ML20245B845
| ML20245B845 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1986 |
| From: | Cantrell F AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245B770 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-76 NUDOCS 8707010348 | |
| Download: ML20245B845 (10) | |
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RELEASE FROM SPEXT FUEL POOL at PLANT HATCH December 3,1986
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Information in this re:ctd was da!eted in accordance with the,Freedam cf lr' ora' alien Act, exemptions.__b FCIA-9 % 7(#
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pj-1 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE 7
r ANALYZED ACCIDENT (13' WATER SHIELD REMAIN)
EVENT OCCURREI) INSPITE OF PRECURSORS ANALYZED ACCIDENT CAUSED BY NONSAFETY SYSTEMS (AIP SUPPLY, TRANSFER CANAL SEAL, SEAL LEAK ALARM) - POOR DESIGN gg0LAT10NS ODNTINUE TO CONTRIB!JTE TO EVENTS WITH POTENTIAL g
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J'* *~: f t t h/<nc iVs - C c w 7 A s.. m : to 0.4 CI RELEASED BULK OF RELEASE TO NITROGEN STORAGE TANK AREA SOE WATER DIRECTLY TO YARD DRAIN FROM N2 STORAGE AREA SOE TO RADWASTE 10% ACTIVIT/ TO OUTFALL
__ 1% TO SWAW i
LICENSEE BUILD DY)ES AT OlRFALL AND INSTALLED PLNPS TO COLLECT WAT YARD DRAIN INSTALLED INFLATABLE BLOCKS IN LINES LEADING TO OUTFALL.
PLNPED CLEAN WATER TO COOLING TOWERS AND CONTAMINATED WATER TO TANK TRUCKS FO THRU RADWASTE ALL CONTAMINATED WATER RETAINED ON GPC PROPERTY CONTAMINATION IN SWAT (0.5 MR/HR - POSTLY IN ROOT SYSTEM 0F PLANTS AL FLOW PATH. COLLECTED "f0T" VEGETATION AND PLACED GRAVEL OVER FLOW i
STATE DID NOT WANT SWAT DESTROYED INSTALLED AUTO SATLERS AT EFFLUENT FRCN SWAT AND AT EFFLUENT TO RIV SET UP PROGRAM TO CDLLECT SATLES AND ANALYZE.
, NOIWACTOt{SWAW ESSENTIALLY NO RELEASES m
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FEJJELING FLOOR PLAN VIEW BUILDING JOINT - 3" GAP 6AT*C W/TH h*"^7Atu SGU SPENT FUEL P00LS TRANSFER CANAL TRANSFER CANAL SEALING STRUCTURE fg55 duT bcrund
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FUEL POOL ELEVATION' BUILDING JOINT SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACK IF WATER DRAINS TO BOTTOM CF TRANSFER CANAL, WOULD STILL HAVE li FEET WATER SHIELDING ABOVE ACTIVE FUEL ANALYZED ACCIDENT IN FSAR MINittM WATER LEVEL WAS 221' GPC CALCULATED THAT WITH BOTH MAKEUP PLNPS IN OPERATION WATER LEVEL WOULD EQUALIZE AT AB0lfT 211' ( 64 FEET ABOVE BOTTCM OF TRANSFER CANAL)
A RfBER OF IRRADIATED CONTROL BLADES WITH COBALT ROLLER WERE STORED ON SHORT HANGERS.
THESE WOULD START UNCOVERING AT 219' ELEVATION RADIATION i
LEVELS WERE CALCULATED TO BE rv 10,000 R/HR AT CONTACT.
THE EQUIVALENT TO ~100 R/HR DIRECTLY ABOVE ONTROL BLADES AT REFUELING FLOOR LEVEL AND rul R/HR REFUELING FLOOR LEVEL 6 FEET FROM THE EDGE OF lliE POOL l
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- EAL ASSENLY U SHAPED
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i REMOVABLE REPLACE SEALS APPROXIMATELY 5 YEAR INTERVALS (N] TECH, SPEC. REQUIR9EhTS) 1 SEALS ARE NOT CONSIDERED SAFETY RELATED BY GPC BlfT HANDLED AS"Q" MATERIAL S w / % -r u n 6 64 (c f
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7 AIR SUPPLY COWlGURATION l
NUTE REDUEANT SEALS j
AIR CUPPLIED FRm U-2 TO ALL SEALS COULD BE MANUALLY TRANSFER 112',NO PROCEDURE BASED FUEL POOL LEVEL NOTE SEAL LEAK DETECTION INSTRtMNTATION NOT OPERABLE BECAUS LEFT OPEN FOLLOWING CAllBRAT10N. PROBABLY WOULD NOT WORK ON CATASTROPHIC
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FAILUE ADDING MKE lP WATER TO POOL APPROXlMATELY 1 PER SHIFT.T0 COM EVAPORATION AND LEAKAGE IN FUEL POOL CLEAN UP/ COOLING SYSTEM U-2 EUNERING FRm REFUELING OlfTAGE HAD PROBLEMS WITH EXCESSIVE USE OF AIR MNAGEENT LETER EQUIED CLEARANCE TAG ON EACH " DROP" AUT AIR OTHERWISE VALVE BE CLOSED UNKNOWN TIE:
EGULATOR FAILED AND DOWNSTREAM VALVE THROTTLE TO SUPP TO SEALS ON 12/02, 4-12 OPERATORS REMNING CLEARANCE NOTED LEVER VALVE CRACKED AND CLOSED r
NOT RER)KitD AT TIE SEALS DEFLATED SLOWLY ECESSARY TO MAEUP WATER TO FLEL POOL M)RE FEQUENT BUT NOT DOCLENTED, ON SHIFT OPERATING SUPERVISOR NOT IWORED A@ ONCmlNG SHIFT NOT IWO LEAKAGE NUTED IN TURBIE Bull. DING AND REACTOR BUILDING AT PEETRATION, FIRST S#fLES NOT CONTAMINATED, SEARG BEGAN TO DETDMIE SOURCE OF LEAKAGE (CORRELATION BETWEE AE LEAK IN TURBIE A10 REACTOR BUILDING t0T RE00GNIZED)~
.ING PLPPS TRIPPED ON LOW LOW skitter SURGE TAfE LEVEL, OEN FLEL POOL
" LNG SUPERVISOR ECALLED PREVIOUS EVENT IN WICH TE FLE TE ON SHIFT POOL / REACTOR CAVITY GATES WERE LEAKING, BECAE ALARED AND WENT -TO REFUELING FLOOR WITH OPERATOR TO ItWESTIGATE.
CHECKED GAW SEAL PRESSURE AND TRANSFER CANAL SEAL PRESSURE PRESSURE ON TRANSFER CANAL SEALS AE WA'E LEVEL DROPPING (LAT TO BE AB0lfi % FEET LOW)
RESTORED AIR PRESSURE AE LEAVAGE si0nts NO RADIATION ALARM ON REFLEL FLOOR g gggTg) gANT AIR SUPPLY TO SEALS EVEN THROUGH IT
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P0DIFIED AIR SUPPLIES U-l SUPPLIES AIR TO ONE SEAL ON 0-1 SIDE AND WE SEAL ON 0-2 SIDE U-2 SUPPLIES ARE TO THE OTHER SEAL ON U-2 SIDE AND OBER SEAL ON 0-1 SIDE BOTH UNITS SUPPLY AIR TO SEALS IN TFIE BUILDING GAP Jcus tro u c O d i a w c.
