ML20245C680
| ML20245C680 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/10/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8711030383 | |
| Download: ML20245C680 (190) | |
Text
,
I
- 13 \\A-
~
Q TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
_j OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
)
~
NATIONAL STATE LIAISON OFFICERS'
)
)
I MEETING
)
)
f Pages:
215 through 343 Bethesda, Maryland Place:
September 10, 1987 Date:
i (3
Heritage Reporting Corporation OQTcial Reporters 1220 L Street, N.W.
l Washington. D.C. 20005 87110303B3 870910 (202) 628-4888 PDR STPRG ESGG a'
~
(z E
i^
~
{
215 #
..g 1
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGUO. TORY COMMISS ON
(
ti 2
. OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
/
/
3
)
~
NATIONAL STATE LIAISON OFFICERS'
)
/
'h )
r'{
4 MEETING
)
s 5
)
-)
6 Ballroom Hyatt Regency Bethesda 7
7400 Wisconsin Ave.
Bethesda, Maryland 8
- Thursday, 9
September 10, 1987 10 The abovn-ontitled matter reconvened at 11 8:35 a.m.
12 BEFORE:
CARLTON KAMMERER Moderator l ~'
O
^rrenoses:
14 AUBREY V. GODWIN, Director 15 Division of Radiological Health Environmental Protection Division 16 State Department of Public Health Montgomery, Alabama 17 MARILYN CRUZ-APONTE 18 Aide to the Goverr;r State Capitol 19 He.rtford, Connecticut 20 ERIC LASCHEVER Alaska Governor's Office 21 Washington, D.C.
22 JACOB DANIEL NASH Public Health Physicist Manger 23 Radioactive Materials Section Lffice of Radiation Control 24 Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services 25 Tal.Lahassee, Florida O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
]
c____-__---____-___.
)
J l
216 I
1 CHARLES F.
TEDFORD, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency i
2 Phoenix, Arizona j
l 3
GRETA J.
DICUS, Director
/
Division of Radiation Control 4
and Emergency Management J
Department of Health 5
Little Rock, Arkansas 6
CHARLES R.
IMBRECHT, Chairman
)
California Energy Commission 7
Sacramento, California 8
ALBERT J.
HAZLE, Director Radiation Control Division 9
Department of Health Denver, Colorado 10 BRADFORD S. CHASE 11 Under Secretary for Energy Office of Policy and Management 12 Energy Division
)
Hartford, Connecticut
]
'3
(])
JAMES SETSER, Chief 14 Program Coordination Branch l
Environmental Protection Division
'l 1F Department of Natural Resources
)
Atlanta, Georgia
)
l 16 THOMAS M. ANAMIZU, Chief l
17 Noise and Radiation Branch Department of Health 18 Honolulu, Hawaii 19 MARK TORF, Manager i
Compliance Section 20 Hazardous Materials Bureau j
Division of Environment l
21 Department of Health and Welfare Boise, Idaho 22 CilARLES MILLER, Chief l
23 Division of Planning and Analysis l
I Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 24 Springfield, Illinois 25 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
-_ A
r 217
).
1 ATTENDEES:
(Continued)
L 2
HAL S. STOCKS, Chief Radiological Health Section 3
State' Board of Health Indianapolis, Indiana 4
ANDREW VARLEY, Chairman 5
Iowa State Commerce Commission Des.Moines, Iowa 6
RICHARD.BAMSEY, Manager 7
Nuclear Power Plant Program Iowa Division of Disaster Services 8
Des Moines, Iowa 9
GERALD W. ALLEN l
I Public Health Physicist 10 Bureau of Air Quality and Radiation Control Division of Environment 11 Topeka, Kansas 12 MARK MCDANIEL Executive Assistant to the Secretary 13 Energy Cabinet
' ()
Lexington, Kentucky 14 L.
HALL BOHLINGER 15 Deputy Secretary Department of Environmental Quality 16 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 17 WILLIAM SPELL, Administrator Nuclear Energy Division 18 Office of Air Quality and Nuclear Energy Department of Environmental Quality 19 Baton Rouge, Louisiana
)
20 DONALD C. HOXIE, Director Division of Health Engineering 21 Division of Human Services i
l Augusta, Maine 22
}
DAVID D.
BROWN, State Director 23 Maine Emorgel.cy Management Agency Augusta, Maine 24 25 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 8
l 218 1
ATTENDEES:
(Continued) 2 ROLAND FLETCHER, Director Radiation Control Program 3
Department of the Environment Baltimore, Maryland 4
MAX EISENBERG 5
Assistant Secretary for Toxics, Environmental l
Science and Health I
6 Department of the Environment i
Baltimore, Maryland 7
LYNN SHREFFLER 8
Radiological Officer Maryland Emergency Management /
9 Civil Defense Agency Pikesville, Maryland 10
)
EDWIN O. TREMPER 11 Assistant Director for Operations Maryland Emergency Management /
12 Civil Defense Agency Pikerville, Maryland 13
(')
ROBERT HALLISEY, Director 14 Massachusetts Department of Public Health Radiation Control 15 Boston, Massachusetts 16 PETER W.
- AGNES, JR., Assistent Secretary Executive Office of Public Safety 17 Boston, Massachusetts 18 LEE E.
- JAGER, P.E.,
Chief Bureau of Environmental and Occupational Health 19 Michigan Department of Public Health Lansing, Michigan l
20 i
RONALD CALLEN, Director of Strategic Planning i
21 Michigan Public Service Commission Lansing, Michigan 22 RAYMOND W. THRON, Director 23 Environmental Health Minnesota Department of Health 24 Minneapolis, Minnesota 25 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
______-_ _ a
l 219
(/
1 ATTENDEES:
(Continued) 1 2
JAMES I.
PALMER, JR.
Governor's Office of General Services 3
Jackson, Mississippi 4
RONALD A.
KUCERA, Deputy Director Department of natural Resources 5
Jefferson City, Missouri 6
LARRY LLOYD, Chief Occupational Health Bureau 7
Department of Health and Environmental Sciences Helena, Montana 8
i MARILYN MCNABB, Esquire 9
Policy Research and Energy Office Lincoln, Nebraska
)
10
)
JOHN VADEN 1
11 Radiological Health Consultant Nevada Division of Health 12 Carson City, Nevada 13 RICHARD STROME, Director
()
State Civil Defense Agency 14 Concord, New Hampshire 15 GERALD P.
NICHOLLS Acting Assistant Director 16 Radiation Protection Programs New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 17 Trenton, New Jersey 18 DAVID SCOTT, Acting Chief Bureau of Nuclear Engineering 19 New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Trenton, New Jersey 20 PETER MARTINASCO 21 Assistant State Director of Emergency Management New Jersey Office of Emergency Management 22 W. Trenton, New Jersey 23 JOSEPH J.
CRAPAROTTA Deputy State Director of Emergency Management 24 New Jersey Office of Emergency Management W.
Trenton, New Jersey 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
220
()
1 ATTENDEES:
(Continued) 2 JOHN CHRISTIANSEN, Nuclear Planner New Jersey Office of Emergency Management 3
W.
Trenton, New Jersey 4
MICHAEL BROWN, Bureau Chief Radiation Protection Bureau 5
Environmental Improvement Division Department of Health and Environment i
6 Sante Fe, New Mexico
'7 DENNIS NIGHTINGALE, Director Electric Division 8
North Carolina Utilities Commission Raleigh, North Carolina 9
H. LYNN REESE 10 Fixed Ndclear Facility Planner North Carolina Division of Emergency Management 11 Raleigh, North Carolina 12 DANA MOUNT, Director Division of Environmental Engineering 13 North Dakota Department of Health
.()
Bismark, North Dakota 14 JAMES R.
WILLIAMS 15 Chief of Staff Ohio Disaster Services Agency 16 Worthington, Ohio 17 DALE MCHARD, Chief Radiation and Special Hazards 18 State Department of Health oklahoma City, Oklahoma 19 WILLIAM T.
DIXON, Administrator 20 Siting and Regulation Division Oregon Department of Energy 21 Salem, Oregon 22 THOMAS M. GERUSKY, Director Bureau of Radiological Health 23 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 24 25 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
221
[~)
(/
1 ATTENDEES:
(Continued) 2 WILLIAM DORNSIFE, Chief Division of Nuclear Safety 3
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 4
PEDRO MALDONADO
{
5 Director of Legal Services Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board 6
Santurce, Puerto Rico 7
SANTOS ROHENA BETANCOURT, President Puerto R'ico Environmental Quality Board 0
Santurce, Puerto Rico 9
HEYWARD G.
SHEALY, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health 6
10 South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 11 Columbia, South Carolina 12 GEORGE SCHNEIDER Senior Nuclear Planner 13 South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division
()
Columbia, South Carolina-14 TAMMY LEBEAU 15 Natural Resource analyst Department of Water & Natural Resources 16 Office of Air Quality Pierre, South Dakota 17 MICliAEL H. MOBLEY, Direct, 18 Radiological Health Tennessee Department of Health and Environment 19 Nashville, Tennessee 20 LAWRENCE R.
JACOBI Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste 21 Disposal Authority Austin, Texas 22 LARRY ANDERSON, Director 23 Bureau of Radiation & Control Salt Lake City, Utah 24 25 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 l
222
()
1 ATTENDEES:
(Continued) 2 GERALD R. TARRANT, Commissioner Department of Public Service
.3 Montpelier, Vermont 4
GEORGE URQUHART Department of Emergency Service 5
Richmond, Virginia 6
CURTIS P.
ESCHELS, Chairman Energy Facility Site 7
Evaluation Council Olympia, Washington 8
WILLIAM H. AAROE, Director 9
Industrial Hygiene Division Office of Environmental Health Services 10 South Charleston, West Virginia 11 RICHARD BRAUND, Administrator Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government 12 Madison, Wisconsin 13 JULIUS E.
- HAES, JR.,
Chief
()
Radiological Health Services 14 Department of Health and Medical Services Cheyenne, Wyoming 15 HOLMES BROWN, Director 16 State and Federal Programs Afton Associates, Inc.
17 Washington, D.C.
18 DEL BUTTERFIELD Nuclear Licensing Manager 19 Commonwealth Edison Company Chicago, Illinois 20 JOSEPH A. COLEMAN, Directot 21 Division of Waste Treatment Frojects Office of Nuclear Energy 22 U.S.
Department of Energy Washington, D.C.
23 24 25
($)
Heritage Reporting Corporation I
(202) 628-4888
l 223
(
1 ATTENDEES:
(Continued) 2 J.
BENNETT EASTERLING, Director Policy and Institutional Planning 3
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
{
Washington, D.C.
4 BARBARA FOSTER 5
Senior Staff Associate National Conference of State Legislatures 6
Denver, Colorado 7
WILLIAM MCCAUGHEY Baltimore Gas & Electric 8
Lusby, Maryland 9
JEFFREY L.
SMILEY Low-Level Waste Program Manager 10 Office of Nuclear Energy Washington, D.C.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l
j Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 t
- d
224 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
MR. KAMMERER:
Top of the morning to you, my fellow 3
Americans.
It is good to see at least a couple of people still l
4 alive here, after yesterday's lively discussions.
That is the 5
kind of stuff that we want to continue on with this morning and 6
throughout the morning.
7 This morning, we are kicking off with the Emergency 8
Planning and Response discussions.
Needless tc 9?.y, the 9
subject of emergency planning has long been a highly 10 controversial one, particularly since, Three Mile Island.
11 State and local governments historically have a role 12 in assuring that their citizens are protected from a variety of 13 potential risks, included those presented in nuclear power O
14 facilities, by providing adequate emergency planning.
And now 15 the proposed Emergency Planning Rule, published in the Federal 16 Register, in a comment in March of 1987, expanded existing 17 criteria with a licensee, which the licensee must meet, in the 18 event that state and local governments do not cooperate in 19 emergency planning.
20 We will have a great opportunity, here, this morning, 21 with the distinguished panel to have some lively dircussion.
22 What I would intend for, this morning, is for each of the 23 participants to give their presentations, and then, at the end, 24 to have the questions totally at the end.
25 Different than what we have bee., doing after each Ov Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
225 O-1 egeeker.
2 This morning to lead off, we will have Ed Jordan from 3
the NRC and Mr. Jordan is a graduate in physics and mathematics 4
from Northwestern State University in Louisiana, and graduate 5
studies in nuclear engineering, at Southern Methodist l
6 University and Texas Christian University.
7 Some of the jobs that he has had in the Nuclear 8
Regu1atory Commission include inspection and enforcement with 9
extensive amounte of work in engineering with events and 10 evaluations in quality assurance.
Also in some responsibility 11 in reactors design and operations.
12 Currently Ed is the office director of the Office of 13
. Analysis and the Evaluation of Operational Date, and Mr. Jordan O
14 is the Chairman of the Committee to Review Generic 15 Requirements.
16 Ed, wou1d you lead off this morning?
17 MR. JORDAN Yes, and thank you.
18 NRC taff have difficulty making a presentation
)
19 without slides, so that if you will bear with me, I will 20 display a slide and try to talk around them.
We have some 1
21 handouts and Mindy, would you make sure that those get around?
22 Thanks.
23 I would like to discuss incident response as 24 differentiated from emergency preparedness.
I would also like 25 to discuss the emergency response data systems and I would like O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l i
226
()
I to discuss guidance that the NRC will be providing to reactor j
l 2
licensees, regarding experiences with exercises scenarios.
l 3
And you will get a discussion of design exercise 4
later this afternoon.
This is sort of a continuity discussion 5
with the operations Center tour that you had yesterday and some 6
of you will get today.
There was not an opportunity to go 1
7 through the roles and functions that the NRC follows, so I will 8
start off first with the roles.
9 The principle point that I would like to make with 10 this slide is that the responsibility for limiting accident 11 consequences rests with the licensee, and responsibility for 12' deciding upon and implementing protective actions, rests with 13 the state and local authorities.
And I try to make that O
14 graphically on the slide, by having at the very bottom, the j
15 statement that the NRC is a regulatory agency.
16 And maybe that is different from the vi that some 17 of you have about what the NRC's responsibility really is.
We j
q 18-had to first understand our role after Three Mile Island, in 19 order to develop our incident response, emergency response j
l 20 capability itself.
21 So, then I will discuss the Agency role.
)
(
22 The NRC role looks simple here, but as I indicated, 1
\\
23 it was very difficult for us to express.
We spent quite a bit 24 of time, arguing internally over what our true role was.
And 25' the role that we have, I think, is in pretty much priority is O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
~ - _
227
(~~s j
(/
1 that our first and foremost is to monito:: licensees, and assure l
2 that appropriate protective actions are being recommended and j
3 taken.
This is with respect to off-site recommendations, 4
principally.
5 Then we support the licensee with technical analysis 6
and logistical support.
We are not really in a regulating role 7
during one of these events.
It would be somewhat unlikely that 8
in a serious accident, the NRC would revert to a regulatory or 9
enforcement type of role.
Our role is really to try to make 10 the best of the situation to provide support to the licensee 11 and to support the off-site authorities.
This is especially 12 important in confirming or disagreeing with the licensee's I
13 recommendations to off-site authorities.
14 The NRC, by law, is the Agency that has the 15 understanding or is required to maintain the understanding of 16 the licensee's capabilities, their plant details, and so in a 17 real event, we would be confirming that the licensee's actions 18 were correct or incorrect in terms of their recommendations to I
19 off-site authorities.
20 Another role is to keep other Federal agencies, and 21 entitles informed of the status of the incident.
A 22 communication role.
A very important and a very difficult one.
23 To keep the media informed, this is the public, of our 24 knowledge of the status of the incident, including coordination 25 with other public affairs groups -- with the states, with the O
l I
lieritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
228
(
1 utility, so that there is really one story going out. It is 2
coordinated, and the state, the utility, the NRC and other 3
government agencies, are, in fact, coordinated with that 4
communication.
5 I need to touch on the four classes of emergencies in 6
order to identify the Agency's response modes, and who has the 7
lead within the NRC for that response.
8 And the lead switches.
I think that it is.important 9
for you to recognize that.
Unusual event -- that is really a 10 misnomer.
In terms of being an emergency, unusual events have 11 not thus far, run up to more serious emergencies.
The more 12 serious emergencies seem to start at alert or start at site 13 area, and so that is sort of an anomaly and that is more nearly 7
14 a normal mode.
15 We have a fairly large number of unusual events 16 reported each year.
The states are advised.
There is a 17 requirement for reporting to the states and it keeps our l
18 communications systems alive.
I understand the states like 19 that arrangement and we don't plan to change it.
We considered 20 it at some point, but we are not.
I just wanted to put the 21 unusual event in context.
22 Alerts, those do constitute conditions where the 23 plant seems to have problems that could lead to something more i
24 serious.
The Agency normally goes into a standby condition, 25 under that situation. That means that the Chairman and the O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
m 229
,n
(_)
1 Staff that would be responding in an event would be called into 2
the operations center, and would be, if you were, standing by 3
that in the event that the situation worsens.
4 The lead, in this case, is with the Regional 5
Administrator, in the Regional Office, so that'the Regional 6
Administrator is communicating with his staff to the licensee 7
and with the state and locals.
If the event worsened and there 8
was a threat of an off-site release or an on-rite release then 9
a site or general emergency would be declared and the Agency 10 would be placed in initial activation.
11 The thing that you have to understand between initial 12 activation and expanded activation is that the lead does change 13 in the Agency for responding to the event and communicating O
14 with the state and locals, and the utility.
15 In the initial activation, the lead is with'NRC 16 headquarters, the Chairman is normally the director of the 17 Executive Team in Washington, and he is in communication with 18 the appropriate officials.
19 And his staff, that is, the team that supports him or 20 obtaining information from the licensec and coordinating with 21 the state and locals and communicating that information.
22 The Regional Office is transporting people from their 23 offices to the site.
We understand and have determined that 24 our best and most capable r*.mponse is by having the right 25 people at the site.
So that it is important to promptly Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l 230
(
1 transport those people to the site, and during that time, the 2
lead is in Washington.
3 The expanded activation is when that Director of that 4
Regional Office and his team have arrived on site, have been 5
briefed, and the Chairman transfers the lead formally to this 6
Director of Site Operations, who is the Regional Administrator, 7
normally of that Region.
8 And so that is the important distinction that.I 9
wanted to make about initial activation and standard 10 activation.
11 Now, in the initial activation, I identified the 12 Chairman as the Director of the Executive Team.
And he has a 13 group of five members of his staff, the Executive Director for O
14 Operations and Directors of four of the offices, who constitute 15 the Executive Team, provide him advice and support him=in 16 making decisions.
17 And these are NRC decisions to make recommendations.
18 These are not decisions that the NRC is making for the states 19 and locals or for the utilities.
The Reactor Safety Team, on j
I 20 the extreme left, provides insight into the plant conditions.
l 21 What is the reactor doing?
Is it adeouately cooled;~is the 1
22 containment intact; was thero any fuel damage; is there 23 expected to be fuel damage; is the containment expected to 24 remain intact?
l l
25 And the Protective Measures Team is taking that kind l
(1)
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
231
()
1 of information and then making prognostications of the source 2
term, what would the release be, if the containment failed with 3
the core in its condition, or what would the release be, if the 4
reactor dried out and the vessel failed?
5 So, they are making those prognostications.
How much 6
time is available?
What are the meterological conditicas?
And 7
they have codes for analysis of these events and providing 8
estimates of what may happen.
9 The Safeguards Team is one that would suppurt, if 10 there were a threat of sabotage.
And if there were a security-11 type issue.
The Regional Base Team is, at this point, 12 scurrying around and getting people transported to the site.
13 Congressional Liaison, Government Liaison, Public O
14 Affairs, and the Response Coordination Teams, are all providing 15 support.
They are doing the communications, keeping people 16 informed about the current situation.
17 In the expanded activation, I would simply focus on 18 the roles in the middle of this slide.
The roles are to 19 provide recommendations to the licensee, and off-site 20 officials.
These are recommendations principally about 21 protective actions.
To act as a focal point for coordination 22 of NRC press releases, and media interactions.
To keep other l
23 Federal agencies informed and to coordinate NRC requests for 24 their assistance.
25 And then, finally, to direct all NRC Staff that are O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
232 1-responding to the event.
2 In looking at this chart, it really is an overlay, 3
the upper organizational structure is overlaid on the chart 4
that you saw, two slides back.
That is, the Site Operations 5
Team is now overlaid and the Executive Team is essentially in a l
l 6
support role to the Site Operations Team.
7 So they are counterparts for reactor safety, for 8
protective measures, public affairs, and then a stronger l
9 element there, for State Liaison, in coordination with other l
10 organizations.
11 The principle interfaces are obvious, but that is I
12 really what this response program is about, is in making those 13 interface, and communicating across channels and within each of O
14 the organizations.
15 I think that it is fair to say that the NRC has as 16 much trouble communicating within, as the various agencies 17 have, communicating between one another.
18 We spend a great deal of our effort in an event 19 responso, simply in, communicating.
And so we are working on 20 ways to try to improve, automate, make more efficient these l
21 communications of data and information.
So that we are 22 spending a little less time communicating and a little more j
l 23 time planning and responding.
I 24 This is a list of the principle Federal Agencies that 25 would be responding in a serious event and a simplified O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 A
9 233
()
1 statement of their areas of support.
For instance, FEMA, does 2
coordinate and manage the off-site logistical response.
3 The FBI would have the lead if there were a 4
safeguards event, and the Department of Transportation can 5
assist if there is a transportation problem, to provide 6
resources to support transportation issues.
7 The object of this slide is to the NRC joint 8
coordination role.
The NRC is responsible for the coordination 9
of the technical aspects of the emergency and FEMA coordinates 10 the logistical non-technical aspects of the Federal response, 11 with all of the Federal Agencies, and the NRC and FEMA come 12 together to communicate with the utility and with the state and 13 locals to provide support in a coordinated fashion.
O 14 I would like to tell you all that you ever wanted to 15 Pnow about the Emergency Response Data System. And if I don't 16 tell you that, you can ask me in the next discussion session.
17 The Emergency Response Data System is a follow-on to 18 the Data Link that some of you will recall of some years ago.
19 After TMI one of the lessons was that it was very difficult to 20 understand plant conditions.
There were miscommunications 21 made, and that there ought to be a better way of handling data 22 and information.
23 The NRC made an effort to come up with what turned 24 out to be called, Data Link, and that system was overwhelming 25 in its size and complexity and cost.
And it was not adopted.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
l 1
1
j 234 I
() _
1 We now have the Emergency Response Data System that is somewhat 2
different than the Data Link.
3 It is bounded, it uses the existing. data systems that 4
the utilities have, oither their Safety Parameter Display 5
System or their Process Computer Typed Data, and with a 6
hardware interface and software, then transmits this data by 7
wire or by satellite to NRC Headquarters, where we have 8
hardware / software to make it user friendly to the personnel 9
that are responding in that initial stage of that event.
10 Similarly, the data would be provided to the Regional 11 office,.and can be made available to the state.
The purpose is 12 clearly to monitor plant conditions during emergencies.
(
13 The description I have provided, the data list that O
14 we are expecting is about 60 parameters.
These would encompass 15 most of the events and for those unusual events, it is really l
16 not worth having for the NRC a longer list of variables, in 17 order to try to pick up the one or two others.
18 So we would simply get those by transmission 19 facsimile or by verbal, which we will maintain a verbal link.
20 We would be able to, with the Emergency Response Data System, 21 focus the discussions more on what are the plant conditions; 22 what equipment is out of service; what actions is the utility 23 taking with respect to the equipment that is malfunctioning?
24 Rather than, what is the pressure; what is the 25 temperature; what is the rate of pressure rise?
We can get O.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
235
()
1 away from those discussions of data.
And it takes a lot of 2
tolephone time to transfer that data, in a verbal fashion.
3 This system h6s a minimum backfit implication to the 4
utilities.
We are not asking them to change their hardware and 5
as I have discussed, software and the modem for transmission 6
from the sites.
7 The benefits clearly are, accuracy, greater 8
timeliness of the data, and a reduction in the licensee's 9
burden, as well as the NRC's burden.
I can list a number of 10 examples that we have had in real events as well as 11 exercises -- bad misunderstandings about data -- starting with 12 TMI and going to other events.
13 We had one reactor event in which the pressure was O
14 communicated to the NRC in containment and the pressure was 15 understood to be something like 18 PSI, in containment, which 16 Indicates that there was a real problem.
There was a 17 substantial primary system leak, a little ways into the event.
18 And in a couple of hours after we got this initial 19 information, it was determined that that was 18 PSIA and so the 20 pressure was not a big problem at all.
21 Those kinds of mistakes, if it were in a 22 non-conservative direction, just would be unacceptable.
And 23 the probability, of course, in a real event, is that the 24 mistake is not going to be in a conservative direction.
This 25 one, it was.
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 a
.236
()
1 So that kind of thing has driven us to the clear 2
understanding that we have to have a better way of 3-communicating data, i
4 The Emergency Response Data System status, the NRC 5
has conducted and completed the survey of plant equipment.
So, 6
we have been to essentially every site, obtained the. data, 7
understood the parameters that are available and the kinds of 8
hardware / software interfaces that would have to be made.
9 We have conducted trials with Duke Power and 10 Commonwealth Edison in exercises and that included the Zion 11 exercise.
The program is budgeted by Congress and completion 12 is slated at this point for 1992.
It is a phased 13 implementation.
We would be doing about 20 or 20-plus sites a
- (:)
14 year beginning this year.
15 We have a contractor selection process and we are in 16 the final stages.
We would expect to select a contractor very 17 shortly, down to days.
18 There is proposed legislation by Congress regarding a 19 data system.
This is HR 1570.
This bill, this proposed bill 20 would cause implementation to be mandatory.
The present 21 program is a voluntary program.
That is we are not requiring 22 by rule that utilities make the connections, but we don't 23 anticipate a problem in making those because there are mutual 24 benefits.
This proposed legislation would require the NRC to 25 completo implementation within three years of bill passage.
It O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
237
((_~)s 1
1 does have funding provisions.
It would lock up the funds r.o j
i 2
that they would be -- certain to be applied to this particulcr l
3 program.
)
l l
4 It provides for data sharing with effected states, l
5 which we would expect to do in any case.
It would put limits l
6 on other authorities from imposing other data requirements and 7
would grandfather oxisting data systems.
I 8
My last chart is about Emergency Preparedness 9
Exercises.
We have gotten signals from our participation in 10 exercises as well as utilities' concerns that the exercises are 11
-- lack realism and that every exercise goes to a severe core 12 damage.
And that is misleading people, the responders, the 13 public and, in fact, the plant operators into a unnatural 7_V 14 situation and is depriving them of some training that may be 15 quite beneficial.
16 So, we are communicating.
I have met with INPO and 17 we have developed a information notice that will be issued 18 shortly that would encourage licensees to conduct more 19 interactive exercises on the alternate years when off-site 20 participation is not required.
We feel that this would be a 21 substantial benefit to problem solving, that the utility would 22 be at greater openness to coming up with innovative solutions 23 within his plant.
24 If there is an electrical problem, then the utility 25 would be thinking more of:
How could we solve this scenario
)
()
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
l J
238 1
problem.
And if the scenario problem is solved, then the plant 2
would not necessarily have to go to the severe accident 3
condition.
So, this realism, we think, would be most 4
beneficial.
So, we are urging utilities to do this.
There is l
5 not a requirement by the NRC to in each case go to a severe 6
core accident.
And we feel it is important for the states to 7
recognize that we are doing this on those alternate years.
8 So, those exercises, we hope, will turn out to be a little 9
different.
10 Thank you.
11 MR. KAMMERER:
Give the guy a hand.
12 (Applause.)
13 MR. KAMMERER:
You know, we who work for NRC need a 0
14 little applause from time to time.
15 MR. JORDAN:
If it wasn't spontaneous, I don't want 16 it.
17 (Laughter.)
18 MR. KAMMERER:
Let the record show that was 19 spontaneous applause.
Thanks, Ed.
20 Proceeding next to Frank Congel.
Frank is the 21 Director of Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency
(
22 Preparedness.
In 1964, he received his BS degree in physics 23 from Lemoyne College, Lemoyne College.
He attended graduate 24 school in Clarks University in Potsdam, New York, and received 25 his Ph.D -- masters and Ph. degree in nuclear physics in '68 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i 239
(
1 and '69, respectively.
2 Dr. Congel is assistant professor for physics at 3
McAllister College.
We are learning a lot about colleges this 4
morning.
Strange named colleges.
Nothing like the University 5
of Pacific, you know, good solid stuff like that.
