ML20245A084
| ML20245A084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1986 |
| From: | Roisman A TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C. |
| To: | Chandler L NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236J334 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-596 CPA, OL, NUDOCS 8702120528 | |
| Download: ML20245A084 (1) | |
Text
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TRIAL LAWYERS FOR Puauc JusTict, P.C.
COUN5tLLOR$ AT LAW
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SulTE 611 2000 P STREET, NORTHWEST ANTHONY Z ACX5MN
%KSHINGTON. D C. 20036 86 DEC -8 P12 :2i202)4634600 inCuTu a uCTOR ART HR BRYANT staff ATTORNEY DOCKET NUMCER mt e uuCToR. tjMRONMINTAL PR OD. f UTIL FAC...... n 4
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l MHISTLIALOWER PROJECT aARa^ u rRATT OrnCL MANAGER December 4, 1986 KATHLLEN CUMBERBATCH SECRITARY I
Larry Chandler BY HAND 3
Office of Executive Legal Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7735 Old Georgetown Road, 9th floor Bethesda, MD 20814 RE:
ENCLOSED
Dear Larry:
The enclosed letter to Victor Stello requests production of the recent OIA report regarding QA/QC at Comanche Peak and Region IV's involvement.
We contend that this report is also covered by our previously filed discovery on CPRT adequacy (9/22/86), including but not limited to questions 2, 9, 13, 14, 19, and 35.
According to the extension agreement you reached with my co-counsel Ms. Garde, it is my understanding that you will be providing your answers to this discovery tomorrow.
Sincerely,
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Anthony Z-,' Roisman AZR/bp enclosure cc:
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UNITED STATES
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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20855 l
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1 ' DEC 1986
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l Docket Nos.:
50-445
'86 DEC 12 P3 :48 and 50-446 CFF.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Atomic Safety and I.icensin@ 30ardnfor Comanche Peak (P. 8. Bloch, W. H. Jordan, K. A. McCellom, E. B. Johnson)
FROM:
Vincent S. Noonan, Director Project Directorate No. 5 Division of PWR l.icensing-A
SUBJECT:
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR (80ARD NOTIFICATION NO. 86-24)
Attached for the information of the t.icensing Board is a copy of a report prepared by the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor concernino Region IV management actions relative to Comanche Peak. This report was sent to the Commission by OIA on November 26, 1986. This report addresses, in part, certain matters regarding Region IV's inspection activities as they pertain to the Applicants' Ouality Assurance program and its implementation and, thus, portions of this report may be relevant and material to the admitted contention in this proceeding, Contention 5.
At this time, various offices of the Commission are reviewing the report and its attachments (consisting of some 3300 pages) to determine whether the findings of the report reauire the initiation of management, enforcement and/or investigatory actions. For this reason, certain deletions have been made, in the first instance, in the copy of the report provided herewith. The Commission has authorized the public release of the report in this form. Upon completion of the staff's review, we will inform the Board whether an unredacted version of the report and its attachments can be provided or whether such release will necessitate a recuest for the prior imposition of an appropriate protective order.
/(
W an, Director PWR Projec D rectorate No. 5 Division of PWR t.icensing-A
Enclosure:
Report of Investigation ec:
See next page l
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o W. G. Counsil Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Texas Utilities Generating Coinpany Units 1 and 2 i
cc:
Nicholas S. Reynolds Esa.
Resident Inspector / Comanche Peak Bishop, t.ibennan, Cook, Steam Electric Station Purcell & Reynolds e/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1200 Seventeenth Street, NW P. O. Box 38 Washington, D.C.
20036 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Robert A. Wooldridge, Esq.
Regional Administrator, Region IV Worsham Forsythe, Sampels &
U.S. Nuclear Reoulatory Commission Wooldridge 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 2001 Bryan Tower Suite 2500 Arlington, Texas 76011 Dallas, Texas 75201 1.anny A. Sinkin Mr. Homer C. Schmidt Christic Institute Manager - Nuclear Services 1324 North Capitol Street Texas Utilities Generating Company Washington, D.C.
20002 Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street, t..B. 81 Ms. Billie Pirner Garde Dallas, Texas 75201 Government Accountability Proiect
(
Midwest Office Mr. Robert E. Ballard, Jr.
3424 N. Marcos t,ane Director of Projects Appleton, WI 54911 Gibbs and Hill, Inc.
11 Pen Plaza New York, New York 10001 David R. Pigott, Eso.
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe 600 Montgomery Street Mr. R. S. Howard San Francisco, California 94111 Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Anthony 7. Roisman, Esq.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Trial I.awyers for Public Justice 2000 P. Street, NW i
Renea Hicks, Esq.
Suite 611 Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C.
20036 Environmental Protection Division P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Nancy E. Wiegers Austin, Texas 78711 Spiegel & McDiarmed 1350 New York Avenue, NW Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President Washington, D.C.
20005-4798 Citizens Association for Sound Energy 1426 South Polk Roy P. I.essy, Jr.
Dallas, Texas 75224 Wright & Talisman, P. C.