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5ar n 7 LITTLE OR NO RADIOACTIVE RELEASE OFF SITE DESIGN OF SEAL ASSE?ELY QEST10NABLE (GPC
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REGULATORY REQUIRE?fNTS)
SEALS DID NOT HAVE REDUNDAN PROOF)
LEAK DETECTION SYSTB WAS INADEQUATE AN PROPERLYVALVED TIAK DETECTION /OOLLECTION ifE PRIMRY LEAK DETECTION SYSB)
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IDEROUS PRECURSORS TO HAVE AVOIDED:
INCREASED FREDLENCY OF SPENT FEL POOL LOW LEVEL ALAfMS - POT DOC 20ED OR TURED (NER 10T WRITTEN WEN REGULATOR FOUND FAILED, AIR VALVE WAS WORK AIR VALVE' CLOSED CDRETELY - 10 PROCEDURE NOT 10 PROEDURE INADEDUATE FOR CALIBRATitG LEAK Pf0&DLEE FOR RETURNING 10 SERVIE i
!O F90EDURE TO A0liTIELY CECK AIR PRESSURE ON SEA i
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Yt Lt4~ ectre sys.'ev Ves Pres de-t a9e Gene's Varace' NID-84-500 Nucee* oenerem September 27, 1984 U. 8. naclear Regulatory t w aimed m atlfE1EN3:
Office of Inspection and Enforcement RII: JPO Region II - guite 2900 50-321/50-366 101 Marietta street, 30(
I6B sulletin Atlanta, Georgia 30303 8443 8
A2'11NTION: Mr. James P. O'Asilly Gefit2MI21:
Pursuant. to a lettee free the Office of Insoection and Enforossent dated-Alaguet 24, 1984, Georgia fewer bereby provides. the following response to ISE Bulletin 84-03, cavity Water seal.
Plant Batch thit 2 was in the process of start-tp at the time of receipt of the Bulletin.
After consultation with the Flant Estch HRC licensing project manager, it was determined that a response to the bulletin should be ma$e before begining the refueling outage is scheduled to begin on or about September 29, 1984.
i Gross seal failure:
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Haddam Neck, the s@ ject plant of the bulletin, used pnematic seals for the refueling cavity asal. Plant Hatch uses two stainless steel bellows for each unit designed by Pathway.
One of the seals is installed 1
between the drywell and the reactor well, and the other is between the drywell and the reactor vessel.
These bellows a===mh11es are pomanently installed components with welde6 interfaces and do rmt require reinstallation ead refueling operation.
Misaligment of the type at Hadden Neck, therefore, is not possible.
'the ballows itself is protected frcen damage by guard rings, and a leak detection systen is installed to alarm on leakage. As a secondary seal, the bellows assembly atploys a self-energized apring-seal.
'Ihis spring seal is designed to limit water laskege by yielding to make a tight fit to the backing plate when subjected to the hydrostatic pressure in the unlikely event of a bellows rupture.
- the only pnematic eesis used at Plant Bate in refueling operations are on the fuel pool gates and the escpansion joint between Units.16 2 in the refueling oanal.
Oese oeals are a part of the gates and their aligment is assured by the gates' seating toleranos.
In the unlikely event of a seal or gets failure, leakage would be prevented by the Fan 47-26 h//d M
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GeorgiaPower A
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U. 8. Nuclear Regulatory omnission Office of Inspection and Inforement Atlanta, Georgia 30303 September 27, 1984 7890 ho redundant gates at both ends of the pool. Wo gates are installed at the remotor vessel transfer onnal and two gates at the thit 1 shipping cask pool transfer canal.- Se ~% joint has redundant snaastic seals ce both t! nit 1 and thit 2 ' sides.
In addition,: there is another sneumatic semi in the expansion joint itself.
Maxime leakage' rate due to failure of active ommunents:
Due to the redundant pool gates and "apansion joint osals it is not postulated that ery significant leakage could occur.
n e refueling bellows assembly does not beve any active components.
Berefore, no calculations to determine maxima leakage rate have been perfonoed.
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Makeup capacity:
Makeup water can be provided by the condensate storage and transfer l
syste, the deineralised water syste, the Residual Heat amoval 4
Bysten, the Residual Heat annoval Servloe Water systa., or the Plant Service Water System. Se primary makeup source, the condensata storage and transfer syntam can provide water fra two 500,000 gallon storage tanks that.are noim, ally maintained at. yin,wdmately 904 capacity or more.
For this operation both 500 gpn pumps per unit can be run in parallel.
Se Plant Service Water Syste provides a seismic Category I aource of makeup water to the spent fuel pools and takes suction directly from the Altmaha River.
Maxima filling capacity fem the Plant Service Water Systen to the spent fuel pools is approximately 350 gpr..
Potential effect on stored fuel and fuel in transfer:
For the worst case scenario of a omplete bellows esserbly failure with the spent fuel pool gates open, the lowest possible level to which the l
spent fuel pool can drain is 14 ft. 9 in. Below this level there are no outlets or drains from the pool.
ne active section of spent fuel stored in the pool will resin covered with water.
As shown in the Hatch thit 2 PSAR evaluation in Section 9.1.2.3.1, boiling of the recaining water in' the spent fuel pool will not occur rapidly.
Corrective actions,. per procedures HNP-1/2-1949, HNP-1/2-2085, and
}t&-1/2-2087, to be taken on low fuel pool level are:
1.
reposition the gates over the canal entrance; 2.
initiate makeup fra condensate stcrage fro: the main control rom; I
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GeorglaPower d
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccittnistion office of Inspection and Ihforcennt Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Septaber 27, 1984 Page 2ree 3.
manually align the plant service water system in the reactor building to provide pool makog; and 4.
continue refilling the pool to normal water lesel; 2e above scenario, however, is highly unlikely since it.would require failure of both pressure boundaries of the bellows assembly.
If the bellows fails, leakage wiltinest~ 21kW1y 'be ' detected upon initiial filling of the refueling cavity and prior to the fuel transfer operation.
Additionang, due to the welded and bookg seal designs, it will not be a catastropsic failure but a leak.
His would permit the operator to secure fuel movmant prior to uncovering fuel in transit. Wereface no analysis has been done to detennine the effect on fuel in transfer. Any evaluation of uncovered fuel in transfer is essentiauy s' ner 24 and any consideration would require entansive generio evaluation not ompleted to date. It has been concluded that the effect on stored fuel
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has been evaluated in the Hatch Unit 2, FEAR and is of no consequence.
Time to cladding damage without operator action i
s Cladding damage to-fuel in the spent fuel pool will take in excess of 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the pool has drained to its lowest possible level. 21s 1s the time calculated for the minimum water level inventory to begin to boil and is reported in Hatch Unit 2 PEAR Section 9.1.2.3.1.
This time paried plus the time fra initial boiling to cladding failure win anow for corrective actions to be taken.
Deege to fuel in the reactor vessel will not oocar since it win never be uncovered, and since the shutdown cooling systen will not be degraded by a bellows rupture.
Deergency operating procefureas The emergency operating procedurea (HNP-1/2-1949, HNP-1/2-2005, ard INP-1/2-2087) reflect the corrective actions discusas$ previcualy and listed in Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.1.2.3.1.