6 In all of his earlier positions, Dr. Congel was 7
involved in radiation protection and emergency planning and his 8
principal areas of work and responsibility.
9 Dr. Congel?
10 DR. CONGEL:
After that introduction, I don't have to 11 make the -- well, maybe I will make the remark.
I topped off 12 that illustrious career in universities by coming to the AEC.
13 (Laughter.)
()
i 14 So, there had to be some recognition someplace.
15 First of all, I want to ask for your patience with me 16 this morning.
I'm having one of my annual allergy attacks and 17 I have been known to be speaking along and all of a sudden 18 having my voice disappear on me.
So, please hang in there with 19 me.
I'll do the best I can.
20 Ed, of course, gave a good overview of the Agency's 21 response to emergencies.
My group is responsible for putting 22 in place those proceduros and actions that would have to be 23 taken given an emergency.
In that capacity, we are responsible 24 for interacting primarily with the licensee and, of course, 25 with FEHA and the state and local people to put into place all O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
240
(
1 of the required Agency pre-planning actions.
And I said they 2
have to be in place prior to the plant being licensed to 3
operate.
4 Before going into some of the details, I would like 5
to at least relate to you the results of a rather major 6
reorganization we had in the Agency back in April of this year.
7 In that reorganization, several branches from the former Office 8
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Office of Inspection and 9
Enforcement were combined to form the division that I presently 10 am the director of.
11 As you can see on the slide we have three branches.
12 The Radiation Protection Branch, Emergency Preparedness and 13 Risk Applications.
The intent of my division is to integrate
,s 14 several diverse technical fields that are integrated and have 15 similar meanings in the context, of course, of emergency 16 preparedness.
I guess that is the reason we put the Emergency 17 Preparedness Branch in the middle.
18 The Radiation Protection Branch consists of members 19 that have expertise primarily in the health physics area and 20 are carrying out the responsibilities, have knowledge and 21 transfer to the EPB in the area of health effects and radiation 22 dosimetry.
23 The Risk Applications Branch, in turn, is responsible 24 for looking at results and insights gathered from probabilistic 25 risk assessments and use those insights for what we call O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l
}
241
()
1 practical purposes.
Of course, I say practical purposes, in 2
some cases, people may disagree with me that there is no l
3 practical purpose for PRAs.
But we indeed feel that it 4
provides us some technical insight.
5 And, indeed, when it comes to some graded responses l
l 6
for reactor emergencies, we use the knowledge gained from those 7
analyses.
8 The biggest difference or the primary difference 9
between Ed Jordan's group and mine is like I said earlier, we 10 are responsible during the licensing process.
We do provide l
1 11 technical assistance given in an actual emergency.
And, in
)
12 fact, most of the members of my division are on special teams 13 that are called into action given a real emergency.
But we are O
14 primarily responsible for putting the actions in place as the 15 plants are being licensed.
16 The second slide here is intended to give an overview 17 of the philosophy or the attitudes that I think are reflected 18 in the requirements that are imposed during the licensing 19 process.
Some of these were mentioned by Ed.
And, of course, i
20 as one would expect, there was a great deal of overlap between 21 the manner in which Ed carries out his functions and we carry 1
22 out ours.
23 Ideally, as I said, if we carry out ours properly, 24 all of these things will be in place and operational, given the 25 hopeful unlikely event that they ever have to be in place and O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
l
5#
242
)
1 used.
2 Emergency planning is part of the overall Commission 3
philosophy of defense in depth.
This, of course, is consistent 4
with all of the other philosophies that go into the 5
construction, design and construction of a power plant 6
facility, including redundancy and equipment, reliability of 7
safety equipment, things of that sort.
Emergency planning is 8
essentially the last part of that defense in depth and it 9
'becomes implemented when it appears that these other redundant 10 features may fail in such a manner that we would get 11, radioactivity off site.
12 Along that line, it is important to note that the 13 protective actions that were referred to by Ed are in place'and O
14 predetermined to the extent that it is possible.
And, in fact, 15 they are put into place based on plant conditions and that is 16 an important thing to state because we don't wait to have 17 measured activity off site, measured dose rates and so on.
We 18 have to determine protective actions based on the plant 19 conditions.
And, hopefully, as I said, if the defense in depth 20 concept works, then people would be moved out in spite of the 21 fact that there would be no activity ultimately off site.
22 These predetermined actions are based, as I mentioned 23 earlier on analyses such as probabilistic risk assessments.
24 You can determine what sequences could possibly occur, ideally 25 protect against them, but given the fact that they occur, O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
243
()
1 anticipate what would be the consequences off site and mitigate 2
those consequences to the extent practicable.
-3 In order to do that, a number of mechanisms have to 1
4 be.put into place.
This is where the Agency, FEMA comes into I
5 play as well as the degree of support that is essential from 6
the state and local governments.
7 In order to provide proper and early notification for 8
the public that could possibly be effected, we have to have the 9
cooperation and the existence of mechanisms at the state and 10 local level.
11 The rest of the things that are on the overview I-32 believe were covered in some detail by Ed, so, I won't spend 13 any more time with them.
14 What I want to do next is focus in on some of the 15 responsibilities, primarily, of the Emergency Preparedness 16 Branch because that is the group under me that would have the 17 primary interaction with you folks.
18 As I mentioned earlier, the licensing reviews:
The 19 category of licensing reviews is the one that denotes that 20 class of actions that is part of our standard review plan, 21 That is the requirements that have to be fulfilled Ly the power 22 plant management as a condition to getting their license.
23 Along those lines, for example, we work closely with 24 reviewing parts of the emergency plan, particularly, the on-25 site emergency plan, data submitted as part of their license.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
()
1 We also have a responsibility for providing the 2
program guidance to our regional offices.
As a result of the 3
organization of April, this role is even more expandedLin an 4
attempt to insure that the manner in which the requirements are l
l 5
carried out are uniform.
We are going to have more of a role 6
to play in providing guidance to the regions on what aspects of 7
the emergency pluns and procedures guidelines are most l
8 important, the manner in which they should be evaluated, 9
carried out and in that case a more, as I see it, important 10 role by headquarters to assure that we are all on the same-11 track.
I 12 Along the same lines as a central authority or a j
13 clearinghouse for regional guidance, we have inspection program
(
l 14 development.
Now, inspection program development.is intended 15 to -- working closely with our regional offices, provide 16 guidance and I would say a bases background, even procedures 17 development for inspections as a result of'the experience we 18 have here at headquarters, where would be the most effective 19 place to put inspection resources?
20 As an example, I mentioned a couple of times, now, l
21 the Risk Applications Branch.
As a result of insights that are 22 gathered from doing the PRAs, where would be the most effective 23 return for the time spent in inspections?
If you see 24 vulnerabilities are glaring, devote your inspection efforts 25 there.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
a 245
)
The last thing on the list, here, is our coordination 1
2 with FEMA.
This is a multi-faceted aspect and, of course, one 3
of the, I will say, more difficult ones. We have various 4
perspectives that are represented with the both agencies and, 5
of course, the role of FEMA is interact the most closely with 6
the state and local people.
We are secondary in that regard.
7 We work primarily with the licensee and on-site activities. Of 8
course, though, we have a very strong interest in the manner in 9
which the local and state people have exhibited capabilities to 10 respond to an emergency.
And our judgment, our interactions in 11 that response very often are with and through FEMA.
i 12 So, we have a number of activities going on with FEMA 13 as well as the direct interactions for each of the sites under O
14 consideration.
We have what I call generic activities:
the 15 development of policy, mutual acceptable policy, guidance. The 16 guidance that FEMA puts out that is the responsibility of the 17 state and local governments to follow. We have a hand in 18 interacting with them.
19 of course, there are exercises, routine or periodic 20 exercises required at the sites.
We have to determine mutually 31 the schedules.
And in order to keep our staffs informed, up to 21 speed, we have routine steering committee meetings where issues 23 that I have just referred to are discussed.
- Ideally, 24 schedules, procedures and so on are agreed upon at these 25 meetings.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
)
i 246
( d-1 My next slide is a breakdown of some principal points 2-and the roles that our two agencies have.
Our marriage with L'
3 FEMA, if you want to call it that, goes back to near the end of 4
1979 and, of course, reflects the results of the Three Mile 5
Island accident and the experiences that we all gained.
6 A memorandum of understanding was drawn up between 7
NRC and FEMA and was revised about a couple of years ago as of 8
April of 1985.
And, as a. result of that memo of understanding, 9
we have a breakdown of what are generally stated -- as 10 generally stated responsibilities for each of the agencies.
I 11 am not going te take the time to read them, but I think the 12 thing that is most important to note is that essentially the 13 fence line is where the prime role of each of our O
14 responsibilities starts or begins, depending on your 15 perspective.
That is only in terms of primary role.
We 16 certainly have a lot, as 1 mentioned earlier, interactionej 17 overlay and interrelated responsibilities.
18 We use the results of all the FEMA findings as 19 related to us in our licensing process.
The role, of course, 20 is very important and the written material serves as a basis 21 for our final safety evaluation reports and they provided 22 extensive support for us at the licensing hearings.
And the 23 direct support or the mechanism we have for the direct support
.4 of FEMA when they are developing the local and state plans is 25 through the regional assistance committees, the RAC.
NRC O
Het tage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
247
(~h
(_)
1 technical people provide assistance as members of that regional 2
assistance committee.
3 Since Ed took up most of the time, I'll make this my boej 4
last slide, and besides, my voice is starting to go, and I want S
to save a little bit for the questions.
But on the other hand, 6
it may be a good excuse not to answer a question.
7 (Laughter.)
0 Especially if it's tough.
9 But I think for this group, in particular, I wanted 10 to list what we felt were the principal responsibilities at the j
11 state and local levels which, of course, you people represent.
12 As Ed pointed out on one of his early sides, the i
13 state and local governments are responsible primarily and fully O
14 responsible for the protection and the safety of their 15 citizens.
So consequently, the responsibility falls squarely 16 on your shoulders to ensure that a policy is developed that 17 protects the public safety to the maximum extent practicable.
18 Some of the other requirements or responsibilities 19 that are listed here I think list secondary, more what I regard 20 as secondary responsibilities, but the primary one is the one 21 that's at the top of the list.
22 The manner in which you provide for the public safety 23 I believe is expressed and the other responsibilities on this 24 slide.
But as long as -- I can say in conclusion that as long 25 as we are all continuously in communication and can estab]ish f~g b
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 620-4888
1-248
)
I the proper rapport that we can all carry out the goal which is, 2
of. course, the safety of the public.
3 I apologize again for my voice, but I will be more 4
than happy to answer questions at the end of the session.
5 Thank you.
H 6
(Applause) l l
7 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you, Frank.
8 The shot I had ist mind for you was a good right 9
cross, and if there is another shot that he might have been 10 referring to, then that could get you a little trotble in our 11 drug and alcohol policy statement here.
i 12 Our next speaker is Gerald Tarrant.
He is the 13 commissioner, the commissioner is the head of the state 0
14 department whose responsibilities include statewide power 15 planning and energy conservation, representation of the public 16 in the. utility rate cases, and supervision of the state's j
17 nuclear power plant.
i 18 Mr. Tarrant served an ute state's public advocate for j
19 over two years, representJ.ng Vermont ratepayers in all utility 20 rate proceedings before the Public Services Board and the 21 courts.
22 He served as general counsel to the Department of 23 Public Services before that.
He is chairman of the New England 24 Governor's Power Planning Committee and the Vermont State 25 Nuclear Advisory Board.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
_m--
249 I) 1 Mr..Tarrant, in 1971, was a graduate of law at 2'
Marshall White School of law at William & Mary, and believe or 3
not as young'as he looks, he retired in 1977 after 24 years of 4
active duty in the U.S. Air Force.
5 And so he.is a senior assistant to the New Hampshire 6
Senate President and in'a science adviso.y capacity --
7 MR. TARRANT:
Wrong guy.
8 MR. KAMMERER:
Wrong guy?
I'm reading right on.
9 Thank you for that assistance.
10-It ends at William and Mary.
11 Gerald.
12 MR. TARRANT: Thank you very much.
I am not that old.
13 MR. STROME:
I resent that.
O 14 (Laughter.)
15 MR. TARRANT:
It is an honor to be here.
I had the 16 misfortune of missing yesterdey's session.
I did note that the 17 topics were of significant interest to me and I think that our 18 topic this morning may even overlap.
I did find it interesting 4
19 that of all the states invited here, two of the smallest states 20 up in the northeast part of this country were invited, New 21 Hampshire and Vermont, and I wondered why.
And I thought about 22 it, and I figured out the reason.
i i
23 That whoever made these decision wanted at least to 24 have two people represent two different views, and you will 25 probably get two different views from New Hampshire and O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
250 l'
U) 1 Vermont.
2 Planning has always been a difficult issue, whether 3
you plan to build a typical fossil fuel plant, a nuclear plant, 4
or anythJng else.
Energy needs are complicated.
We are 5
entering, in fact, I think it's fair to say we have entered a I
6 period where federal and state relationships are more complex 7
than over.
The relationships have been strained at times, and 8
I suspect they will become more strained over the next several 9
years.
10 I think the Shorehams of the world, the Seabrooks of 11 the world, plants like the Pilgram plant, all create their own 12 problems, but they all share similar issues; issues that the 100 (
13 states, whether those plants are located in our state or ty-
'~'
14 state, whether they are bordoring your state or my state, they 15 create issues that the states have t0 understand, and I think 16 the federal government has to understand, because we do' share 17 some of the same responsibilities as Mr. Jordan pointed out.
18 I think it's quite clear, if you read the court 19 cases, the ultimate safety responsibilities in terms of-20 radiation hazard, in terms of building a plant, in terms of 21 operating a plant lie with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
22 But I think as Mr. Jordan pointed out clearly also, 23 the ultimate responsibility in protecting citizens' lives rests 24 with the states, and I think therein lies the issue.
25 The NRC has been attempting to strengthen its role in T7
\\_/
lleritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
251 (O
_/
1 plant safety, expand its role perhaps.
The states have argued 2
for greater rights in protecting their citizens, at least some 3
states.
The interrelationship of the federal and state 4
authority in the nuclear energy field never has been simple, 5
It is becoming more complex, for when we look at emergency 6
planning, tne purpose is really to protect the people out 7
there.
8 No one can really question the states' rights, the 9
states' responsibilities, and I think the states' duties to 10 protect their citizens with conviction, with vigor and with 11 enthusiasm.
I think that's our responsibility.
12 Planning for protecting the public health and safety 13 in the event of a nuclear accident has been referred to by one 14 Vermont official as trying to plan for the invasion of 15 Normandy.
Well, I don't know if that's true.
If he feels that 16 is true, we should send him to Long Island and see how he feels 17 planning for a plant on Long Island.
18 However difficult it is, we have to come to grips 19 with it.
We have elevated emergency planning in response in 20 Vermont right to the top of the stack, so to speak.
It is a I
21 number one issue.
We want to focus on it, but we do not want 22 to focus on it to the detriment of any other issue.
23 We want to look at emergency planning probably for 24 the first time, at least in our state, on an integrated basis.
)
i 25 We want to bring in other issues.
We want to bring in other 1
l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
252 U;
.1 people.
We want to bring in issues like containment safety.
2 We want to talk about venting.
We want to see how that relates 3
'to emergency planning, if it does.at all.
4 In'the past, these issues tended to be se gregated.
5 We had in Vermont a' Department of Public Safety.
They were out 6
in another town, and they devised the plan.
They had people to 7
contact.
They had phone numbers.
They had agencies and 8
groups, and they put it on the shelf and once a year we have a 9
mock sesslon where we go through an. emergency drill.
Other 10 agencies would get involved for a couple days, some more than 11 others.
But it was still segregated to some extent.
12 Other. issues were not, in my opinion, meaningfully 13 integrated or brought into consideration to the extent they O
14 probably should have, and to the extent we intend to bring them 15 in in the future.
16 Safety issues were the NRC's responsibility.
The 17 state's nuclear engineer, who works under my direction, was 18 responsible for reviewing and focusing on most nuclear issues.
19 Certainly when there was a nuclear problem, a new nuclear l
l 20 issue, a safety issue, that person reported to me.
We-
{
l 21 coordinated things with Vermont Yankee, our nuclear plant.
We 22 coordinated things with the NRC.
I don't know if we brought in l
23 the public safety people unless there was really an emergency.
24 They never fully perhaps understood all of the issues that were 25 going on in terms of nuclear isaues as they may or may not O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
1 l
253 O(_)
1 affect their plants.
2 Today, we believe, in Vermont, that you cannot plan 3
for safety of your citizens unlesa you understand more and more i
4 about the plant or plants which affect your citizens.
Let me l
5 try to put it another way.
l 6
Last year when we were trying to understand a little 7
bit more about Vermont Yankee's containment system, we were 8'
being comforted by NRC officials.
Statements were made that I 9
expected, don't worry; your plant is safe.
I think that's an 10 accurate statement.
But I couldn't help myself.
I said, how 11 safe.
And I don't think we got a very good answer, and I don't 12 think it possibly could be answered.
13 We have tried to understand how safe that plant is.
b' 14 We have tried to understand how these things like containment 15 safety interrelate to the citizens' welfare.
16 We believe that if you don't understand your plant, 17 if you don't understand how it operates and how it might 18 operate as it ages, then I don't think that you can really 19 fully understand how you can best protect yout citizenry.
20 We intend in Vermont to bring in town officials, 21 selectmen, town managers, the citizens, to find out if they 22 believe they can respond if there were a major nuclear accident 23 in Vermont, ot Massachusetts, or New Hampshire, but especially 24 in Vermont.
25 Preliminary indications are that we may find some O
I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
1 l
l
254 I) 1 problems, as you might expect.
Might find some confusion, 2
might find lack of full understanding of what everyone is to do 3
and interrelate, perhaps a lack of equipment, including perhaps 4
the proper and the m<>st technologically advanced 5
telecommunication systems.
And it's a problem in our little 6
state, as well as other states that share the kind of geography 7
we have, _and topography, with mountains, with a. scattered 8
population, how do you really contact some of these people.
9 Local communities have already complained about lack 10 of equipment.
They have already complained to us about lack of 11 funds.
They have already complained to us about lack'of 12 training.
Does it add up to being adequate?
Does the NRC know 13 what adequate is?
We're talking about something that we don't 14 expect to happen.
We hope will never happen.
But if it does 15 happen, if we do get sick or your children get sick,'o you d
16 plan on having an adequate doctor?
I don't know.
I would try 17 to get the best doctor I could.
18 I think the words that are used are manipulated too 19 many times.
And I think that le where the stress comes in 20 between the states and the federal government, because the 21 states do have, as Mr. Jordan pointed out, the ultimate 22 responsibility in protecting the citizens.
Ano we want to make 23 sure if we use the threshold standard of adequacy, that it 24 truly is adequate; that we have done the best we can in that 25 sense.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 c
255
()
1 We have found out that even state officials have 1
2 complained to us that they don't know whether it's possible to 3
truly adequately plan for a major disaster if it occurred.
And
)
4 yet, it's the type of thing that state officials aren't going l
5 to walk around and publicly admit, and maybe therein lies why 6
so many plants came on so easily in the past.
7 Few have said anything over the past 15 years of the 8
difficulties in really planning for a real problem.
But I 9
think there are a few now who are raising questions, and 10 raising issues, and truly admitting the problems as the one l
11 official publicly stated that it's really like planning for the 1
12 invasion of Normandy.
You can't do it very well.
l 13 My position is you have to do it better than what we
,_T r\\#
14 have done, and I think there is room for improvement.
The fact 15 is we do have a nuclear plant in Vermont, and the fact is we i
16 must plan as if an accident would occur.
I think that's our 17 charge.
18 That brings me to the issue that may have been 19 addressed yesterdav, an issue that I think is really at the 20 forefront on emergency planning as well as a lot of other 21 issues.
And that is, how do we really relate and maximite our 1
22 relationship with the federal officials so that we can take l
l 23 advantage of the federal officials, and the NRC, and their 1
24 technical expertise, and how they can take advantage of our 25 perspective, and our> expertise, especially when it comes to O
Heritage Reporting Corporation i
(202) 628-4888 l
l I
()
1 emergency management, because I think we both have to cope with l
2 these legitimate concerns.
l l
3 The ability of the states and the NRC to work in 4
cooperation in ensuring the protection of the publ1c from the 5
hazards associated with nuclear power plants will be 6
determined, in my opinion, to a very large extent by the 7
willingness of the NRC to recognize the fundamental 8
responsibilities that the states have in protecting their 9
citizens.
10 That responsibility carries with it the necessity of 11 the states to take certain actions.
The proposed rule change 12 that was referred at the outset of this meeting is probably e 13 rule change that will continue to be discussed at vario s O
14 levels within states and at the federal level for many years to 15 come.
I think that that kind of a rule change undermines our 16 relationship with the federal government, and I think it 17 ultimately has a very negative effect on all states, even if 18 all the states are not directly affected.
19 The change, as you all know, would allow the full 20 power operations of nuclear power plants without state and 21 local government emergency plans perhaps.
The NRC would be 22 declaring that its own judgment on what the states and local 23 governments can do to protect its citizens cancels and 24 overrides the judgments of the people responsible for taking 25 the protective actions and trying to protect themselves and S
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 257
()
I their citizenry.
2 The question that immediately comes to my mind is why to do that.? The answer appears to be that 3
would anyone want 4
some people think that that is legally permissible, and that 5
there is some fear that if they do not, some utility 6
corporations would face harsh economic consequences.
Equity 7
and fairness, economic considerations have been referred to.
8 It doesn't seem to be based on public health and 9
safety which is really what I thought, reading the court cases, 10 the United States court cases, district court cases, is what g
11 the NRC is all about.
12 The United States Supreme Court has issued a number 13 of casec, and I think we should all go back and read those
\\~#
14 cases, and obviously any time you read a court case you can 15 interpret it differently.
And therein gets to be a problem, 16 because the federal government seems to be interpreting it in 17 an expansive way.
The states seem to be interpreting it in a hI1 ultimately,unfortunately, have to go to 18 narrow way.
19 court agajn, I suspect, the states will to detenuine exactly 20 how the Supreme Court would interpret it in this instance.
21 But it seems to be clear to me that the states retain 22 financial responsibility.
The states retain the responsibility 23 to plan for whether a nuclear plant or a fossil fuel plant 24 should come on line.
The states retain economic 25 responsibility, and ultimately as the Supreme Court has stated, O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
_j
1 L.(
250 i
A(_/
1 the states retain the responsibility for ratemaking.
2 Ratemaking is not a narrow, hollow issue.
It's an e'pansive x
3 one.
It's one where many'of the commissions where all of us 4
reside have dealt with failed plants, whether they be nuclear l
5 or not; where they have been partially built and for whatever 6
reastL have been walked away from:
Lack of need, poor 7
environmental issues, health and safety issues.
Other options 8
were better.
9 And I think that's what the courts have said.' The 10 states have the right to select what options they want.
The il federal government through the NRC has +L' rr, possibility to fnWL.
12 make sure if the states what-that option. co make sure that the 13 construction is done properly, and to make sure that once it O
14 operates, it operates properly.
1 15 The question of the legal authority of the NRC to 16 take such an action will probably have to be resolved in the 17 courts.
However, I believe that a recent opinion by the D.C.
18 Court of Appeals should raise the red flag once again with the 19 Commission.
And I hope that it will remind the Commission that 20 their focus should be on safety, not economics.
21 The Court just last month ruled that the NRC may not 22 take economic costs into account in deciding whether to order 23 safety-enhancing modifications to existing nuclear power 24 plants.
The Court. noted that not a single provision in either 2 '.
the 1954 Atomic Energy Amendments, or any subsequent amendments O
Heritags Reporting Corporation (202) G28-4888
1 259
()
1 provides that the NRC could consider economic costs in 2
determining adequacy thresholds.
l 3
The Court further noted that during consideration of l
4 the 1974 Act, which created the NRC, the exchanges which 5
occurred suggest to Congress, the Atomic Energy Commission and a
6 the industry all understood that consideration of economic 7
costs in administering the adequate protection standard was 8
inappropriate.
9 Go back and read the notice that the NRC sent out on 10 its rule change.
Throughout it, it talks about equity, 11 fairness and economic considerations in terms of dealing with 12 adequacy of plants.
l 13 Go back and read the Supreme Court cases and the D.C.
O 14 Court of Appeals case.
Can't do that.
It can be debated, but 15 I don't think you can do that.
16 It isn't new.
The Pacific Gas case in '83 talked 17 about this, referred to it throughout about economic I
18 considerations not being the NRC's responsibility.
The court I
19 has said it before.
It said it in a case involving Vermont 20 Yankee in 1978.
Economic considerations are primarily for the 21 states.
22 I think if the Commission is able to retain its 23 focus, the relationship between the states and the federal 24 government will fit nicely.
The ilRC knows much more about how 25 a plant should be constructed, how about a pla-t should be O
Heritage Reporting Corporation
( 2 'J 2 ) 628-4888
1 260
()
1 operated.
That is their goal, that is their charge, and that 2
is their responsibility.
My feeling is thcc most states 3
wouldn't want that responsibility.
4 But I do think the states, in terms of power 5
planning, and in terms of protecting for the ultimate safety of 6
the citizenry do want to exert and do want to assert their 7
rights and their responsibilities.
8 The proposed rule does not improve safety, and I 9
believe that.it ignores important painful lessons that should 10 have been learned after the accident at Three Mile Island and 11 Chernobyl.
12 Remember, the rule that is now the subject of a 13 change was implemented right after Three Mile Island, and I 14 think it's the NRC itself has said that that rule was 1
15 implemented back in 1980 because they.found that there were 16 inadequate plans and inadequate planning done at the state 17 level, and therefore, there were the requirements to upgrade 18 it, these state. plans, to bring the states into the situation 19 so that we had an adequate safety plan.
20 I believe the response by the NRC with respect to 21 emergency planning following the Three Mile Island accident was 22 appropriate.
As I said, in 1980 the NRC promulgated revised l
23 regulations governing emergency planning and preparedness at 24 nuclear power plant sites.
And those regulations required 25 development of off-site emergency plans, including the full O
l Heritage Reporting Corporation I
(202) 628-4888 J
261
('O
_/
1 participation of the states and local governments in the 2
development of those plans.
3 The proposed amendment to the rule clearly ignores 4
the inescapable fact that local and state governments are the 5
entitles ultimately responsible for public health and safety.
6 The basic assumption of emergency planning is that an 7
accident can occur, and I think we all have to admit that an 8
accident can occur.
The realization that radiological 9
accidents will in fact occur has ushered in a new age in how 10 safety regulations of nuclear power plants are viewed.
11 The Three Mile Island accident exposed the woeful 12 inadequacy of emergency response plans that existed at that 13 time.
The NRC acknowledged that.
Indeed, the rule that is now 14 under consideration for change was specifically developed 15 following that accident.
16 Last year it was reported that the staff of the NRC 17 estimated that there is about a 45 percent chance that a core fs 18 melt accident will occur in the United States.
Thatis not 19 important whether it's 45 percent or 25 percent or 5 percent.
20 The fact is it possibly could happen.
21 Last year it was reported that there is a 90 percent 22 chance that the containment would fail if a severe accide: _t 23 occurred at plants with a boiling water reactor Mark 1 24 containments.
Again, the 90 percent i g u re is not important.
1 25 Doesn't matter it it's 9 percent.
It is of the utmost l
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
262-UU O
1 important, that we are prepared to deal with any eventuality 2
which may develop as a result of an accident.
T4 3
Physical and economic effects of an accidentesuch as 4
the one at Chernobyl has been felt worldwide.
Many countries l
5 have lost tremendous amounts of money, have lost valuable
{
6 economic products, and lives have even been lost.
Few were 7
immune.
In think in the United States, the State of Vermont, 8
where we are situated, received the highest level of 9
radioactive fallout.
It just so happened that as the plume was 10 going over Vermont it rained.
11 It would seem almost impossible to overstate the-12 seriousness with which we should treat the potential for'a 13 nuclear reactor accident and the consequences.
And that's
(:)
14 exactly why we plan.
We plan for the worst situation.
l 15 Clearly, the people who would suffer the most as a 16 result of any accident are those people who are living and l
17 those people who are working in the area around the plant.
It I
18 is this population that really must be protected.
'19 Clearly, the responsibility of the state and local 20 governments is to protect those people, and there is no 1
21 question I think in any of our minds that it is the state and 22 the local governments who are really in the best position to 23 protect their citizens, and they traditionally have exercised 24 that responsibility through their police powers.
Indeed, they 25 are the ones.
