Text

Proposed Tech Specs Re Max Svc Water Temp Limit, Recirulation Spray HXs Svc Water Flow Requirements & Containment Air Partial Pressure & Containment Average Air Temp Operating Limits
	ML20245H502
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/22/1989
From:	; DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20245H488	List: ML20245H483; ML20245H498; ML20245H502;
References
	NUDOCS 8906290506
	Download: ML20245H502 (16)
	v • d • e

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4 ATTACHMENT A Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:

Remove Pace Insert Pace 3/4 6-6 3/4 6-6 3/4 6-7 3/4 6-7 3/4 6-9 3/4 6-8 3/4 6-13 3/4 6-13 3/4 7-13 3/4 7-13 B3/4 6-1 B3/4 6-1 B3/4 6-2 B3/4 6-2 1

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS INTERNAL PRESSURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.4 Primary Containment internal air partiel pressure shall be maintained

> 9.0 psia and within the acceptable operation range (below and to the left of TheQiWfrT watiiP temperature limit line) shown on Figure 3.6-1 as a function of servicewaterQemperature

y APPLICABILITY

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

4terlica 6 /t. C'niabe[

With the/ containment internal air partial pressure < 9.0 psia or above the CWrT waGb temperature limit line shown on Figure 3.6-1, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 6.1. 4 The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

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3 OPERATION 3 9.2 E<g 9.1 32 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE (*F)

FIGURE 3.6-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR PRESSURE VERSUS SERVICE WATER

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1. RWST TEMPERATURE BETWEEN 450F AND 500F.

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TEMPERATURE 1050F.

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3. MINIMUM ALLOWABLE CONTAINMENT AIR PARTIAL PRESSURE 9.0 PSK.

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4. MAXIMUM SERVICE WATER TEMERATURE 890F 10.2 CONTAlhMENT

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l 9.0 i i 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 i !90 i 89 SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE (OF) 87 FIGURE 3.6-1 MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR PRESSURE VERSUS SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE BEAVER VALLEY - Unit 2 3/4 6-7 PROPOSED WORDING I

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITING CONDITION F00 OPERATION 3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall be maintained ; 195*c

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

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iv (squr< '3.L-t ( tsf or too*FL-With the containment avera~ge air temperature > 105'F or'e'in at least HOT STANDBY

""*" restore the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or b within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN withir. the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5 The primary containment average maximum and minimum air temperatures shall be the arithmetical average of the temperatures at the following locatiore and shall be determined at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

The nearest alternate detector may be used for temperature determination up to a maximum of one per location.

Location a.

Reactor Head Storage Area - Elev. 802'-0" b.

Pressurizer Cubicle - Elev. 802'0" c.

RC Annulus - Elev. 777'-4" d.

RHR Heat Exchanger - Elev. 801'-6" e.

RC Annulus - Elev. 701'-6" 0.. G reater Nn or aga,$l to f sF 06nd l< s s An or 47xcl to loS*F,or I

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CONTAIMENT SYSTEMS l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 2.

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates i

to its correct position on a test signal.*

3.

Initiating flow through each Service Water subs associated recirculation s) ray-heat exchangers,ystem and its two flow rate of at leas and verifying a f.

At least once per 5 years uy performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

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The specified 18-month surveillance interval during the first fuel cycle may be extended to coincide with completion of the first refueling outage.

i BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 6-13 Proeosed Wordin s 1

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l PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK - OHIO RIVER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.5.1 The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

A minimum water level at or above elevation 654 Mean Sea Level, at the intake structure, and

( ~?9 b.

An average water temperature og s-86'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

juRVEILLANCEREOUIREMENTS 4.7.5.1 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by verifying the average water temperature and water level to be within their limits.

I-J BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 3/4 7-13 frapese.J bdording

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3/4.E CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 4

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials. from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses.

This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure, P,.

As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to < 0.75 La during performance of the periodic test to account for possible~3egradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the requirements of Appendix "J" of 10 CFR 50.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment.

leak rate.

Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

3/4.6.1.4 and 3/4.6.1.5 INTERNAL PRESSURE AND AIR TEMPERATURE Epenc e_ wattr3 The limitu.

on containment internal pressure and average air temperature as a function ktemperatureensurethat1)thecontainmentstructureis prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure of 8.0 psia, 2) the con-tainment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 45 psig during LOCA conditions, and 3) the containment pressure is returned to subatmospheric conditions following a LOCA.

The containment internal pressure and temperature limits shown as a function' ofdlWS4dservice water temperature describe the operational envelope that will 1) limit the containment peak pressure to less than its design value BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-1 Preensd WarJ

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F a s sh = w on F.p re. 3.6-1.