Base $ on the above, it is not considered credible to have a seal failure at Plant Batch similar to that which occurred at Badde Neck.
Further, the consequences of such a postulated failure at either unit win not result in any adverse effects on plant or public safety.
Derefore, no corrective actions are required.
If you have any further questions, please contact this office.
E Geory,la Power A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Canission office of Inspection and thforoment Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Septaber 27,: 1984 Pope seur
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J. T. Beckham, Jr. states that he is vice President of Georgia Power Ocupeny an$ is authorised to esswte this oath on behalf of Georgia Power coupery, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief the facts set forth in this letter are true.
GINGIA POWER COMPANY i
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'BYE h pv-- // h
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g/ J. T. Beckhm, Jr#
oworn to aind, subscribed ore me this 27th day of agtember,1994.
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4 Notary Public M7B
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xc H. C. Nix, Jr.
Senior Resident Indpector Document Osntrol Desk, Wash.
offices Lic. Engr.: Sect.Mgr.ibgr. & QE IAgal : Plant G.M.!
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19Jrnme 1 Blackwood! Baker
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!Date 09/A.7/64 ! 09/ /84 ! 09/M/84 ! 09/ /84 ! 09/ /8_4 !
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SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-93 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM11SSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 17, 1984 I
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-93: POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF WATER FROM THE REFUELING CAVITY Addressees:
All holders of a nuclear p! Vrain.ower reactor operating license (OL) or. construc I
permit (CP) except Fort-St
Purpose:
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This notice is provided to alert licensees and applicants to features in some PWRs and BWRs that may have a significant potential to cause loss of water in the refueling cavity.
It is expected that recipients will review the-informa-tion for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC require-(
ments and, therefore, no specific action or, response is required.
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Description of Circumstances:
i On August '21,1984, the 11addam Neck plant experienced a failure of the refueling cavity water seal with the refueling cavity flooded in preparation for refueling.
The refueling cavity water level (23 feet) decreased to the level of the reactor vessel flange in about 20_ minutes, which flooded the containment with approxi-mately 200,000 gallons of water..The leak developed when the pneumatic seal assembly was forced out of the normal position as a result of static water pres-sure. The pneumatic seal assembly remained intact but was extruded through the gap for about 25 percent of its circumference.
j No fuel was being transferred at the time.of this seal failure.
If fuel had been in transfer at the time, it could.have been partially or completely uncovered with possible high radiation levels, fuel cladding' failure,-ahd
-l release of radioactivity.
In addition, if the fuel transfer tube had been-open, the spent fuel pool could have drained to a level that would have uncovered the top of the fuel assemblies stored in the pool.
IE Bulletin No. 84-03, " Refueling Cavity Water Seal," was issued on August 24, 1984, as a result of the above incident.
While evaluating the potential for loss of water from refueling cavities at other plants, the NRC staff learned from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) that reactor cavity seal development testing had been previously FoI n - f 7-76 D//3 8412120 7 $"
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IN 84-93 December 17, 1984 Page 2 of 3 perfomed. This seal testing was sponsored by EPRI as part of a "Refuelin Outage Availability Improvement Program." These tests (completed in 1981)g initially resulted in a failure mode very similar to that experienced by the Haddam Neck plant.
However, this failure node was not observed in further testing with c modified seal design.
This EPRI testing indicates that the.
performance of pneumatic. seals is very sensitive to seal design details and to plant-specific refueling cavity design details, including variations in cavity gap dimensions.
Other potential failure modes of the refueling cavity seal have been identified, since the incident at the Haddam Neck plant, which could cause a rapid loss of water in the refueling cavity at some plants. San Onofre Unit 2 recently experienced several problems while installing the reactor cavity seal in pre-paration for the unit's first refueling. This unit has redundant (inner and 1
outer)pneumaticseals. The inner pneumatic seal was punctured during instal-lation. The seal was replaced with a spaFe. The spare seal also failed during testing as a result of a manufacturing defect in the seal wall. Both the above failures were discovered and corrected before flooding the reactor cavity.
Failures, like those reported at San Onofre Unit 2, could cause a rapid. loss of -
cavity water (4f the cavity were flooded) at plants with nonredundant pneumatic seals. Some pneumatic / flexible seals also may be. susceptible to damage from the impact of dropped objects.after the cavity is flooded..If the dropped object were radioactive, significant radiation damage to the pneumatic seal also could occur after a period of time.
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in addition to the refueling cavity seal, pneumatic seals also are used as hot 4
and cold leg nozzle dams in PWRs and, for-some plants, in gates between the i
spent fuel pool and the fuel transfer canal. The failure modes and concerns i
expressed above for the " pneumatic refueling cavity. seal also apply '.in many cases to these other pneumatic seals.
Nozzle dams are of particular concern,.
when the steam generator primary is open during refueling.
The refueling cavity also can be partially drained (PWR or BWR) by certain misalignments of the residual heat removal system (RHR) valves while in the shutdown cooling mode (assuming that shutdown cooling is in use when the cavity is filled). GE Sll No. 388, "RHR Valve Alignment During Shutdown Cooling.0pera-tion For BWR 3/4/5 and 6 " dated February 1983, and If Information Notice 84-81,
" Loss of Reactor Pressure Vessel Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors,"
dated November 16, 1984, discuss these possibilities in a BWR. Nuclear Safety Analysis Center report, NSAC-52, " Residual Heat Removal Experience Review and.
Safety Analysis, Pressurized Water Reactors," dated January 1983, discusses these possibilities in a PWR.
Finally, there are numerous ways in which the refueling cavity of a PWR or BWR could be drained at a slower rate through one of the attached drain lines.
Adequate emergency procedures and properly calibrated refueling cavity water level instrumentation are considered to be important in the mitigation of any loss-of-cavity-water accident.
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IN 84-93 December 17, 1984 Page 3 of 3
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No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
<dI'
'fbhard L.' Jordan, Director Divisi of Emergency Preparedness and gineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical
Contact:
H. A. Bailey, IE (301)492-9006 1
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices D
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Attachment IN 84-93 December 17, 1984 (l
LIST OF,RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No.
Subject Issue Issued to 84-92 Cracking of Flywheel on 12/17/84 All boiling water Cummins Fire Pump Diesel reactor facilities Engines holding an OL or CP f
84-91 Quality Control Problem 12/10/84 All' boiling water of Meteorological reactor facilities j
Measurements Problems holding an OL or CP l
84-90 Main Steam Line Break 12/7/84 All ' boiling water Effect on Environmental reactor facilities Qualification of Equipment holding an OL or CP 84-89 Stress Corrosion Cracking.
12/7/84 All boiling water in Nonsensitized 316 reactor facilitiR Stainless Steel holding an OL or CP 84-88.
