section 2.4.1 where it was concludwr that the formation of the alloy was not a likely possibility.
_nere was no indication of any melting or alloy formation as a result of this thermal test.
3.5.4 Maximum Internal Pressures I
In Section 3.6.3, an analysis of the source capsule, which serves as the primary containment, under the thermal test condition is presented.
This analysis demonstrates that the maximum internal gas pressure at 800*C would be 373 kPa (54 psi).
The critical location for failure is the source capsule weld.
l The analysis shows that an internal pressure of 373 kPa (54 psi) l would generate a maximum stress of 1.96 MPa (284 psi).
At 870*C (1600*F), the yield strength of Type 304 stainless steel is 69 MPa (10,000 psi).
()
Therefore, if the source capsule were to reach a temperature of 800*C, the maximum stress in the capsule would be only 3% of the yield strength of the material.
3.5.5 Maximum Thermal Stresses There are no significant thermal stresses generated during the thermal test.
3.5.6 Evaluation of Package Performance The C-8 will undergo no loss of structural integrity or shielding when subjected to the thermal accident condition.
The pressures and temperatures have been demonstrated to be within acceptable limits.
l r
\\
U REVISION 0 14 FEBRUARY 1989 L_____-________-___-_-
~
3.6.0 Appendix 3.6.1 C-8 Type B(U) Thermal Analysis:
10 CFR 71.43 (g) and i
paragraph 230 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 1
3.6.2 C-8 Type B(U) Thermal Analysis:
Paragraph 240 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 3.6.3 Cobalt-60 Source Capsule Thermal Analysis O
O REVISION 0 15 FEBRUARY 1989
l l
/"%
(,)
3.6.1 C-8 Type B(U) Thermal Analysis 10 CFR 71.43 (g) and paragraph 231-of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 This analysis demonstrates that the maximum surface temperature of the C-8 will not exceed 50'c with the package in the shade and an ambient temperature of 38'C.
To assure conservatism, the following assumptions are used:
(a)
The entire decay heat (4.00 watts) is deposited in the exterior surfaces of the package.
(b)
The interior.of the package is perfectly insulated and heat transfer occurs only from the exterior surface to the environment.
(c)
Because each face of the. package eclipses a different solid angle, it is assumed that twenty-five percent of the total heat is deposited in the smallest face.
(d)
The only heat transfer mechanism is free convection.
Using these assumptions,the maximum wall temperature is found from l
q = hA(Tw - Ta) where q = Heat deposited per unit time in the face of-interest (1.00 watts) h = Free convection heat transfer coefficient for air T
= 1.42
(_
.)1/4 watt /m2
'C d
A = Area of the face of interest (0.1297 m2)
Tw = Maximum temperature of the surface of the package Ta = Ambient Temperature (38'C) d = height of face of interest (m)
.406m
=
l From this relationship, the maximum temperature of the surface is 38.5'C.
This satisfies the requirement of 10 CFR 71.43 (g) and paragraph 230 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 s
REVISION O 16 FEBRUARY.1989 E__ _ ___
3.6.2 Model AI Type B(U) Thermal Analysis paragraph 240 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 This analysis demonstrates that the maximum surface temperature of the C-8 will not exceed 82*C when the package is in an ambient temperature of 38'C and is insulated in accordance with 10 CFR 71.71 (c) (1) and Table III of IAEA Safety Series No. 6.
The calculational model consists of taking a steady state heat balance over the surface of the package.
In order to assure conservatism, the following assumptions are used.
(a)
The package is insulated at the rate of 387 W/m (400 cal /cm2-12 his on the top surface, 194 W/m (200 cal /cm2-12 hr) on the side surfaces and no insolation on the bottom surface.
(b)
The decay heat load is added to the solar heat load (c)
The package has an unpainted stainless steel surface.
The solar absorptivity is assumed to be 0.9.
The solar emissivity is assumed to 0.8.
(d)
The package is assumed to undergo the convection from the sides and top,and undergo radiation from the sides, top and bottom.
The inside faces are considered perfectly insulated G
so there is no conduction into the package.
The faces are considered to be sufficiently thin the no temperature gradients exist in the faces.
(e)
The package is approximated as a cylinder 33cm (13 in) wide, and 40.6cm (16.0 in) high transported on its side.
The surface area of the top and bottom are.421.