1050 Seventeenth Street, NW Ms. Nancy H. Williams Suite 600 CYGNA Washington, D.C.
20036-5566 101 California Street San Francisco, California 94111
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Texas Utilities Electric Company Comanche Peak Electric Station Units 1 and 2 CC:
i Resident Inspector - Comanche Peak Joseph F. Fulbright l
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fulbright & Jaworski P. O. Box 1029 1301 McKinney Street Granbury, Texas 76048 Houston, Texas 77010 Mr. John W. Beck Vice President Texas Utilities Generating Company Skyway Tower 400 N. Olive Street, t.B#81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. Jack Redding C/0 Oatel Service Corp.
Texas Utilities Generating Company 7910 Woodmont Avenue Ste. 208 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 William A. Burchette, Esq.
Counsel for Tex-l.a Electric Cooperative of Texas Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell Suite 700 1025 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW Washington, D.C.
20007 GDS Associates Inc.
2525 Cumberland Parkway Suite 450 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Administrative Judge Peter Bloch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D.C.
20555 Elizabeth B. Johnson Administrative Judge Oak Ridge National 1.aboratory P. O. Box X Building 3500 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom 1107 West Knapp Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 Dr. Walter H. Jordan 881 Outer Drive l
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 l
l
f-j C/1 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT BY REGION IV MANAGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION i
BACKGROUND On March 19, 1986, met with the Acting Director, Office of Inspector and Auditor allegations of wrongdoing by M(OIA), to refer to OIA a number of concerning the handling of safety issues at COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION These allegations had been brought to h (CPSES).
attention by current and former NRC employees and NRC contractors. DIA was concurrently infomed of the allegations from sources outside NRC.
On March 19 6, 1986, OIA interviewed regarding his concerns a out the way Region IV was reg-ulating the construction of CPSES.
alleged that 6 6 were being pressured, harassed and intimidated by Region IV management to delete or downgrade proposed findings in draft inspection reports to make the TEXAS UTILITIES GENERA 11NG COMPANY (TUGCO), the applicant for CPSES, look better.
During the interview,%4 asserted he had been intimidated almost to the point where he believed he could not write independent draft reports based on his inspections.
In support of this assertion Mdiscussed specific instances in which he alleged that harassment and intimidation b ion IV management resulted in violations proposed by M and in draft inspection reports being unjustifiably downgraded in ina reports.
(Attachment A is a list of proposed violations that M alleged had been inappropriately downgraded or deleted from inspection reports by Region IV management).
After reviewing the infomation provided byM, DIA combined the specific instances of alleged wrongdoing into a general allegation that:
Region !Y management harassed and intimidated inspectors to pressure them to downgrade or delete proposed inspection findings at CPSES.
Additionally, based on our review of the information provided byg, OIA identified other issues that warranted OIA investigation. Two of these mat-ters, which did not relate specifically to CPSES, were an alleged violation of the Freedom of Information Act and allegations pertaining to the Fort St.
Vrain Nuclear Generatin Station. These allegations will be handled by OIA in separate reports.
aised two other issues involving CPSES which OIA detemined warranted review during this invutigation:
The Region IV Quality Assurance (QA) Inspection Program at CPSES was inadequate; and Data documented in Region IV's NRC Fom 766, Inspector's Report, was
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inaccurate.
o1
0
SUMMARY
OF INVESTIGATIVE FIADINGS NOTE: This ripset is divided into sections that separately report our investigative findings and conclusions regarding each of the three general allegations. In each instance, the technical aspects of the allegations and the testimony regarding the allegations were reviewed by 01A's technical advisors. Their cuments are attached and should be read in conjunction with each section of the report. Additionally, the first section is organized by specific inspecties report. The discussion of the inspection reports is followed by a summary of 1starviews regarding Region IV maragement's attitude toward enforcempt.
Allegation 1: Region IV Ranagement Harassed and Intimidated Inspectors to Pressure Them ta towngrade er Delete Proposed Inspection Findings at CP5ES 6 was interviewed and stated that since September 1985 he has been l
harassed by concerning his lespection findings at CPSES. He believes he has been harassed i
to the point defe he has almost been intimidated into writing inspection reports contaisteg only detM wants, instead of writing independent j
draft inspectia reports bued on his findings of TUGC0 compliance /non-compliance with lations and then submitting the report to management.
In W view, seemed to have total backing from Re ion IV manage-j ment concerning her inspection reports were written.
was afraid he might be removed from the WSES project unless he cooperated.
M also learned there were several other inspectors who had been subjected to similar treatment by while conducting and documenting inspections. Scomented t at the disagreements he was having with 6wem unre than technical differences of professional pinion.
Without providing my valid rationale, W wanted o downgrade or delete proposed findings from inspection Nports. H sserte that when j
q @ tor with tasassant argument. disagreed that a violation should be written, he j j
'nspec M believed motivation for not wanting to document findings against TUGC0 uns had taken it u on himself to make sure CPSES was licensed. As support for his belief, stated that in mid-1985, when
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first arrived at CPSES as the d M there was nothing wrong with COMANCHE PEAK.
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and ct, i; m 1 one of the best built plants in the country.
M, in l
assectad th!
constantly defended TUGC0 and gave ground rud in 1 when aderse 'indings were identified. 4 considered attid act ta be one of a diligent regulator but one of a defender and prussar of tie licensing process (Attachment B, pages 6, 148-153 l
and159-161).