Standby Gas Treatment 12/3/84 All boiling water System Problems reacto.r facilities holding an OL or CP [
84-87 Piping Thermal Deflection
-12/3/84 All boiling water Induced,by Stratified Flow reactor facilities.
holding an OL or CP 84-86 Isolation Between Signals 11/30/84 All boiling water of the Protection System reactor facilities and Non-Safety-Related holding an OL or CP Equipnent 84-85 Molybdenum Breakthrough 11/30/84 All NRC licensed j
from Technetium-99m medical institutions Generators and radiopharmaceutical suppliers 84-84 Deficiencies In Ferro-11/27/84-All boiling water Resonant Transformers reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 84-83 Various Battery Problems 11/19/84 All boiling water reactor facilities holding an OL or CP OL = Operating License
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1 CP = Construction Permit i
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SSINS No.:
6820 4.,
LETTER 4 - g*
Expiration Date:
04/30/85 OMB No.:
3150-00n i
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I UNITED STATES D!c r:a #
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPNISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCENENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 I _ --- d g
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August 24, 1984
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REFUELING CAVITY WATER SEAL g
g MANAGEMENT Addressees:
All power reactor facilities holding an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP) except Fort St. Vrain.
Purpose:
The purposes of this bulletin are to:
(1) notify addressees 'o.f an incident in which the refueling cavity water seal failed and rapidly drained the refueling cavity, and (2) request certain actions to assure that fuel uncovery during 7
mfueling remains an unlikely event.
Description of Circumstances:
f On August 21, 1984, the Haddam Neck plant' experienced a failure of the refueling
-cavity water seal with the refueling cavity flooded in preparation for refueling.
The refueling cavity-water level (23 feet) decreased to the level of the i
reactor vessel flange Grithin 20 minutes which flooded the containment with approximately 200,000 gallens of water.
The seal assembly consists of an annular plate with two pneumatic seals (Figure 1).
The assembly was recently i
redesigned by the licensee and had been used once previously. The seal was manufactured by Presray, Inc.
The seal assembly was subject to a gross failure due to lack of an interference between the widt.h of the seal annulus and the width of the opening, which allowed the seal to be significantly displaced.
No fuel was being transferred at the time of this seal failure.
If, however, fuel had been in transfer at the time, it could have been partially or completely uncovered with possible high radiation levels, fuel cladding failure and release of radioactivity.
In addition, if the fuel transfer tube had been open, the spent fuel pool could have drained to a level which would have uncovered the top of the fuel.
Action to be Taken by Plants Currently in Refueling:
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1.
Evaluate the potential for and consequences of a refueling cavity water i
seal failure and provide a summary report of these actions by August 31,
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IE8 84-03 August 24, 1984 Pagt 2 of 2
'T Action To Be Taken By Plants Prior To Beginning Refueling Or Within 90 Days, Of Receipt Of This Bulletin, Whichever Is Sooner:
2.
Evaluate the potential for and consequences of a refueling cavity water 4,
seal failure and provide a summary report of these actions.
Such evaluations should include consideration of: gross seal failure; maximum leak rate due to failure of active components such as inflated seals; makeup
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capacity; time to cladding damage trithout operator action; potential effect on stored fuel and fuel in transfer; and emergency operating. procedures.
Written reports describing the above actions shall be submitted to the appropriate Regional Administrator under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Also, the original copy of the
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cover letter and a copy of the report shall be transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear i
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Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk,' Washington, D.C.
20555 for reproduction and distribution.
j I
18 This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and Budget under a blanket clearance number 3150-0011 which expires April 30, 1985.
Comments on burden and duplication may be. directed to the Office'of Management and Budget, Reports Management, Room 3208, New Executive Offic.e'?uilaing, 20503.
Washington, D.C.
If you have any questions regarding this mai.ter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the-appropriate NRC Regional Office or the technical contact j
listed below.
4 ha
' Defoung, Director Offi f Inspectior, and Enforcement 3
Technical
Contact:
H. Bailey, IE (301) 492-7078 Attachments:
I 1.
Figure 1 f
2.
List of Recently issued IE Bulletins 4
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IEB 84-03 August 24, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Date of No.
Subject Issue Issued to 84-02 Failures Of General Electric 03/12/84 All power reactor Type HFA Relays In Use In Class facilities holding IE Safety Systems an OL,or CP 84-01 Cracks in Boiling Water Reector 02/03/84 All BWR facilities Mark I Containment Vent Headers with Mark I contain-ment and currently in cold shutdown with an OL for Action and All other BWRs with.an OL or CP for information 83-08 Electrical Circuit Breakers 12/28/83 All power reactor with an Undervoltage Trip facilities holding Featute in Use in Safety-an OL or CP Related Applications Other Than the Reactor Trip System 83-07 I
Apparently Fraudulent Products 12/09/83 Same as IEB 83-07 Supp 2 Sold by Ray Miller, Inc.
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83-07 Apparently Fraudulent Products
- 10/26/83 Same as IEB 83-07 Supp 1 Sold by Ray Miller, Inc.
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83-07 Apparently Fraudulent Products 07/22/83 All power reactor
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Scid by Ray Miller, Inc.
facilities holding an OL or CP; Other i
fuel cycle facilities i and Category 8, Priority 1 (processors '
and distributors) 1 material licensees.
i 83-06 Nonconforming Materials Supplied 07/22/83 All power reactor by Tube-Line Corporation Faci-facilities holding lities at Long Island City; an OL or CP New York; Houston, Texas; and Carol Stream, Illinois
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OCT 0 3 1996 Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328 License Nos. OPR-77, DPR-79 1
Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. S. A. White Manager of Nuclear Power f
6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Gentlemen.
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SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
- REPORT NOS. 50-327/86-50 AND 50-328/86-50 j
This letter refers to the Enforcement Conference held at our request at the Region II Office on August 25, 1986.
This meeting concerned activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Facilities.
The meeting related to programmatic problems associated with the Sequoyah Surveillance Program.
Our concerns about violations of regulatory requirements pertaining to the Sequoyah Surveillance Program were expressed to TVA representatives at the meeting. The items discussed at the meeting and similar items discussed during the May 30, 1986, Enforcement Conference are under consideration for escalated enforcement action. Accordingly, no notice of violation is being issued at this time.
No response to these items is required. However, please be advised that the number and characterization of these violations may change as a result of further NRC review.
It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial and has provided for a better Onderstanding of inspection findings and enforce. ment issues.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in NRC's Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them.
Sincerely, 7,,. A ~-~
J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator pebtionReport ECG S~E7~70 R
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(See page 2)
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H. L. Abercrombie,$5equoyah Nuclear Plant site Director P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager J. A. Kirkebo, Director Nuclear Engineering R. L. Gridley, Director Nuclear Safety and Licensing M. R. Harding, Licensing
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50-327/86-50 and 50-328/86-50 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.:
OPR-77 and OPR-79 Facility Name:
Sequoyah 1 and 2 l
MeetiAQ L6h8 Ult &5! AugUlt 25, 19Bb Project Engineers: / // A 6 d
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J/ B. Bracy /
Date Signed M JA WWs4
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/7 Approved by:
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B. T. Debs, Section Chief D4te signed Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
An Enforcement Conference was held at Region.II on August 25, 1986, at 1:00 p.m.,
EDT to review items pertaining to the Sequoyah Surveillance program. TVA gave a chronology of the Surveillance Review program since August 1985. The program is in its fourth evolution, the latest having started in June 1986.
The progra'm requires that review of all surveillance instructions for technical adequacy be completed prior to restart.
TVA stated they neither feel their surveillance program was out of control nor did they have a programmatic breakdown in this program. TVA believes their present review program is adequate and will identify and correct any procedural problems.