The utilities don't have the capability.
They O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
263 1.
can't.
They are not there.
Neither the federal government nor 2
private utility companies have the authority or capability to 1
3
' provide such protection, intimate protection, immediate 4
protection.
1 5
In view of what I consider the basic fundamental 6
points that we have just discussed, I have just discussed, I 7
believe that it is unacceptable that the NRC would even 8
consider attempting to usurp the state's authority to protect 9
its citizens.
10 We're talking about two isolated cases where this 11 rule would apply:
New York and New Hampshire.
The proposed 12 rule does not simply remove some troublesome roadblocks to 13 licensing two new plants.
It would essentially diminish the O
14 rights of( all state governments to determine how best to 15 protect its citizens from nuclear accidents to the point where 16 state government rights would be home almost irrelevant.
17 I think I do understand the frustration of the 18 Commission in dealing with these two cases.
It must be i
19 terribly frustrating.
It must be enormously frustrating for 20 the utilities involved.
But I believe the NRC must take a step 21 back from this issue.
If as it says in its justification for 22 the rule that billions of dollars are at stake, it should let 23 the states decide the economic consequences of those 24 investments.
To do otherwise undercuts adequate emergency 25 response, optimum protection of the public and the O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
264
()
1 relationship, I think the very fragile relationship between the 2
states and federal governments.
3 The fundamental reasons for vermont's objection to 4
the proposed rule change is it is our belief that the states 1
5 cannot have the responsibility for responding to reactor 6
accidents and have no authority over the adequacy of such a l
{
7 response.
l 8
The broad issue of public safety and state's rights 9
cannot be sacrificed simply for the narrow purpose of licensing 10 two new power plants, and that's all we are talking about here.
11 The rule change is based on the concept that 12 emergency planning is of only secondary importance, a concept 13 which would have been unthinkable after Three Mile Island, and 14 accepts the idea that an emergency plan is acceptable as long 15 as the utility does the best it can.
16 I am concerned that this attitudo may indicate the 17 direction that the Commission wishes to pursue regarding how it 18 plans in the future to deal with the states.
Regardless of gg 19 what may be the extent of federal preemption in nuclear 20 regulation, states cannot be treated this way in terms of these 21 basic fundamental rights.
Different states do have different 22 views, and like anything else, there are going to be different 23 views.
But in terms of how they want to deal with their energy 24 needs, in terms of how they ultimately want to plan, they have 25 to have certain rights, and those ri.ghts have to be respected
,n
'pl Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
265
()
1 by the federal government.
2 once those decisions are made, then the construction 3
and the operation and the responsibility for that construction 4
and operation results and remains with the NRC.
5 We must all recognize that we do have the ultimate 1
6 responsibility, the states, in ensuring that our citizens are l
.i 7
provided for in a safe manner.
8 Thank you very much.
9 (Applause,)
10 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you, Jerry.
i 11 And now a.very young person, Richard Strome, native 12 of New Hampshire; graduate of the University of New Hampshire 13 with a Bachelor of Science Degree, cum _ laude.
Majored in l
14 biological sciences and chemistry.
Did in fact retire in 1977 15 after 24 years.of active duty in the United States Air Force.
16 And after retirement, he was a senior assistant to the New 17 Hampshire Senate President as a science advisor, and is 18 currently the Director of the Governors Office of Emergency 19 Management and the Governor of the Executive Council since 20 January of '83.
21 Richard.
22 MR. STROME:
First of all, Carleton, let me thank you
{
23 for inviting me to participate in this forum.
It's really an l
l 24 honor.
This is the second one I have been to.
They are l
25 fruitful, and obviously I gain a great deal of information from O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
q a
266
()
I being here.
And on behalf of Governor Sununu, I would like to 2
take this opportunity to invito you to visit the Granite State, 3
perhaps the last state in the nation without a sales or income 4
tax, and when you come, bring money.
We can use it.
5 (Laughter.)
6 I don't intend to tilt with Mr. Tarrant from Vermont 7
over the safety issue.
Obviously, the State of New Hampshire 8
supports the proposed rule change.
We don't like other states 9
telling us what we have to do, and that's exactly what's 10 occurring at the present time, people who are ducking behind an 11 issue for either personal or political gain or for 12 philosophical reasons that perhaps are not the same as ours.
13 But I am here today to give you an outline of:New O
14 Hampshire's perspective of the licensing process for nuclear 15 power plants.
For New Hampshire, that does mean the Seabrook I
16 Nuclear Power Plant that has been completed for more than a 17 year after being in the construction stage for well over a 18 decade.
19 Do you recall what you were doing in February 1972?
20 I was still on active duty in the Air Force, and would be for 21 another five years.
I mention that because it was in February 22 of 1972 that Public Service Company of New Hampshire applied to 23 the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission for permission to 24 build two nuclear reactors in Seabrook, a small town on New 25 Hampshire's sea coast, to generate electricity.
)
i Heritage Reporting Corporation I
(202) 628-4888
a 1
267 rs
(._) -
1 A little more than a year later, in March 1973, I
2 Public Service Company applied to the Federal Atomic Energy 3
Commission to' build both reactors.
The estimated overall cost 4
of the Seabrook station project was less than $1 billion, and S
the projected completion dates were 1979 for the first reactor, 6
and 1981 for the second.
7 Let's go back in time a little bit to put Seabrook in 8
perspective.
One of New Hampshire's more knowledgeable veteran j
l 9
newspaper reporters related this story to me recently.
10 He said he received a call from his newspaper's i
11 publisher with a request to join him and a couple of lawyers j
12 for lunch.
He should have avoided that.
13 (Laugher.)
('T
'/
14 The lawyers proceeded to tell the newsmen that a 15 client of theirs was planning to build a nuclear power plant 16 somewhere on the coast of New Hampshire.
The reporter told me 17 that since he had absolutely no knowledge of nuclear energy l
18 production, that he didn't know enough to ask an intelligent 19 question.
20 He did eventually ask a question more to cover his l
21 back side, and I know that reporter, he's not too intelligent, 22 from his boss than anything else.
He asked, "Do you expect any 23 opposition to this project?"
24 The lawyers answered simply, " Absolutely none,
{
i 25 absolutely no opposition."
i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
a
__m______
l
L
!p 268 ss
(_)
1 That-is how the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station l-2 started again.
Oh, how things change with time.
3 In the intervening four years, two important events 4
took place.
In March 1976, Governor Meldrim Thompson and the 5
executive council endorsed the construction of the two 6
reactors.
In June, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 7
approved the construction.
And in July, actual construction 8
began.
In May of the next year, the first of many 9
demonstrations against the plant took place.
At that time 10 1,414 protesters were arrested at the Seabrook construction 11 site, and I'm very pleased to find out where they went, Greta.
12 (Laughter.)
13 In March 1978, a majority of voters at more than two O
14 dozen New Hampshire town meetings voted to oppose paying what 15 became known as Seabrook's construction works in progress 16 charges.
March 1979 was a benchmark for the increasingly 17 beleaguer New Hampshire utility.
The accident at Three Mile 18 Island in March 1979 brought emergency plann'in o the 19 forefront.
The President's Commission on the Accident 20 concluded that largely because of off-site emergency planning 21 had been a low priority with federal regulators, state and 22 local officials were poorly prepared to carry out the response 23 that might have been required.
24 Two months later, in May 1979, Governor Hugh Gallen, 25 God rest his sole, signed the anti-equip law passed by the
-)
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
__________-____D
269
()
i legislature which prohibits the billing of customers for-l l
2 Seabrook construct costs until the project is completed.
As 3
many of you may be aware, the utility has within the past 4
several weeks asked the New Hampshire Supreme Court to-rule the 5
anti-equip law invalid because the plant is now completed and 6
has been for more than a year.
7 Federally-mandated construction redesign costs, the 8
anti-equip law, legal challenges from opponents to nuclear 9
power and the accident at TMI all added to the increased 10 financial burden of the utility.
11 Between February 1972 and May 1979, the distinction 12 between a state-regulated monopoly utility and a free 13 enterprise business became lost.
The utility was forced to G
2 14 make repeated trips to the lending institutions to get enough 1
1 15 money to continue construction of a project where the rules 16 changed with relentless speed.
17 In November 1979, the Public Service Company of New 18 Hampshire raised Seabrook's estimated cost to $3.3 billion.
19 The first reactor was rated 20 percent complete instead of it's 20 forecast completion date.
21 In June of 1980, the New Hampshire Public Utilities
)
22 Commission ordered a delay in the second reactor construction.
23 During the years 1981 and 1982, enabling legislation 1
1 24 was passed and signed into low by the prier administration that 25 dealt specifically with tixed nuclear sites.
Let's take a Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 t
i
270
("/
(_
1 brief look at that enabling statute.
2 The operative paragraph, I'll quote.
"The Civil 3
Defense Agency," we were known as the Civil Defense Agency at 4
the time, "shall in, cooperation with affected units of local 5
government initiate and carry out a nuclear emergency response 6
plan as specified in the licensing regulations of each nuclear 7
electrical generating plant."
8 I think that statutory mandate is both directed and 9
clear.
It certainly provides the direct thrust of what is 1
10 being done by the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management 11 with respect to planning for incidents at fixed nuclear sites, 12 including Vermont Yankee, which impacts directly on five towns 13 within the emergency planning zone that exists in New
\\
14 llampshire.
15 So we are not new to this business.
Seabrook does 16 not make us new to this business.
We have had sophisticated 17 documents in place for a number of years that have been 10 exercised and evaluated by federal authorities for Vermont 19 Yankee.
Also, Yankee Rowe in Massachusetts.
20 We do in fact cooperation with the State of Vermont j
21 and with the State of Massachusetts for all kinds of I
22 technological hazards and for all kinds of natural hazards.
23 As we move into 1983, we see the completion of the 1
24 first set of planning document-drafts by Costello Lomasney de l
25 Napoli, a consulting firm hired by the prior administration, l
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4000 t
271
()
1 and these documents.obviously have been through many iterations 2
'since then.
l 3
Currently, our New Hampshire Radiological Emergency l
4 Response Plan, which includes Vermont Yankee planning, consists 5
of over 30 volumes and contains some 6,000 pages.
Isn't that a 6
lawyer's paradise?
7 In addition to the first cut planning documents and 8
as a result of statutory direction, a site-specific i
9 probabilistic risk assessment was accomplished for Seabrook 10 station by Pickett, Low & Garrick, a very well known 11 engineering firm.
This completed analysis was submitted to a 12 bipartisan committee of legislators, local officials and 13 experts in various professional disciplines when it was O
14 completed.
I sat on that statutory committee, incidently.
15 The results of the study were unanimous 13 accepted by 16 the statutorily constituted committee, and that PRA, which was 17 one of the first done for a fixed nuclear site and one of the 18 most comprehensive, incidently, is the background -- provides 19 us with the background and technical data with respect to 20 planning that were done, j
21 In 1984, this year was characterized by the shakeout 22 within the regulatory judicial systems of the financial status 23 of the various utilities involved.
This impacted directly on 24 our planning insofar as I was hesitant to levy resource 25 requests against the company involved in litigation to acquire O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
I
l 3
272 (o
1 funding for the overall project.
As that litigatory process l
s 2
moved and funding became available, we put together an 3
assessment package.
4 First off, we put together material and personnel 5
resource lists both at state and local levels with the thought 6
in mind that costs incurred sound be borne by the applicant for 7
the license.
Then for the first time we put in place a 8
technological hazards division within the agency whose prime 9
function was to accomplish planning for fixed nuclear sites.
10 Up until that time, there were no planners 11 specifically designated or funded to accomplish this planning 12 on a full-time basis.
This new division is funded by monies 13 provided through assessments against the utilities.
14 Last but not least, the agency moved into a building 15 large enough to provide space for an emergency operation center 16
-- the state didn't have one prior to that time -- and the 17 associated redundant communications systems necessary to manage 18 a large scale emergency.
It's been used a number of times 19 subsequent to that time, and obviously is an asset to state 20 government and provide for the protection of the citizens of 21 our state.
22 It was truly a major milestone in the history of the 23 agency having lived for many years in two small rooms carved 24 out of a converted garage.
25 The bulk of construction was accomplished in 1985.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i
()
1 And as I pointed out, the EOC is now fully operational and 2
self-contained though still being modified.
Probably will be 3
as long as I'm around anyway.
j 4
We initiated a training program for state and local 5
responders which is still being actively implemented in;this 6
preparatory phase.
It will require, obviously, some regular 7
recurring training to maintain proficiency levels once an 8
operating license is granted.
9 Incidently, some 2,000 individuals have received 10 various forms and types of training to date specifically for l
11 contingencies at Seabrook station.
12 One of the most emotional issues associated with this 13 whole planning process is that of the evacuation time 0
14 estimates, and several have been done for Seabrook Station.
15 The latest by KLD Associates, one of the foremost graphic 16 engineering consulting firms in the country.
What is of prime 17 interest is that no significant differences exist in all the 18 studies with respect to the time required to move people out of 19 the emergency planning zone.
20 Incidently, we have looked at evaluation times under 1
21 a number of scenarios from winter snowstorms to summer 22 weekends, not just under ideal conditions.
23 Public hearings were held in the town of Exeter 24 within the emergency planning zone, and 21 of 23 affected 25 communities appeared at the hearing to make their planning O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
274
()
1 requirements known.
The bulk of the equipment requested, after 2
review, has been acquired and installed up to and including the l
3 construction of an emergency operations center for the town of 4
East Kingston.
The utility funded that.
5 1986 was a busy year.
On 26 of February, we-held a 6
graded exercise which was very successful from the state's 7
point of view.
FEMA was somewhat less sanguine
<g its view and 8
we feel that they measured us with a very closely calibrated 9
yardstick.
10 We have been working very hard subsequently to put 11 the fixes in places that FEMA suggested.
Revision 1 of the 12 plan was a major undertaking.
It incorporated as much as 13 possible the RAC comments, and exercise comments received by 0
14 the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management as well as the 15 editorial changes and revisions requested by local communities.
16 That was submitted in June of 1986, and in a 17 subsequent meeting held with FEMA and federal RAC members we 18 agreed to submit formal Revision 2 by the 25th of August of
)
19 1986.
This in fact is the -- are the planning documents that j
20 are currently before the Atomic Safety Licensing Board and for 21 which litigation will begin on the 28th of this month in the EndT4 22 House of Representatives at the State House in Concord.
23 A 400 member body, 400 seats right out there, and then there 24 are 200 up in the balcony.
It ought to be an interesting 25 administrative law proceeding.
(}
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 w_-____________
275
()
1 Now I have talked a lot about Seabrook's specific 2
kinds of problems.
But for those of you who are dealing with 3
emergency management, if you have reservations or concerns 4
about dealing with Seabrook Station or fixed nuclear sites, 5
then wait until you see Title 3 of the superfund amendment.
6 Because the requirements are even stricter.
The requirements 7
that are going to let to the state are even more difficult and 8
they are even more difficult for the local community.
9 So if you cannot get your act together with emergency 10 management for a fixed nuclear site, then you better get going, 11 because you have got a lot of work to do to protect the 12 citizens of this country.
That is the real problem for you, 13 hazardous material response.
\\#
14 Talking to any local fireman, and ask him what he is 15 concerned about, any local first respondent.
Ask them what 16 they are concerned about.
There is your problem.
Think about 17 it.
18 I do have a few gripes and complaints.
One is not my 19 job, because it has been a challenge for me and I have enjoyed 20 every single minute of it.
We know that we have increased the 21 level of competency of emergency response in the State of New 22 Hampshire.
As far as I am concerned, we are the best in New 23 England, and probably among one of the best in the country, and l
l 24 we are getting better all of the time l
l
\\
25 We have the most competent state and local team of Heritage Reporting Corporation j
(202) 628-4888 l
1
._____ - _-____ L
276
()
1 anybody that I have'ever observed, that includes the feds.
We 2
are better in most cases than the feds.
You feds tnink about 3
that.
4 I notice some problems with the federal role.
They 5
have a two-pronged role, oversight and assistance.
Now they 6
are long in the tooth in oversight, but.they are sort'of har'd 7
to' find when you are looking for assistance.
You might think 8
about that.
9 I have been through a number of evaluations and 10 exercises to this point, and the feds have a real problem with 11 standardization and evaluation procedures.
They do not have 12 people who have a great deal of experience in standardization 13 and evaluation.
They really need to seriously address that O
14 problem.
15 Their RAC review process has been termed collegial.
16 I am not sure that I know what that means.
I think that it 17 means that it is an exclusive club.
We have a very difficult 18 time getting the RAC together.
They want to do everything off 19 in the corner and issue pronouncements.
That is not the most 20 efficient way to work that process.
We are directly involved 21 in what the RAC has to say and do, why not invite us to 22 participate.
23 There are differing standards in the process, and I 24 am addressing this essentially to FEMA.
There are differing 25 standards amongst the various regions.
And certainly within O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 277
'( )
1 the' regions, there are differing standards for the various 2
locations.
That is that old yardstick again that is calibrated 3
differently for the various plants.
4 Now the spin-off from that is that we are better than 5
anybody else.
We are held to a-higher standard.
I' enjoy 6
reading the guidance memoranda'that issued from on high'by 7
FEMA.
They certainly do not follow their own guidance 8
memoranda.
They certainly do not consult with the local 9
authorities or the states on the provisions that are outlined.
10 They might think about doing that sometime in the future, too.
11 Information dissemination.
I have no idea what takes 12 place at Maine Yankee when an evaluation has taken place.
Why 13 not, why do I not know what is taking place generally O
14 throughout the industry when a site is evaluated.
That is not 15 a new idea.
For 24 years while I was in the Air Force, the 16 Inspector General would come around on a regular basis to all 17 of the various bases and inspect you and put you through an 18 operational readiness inspection, and the results of that were 19 promulgated and provided throughout the whole Air Force system.
20 So that we knew the areas that they were focusing on, so that 21 we could clean our own house.
22 Is it a secret what is taking place during an 23 evaluation at Maine Yankee, do I have to go and seek that out.
24 No.
You should be providing that information to everybody who 25 has an interest in that process of protecting the lives and O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
278
()
1 safety of the citizens of this country.
2 Sometimes I feel a little bit like I am between 3
Scylla and Charibdys of FEMA and NRC.
Not there are some 4
obvious turf problems here at the national level.
And they 5
seem to filter down in various forms to the states.
And I 6
never know what the turf problems are up here at this high 1
7 level, but they certainly affect the levels of responsibility l
8 that the federal authorities are willing to assume.
This is an 9
area where you need to do some housecleaning.
I 10 I got a fax of a message yesterday that pretty much 11 indicates to me that both FEMA and NRC cannot decide what or 12 how to handle a utility submitted emergency response plan.
I 13 There is no clear guidance there.
That should be provided to
,O)
N/
14 the states.
Because that utility submitted emergency response
)
l 15 certainly impacts on the states.
16 Politics, let's talk about politics for a minute.
If 17 any of you are missing a significant local figure, you might l
1 18 start looking for him in New Hampshire.
Because he is probably 19 running for president, and I probably had the opportunity to 1
20 shake his hand.
21 Obviously, politics plays a large role, and this is a 22 trendy subject for politicians.
You do not hear so much about i
23 acid rain any more.
That is sort of dying.
But you are 24 starting to hear a lot about nuclear power from the moro 25 aspiring politicians.
l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
279 I) 1 Other states are having some problems.
I talked to 2
Dave Brown from Maine yesterday.
He has a referendum coming up 3
the latter part of this year, and the referendum question goes 4
like this.
"Do you want to let any power plant like Maine 5
Yankee operate after July 4, 1988," that is a wonderful'date, 6
"if it makes high level nuclear wast'e?"
You can all look 7
forward to that.
I am sure that if it passes in Maine, that 8
you are all going to see it.
)
9 I think that with that that I have pretty much used 10 up my time.
I used more actually than I had intended, but Mr.
11 Tarrant I guess set me off.
At any rate, I would be remiss 12 though if I did not take just a second to tell you that we have 13 made as a result of the planning that is required tremendous O
14 strides in emeroency management in the State of New Hampshire.
15 I think that most states have made tremendous strides in 16 emergency management, because of the requirements outlined for l
17 fixed nuclear sites.
l l
18 I have had a lot of support, and I have to publicly l
19 thunk my Governor, Governor John Sununu, for his interest in 20 the process and his strong encouragement as we move through the 21
- process, 22 I really look forward to the question and answer 23 period.
I think that it will be a lot of fun.
Thank you very 24 much for your attention.
25 (Applause.)
l (O
%./
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
280
(
1 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you very much.
Let the record 2
show that I am neither a lawyer nor am I am running for 3
political office.
But this is just the kind of stuff that we 4
are looking for here.
5 JameF R.
Williams is the chief of staff of'the Ohio 6
Disaster Services Agency.
He also serves as director of the 7
radiological response team and has taught public health and i
8 radiation safety and numerous separate teaching positions for 9
health physics and nuclear science.
James, would you take the 10 podium, please.
11 MR. WILLIAMS:
Thanks, Carl, and I will try and be 12 brief.
But I need to say some things, because I do not dare to 13 go back to Ohio and look at the Governor without doing it.
O 14 I need to talk today about two particular aspects of 15 emergency planning.
The first addresses the fixed nuclear 16 facilities that we know as nuclear power plants.
And to do 17 that, I need to set just a little bit of background for some of 18 our power plants who have a little more notoriety than others.
19 And I would like to begin with the Davis-Besse plant.
It has 20 been operating since 1977 with a younger sister of TMI II and 21 with a certain design flaw on the auxiliary feed water that was 22 a point of contention between NRC and the utility which allowed 23 the plant to operate without being fully prepared for the 24 asixiliary feed water program, which eventually caused the plant 25 to have a very, very brief site area emergency incident in 1985 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
281
()
1 in the early summer.
2 The other plant that has just received its license 3
and a point of contention is the Perry nuclear power plant 4
which in the pre-licensing process was subjected to a 5.2 1
5 earthquake nine miles from the plant which we normally reserve j
6 for California, but somehow or another got transferred to Ohio.
7 And this plant has also been brought under a lot of 8
criticism for the GE design process that we are all familiar 9
with from recent publication.
10 So with those two plants having some problems, the
'L__
11 much proclaimed and I think acknowledged management programs 12 and management faults at Toledo Edison and Davis-Desse were 13 being corrected, I think much to the pleasure of the State of O
14 Ohio and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
And Davis-Besse 15 regained control over its management structure and became 16 aligned with the hardware requirements of NRC, it was apparent 17 that the plant was going to be permitted to restart in late 18 1986.
And simultaneously, the Perry nuclear power plant was 19 complete and would soon be receiving its operating license late 20 in 1986.
21 With certain anti-nuclear groups and concerned 22 citizens groups in the state peaking their activity, the state 23 reached its sensitivity point that was generally established by 24 the administration.
And as all states have different 25 personalities and those personalities can change when Governors O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i i
282 l
()
1 and administrations change, that also happened in the State of 2
Ohio.
And the current Governor has a very justifiable well j
l 3
respected lower sensitivity threshold for all nuclear issues, 4
not just nuclear power plants, but for all issues involving 5
nuclear material.
I 6
And I think that once we saw the Governor, his staff, j
i 7
and cabinet and the attorney general with that lowered 8
threshold and when we say that the threshold met midway in 9
1986, we saw the action on the part of the state to halt the 10 restart of Davis-Besse and to try to prevent the operating 11 license issue for Perry.
12 Once Governor Celeste announced his intentions and 13 established what we called an emergency evacuation review team,
{
l's i
14 and I will refer to this from now on as EERT, to address the 15 one aspect over which the state has prime responsibility that 16 has been acknowledged this morning as that of public safety and 17 emergency planning, and with rhe NRC firmly in control of its 18 particular responsibilities of on site licensee actions, the 19 state undertook a challenge to this control through the 20 established legal processes available to us in federal 21 rule.
22 On August 15th, the Governor in a letter to Chairman 23 Zech announced that he was withdrawing the support of the 24 established emergency plans that were in the process, in the 25 350 process, for approval.
And these plans had been developed O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
.j L
l 283
.( )
1 in the early 1980s.
They were tested, exercised, found not~to l
2 be lacking, and were generally approved as good competent l-3 plans.
4 And with this withdrawing of his support, he q
5 announced that he would like to see the NRC withhold restart 6
permission for Davis-Besse and the license for the Perry plant 7
~ until the EERT had completed its task of reviewing the 8
emergency planning functions and made-further recommendations 9
toward what we felt in Ohio would be improvements in emergency 10 planning, that part over which the state has control having L
11 already given the fact that the selection of the power process 12 to nuclear power had been granted, and the plants were 13 built.
O 14 In the emergency EERT process, a three person group 15 and staff of competent technical people, and I suppose that has 16 been brought to conjecture at points depending on who you talk 17 to, the competent staff conducted interviews with local 18 government, with citizens groups, with the Federal Emergency 19 Management agency, with the NRC, and state agencies.
20 The group made on site visits to the plants.
The 21 group made a presentation to the assembled commission downtown 22 in Washington, D.C.
The chairman of the emergency evacuation 23 review team made presentations.
The chairman of the public 24 utilities commission of Ohio made presentations.
And the 25 Governor came to speak to the commission.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
284 1
The report of the review team was prepared and 2
presented in January of 1987, and it addressed two areas, one 3
aret of practical solutions and one area of philosophical 4
recommendations.
There were thirteen practical points.
Not to 5
belabor it, I want to go through them quickly just to show 6
you.
)
7 Where we had approved working plans, but the review 4
8 team based on further investigation found that in the area of 9
handicapped, sick, and elderly that we needed further 10 provisions for identifying and evacuating specially vulnerable 11 populations, and special lists of those people who were coming 12 seemingly out of the woodwork after the plans has been approved 13 denying that they had been contacted before and requiring new i
Os I
14 efforts.
l 15 A recommendation for a radiation monitoring system be l
16 provided, so that the state could have independent information 1
17 on radiation releases in the area of the plant without total 18 dependence on the plant for information and relying on the 19 plant to provide that.
The fact that the utilities should bear 20 the cost of implementing any improvements made in the emergency 21 plans after having been once approved.
22 Another recommendation was because the state was i
23 planning to use bus drivers of school buses that those bus l
24 drivers should be required to sign a written agreement to 25 participate in the evacuation.
Because the citizens groups and O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
l o
285
()
1 the groupc that were presenting an anti-preparedness posture 2
had convinced the school bus drivers that their lives were in 3
jeopardy and that they had a lot to lose by participating.
And
(
4 that appropriate training and protective equipment should be 1
5 agreed upon by the utility to train those people, and that the I
6 training should be updated.
And if public school bus drivers 7
were not to be used, then the utilities should propore j
l 8
alternatives on how we were going to provide for mass 9
transportation.
10 A recommendation for a direct computer link.
And I 11 am happy to hear the data link system being implemented by NRC.
12 The state's recommendation was that a direct computer link 13 should be created between the state and the nuclear facilities
^\\J 14 control rooms to provide the state with direct information 15 about reactor conditions, and that this would be monitored on a 16 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis in two existing state agencies with new 17 capabilities.
And included in that monitoring computer link 18 would be thresholds of various accident sequences which would 19 trigger a specific emergency response.
20 This review team also said that the plans should be 21 completed in full, ingestion planning, recovery and reentry 22 which we have all been glossing over for years, and 23 decontamination and waste disposal needed to be completed 24 before the plants should be permitted to operate.
25 It also must take into consideration the impact of O
Heritage Reporting Corporation l
(202) 628-4888 l
l
\\.
286
()
1-accidents on counties well beyond what-we knew as the ten mile 2
or inhalation EPZ.
That hospitals, that the state should make 3
on site revicws of all of the hospitals to determine the 4
greater capability to treat victims of radiation.
And that the 5
states should conduct an independent test of warning' sirens 6
separate and a part from that done by FEMA.
7 The state should conduct a campaign to improve the 8
public's understanding of the emergency response plan, because 9
it was the feeling of this review team that even though the 10 local minority was being heard that the silent' majority did not 11 know enough about emergency planning either.
12 Radioprotective drugs were covered, in that the state 13 should provide those drugs to off site emergency workers.
And O'
14
.that the state should be the primary point of contact, and 15 responsibility should rest with the state for making emergency 16 response decisions and not local government.
And this is a 17 very,-very contentious point.
That the public utilities
]
I 18 commission should monitor the entire program.
19 Those were the practical solutions.
The 20 philosophical points were that the NRC should develop criteria 21 for site specific EPZs.