M discuss @ed the following specific instances of alleged harassment intimidation hy as a result of inspection findings:
Inspection h=rt 56-445/84-32; 50-446/84-11 (84-32/11)
When interyi elA cancerning inspection report 84-32/11 6 asserted that told him " Region IV management would never forget this t
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inspection."
said he replied to Mthat he was unhappy with the enforceseat pe icy-in Region IV and was looking for another job, and g said te thught that was a res11y good idea.
According tom the purpose of the inspection was to audit the TUGC0 corporate office as msvre the applicant was properly managing QA activities.
The Region IV tapaction determined that TUGC0 was understaffed to run an effective audit preyan and TUGC0 management had not comprehensively reviewed the status and &y of their QA p ram between 1974 and 1984. During the inspection, told that 84-32/11 was the first in-depth "au it corporate program that the NRC had done since the constructies permit tas issued in 1974.
g@5,1906. h November 2,1984, och he results of his inspection in a draft ort dated October 1 g g, M agreed thatcase ta CPSES to review the ins ec ion report with Tccording to inspection findings were supported end, la fact, thought the report was too low keyed.
MM opined that because the NRC had not performed a comprehensive inspection of 1ES arporate headquarters in ten years, TUGC0 thought it was doing a good job is te absence of being told differently. M considered NRC to be the real problem. Because TUGC0 was new in the nuclear field, g nellened good inspections by the NRC were needed.
W related heims at Region IV Hea ters a short time after the inspect on report uns written, and so t him out to discuss and take issue with tie inspection report.
defended his own actions and those of while WM was the supervisor of the CPSES project, and stated he did not believe they had failed to perfonn the required QA inspections. M pointed out to severa QA inspection procedures that had not been completed at CP50, ad became very defensive.
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and stated, " Regio N w I never forget this report".
nferred this statement to be a tuest. Msaid he mentioned again to that he was trying to trusfer to another NRC region because of the intense rassure, andW again replied he thought this was a good idea.
( g relatas est so findings were changed in inspe,ction report 84-32/11
- tachment B, hys 9. N,13, 2124 and 28).
g was interviewed retarding inspectims 2 l' stated that at the time of the ins pection, he as q
s a result o inspectio 4-32/11,a nunber of imp ime identified. Several of the findings pertaining to the status and adegsg af the TUGC0 QA program and the establishm nt and implementation af the1UGC0 audit program were considered by to be significant. @eid he considered the findings to be significant because the quantity and tysitty of QA records at CPSES had already been questioned by the NRC Technical krisw Team (TRT).
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6 agreed fully.with the inspection findings. He recalled working for about eight heurt with6 to help put the findings to e her and to make J
sure they were le the proper perspective.
In fact, after reviewed the draft findings from a supervisory viewpoint, he thought the findings had more significance than as originally written. 6 did not receive any resis-tance to the inspection findings from Region IV mana ement,
' he was unaware l
of any coments that may have been made by to concerning the inspectim report (Attachment C, pages
-8 and 11-16).
I s interviewed concerning his involvement with inspection report 84-32/11..
related that he was generally familiar with l
inspection report M-32/11, and it was his understanding the inspection was
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done as a followep on miscellaneous allegations that had been assigned to l
i Region IV as part of the TRT activities.
6 had some involvement with the inspection report in June 1985 with
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respect to what uns going to be done concerning@the findings in the report 6 discussed the in tion report with to obtain background information and believed told him the report was more nega fve than first intended. Beyond askin for background information, said he had as further involvement wit the report.
% stated the report was written in negative fashion. M stated he did not ske the statement to that "Recion IV will never that was a conclu on@ drew himself I
forget this report." He adding that he had hear make the statement himself. M w.
as not worried about my pro ems e report may have caused TUGC0; however, he thought the report uns overly critical.
believed the report would lead the reader to believe TUGC0 did not ave an udit program. In fact, although it my act have been effective, TUGC0 did have an audit program.
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6 statedM had mentioned a number of times that he was looking for a ositis artside of Region IV. He recalled that one day, after he and had discussions for a period of time,4 said "I'd be better off if I had mener come to Region IV; if I had gone to headquarters."
said be pre a very hon t answer, "Maybe you would have been."
stated he never told "You better leave Region IV.*
said Ms comments were not intended as a threat (Attachment D, pages 67-76 and 105112).
Inspection tigert 50-345/85-07;50-446/85-05(85-07/05)
W to10 014 he was directed to drop a trend analysis of the NRC85-07/05 6 was inspection at CPSES from inspection report tp do a trend analysis of the NRC inspection rogram at CPSES asked by to include violaties and unresolved items. @ documented curing Region IV said i wanted to review unresolved items at CPSES that had been inspections to determine if any of them should have been violations. 6 believed 6 Masted this infomation because 6 suspected violations were reported as aresolved items so TUGC0 would not nave to femally document correctise action ad would not be required to detemine the cause of the deficiency or take corrective action.
lieved this could allow an inadequate @ prepnun to go undetected.
stated his trend analysis revealed adverse tends which should have been identified during NRC
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s inspections. He added'that these trends were comparable to the problems with the TUGC0 QA proyam, which were later identified by NRC Construction AssessmenLTeamLCAT) inspection report 83-10/12 and the NRC TRT. It appeared to m that many inspection violations had been handled as unresolved items.