The total surface area of the sides is 0.26 m2 The maximum surface temperature is computed from a steady state heat balance relationship:
Gin - gout The heat load applied to the package is 9in = qs + qd where : solar absorptivity (0.9) q
- solar heat load (213.4 watts) 9d
- decay heat load (1.00 watts)
The heat dissipation is expressed as Gout = qc + gr l
REVISION 0
)
17 FEBRUARY 1989
i I
-()
where qc: convective heat _ transfer 9r: radioactive heat transfer The convective heat transfer is I
9c = ((hA) top + (hA) sides) (Tw - Ta) where h: convective heat transfer coefficient l
A: area of the surface of interest i
l T: Temperatures of the surface w
i T: Ambient Temperature (38'C) a The radiative heat transfer is 9r =
E A (Tw4 - Ta4) where Stefan Boltzmann Constant (5.669 x 10-8 W/m20K)
E: Emissivity (0.8)
Iteration of this relationship yields a maximum wall temperature of 67.0'C which satisfies the requirements of paragraph 240 of l ()
the IAEA Safety Series No. 6.
l 3.6.3 C-8 Type B(U) Source Capsule thermal Analysis Paragraph 238 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6 1973 l
This analysis demonstrates that the pressure inside the source l
capsule used in conjunction with the Gammatron, when subjected to the hypothetical thermal accident condition, does not exceed the pressure which corresponds to the minimum yield strength at the thermal test temperature.
The source capsule is fabricated from stainless steel, either Type 304 or 304L.
The outside diameter of the capsule is 6.35 mm (0.250 inch).
The source capsule is seal welded.. The minimum weld penetration is 0.5 mm (o.02 inch).
Under conditions of l
internal pressure, the critical location for failure is this weld.
The internal volume of the source capsule contains only cobalt-metal (as a solid) and air.
It is assumed at the time of loading the entrapped air is at standard temperature and pressure (20*C and 100 kPa).
This is a conservative assumption because, during the welding process, the internal air is heated, causing some of the air mass to escape before the capsule is sealed.
When the welded capsule returns to ambient temperature, the internal pressure would be somewhat reduced.
REVISION 0 18 FEBRUARY 1989 L
Under the conditions of paragraph 238 of IAEA Safety Series No.
(~)T 6, it is assumed that the capsule could reach a temperature of
(_
800*C (1475'F).
Using the ideal gas law and requiring the air to occupy a constant volume, the internal gas pressure could reach 373 kPa (54 psi).
The capsule is assumed to be a thin walled cylindrical pressure vessel with the wall thickness equal to the depth of weld penetration.
The maximum longitudinal stress is calculated from:
where Longitudinal Stress Stress Area p
Pressure Ap pressure Area From this relationship, the maximum longitudinal stress is calculated to be 900kPa (129 psi).
The hoop stress is calculated from A
where Hoop Stress l (';
i 1
- Length of the Cylinder l
t Thickness of the cylinder (0.5mm or 0.02 inch) i l
From this relationship, the hoop stress is calculated to be 1.96 MPa (284 psi).
At a temperature of 870'C (1600*F), the yield strength of Type l
304 stainless steel is 69 MPa (10,000 psi).
Therefore, under the conditions of paragraph 238 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, the stress generated is less than 3%'of the yield strength of the material.
4.0 Containment i
4.1.0 containment Boundary 4.1.1 Containment vessel The containment system for the C-8 is the radioactive source capsule as described in Section 1.2.3 of this. application.
This source capsule is certified as special from radioactive material in IAEA Certificate of Competent Authority Number USA /0166/S or l
USA /0377/S.
/~]
4.1.2 Containment Penetrations l N~J l
REVISION 0 l
19 FEBRUARY 1989
(.
There are no penetrations of the containment.
k- '
4.1.3 Seals and Welds The containment is seal welded by tungsten insert gas welding process which is described in Amersham Standard Source Encapsulation Procedure presented in Section 7.4.
The minimum weld penetration is 0.5 mm (0.02 inch).
4.1.4 Closure Not applicable.
4.2.0 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport 4.2.1 Release of Radioactive Material The source capsules used in conjunction with the C-8 have satisfied the requirements for special form radioactive material as prescribed in 10 CFR 71.77 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6.
There will be no release of radioactive material under the normal conditions of transport.
i 4.2.2 Pressurization of the Containment Vessel Pressurization of the source capsules under the conditions of the I
g-hypothetical thermal accident was demonstrated to generate j
(3 stresses well below the yield strength of the capsule material as
=
- j described in Section 3.6.3.