That a national blue ribbon commission 22 be established to investigate the potential for severe reactor 23 accidents involving sudden and large releases rather than the 24 smaller normally exercise scenario releases that we have been 25 dealing with for the past seven years.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
287
()
1 That the Price-Anderson Act should be readdressed, 2
and that the state should be given a right in the licensing of J
3 plants, because Governors are specifically charged with the
)
4 responsibility for protecting public health and safety. ' And we j
i 5
recommended that the states have expanded legal rights to 6
become involved in the licensing process.
And when the I
7 Governor came down to talk to the NRC about it, he was not well 8
received in that regard.
9 The licensing issues then were taken to the Sixth 10 District Federal Court in Cincinnati.
And of course, the state 11 lost on every issue.
The Governor appeared again before the 12 NRC to appeal to the Chairman not to do the licensing process 13 even though the state had lost in the federal court system.
14 And the state finally filed for intervention, and we had not 15 done that since 1977.
16 We implemented in Ohio the recommendations of the 17 EERT.
We negotiated with governments and utilities through
{
18 February, March, April, and May.
We met with the commission,
{
19 the county, union groups, handicapped citizens, utilities, 20 hospitals.
And just yesterday morning, we signed off on a 21 number of those implementation recommendations, whereby the 22 utilities have agreed to participate as a full partner with the 23 state and local governments in implementing those 24 recormnenda tions.
25 MR. WILLIAMS:
The time period towards the latter O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
288
'( )
1 part of August and the Governor then issued another, if you J
2 will to use the term, ultimatum, that by September 30th, the 3
recommendations of this Review Team had to be fully implemented 4
or he would, again, petition under 2.02 to do further action as 5
the state would be permitted under the Rule to seek closure of 6
the plants.
1 7
Now, meanwhile, while this was going on, we had l
1 I
8 successfully completed drills at Davis-Besse, Perry and Beaver 9
Valley.
And we have had a 350 approval of the State of Ohio l
10 Plan and Beaver Valley through FEMA.
11 The 350 process for Davis-Besse has been started.
1 12 And simultaneously the NRC proposed to change the Emergency 1
13 Planning Rule.
There is such a dichotomy here, on the entire
(:)
14 process, as has been outlined by some of our colleagues from 15 the other states, that I am hopeful that you can see the 16 complexity of just getting emergency plans developed and 17 approved under the current rule.
18 We had an emergency plan and we have thoroughly 19 examined that emergency plan by a qualified group and we found j
20 it to be lacking and we changed it.
i 21 Imagine, if we could license a nuclear power plant 22 without an emergency plan, the NRC's role for public health and 23 safety notwithstanding, mandated by Federal law.
Somehow we 24 have got to change this mix that we have between NRC, FEMI,and 25 the states, to bring some more detailed full-partnership roles O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4088 i
i
289
)
I to play in there, without having a structured system that 2
begins with the Federal level and rolls downward to the states, 3
and the states, as Dick Strom said, having to read and j
4 interpret the guidance, not being in on the ground floor, to I
5 develop a system.
]
l 6
And the MOU that the NRC has with FEMA is a good i
7 start.
But I think that it further has to develop the states 8
in that MOU.
9 Bill Dornsike yesterday talked about credibility when i
10 he said that the states has greater credibility than the NRC l
11 has with some of the public groups.
We have learned a tough 12 lesson and we are saying that the state does not have as much 13 credibility as we thought with the local groups, particularly O
14 after our process in the EERT, Review System.
15 So, we, also have to build a credibility and so, 16 therefore, we need to be full partners and improve that jointly 17 with NRC, FEMA and the state.
18 There is another aspect of emergency planning that 19 impacts on all of this in Ohio.
In Ohio we have got a fuel 20 cycle installation that is giving us problems, and we have an 21 enrichment facility that enriches both power plant fuel and 22 weapons-grade material.
23 And we have a research facility that does research on 24 spent fuel and this spent fuel assemblies and the " irradiated" 25 fuel assemblies are shipped in there, and shipped out and it O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 t
290
/~T s_/
1 does a considerable amount of research.
2 It was mentioned yesterday that DOC has a notorious 1
3 record at its plants.
We have three of those and DOE does have 4
a notorious record, and with the feed production materials i
5 facility at Fernald, it releases radioactive materials monthly.
6 We have more problems with the DOE and the fuel cycle 7
facilities than we have ever had before, than we would expect 8
to have at a nuclear power plant. And we find that thc NRC's 9
rulemaking process just recently does not require the standard 10 that we have to uphold for nuclear power plants.
11 And we are not so sure that by simply permitting a 12 local emergency plan, not requiring the structured plan that we 13 do for nuclear power plants, but just permitting those local 14 plans to be made at the local level, is the proper way to go.
15 Because at the state level, our sensitivity to those 16 issues is very great.
And I think that it is good that we have 17 changed our sensitivity.
It has caused us a new look at 18 emergency planning; a comprehensive look at emergency planning, 19 and I think that we all jointly -- states, NRC, and FEMA --
20 need to deal more closely with this and not relax the 21 requirements, but indeed, hold the standards tough.
22 Thank you.
23 (Applause.)
24 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you, very much, Mr. Williams.
25 The last speaker on the panel this morning, is Bill Parler, and i
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 t
291
()
1 he is the General Counsel for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2
and graduated from the Naval Academy many moons ago and also 3
from the University of South Carolina and Harvard in law 4
degrees.
5 He worked on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and 6
he is a former Group Leader for the NRC Special Inquiry on 7
Three Mile Island.
He is a guy who takes on tough jobs, and a 8
man for whom I have enormous respect, the General Counsel, Bill 9
Parler.
10 MR. PARLER:
Thank you, very much, Mr. Kammerer.
I 11 am very pleased to be here with this group.
The time for this 12 presentation has expired, but I requested an extension of time, 13 to at least briefly make some comments.
Ok#
14 The proposed Emergency Planning Rule has been the 15 subject of much discussion.
Indeed, there was a Commission 16 meeting in February in which Governors, Senators, and others 17 were there.
There is a transcript of that meeting available.
18 That is something that is unique in the area of proposed rules.
19 So that there is -- time will not permit a detailed explanation 20 or response to some of the things that I heard here, this l
21 morning, and also have heard many times before about the
)
22 objectives of the proposed rule -- what would happen, etc.
23 And if all of those things were true, since I 24 initiated the proposed rule, for reasons which I will tell you 25 later, I would, I think, hang my head in shame and leave, after O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
292
()
1 apologizing to everybody.
2 There are some things that are fundamental in this 3
area, or in any other area that this Agency deals with.
This 4
Agency only has the authority that the Congress has given us.
5 The basic authority is in the Atomic Energy Act, and 6
in the Energy Reorganization Act, of 1974.
And we also have 7
environmental responsibilities.
8 And the notion that this Agency, even if it wanted 9
to, could usurp states' rights, states' police powers, is just 10 nonsense.
11 If anybody had that idea and wanted to lessen the 12 role of the states, I doubt very seriously if we would have had 13 the successful agreement state program that we have.
We would 14 have the 1959 amendment, would have had provisions in other
- 1. 5 major pieces of legislation since that time.
16 Thc Cupreme Court of the United States in the Pacific 17 Gas and Electric Company decision has spoken on all of these 18 matters.
If time had permitted, I had some choice quotes here, 19 to give you, but I will just give you one.
20 There is little doubt that under the Atomic Energy 21 Act of 1954, state public utility commissions or similar bodies 22 are empowered to make initial decisions regarding the need for 23 power.
Thus, Congress legislated in a field which the states 24 have traditionally occupied.
25 So, we start with the assumption that the historic O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
293 1
police powers of the states were not to be superceded by the 2
Federal Act, unless that was a clear and manifest purpose of 3
the Congress.
I am unaware of any such clear and manifest 4
purpose of the Congress, therefore, debating that issue in 5
connection with the proposed rule, or any other matter is just 6
a waste of time.
That is not a matter that is at issue.
7 The, again, the importance of the state role, the 8
need for cooperation, the need for communication, the need for S
9 working together to accomplish the common objectives, that 10 Chairman Zech and perhaps others -- I was not here all of 11 yesterday -- mentioned.
That is not at issue.
You take that 12 as a given.
13 Well, what is the proposed Emergency Planning Rule O
14 all about?
Why last year, did I decide that it was a good idea 15 to ' propose such a rule, at least to be the focal point of 16 debate and public comment?
17 And it certainly has accomplished that objective, if 18 it accomplishes nothing else and I can guarantee you that.
19 The reason for doing this was because of a court 20 decision, perhaps the one that Jim Williams mentioned in the 21 Sixth Circuit.
The Commission has a procedure, under which 22 they have to meet and decide whether or not to authorize equal 23 power licensing of nuclear power plants.
24 The Perry Plant was such a plant last year. And 1o 25 and behold, our solicitor was contacted by the Clerk's Office O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
294
()
1 of that Circuit with a communication which was kind of 2
ambiguous as to whether the Commission could even meet, but it 3
was not ambiguous that if they at, they'certainly could not 4
vote until they got further guidance.
5 Now, there is nothing wrong with that as far as I am 6
concerned, because the Courts occupy a very important role 7
under the Atomic Energy Act.
It is a very important part of 8
the checks and balances system that we have -- one of the many.
9 And well that left me with the impression that since 10 the Emergency Planning Rule that we have is perhaps the source 11 of the belief that if a state or a local government decides 12 after a nuclear power plant has been constructed, when it is 13 near readiness for operation -- and let us assume for the Gk#
14 purposes of this discussion, that there are no other 15 problems -- that by withdrawing that action could 16 automatically freeze a situation so that the Agency was 17 powerless to vote on the full power license, or to issue the 18 full power license.
19 That certainly was something that I don't believe was 20 intended by the existing rule, and certainly, the 1980 21 legislation that the Congress enacted appeared not to 22 contemplate that.
23 And that is the reason why the rule was initiated, l
24 not to run rough shod over state rights; not to ensure that two 25 very controversial plants were licensed.
l Heritage Reporting Corpora!
sn (202) 628-4888
295 O
\\_/
1 Because although on the one hand, there should not 2
be an automatic stopping of activities, if there is a 3
withdrawal -- on the other hand, if there is a withdrawal and 4
there is a utility plan that is substituted, that it, by no 5
means, follows from that, that either automatically or 6
eventually an operating license will be issued.
7 Because it is also fundamental that under the Atomic 8
Energy Act, the Commission has to make a reasonable assurance 9
of safety finding, before they can do that.
10 It has to do that under the existing statute, and 11 under the existing rule and it would have to do that under the 12 proposed rule.
13 The problem that the proposed rule sought to clarify i-)'
14 was to reflect more clearly, the two approach system that the 15 Congress in 1980 enacted into law.
The preferred approach is 16 the approach when there is state and local cooperation in the 17 planning and in the exercises and there is a FEMA review and 18 comments.
19 The other approach, however, which was recognized and 20 it certainly is not the preferred approach -- it is the 21 emergency type of approach, you know, when all else fails, what 22 do you do -- is that it provided for a utility plan, in the 23 event that there was not state and local cooperation.
)
24 Under that approach there is nothing that is said 25 about FEMA participation or FEMA review.
(~)
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
296 0
1 rer whetever reeeon, the 1980 resu1ee1en did not l
2
-clearly set forth those two approaches.
Again, the preferred J
l 3
approach certainly is state and local participation in the-
)
4 planning and the exercises. There should be no doubt about 5
that.
Fortunately, the participation has been outstanding,
]
6 just about in every case.
That does not imply any criticism on 7
my part, for those who have chosen to do whatever they have 8
done for, I am sure,. reasons that are sound from their j
9 standpoint.
10 However, I think that we can all agree, that for the k
11 future, that one of the recommendations of a task force, recent 12 task force of the National Governors' Association, that for new 1
13 applications these matters should be straightened out and 14 agreed to, before the plant is constructed.
15 And if at that time, for a variety of reasons, such 16 as Mr. Tarrant mentioned, a state does not want one of these
{
17 plants, it would seem to me that that would be the appropriate 18 time to take a position, whether it is because of emergency 19 planning or some other reason.
t 20 The present status of the rule, the proposed rule, is 21 that the comment period, the 90-day comment period has expired.
22 And there are thousands of comments that have been received, 23 and those comments have been, and probably still are being i
24 reviewed and analyzed by our office of research under the 25 direction of Mr. Michael Jamgochlan, who has had long o
Heritage Reporting Corporation
{
(202) 628-4888 l
l 297
/"N
(_)
1 experience and involvement in the emergency planning area, as 2
well as in other areas of responsibility.
)
3 Sometime this year, perhaps by early Fall, the 4
analysis will have been completed and a paper will be sent to 5
the Commission.
The paper, as is typical for Commission papers 6
on matters such as this, will present options to the 7
Commission.
One option, of course, will be doing nothing.
8 And I would take that in view of the comments that 9
have been received from a variety of sources, that certainly if 10 the Commission would decide -- I emphasize "if" -- that the 11 rule that was proposed would probably be clarified in certain 12 respects.
13 For example, one of the speakers emphasized the 14 economic considerations and the relevance of a recent United 15 States Court of Appeals decision in connection with another 16 matter -- the other matter being the Commission's backfit rule 17 in that case -- recognized that costs were appropriate for i
18 consideration, when you are operating above the adequacy level.
19 The Court pointed to certain language in the 20 backfitting rule, which could have been subject to the 21 interpretation that costs could have also been considered in 22 setting the adequate level.
In other words, a conscious 23 decision perhaps made to lower the safety standard so that J
24 there would be economic benefits provided to the industry or to f
25 some others.
1 Heritage Reporting Corporation
{
(202) 628-4888 4
298
()
1 That has never been legally permissible as far as the 2
legal office of this Agency or its predecessor, or the 3
positions that they have taken.
And recently, on September the 4
4th, a clarifying correction to the backfitting rule in that 5
regard, has been issued for comment.
6 So, sacrificing safety for economic considerations is 7
not a matter that need to be debated, because of what I just 8
said.
To the extent that the rule suggests that that can be 9
done, that is, the proposed Emergency Planning Rule, obylously J
l 10 it needs clarification.
I 11 I am told that if one would go by the numbers of the 12 proposed comments, that the proposed rule should be scrapped, 13 because as one should not be, I guess, very surprised, there O'
14 are people in certain parts of the country that believe that 15 the proposed rule would do all of the things that one of the l
16 speakers here, has described.
j 17 others support the rule.
If basic changes are going 1
l 18 to be made in the role of the states, giving the states more 19 authority in licensing decisions, etc.
That really is a 20 decision for the Congress to make.
Whatever those decisions 21 are, if statute is enacted, we try to do our best to interpret 22 them, and apply them.
Because that's what we iwve to live by.
23 That is precisely what we try to do here, for this 24 proposed emergency planning rule.
In 1980 the Congress spoke.
l 25 About the same time the Commission was issuing its Emergency Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 l
299
()
1 Planning Rule.
That Emergency Planning Rule had been'in the 2
works for a number of years, including a couple of years before J
l 3
the Three Mile Island accident.
l 1
4 At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, and 5
the studies that were made there after, there was considerable
)
I 6
pressure, I suppose, to get an emergency planning rule in 7
place.
l 8
For Whatever reason, the text of the rule was put in 9
place did not clearly state the two approaches that the 10 Congress of the United States said that this agency had.
11 Emphasizing again the first approach, state, local 12 participation, FEMA involvement.
Certainly the approach that 13 was hoped for the other utility pla'n if that became a 14 necessity.
15 There is very limited legislative history on this 16 particular provision, in the 1980 Authorization Act.
Because 17 the provision was a product of compromise in conference.
18 Here is what the conferees said, on page 27 of the 19 conference report.
If I may be permitted to read that, and 20 then I will conclude.
21 "The compromise provides that NRC is to issue an l
22 Operating License for a new utilization of facility, only if 1
23 the state and local plan.
As it applies to such facility, 24 complies with NRC's current guidelines for such plans or the 25 rules when promulgated.
Except that if the state or local plan O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
300
()
1 does not exist, it complies with the guidelines or rules, the 2
compromise provides that the NRC still issue an operating 3
license if it determines that a state, local or utility plan 4
provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety 5
is not endangered by operation of the facility.
6 The commissions regulations now require the 7
determination, prior to the issue in civil operating license, 8
that there is reasonable assurance that public health and 9
safety is not endangered by operation of facility.
10 And continuing, the Conferees sought to avoid 11 penalizing an applicant for an operating license, if a state or 12 locality does not submit an emergency response plan to the NRC 13 for review.
Or if they submit a plan, does not satisfy all the
'd 14 guidelines or rules.
15 In the absence of a state or local plan, if it 16 complies with the guidelines and rulea, the compromise permits 1
17 NRC to issue an operating license, if it determines that a
]
i 18 state or local or utility plan, such as the emergency 19 preparedness plan, submitted by the applicant provides 20 reasonable assurance that the public health and safety is not 21 in endangered by the operation of the facility."
22 That is the statutory language in the 1980 23 Authorization Act.
That the purposed rule seeks to clarify in 24 our existing rule.
That and nothing else.
Certainly not all 25 of these things that various folks, I'm sure, in good faith.
I OV Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 301
)
1 certainly respect their views.
But all I'm telling you-is that 2
as far as I'm concerned, these other objectives that have been 3
attributed to the purposed rule are not correct.
And again 1 4
think that the fact that there has been a public debate which 1
5 will continue only the matter is important, is worthwhile.
6 No matter what happens to the purposed rule, there is 7
still a problem of how the situation should be handled when 8
there is an unexpected withdrawal of state, local 9
participation.
In the emergency planning and preparedness-10 process, after a nuclear powerplant has been substantially 11 constructed, unless the sole purpose of this discussion, that 12 is otherwise ready to be licensed for full power operation.
13 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you, Bill Parler.
14 (Applause.)
15 What we're going to do here, I think we've achieved 16 out objective in the panel, in the views expressed here.
We 17 can debate maybe some of these issues for a very long time.
18; And that's not our purpose here.
We want to raise them and 19 bring that information to you.
20 So we'll allow two or three questions and then we'll 21 go to our break.
22 But before doing that, I want to recognize a couple 23, of people that are with us.
24 Joe Fouchard, Director of Public Affairs.
Joe would l
25 you let yourself be known.
He's here so you can jump on his O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L- _ --_----- -
302
()
I wagon.
2 Janice Dunn-Lea, from the Chairman's Office, back 3
with us here this morning.
And you stand so they can see you.
l I
4 Thank you very snuch.
l 5
And Margaret Federline from the Commissioner Carr's l
6 Office.
t 7
All right, let's then have two or three questions, l
l 8
and we'll get back on our schedule.
9 I think we'll just go ahead, and the federal field
{
l 10 exercise about which most of you have heard is a topic of our 11 next discussion.
12 In June of this year, the NRC participated in a 13 federal field exercise which depicted a scenario of a nuclear
(
14 emergency at the Zion Nuclear Power Plant in Illinois.
The 15 exercise was designed to test federal agency response to the 16 emergency. The extraordinary effort put forth by various 17 federal agencies, the affected states, the utility and local 18 communities was evident in the successful cooperation and 19 interaction within all of these groups.
20 I'll now introduce one of the key players in the 21 planning of the FFE as well as someone largely responsible for 22 its success.
We will also hear from Del Butterfield a little 23 bit later, a representative of Commonwealth Edison, the utility 1
24 which owns Zion, and Richard Braund, a key player from 25 Wisconsin, both of whom participated in the exercise. And that
()
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
)
i l
I
303
/'(j) 1 will comprise the introductions.
And if you would just rise at 2
the time when you are ready.
3 You're next, Ken.
4 MR. PERKINS:
Good morning, I want to discuss with 5
you this morning the preliminary findings from the federal 6
field exercise.
They are preliminary.
They are still coming 7
in and being evaluated.
As we go through it, I'm going to hit 8
the major items.
There are quite a list of items that fall in 9
the category of lessons learned.
I think many of those would 10 be real yawn material, so I won't go into those, but I will try 11 to hit the major ones with you.
12 First, I'd like to point out that I will attempt to 13 give you an overview with emphasis on the federal lessons
[~
14 learned.
Subsequently, Richard Braund from Wisconsin will give 15 you their state's perspective, and Del Butterfield will give 16 you the Commonwealth Edison Company's perspective.
17 There are other folks in the room who were also 18 involved in the exercise.
Aubrey Godwin was one of our 19 evaluators at the NRC operation center.
Charles Miller from 20 Illinois was also intimately involved in the exercise.
21 The exercise did involve two states, Wisconsin and 22 Illinois, Commonwealth Edison and 12 federal agencies.
There 23 were approximately 1,000 players, 200 nonplayers which boils j
24 down to controllers and evaluotors, and 175 visitors.
Of that 25 number, roughly half, 75 to half of that number were foreign
{
()
{
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
304
()
1 visitors.
There was a great deal of international interest in 2
the federal field exercise.
3 It extended over three days.
The scenario actually 4
was a 10-day time frame.
i 5
It should be pointed out that there,is a federal plan 6
for responding to radiological emergencies.
The plan is not l
7 for the federal government to take over.
But rather, to be 8
ready to support the state and local governments as well as the j
9 licensees.
10 If we could turn to the next slide I hope you have in 11 our packages. It talks about the lessons learned themselves.
12 First off, the. exercise was a success.
It did test 13 the federal plan.
It did demonstrate that the federal plan
\\-)>
(
14 does provide for coordination amongst the participants, and it 15 generally worked well.
That's not to say that there were not 16 some problems identified and some areas where we have got to go 17 back and refocus and perhaps develop some new procedures.
18 Some of the federal agencies that participated in I
19 this federal field exercise participated for the first time, 20 and we have to give more attention to just what their roles 21 are.
One example of that was the Department of State.
They 22 became involved in this federal field exercise.
Their
)
23 involvement in the federal plan, as a matter of fact, grew out
?1 of the Chernobyl event.
25 Next, there was substantial -- there was evidence, O
v Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
305
'()-
1 and it was demonstrated that there is substantial federal.and-2 state capabilities that can be brought to bear on a 3
radiological accident.
Those capabilities are not fully 4
recognized by the people who have to respond.
Federal agency 5
to federal agency, they are not always recognized.
State to 6
federal agency, and federal agency to state, it's not well 7
recognized.
The exercises are good, and necessary from~that 8
standpoint to get that information and knowledge across.
9 Third, the federal liaisons that were sent to the 10 states and to other federal facilities were found generally to 11 be quite helpful.
Caution is to make sure that the people that 12 are being sent are properly trained and have the proper 13 background for the role.
14 One example was a comment that we received from one 15 of the state facilities having an NRC person here in this 16 facility was extremely helpful to us.
It was especially good 17 that this person was well versed in reactor technology, could 18 help us to understand the terminology, and to help us to 19 understand what we were being told.
We have health physicists.
20 It's fortunate at this time we got a reactor person to help us 21 put these things in context.
22 Next, out of the federal field exercise the states 23 and utility developed a better appreciation of the federal 24 capabilities and the structure.
The federal agencies, it was 25 recommended, or is being recommended, should participate more O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
306
()
1 routinely in the radiological emergency preparedness exercises.
2 This is highly desirable.
There are a large number of 3
exercises to be participated in.
If we don't participate more 4
frequently than we are now, the training is going in the wrong 5
direction.
It's training people to think that we don't exist, 6-and then when we do participate or we do become involved, there i
7 is a major perturbation.
8 What we have got to find is a way to get'that 9
message, that experience out in a cost-effective manner.
10 Federal field exercise took a year and a half to plan, and many 11 dollars, and many man years to carry off.
We want to be able 12 to give the experience to more people in a more timely way.
13 The multi-agency recovery and reentry group that was
)
14 formed for this federal field exercise to support the state was 15 very useful.
It needs to be better formalized.
What they 16 dealt with is after the release had occurred, the plant 17 conditions had been stabilized, people had been moved, what are 18 the problems you are facing then?
What are the pressures that 19 are being exerted on you?
20 People have been evacuated perhaps.
They want to get 21 back in.
Can you identify clean areas that you have evacuated, 22 the white areas that you have evacuated to bring the people 23 back into?
Can you identify the significantly contaminated, 24 the dark areas that you are not ooing to be able to bring 25 people back into promptly.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
_A
307 O
1
^md taem there is tae erer or fezzv etee-waet 2
actions should you take to clean that area up?
Are there 3
activities which you should allow people to reenter for?
This 4
we attempted to address through this recovery and reentry group 5
along with some other questions.
We need to develop more 6
guidance on that, and to formalize it.
7 Next, it was found that the startup and transitions 8
in several facilities caused some problems.
This is a fact of 9
live.
Even for those of us who exercise often, there is always 10 a startup curve that you have to overcome that inertia.
But i
i 11 the more that individuals exercise and attempt to set up these 12 types of facilities, the better off they are when they do it.
13 Next, the joint press information center generally 14 was successful.
The bullet up there says more effort should be i
15 made to improve this highly visible process.
q i
16 I think the specific thing that they are talking 17 about there is that there is not any clearcut guidance on who 18 is in the lead at what point in time.
And I think very early
-19 on the utility was the first one there.
They had the lead in 20 the information center.
Then as the state started to 21 participate, the state had a lead, but we had two states.
We 22 need to take a look at how we can better lay that out so that 23 there is not confusion when the real situation occurs.
24 Next, we demonstrated that elect.ronic mail was a 25 useful tool in exchanging information amongst the federal O
Heritage Reporting Corporation J
(202) 628-4888
308 i
()
1 agencies during the federal field exercise.-
The federal' 2
agencies had status documents that they shared with each other.
3 This was very useful.
It's the first time we have done it.
4 We tested this process back when the U.S. delegation 5
went to Vienna, and it was a way that we had supported the'U.S.
6
' delegation on Chernobyl at that time.
We applied it to the 7
federal field exercise and it worked well.
8 We are now evaluating it for its application'to the 9
states as a tool for getting information to the states more 10 promptly.
It's not without some implementation problem.
11 That's why we are evaluating it and now quite jumping on the 12 bandwagon yet.
13 Next,.nore federal preparation and emphasis is needed
(
14 with respect to responding to congressional inquiries and 15 requests.
There is a NRC and FEMA procedure for dealing with 16 congressional inquiries in Washington, which was a NRC role, 17 and congressional inquiries in the field, FEMA supports --
18 performs that function.
We need to look at that and flesh that 19 out a little further.
20 Next, the next slide speaks primarily of the 21 Department of Energy's federal radiological monitoring and 22 assessment conter.
It was a success.
It's the facility at 23 which the field monitoring data, whether collected by federal 24 teams, state teams or licensee teams, they're all pulled 25 together.
It's simulated, assessed and then shared with the O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
309
()
1 states and the lead federal agency, technical lead federal 2
agency which was the NRC in this.
3 It was successful.
It did integrate those 4
activities.
It was also evidence that if we have a ma,ior event i
5 in which there is a significant release, that that support will 6
be needed.
There is no state in the country that has i
7 sufficient field monitoring capabilities to handle it without 8
the support of the Department of Energy.
They have a very good I
9 capability there.
10 The next bullet, I'm going to jump over.
It was a --
11 it just deals with streamlining seme organizational problems 12 that had occurred in getting the facility set up.
13 The next bullet is one that I think you all probably O
t v
14 know, but I'm not sure we did.
It takes a little while for a 15 facility like a federal monitoring and assessment center to get 16 set up, to receive the data and to start functioning.
Our 17 expectations, perhaps ingrained in us by a few exercises, was 3
4 18 that as soon as they were activated we would start getting
]
19 field monitoring assessments.
That takes some time, and there 20 is going to be a time lag there.
Fact of life.
21 Next, there is a need to develop a uniform, or 22 approach a uniform sampling technique, sampling data collection 23 and analysis technique.
The purpose for this is not just to 24 force everybody into the same mold, but rather, to make the 25 information more easily usable by everyone who is interested in O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
310
()
1 that information.
2 The next slido speaks to the Federal Emergency 3
Management Agency's federal response center.
Remember that 4
FEMA sets up a federal response center in the vicinity of the 5
event, and the function of that federal response center is to 6
coordinate the logistic support that they would be providing to 7
the state to facilitate coordinating that support, and to serve 8
as that partner with the NRC if there is a recommendation for i
9 protective action that goes to the governor, 10 NRC would be saying, this is the federal 11 recommendation, and FEMA would be saying, if you decide to 12 implement a recommendation for protective action, we're here to 13 help you with this.
O)
\\J 14 Okay, so it did provide that capability.
There is a 15 need, again, to make sure that more states are aware of the 16 function, the purpose of the federal response center.
There is 17 also a need to make sure that the federal agencies who i
18 participate in the federal response center know the kinds of 19 requests they are likely to be confronted with.