The results of the trend analysis performed b were documented in a January 13,1986, memorandum from e ttachment E). (M also included the results of the trand analysis a Item 18 in a draft of inspection report 85-07/05 (Attachment F).
said Mdtrected him to delete the paragraph on the trend analysis from inspection repcrt 85-07/05 because the analysis would subject the NRC to embarrassing questions.
Because the paragraph did not contain any violations or unresolved items 6 drop d the paragraph. However.
later learnedMhid this without concurrence.
thought wanted the results of the analysis is inspection report 85-07/ 5, and 1so thought the results should be documented in the report because the work was done during the inspection period (Attachment B, pages 37-40 and 76-85).
6 continued with his discussion of inspection report 85-07/05 by claimin he was pressured to ogree with changes to the inspection report.
explained the i ction was conducted under the supervision of E1Jand
, by g
and After the ins etion report had been conpleted and signed by the inspection tearr,
beoan to interject himself into the report process. M added that tarted to pressure ( W to han e his findings that were documented a the inspection report, and also exerted essure to agree with him instead of with ccording to n
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violations that were deleted by rom inspection re t
85-07/05 included:
Failure to Translate Design Criteria Into Installation Specifica-tions. Procedures, and Drawings; and Failure to Control Deviations from these Standards; Failure to Maintain Tolerances Stated and Failure to Report these Results en a Nonconformance Report; f
Failure to Audit RPV Specifications / Procedures, Installation and As-built Records; and Failvre to Properly Identify a Spool Piece.
in addition,6was concerned that 6 did not require TUGC0 to l
respond to his violation that:
No objective evidence (records) that concrete mixing blades had been inspected quarterly since trucks were placed in service in 1977.
6)noted that two of the findings dropped as violations from the report, i.e.,(1
'failvet to maintain tolerances stated and failure to report these
-_________._m___________
6-3 results on a noncesformance report." and (2) " failure to audit RPV specifica-tions/ procedures installation and as-built records." were never challenged by TUGCO. Wasserted that, even though the utility did not take exception did not think they unre vio @ations.
to the proposed violationsq elected to drop the findings because he l
AdditionallyMnated that the proposed violation regarding ' failure to properly idenrify a spool piece" was identified byM during the period of i
the inspection. April 1 - June 21,1985; however, even though the inspection was over, the utility contacted Region IV about the end of August or the first of September 1985 vfth additional infomation to demonstrate compliance with the requirement. According to Mdirected that this input be considered and the violation dropped.
Because W began to feel uncomfortable and pressured byOs the result of discuscices they had concerning the deletion of proposed violations from inspection report 85 07/05, he prepared four memoranda to the file dated December 4.1985. March 5.1986. March 10.1986, and March 12. 1986. M said these memoranda discuss di nts he had with (Exhibits
- 6. 7 and 8 to Attachment 8).
noted that overheard some of e conversations ween 6 (A@ttachment B. pages uring w ich detected what he considered to be vei threats 85-94. 102-118, 132-148, and 154-159 was not able to comment specifically about conversations between and regarding inspection report 85-07 05; he related to 01A that however, M concerning
'e was present during discussions between and inspection repo 85-14 11 and the findings involving the BISCO fire seals.
See sumaries of interview with OIA on pages 26 and 49 of this report).
was interviewed by OIA and stated his involvement with inspection repor 85-07/05 was with the planning of the ins >ection and preparation of the re port. An inspectism plan was developed to loot at some specific items at CPSES, with the intant of abtaining a better understanding of the M PEAK project as a tesle, and to look at areas where weaknesses haNen noted.
At the conclusion of the inspection in June 1985, an inspection report was drafted. The first haft uns completed in October 1985. A copy of the draft re rt was then sent by the inspection team for review b Re ion IV mana ers, subs ent to October 1985, assumed posi ion as Therefore, the report was not going to signed by W stated, hourser, that he wanted to remain involved with the inspection report to ensure the findings were properly addressed. Although the final inspection report uns issued in February 1986; between October 1985 a February 1986, the report had gone through reviews and changes whic was not involved with. After the report was issued, M noted that t was different from the draft report and different from the information he provided the licensee during the att meeting in June 1985. M said he was never asked for his input er opinion concerning these changes.
According toMoriginally there were ten items of noncompliance in the draf t report that inre cassidered to be violations. However, when the final roert was issued.@epted that five of the ten items remained as
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violations hree unre down raded to unresolved, and two were deleted from the report.
spationed and concerning the rationale for downgrading the gnposed violations, was told that for the two items that were deletaitum the report, subsequent information provided by the utility in Janary386 resolved the violations. M tol@d OIA that this additional activltwas not noted in the inspection report.
did not consider this sygriate.
was not Weto detsmine the basis on which three of the proposed
@ ions ass with installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel violat were downgraded, also questioned 6an6 about differ-ences between er es the report was signed b e inspectors nd the date he final reportie concurred in and issued.
aid and basicalbtid him it was management's prerogative to do things the way they wanted.