BASES 3/4.6.1.4 AND 3/4.6.1.5 INTERNAL PRESSURE AND AIR TEMPERATURE (Continued) of 45 psig and 2) ensure the containment internal pressure returns subatmospheric within 60 minutes following a LOCA.

The limits on the parameters of Figure 3.6-1 are consistent with the j

assumptions of the accident analyses.

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3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY 4

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility.

Structural integrity is required to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 44.7 psig in the event of a LOCA.

The visual and Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT QUENCH AND RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the containment spray systems ensures that containment depressurization and subsequent return to subatmospheric pressure will occur in the event of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant termination of containment leakage are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the chemical addTtion system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on Na0H minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized.

These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the con-tainment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in'the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressuri-zation of the containment.

'sntainment isolation within the time limits speci-fied ensures that the rel' ae of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for both a LOCA and major secondary system breaks.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2 70 pas eJ Word

ATTACHMENT B Safety Analysis Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 18 l

Description of Amendment Request:

The proposed amendment would revise the maximum service water temperature limit, the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers service water flow requirements and the containment air partial pressure and containment average air temperature operating limits.

More specifically, these changes would include:

1.

The ultimate heat sink (Ohio River) average water temperature in specification 3.7.5.1 would be revised from 5 86*F to 5 89'F.

2.

The 2equired Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers service water flow of surveillance requirement 4.6.2.2.e.3 would be revised from 12,000 gpm to 11,000 gpm total flow for the two heat exchangers associated with each service water subsystem.

3.

The containment air partial pressure specification 3.6.1.4, associated Figure 3.6-1 and the containment air temperature specification 3.6.1.5 would be revised to be consistent with the assumptions of the revised containment pressure analyses performed to support the above changes.

Discussion:

The ultimate heat sink provides a source of cooling water for normal operation and to dissipate the heat of an accident and to achieve and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

The design service water temperature for Unit 2 is 86*F.

The design service water flow thru the two Recirculation Spray Heae Exchangers associated with each service water subsystem is 12,000 gpm.

The proposed increase in the service water temperature limit will provide additional margin to prevent a plant shutdown should abnormally hot weather conditions, as experienced the previous summer, re-occur.

The proposed decrease in the required Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers service water flow would provide additional design margin-to ensure that these flow requirements continue to be met.

This additional design margin is required to compensate for increased system resistance that has recently been experienced in the service water discharge lines.

The impact of increasing the service water temperature limit from 86*F to 89'F and decreasing the required service water flow thru the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers from 12,000 gpm to 11,000 gpm was evaluated for the effect these changes would have on the plant's containment depressurization systems.

In addition, the effect of increasing the service water temperature limit on other safety related equipment for which the service water system supplies cooling water to was also evaluated.

These evaluations are discussed below.

ATTACHMENT B (CONTINUED)

Pago 2 Containment Depressurization The Containment Depressurization System is designed, as discussed in Section 6.2 of the FSAR, to reduce the containment pressure below atmospheric pressure in less than 60 minutes following a LOCA.

The recirculation spray coolers provide cooling of the containment spray water and long term heat removal during the recirculation mode following a

LOCA.

The service water system provides the cooling medium for these coolers.

Increasing the service water temperature limit and reducing the required Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers service water flow does not effect the containment peak pressure analysis from a

LOCA but does effect the capability of the Containment Depressurization System to depressurize the containment following the accident.

An analysis of the containment depressurization following a LOCA was performed using the LOCTIC computer code for service water temperatures up to 89'F.

The analysis was performed with the assumed Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers service water flow revised from 12,000 to 11,000 gpm.

In performing the analysiu one conservatism was removed from the current containment depressurization analysis calculations.

As part of the current licensing basis and as stated in the Unit 2

FSAR Section 6.2.2.3.1, a

containment spray effectiveness for heat removal of 95% was assumed for all containment design analysis.

In performing this analysis for elevated service water temperatures, the currently accepted thermal spray efficiencies were used.

The Quench Spray thermal efficiency was revised to 99%.

The recirculation Spray thermal efficiency was revised to vary with time according to the attached Table 1.

The analysis results show that the depressurization systems are capable of satisfying their design basis of depressurizing the containment within one hour following the DBA for service water temperatures up to 87'F assuming a limiting case initial containment average air temperature of 85'F.

The initial conditions assumed in this analysis is reflected in the revised Technical Specification Figure 3.6-1 85'F limit line.

Additional analysis was also performed assuming an initial containment average air temperature of 100'F.

This increased containment air temperature reduces the initial air mass in the containment and therefore reduces the requirements of the containment depressurization system. The analysis results showed that with an initial minimum containment air temperature of 100*F the depressurization systems were capable of meeting their design basis for service water temperatures up to 89'F.