The slides used by TVA during the pre-sentation are contained in the attachment.
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'd 55: Pt 48/CUlO vin 9Ee-?'933 WOM:i REPORT DETAILS 1.
Attendance N.RE J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator G. G. Zech, Director, Division of TVA Projects A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
A. B. Beach, Deputy Director, Enforcement Staff, IE
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G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff S. P. Weise, Branch Chief, TVA Projects K. P. Barr, Branch Chief, Division'of Radiation Safety and Safeguards B. T. Debs Section Chief, TVA Projects M. B. Shymiock, Section Chief, TVA Projects B. A. Wilson, Acting Section Chief, DRS t
K. M. Jenison, Senior Resident Inspector, TVA Projects R. E. Carroll, Project Engineer, TVA Projects J. B. Brady, Project Engineer, TVA Projects G. K. Hunegs, Project Engineer, TVA Projects I
C. L. Vanderniet, Reactor Engineer, DRS TVA
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C. C. Mason, Deputy Manager of Nuclear Power R. L. Gridley, Director, Division of Nuclear Safety and Licensing, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant II. L. Abcrcrombic, Site 01rceteri Segwey h Hwslear Plan P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant M. R. Harding, Site Licensing Manager, Secuoyah Nuclear Plant R. H. Buchho12, Site Representative, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant M. E. Frye, Plant Operating Review Staff, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant W. E. Andrews, Site Quality Manager, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant E. W. Whitaker, Licensing Engineer, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant G. B. Kirk, Compliance Licensing Supervisor, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant H. D. Elkins, Jr., I&C Section Supervisor, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant R. W. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant J. M. McGriff, Branch Chief, EI & Controls - SI Review Coordinator T. A. Ippolito, Consultant, DBA 2.
Event Discussions The Regional Administrator opened by reviewing the NRC concerns on the surveillance program.
The Director of TVA Projcats expanded on the con-carns, briefly describing the surveillance defic *encies identified by both TVA and NRC during late 1985 and 1986.
Mr. C. C. Mason, Deputy Director of Nuclear Power, gave brief opening statements for TVA.
Mr.
P. R. Wallace gave an opening overview of the surveillance program history.
Mr. M. E. Frye gave a detailed presenta-tion of the surveillance program review from August 1985 until present.
- /
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2 TVA stated that their review of QA Audit Reports, NRC Inspection Reports, and Reportable Event History Files prior to August 1985 did not indicate generic problems.
The review program started in August 1985 with a one j
for one check between Technical Specification Requirements and Surveil-lance Instructions (nine deficiencies identified).
Based on problems associated with the 6.9 kv penetration testing, the program was revised in February 1986 to include random sampling of 137 surveillance require-ments (minor discrepancies). Based on f ailure to implement a surveillance requirement on the manuel SI hand switch, the program was revised again in March 1986 to include a Task Force.
A revised Technical Review Program was added to the ongoing Administrative Program in June 1986. TVA stated that the Technical Review Program will be completed prior to startup.
The NRC stated that the licensee should be identifying and correcting their own problems.
The NRC questioned if TVA is now identifying.their own problems only because of programs the NRC has forced upon them, and if TVA is now convinced that they have had a programmatic breakdown in the surveil-lance area. Mr. P. R. Wallace answered that he did not feel the program was out of control nor that a programmatic breakdown had occurred.
He did not believe that these problems represented widespread problems, but isolated examples.
Mr. Wallace stated that the reason that prior QA reviews had not been effective in picking up problems was that QA had not been staffed for or tasked with an in-depth Technical Review.
QA involvement from a technical standpoint starte.
'n June 1986.
The technical people now assisting QA in the review include some Watts Bar personnel that are familiar with earlier Watts Bar type surveillance problems.
The NRC generically questioned ASME Section XI pump performance Testing.
The nnas+ inn was in ranard tn nnaratnes deviatino from crocedures to obtain acceptable ERCW pump performance data. TVA responded that the Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) had investigated this issue and found no other such occurrences.
The NRC thanked TVA for their presentation and closed the meeting.
Attachment:
Enforcement Conference Agenda J
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December 4, 1986 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II-86-90 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or i
public interest significance.
i The information is as initially received without verifi-cation or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region II staff on this date.
FACILITY: Georgia Power Company Licensee Emergency Classification:
Hatch Units 1 and 2 Notification of Unusual Event Docket Nos. 50-321/366 Alert Baxley, Georgia Site Area Emergency General Emergency X Not Applicable
SUBJECT:
AIT DISPATCHED TO INVESTIGATE LEAK FROM SPENT FUEL POOLS Region II has dispatched an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to the Hatch site to investigate the leak of about 50,000 gallons of water from the Hatch Units 1 and 2 spent fuel pools.
Georgia Power discovei.J the leak at 10:02 p.m. (EST) yesterday, when it was found that water had spilled into an outside area between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor buildings.
Hatch Unit 1 is operating at 300 percent power; Hatch Unit 2 has completed a refueling outage, but is in cold shutdown.
An immediate investigation by Georgia Power disclosed that the leak detection annunciator failed to alarm and that the spent fuel pool levels had dropped about five feet.
The pools are built so that they cannot be completely drained and the fuel uncovered. Although the pool levels dropped by five feet, the levels did not go below the technical specification limits.
Of the m :#xttb E.':: ;al k ns v u ter cien leaked, between 5,000 and 10,000 gallons were released throu;;h the storm drain system to a swampy area within the owner-controlled property.
Plant personnel are building dikes and taking other steps to contain this water.
Georgia Power believes no contaminated water has entered the nearby Altamaha River, j
Georgia Power also believes that leak may have been caused by a loss of air to inflatable seals in the transfer canal flexible-joint seismic area.
A valve which regulates air supply to these seals was found shut.
Georgia Power is still investigating why the valve was shut and why the leak detection annunciator failed to alarm.
Coolant sample analysis by Georgia Power indicates that 1.26 times the maximum permissible i
concentrations of the following isotopes were released: cesium-134, cesium-137, zinc-65 and manganese-54.
The AIT is composed of a section chief from the Division of Reactor Projects, resident inspectors, and a specialist in both radiological effluents and chemistry, and environmental effects.
Media interest has occurred.
Georgia Power has issued a press release, and Region II is responding to inquiries.
The State of Georgia has been informed and has dispatched a person to take environmental samples.
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f Georgia Power informed the NRC incident response center of this occurrence by telephone at 1: 35 a.m. today.
This information is current as of 2:30 p.m.
Contact:
R. Croteau, 242-4668 V. L. Brownlee, 242-5563 DISTRIBUTION:
i H. Street MNBB Phillips EN Willste MAIL-Chairman Zech F
NRR If NM55 ANEUM8 Com. Roberts PA OIA RES DOT:
Trans Only Com. Asselstine MPA AE0D Applicable State Comm. Bernthal ELD Com. Carr Air Rights INPO SECY SP NSAC ACRS CA POR Regions:
Licensee:
(Reactor Licensees)
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December 5, 1986 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-II-86-90A This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or gublic interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification ar evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region II staff on this date.
Facility:
Licensee Emergency Classification:
Georgia Power Company Notification of Unusual Event Hatch Units 1 and 2 Alert (Ioccket Mos. 50-321/366
_ Site Area Emergency i
B'a:xley, Georgia General Emergency X
Not Applicable S11BJECT: LEAK FROM SPENT FUEL POOLS - UPDATE This PN updates PNO-II-86-90, issued on December 4.