6 also noted Set a paragraph documenting 6' review of NRC's inspection proymat CPSES (i.e., the trend analysis) was deleted from the final inspectis nyert. Th s infomation had been provided to the licensee at the exit needs and did not know wh deleted from the final report. Md that although the appears to be menctive regulator, there were managers b low that level that did not samer be as objective as they should be.
stated he was j
tired of indivWuk making excuses for why the utility cannot meet regulations. httieved Region IV had trouble addressing the big issues, and the bigger the tume the less likely it would be addressed (Attachment C, pages16-77).
r!t r a d at t e insoection he pUtiripated in at CPSES was 85-07/05. During this inspection, j
6perforumf ainspection of the reactor pressure vessel and internals for Unit 2 and testactor coolant pressure boundary system for Unit 2.
I 6 reported te re its of his inspection of these two areas in inspection report 85-07/tE.
related that as a result of his inspection, he documented a yttson involving installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel. Additiusy, he documented two findings which he later agreed to delete from thesesrt as a result of information provided by the licensee several months & the completion of the inspection.
I M noted tightween the time the draft re rt was signed by the inspectors ce tahr 1 r 2, 1985, f1 port was issued on Januar 28 replaced several occasions, discussed with the fact that anted to change some of violations to unresolved itus opined that this action by was based on additional i n provided by the utility after the conclusion of the
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inspect adtmuse and M. the team leader who worked i
for
,G y eed with interpretation of the requirements.
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Eventua thuahdings concerning the installation of the reactor vessel j
which lutemmented as violations we:e changed to unresolved items.
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did nottfure these changes were appropriate because he thought he had developed sAdent information to cite violations.
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i Wiso noted that uhes the draft inspection report containing these three violations was originally prepared, it was approved bM and M i
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repor,t "the inspector considers this atter unresolved," pertaining to the three findings concerning installation af the reactor vessel, was true. M explained that when Mdiscussed the findin he wanted changed with him, he told the findings une valid and if wanted changes made, then j
e would have to make thee himself. Therefore did not believe it was correct for t rt to attribute to him the act that the findings were unresolved.
addittunally related that as a result of his discussions with several ilums he had documented as unresolved were deleted from the inspection report. (Attachments.Pages4-54).
j M related to 01A tat he was very familiar with inspection report 85-07/05. He said the inspection was conducted between April 1 and June 21, 1985, and the report was ided to the division director in late August or early September 1985.
reviewed the report and instructed M
-l and M
to review tTe report and provide comments on its tecinica content.
e eturned the draft report with his consents IM Mexplained that ten he reviewed the draft report, he had questions concerning the accuracy of some of the violations cited in the report.
M did act think a violation pertaining to retrievability of certified material test reports (OR) was valid because the regulations did not specify records had to be readily retrievable, only that they had to be retrievable.
M noted that his superience has been that, although TUGC0 might not have the fastest retriegel system. TUGC0 has always been able to come up with documentation if the NRC sunt to the right person. M not d that TUGC0 eventually provided the russrds requested by the NRC inspectors.
has had no problem with TECO finding records, other than the utility was slow. Although antiquated, their system always worked. Consequently, because retrievability was not deftsed in the requirements with respect to an amount of time Mdid act see anything to be gained by writing a violation.
With respect toMgroposed violation renarding TUGCO's failure to audit the reacter vesseT Installation,M) this specific activity.
stated there was no absolute j
requirement that the st11% perform an audit o' j
Additionally, he stated est because this issue had previously been identified by the TRT, he wanted ei an unresolved item pendtng TUGCO's response to the TRT's finding, stated that genera 11y'the effectiveness of audits of this sort was spustiontble because audits do not catch everything.
Masserted that to have a violation the NRC must show that a require-ment was not set. Mknew of no specific requirement which stated the reactor vessel sust be austed. However, during questioning by OIA he was not j
aware if the reactor vessel was scheduled as part of TUGCO's audit plan or if TG
's audit plan satisfied 10 CFR 50 A endix B, Criterion XVIII. Also, f
stated that he ed not have review the TUGC0 audit plan to i
determine its adequacy er to see if it required an audit of the reactor vessel.
Mtold $1A that he relied on who was a member of the RegionTv Comanche Peat Burfew Group, and knowledge of the ASME code
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i to resolve a questtesencerning a violation in the inspection report involv.
ing the defersal af s Hydrostatic test on the cold leg subassembly.M stated it 64s indicated to him that the inspectors were technically incorrect and els estederstand the codeM stated that because it was a piping semessely, and not a component under the code it was accept-able for TUEIB m ety conducting the hydrostatic test until the entire system was asesMath the field. For this reasonMdeleted this finding from te lugsction report.
disast ammWer the failure by TUGC0 to mark a spool piece with the ma eria spectikatius, heat number or heat code to be a violation involving the lack of tunedEBty.M stated that the proposed violation as written did est staarthere was no marking on the spool piece; the violation stated the spast pesar had not been marked with the material specification, heat number er tsat mies.M stated it was not necessary for this information t te amtsd on the spool piece to have traceabili
, in that any identification and a the piece could establish traceability.
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stated that "aT's to the conclusion of the NR located a aart a Sespool piece and showed it t ins ection, M the the uti ity and inspectors.
asserted the mark provided sufficient identification of the spool piam andMagreed. Mcopraented that if the utility puertestrformation to the NRC before a final inspection report is issued, he easths the new infonnation and, if warranted, drops the proposed vielstisk.