Therefore, the containment will withstand the pressure variations of normal transport.
l l
4.2.3 Coolant contamination Not applicable.
4.2.4 Coolant Loss Not applicable.
4.3 Containment Requirements for the Hypothetical Accident Condition 4.3.1 Fission Gas products Not applicable.
4.3.2 Release of Contents The hypothetical accident conditions of 10 CFR 71.73 will result in no loss of package containment.
This conclusion is based on information presented in Sections 2.7.1, 2.7.2, 2.7.3, 2.7.4, and 3.5.
()
REVISION 0 l
20 FEBRUARY 1989 lL
1 1
l
_( )
5.0 ' Shielding' Evaluation 5.1 Discussion and Results j
The principle shielding'of.the C-8=1sithe uranium shield-assembly.
The mass of the uranium' shield is 159 kilograms (350 pounds).
A shielding-efficiency test of a C-8 was made by C-8.
The package contained 110 curies'of cobalt-60.
A' report of'this test 3
is presented in a letter to NRC from Gamma' Industries dated.20 May 1978 and included in section 2.10.
Extrapolation of these data to a capacity of 220 curies of cobalt-60 is presented in Table 5'.1..
Since the C-8 contains no neutron source, the gammaL
~
dose rates are the total dose rates which are presented.
As shown in Table 5.1, the maximum-dose rates are below the regulatory requirements.
Table 5.1 Summary of Maximum Dose Rates.
Extrapolated to 220 curies Co-60 mR/hr CE)
I At One Meter i
At Surface from Surface Outside Outside-Lockbox Surface (max)
Lockbox surface (max) 70 120 4.0 4.0 5.2 Source Specification 5.2.1 Gamma source The gamma source is cobalt-60 in a sealed capsule ~as.special' form radioactive material in quantities up to 220 curies.
5.2.2 Neutron Source Not applicable.
5.3 Model Specification Not applicable.
5.4 Shielding Evaluation l
1 REVISION 0-21 FEBRUARY 1989-i
v i
A shielding efficiency test of a C-8 containing 110 curies of cobalt-60 was performed..The results of.this test, which are-presented in Section-2.10, demonstrate that the dose rates surrounding this package are within the regulatory limits.
O O
REVISION O 22 FEBRUARY 1989
'l
6.0 Critically Evaluation Not applicable.
\\
O I
O REVISION 0 23 FEBRUARY 1989
(
7.0 Operating Procedures 7.1 Procedure for Loading the Package 1
The procedure for fabricating the special form source capsule is presented in Section 7.5.1.
The procedure for loading the source j
assemblies into the package is also included in Section 7.5.1.
7.2 Procedure for Using the Exposure Device The procedure for performing industrial radiography with the l
Gammatron exposure device is included in Section 7.5.2.
i 7.3 Procedure for Unloading the Package i
The procedure for unloading the package is presented in Section i
7.5.2.
]
7.4 Preparation of a Package for Transport j
t l
The procedure for preparation of a package for transport is l
included in the C-8 Instruction Manual presented in section 7.5.2.
J
()
i i
REVISION 0 24 FEBRUARY 1989 E_--------------_--
)
7.5 Appendix 7.5.1 Procedure for Encapsulation of Sealed Sources 7.5.2 C-8 Source changer operation Manual bV O
REVISION O 25 FEBRUARY 1989 u_______________._____________.____
?~
C-8 SOURCE CHANGER OPERATION MANUAL
)
NOTICE l
This device is used as a radiographic exposure device and Type B(U) transport package for Amersham Corporation radioactive sources listed in this manual.
The user should become thoroughly familiar with the instruction manual before attempting operation of the equipment.
3 In order to use this equipment to perform industrial radiography within the United States, the user must be specifically licensed to do so.
Application for a license should be filed on Form NRC-313 with the appropriate U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office listed in Appendix D of 10 CFR 20 or with the I
appropriate agreement state office.
Prior to initial use of a Source Changer as a transport package, the user in the United States must register his name, license number and package identification number with:
Director
/~N Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
(_,)
U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission Washington, DC 20555 The user must have in his possession a copy of USNRC Certificate of Compliance issued for this package; USA /9128/B(U).