Georgia Power is now in the final stages of recovery from this spill.
Cleanup of normally clean plant areas which were contaminated is essentially complete, encept for the nitrogen storage area. Samples indicate that 25 to 35 percent of the esti-mated.37-curie released from the spent fuel pools are retained in this area.
A temporary roof has been erected there to keep out rainwater.
The hot machine shop, adjacent to the nitrogen storage area, was the pathway for water to reach the storm drain outside the hot machine shop door. This storm drain leads to the outfall and subsequently to the swamp area.
Cleanup of sediment and decontamination is in progress.
Aill water sources from the plant to the swamp area have been diverted at or before reaching j
the cutfall. Contaminated water which is being collected is currently at four percent of maximum permissible concentration, as compared with samples taken at 8 a.m., on December 4, which were 1.15 times greater than MPC, Cleanup is continuing between the outfall and the I
swamp. About 300 cubic feet of contaminated sand, roots, rocks, etc., have been removed.
i G'eorgia Power plans to remove vegetation, sand and sediment in the creek to reduce radiation I
readings on contact to less than one-half millirem per hour and to cover with six inches l
of gravel. This work is expected to be complete today before rainfall which is predicted tonight and tomorrow.
j J
A' composite sampler will be set up at the outfall to monitor activity discharged to the swamp l
when the rain starts. Two composite samplers have been set up between the swamp and the j
Mtamaha River to monitor expected runof f.
No centaminated discharges to the river have accurred thus far.
Between 50,000 and 60,000 gallons of water, collected from various drains and dikes, have been processed through the plant radioactive waste system. At this i
thne, the plant has discharged no unprocessed liquid ef fluent directly to the river, j
Ihtegrity of secondary containment, including the refueling floor, was demonstrated on
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D1cember 5.
In the normal configuration, the fixed seal between the two reactor buildings l
it H05185 to tM reluWilny fl0Ur atmnphuf'W, dild ally dir' 1WdAdyW 15 a pat L ur Llie leakage i
that is measured when secondary containment integrity is demonstrated. The refueling floor i's. a part of the Unit 1 secondary containment.
Recalculations by Georgia Power have concluded that the water loss from the Units 1 and 2 I
spent fuel pools totals about 141,000 gallons, rather than the 50,000 gallons reported f
initially. This updated figure, derived from reviews of logs, includes all water added to the pools since December 2, when the leak is believed to have started. It also has now been datermined that the drop in fuel pool level was f;ce and a half feet, rather than five feet.
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Of the total 141,000 gallons which leaked, Georgia Power now believes that 17,000 gallons were captured in radioactive waste holding tanks. An estimated 40,000 gallons may still be collected below the 112-foot elevation in the joint between the two reactor bwildings.
It appears that the reminder, about 84,000 gallons, drained to the areas outside the plant buildings, but still on site property. The total quantity of radioactivity released to the swamp was less than one half curie.
During the weekend, Georgia Power pumped water from portions of the swamp into tank trucks and processed it by recirculation through demineralizers before transfer to the plant radio-active waste system. Removal of the water and contaminated vegetation and sediment reduced the radiation levels in the swamp from the maximum of 1.6 millirem per hour seen in one localized area. Radioactivity levels in the water contained in the swamp were less than 1%
of the NRC limits for unrestricted areas.
Although no emergency preparedness declarations were made, Georgia Power activated its Hatch technical support center and coordinated the cleanup and recovery effort from there.
The President of Georgia Power and members of his staff were on site during part of the recovery actions.
The Director and Deputy Director of the Region II Division of Reactor Projects joined the four-member Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) en site on December 7 and concurred with Georgia Power's plans for restart of Unit 2.
The Unit 2 reactor was trade critical at 3 a.m., on December 7 and is working to establish condenser vacuum in preparation for rolling the turbine generator.
Both Georgia Power and NRC'are continuing to respond to media inquiries.
This information is current as of 4:00 p.m. (EST) today.
CONTACT:
F. S. Cantrell, 242-5534 V. L. Brownlee 242-5563 DISTRIBUTION:
H. St.
HNBB Phillips E/W W111ste Mail:
ADM:0MB
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Chairman Zech EDO NRR IE NHSS 00T:Trans only Comm. Bernthal PA OIA RES Comm. Roberts ELO AE00 l
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4-Georgia power Company 333 Piedmont AvenuO Ananta. Georg:a 30308 Teleonone 404 526 6526 Mailing Address:
Post Ottice Box 4545 Attanta, Georgia 30302 Georgia Power
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L t ooe uarager nuciear safety SL-1692 ana uce-s ng December 5, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
REFERENCE:
Office of Inspection and Enforcement RII: JNG
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Region II - Suite 2900 50-321/50-366 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 ATTENTION: Dr. J. Nelson Grace Gentlemen:
This letter serves to document those items which we presented to members of your staff in telephone conversation today.
The following items describe certain of our planned actions related to the loss of water from the Plant Hatch Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pools which occurred on December 3,1986.
The fuel pool transfer canal bellows seals arrangement is being i
evaluated to assure that design changes are generated to make the transfer canal assembly single failure proof.
The transfer canal sealing configuration is currently such that no single-failure will result in the loss of inventory from the spent fuel pools and will be maintained in that mode.
The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident.
To assure this objective, Technical Specifications provide for periodic operation of the standby ventilation system to assure its ability to draw and maintain an airflow into the building.
The specific performance objectives of the Technical Specifications could be affected by changes in the status of elements of the secondary containment boundary.
As is our practice, Georgia Power Company will continue to monitor these secondary containment elements, including the refueling floor boundary, in order to assure that we meet the performance requirements of the Technical Specifications as plant conditions change.
The plant environmental monitoring program has been augmented to further assure detection of manmade isotope concentrations and to identify any significant migration.
This program, will be fully implemented by December 15, 1986, and will be available for NRC review upon site inspection.
The program specifically will include sampling of the run-off from the yard drainage system.
Monitoring data and analysis will be maintained at the plant for review by your staff.
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I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 December 5,1986 Page Two If you have any questions in this regard, please contact this office at any time.
Sincerely, M g
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L. T. Gucwa l
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c: Georgia Power Company U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. s. P. O'Reilly Mr. D. Muller, Project Director Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
BWR Project Directorate No. 2 Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.
Mr. P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident GO-NORMS Inspector - Hatch 0963C l
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Date: December 8, 1986 g
E lfl!!M.!9IIBGGIlgy 0F EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--FND-II-86-90A
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1 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification
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or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Regton 11 staff on this date.
j Facility:
Licensee Energency Classification:
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Beorgia Power Company Notification of unusual Event
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Hatch Units 1 and 2
~~ ~ Alert Docket Nos. 50-321/366
~~~ Site Area Energency Buley, Beorgia
~~~~ Seneral Energency "I" Not Applicacle
SUBJECT:
LEAK FROM SPENT FUEL FOOLS - UPDATE This FN updates PND-II-86-90, issued on December 4.
Georgia Power is new in the final stages of recovery from this spill.