6notsititarterMmade the changes to the first draft inspection rugurt,M suggested it be returned to the region to be typed. The ngertus then returned to CPSES to be signed by the inspectors.
M ccamenf est igned for himself and for and expressed no usanudas.
e report was then returned to egion V to be concurred wie auf tuned. The concurrence procedure involved forwarding the I
report to theSmast Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRR) and the Of fice of the Executive LepINsuar (ELD) at NRC Headquarters.
stated that based on commets emiting from the NRR review, he decided he would not require TUGt8 ta rug % to a Level Y violation concerning concrete mixer blades.
Concerning thesisham pertaining to TUGCO's failure to translate des n
criteria iets tuulimsios specifications, procedures win stated this slutstemens initially questioned by aulgustereview Region IV draft reports on CPSES.
wro e on Gudt
'Isn't a traveler a form of instruction I
concurred wt question and believed the traveler used by UGC0 to I
install the ietsurussel was a controlled instruction. All changes to the traveler wereamassufis by Westinghouse (the manufacturer of the reactor vessel) and engstrthe installation requirements did not require.a formal design contrut uutssith accompanying signatures.
AdditionallyMdid not agree withMeoncerning the need to write a novaa===mreport for changes to clearances stated in the traveler (i.e., clearmastasen the reactor vessel support brackets and support shoes) becaustteemaler could be changed in the field, according to the plant procedsstirarpreparation, approval and control of operations travelers. keen,gua questioning by OIA M could not describe the
4 )
I TUGC0 chan!)e preens concerning travelers, nor could he describe or summarize the installation specifications. Also, Mcould not verify if the traveler specified all the critical components, and he did not know if the design specifications were on site. In the final reportMwrote this
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issue as unrasolved to allow the inspector time to acquire sufficient infomation about Eastinghouse's design criteria in order to convince Mthere uns a violation. Mleft the resolution of this issue to the inspectar.
i Concerning the trad analysis of the Region IV inspection program at CPSES, p related it was deleted from the report based on a cocinent from NRR that in their spision the paragraph did not describe a trend review. When Mreplied te wanted to account for the time he spent preparing the' askedMwhy he had included the analysis in the report, analysis. M thought the information could be applied to M inspection progress however, he did not believe the infomation belonged in the inspection repsrt. 6 stated he never told Mthat the trend d
analysis would esse the NRC to a lot of embarrassing questions. M indicated t that it would be a subject in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board B hearing for CPSES and would result in a lot of needless questions.
M noted est ever chan e made to inspection report 85-07/05 from the time M a signed it on October 1 and 2,1985, was reviewed with e asserted the inspectors knew exactly how the report was going a be changed. Mrelated that while using the cover sheet which had hem signed by the inspectors in October 1985 on the final inspection report as not the most ideal thing to do, he considered it an acceptable way la heilitate the issuance of the final inspection report. On the concurrence for the Region IV 1 transmittal for h in ection e
- report, signed believed agreed with the report use toldM that be had seen enough of the report, specificaMr the part of the report that change reposed violation on the suector vessel to an unresolved item.
sai M l
indicated that hemy not fully agree with downgrading the violation, but if i
I that was what aussynent wanted to do, then he concurred. M noted M later prwidedM with a memorandum stating that even if he signed the inspecIlan re ort he was only concurring that management had the right to make chuys, noted the report was discussed with ME after Mrsial questions concerning the changes he noted in the fina report.
6 cos==h8 that there are different ways the Region can approach writing a violatte. He said you can write a violation that may not be a violation and toitfor the utility to respond as to why it is not a violation.
M further stated that on some other plants he might take more liberty in writing the vistation, but that in the case of CPSES he was going to be I
very tight in the violations and make sure the violations are absolutely correct.
explained that because CPSES was in the ASLB process and with contes gs, he did not want to write a violation that the utility could argue was tuhnically incorrect. 6 further stated that would make unnecessary peerwork and could even raise questions regarding the Region's crediMitt and technical competency during the ASLB hearing.
(Attachment D fings 113-208).
i l
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85-7 ted his involvenest rincipally as a reviewer of the draft ins ection report.
Af ter his review, relayed his comments to Region IV.
noted his comments contarsing the draft inspection report were made in marginal notes on the report.
Concerning the proposed violation regardin the f ilure to translate design criteria into installation specifications, stated that, although he never inspected the traveler written to install the reactor vessel, he opined that it could have provided specific enough instructions for the construction activity. Consepently, his question on the draft inspection report asking if the traveler ens a form of instruction was intended to determine if, in fact, the traveler esed TUGC0 was detailed and equivalent to an instruction or procedure.
said his coninent on the report was not opinion, it was a question to be answered by Region IV.
Concerning the proposed violation pertaining to failure to provide objective vidence to show that central and truck concrete mixer blades were ins sected, stated that he thought it was unusual for an inspector to loot at concrete mixer blades because the safet -related concrete work at CPSES had
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been already coupleted. However, oted that possib1 the NRC inspec-tion procedure for concrete on CPSES Unit 2 had not been ted; therefore.
it would have been a perfectly understandable effort by M to complete this construction inspection program.
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Msaid the citation as written, stating that there was no documented
)
evidence in the form of records that the quarterly checks on the blades had been done, was, is and of itself, an explicit violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Critarion Y.