20 And the last one kind of folds the previous ones 21 together.
We need to put this into some kind of definitive 22 statement and get it out so that other parties will have the 23 benefit of the same information.
l 24 Okay, the last side that I have is that the federal j
25 plan, while I mentioned earlier served us well, it did provide
(
l Heritage Reporting Corporation 1
(202) 628-4888
311
\\
\\
1 for the coordination and allowing us to support the state, does 2
need to be looked at for modification.
One of the areas I have 3
already mentioned is the Department of State should be j
4 included.
The plan should be amended to include the' Department 5
of State.
6 It should also include General Services 7
Administration who can provide a lot of the support j
8 capabilities that are available in the federal government.
9 Next, as I mentioned earlier, we need that guidance 10 on recovery and reentry.
There is a lot of interest in that.
11 Third, this is a subtlety that I hope doesn't escape 12 you.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission under the federal plan 13 stayed the cognizant federal agency.
That means we had the A\\/
14 federal technical lead throughout the exercise for supporting 15 the state.
16 At the point where there is no longer a release 17 coming from the plant and the conditions are stable with 18 respect to the state interest, we were dealing primarily with 19 radiation in the environment and those concerns.
There is 20 another -- there are other federal agencies who have more 21 expertise on radiation in the environment.
We need to amend 22 the federal plan in order to recognize that agencies like 23 Environmental Protection Agency would be there and would be 24 coordinating the recovery and reentry assessments.
25 And last, we need to provide guidance for lieritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
312
()
1 international coordination.
This goes along with the 2
Department of State being included.
3 The last thing I would point out is we need to find a 4
way, as I stated earlier, to give the federal plan experience 5
to more states and licensees in a more timely manner than were 6
presently -- that the program we are presently involved in, 7
which has us doing a federal field exercise about every three j
8 years.
At that rate, I think it takes 30 years to get to all 9
the states, and that's too long.
We have tried capability 10 conferences.
That doesn't seem to get the message out.
It 11 feels more like the feds standing up there talking at people.
12 The experience if interacting is where it really comes 13 together.
Ok/
14 Perhaps we can do more with these tabletop exercises.
15 We have done some of those.
They have been very useful in 16 identifying the rubs, and then starting the discussions to get 17 those rubs resolved.
18 That's all I have for right now.
I would like to 19 turn it over next to Richard Braund.
20 (Applause.)
21 MR. BRAUND:
I am pleased to be here from the State 22 of Wisconsin and even though Chairman Zech, in discussing this 23 exercise yesterday, mentioned Illinois many times, Wisconsin 24 did play, also.
25 We were pleased to be participants in this second of O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
313 l
r~T
(_j 1
the full field exercises.
The exercise, together with 2
Commonwealth Edison Zion Nuclear Generating Station was 3
conducted jointly by Kenosha County, State of Illinois' and the 4
County and local governments of Lake County Illinois.
It was a 5
culmination of 16 months of cooperative effort between the 6
Federal, state, local officials and many volunteer 7
organizations.
Think about that: 16 months in the planning.
8 If we were to have a real emergency, you wouldn't have 16 9
months.
10 Lessons learned will aid greatly in providing a 11 degree of preparedness that did not exist before.
It went 12 well.
Th_ere is a feeling in Wisconsin at both the state level 13 and the county level, that if called upon, the Federal 14 Government would be able to respond and supplement the local 15 emergency capabilities.
16 I might add here that coordination took place between 17 the State of Illinois and the State of Wisconsin regarding how l
18 we were going to handle protective actions.
And a 19 representative from the Governor's Office was designated in 20 both instances and a telephone line was basically dedicated to 21 those two circumstances.
And before a decision was implemented 22 to shelter or to evacuate or whatever, in one state, the 23 discussion took place between the two governors or their people 24 acting in those capacities.
And that is extremely important i
25 because it would be very awkward if Illinois would have decided t
)
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
i
?
_U
314
/~N (j
1 sheltered and Wisconsin would have decided to evacuate one of 2
the zones.
3 For Wisconsin, this was the 20th nuclear power plant 4
exercise.
It was the first, however, in which we were to test 5
the relationship between the Federal Government and the state.
6 And, of course, that would be so critical in the event of an 7
actual nuclear emergency.
8 I believe that the exercise did increase the 9
awareness on the part of the Federal Government in confidence 10 in, I hope, of Wisconsin's ability to respond to an emergency 11 situation.
And that was a real benefit.
It will certainly 12 enhance our ability to work together in the future.
13 And while the exercise was successful in most
(
14 respects, there are many concerns that need to be dealt with 15 and I will mention only a couple.
Logistics is going to be a 16 significant problem in any actual emergency.
And in this case, 17 prior to the exercise, a great amount of time was spent 18 arranging for facilities for the Federal Response Center and 19 the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. They 20 spent a lot of time installing telecommunications, lining up 21 housing for the Federal participants and many other activities.
22 Much Federal equipment was pre-positioned in Illinois near the 23 Zion site.
a 24 It's true that the Federal participants did not
)
i 25 become involved in the exercise until a certain time, but still l
(*h
\\_/
)
lieritage Reporting Corporation l
(202) 628-4888
)
i 1
315
( ).
1 that equipment and all of that arrangements were made before 2
. hand.
And I question that.
3 The exercise depended heavily upon the commercial 4
telephone system, primary communications, radio communications 1
5 between the Federal participants and the state agencies were i
6 not planned for and were not utilized to any extent as far as I 7
know.
l 8
I recognize that many of these logistica1' problems 9
could be overcome expeditiously in the event of an emergency, 10 an actual emergency. They could say to the military, Airlift:
11 Iley, we've got to have transport immediately to get this 12 equipment to Zion, Illinois area.
Perhaps for another exercise 13 some consideration should be given to that.
14 It may be advisable and consideration might be given 15 to this to pre-identify locations or sites around every nuclear 16 power plant where the Federal Government would want to set up 17 and to operate from.
That wouldn't take a lot of effort.
A 18 little coordination with the state and the locals, they could l
19 say:
Well, they could operate out of this school facility or 20 they could operate out of this other facility of whatever type 21 it is and get those facilities identified and even get a 22 contract signed, perhaps, with those facilities that in the 23 event of a real emergency that would be made available to them.
24 Then that would lessen some of the 16 months worth of work that 25 went into planning for this exercise.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i 316 I
()
1 There was a great committal on the part of Federal 2
Agency personnel.
There was an exercise held three years ago i
3 in Florida and there really wasn't very many people on the 4
Federal level that worked in that exercise, participated in 5
that exercise in Florida that were still participating in this 6
exercise, if I understand it.
7 Three years had elapsed, people had left agencies, 8
people had transferred to different positions, changed jobs.
9 And with the passing of time, some of them that had 10 participated and in the same capacity, it is just natural that 11 you will forget some of the things.
12 I think that needs to be addressed.
Most state and
~
13 local emergency personnel participate at least once every two 14 years and in Wisconsin with the several reactors that we have 15 responsibility for, almost everybody participates several times 16 each year.
And, perhaps, something could be done that when 17 we've got a training exercise or there's a training exercise in j
i 18 Ohio or in Vermont or something, why, some of the Federal
]
19 people could participate in that exercise, in a very limited 20 scope, but just be involved.
21 I realize the great cost of this exercise and that to 22 do it more often than three years probably would be more than 23 the taxpayers would want to stand.
24 After action reports:
There were a lot of lessons 25 learned and the direction that I gave to the people from O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 1
l-317
()
1 Wisconsin:
Be very critical of yourself when you are writing 2
your after action report.
Don't gloss over things and even the 3
little things,.be sure to get them'down on paper.
i 4
I would hope that the final after action report and 5
there is a lot of effort-still going into that.
I hope that 6
when it is written, it is critical of those things that are 7
justified.
And that it.gets wide dissemination so that i
8 everybody can benefit from it.
It was a great opportunity to 9
have been involved with this exercise and I would like to thank 10 Commonwealth Edison Company, who was an excellent company to l
11 work with.
You won't find one single person in Wisconsin that 12 worked on this exercise -- and there were many of them -- that l
13 don't have complimentary things to say about Commonwealth O
(/
14 Edison and I found it extremely enjoyable to work with the 15 Federal Government, also:
a good experience of us.
16 (Applause.)
17 MR. PERKINS:
Next, I would like to introduce Del 18 Butterfield who had been the management team member from t
19 Commonwealth Edison Company in helping us to plan and conduct i
20 the Federal field exercise.
Del?
21 MR. BUTTERFIELD:
Thank you, Ken.
l 22 I must tell you, though, to begin with that there are 23 not many people in Illinois that are happy with Commonwealth 24 Edison.
As Mr. Braund says, they are in Wisconsin.
He has two 25 advantages.
One is that, of course, ve did cooperate because O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
r 318
()
1 it is to our advantage to do so; but the second thing is he 2
doesn't pay our rates.
And we went in for a 27 percent rate l
3 increase the other day because the State Commerce Commission 4
refused to go along with our plan for Byron and Braidwood at 5
9.65 percent and take them out of the rate base.
And I don't t
6 tell many people, to be honest with you, when I walk down the 7
street who I work for today, because they can't afford to pay 8
it.
Let's face it.
So, it is going to be an interesting 11
)
J months, and, fortunately, I am not involved in that. So, there l
10 are some advantages.
11 I guess if I had to sum it up in one statement, I 12 would say, I'm glad it's over.
13 (Laughter.)
14 It has been 16 months of work.
It was a lot of hard 15 work.
We had a lot of enjoyable times with it. And I think we 16 learned a lot.
I think that the knowledge we gained will be 17 very advantageous to us if we ever have to use it.
- And, 18 hopefully, we don't. No one wants to use it.
But I think that 19 it does provide a tremendous insight into the operation of the 20 Federal Government that we didn't know about before.
21 Now, I realize t'iat some of us will move on and if we 22 ever have to use, probably none of us will be around that will 23 remember how to do this.
But we hopefully will put things in 24 place to cover that.
25 We were also extremely fortunate in that we had good l
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
I
_a
i 319
(
1 team leaders from both the NRC and FEMA.
Without their 2
leadership, we would not have done this as smoothly as we did.
3 Now, this started simply with a phone call from Ed 4
Jordan to my now Senior Vice President, Cordell Reed.
He said, 5
"I've got an opportunity for you.
A deal you can't turn'down."
6 And we turned it down for several months until we 7
7trally got the message.
We're still trying to get a plant 8
license.
No.
They didn't do that to us.
9 (Laughter.)
10 But, anyway, it did work out very well.
And I would 11 certainly recommend it to the next -- to any state sitting 12 here.
I think there is so much to be learned that you just 13 can't afford not to do it.
14 There has been a lot of talk at least today -- and, 15 by the way, when I walked in and I met Mr. Harold Denton over 16 here, because I had another subject to bring up with him, and 17 he says, "How did you get in here?"
18 So, I'm not sure I'm supposed to be here, but, 19 anyway, from what I have heard today, it was pointed out i
{
20 several times that there are other instances where the states 21 need plans other than nuclear power plants.
And to. indicate 22 how utility emergency plans have helped the states in other 23 ways, the Atomic Industrial Forum, which is now a part of 24 NUMARC, which is I think Nuclear Utility Management and 25 Resource Council, which is the conglomerate of all the OV Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
320
()
1 utilities in the country, is doing a study to show how people j
2 respond in emergencies.
And that your bus driver, in fact, 3
will respond or whatever is necessary, as they did in 4
Chernobyl, also.
Things will be done.
l 5
But we have had several communities come up to us 6
over the past few years, and ones that we've had problems with, 7
too, quite frankly, on the local level and say, "You know, we 8
had a problem with a chemical spill out here and we took your 9
plan or the state plan," excuse me, it is the state plan.
Took 10 the state plan, put that into effect for a chemical emergency 11 and it worked beautifully.
No problems.
Everything worked 12 well.
We had our routes, the sheriff deputies knew where to 13 go.
Everything worked well from their point of view.
V 14 So, I think it is a tremendous advantage and it gives 15 all the communities and EPZs a leg up on addressing the 16 hazardous issue.
17 I would like to mention just two areas, really.
One 18 is the development and planning area which happened before the l
19 exercise, and then the actual exercise, itself.
I 20 Under initial activities, we got going about 16 l
21 months ahead of time and that was really a little short.
You 22 are going to have confusion, at least there was in my mind 23 about the acronyms, the capabilities of Federal agencies.
24 And I am going to try -- I didn't bring slides.
I l
25 didn't know I was allowed to. So, what I have done here is O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 5
321
()
1 borrowed one from Ed Jordan.
In your packet from Ed Jordan, 2
this is about half-way in there.
3 I would suggest that you take that home and you copy 4
that or somehow put that in the front of your book because --
5 or have it on file somewhere, because if you need to get 6
involved, this tells you what agencies respond where.
And if 7
there is one single slide that sort of gives you an overall 8
umbrella picture, this is it.
And believe me, when we were 9
sitting down at an early meeting and the various Federal 10 agencies were talking about what their roles were, I remembe) 11 very distinctly one an
- y, which came in with a person that 12 had not been: involved in this area before, and this person 13 listed the kinds of things that a agency could do.
14 And I said, " Glory, Hallelujah."
The State of 15 Illinois Department or Emergency Service and Disaster Agency 16 doesn't have to do anything and maybe I can save some money 17 because the Feds are going to do it all.
18 Well, obviously, it doesn't work quite that way. But 19 you need to understand the interfaces between the agencies. It 1
20 is an extremely important part.
And you need to start early 21 because the understandings today and the people today will be 22 different three years from now.
23 You need to get the committees formed early so that 24 you understand who is dealing with whom.
You need to get the 25 state and county presence involved in these.
Now, anytime we
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
322
()
I get into this, and'this happened in Illinois'and it was, I 2
. guess particularly true in Wisconsin because Illinois' presence 3
is much larger, thanks to Mr. Terry Lash, perhaps, and Governor 4
Thompson and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety who has 5..
almost 200 employees.
But you need to get state and county 6
people involved.
And they need to be involved early and they 7
have to make a significant commitment of their time.
8 In order to do this, you need to know the budget 9
recommendations early.
So, I think.the budgeting needs to be 10 an issue that is brought up early.
11 Now, let's be honest about it.
If you are going to 12 have one of these things, as you do with your regular 13-exercises, you have problems and I have heard problems about 14 the state saying that the communities needed equipment'or 15 whatever. The utility has to be somewhat receptive, somehow, 16 because it is their license and you know and I know it.
And 17 don't -- you know, there's no sense kidding each other.
18 So, we are trying to minimize our expense.
On the 19 other hand, we have to have an adequate plan.
So, there is 20 room for dialogue.
When you come to one of these exercises, 21 you come to a rather larger expectation in terms of budgeting.
22 If there is a problem out there, you need to know it and the 23 uti.11ty needs to know it so it can be addressed.
Please don't 24 slight it.
You need the county and state and local 25 participation.
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
323 lh 1
You need to start this early. You need to have 2
tabletops and dry runs early.
Now, all of you that are 3
involved in emergency planning exercise with nuclear power 7
4 plants understand that when you have one what I'll call the 5
normal full-scale exercises, you are graded.
The utility is 6
graded by the NRC and you are graded by FEMA.
This was true in 7
the Zion exercise.
And we used Day One as the regulatory part 8
of the exercise and Day Two and Three were the really I
9 experience of the Federal agencies, which is what it is for.
10 We would strongly recommend in the future that that l
11 not be the case, that the regulatory exercise be perhaps the 12 dry run, which lasted a full day anyway.
It could be longer if 13 necessary, but it could be in more detail.
Get that out of the 14 way.
Get that pressure off so that when the Federal field 15 exercise comes, in fact, all the attention is put on making 16 everything flow together because you really don't care about 17 whether the results of the analysis of the grasses and all, 18 everything, dovetails together.
It is the communications.
It 19 is the experience of working together and getting results and 20 getting them fed back to the public, whatever is necessary.
21 That is the importhnt thing.
And we need to spend our efforts 22 doing that, not worrying about how we are going to get graded 23 and how many findings there are going to be.
24 When you have people on your committees, you need to 25 make sure that they, in fact, have the power of decision to the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L____-----_
l l
324 j
()
1 extent.possible so that when the meetings are taking place, 2
decisions can be made.
3 Another thing that we have had problems with a little j
i 4
bit in this case and others in the past, is that no player l
5 should be ever allowed access to the information on the 6
exercise.
There are players and there are controllers. 'And by 1
7 gosh, there has to be a pretty heavy curtain between them 8
because I don't care how forthright, upright, whatever you want 9
to call it, how much integrity a person has, if he has access 10 to data, he runs a great risk of letting the data get out to 11 the person who could use it and spoil part of the play.
12 I remember one of our other exercises:
We went into 13 a meeting one morning and one of our people said something O'
14 about an unannounced exercise coming up and after the meeting,.
I 15 one of my bosses came'over and he says:
Is the date known?
16
'Does he know that?
Cancel it.
17 So, I went back and found out the man knew no more 18 than I did.
Emergency Response people reported to me at the 19 time, but I was not involved, so, even I don't know those 20 things or didn't at the time.
And, so, it was not jeopardized, 21 but that is a concern.
22 During the actual FFB, we felt that we should have 23 had increased FEMA participation.
FEMA did not seem to get as 24 involved as we thought they should have, particularly in the 25 public arena.
And, again, I was involved in the emergency O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
325
()
1 operations facility for all three days. So, I am taking this i
2 feedback from others in my group.
3 As Ken mentioned, there were some things at the 4
FERMAC that probably could have been improved and that is 1
I 5
primarily in the communications area.
6 Then there was a. disagreement -- not a disagreement, 7
but a difference between the guidance on protective action l
8 recommendations that we and the states were using versus what 9
the NRC had just come out with.
Those are very, very important 10 to get straightened out.
And it worked out reasonably well, I 11 believe, but it could have been a real problem with us.
So, 12 those kinds of ground rules need to be understood.
J 13 From our point of view, one of the most important
.A 3 A/
14 areas is the JPIC, the Joint Public Information Center.
There 15 is a question about who is in charge.
We still have a ways to 16 go.
We have improved a lot.
The NRC agrees we have improved a 17 lot.
We have changed our techniques of how we, the utility 18 handle the Joint Public Information Center.
We have our 19 executives there, which we didn't three or four years ago.
20 We need to decide who is in charge on what times.
I 21 mean after all, normally, when we do it on a one-day scale, we 22 go in with a state and it is fairly simple to do. The state is 23 there, the NRC is there, we're there.
It works pretty well 24 because we are used to doing it.
We've done many of them.
25 We have six sites in the state and Illinois Power has O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
326
()
1 one, so we do at least one full scale exercise a year. So, we 2
are familiar with doing it.
But when you get the others in on 3
the second and third days, when the utility is not the biggest 4
issue, then who is in charge?
It is hard to maintain roles in 5
there.
You get -- you are playing a role and all of a sudden 6
you go over and talk to a media person or something, you have 7
to be careful about the ground rules.
8 And you need to improve the inter-agency 9
communications.
They don't like to see the utility come up and 10 make a statement and 10 minutes later the State of Illinois 11 comes up, and 5 minutes later the State of Wisconsin, then the 12 NRC or whatever.
You need to be coordinated.
13 The last point is that when you have one of these O
N/
14 things, the NRC will bring the world.
They brought a large 15 team to our emergency operations facility, and we have just 16 redesigned our emergency operations facility, and it still 17 isn't big enough.
I suspect we could probably enlarge it again 18 and it still wouldn't be large enough.
So those kind of ground 19 rules need to be work in also, because you can't expand forever 20 because they need more people.
You have to have alternate 21 methods of handling it.
22 So, Ken, those are my thoughts and I will be around 23 until the end of the meeting.
24 (Applause.)
25 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you very much.
i C) lieritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
327
()
1 The Chair is going to say that questions will be 2
after the meeting is adjourned.
And right now getting back on 3
schedule as an important matter, we will catch airplanes and so 4
on this afternoon.
So the next speaker who had slides to show 5
will condense it to a two-minute version and will let you know 6
where the information is available and things of that kind.
7 And Brian Sheron, if you would come up, please, and 8
make your two-minute presentation.
9 MR. SHERON:
This may be a blessing in disguise.
I 10 My name is Brian Sheron, and I worked on our 11 Chernobyl report, and I had the privilege of going to Vienna 12 last August and listening to the Soviets tell us what happened.
l t
13 In summary, we had prepared two reports; one is n(_)
14 NUREG-1250, which is the fact finding report of the federal 1
15 government; and the second report is NUREG-1251, which is the 16 implications report which the NRC developed.
17 The overall conclusions that we drew in that report 18 were that there were unique differences in the design of 19 Chernobyl, the physics characteristics, that just did not make 20 it behave like a U.S.
plant behaves.
21 We also concluded that human error played a very 22 large part in the accident at Chernobyl, and we took a hard 23 look at what our practices are in the United States, both with 24 to the human factors, to procedures at these plants, as well as j
25 the design of our plants.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
328
()
1
.The overall conclusion was that there was nothing 2
staring us in the face that said there was a lesson to be' 3
learned here; that U.S.
plants needed to change in either their i
4 operations or their design.
We felt that the causes of the l
5 Chernobyl accident and the things that exacerbated it are not 6
really present in U.S.
reactors.
7 We did find a number of areas, however, that we 8
thought it would be prudent to study further before we really 9
closed the door on any of the issues.
These are all outlined 10 in NUREG-1251, and my understand'ing is all of the state liaison 11 officers and the radiation officers of each of the states have 12 received copies of these.
13 So what we are planning on doing now is following up 1
14 in the areas that are outlined in that report with further 15 study, and we plan on issuing another report, probably in a 16 year or so when we complete our studies, of the conclusions 17 that we have reached.
18 That concludes my remarks.
19 (Applause.)
20 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you very much, Brian, for 21 helping us get back on track.
22 Next, North Carolina's own, Harold Ray Denton is here 23 to give us a little slide presentation, preparing in the back 24 even as we speak.
Harold was formerly the director of Nuclear 25 Reactor Regulation, and as you heard Chairman Zech began his O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
329
()
1 remarks yesterday that Harold is now the Director of 2
Governmental Public Affairs which includes public affairs, 3
congressional affairs, international programs in our state, 4
local and indian tribes program.
5 And without further ado then, I bring you Mr.
Y 6
Credibility, Harold Denton.
7 MR. DENTON:
I'll be brief also; just as brief as it 8
takes to load the slides perhaps.
But let me just share with 9
you some of my perspective on what I think Chernobyl may mean 10 to the nuclear business in general, and I'll give you some 11 facts first, and then show some slides and draw a few 12 conclusions and be over.
13 First off, it's obvious to everyone that a reactor
)
14 accident anywhere is an accident everywhere in terms of public 15 perception.
It's clear that those of you with reactors in 16 your states can be affected by an accident in a reactor i
17 anywhere in the world from the public perception.
18 There were plants cancelled in Europe because of the 19 Chernobyl accident, major changes of direction in programs in a 20 lot of countries.
Just be aware of that fact.
21 But it doesn't follow that from a technological 22 standpoint that that same saying is true.
As iou heard from 23 Brian, the RBMK reactors are so different in design from our 24 type of pressurized water reactors, the boiling water reactors, 25 it really doesn't have a lot of technological implications.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
330
()
1 Although from a public standpoint, the reaction is sure there.
2 Let's look also at what is the experience of the 3
nuclear power industry.
We have had about 3,000 reactor years 4
of operation total worldwide.
We have had two severe 5
The consequences were quite 6
different because TMI had a containment.
7 Incidently, the milk levels in Middletown, 8
Pennsylvania were higher due to the Chernobyl accident'than 9
they were to the TMI accident.
It shows the value of a stout 10 containment.
11 There have also been another half dozen events 12 worldwide that were serious enough to attract the attention of 13 us regulators, and to call for improvements.
So the historical 14 data base is pretty low.
15 Accidents can be severe if you have a plant that is 16 poorly designed, poorly constructed, or poorly operated, or a 17 combination of all of those, and I did want to show the 18 Chernobyl slides since you may not have seen then.
I have i
19 shown them in several forms.
But if they are available, I'll 20 just flick through a few that may be of interest to you.
1 21 If someone could run them, and I'll -- upside down.
22 I thought you might like to see what a city like 23 Pripriot looks like.
This isn't Pripriot.
This is Ergodot, 24 which is energy city in Russia.
We visited some reactors other 25 than Chernobyl, and these cities are built there.
It's usually
)
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
i 331 L( )
1 4 or 5,000 people, and they are built just to support the power 2
plant operation,.and.this is the little hotel in the city of 3
Ergodot, and they have four or five reactors nearby.
Everyone 4
. lives in the high rise apartment buildings.
And I think l
5 Pripriot you can think of as being-very close.
6 The next one, the next slide.
This is Kiev upside 7
down.
Maybe they are all upside down.
What do you think?
8 Kiev was the nearest large city.
I was there at the 9
end of February.
The temperature was between minus 25 and 10 minus 40; apparently a normal winter for Kiev.
Life is going 11 on, as far as I could tell, normal in Kiev, and there was no 12 decontamination efforts or anything else happening there.
13 The next slide.
I wanted to show you the checkpoint-(
14 30 kilometers away from the reactor.
This was established 15 after the accident, and this is how they controlled entrance to 16 the highways.
And so when I was there no one had been allowed 1
17 to return closer than 30 kilometers due to the overall j
18 contamination level.
19 Next.
I took film badges in order to try to find the 20 difference between the dose I'd get staying away from the plant 21 and what I got at the plant.
So I left some film badges in 22 Kiev and then wore some more control badges to the plant.
And 23 so during that 8-hour trip to the plant and back, I got an 24 additional 4 millirem.
So you can tell that that's a pretty 25 low number, and they had male amazing strides in cleaning the
(
3 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 i
l l
1 332 h
'l place up.
2 This is the little town of Chernobyl.
It had been l
3 there prior to the reactors being built.
It was all abandoned, i
4 The sidewalks were not plowed and the streets were unplowed.
5 And this takes you into very near the reactor, and the
-)
6 apartment in Chernobyl is the only one in which anyone is 1
7 living.
And so this apartment is at the end of the city'of 8
It's being used by workers and they stay there two 9
or three weeks at a time, and then go back outside the 30 10 kilometer zone and rejoin their families.
11 Next.
This is the first view of the complex.
They i
12 have six reactors there.
Before the accident, four of them l
l 13 were in operation and two were under construction.
14 This is the control room inside Unit 1.
They.had 15 Units 1 and 2 back in operation.- They had done a tremendous I
16 job of decontaminating the plant.
The operation seemed quite j
17 normal, very orderly.
No one who I met there had been there at 18 the time of the accident.
They had completely replaced 19 management, and the best I could tell the plant was being 20 operated in a professional manner.
21 They had made very few changes in the plant actually.
22 The major change, they had locked up the panel where the 1
1 23 operators bypassed the safety systems, and they said only the 24 plant manager now has the key to that area.
But if this 1
25 reactor were put back in the same state and run the same test, O
Heritage Reporting Corporation i
(202) 628-4888
333 o)
(_
1 the same accident would result again.
These type plants were 2
scattered throughout the Soviet Union, and there are a number 3
of them in the East European countrie" 3f Czechoslovakia, 4
Bulgaria.
So they are preventing the accident from happening i
5 again largely by procedural and administrative reasons, not by
]
6 technical changes which will come about very slowly, 7
Next.
Relatively clean turbine building floor.
The 8
two units that were undamaged were back at full power.
There 9
was a severe power shortage in the Ukraine.
They were taking 10 power abortages of 20 percent or so at the time I wac there.
11 The airport temperature was like 50 degrees inside due to 12 shortage.
But the turbine buildings were not that different 13 from ours.
(~%
\\_/
14 Next.
You recall the fire at the plant and the 15 trouble they had in fire fighting.
There was very little 16 evidence of fire fighting equipment at the plant in general, 17 but they had brought in two fire trucks, and that's what that 18 slide was a picture of where the two fire trucks parked on the 19 turbine building floor at the plants that were operating.
Very 20 little in the way of, otherwise, fire detection, fire 21 prevention that was obvious.
22 Okay.
They had done a lot of work in building a i
23 sarcophagus around the damaged unit.
This was in the plant 24 manager's officer, and you can see over on the right the design 25 of a sarcophagus which was just a very thick concrete wall all O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
J 334
()
1 around the reactor, and new concrete roof, and in fact they had 2
just entombed the reactor.
But they have done more than entomb j
i 3
it.
They put filters in.