The conditions assumed in l

this analysis are reflected in the revised Technical Specification Figure 3.6-1 100*F limit line.

The results of the containment depressurization is summarized in the revised FSAR Table 6.2-9B attached.

A complete FSAR revision incorporating the new containment depressurization analysis will be included in the next FSAR update.

L s

'hTACHMENT B (CONTINUED)

Paga 3 Service Water System Components The effect of increasing the service water temperature limit from 86*F to 89'F on components other than the recirculation spray cooler:

that are required to operate during a post DBA lineup of the service water system was also reviewed.

This review included the following components:

Emergency Diesel Generators Charging Pumps Control Room Air Conditioning Units Rod Control Area Air Conditioning Units MCC Room Cooling Coils Safeguards Area Air Conditioning Units Post Accident Sampling Coolers Main Steam and Feedwater Valve House Cooling Coils All components.were found to be capable of accepting the increased service watet temperature while continuing to perform their intended design function.

Plant Cooldown Capability The primary component cooling water system is designed to provide a

supply of cooling water for normal and cooldown operation.

The service water system is the cooling medium for the component cooling system.

i The capability of the Component Cooling Water System to achieve and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition with the increased service water temperature limit was evaluated as discussed below.

Per Section 9.3.2 of the FSAR the temperature of the component cooling water supply will not normally exceed 100*F during normal operation or 120*F during cooldown operation with the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

System.

With the service water temperature at 89'F it was determined that the component cooling water supply temperature would increase approximately 3*F.

This would result in a maximum supply temperature of 106*F with the heat exchangers at the maximum fouling rate and system maximum heat load for normal operation.

During RHR operation, the maximum cooling water supply temperature is controlled to 120*F by throttling RCS flow.

With the service water temperature at 89'F it was calculated that the time required to cool down from 350*F to 140*F would increase from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to approximately 28 hours3.240741e-4 days 0.00778 hours 4.62963e-5 weeks 1.0654e-5 months .

Based on this evaluation it was determined that the small increase in component cooling water temperature and time required to cool down the plant did not significantly impact the plant's cooldown capability.

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.' ATTACHMENT B (CONTINUED)

Ptgn 4 l

l The Unit 2 Fire Protection Evaluation Report (FSAR Appendix 9.5A) discusses the use of the RHR System to achieve safe shutdown in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months as required by the SRP.

This shutdown capability was re-evaluated with a maximum service water temperature of 89'F.

.This evaluation determined that with the increased service water temperature

limit, the plant would continue to be capable of achieving safe shutdown with the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months criteria.

In summary, the revised containment depressurization analysis has demonstrated that the containment depressurization systems will be capable of satisfying their design basis requirements at service water temperatures up to 89'F with the service water flow thru the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers reduced to 11,000 gpm per train.

This change is therefore considered safe.

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i ATTACHMENT B (CONTINUED) l TABLE 1.

BVPS-2 RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM THERMAL EFFICIENCY TIME (SECOND)

EFFICIENCY 0.0 0.994 720 0.994 2000 0.981 3500 0.976 5000 0.966 7500 0.960 10000 0.956 11000 0.955 12000 0.954 12470 0.953

.12600 0.962 13100 0.964 14000 0.972

-15000 0.973 40020 0.972 1

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t ATTACHMENT C No Significant Hazard Evaluation Proposed Technical Specification Chance No. 18 Basis for Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination:

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a

significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)).

A proposed amendment to an operating license for a l

facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change does not involve a

significant hazards consideration because:

1)

Increasing the service water temperature limit and decreasing the service water flow requirements for the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers will not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

To ensure that the consequences of any accident previously evaluated will not be significantly increased the effected. plant safety analysis have been reevaluated.

In addition the effect of the increased service water temperature on safety related equipment assumed to operate during an accident which require service water have been reviewed.

These evaluations have determined that the design basis requirements of the containment depressurization systems will continue to be met and that the safety related equipment which require service water cooling will be capable of performing their design function at the increased service water limit.

The proposed Technical Specification changes will ensure that the assumptions of the containment depressurization safety analysis will remain valid.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2)

The proposed changes do not involve any plant equipment or operating configuration changes within the plant.

Therefore the probability of an accident or a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated would not be created.

3)

The proposed service water temperature limit and revised service water flow for the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers are based on a

re-analysis of the containment depressurization safety analysis.

This analysis has determined that with these changes, the containment depressurization systems will be capable of depressurizing the containment within one hour and maintaining the containment at subatmospheric pressure.

The proposed Technical Specification changes will ensure that the assumptions of this re-analysis will remain valid.

This change will therefore not involve a

significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above considerations, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving no significant hazards consideration.

_ - _ _ -

ML20245H502

Text

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