However, in partial mitigation of the finding was the fact that the actual condition of the blades was good. Consequently, Mconsidered the importance of the finding in the 1985-1986 timeframe to be pretty minimal. When viewed from the broad context of all the issues that were ongoing at CPSES,Mpined that Region IV had been under a great deal of criticism by the interveners for a number of years for not having done a complete job on inspections. From the standpoint of its appearance to the public, it seemed an unwise use of NRC resources to raise a relatively alsor eerinistrative issue on somthing that happened years in the past.
Meknarledged as valid the argumerit presented byMthat if the licensee failed as maintain records in one area, then ft may have failed to maintain recoeds to other areas as well. However, at CPSES there was already-a litany of enasples where they failed to follow procedures.Mopined that had the laspection found the condition of the mixer blades to have been poor, then there 1d have been broader im li tions concerning the quality of the concrete stated he told it was a clear violation (Attachment H).
M was laterviewed concernin hi involvement with inspection report 85-07/05 and stated be was asked by to review the report and make technical e conducted a limited review of the report and identified to areas he thought were questionable. M believed that when he rerimed t e inspection report it was still in draft.
Concerning the proposed violati n that a spool piece had not been marked, e
that he thought the inspection was in error.
M s called.tellin ated that based on his knowledge of the code, there was no requirement to maintain the material specifications, hent number, and heat code of the material on a piping assembly M recalled that the inspector found a mark number on the spool piece in question, an asserted that this mark number, in itself, provided total traceability, stated that his reading of the ASME code did not indicate that the item had to have heat numbers.
Concerning the proposed findine involving the deferral of a drostatic test on the cold leg subassembly,Mstated he believe was in error and did not understand the ASME code quoted rom various parts of Section 3 of the ASME code to support his e 1e that the hydrostatic test of the subassembly was not required prior to the hydrostatic testing of the full assembly believed he was told the NRR opinion verified that his understanding o ecodewascorrect(Attachments,pages7-25).
reviewed ens expressed by that vio ations proposed b and in inspection report 85-07/05 wer un stifi bly downgraded o unr ens by Region IV management.
documented his technical assessment of these proposed violations on pages 11-18 of his July 8,1986, memorandum and pages 1 and 2 of his November 25, 1986, i
memorandum (Attachment HH).
o is detailed to 01A to provide technical assistance, perfonned a rev ew o e technical issues contained in inspection report 85-07/05. He reviewed five issues that were specifically related to DIA as allegations byM His assessment is documented on pages 2-9 of Attachment MM.
Inspection Report 50-445/85-14; 50-446/85-11 (85-14/11) as interviewed concerning inspection report 85-14/11 and stated ured and harassed him because of the findings in the inspection report.
stated the purpose of the inspection was to review the applicant's act on on previously identified items and to look at the overall condition of and equipment. While inspecting previously identified
- items, found significant problems with records. These p ems en ecame t focus of the inspection.
A finding in the inspection report was that TUGC0 had shipped all original design records for piping to Stone and Webster, New York, without making a duplicate. The licensee also made no provisions to protect the records in route commensurate with requirements employed while the records were stored onsite. A similar finding was also identified byM with respect to Chicago Bridge & Iren (CB&I) records shipped from CPSES to Houston, Texas. As a result of these findings, site storage facilities were inspected and found to be in noncompliance with requirements.M provided OIA a copy of a memorandum dated A ril 29, 1986, that he had written t M The memo addressed concern reaardin the CB&I records shipped off-site and TUGC0 site storage facility.
memorandum recomended that the issues be forwarded to IE's QA Branch for review (see Attachment 00).
4 agreed withh findings and d ded them when M tated none of the findimps were violation related tha during the period of the '.*nspectim in October 1985 argued with in an attempt to coariam him re was nothing wrong with the records. Addition-i tily,M said interjected himself into the inspection process by going to the stility to get more infomati n in an attempt to defend the utility and prese empliance. Alth eventually agreed with 6 inspecties flodi
, he made report other findings as unresolved items het consi ere to be violations.
l The first draft af gespection report 85-14/11 (Exhibit 10. Attachment B) contained tuo violations (one with two parts), one deviation, and eight i
unresolved items for CPSES, Unit 1, and six violations, one deviation, and nine unresolved Itaus for CPSES, Unit 2.
However, the final inspection report 85-14/11 (Exhibit 11. Attachment B) contained one violation,11 unresolved i
items, and two apus items for CPSES, Unit 1, and three violat' As,12 unre-J solved items, and to open items for CPSES, Unit 2.
further related
,* that by the end af October 1985, 6 3 considered to be a trou-blemaker and to he hed started takin action by discussing the matter with ma
. 6 considered comment to the effect that "you male gutte a bit of money, don't you" to be a threat (Attachment B, pages 163-183).
6 related to EA that he participated in inspection 85-14/11. During his
,.irtspectionM1 earned that all the containment liner and mechanical pene-tration records did had been generated on site by Chicago Bridge & Iron had been shipped ta hastan, Texas, for reprot'uction. 6 also discovered that these safety-reland records were shipped in cardboard and wood containers
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which were not fbaproof or waterproof. Additionally there was no inventory of the records ad mere were no back-up records.
considered this a violation; however, he did not recall how he initially wrote the finding in the inspection rupert. The finding was eventually documented in the final inspection rupert as an unresolved item which required no written response from the utilliy Desachment 6, pages 54-62).