Prior to the first export shipment of this exposure device from the United States, the user must also register his identity with:
Office of Hazardous Materials Regulation I
Materials Transportation Bureau U.S. Department of Transportation Washington, DC 20590 The user must have in his possession a copy of International Atomic Energy Agency Certificate of Competent Authority Number issued for this source changer.
Users of this equipment outside the United States must comply with the regulatory, licensing and transportation rules and regulations as they apply in their respective countries.
f'%
b REVISION 0 26 FEBRUARY 1989 L :.
I
("')
Radiation Safety Considerations 3
%-)
l Pursuant to USNRC and agreement state regulations, all personnel present during radiographic and source changing operations are required to weir a direct reading pocket dosimeter and either a film badge or a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD).
The pocket dosimeter must'be recharged at the start of each shift.
The operator should frequently check the pocket dosimeter reading throughout the shift.
Dosimeter readings must be recorded at the end of each shift.
Records of the initial and final readings of the pocket dosimeter must be kept for inspection by the USNRC.
{
In the event that a person's pocket dosimeter is found to be off scale, that person must stop all work with radiation immediately.
His film badge (or TLE) must be sent in immediately for.
processing, and he must not reenter a restricted area until it has been determined that he received less than the maximum allowed occupational exposure as defined in 10 CFR part 20.101.
Personnel performing source changing and radiographic operations must also have a calibrated and operable radiation survey meter capable of measuring from 2mR/hr to at least 1000 mR/hr to determine radiation levels when performing these operations.
Areas in which source changing or radiography is-performed must be identified.
If a permanent radiographic installation is used,
-sI]-
it must have the appropriate personnel access control devices as
\\-
defined in 10 CFR 20.203.
Otherwise, certain areas must be established as follows:
Access to the Restricted Area must be controlled.
A i
Restricted Area is defined in 10 CFR 20.105 as the area l
where an individual could receive an' exposure in excess i
of two milliroentgen in any one hour, or 100 milliroentgen in seven consecutive days or 500 i
milliroentgen in one year.
The Restricted Area should I
I j
also be posted with signs reading " Caution (or Danger)
Radiation Area."
Signs reading " Caution (or Danger) -
I High Radiation Area" should be posted around the perimeter where an individual could receive an exposure in excess of 100 milliroentgen in any one hour.
I The radiographer or radiographer's assistant must guard against unauthorized entrance into these areas at all times.
No personnel should be allowed into the restricted area without a direct reading pocket dosimeter and either a film badge or TLD.
Receipt of Radioactive Material The consignee of a package of radioactive material must make arrangements to receive the package when it is delivered.
If the y (v~}
package is to be picked up at the carrier's terminal, 10 CFR Part REVISION 0 27 FEBRUARY 1989 w.
20.205 requires that this be done expeditiously upon notification of its arrival.
Upon receipt, survey the exposure device with a survey meter as soon as possible, preferably at the time of pickup and no more than three hours later it is was received after normal working hours.
Radiation levels should no exceed 200 milliroentgen per hour at the surface of the exposure device, nor 10 milliroentgen per hour at a distance of three feet from the surface.
Actual radiation levels should be recorded on the receiving report.
If the radiation levels exceed these limits, the container should be secured in a Restricted Area, and the appropriate personnel notified.
All components should be inspected for physical damage.
The radioisotope, activity, model number, and serial number of the source and the package model r4 umber and serial number should be recorded.
Operation 1.
Survey the C-8 changer with the meter.
Surface reading should not exceed 200mR/hr, and 10 mR/hr at three feet (3) from the surface.
2.
Unlock the plunger type lock on OLD SOURCE side of the h
changer and remove the safety plunger.
3.
Connect the short source exchange tube that is provided, to the empty lock with the other end attached to your camera outlet nipple.
4.
Connect the control drive cable to the old source in ycur camera.
5.
Unlock the camera lock.
6.
Crank the old source from your camera into the source changer until it stops when the old source comes into contact with the new source in the source changer.
7.
Survey the C-8 changer to be sure source is in safe position.
8.
Depress the lock plunger.
Check that the lock plunger has engaged the locking ball and that source cannot move in either direction by gently cranking in both directions.
Unscrew source exchange tube and pull away from the source changer slowly, while cranking forward the additional drive cable for clearance.
Continue to monitor with the survey meter to be certain that the source is locked in the safe position.
The old source cable and connector should come into view at this point.
REVISION 0 28 FEBRUARY 1989
l 9.