I Cleanup of normally clean plant areas which were contaelnated is essentially cCaplete.
except for the nitrogen storage area. Saaples indicate that 25 to 35 percent of the esti-sated.37-curse released from the spent fuel pools are retained in this area. A temporary roof has been erected there to keep out ratnwater. The hot eachine shop, adjacent to the nitrogen storage area, was the pathway for water to reath the store drain outside the hot eachine shop door. This stare crain leads to the outfall and subsequently to the swasp area.
Cleanup of sediment and decontasination is in progress.
All cater sources from the plant to the swasp area have been divtried at or before reaching the outfall. Contasinated water which is being collected as currently at four percent of anisua permissible concentration, as compared with saeples taken at 8 a.m., on December 4, which were 1.15 trees greater than MPC. Cleanup is continuing between the outfall and the szaap. About 300 cubic feet of contasinated sand, roots, rocks, etc., have been removed.
Georgia Power plans to resave vegetationi sand and sediaent in the creek to reduce radiation readings on contact to less than one-halt aillites per hour and to cover with six inches of gravel. This work is expected to be complete today before rainf all which is predicted tonight and tomorrow.
A cospesite saepler will be set up at the outf all to sanitor activity discharged to the swasp then the rain starts. Two ccaposite samplers have been set up between the swasp and the Altaeaha River to sanitor expected runoff. No contasinated discharges to the river have occurred thr. rer. Between 50,000 and 60,000 gallons of water, collected free various drains and dites, have been prccessed through the plant radioactive waste systes. At this time, the plant has discharged no unprocessed liquid effluent directly to the river.
Integrity of secondary containment, including the refueling floor was demonstrated on is exposed to the refueling floor atsospbere, fixed seal between lhe two reactor buildings Cecembe,r 5.
In the norsal configuration the and ar,y air leakage is a part of the leakage that is measured when secondary containeent Integrity is demonstrated. The refueling floor is a part of the Unit I secondary containeent Recalculations by Georgia Power have concluded that the water loss free the Units 1 and 2 spent fuel pools totals about 141,000 gallons, rather than the 50,000 gallons reported initially. This updated fi the pools since December 2,gure, derived from review 6 of logs, includes all water added to when the leak is believed to have started, it also has now been determined that the drop in fuel pool level was five and a half feet, rather than five feet.
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p Of the total 141,000 gallons which' leaked, Georgia Power now believes that 17,000 gallons were captured in radioactive waste holding tanks. An estiaated 40,000 gallons say still be collected below the 112-foot elevation in the joint between the two reactor buildings, it appears that the reeinder,te properly.0 gallons,l quantity of radioactivity released to the about 84 00 drained to the areas outside the plant buildings, but still on si The tota sweep was less than one half curse.
During the weekend, Georgia Power pueped water from portions of the swasp into tank trucks and processed it by rectrculation through desineralizers before transfer to the plant radio-active waste systes. Removal of the water and contaetnated vegetation and sediment reduced j
the radiation levels in the sweep froe the sanieus of 1.6 millares per hour seen in one localiard area. Radioactivity levels in the water contained in the swasp were less than li of _ the NRC limits for unrestricted areas.
Although no energency preparedness declarations were made, Georgia Power activated its
- Hitch technical support center and coordinated the cleanup and recovery effort from there.
The Fresident of Georgia Power and seabers of his staff were on site during part of the recovery actions.
The Director and Deputy Director of the Recton 11 Division of Reactor Projects joined the four-seaber Augeented Inspection Teae (AIT) on site on December 7 and concurred with Georgta Power's plans for restart of Unit 2.
The Unit 2 reactor was made critical at 3 a.s., on December 7 and is working to establish condenser vacuus in preparation for rolling the j
turbine generator, j
Both Georgia Power and NRC are continuing to respond to media Inquirtes.
This information is current as of 4:00 p.e. (EST) today.
j CONTACT: F. S. Cantrell, 242-55:4 V. L. Brownlee 242-5563 DISTRIBUTION:
H. St.
MNBB Phillips E/W Willste Mail: ADM:DMB Chaireas'Isc6" EDO ~ ~ NRR IE ~ ~ NMSS DOT:Trans only
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Coas. Bernthal PA OIA RES Coas. RoDerts ELD AEDD Cose. Asselstine Coos. Carr ACRS Air Rights INPD----
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N.LLh UNITED STATES a
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NUCLEAR P.EGULATORY COMMISSION REGION H i
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'#l 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANT A. GEORGI A 30323 j
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FEB 0 41987
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Georgia Power Company ATTM: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE MEETING
SUMMARY
- DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366 This refers to the enforcement conference conducted at our request in the NRC Region II office on January 22, 1987. The meeting was held to discuss the design and procedural problems associated with the loss of water from the spent fuel pools at Hatch.
The details of the meeting are provided in Enclosure 1.
A list of attendees at the meeting is shown in Enclosure 2.
It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial in that it provided a better I
understanding of Georgia Power Company's position on the issues.
O Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning thsse matters, we will be pleased to discuss them.
Sincerely, 4
J. Nelson Grace
/ Regional Administrator
Enclosures:
1.
Meeting Summary 2.
Meeting Attendees 3.
Meeting Outline Submitted by Georgia Power Company cc w/encls:
J. T. Beckham, Vice Pr'ssfdent, Plant Hatch H. C. Nix, Site Operations Gene ~ral Manager A. Fraser, Acting Site QA Supervisor ft 2 # -f 7 L. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety b
and Licensing
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i ENCLOSURE 1 i
MEETING
SUMMARY
Licensee: Georgia Power Company Facility: Hatch Units 1 and 2..
Docket Nos: 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos: DPR-57 and NPF-5 j
An enforcement conference was held on January 22, 1987, in the Region II offices with Georgia Power Company (GPC). The subject of this conference was the potential.
enforcement actions steming from the loss of fuel. pool level by means of a leak by the fuel pool transfer canal seals.
The conference was opened by J. Nelson Grace who asked if GPC understood the i
NRC concerns.
When GPC responded that they were ready.to address the. NRC concerns, the floor was turned over to GPC for their presentation.
J GPC reviewed the event and the actions taken to contain and clean up the -
contaminated water lost from the fuel pool.
No information presented in this area was different than what was previously understood to.have occurred.
. The NRC had a concern as to whether the transfer canal seals' were adequately designed to prevent a significant loss of contaminated water from the fuel pool as specified by Criterion 61 and 64 of Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC)..
GPC stated that their analysis of the seal design indicated that it was proper and in accordance with GDC and NRC Safety' Guide 13 which implements.GDC.61. GPC also stated that all FSAR comitments were met. The air supply to the seals was stated to be redundant but not single failure proof. The redundancy was achieved since the Unit 1 and Unit 2 service air headers had manual cross connect capability on the 112' elevation but not on the 228' level of the refueling floor.
The FSAR states that interconnected drains behind the stainless steel fuel pool liner will prevent uncontrolled loss of contaminated fuel pool water to other relatively clean areas within secondary containment.
GPC stated that'this FSAR commitment only applied to the fuel pools, not the transfer canal.
GPC made the point that the loss. of water from the fuel pool was a spill, not an unmonitored release, since all the contaminated water remained on the plant site : until properly processed through the radweste system and ~ properly discharged.
GPC agreed that there were personnel errors -committed and that there were procedural. problems contributing to the event and. that corrective action in the' form of personnel discipline W prece@re changes had been taken.
