ML20246B607
| ML20246B607 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246B591 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8908230409 | |
| Download: ML20246B607 (3) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED T0' AMENDMENT NO. 68 TO FACILITY OPERATIhG LICENSE NPF-35 l
'AND AMfNDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-52 DUKE POWER COMPANY, ET.AL.
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Catawba Unit 1. License Condition 2.C.(16) states that: " Prior to startup following the second refueling outage, Duke Power Company shall submit for NRC staff review and approval an analysis which demonstrates that the steam generator single-tube rupture analysis presented in the FSAR'is the most severe case with respect to the release of fission products and
' calculated doses.. Consistent with the analytical assumptions, Duke Power Company shall propose any necessary changes to Appendix A to this license."
Catawba Unit' 2 License Condition 2.C.(10) re those required by License Condition 2.C.(16) quires actions identical to for Unit l'.
However, Unit 2 is required to complete'these actions prior to its startup following the i
first refueling outage while Unit 1 is required to complete them prior to it startup following the second refueling outage.
By letters dated December 4,1987, and supplemented Decenber 7,11, and 29,1987, March 29, May 4 and 18, June 16', ^ July 1, August 8 and 24, and December. 15, 1988, and June 12 and 28, 1989, Duke Power Company (the licensee) submitted the required steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) analysis and its associated Technical Specification-(TS).
Because the June 28, 1989, submittal clarified and corrected certain aspects of the request, the substance of the changes noticed in the Federal Resister
- cnd the proposed no significant hazards consideration were not affecteo.
2.0 EVALUATION-two separate concerns related to
' The NRC staff is currently) reviewing (10) of Operating License Nos. NFF-35 License Conditions 2.C.(16 and 2.C.
i and NPF-52', respectively. The first concern is the SGTR accident analysis.
L Two scenarios were analyzed as requested by the staff:
the scenario riost conducive to steam generator overfill, and the scenario that maximizes offsite dose. With regard to the SGTR analysis, the staff is currently examining assumptions being used for operator action times used in the analysis. The second concern of the license conditions is the proposed TS 8908230409 890815 PDR ADOCK 05000413 i
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for operability of steam generator (SG) power-operated relief valves (PORVS). The staff is handling the two concerns separately and will address the acceptability of the SGTR analysis in future correspondence.
The Catawba-Plant design includes four SG PORVs, one for each SG. The operability of at least three of the four PORVs ensures that reactor
. decay heat can be dissipated to the atmosphere in the event of a SGTR l
coincident with a loss of offsite power.
Reactor coolant system (RCS) cooling (RHR).;an subsequently be performed through the residual heat removal system For RCS cooldown to RHR system initiation, only one PORV is required. Three operable PORVs are adequate, assuming that one of the operable PORVs is on the faulted SG, and thus unavailable for heat removal, and that one PORY fails to function in accordance with single failure assumptions.
Each SG PORY is equipped with an upstream electric motor operated block valve whose primary purpose is to allow isolation for repair or maintenance.
The block valve can be used to isolate a partially or fully stuck open PORV.
The motor operators fail "as is" and can be controlled from the control room.
The power supplies and controls for the SG PORVs are Class 1E.
The Action statements included in the TS are consistent with those already accepted by the NRC staff. The )roposed requirements state that three of the four SG PROVs shall be opera)1e in Modes 1, 2, and 3.
Also, in Mode 4 three of the four PORVs are required to be operable only when the SGs are being used for decay heat removal.
If only two PORVs are operable, the Action statement allows 7 days to return one of the two inoperable valves to operable status.
If only one is operable, the Action statement allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to return at least one to operable status. The restoration time periods provided in the TS Action statements are based on the low likelihood of having a SGTR event coincident with a loss of offsite power during the time period that one (or more) of the required PORVs is (or are) out of service.
The proposed TS requirements are consistent with those already accepted by the NRC staff. They constitute additional limitations on facility operations, and satisfy, in part, the specific requirements of License Conditions 2.C.(16) and 2.C.(10) of Facility Operating Licenses NPF-35 and NPF-52, respectively.
Based on its review, the staff concludes that the proposed TS has no adverse impact on safety and would not pose an undue risk to public health and safety. Therefore, it is acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted L
area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the j
amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no signif-icant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite l
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, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendnents involve no significant hazards con-sideration and there has been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly,
these anendgents meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in~10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environ-mental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Comission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve.
no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR29404 ) on July 12, 1989. The Comission consulted with the state of South Carolina.
No public comments were received, and the state of South Carolina did not have any coments.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors:
K. Jabbour, PD11-3/DRP-1/II K. Desa1, SRXB/ DEST Dated:
August 15, 1989
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