They put in temperature monitors, j
l 4
radiation monitors, a number of ingenious devices to track what 5
is happening inside the sarcophagus.
Very little is coming out 6
now.
It's mainly iodine 125, I think is about the only 7
isotope, and it's a few microcuries a day.
i 8
Next slide.
This shows where the instrumentation in 9
the sarcophagus comes to monitor in the plant manager's office, 10 and he is able to trend the data and instantaneously look to 11 see what is going on.
The radiation level the day I was there 12 I believe was 1,000 R an hour on the inside.
Air temperature
)
13 coming in was like minus 10 degrees C, and the exit temperature 14 was 100 degrees C, and what was being released was being 15 filtered.
16 So I was quite pleased, I guess, to see that~they had 17 put so much work into trying to isolate this damaged reactor 18 from the environment.
A lot of things they could have done a q
19 lot better leading up to the accident, but obviously after it 20 happened they really turned to and did a tremendous job.
They 21 built all of this before the snows got too deep in the fall of 22 the same year, i
23 Next.
The damaged reactor is over Commissioner 24 Burnthal's head back there.
You can't hardly tell it is any 25 different from any other eactor, but it's had a huge amount of
)
(2)
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l l
l 335 e
1 construction.
They used the Army to do the work.
2 Thank you.
Turn the lights.
l 3
Let me just give my perspective a bit on what this l
4 may mean, or could mean.
It seems clear that the NRC efforts i
5 to make plants safe have done two things.
They have gotten 6
people very sensitized to the risk of nuclear power, and we 7
worry about tornadoes and earthquakes and operator errors and 8
these kinds of things, and safeguards.
So people are very much I
9 more aware of the risk of nuclear power than they are the risk 10 of coal, for example.
11 Plus, they have run up the cost of nuclear power, and 12 as you heard from the representative from Michigan, in some 13 cases new plants today may not even be competitive with coal.
14 So we have spent a lot of money trying to make this business 15 safe.
16 From some of the questions I have heard today, people 17 might ask, well, why do we continue with the nuclear business.
18 And I wanted to give you my answer, at least.
19 I think it's the same answer that Churchill gave 20 about democracy.
You know, what's better.
And in this country l
l 21 if we don't put up with the warts of nuclear power and try to 22 make it safe, and efficient, and economical, then we are left 23 with coal.
And I think most people who look at the comparison l
24 between coal and nuclear come to the conclusion that coal --
25 that coal is no better and possibly far worse than nuclear Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
336
()
1 power l you look at it objectively.
2 So while nuclear has all its warts, has these risks, 3
has these costs, it does seem to do better in many respects
]
4 than coal.
5 When I talk to people about the possibility of a real l
6 meteorological shift due to burning CO-2, they don't talk about 7~
probabilities of one in a million, or one in 10,000.
8 Apparently the probability of that becoming a real serious 1
9 national problem is more like 10 or 20 percent.
10 So coal has -- the burning of fossil fuels has some 11 large cost also, and many of that are coal miner problems and i
12 black lung disease, and air pollution of coal.
l 13 So It think we need a mix of all kinds of energies a
14 and I'm not ready to rule that nuclear is totally a loser l
15 compared to the other ones yet.
Thinks like Chernobyl are just l
16 the reason that it requires so much attention from all of you, 17 and the NRC, and all the other federal agencies that worry with 18' you.
19 I do have time for maybe a question or two, and I'd 20 be happy to take that.
21 VOICE: Did you have any opportunity to speak with l
l2 individual Russian workers at the site?
2 23 MR. DENTON:
I didn't really get a chance to talk to l
24 the crews as much as the plant managers.
But the managers had 25 been brought in from other stations like the Leningrad station O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
337
()
I which was their oldest operating station.
And I got the 2
feeling that the new plant managers were thoroughly
)
J 3
professional and weren't going to let it happen on their watch.
)
4 And that maybe they had been lax and overconfident before, but 5
the people I talked to were certainly safety conscious and as 6
far as I could tell,'ran the plant in a very crisp manner in 7
complete conformance with the rules.
8 So I think in a sense this is their TMI, and they may 9
have been overconfident before, but I think they got the 10 message nu r.
11 Otherwise -- yes.
12 MR. KAMMERER:
Could you use the microphone, please?
13 VOICE:
Just wanted to ask if you are aware exactly
()
14 what is the fate of the former plant managers.
And cacondly, 15 what you know of the plans for that area of the 30 kilometer 16 radius area in the future, what are they going to plan to 17 eventually repopulate that soon, or what do you know about 18 that?
19 MR. DENTON:
The plant mangers were recently tried, 20 and the results were reported, and I think the plant manager or 21 the chief engineer and maybe one other person were sentenced to 22 five or 10 years, I have forgotten the details, in jail, or 23 labor camps as they use it.
They weren't sentenced for life, 24 and they weren't executed.
But obviously they got very severe 25 penalties for their role, or lack of attention to duty.
O Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
338
()
1 When I was there it wasn't clear what the radiation 2
levels would be after the snow melted, and there was a lot of 3
technical uncertainty.
And.I think the Soviets do intend to 4
resettle.
They are fortunate that around the plant was a 5
largely unpopulated area.
It was a rather rural, I couldn't 6
tell that it was a very productive region; apparently it 7
wasn't.
But I think their plan would be if they can 8
decontaminate it and if the radiation levels are low enough, 9
they will resettle.
10 But Russia is such a vast country.
Clearly they can 11 set aside an area like this for some time without having a 12 great impact on their economy.
And that's something that you 13 hear from the European countries, especially countries like
(
14 Austria, Luxembourg, Belgium.
They don't have the ability to 15 set aside 30. kilometers.
That's the entire country.
16 So to some extent, Chernobyl has had a much bigger 17 influence on European attitudes toward nuclear than it has in 18 the U.S.
We are more like them in terms of size.
19 I did want to thank all of you for coming in.
It's a 1
20 very important meeting we're having today, and I think l
21 Chernobyl re-illustrates that what we are in here is if not 22 controlled properly can really have the most profound impacts 23 on both state and national economies and public health and 24 safety.
l J
25 MR. THRON:
Ray Thron from the State of Minnesota.
j l
(
l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
1 339
()
1 Perhaps you can't answer this, but I-will ask anyway..
2' Are you aware of what health follow-up studies that 3
might.be in place by the Soviets, or European countries, 'cn: by 4
the U.S. as a part of this accident?
5 MR. DENTON:
We took as part of our team the chief.
6 epidemiologist from NIH, and he tried to get a dialogue' going 7
with his health counterparts, and.the Soviet view seems to be-8 that whatever the long-term health affects are they won't be 9
distinguishable in the general population.
-10 I think we might agree with that based on the data 11 that's around for people who live say outside the 30 kilometer 12 zone.
But we.think for the people close in that an 13 epidemiological long-term follow-up would be passible.
(
14 So the epidemiologist are still talking to each 15 other, and I don't know for sure whether the Soviets have 16 decided to pursue it.
There is a lot of pressure on'them to do 17 the follow up because it's a rare case in order to really 18 determine what are the health effects of low amounts of
]
19 radiation.
You know, the argument between having a threshold 20 and having no threshold maybe could be decided.
We wouldn't 21 know the answer for 20 years, but it's the potential for 22 experiment.
23 Incidently, the Soviets are making a return visit to 1
24 the U.S.
soon, and we will have them talk again to our NIH 25 experts in this area and maybe they will have decided to do
()
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
340
()
1 some long-term follow ups.
q 2
MR. THRON:
I think, just as a comment, it would 3
be -- if in any way that NRC can facilitate the distribution of 4
that information, I think it's important to the states to know.
5 Oftentimes we will get questions, are they establishing health 6
registries, or will that information be forthcoming and --
7 MR. DENTON:
They have been very forthcoming about 8
the reactor design and those sorts of areas, but not about the 9
health aspects.
And I just don't think they have made up their 10 own minds about what to do.
11 MR. THRON:
Thank you.
l J
12 MR. DENTON:
If we find out, we'll let you know.
l 13 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you, Harold.
(J10
~)
.En 14 (Applause.)
Til 15 MR. KAMMERER:
Ladies and gentlemen, this is bringing 16 to a conclusion then a very profitable day and a half.
I very, i
17 very much appreciate the speakers that we have had, and the 18 candor with which they have addressed the problems that we have i
19 asked them to speak to.
It has made, at least for me, this j
20 day and a half a very good one.
21 There have been some good dialogue, some good i
22 cross-talks.
Some people have found out some information, and, l
23 indeed, that's one of the things that we were looking for.
24 I note that Jim Shea here is -- I want to recognize 25 my office mate.
The Director of International Programs is l
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 L
[_______________
l
341
()
I here.
So on Chernobyl or' foreign matters or anything, Jim, if j
i 2
you wave,your hand and let people know where you are.
3 Appreciate it~.
4 For those of you who stuck around last night during S
the latter part of'the reception you were able to meet 6
Commissioner Rogers,.our newest commissioner was out to shake a
-7 few hands and say hello to some of the people.
8 In.the last day and a half, we learned information 9
through the presentations, and then there was further 10 information through the questi.ons and answers, and, indeed, a 11 lot.of exchange I was noticing going on at the breaks.
The
. 12 breaks were not simply to get coffee and to deposit coffee, but to have some good cross-talk there as well.
13 14
.So that then concludes our session, and I very much 15
. appreciate everybody being here.
Thank you.
16 Yes.
17 3(R. AAROE Bill Aaroe from West Virginia.
i 18 MR. KAMMERER:
Yes, sir.
19 MR. AAROE:
West By God Virginia.
I forgot to say 1
20 that.
q 21 You people are probably being mixed up with mix waste 22 disposal questions, and there's a very helpful guide.
It's 23 called A Small Business Health and Safety Guide for a Chemical l
24 Waste Disposal.
It's available from the American Conference of
(
l 25 Governmental and Industrial flygienists, at $7.50 a copy.
It's e
(:)
I Heritage Reporting Corporation j
(202) 628-4888 J
i 1
342 h
'l not a tome, it's a. guide.
And you people can use it in the 2
nuclear side over to the chemical side.
If you want to take-a
'3 look at it, I have a copy right here.
You can take a look at l
4 it before you leave.
i 5
Thank you.
6 MR. KAMMERER:
All right., in conclusion then,-- if 7
everybody would give my staff a big hand, I'd appreciate that, i
i 8
(Applause.)
{
9 (Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m.,
the meeting was-10 concluded.)
l 11 12 13 i
14 l
15 16 i
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
343 1
CERTIFICATE (2) 2 3
This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
5 Name: Office of Government and Public Affairs 6
National State Liaison Officers' "eeting 7
Docket Number:
8 Place:
=Bethesda, Maryland 9
Date: September 10, 1987 10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 11 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear
-12 Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and, 13 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction 14 of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a 15 true and accurate record of the foregoing roceedings.
)
/
)
16
/S/
E4C A.LLLL C.-.)
17 (Signature typed): Kent Andrews 18 Official Reporter 19 Heritage Reporting Corporation 20 21 1
22 23 24 25 j
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
)
\\
NOV 2 1987
'T he following encerpts were annotated by the staeakers at the National State Liaison 07ficers' Meeting for errors or inaccuracies, i
l l
l I
l l
l l
l I
i 1
)
l, I
I
(bfL
-W H~T5 W 4
88 I
~(
1 Ron Callen is with us, also, and is Director of I
2 Strategic Planning at the Michigan Public Services Commission.
)
1 3
Much of'his work there has focused on a nuclear option.and'its 4
effects on' local and national electrical rate payers.
Areas'of 5
his responsibility include nuclear construction and operation 6~
oversight,'past and future cost, and, for the Commission, 7
assessments of future development of the utility at state and
)
1 8
national level.
He is a staff coordinator for the Subcommittee 1
9 on Nuclear Waste Disposal and has advanced degrees in physics i
10 from Wesleyan University.
Jim?
I l
11 MR. TAYLOR:
I welcome all of you on behalf of Vic 12 Stello, who is in Europe. Vic is the Executive Director and, as 1
13 you can see, I am a smaller version of that guy. The l
('
14 heavyweight is in Europe today.
15 Certainly, the goal of safe and economic nuclear 16 power is an important nationel objective.
And I think that f
17 meetings like this provide an important forum for communicating 18 among those who have regulatory authority for assuring that 19 this type of national objective and the public interest are met 20 in nuclear power.
21 My remarks will focus on the NRC's role in assuring 22 nuclear plant safety and on the NRC's views concerning plant 23 performance incentives established or proposed by some state 24 public utility commissions.
25 Let me begin by summarizing our understanding of
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
~
89
(
1-various PUC incentive plans.
PUCs through economic performance 2
indicators hope to achieve better performance with less 3
regulation by having the utilities derive financial benefits as 4
a result of good performance and financial burdens as a result' 5
of poor on-line performance.
The general concept of providing 6
incentives in the utility industry is not new he end of 7
1983, 11 state PUCs had some type of incentiv'e programs in 8
effect for nuclear plants. Several other states had similar 9
programs under consideration.
1 10 Since then, some have been terminated, but today 11 performance incentives are applicable to either construction or i
12 operation of about 45 nuclear power plants in 17 states.
Most 1
}
13 of these incentive plans provide for both penalties and
{
?
i 14 rewards.
Currently, the NRC has no formal requirements or 15 explicit policy concerning incentive plans.
However, the NRC I
16 does continue to study across the board the possible effects 17 that incentive plans could have on nuclear plant safety.
18 Obviously, no matter what specific incentive plans 19 are established, utilities must continue to operate these 20 nuclear plants safely.
The way incentives are formulated, 21 however, can effect the balance between aspects conducive to 22 safe operation and those which could undermine it.
The effect 23 of an incentive plan on plant safety ultimately hinges on a utilit,y[$)~ management reaction A y % 5 p weut': rcact M x
24 25 to the plan; that is the nature of the way operational plans
(
t Heritage Reporting Corporation j
(202) 628-4888 l
_____.__m_
90 ek J
-(
l are carried on at the_ pl a_M, instructions are given and y
O
/
maintenance 4 carried out under this type of incentive plan.
2 3
As you well know, the NRC's fundamental mission has 4
been to regulate those who use nuclear material and nuclear 5
power so that the public health and safety, common defense and 6
security are protected.
7 While the area of safety regulation is reserved for 8
the Federal Government, states retain their traditional N
9 responsibility of regulating electric utilities with regard to 10 direct cost to customers and related matters.
11 Although the roles of the NRC and state regulatory 12 agencies are different, actions by one can certainly impact the 13 role and the effect of the other. For example, the NRC's
(
14 increased regulatory efforts after the Three Mile Island 15 accident impacted significantly on costs at nuclear power 16 plants.
In that regard, there have been significant efforts by 17 the NRC to better control the regulatory process and the costs 18 resulting from that process.
19 As you know or may have heard, we have tried to 20 tighten up on the rule-making area.
We have established the 21 committee for review of generic requirements.
There is an 22 ongoing review of existing regulations to see those which 4 W M 6 dCA/'N.SS/dN N 23 should be corrected or deleted.aedrme rcccatly^ passed a 4 d o control 24 regulation y hatd th^ Nrr i-25 backfitting.
/
1 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
91
(
1 You may also know there was a court challenge to that 2
regulation,and just this past week a change to that rule was 3
signed out to bring the rule in compliance with the court 4
- action, t ddovers how costs are to be considered when j
5 requiring backfit safety improvements at nuclear plants. h 6
e recpanse fo,the-cimrAchall "R
8 One important thing that has been going on and Vic i
)
9 Stello and others that you will see here have been very active 10 in with regard to trying to improve plant performance, l
11 certainly, from oup. view point, are senior NRC management j
M Y'
{
12 meetings.
cover individual plant performance and problems w h-el 13 wht b are conduct 4tre about twice a year.
We look very 14 deeply at performance problems in nuclear plants, particularly, 15 of course, directed to the safety issues, but the net objective 16 is to try to take action before the plants deteriorate further 17 to the potential shut-down condition,s, with those high costs.
18 As I mentioned earlier, the issue of plant economics 19 is primarily a state responsibility.
And, now, I would like to 20 say a few more words about incentive plans.
It appears that 21 incentive plans are gaining momentum.
I would like to discuss 22 some general observations based on the information that has l
23 been available to the NRC staff concerning various PUC plans.
24 I would like to outline the status of what the NRC is doing and 25 provide some perception of NRC's view of potential safety
(.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
92
'(
1 impacts from these plans.
2 These plan ry widely across the states that 3
have them.
A number of criteria have been applied as a measure 4
of performance.
Among these are capacity factor, availability' 5
factor, fuel costs, construction costs and others.
.Ln-addition)ffomeplansbaseincentivesononlyone 6
7 measure of performance, while others use more than one. The 8
form of incentives varies from plan to plan.
Some plans only 9
reward good performance.
That is they have a financial benefit 10 from good performance and others provide a penalty for poor I
f 11 performance. =d 2 drop in earnings, cherei>y. (
)
12 The incentives which may be applied vary in value.
L 13 Some cases potentially involvieg%illions of dollars and may be 14 applied to a utility on a system-wide' basis or to an individual 15 plant.
Most plans include an objective predetermined formula j
16 for determining the size of the financial reward and a penalty i
17 as a function of performance.
18 Some plans include a null zone of performance in 19 which neither penalty nor reward is accrued to that utility.
20 Some plans have no predetermined formula but depend on an 21 after-the-fact evaluation by the PUC on the factors which were 22 under the utility's control and which may have contributed to 23 increased or decreased costs.
24 Some of the plans provide for adjustments based on 25 PUC judgment.
There has been a lot of discussion within the j
j Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
~
93
(
1 industry and in various PUC bodies and certainly.between 2
various states as to the types and soundness and fairness of 3
the various incentive plans.
Certainly questions have been 4
raised about whethe$
perfect incentive plan might offer an 5
incentive for a utility to unknowingly at against the public 6
interest, that is, public health and safety in some situations.
7 8
There are key questions that need to be faced by any l
9 state nsidering an incentive plan, ead long these
=
10 lines, what performance parameters should be the subject of i
11 incentives?
How should factors that are not directly under 12 utilities' control be considered?
How do you relate the 13 incentive compensation level to the utilities' right to a fair t
14 return on its investment?
And most important, certainly to the 15 NRC, how do you avoid safety compromises that could result from 16 performance parameters such as capacity factors?
17 I'd like to just say a few words about that last one, l
18 andthatis,prformanceincentives{potentialfnfluencpDon 19 reactor safety.
While we have done no detailed safety impact 20 analysis and we have no specific information concerning the 21 effects of incentive programs, the staff currently perceives 22 that the influence of such incentive plans on reactor safety is 23 small.
This is because, without exception, all licensees are i
24 required to co ply with NRC, regulations hner mesni.tve ~
N Ah gk4f e
25 (th,
r^ fit er le:: cr A e + =u= ny may exist.
These c
k Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
94
(,
1 regulations, together with license conditions governing 2
operations and maintenance, specify that, in specifying the 3
safety design, are the NRC's ways of trying to assure that I
4 these pl.ans are operated with an attention to safety.
g 5
'Framewise, yee kno e resident inspectors) 6 an gional inspectors and audits eviewia$-whether licensees j
7 and plants are adhering to the requirements of the Commission.
l acb M I
8 Nevertheless, it is recogniz economic incentive plans could i
l b
influence a Iicensee's approa6h to-reactee-s>Mn situations 9
?
10 not addressed by specific license conditions which could have U
f 11 an indirect bearing upon safety, -eocncric incentiveo woulu havi l
be 12.
en-infinane@-
For this reason they could be(either a positive 13 or a negative influence on safety.
On positive side, 14 performance incentives reward a utility for correcting 15 recurrent or predictable failures or degradations that could 16 lead to plant outage or derating.
That's a desired result V *# hsat C-M md \\
L.
s rMkyo because,these crer - qhd correci.ie of-these--types n P calems tr 17 118
-falkuresauld - w inc; the uld be in safety systems ould M et 19 adversely affect saf7 plant performance.
20 For example, unanticipated shutdowns can challenge 21 safety systems, and therefore might provide initiating events 22 to a potential accident.
Nonetheless, high morale and a quest 23 for excellence in the utility's operational organization, which 24 can be encouraged by performance incentives, can be conducive 25 to improving plant safety, as well as economic performance.
(
s Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4988
1 l
95 l
(
1 On the negative side, oncern o centive 2
plan is that in the interest of real or perceived short-term yr 3
economics, utilities might hurry work, take short-cuts, or l
4 delay important actions in order to meet a start-up deadline, l
5 or cost limitation or any other incentive plan factors.
I n.
)
6 other words, the potential exists that such a program could i
7 encourage directly or indirectly the adoption of actions 8
designed to maximize measured performance at the expense of 9
plant safety.
10 And if you ven't read about it, there was a 11 recent civil penalty, a rather substantial one, issued against 12 a utility in a neighboring state because of the tying open of,#--
13 Lie b ntainment vacuum breaker ptctection to aid in rapid de-i' 14 inerting of the containment.
Unfortunately this was done while
% -M4 d.
15 the reactor was in power.
There's i case in which trying to 16 get the containment de-inerted so work could start fast 17 potentially compromised reactor safety.
18 Unlike economic incentive plans whose primary 19 emphasis is on economic performance, one state has proposed an 20 incentive plan intended to enhance utilities' attention to i
21 nuclear safety.
This plan would use the NRC's performance 22 assessment or enforcement programs as a basis for financial l
23 rewards and penalties.
Plans of this type present several 1
24 concerns to the NRC.
First, the NRC's own method of measuring 25 utility safety performance, the systematic assessment of
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
~
96
(
1 licensee performance, the so-called SALP, was developed 2
primarily to assist the NRC in identifying plants and plant 3
areas where inspection resources would best be increased or 4
allocated to improve performance or direct it to other plants 5
where performance was already good.
The NRC focuses on facts 6
in the SALP report, the issues identified, and the entire group 7
causes of problems at that particular plant.
It's not the 8
NRC's intent that the public focus on the numerical SALP score 9
values themselves.
SALP functional areas do change.
And some MJ &
10 AT P nariod4L don't get suf ficient inspection e to be rated.
u h ospect of financial rewards or punishments 11 12 based on SALP ratings and scores raises concern in that it may 13 change the focus of the SALP process from trying tn g
(
WA 14
-ut+1-1-ties te correu underlying causes to safety problems.or-=--
15 should properly be to concentration on the numerical ratings 16 and the potential of reward for high numerical ratings.
- M.
17 It's the NRC's staff's concern that concentration on 18 SALP scores as an incentive plan basis may present problems in 19 the NRC's interaction with licensees' staffs.
Our 20 effectiveness in inspecting these plants to a major degree, 21 depends on having an open relationship with plant operating l
22 staff, going to the meetings nd interacting with the people a
23 in the meetings, on interacting with the peop 4and-the '
24 meehaTriss and Managers of the plant.#
's well-25 established within the NRC that plant staff frequently ill
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
97
(
1 tell inspectors of problems that might not be revealed 2
otherwise by our ins ection program, and we want to encourage 3
this opennesa/// MF e're careful to see that plant staff aren't 4
punished for discussing problems of possible safety 5
significance with the NRC.
The prospect that, for example, an 6
individual's cash bonus might be adversely affected as a result 7
of disclosing safety information to the NRC is a great concern.
8 Finally, we're concerned with any program based on 9
SALP which specifically imposes a large penalty on a licensee 10 for minimally satisfactory performance.
In such cases, the NRC 11 may have determined that nuclear safety performance needs to be 12 improved.
But this would be in the fact of these economic 13 penalties which could reduce the very resource that might be
(
14 necessary to improve safety performance, j
15 In light of these concerns, the NRC staff does not 16 support the use of SALP ratings or enforcement history to 17 arrive at financial awards and penalties.
Furthermore,
)
18 performance in incentive plans which focus on nuclear safety j
19 rather than on economic operation of nuclear plants, may 20 interfere with the federal authority over nuclear safety 21 matters.
22 Let me make some observations on licensees' 23 performances there are clearly differences in the regulatory 24 performance of the utilities with nuclear plants across the 25 United States.
Some utilities have an excellent record, while
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
98 I
1 others have records that indicate they need improvement.
In 2
some cases the utilities have problems that only occur once 3
because they get to the root causes and correct them; other 4
utilities just keep repeating the same kinds of problems.
5 There is a wide variation in the capability of the utilities.
6 However, it is le it may be difficult to 7
prove, I strongly believe that there is a positive correlation 8
between safety performance and economic performance.
I suggest 9
that a safe plant is a reliable plant, and a steady-state plant 10 producing power is safer and more economical than a plant which 11 is obviously more economical than a plant with frequent 12 unplanned outages.
13 on the other hand, if on the pursuit of increased 14 availability, a licensee keeps a reactor on-line when it should M
15 be down for preventive or corrective maintenai.cer' work short-n & & own-time, cuts -of use #e* compressed schedules eq3minimize d the j
16 f
17 pursuit of greater availability could have an adverse impact on 18 safety.
19 Similarly if significant maintenance issues 20 identified in the SALP report are obscured by concerns of
)
21 financial consequences incurred as a result of correction of 22 this maintenance problem, an adverse impact on safety could 23 result.
24 In all this, I believe that the NRC and the state 25 PUCs have a compatible goal, however, and that is certainly
(.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
C
99 1
safe and economical plants.
It's in our best interest to 2
continue to wo'rk cooperatively between the NRC and the states, 3
to put the appropriate balance between the goals of economic 4
and safety performance.
Thank you.
5 MR. CALLEN:
I'm Ron Callen from the State of 6
Michigan and I've also been asked to talk about performance 7
incentives.
Our message is a little bit different even though 8
if you can't tell us apart from our ties -- let me say'that, to 9
try to introduce the subject, I wanted to talk a little broader 10 than just the performance incentives themselves.
And so I have 11 chosen to look at the larger issue.
12 Compared to the long history of commercial nuclear 13
- power, increased attention to efficiency of operation of 14 nuclear power facilities is a recent matter.
This interest has 15 drawn.the attention of the Federal Safety Regulator, as you 16 just heard from Jim today, and certainly from the state 17 economic regulators, the PUCs or the PFCs, and of course, the 18 utilities industry.
19 The views expressed by all in my are, in my personal 20 estimation, one that displays some weariness as these 21 institutions confront an increase in their interaction.
While 22 there has been much mutual recognition over the years among 23 these institutions, they I don't believe, have seen as much 24 mutual confrontation and this issue is going to bring that more 25 to the fore.
C.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
f*.
gi g a (cnL u 225
(
1 speaker.
2 This morning to lead off, we will have Ed Jordan from 3
the NRC,and Mr. Jordan is a graduate in physics and mathematics sid.
4 from Northwestern State University in Louisiana, end graduate 5
studies in nuclear engineering, at Southern Methodist 6
University and Texas Christian University.
7 Some of the jobs that he has had in the Nuclear 8
Regulatory Commission include inspection and enforcement with 9
extensive amounts of work in engineering with events and 10 evaluations in quality assurance.
Also in oome responalbility 11 in_-reacto r a ries-ign-and cFerations.
fA -
12 Currently Ed is the offtce director of the Of fice SWF
(,
13 Analysis and the-Evaluation of Operational Data, and-Mr. Jordan 14 is the Chairman of the Committee to Review Generic 15 Requirements.
16 Ed, would you lead off this morning?
I 17 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, and thank you.
i 18 NRC Staff have difficulty making a presentation 19 without slides, so that if you will bear with me, I will 1
20 display a slide and try to talk around them.
We have some l
l 21 handouts and Mindy, would you make sure that those get around?
22 Thanks.
23 I would like to discuss incident response as 24 differentiated from emergency preparedness.
I would also like 25 to discuss the emergency response data systems and I would like
/
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
226
'(
1 to discuss guidance that the NRC will be providing to reactor 2
licensees, regarding experiences with exercises scenarios.
3 Ased you will get a discussion of tien ou exercise,5 4
later this afternoon.
This is sort of a continuity discussion 5
with the Operations Center tour that you had yesterday and some l
6 of you will get today.
There was not an opportunity to go j
l 7
through the roles and functions that the NRC follows, so I will 8
start off first with the roles.
el 9
The principbe point that I would like to make with j
10 this slide is that the responsibility for limiting accident 11 consequences rests with the licensee, and responsibility for 12 deciding upon and implementing protective actions, rests with 13 the state and local authorities.
Jumd I try to make that i
14 graphically on the slide, by having at the very bottom, the 15 statement that the NRC is a regulatory agency.
16
-Add maybe that is different from the view that some I
17 of you have about what the NRC's responsibility really is.