Recheck position of the source locking ball to ascertain that
.}
the ball is directly under the lock plunger and that the
(/
s-source cannot move in either direction, and then disconnect the control cable from the source pigtail.
- 10. At this point, screw the swivel protector cap into the old source lockbox to protect the pigtail and further contain it.
- 11. Move the camera to NEW SOURCE end of the C-8 changer.
1
- 12. Remove the protector cap from the lockbox marked NEW SOURCE.
]
- 13. Connect the control drive cable to the new source and screw I
the source exchange tube into the lockbox.
l
- 14. Unlock the new source lock.
- 15. Stand away as far as possible and draw the new source into the camera until it comes to the safe position.
- 16. Survey the camera and lock the new source in the camera.
- 17. Disconnect the control cable from the source and camera.
- 18. Remove the source exchange tube from the camera and C-8 source changer.
()
- 19. Screw the safety plug into the lockbox marked NEW SOURCE and lock.
- 20. Survey the source changer to be sure that the surface radiation does not exceed 200mR/hr, or 10mR/hr at one meter from the surface.
l l
l Lock each end compartment with the pad locks.
Return the Source Changer to Amersham Corporation as quickly as possible.
pLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING SHIpp1NG INSTRUCTIONS:
Shipment of Radioactive Source 1.
Assure that the source assembly is secured in the proper storage position and the source changer is locked.
Assure that the brass plugs are seal wired with tamper proof seals.
2.
If the source changer is to be packaged in a crate or other outer packaging, the outer packaging must be strong enough to withstand the normal conditions of transport.
These requirements are outlined in 10 CFR 71.71.
The exposure device should be put in the outer package with sufficient blocking to prevent shifting during transportation.
D 3.
Survey the package with a survey meter at the surface and a a s/
distance of one meter from the surface to determine the REVISION O 29 FEBRUARY 1989
proper radioactive shipping labels to be applied to the
]
[~T package as required by 49 CFR Part 172.403.
The radiation
\\-
exposure limits for each shipping label are given in figure-1.1.
If radiation levels above 200 mR/hr at the surface or 10 mR/hr at one meter from the surface are measured, the package must not be shipped.
4.
Properly complete two shipping labels indicating the radioisotope, activity and the Transport Index.
The transport Index is used only on Yellow II and Yellow III labels and is defined as the maximum radiation level in milliroentgen per hour measured at a distance of one meter j
from the surface of the package.
Put these two labels on opposite sides of the package after making sure any previous j
labels have been removed.
The package should be marked with the proper shipping name (Radioactive Material, Special Form, n.o.s.) and the identification number (UN2974).
If the I
source changer is packaged inside an outer container, mark the outside package "INSIDE PACKAGE COMPLIES WITH PRESCRIBED SPECIFICATIONS - TYPE B(U) USA /9128/B(U)."
l
)
5.
Complete the appropriate shipping papers - Examples are shown 1
in Figure 2 and 3.
These shipping papers must include:
a.
Proper Shipping Name (Radioactive Material, Special Form, l
n.o.s.) and Identification Number (UN2974)
)
\\
\\
( ~)
' (
b.
Name of Radionuclides (cobalt-60)
]
1 i
c.
Activity of the Source (in Curies)
I d.
Category of Label Applied (i.e. Radioactive Yellow II) e.
Transport Index f.
Package Identification Number (i.e. USA /9128/B(U) Type
)
B(U).
1 g.
Shipper's Certification "This is to certify that the above named materials are properly classified, described, packaged, marked and labeled and are in proper condition for transport according to the applicable regulations of the Department of Transportation."
Notes:
1.
For air shipments, the following shipper's certification may be used:
"I hereby certify that the contents of this consignment
,I are fully and accurately described above by proper i
shipping name and are classified, packed, marked and REVISION 0 l
30
. FEBRUARY 1989 i
l labeled, and are in proper condition for carriage by air
(-')
according to applicable national governmental regulations."
2.
For air shipments to, from or through the United States, i
a " CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY" label and the shipping papers must state:
l "THIS SHIPMENT IS WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR CARGO ONLY AIRCRAFT."
6.
Due to the depleted uranium used as shielding in the exposure device, a ' tice must also be enclosed in or on the package included with the packing list, or otherwise forwarded with the package.