(O The questions of the adequacy of the seal and air ~ supply design and of. the applicability of the FSAR section on fuel pool liner leakage detection and water containment will be the subject of further NRC review.
The NRC appreciated the quality and frankness of the GPC presentation.
?
ENCLOSURE 2 MEETING ATTENDEES.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator J. Lieberman, Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement V. L. Brownlee, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, DRP F. S. Cantrell, Section Chief, Reactor Projects Section 28 DRP M. B. Shymiock, Operational Programs Section Chief, Division of Reactor Safety -
P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector, Hatch Georgia Power Company J. P. O'Reilly, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations J. T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch L. T. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing 1
D. S. Read, Plant Support Manager, Plant Hatch P. R. Bemis, Manager Engineering Liaison E. M. Howard, Manager Emergency Preparedness S. C. Ewald, Radiological Safety Manager R. D. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager, Hatch, Corporate i
A. H. Domby, legal Council w
,= e
ns at:
UNITED ST ATil k
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMissl0N 48
- R E ClON 11 E
ATLANTA,06oACIA 30323 December 30. 1986 MEMCRANPUM FOR:
Gary Holahr.r. Director, Operating Reactor A u etsment Staff.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:
Albert F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
TRANSFER OF LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVALUATING THE ADEQUACY OF l
THE TRANSFER CANAL SEAL BETWEEN HATCH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDINGS l
As the result of the loss of air pressure to the inflatable seals in the transfer canal at the three-inch gap between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 building, on December 3, i
1986, approximately 141,000 gallons of water were lost from the spent fuel pools and the transfer canal.
Eighty thousand gallons may have been released to the environs on Georgia Power Company property.
It does not appear that this inflatable seal in the transfer canal was adequately' described in the FSAR or i
evaluated by the NRC for its intended use.
Figure 9.1 6 in the FSAR shows double i
redundant inflatable seals, but does not show that all six seals were inflated by a single air Tine.
None of the seals were instrumented.to alann on loss of air pressure. The same sketch shows the leak detection alarm system for these seals.
A critical review of this sketch and other prints at.the site indicates a high probability that the leak detection alann system would not alert the operators to a common mode failure of all seals such as the loss of all air pressure; leakage would preferentially flow to the three-inch gap between the. building rather than into the leak detection system.
$ccr m y cer.t3 0: rent 4
- ev' fed te re6ce the potential fcr a ground level 5
re'.eu e of gases ar4 sc-ticaiste tratter.
Technical Specifications require periodic testing to assure that secondary containment meets specift: criteria.
It is Region II's position that containment is also required for the radioactive liquid in secondary containment.
FSAR 9.1.2,2.1 states that in order to limit the possibility of pool leakage j
around pool penetrations, each pool is lined with stainless steel and that 1
interconnected drainage paths are provided behind the liner to prevent j
uncontrolled loss of containment poc1 water to other relatively cleaner areas within the secondary containment.
The Hatch 2 Safety Evaluation Report dated j
June 1978 concluded that the design of the spent fuel storage facility was in conformance with the requirements of GDC 61 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A.
We believe if the FSAR had adequately addressed the as-installed transfer canal and the transfer canal seals, the NRC would not have concluded that the intent of GDC 61 was met.
CONTACT:
F. Cantrell FTS: 242-5534 Fc78-5 7 - 7 6
.g. O pg
I Gary Holahan 2
Decembar 30, 1986
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A subsequent evaluation by Georgia Power Company indicated that irradiated control blades are stored on short hanger rods clipped over the side of the spent fuel pool.
Some of these control blades would be completely uncovered if the water level dropped to the top nf the transfer canal.
Because of cobalt in the rollers on the control blades, the rtillers have a contact rrading cf 8,000 in 10,000 R/hr, which would result in a field of about 100 R/hr at the edge of the j
spent fuel pool and 1 R/hr 6 feet from the edge of the pool.
Georgia Power Company provided thelenior Resident Inspector with preliminary information that shows that with both condensate pumps in operation supplying 1,000 gpm, the pool level would stabilize at 6'3" above the bottom of the transfer canal with a complete failure of the inflatable seals.
Under these conditions, part of the control blades would still be uncovered with a possible 1,000 gpm unmonitored 1
1 release.
(Region I! has not verified these figures.)
{
Georgia Power Company has separated the air supply to the transfer canal seals and the air supply to the inner and outer gates between the transfer canal and the spent fuel pools, and is studying other changes to assure greater reliability.
We request that you:
1.
. Evaluate the adequacy of the description of the transfer canal and sealing i
arrangement in the FSAR.
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2.
Evaluate proposed changes to the seals in the transfer canal to determine if
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inflatable seals can be upgraded to meet NRC requirements or if a different solution is required.
3.
Evaluate the leak detection alarm system to determine if the current
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ccnficuration is an acceptable method to identify leakage past the transfer cs-M uti.
O sider ths ;cssibilisy c' urmoni*.cred releases of spent fuel
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- W CW t; v.e erv1rcreent upon gross seal failure.
4.
Determine if these inflatable seals should have a low air pressure alarm to indicate potential seal failures, rather than waiting for a leak to provide an alarm.
Please provide a response by March 1, 1987
/
Albert F. Gibson cc:
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JAN UARY 22, ' 987-AGE \\JA 1.
OPENING REMARKS J. P. O'REILLY 11.
EVENT
SUMMARY
J. T. BECKHAM, JR.
Ill. -GPC RESPONSE TO EVENT
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IV.
RAD / ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE S; C. EWALD V.
SAFETY / REGULATORY DESIGN BASIS L.T. GUCWA VI.
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- STATUS OF UNITS
- AIR PRESSURE REGULATOR FAILS
- valve to transfer canal seals partially closed
- AIR SUPPLY VALVE CLOSED e PERIODIC REPLENISHMENT OF FUEL POOL WATER
- CAUSE OF LEVEL DECREASE INVESTIGATED AND IDENTIFIED e AIR SUPPLY VALVE OPENED-REESTABLISHING AIR TO SEALS
- INCIDENT MITIGATION ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN
- management notified and involved
- NRC/ government agencies notified
- spill contained cleanup activities undertaken a
EVENT RESPONSE EXCELLENT Rc2-1
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TIMELY NOTIFICATION AND UPDATES PROVIDED
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- Senior Vice President
- Vice President Plant Hatch r
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- PLANT / CORPORATE EMERGENCY CENTERS ACTIVATED EARLY AND MANNED AROUND THE CLOCK
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- ISEG investigation
- environmental protection
- engineering efforts recovery plans
- COMPREHENSIVE FORMAL REPORT dort
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JE\\~ r EJ 3R03_EVS AIR SUPPLY OPERATION (regulator & ball valve)
- revised DR procedure - e-M
- " ~ F='"""
- in PE0 inspection procedures
= operator discipline
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e LEAK DETECTOR OPERATION
- revised procedures
- engineering review during replacement der 2
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e TRANSFER CANAL SEAL OPERATION
- redundant air to seal system
- normal seal replacement j
- further engineering evaluation 4
- ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
- DR procedure
> procedure upgrade (calibration, annunciators)
~
- shift turn-over
- discipline
- fuel pool level APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT CONTROLS IN Pl. ACE
.