We
]
18 had to first understand our role after Three Mile Island, in asf order to develop our incident responseq emergency response 19 20 capability itself.
j l
21 So_ then L.wM4--Meeees-the.^.gency role 22 The NRC role looks simple here, but as I indicated, 23 it was very difficult for us to express.
We spent quite a bit 24 of time, arguing internally over what our true role was.
And 25 the role that we have, I think, is in pretty much priority is Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
)
l 227 j
1 I
that our first and foremost is to monitor licensees, and assure 2
that appropriate protective actions are being recommended and i
3 taken.
This is with respect to off-site recommendations, 4
principally.
5 Then we support the licensee with technical analysis j
6 and logistical support.
We are not really in a regulating role 7
during one of these events.
It would be somewhat unlikely that 8
in a serious accident, the NRC would revert to a regulatory or 9
enforcement type of role.
Our role is really to try to make
]
10 the best of the situation to provide support to the licensee 11 and to support the off-site authorities.
This is especially I
12 important in confirming or disagreeing with the licensee's 13 recommendations to off-site authorities.
l l
l 14 The NRC, by law, is the Agency that has the l
l 15 understanding or is required to maintain the understanding of j
16 the licensee's capabilities, their plant details, and so in a 1
17 real event, we would be confirming that the licensee's actions l
18 were correct or incorrect in terms of their recommendations to 19 off-site authorities.
20 Anocner role is to keep other Federal agencies, and 21 entities informed of the status of the incident.
A 22 communication role.
A very important and a very difficult one.
1 23 To keep the media informed, this is the public, of our l
J 24 knowledge of the status of the incident, including coordination l
25 with other public affairs groups -- with the states, with the l
l k
l Heritage Reporting Corporation l
(202) 628-4888 l
228
(
1 utility, so that there is really one story going out. Jt ic 2
coordinatudr--orid the state, the utility, the NRC and other l
n o te.c+vl% Q m W p aJm bc
~
3 government agenci s, are, in f act r-coordtriated-with-that yh M& 2 D
4 communteation.
5 I need to touch on the four classes of emergencies in 6
order to identify the Agency's response modes, and who has the 7
lead within the NRC for that response.
8 And the lead switches.
I think that it is important 9
for you to recognize that.
Unusual event -- that is really a 10 misnomer.
In terms of being an emergency, unusual events have 11 not thus far, run up to more serious emergencies.
The more 12 serious emergencies seem to start at alert or start at site w:wjf n n. m f w t~k n w n,
13 area, and soj tdrat is sort of an anomaly and neatly -
a mvre 14 a_no rmal-modew 15 We have a fairly large number of unusual events 16 reported each year.
The states are advised.
There is a 17 requirement for reporting to the states and it keeps our 18 communications systems alive.
I understand the states like 19 that arrangement and we don't plan to change it.
We considered 20 it at some point, but we are not.
I just wanted to put the j
l 21 unusual event in context.
22 Alerts, thcae do constitute conditions where the 23 plant seems to have problems that could lead to something more 24 serious.
The Agency normally goes into a standby condition, 25 under that situation. That means that the Chairman and the
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
229 b
1 Staff that would be responding in an event would be called into 2
the operations center, and would be, if you were, standing by 3
that in the event that the situation worsens.
4 The' lead, in this case, is.with the Regional 5
' Administrator, in the Regional Office, so that the Regional-6 Administrator is communicating with his staff to the licensee j
7.
and with the state and locals.
If the event worsened and there 8
was a threat of an off-site release or an on-site release then 9
a site or general emergency would be declared and the Agency 10 would be placed in initial activation.
11 The thing that you have to understand between initial 12 activation and expanded activation is that the lead does change 13 in the Agency for responding to the event and communicating 14 with the state and locals, and the utility.
15 In the initial activation, the lead is with NRC 16 headquarters, the Chairman is normally the director of the 17 Executive Team in Washington, and he is in communication with 18 the appropriate officials.
A 19 And his staf f, that is, the team that supports him or-20 obtaining information from the licensee and coordinating with 21 the state and locals and communicating that information.
l 22 The Regional Office is transporting people from their 1
i 23 offices to the site.
We understand and have determined that 24 our best and most capable response is by having the right 25 people at the site.
So that it is important to promptly i
Heritage Reporting Corporation j
(202) 628-4888 i
i i
230
(
1-transport those people to the site, and during that time, the 2
lead is in Washington.
Mi 3
The expanded activation is when that Director of that 4
Regional Office and his team have arrived on site, have been 5
briefed, and the Chairman transfers the lead formally to tMs.
6 Director of Site Operations, who is the Regional Administrator, 7
normally of that Region.
8 And so that is the imrortant distinction I
l 9
wanted to make about initial activation and etandard-
~
4 10 activation.
11 Now, in ttse initial activation, I identified the 12 Chairman as the Director of the Executive Team.
M he has a 13 group of five members of his staff, the Executive Director for 14 Operations and Directors of four of the offices, who constitute 15 the Executive Team, provide him advice and support him in 16 making decisions.
17 And these are NRC decisions to make recommendations.
18 These are not decisions that the NRC is making for the states l
19 and locals or for the utilities.
The Reactor Safety Team, on 20 the extreme left, provides insight into the plant conditions.
21 What is the reactor doing?
Is it adequately cooled; is the 22 containment intact; was there any fuel damage; is there 23 expected to be fuel damage; is the containment expected to 24 remain intact?
25 And the Protective Measures Team is taking that kind
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation j
(202) 628-4888
231 1
of information and then making prognostications of the source 2
term, what would the release be, if the containment failed with 3
the core in its condition, or what would the release be, if the 4
reactor dried out and the vessel failed?
5 So, they are making those prognostications.
How much
{
6 time is available?
What are the meterological conditions? -MMb WM, 7
they havegcodes for analysis of these events and providing 8
estimates of what may happen.
9 The Safeguards Team is one that would support, if j
10 there were a threat of sabotage.
And if there were a security-11 type issue.
The Regional Base Team is, at this point, 12 scurrying around and getting people transported to the site.
13 Congressional Liaison, Government Liaison, Public 14 Affairs, and the Response Coordination Teams, are all providing 15 support.
They are doing the communications, keeping people 16 informed about the current situation.
17 In the expanded activation, I would simply focus on
)
18 the roles in the middle of this slide.
The roles are to 19 provide recommendations to the licensee, and off-site 20 officials.
These are recommendations principally about 21 protective actions.
To act as a focal point for coordination 22 of NRC press releases, and media interactions.
To keep other 23 Federal agencies informed and to coordinate NRC requests for 24 their assistance.
25 And then, finally, to direct all NRC Staff that are
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i 232
(
1 responding to the event.
2 In looking at this chart, it really is an overlay, 3
the upper organizational structure is overlaid on the chart 4
that you saw, two slides back.
That is, the Site Operations f
5 Team is now overlaid and the Executive Team is essentially in a 6
support role to the Site Operations Team.
7 So they are counterparts for reactor safety, for 8
protective measures, public affairs, and then a stronger 9
element there, for State Liaison, in coordination with other f
10 organizations.
(_
11 The principit interfaces are obvious, but that is 12 really what this response program is about, is in making those
{
13 interface, and communicating across channels and within each of l
I I
14 the organizations.
15 I think that it is fair to say that the NRC has as 16 much trouble communicating within, as the various agencies 17 have, communicating between one another.
{
18 We spend a great deal of our effort in an event simplyinfcommunicating.
And so we are working on 19
- response, 20 ways to try to improve, automate, make more efficient these l
21 communications of data and information.
So that we are 22 spending a little less time communicating and a little more 23 time planning and responding.
s[
24 This is a list of the princip W Federal Agencies that 25 would be responding in a serious event and a simplified
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
)
l
____-______a
233 b
statement of their areas of support.
For instance, FEMA, does 1
2 coordinate and manage the off-site logistical response.
3 The FBI would have the lead if there were a 4
safeguards event, and the Cepartment of Transportation can 5
assist if there is a transportation problem, to provide 6
resources to support transportation issues.
7 The object of this slide is to the NRC joint 8
coordination role.
The NRC is responsible for the coordination 9
of the technical aspects of the emergency and FEMA coordinates l
10 the logistical non-technical aspects of the Federal response, 11 with all of the Federal Agencies, and the NRC and FEMA come l
I 12 together to comn.unicate with the utility and with the state and l
l 13 locals to provide support in a coordinated fashion.
)
14 I would like to tell you all that you ever wanted to 15 know about the Emergency Response Data System. And if I don't 16 tell you that, you can ask me in the next discussion session.
17 The ENergency Response Data System is a follow-on to 18 the Data Link that some of you will recall of some years ago.
19 After TMI one of the lessons was that it was very difficult to 20 understand plant conditions.
There were miscommunications 21 made, and that there ought to be a better way of handling data 22 and information.
23 The NRC made an effort to come up with what turned 24 out to be called, Data Link, and that system was overwhelming 25 in its size and complexity and cost.
And it was not adopted.
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
234 I
1 We now have the Emergency Response Data System that is somewhat 2
different than the Data Link.
3 It is bounded, it uses the existing data systems that 4
the utilities have, either their Safety Parameter Display 5
System or their Process Computer pe ta # with a 6
hardware interface and software, then transmits this data by 7
wire or by satellite to NRC Headquarters, where we have 8
hardware / software to make it user friendly to the personnel M
9 that are responding in that initial stage of that event.
10 Similarly, the data would be provided to the Regional 11 office, and can be made available to the state.
The purpose is 12 clearly to monitor plant conditions during emergencies.
jphedescriptionIhaveprovided, I
the data list that 13 q
14 we are expecting is about 60 parameters., These would encompass Akmwm 15 most of the events and for tho,se nr. :rel-// events, it is really A
notworthhaving=fortheNRCfg a longer list of variables, in 16 17 order to try to pick up the one or two others.
18 So we would simply get those by transmission i
19 facsimile or by verbal, which we will maintain a verbal link.
20 We would be able to, with the Emergency Response Data System, 21 focus tha discussions more on what are the plant conditions; 22 what equipment is out of service; what actions is the utility 23 taking with respect to the equipment that is malfunctioning?
24 Rather than, what is the pressure; what is the 25 temperature; what is the rate of pressure rise?
We can get
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation i
(202) 628-4888 l
1
235 1
away from those discussions of data.
And it takes a lot of 2
telephone time to transfer that data, in a verbal fashion.
3 This system has a minimum backfit implication to the 4
utilities.
We are not asking them to change their hardware and 5
as I have discussed, software and the modem for transmission 6
from the sites.
7 The benefits clearly are, accuracy, greater 8
timeliness of the data, and a reduction in the licensee's 9
burden, as well as the NRC's burden.
I can list a number of
)
10 examples that we have had in real events as well as 11 exercises -- bad misunderstandings about data -- starting with 4
l 12 TMI and going to other events.
I l
13 We had one reactor event in which the pressure was 14 communicated to the NRC in containment and the pressure was G
15 understood to be something like 18 PSI, in containment, which 4
16 indicates that there was a real problem.
There was a 17 substantial primary system leak, a little ways into the event.
18 And in a couple of hours after we got this initial T4e/^""R 19 information, it was determined that 4 hat was 18 PSIA and so the 20 pressure was not a big problem at all.
21 Those kinds of mistakes, if it were in a 1
22 non-conservative direction, just would be unacceptable.
And 23 the probability, of course, in a real event, is that the 24 mistake is not going to be in a conservative direction.
This 1
25 one, it was.
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 t
W__.________________
236
'I 1
So that kind of thing has driven us to the clear 2
understanding that we have to have a better way of 3
communicating data.
4 The Emergency Response Data System status, the NRC 5
has conducted and completed the survey of plant equipment.
So, 6
we-have been to essentially every site, obtained the data, 7
understood the parameters that are available and the kinds of 8
hardware / software interfaces that would have to be made.
9 We have conducted trials with Duke Power and 10 Commonwealth Edison in exercises and that included the Zion 11 exercise.
The program is budgeted by Congrees and completion 12 is slated at this point for 1992.
It is a phased 13 implementation.
We would be doing about 20 or 20-plus sites a 14 year beginning this year.
15 We have a contractor selection process ana we are in 16 the final stages.
We would expect to select a contractor very 17 shortly, down to days.
18 There is proposed legislation by Congress regarding a 19 data system.
This is HR 1570.
This bill, this proposed bill 20 would cause implementation to be mandatory.
The present 21 program is a voluntary program.
That is we are not requiring 22 by rule that utilities make the connections, but we don't 23 anticipate a problem in making those because there are mutual 24 benefits.
This proposed legislation would require the NRC to i
j 25 complete implementation within three years of bill passage.
It
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
237
(
1 does have funding provisions.
It would lock up the funds so 2
that they would be -- certain to be applied to this particular i
3 program.
4 It provides for data sharing with effected states, 5
which we would expect to do in any case.
It would put limits 6
on other authorities from imposing other data requirements and 7
would grandfather existing data systems.
8 My last chart is about Emergency Preparedness 9
Exercises.
We have gotten signals from our participation in 10 exercises as well as utilities' concerns that the exercises awe-11
-- lack realism and that every exercise goes to 4 severe core 12 damage, nhin that is misleading people, the responders, the 13 public and, in fact, the plant operators into a^ unnatural A
14 situation and is depriving them of some training that may be 15 quite beneficial.
16 So, we are communicating.
I have met with INPO and 17 we have developed a information notico that will be issued 18 shortly that would encourage licensees to conduct more 19 interactive exercises on the alternate years when off-site i
20 participation is not required.
We feel that this would be a 21 substantial benefit to problem solving, that the utility would 22 be at greater openness to coming up with innovative solutions 23 within his plant.
24 If there is an electrical problem, then the utility 25 would be thinking more of:
How could we solve this scenario
(
i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
]
J
238 b
1 problem.
And if the scenario problem is solved, then the plant 2
would not necessarily have to go to the severe accident 3
condition.
So, this realism, we think, would be most 4
beneficial.
So, we are urging utilities to do this.
There is l
5 not a requirement by the NRC to in each case go to a severe 1.
6 core accident.
And we feel it is important for the states to 7
recognize that we are doing this on those alternate years.
8 So, those exercises, we hope, will turn out to be a little 9
different.
10 Thank you.
11 MR. KAMMERER:
Give the guy a hand.
12 (Applause.)
13 MR. KAMMERER:
You know, we who work for NRC need a 14 little applause from time to time.
15 MR. JORDAN:
If it wasn't spontaneous, I don't want 1
16 it.
17 (Laughter.)
18 MR. KAMMERER:
Let the record show that was 19 spontaneous applause.
Thanks, Ed.
20 Proceeding next to Frank Congel.
Frank is the 21 Director of Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency 22 Preparedness.
In 1964, he received his BS degree in physics 23 from Lemoyne College, Lemoyne College.
He attended graduate 24 school in Clarks University in Potsdam, New York, and received 25 his Ph.D -- masters and Ph. degree in nuclear physics in '68 i
i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
F kd
.g.
J u9 k
1 remarks yesterday that Harold is now the Director of
)
i GovernmentalPublicAffairswhichincludespublicafairs, f
2 Mut 3
congressional affairs, international program /s. in-cur state, 4
local and indian tribes programs, l
l And without further ado then, I bring you Mr.
5 y
6 Audiotuty, Harold Denton.
7 MR. DENTON:
I'll be brief also; just er brim ac 4
]
the slides perhaps7 M let me just share with 8
takgs t.o load 9
you :: : sf my perspective on what I think Chernobyl may mean 10 to the nuclear business in general, arnt I'll give you some 11 facts first, and then show some slides and draw a few i
12 conclusions,-and b; ;m.
13 First ef4, it's obvious to everyone that a reactor 14 accident anywhere is an accident everywhere in terms of public 15 perception.
It's clear that those of you with reactors in 16 your states can be affected by an accident in a reactor 17 anywhere in the world,f r>=
- he public$ perception.
18 There were plants cancelled in Europe because of the 19 Chernobyl accident, major changes of direction in programs in a 20 lot of countries.
Just be aware of that fact.
/'4 But it doesn't follow that from a technological l
21 22 standpoint that that same saying is true.
As you heard from
- 0. Sdn t
23 SetsTr, the RBMK reactors are so differ,ent in design from our type of pressurized water reactors /d boiling water reactors, 24 25 it really doesn't have a lot of technological implications
(
Heritage Reporting Corporation I
(202) 628-4888
l
)
330 b
1 Although from a public standpoint, the reaction is sure there.
2 Let's look also at
^.:t ir the ex erience of the i
a -t o to) 3 nuclear power industry.
We have had about
,000 reactor years j
4 of operation w eeF worldwide.
We have had two severe 5
The consequences-were quite
{
ro60s f i
6 different because TMI had a ontainment.
t unsJpf2.
j (Incidently,the RsliivelsA n Middletown, i
7 j
8 Pennsylvania were higher due to the Chernobyl accident than 9
they were to the TMI accident.
I + Awe--the v alue o r a s wu L -
10 c e in=ca 11 There have also been another half dozen events 12
' worldwide that were serious enough to attract the attention of il. $.
(-
13 us regulators, and to call for improvements.
So the historical 14 data base is pretty low.
15 Accidents can be severe if you have a plant that is 16 poorly designed, poorly constructed, or pooyly operated, or a M
el$ put 17 combination of aFl of those, and I A sant to show the have seal f. hen.
I have 18 Chernobyl slides since you may notj shown them in several forms /n w&g t - i f - t h e y - a r e - a v a i-l a b l M I ' l l a
19
^
slow 20 just 544ck/hr~2@ a few that may be of interest to you.
21 af. someone reDTdTfunghem7-andrI?llw-upsiderdown.
22 I thought you might like to see what a city like 23 Pripriot looks like.
This isn't Pripriot.
This is Ergodot, e
24 which is fnergy $ity in RussiaH. We visited so e reactors other
+1P '6 y te yh 4 u: Lea 25 than Chernobyl, and these cities are bui.t there.
-I.ps usually Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
\\-
I Wg gDCOO di 331 lt+-er 50,000 people /g/
t
(-
and.tiusy are built just to support the power 1
plant operation, asedThis is the little hotel in the city of 2
3 Ergodot, and they have four or five reactors nearby.
Everyone 4
lives in,the high rise apartment buildings.
AndwL4.hads e
5
. Pripri-ot yousan-th.Lnk pf -as-teing_ car l a s e..,
6 rTh n en vu The--nnvi-a l i de 7"ht _ie--
e 7
db. r Maybe they are-all uDir~rk;...~rinatX~
hint ?
do y e 8
Kiev was the nearest large city.
I was there at the 1%?.
9 end of Februaryp The temperature was between minus 25 and minus 40; apparently a normal winter for Kiev. /hifeYgoing7G 10
-up;Ms farasIcouldtell,kormalhinKiev, and there @ no 11 wy 12 decontamination efforts or anything else happening.there.
.n y
13 The next slideg I wanteur to show you the checkpoint
(_
14 30 kilometers away from the reactor.
This was established 15 after the accident, and this is how they contro11e entrance to W$
JLMosn*W*' "
16 the highways.
And-sbfMhenIwastherenoonehadbeenallowed
)
s 17 to return closer than 30 kilometers due to the overall 18 contamination level.
19 Next~ I took film badges in order to try to find the 20 difference between the dose I'd get at:yir.7 away from the plant 21 and what I got at the plant.
.Scr I left some film badges in j
i 22 Kiev and then wore some more control badges to the plant.
And.
23 wo)uring that 8-hour trip to the plant and back, I got an yL 24 additional 4 millirem.
So you can tell that that'5 e eretti 25 low member, and they had made ama'ing strides in cleaning usa 7 -
(
l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
s
\\'
332
(
1 pl % = +
2 This is the little town of Chernobyl.
It had been 3
there prior to the reactors being built.
It was all abandoned.
avu sv-and the streets were unplowed.
4 The sidewalks u
% This ta$
you intro very near the reactor, endThh 5
6 apartment in Chernobyl is the only one in which anyone is
/
living.)/ndsn ;h:=m p utment is at the end of the city of 7
8 Chernobyl.
It's being used by workers and they stay there two 9
or three weeks at a time, and then go back outside the 30 10 kilometer zone and rejoin their families.
11 Next-This is the first view of the complex.
They 12 have six reactors there.
Before the accident, four of them 13 were in operation and two were under construction.
(,
14 This is the control room inside Unit 1.
They had 15 Units 1 and 2 back in operation.
They done a tremendous 16 job of decontaminating the plant.
The operation seemed quite 17 normal, very orderly.
No one h I met there had been there at
]
18 the time of the accident.
They had completely replaced 19 management, and the best I could tell the plant was being i
i 20 operated in a professional manner j
21 They had made very few changes in the plant.ect=11y.
A96#
The major changepNthey had locked up the panel where the 22 i
23 operators bypassed the safety systems, and they said only the 1
0 24 plant manager now has the key to that prea.
But if this yh&f 25 reactor were put back in the same attree and m the same testp
(
a Heritage Reporting Corporation J
(202) 628-4888
)
i
1 333 d!dL-(
1 the same accident would result again.
These type plants -
2 scattered throughout the Soviet Union, and therm m c c n u mbo r-)
3 of--- tnem in the sas u Cerope n countries of Ct.whoslovakia +ws r
N r
IL Bulymi A bey are pe 7,% 9c.cnting th; acclucac h um nappcuing 4
cobr&
ch 5
again 4argely Why procedural and administrative r.sasees, not t 6
technical changes which will come about very slowly.
~;f;u,m en 7
Next.' Relatively clean turbine building floor.
The 4i tM-l 8
two units that were undamaged were back at full power.
There k.4/
9 was a severe power shortage in the Ukraine.
They.were taking-10 power shortages of 20 percent or so at the time I was there.
oh<.)
l 11 The airport temperature was Mke 50 degrees inside due to 1
1 12 shortage. ht.heturbinebuildingswerenotthatdifferent s
i l
13 from ours.
14 Next.
You recall the fi e at the plant and the troubletheyhadinkr[e,fightingbherewasverylittle 15 16 evidence of fire fighting equipment at the plant in general,,
17 but they had brought in two fire trucks, and-thatte-what Y
M plSture W w hose-the two fire trucks parked on the 18 slide s
ov,Lnaq'f!,'NryaJl turbine building floor at the plants that were operating.l,Very 19 gq 20 little in the way of ccttherw4ee, fire detection fire 21 prevention that was obvious.
f'Skay.
Theyhafdonealotofworkinbuildinga 22 23 sorcephmu d around the damaged unit.
This-was1ntheplant 24 manager's o ficer, and you can see over on the right the design th b
25 of ? cercophcgus which was 1R31 a very thick concrete wall all l
l
[
i
(
l Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
1 1
l 1
s 334
(
1 around the reactor, and new concrete roof,.aed [ fact they had 2
g entombed the reactor.
But they have done more than entomb h k 4
3 it.
They put filters in.
They-W in temperature monit9rs, Jj m,+ ^
^
A radiation monitors,(',a number of ingenious devices tg.t+eek,what 4
- d.
- nl.v.h j
is happening inside.the carccph gug.
Very little,is coming out 5
It's mainly lodine 125,p.u-I think is about the only 6
now.
7 isotope, and it's a few microcuries a day.
8 Next slide.
This shows where bhe instrumentation _in.rar
=
E-Te to acnit
, n-the iblant manager'_s of fice, 9
(the sarcopim3 65 v.__
10 is able to trend the data and instantaneously 1 8 i
- he radiation level the day I was there 11
.ase what is ge T
ao 12 I -bets-eve was 1,000 R an hour on the inside.
Air temperature p
13 coming in was tihe minus 10 degrees C, and the exit temperature f
14 was 100 degrees C, and what was being released was being 15 filtered.
16 jW-I was quite pleased, -I guess, to see that they had 17 put so much work into trying to isolate this damaged reactor 18 from the environment.
A lot of things they could have done c-19
% etter leading up to the accident, but obviously after it 20 happened they really h neda.tc_and-did a tremendous job.
They 21 built all of this before the snows got too deep in the fall of 22 the same year.
/,
ylet g/J, 23 Next.
The damaged reactor is over Commissi er l
24 Burnthal's head.back-there.
Y o u c a n % h a r d l y t e l l izb is any j
25 different from any other reactor, but it's had a huge amount of
{
I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l s
l 335 I
j
(
1 construction.
They used the Army to do the work.
)
v es 2
Thank you.
Turn the lights.
l g
3 Let me just give my perspective a-6ft on what this 1
4 may mean, or could mean.
ItseemsclearphattheNRCefforts(/[AI*
L-e uniu/p t's
<uadC 1.A V
}#v<- W Aod two vs.
They have gotten 5
to make plants safe he"e dcam P
6 peoole very sensitifed to the risk of nuclear power,. and-we 7
worsy -abcu t tornadues and earthquakes and vperatur ertuto and-8 thona kinda nf +hings, end sareguaras.
20heopleareverymuch 9
more aware of the risk of nuclear power than they are the risk 10 of coal, for example.
~/
11 they have run up the cost of nuclear power, and 12 as you heard from the representative from Michigan, in some 13 cases new plants today may not even-be competitive with coal.
/
14 seolke have spent a lot of money trying to make this business 15 safe.
16 From some of the questions I have heard today, people 17 might ask, well, why do we continue with the nuclear business.
18 And I wanted to give you my answer, at least.
19 I think it's the same answer that Churchill g ve JC.-
/ * -lv po
- , s up.,ta 20 about democracy.
You know what9B betterg J[n this country 3
A A
21 if we don't put up with the warts of nuclear power and try to 22 make it safe, and efficient, and economical, then we are left 23 with coal.
And I think most people who look at the comparison 24 between coal and nuclear come to the conclusion that coal 4k[
25 thot-coa 1 is no better and possibly f,pr" worse than nuclear i
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l s.
V 336 1
power M 100k aL li Objectively.
2 So N ile nuclear has all its weets, has these risks, 3
has these costs, it does seem ter-do better in many respects 4
than coal.8 5
When I talk to people about the possibility of a real 00s co d 6
met:sreicgicel shift due to burning OcaG, they don't talk about 7
probabilities of one in a million, or one in 10,000.
8 Apparently the-probability of that,becoming a real serious W"
9 national proolem.is more like 10,or-204ercent.
N b al Nga -- the burning of fossil fueJs has seme 10 large costjalso, a'n Y y
_ that.--are coal miner problems and-11 j
12 black lung disease, and air pollution.cf cccl.
13 derIt think we need a mix of all kinds of energies 14 and I'm not ready to rule that nuclear i Lviolly a loser p est H like Chernobyl are just 15 compared to the other ones,yet.
Thir.p 16 the reason that it requires so much attention from all of you, ewM 17 and the NRC, and all.the other federal agencies that.;cm,
ith 18 yW 19 I do have time for.maybe a question or two, a h n_ S 2 20 be-happf to take thKt.
j 21 VOICE: Did you have any opportunity to speak with 22 individual Russian workers at the site?
23 MR. DENTON:
I didn't really get a chance to talk to 24 the crews as much as the plant managers.
But the managers had 25 been brought in from other stations like the Leningrad station
(
l Heritage Reporting Corporation l
(202) 628-4888
)
1
__ _ _ _ _ A
r i
337 1
which was their oldest operating station.
And I got the 2
feeling that the new plant managers were thoroughly 3
professional and weren't going to let it happen on their watch.
l
,And-thatfaybetheyhadbeenlaxandoverconfidentbefore, but 4
1 5
the people I talked to were certainly safety conscious and,as l
l 6
far as I could tell, ran the plant in a very criep manner in l
l 7
complete conformance with the rules.
)/4 yxv' l
8 Sd'1 think in a sense this pa their TMI, and they may l
/
\\
9 have been overconfident borore, but I LL1nh they got ehe-I v bl,s, n~
\\
10 ma % now.
l l
11 Ogherw4se - yes.
l 12 MR. KAMMERER:
Could you use the microphone, please?
13 VOICE:
Just wanted to ask if you are aware exactly
{'
14 what is the fate of the former plant managers.
And secondly, 15 what you know of the plans for that area of the 30 kilometer 16 radius area in the future, what are they going to plan to 1
17 eventually repopulate that soon, or what do you know about 18 that?
g 4 f,,,
p 19 MR. DENTON:
The plant mangers were recently erted, 20 and the results were reported, aed-I think the plant manager 4k+f 21 the chief engineer and maybe one other person were sentenced to l
\\
fiveor10 years /('Ihaveforgottenthedetails)injail, 22 or 1
y 23 labor camps, cro _ uimya--it. VThey weren ' t sentenced f or lif e, 24 and they weren't executed.