This notice must include the name of the consignor or consignee and the following statement:
"This package conforms to the conditions and limitations specified in 49 CFR 173.424 for expected radioactive material, articles manufactured from depleted uranium, UN 2909.
i 7.
For shipment of an empty source changer, assure that there is no source in the container.
If the radiation level is below 0.5 mR/hr at the surface, and there is no' measurable radiation level at one meter from the container, no label is
('}
required.
Mark the outside of the package with the proper
(,/
shipping name (Radioactive material, articles manufactured from depleted uranium UN 2909).
Mark the outside of the l
package:
l
" Exempt from specification packaging, shipping paper and l
certification, marking and labeling and exempt from the requirements of Part 175 per 49 CFR 173.421-1 and 49 CFR 173.424."
Additionally, a notice must be enclosed in or on the package included with the packing list or otherwise forwarded with the package.
This notice must include the name of the consignor or consignee and the statement:
"This package conforms to the conditions and limitations specified in 49 CFR 173.424 for expected radioactive materials, articles manufactured from depleted uranium, UN 2909."
8.
Return the container to Amersham Corporation according to proper procedures for transporting radioactive material as established in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations part 172-178.
NOTE:
The U.S.
Department of Transportation, in 49 CFR 173.22
(-)
(c) required each shipper of Type B quantities'of i
REVISION 0 31 FEBRUARY 1989 E-
radioactive material to provide prior notification to the consignee of the dates of shipment and expected arrival.
i i
)
O O
REVISION 0 32 FEBRUARY 1989
Maintenance It is recommended that inspection and maintenance of the C-8 Source changer be performed at intervals not to exceed three months.
- O l
O l
REVISION 0 33 FEBRUARY 1989 L--
8.0 Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program
{,}
~
8.1 Acceptance Tests 8.1.1 Visual Inspection The package is visually examined to assure that the appropriate fasteners are properly seal wired.
The package is inspected to assure that the proper marking and labeling is present.
The seal weld of the radioactive source capsule is visually inspected for proper closure.
8.1.2 Structural and Pressure Tests The swage coupling between the source capsule and cable is subjected to a. static tensile test with a load of one hundred pounds.
8.1.3 Leak Tests The radioactive source capsule, which serves as the primary l
containment, is wipe tested for leakage of radioactive l
contamination.
The source capsule is subjected to a vacuum bubble leak test.
These tests are described in Section 7.4.1.
Failure of either of these cests will prevent use of this source
(-)
assembly.
8.1.4 Component Tests The lock assembly of the package is tested to assure that the i
security of the source will be maintained.
A simulated (dummy) source assembly is installed in the radiographic exposure device and the lockbox locked.
An attempt is made to pull the simulated source out through the lockbox.
The brass outlet plugs are installed and checked to be sure they are attached securely to the device.
Failure of either of these two tests will prevent use of the package until the cause of the failure is corrected and retested.
l 8.1.5 Tests for Shielding Integrity With the package containing a source assembly, the radiation levels at the surface of the package and at one meter from the surface of the package are measured using a small detector survey instrument.
These radiation levels, when extrapolated to the rated capacity of the package, must not exceed 200 milliroentgen per hour at the surface of the package.
l I
8.1.6 Thermal Acceptance Tests
(~')g Not applicable.
4 l
REVISION O i
34 FEBRUARY 1989 I
k
___.___________________.]
8.2 Maintenance Program es
-)
8.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests l
Not applicable.
i 8.2.2 Leak Tests J
As described in Section 8.1.3, the radioactive source assembly is leak tested at manufacture.
Additionally, the source assembly is wipe tested for leakage of radioactive contamination every six months.
3 8.2.3 Subsystem Maintenance The lockbox assembly is tested as described in Section 8.1.4 prior to each use of the package.
Additionally, the package is inspected for tightness of fasteners, proper seal wires, and general condition before each use.
l 8.2.4 valves, Rupture Discs, and Gaskets Not applicable.
8.2.5 Shielding rs Prior to each use, a radiation survey of the package is made to
(_)
ar.sure that the radiation levels do not exceed 200 milliroentgen I
por hour at the surface nor ten milliroentgen per hour at three feet from the surface.
8.2.6 Thermal Not applicable.
8.2.7 Miscellaneous Inspections and tests designed for secondary users of this package under the general license provisions of 10 CFR 71.12(b) are included in Section 7.4.
l
[]
v REVISION 0 35 FEBRUARY 1989 a