But obviously they got very severe 25 penalties for their role, or louk or attencion ca ducy.
r I
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
\\
l l
i
I I
1 I
l 338
(
When I was there it wasn't clear what the radiation 1
2 levels would be after the snow melted, and there was a lot of l
And I think the Soviets do intend to technicJalnJcrtainty.
3 4
resettleA They are fortunate that around the plant was a j
W l
5 largely unpopulated area.
It was y rather rural, I vuulda-i l
MA 6
tell thc.t it nc a very productive region, app: cntl, it AA 7
w.an 't.
n"t g think thcir plou -vuld 6 if they can 8
decontaminate it and if the radiation levels are low enough, 9
they will resettle.
etrt hssia is such a vast country.
Clearly they can 10 1
11 set aside an area like this for some time without having a l
l 12 great impact on their economy.
And thoL's something that you T hear from the European countries, # pecially countries like 13 es M
2#
(
14 Austria, Luxembourg,4 Belgium, They don't have the ability to 15 set aside 30 kilometers.
ThatJ-e the entire country.
4 16 sfo % some extent, Chernobyl has had a much bigger 17 influence on European attitudes toward nuclear than it has in 18 the U.S.
We are more like them in terms of size.
I did pui
)
Je want to thank all of you for coming in.
It's a 19 20 very important meeting we're having today, and I think relag.,an<sLL 21 Chernobyl re-illustrates that Nhat-we-are in-here-le if not j
22 controlled properly can reatty have the most profound impacts
)
23 on both state and national economies and public health and 24 safety.
25 MR. THRON:
Ray Thron from the State of Minnesota.
i Heritage Reporting Corporation l
(202) 628-4888
s e
339 (s
1 Perhaps you can't answer this, but I will ask anyway.
2 Are you aware of what health follow-up studies that 3
might be in place by the Soviets, or European countries, or by 4
the U.S. as a part of this accident?
5 MR. DENTON:
We took as part of our team the chief 6
epidemiologist from NIH, and he tried to get a dialogue going 7
with his health counterparts, end-the Soviet view seems to be 8
that whatever the long-term health affects are they won't be 9
distinguishable in the general population.
10 I think we might agree with that based vu the~ data 11 thab4s utvand for people who live say outside the 30 kilometer 12 zone.
But we think for the people close in that an Ycn 0 epidemiologicallong-termfollow-upwouldbe/$$cibic.
13
(
14 AM) [heepidemiologistsarestilltalkingtoeach 15 other, and I don't know for sure whether the Soviets have 16 decided to pursue it.
There is a lot of ppessure on them to do eg m & dh 17 the follow up because it's a rare c s2 la vider to really 18 determine what are the health effects of low amounts of 19 radiation.
You know,7Ehe argument between having a threshold 20 and having no threshold maybe could be decided.
We wouldn't 21 know the answer for W years, but itO the potential for vad~e -
22 espe rimun c.
23 Incidently, the Soviets are making a return visit to 24 the U.S.
soon, and we will have them talk again to our NIH 25 experts in this area and maybe they will have decided to do 7
i Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
s
's 340
(
1 some long-term follow ups.
2 MR. THRON:
I think, just as a comment, it would 3
be -- if in any way that NRC can facilitate the distribution of 4
4 that information, I think it's important to the states to know.
5 Oftentimes we will get questions, are they establishing health 6
registries, or will that information be forthcoming and --
7 MR. DENTON:
They have been very forthcoming about 8
the reactor design and those sorts of areas, but not about the 9
health aspects.
And I just don't think they have made up their 10 own minds about what to do.
11 MR. THRON:
Thank you.
12 MR. DENTON:
If we find out, we'll let you know.
13 MR. KAMMERER:
Thank you, Harold.
EnuT10 14 (Applause.)
Til 15 MR. KAMMERER:
Ladies and gentlemen, this is-bringing 16 te a conclusion then a very profitable day and a half.
I very, 17 very much appreciate the speakers that we have had, and the l
l 18 candor with which they have addressed the problems that we have 19 asked them to speak to.
It has made, at least for me, this 20 day and a half a very good one.
21 There have been some good dialogue, some good 22 cross-talks.
Some people have found out some information, and, 23 indeed, that's one of the things that we were looking for.
I want to recognize 24 I note that Jim Shea here is 25 my office mate.
The Director of International Programs is
.e i
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888 l
I STATE OF OHIO l
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT 2825 WEST GRANVILLE ROAD WORTHINGTON, OHIO 43085-2712 DISASTER SERVICES AGENCY AG0il-DS October 16, 1987 l
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Carlton Kammerer, Director State, Local and Indian Tribal Programs Office of Governmental and Public Affairs
)
Washington, D.C.
20555 l
(
1
Dear Carl,
l My presentation at the State Liaison Officers meeting in Bethesda 9-10 September 87 was made from a note outline.
I did not have a hand-out of this outline nor did I have a prepared text availabic.
I have reviewed the transcript you submitted to me and compared it with my note outline.
In this process, I have corrected the transcript to reflect the concept of my presentation and have made it more orderly for reading. As you will see, there are few, if any, substantive or topic changes.
You may reproduce and distribute the revised text of my presenta-tion.
It contains all essential elements of what I had to say.
Thanks for the opportunity to review the transcript.
-.. Sincerely, l
I (Ph
/
1
/
JAMES R. WILLIAMS l
/
Chief of Staff i
JRW: liv I
Enclosure l
l l
l l
l l
l 1
AGN-0001 l
l 2
e h
l MR. KAMMERER; Thank you very much. Let the record show that I am i
I 1
neither a lawyer nor an I running for political office.
But this is just l
the kind of stuff that we are looking for here.
James R. Williams is the chief of staff of the Ohio Disaster Ser-vices Agency. He also serves as director of the radiological response team and has taught public health and radiation safety and numerous separate teaching positions for health physics and nuclear science. James, would you i
(
take the podium, please.
MR. WILLIAMS; Thanks, Carl, and I will try and be brief.
But I need to say some things, because 1 do not dare to go back to Ohio and look at the Govarncr without doing it.
I need to talk today about two particular aspects of emergency planning.
The first addresses the fixed nuclear facilities that we know as nuclear power plants.
And to do that, I need to set just a little bit of background for some of our power plants who have a little more notoriety than others.
I would like to begin with the Davis-Besse plant. It has been operating since 1977 as a younger sister of TM1 11 and with a certain design flaw in the auxiliary feed water system that was a point of contention between NRC and the utility which allowed the plant to operate without being fully prepared for the auxiliary feed water program. This eventually caused the plant to have a very, very brief site area emergency incident in 1985 in the early summer.
1
i i
I The other plant that has just received its license and which is a point of contention is the Ferry nuclear power plant which in the pre-licensing process was subjected to a 5.2 Richter Scale earthquake nine miles from the plant (which we normally reserve for California, but somehow or another got transferred to Ohio). This plant has also been brought under a lot of criticism for the GE design process that we are all familiar with from recent publication.
While those two plants were having some problems, the much proclaimed, and I think acknowledged, management programs and management faults at Toledo Edison and Davis-Besse were being corrected, I think much to the pleasure of the State of Ohio and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
As Davis-Besse regained control over its management structure and became aligned with the hardware requirements of NRC, it was apparent that the plant was going to be permitted to restart in late 1986. Simultaneously, the Perry nuclear power plant was complete and would soon be receiving its operating license late in 1986.
With certain anti-nuclear groups and concerned citizens groups in the state peaking their activity, the state reached its sensitivity point that was generally established by the administration.
As all states have 1
different personalities and those personalities can change when Governors and administrations change, that airo happened in the State of Ohio. The current Governor has a very justifiable, well-respected lower sensitivity threshold for all nuclear issues, not just nuclear power plants, but for all issues involving nuclear material.. _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
1 think that once we saw the Governor, his staff, and cabinet and the Attorney General with that lowered threshold, and when we say that the threshold was met midway in 1986, we saw the action on the part of the state to halt the restart of Davis-Besse and to try to prevent the operating license issue for Perry.
Once Governor Celeste announced his intentions and established what we called an Emergency Evacuation Review Team (and I will refer to this from now as EERT) to address the one aspect over which the state has prime responsibility (emergency planning that has been acknowledged) and with the NRC firmly in control of its own particular responsibilities of on site licensee actions, the state undertook a challenge to this control through the established legal processes available to us in federal rule.
On August 15th, the Governor in a letter to Chairman Zech announced that he was withdrawing the support of the established emergency i
plans that were in the process (in the 350 process) for approval. These
{
i plans had been developed in the early 1980's, They were tested, exercised, found not to be lacking, and were generally approved as good competent plans.
l With this withdrawing of his support, he announced that he would j
like to see the NRC withhold restart permission for Davis-Besse and the license for the Perry plant until the EERT had completed its task of review-ing the emergency planning functions and made further recommendations toward what we felt in Ohio would be improvements in emergency planning (that part. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
over which the state has control having already given the fact that the selection of the power process to nuclear power had been granted, and the plants were built).
In the emergency EERT process, a three person group and staff of competent technical people (and I suppose that has been brought to conjec-ture at points depending on who you talk to) conducted interviews with local government, with citizens groups, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the NRC, and state agencies.
The group made on-site visits to the plants. The group made a presentation to the assembled Commission downtown in Washington, D.C.
The chairman of the Emergency Evacuation Review Team made presentations. The chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio made presentations, and the Governor ~ame to speak to the Commission.
f d
The report of the review team was prepared and presented in Janu-1 ary of 1987, and it addressed two areas, one area of practical solutions and one area of philosophical recommendations. There were thirteen practical points. Not to belabor it, I want to go through them quickly just to show you what is covered.
We had approved working plans, but the review team based on fur-ther investigation, found that in the area of handicapped, sick, and elderly that we needed iurther provisions for identifying and evacuating specially vulnerabic populations, and special lists of those people who were coming
{
l ___
seemingly out of the woodwork after the plans had been approved, denying that they had been contacted before and requiring new efforts.
A recommendation was made for a radiation monitoring system to be provided, so that the state could have independent information on radiation releases in the area of the plant without total dependence on the plant for information and relying on the plant to provide that. The recommendation was made that the utilities should bear the cost of implementing any improvements made in the emergency plans after having once been approved.
Another recommendation was, because the state was planning to use bus drivers of school buses, that those bus drivers should be required to sign a written agreuaent to participate in the evacuation. This was made because the citizens groups and the groups that were presenting an anti-preparedness posture had convinced the school bus drivers that their lives were in jeopardy and that they had a lot to lose by participating. Appro-priate training and protective equipment should be agreed upon by the util-ity to train those people, and that the training should be updated.
If pub-lic school bus drivers were not to be used, then the utilities should pro-pose alternatives on how we were going to provide for mass transportation.
A recommendation was made for a direct computer link.
I am happy to hear that the data link system is being implemented by NRC. The state's recommendation was that a direct computer link should be created between the state and the nuclear facilities' control rooms to provide the state with direct information about reactor conditions, and that this would be moni- _
4 monitored on a 24-hour basis in two existing state agencies with new l
capabilities.
Included in that monitoring computer link would be thresholds of various accident sequences which would trigger a specific emergency j
l response.
This review team also said that the emergency plans should be com-pieted in full. Ingestion pathway planning, recovery and reentry (which we have all been glossing over for years) and decontamination and waste disposal needed to be completed before the plants should be permitted to operate.
The plan also must take into consideration the impact of accidents in counties well beyond what we know as the ten-mile or inhalation EPZ.
For involved hospitals, the state should make on site reviews of all of the hos-pitals to determine the greater capability to treat victims of radiation.
Also the EERT recommended that the state should conduct an independent test of warning sirens separate and apart from that done by FEMA.
The state should conduct a campaign to improve the public's under-standing of the emergency response plan, because it was the feeling of this review team that even though the local minority was being heard that the I
I silent majority did not know enough about emergency planning either.
Radioprotective drugs were covered, in that the state should pro-vide those drugs to off site emergency workers. Additionally, the EERT said that the state should be the primary point of contact, and responsibility I
should rest with the state for making emergency response decisions and not _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l I
l l
local government. This is a very, very contentious point. Another recom-mendation was that the Public Utilities Commission should monitor the entire program of nuclear safety.
Those were the practical solutions. The philosophical points were that the NRC should develop criteria for site specific EPZ's and that a national blue ribbon commission be established to investigate the potential for severe reactor accidents involving sudden and large releases rather than the smaller normally exercise scenario releases that we have been dealing with for the past seven years.
l The Price-Anderson Act should be readdressed, and the state should be given a right in the licensing of plants, because Governors are specifi-cally charged with the responsibility for protecting public health and safety. We recommended that the states have expanded legal rights to become involved in the licensing process.
When the Governor came to talk to the NRC about licensing, he was not well-received in that regard.
i l
The licensing issues then were taken to the Sixth Circuit Federal i
I Court in Cincinnati, and of course, the state lost on every issue. The j
Governor appeared again bei ce the NRC to appeal to the Chairman not to complete the licensing process even though the state had lost in the federal court system. The state finally filed for intervention which we had not done since 1977.
I l - - _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
1 l
We implemented in Ohio, the recommendations of the EERT. We nego-tiated with local governments and utilities through February, March, April and May of 1987. We met with the Commission, the county governments, union groups, handicapped citizens, utilities and hospitals. Just yesterday morn-ing (September 9, 1987), we signed off on a number of those implementation recommendations whereby the utilities have agreed to participate as a full partner with the state and local governments in implementing those recommen-
)
l dations.
1 After meeting with concerned citizens towards the latter part of August, the Governor then issued another, if you will to use the term, ulti-matum, that by September 30th, the recommendations of this Review Team had to be fully implemented or he would, again, petition under 2.02 to do fur-ther action as the state would be permitted under the Rule to seek closure of the plants.
1 l
l Meanwhile, while the EERT process was going on, we had success-i fully completed drills at Davis-Besse, Perry and Beaver Valley. We have had
]
a "44 CFR 350 " approval of the State of Ohio Plan and Beaver Valley Plan through FEMA. The "350" process for Davis-Besse has been started.
Simultaneously, the NRC proposed to change the Emergency Planning Rule.
There is such a dichotomy here in the entire process, as has been outlined by some of our colleagues from the other states, that I am hopetul that you can see the complexity of just getting emergency plans developed and approved under the current rule.
j l
_g.
l l
_-__________-_-___-____-O
1
}
i We had an emergency plan and we have thoroughly examined that emergency plan by a qualified group and we found it to be lacking and we changed it. Imagine, if we could license a nuclear power plant without an emergency plan, the NRC's role for public health and safety notwithstanding, mandated by Federal law.
Somehow, we have got to change this mix that we have between NRC, FEMA and the states, to bring some more detailed full
]
partnership roles to play, without having a structured system that begins j
with the Federal level and rolls downward to the states, and the states (then) having to read and interpret the guidance, (not being in on the ground floor), to develop a system. The MOU that the NRC has with FEMA is a good start, but.1 think that it (the NRC) further has to develop the states in that MOU.
I I
Bill Dornsrife yesterday talked about credibility when he said that the states have greater credibility than the NRC has with some of the public groups. We have learned a tough lesson in Ohio and we are saying
)
that the state does not have as much credibility as we thought with the i
local groups, particularly after our process in the EERT, Rev'ew System.
I So, we also have to build a credibility and therefore, we need to be full partners and improve that jointly with NRC, FEMA and the state.
There is another aspect of emergency planning that impacts on all of this in Ohio.
In Ohio, we have a fuel cycle installation that is giving us problems, and we have an enrichment facility that enriches both power plants iucl and weapons grade material, i _ _ _ _ - - - - _
]
I 1
We have a research facility that does research on spent fuel and spent fuel assemblies. The " irradiated" fuel assemblies are shipped in there, and shipped out and the facility does a considerable amount of l
research.
It was mentioned yesterday that DOE has a notorious record at its plants. We have three of those and DOE does have a notorious record, and with the feed production materials facility at Fernald, it releases radioac-tive materials monthly.
We now have more problems with the DOE and the fuel cycle facili-ties than we have ever had before and than that we would ever expect to have at a nuclear power plant. We find that the NRC's rulemaking process just recently does not require the standard at fuel facilities that we have to uphold ior nuclear power plants.
We are not so sure that by simply permitting a local emergency plan, not requiring the structured plan that we do for nuclear power plants, but just permitting those local plans to be made at the local level, is the proper way to go.
At the state level, our sensitivity to those issues is very great.
I think that it is good that we have changed our sensitivity.
It has caused us to take a new look at emergency planning; a comprehensive look at emer-gency planning, and 1 think that we all jointly -- states, NRC, and FEMA --
1 need to deal more closely with this and not relax the requirements, but 1
J l
- - J
l' indeed, hold the standards tough.
I i
I
\\
l l
Thank you.
(Applause) l 1
1 MR. KAMMERER; Thank you, very much, Mr. Williams. The last l
l speaker on the panel is morning, is Bill Parlor
(
i l
l l
l I
I i
1 l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
a N
TEXT OF SPEECH GIVal BY GRETA J. DICUS, DIRECTOR DIVISION OF RADIATION CCNTROL & EMERGBICY MANAGUENT PRCGRAMS
'ID THE U.S. NRC NATIOt#1 STATE LIAISON OFICERS MEETIIIG IN BETHESDA, MARYLAND ON SEPTEEER 9, 1987 Meeting the milestones of Public Law 96-573 for us has become an extremely trying task. The corm:ents that follow, of course, are specific to the State of Arkansas, but because we are a member of a Compact, they extend quite generally to the activities witnin our Compact.
Cur Compact is the Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact; it is composed of the States of Arkansas, Louisiara, Oklahorra, Kansas, and Ne-braska.
~'nese states ratified the contract very early on in 1983
'fnen the cortferees first got together; first started making scme of their key decisions; there were a couple of decisions they made that I'd like to mention to give you a better idea of why we are having some of our problems, today.
They made two decisions:
first, the Compact itself would not select our host state, but rather, the Compact would select the developer and then the developer would select the host state.
Secondly, they detemined that even prior to selecting our developer, we would do a few ver/ preliminary site stu-dies across the region to try to get some idea of regional suitability.
Fund-ing was subsequently secured from the U.S. Department of Energy to undertake what became known as our " Phase One Site Exclusionary Study." This was simply
)
I a first-order screening, which would assess the entire region based upon siting
)
I criteria in 10 CFR 61.
It was not an attempt to really specifically designate 1
certain areas. This study was finalized in June 1985, and it showed for Arkan-sas that there was portions of some 17 counties that had what were referred to 1
(07/87)
i i
i l
as " candidate areas."
We immediately made contact with the public offi-
)
cials in those counties; we met with them; we explained to them what the study i
meant; the significance - or lack of it, really - of the study; the media were invited; we had a question-and-answer session; and everything went very I
well. This essentially got very little coverage, j
s i
We went on, "we" being the Compact, and decided, "okay," we'll go on a lit-tle farther. We will undertake what became known as "The Phase Two Site Exclu-l sionary Study." This study was designed to look at the candidate areas in some-l what closer detail, to perhaps pinpoint a few areas that became known as " pre-i ferred siting areas." In December of 1986, this past December, a draft copy was F
sent to each Commissioner.
And that's essentially when our problems really started.
Since January of this year, we have experienced the most turbulent and vo-
)
latile time in our Compact's history and it has never been in more jeopaMy than it has been recently.
Accoding to the draft report, there were five extremely strall areas in Arkansas that were identified as " preferred" or " potential" siting a reas. There was one small area in Louisiana; Kansas and Nebraska had several areas identified; Oklahoma had no areas identified.
l I
Now, prior to the time that the person who served as our Commissioner was able to disseminate a copy of this draft report to members of the Advisory Group, l
before there was an opportunity to brief public officials, a member of an inter-venor group obtained a copy of it.
He irrmediately issued a press release and implied rather strongly that those sites had already been selected, and that it was simply a matter of time before the bulldozers were there and the waste site would be operational.
l Page 2 (09/87)
\\
They immediately began, within a week, organizing the communities that l
l were impacted into very active public groups, and we must admit that they have l
been extremely successful in their activities.
Public meetings were called, several of which we attended.
The crowds at our public meetings were running 600 to 1,600; they were extremely vocal; they were extremely well-organized.
They have officers now in their organizations and they have secured a law firm l
to represent them.
l Most of the citizens of these regions, as well as many of the legislators that we're dealing with have been convinced that if a site is located in Arkan-l l
sas, the State will have absolutely no control over the site. They believe fur-ther that no other industries will locate in the area and absolately nothing that we can say changes their minds or will convince them of this otherwise.
At most of these meetings - all of the meetings that I've attended - there i
is one local physician (one of the counties only has two physicians) who had indicated that he has become, of course, an " expert" on radioactive material, radiation biology, and the effects of radiation.
Ha has studied the sites.
There is (according to him) absolutely no way that you can safely dispose of this material; the sites will leak; and he goes on to say that " leaking radia-tion," as he refers to it, is going to cause birth defects, abortions, cancer, and any number of serious illnesses, and the people believe him.
He has been a physician in these conntnities - I think he's delivering the grandkids now.
So his voice is heard and unfortunately, ours is not.
l Headlines, of course, through all this, abound - about fighting the " toxic waste," and so forth. There's one headline that sticks out in my mind - it was one I picked up at the breakfast table; it was first-page of one of the State's Page 3 (09/87) l 1
1 major newspaper.
It said, " Governor Asked to Fire Health Official." And I thought, "well, you know, someone's messed up."
Well, I read further and I found that I am the health official that the Governor has been asked to fire.
Intervenor groups in the other four states of the Compact have been con-tacted; they've become very well-organized as well, and the intervenor groups across the Compact have formed, if you will, an executive council, and they are right now working together among themselves. The purpose that they seem to have is to get at least one state, hopefully more states, to withdraw from the Ccmpact, because they feel if that happens they can destroy the Compact.
And that, of course, is their goal.
Now, the reasons that we hear in Arkansas about getting out of the Compact are such things as:
"We don't want anyone else's waste but our own.
If we got to have it, at least just let it be ours." And this same tenet - that it's just Arkansas, just go it alone, that we can control the site.
Furthemore, there are very strong feelings among the people that the waste should be disposed where it is produced.
And again, because they are totally unconvinced that these facilities are safe, they feel that you should not try to dispose of it now; it should be stored on-site, above-ground, for a very in-definite period of time.
But there is more behind this, and I think all of us recognize this, that a sort of subtle agenda is in place; and that agenda is a very small core group of interveners actually have as their purpose to close down the nuclear power plant.
And they feel that if they can make a resolution of the waste problem impossible, they can do that. The regrettable thing is how they are using and in effect, abusing, the fears of the people to try to achieve this goal. They Page 4 (09/87)
l 1
]
have one phrase that's become extremely popular and that is:
" Dump the Compact."
1 1
Now, in order to fight against our Compact and to be as organized as they 1
are, to attend all' the Commission meetings, no matter whien state we have them in, they're there, They've had a series of fundraisers, extremely popular in the South; such things as barbecues, chicken-frys, and ice cream socials. And they will raise upwards of $7,000 at each one of these events. There are also articles that you can buy, and these are at all the meetings that come up; you can get your "Dunp the Compact" button, which is really cheap; it's only a dol-1 lar.
You can buy a tee-shirt.
For &7.95 you can have your " Dump-Busters" tee-shirt. These also come in blue and white, if you don't particularly care i
for the yellow.
I think by far the biggest pmblem that we have faced througnout all of theses public meetings and things that have been going on since January, is the fact that for most of our State legislatures were in session and clearly, the legislators from these so-called " sited areas" have been beseiged with calls, letter, and visits frcm their constituents, and they have to listen to these peo ple. We have right now several political careers en the line.
And of course, the cry always has been, " Dump the Compact."
Resciutions have been passed at City Councils, and in our County Quorum j
Courts (' 'ich are the governing bcdies is for our counties) to witndraw Arkansas from the Compact.
A bill was introduced in the Arkansas legislature that would I
not only withdraw us from the Compact; that bill further stated that "each county j
l in Arkansas that had a potential waste generator had to establish a disposal j
l site." In Arkansas that meant that we had 50 some sites that had to be esta-I blished if that bill had passed.
Fortunately, it did not.
But most of my staff spent most of January, February, and March at the State Capitol.
I don't know l
Page 5 l
(09/87)
I I
I
I how many ccanittees.that I had to testify before.
Although the bill to withdraw from the Compact - and similar bills have i
been introduced in Kansas and Nebraska, I think - fortunately those bills have
~
not passed.
As recently as two weeks ago, I believe Kansas had called a special session on another matter, but there was an attempt to get withdrawal from the Compact on the agenda. We are facing a called special session in a few weeks, and I know we'll have to be down at the Capitol, tr/ to be sure that it doesn't get back to our agenda.
Even though we did not withdraw from the Compact, a bill was passed in Arkan-sas, and it is now a statute that does require any facility built in Arkansas to be an above-ground facility.
So, we will not be able to have a below-ground fa-cility, if we are selected as the host state.
Now, throughout all of the public hearings and the uproar that we have been having, the Compact Cormtission centinued to tr/ to do the business that we had to do. We have had the Phase II Study that we had to have public hearings on i
to draw formal ecmments frcm the people, and we also had a management study that we had to have these public meetings on.
So those meetings were held on j
into the Spring, and of course, they were very well attended. We chose to have ours at an auditorium and the people came in chartered busloads. The auditorium simply was not big enough to hold them.
And later on, in the Spring, we asked for proposals from developers and we did receive two - Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and U. S. Ecology sub-mitted proposals to our Compact.
They undenvent very careful review by our technical people and of course, for intevenors, again, out of necessity, we held a series of public hearings throughout the five states on these proposals.
Page 6 (09/87)
]
1 I
We had learned our lesson in Arkansas. When we held the public hearing on this one in a convention center, and it was just about large enough to handle q
the people. On June 27th of this year, we met in Oklahoma City and we selected f
U.S. Ecology to be the developer for our site, 1
Obviously, I have dwelled on the particular aspects on the problems that i
we are dealing with, with public opinion.
If you have not gotten to the speci-fic siting that we have gotten into, you may find public opinion to be something that you had better be prepared to deal with.
And it is only one of the problems that we are facing.
Clearly, it has been extremely difficult to keep this Compact together.
There are incessant rumors.
I have received calls from the media in Nebraska saying,'"We just heard that Arkansas pulled out of the Compact." And I say, "Well as of an hour ago, we were still in."
The rumors went en and on and we l
had a very trying time.
I must admit that I think that a great part of the rea-sen that our Compact is holding together has to do with the support that we have received frcm our Governor. Certainly we have received tremendous support from Covernor Clinton. He, in fact, this sunrr.er, called for and hosted in Little Rock a meeting of the governors of Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and a representa-tive of the governor of Louisiana, at which the governors looked at the issue.
Thet/ had resolved to try to keep our Compact intact. There are problems and we are simply going to try to solve these problems as we ccme to them.
We are currently, even with everything else going on, trying to finalize our contract with U.S. Ecology and we are behind schedule in getting that contract finalized. We have some sensitive issues that we are not moving too well on.
I am going to mention two of these very lightly.
Page 7 (09/87)
\\
l One is the problem of liability.
We do need to address it in the contract, and it is a very major issue. The other problem is one of financing.
I, person-
]
ally, and apparently several of the other Commissioners entered into this a little naive about the fact that a compant gets, if you will, a contract for essential-ly a guaranteed profit, and you would expect them to provide the financing for that, but that is not the case.
Right now, our Conmission is in the process of trying to find $10 million to, in effect, give to U.S. Ecology to start the work. Where the money is going to ccme from and how it will be allocated, the costs involved, these are the questions that we are having trouble resolving in our contract negotiations. So, it'it not going along well. We are behind schedule. We are pushing ourselves into a bit of a corner to meet some of these milestones.
Finally, we have one very critical step left and that is selection of our host state. We have had all of these problems and we do not have a host state selected yet.
The Ccmpact Cc elssion will meet in two weeks, in Little Rock, to approve the criteria and to establish procedures whereby U.S. Ecology will pick the host state.
And U.S. Ecology tells us that they will make that selection toward the end of November or the very first part of December.
If we are able to keep this schedule, then we will have the opportunity of meeting that critical January
}
l 1, 1988 deadling.
l In closing, I know that there are many more problems that are involved, but from our perspective, and of course, this is one state, and one Compact's perspec-tive of the problem. We have this big boulder in our way, which is public opi-nion - and it is not over yet. There is a possibility that the Compact will be Page 8 l
(09/87) l
sued, simultaneously in all five states, and/or, in Federal Court - and because of the configuration of our states, we are in three different Federal Court jurisdictions.
f Page 9 (09/87) a
_ _ _ _ _