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was intervised concerning his invo vement with Region IV inspections at PSES. W rutsted that while he was reviewing changes to drawings at CPSES, he decidalts check to make sure there was adequate documentation for the changes. Asa sussit of asking for some records, he learned TUGC0 had shipped all artphet design records for piping to Stone and Webster, New Yorki without makias adelicate set. Additionally, there was no complete inventory made of the an==** before they were shipped. As a result of this finding, 6 inspects # as MCO site storage facilities and found they were not in compliance with up$rements.
M reported his Findings to M who agreed the finding was a violation.
related thatM did not agree with this finding and
" grill a the issue for an estimated five hours. W considered that as a the point of being badgered. 6 asserted that TUGC0 was in taqMute with the Na i nel Fire Protection Association Standards; hoever,6 and isagreed. These issues were documented is fluf hspection report 85-14/11 as unresolved items. &
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- 14 believed there uns sufficient infonnation available to cite TUGC0 for violations (Attachment 1, pages 37-61).
M related to DIA that ins ection report 85-14/11 pertained to records control by TUGC0 at CPSES.
had providedMwith a matrix of the differences between the draft inspection reports and the final inspection report (Attachment K). During his discussion with OIA,M referred to this matrix and a draft of the inspection report to explain his rationale for es to the draft inspection report. Some f he changes discussed by ad not been raised as issues by during his interview with OIA.
noted that as the draft ins on report was reviewed, each draft report was marked and returned ome items were also discussed in great length with also noted that prior to this inspection, the TRT and QA Sranc, IE, were at CPSES and conducted a 1
complete review of TUGCO's records control. As far a
' ew, thet uncovered no ees with TUGCO's record identified M The first proposed violation downgraded to an unresolved item in inspection report 85-14/11 concerned TUGCO's description in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 17.1.17 of its current QA rec rds s stem.
onsidered this to be a violation of 10 CFR 50.34(a)7.
state e id not believe the st ndard review plan for FSAR 17.1 would require the amount of detail desired by to be in the FSAR. Additionally, M oted the IE QA Branch had looked at the same area and had no problem with it. Mtold OIA that the FSAR section describing the TUGC0 QA records system for the desi n and construction of CPSES was in conformance with ANSI N45.2.9.
downgraded the proposed violation to an unresolved item.
The next violatten proposed b hat the TUGC0 QA manual did not address ANSI M45.2.9 requirements.
stated the TRT review of this area, as documented in Supplemental Sa ety lustion Report (SSER) 11 found TUGC0 to be in compliance.
stated that the SSER indicated the QA manual did address ANSI N4b.., a t ough, perhaps not in great detail.
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considered this to be an unresolved item because of the disagreement between findings and the SSER.
The next items discussed by ere three proposed violations and one proposed unreselsed item.
concerning the shi design records from CPSES to. a Stone and Webster office'pment of originalin N found TUGC0 did set have er use procedures to control the shipment in cardboard bones, so backup copies of the records were made, and TUGC0 failed to control or account for the records transferred to Stone and Webster.
lieved TUGC0 was in violation cf 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion i
XV an did not conform to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9.
tated that ANSI M45.2.9 did not clearly addressM issues concern the shipment of original records in cardboard boxes, not creatin backup copies and not controlling and accounting for the documents.
considered the Stone and Webster documentation to be in-process documents and l
not records because they were design calcul in h t were being sent to Stone and Webstar for reanalysis. However stated that because TUGC0 had committed to having procedures, he retainedM violation that TUGC0 failed ta establish and implement procedures in accordance with 10 CFR C
I.,
50, Appendix 8. triter'lon V, which addressed required control and inventory measures.
The next items elemssed b were proposed violations b concerning TUID's shipment o. cons ruction records pertaining to e
containment lier fra CPSES to Chicago Bridge and Iren (C8&I) in Houston, Texas. Mielations concerned his findings that TUGC0 did not properly control te shipment of these records because there were no backup copies and the erards were not inventoried, and TUGC0 did not document an audit of C3115 records at the CB&I facility.
considered these findings to be violations of 10 CFR 50, Appendi ria XVII and XVIII and not to be is ashformance with ANSI N45.2.9.
M oted that at the time of the inspectim, the records were in the contro. oTCB&I, not TUGC0; therefore, ontended that neither 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVII nor A
. have specific requirements concernin the control of records during skipant that TUGC0 could be cited against.
opined that the records mere shipped at the risk of CB&I.
Malso stated that the requirements were not clearly defined regarding the control of remrds in transit off-site. He added that NRC's ultimate concern was that p'lar to licensin TUGC0 have in its possession all records required by regstatie.
further connented if the records were considered is-preuss documents, there would be almost no requirements controlling hou esy are stored while on-site, let alone during the short time they were in tramit. Whe stioned about ultimate authority under 10 CFR 50, Appendis t, Criterion I stated that in his view, because i
CB&I was a vender.ttus TUGCO's responsi ility to ensure CB&I complied with ANSI N45.2.9 and B DR 50, Appendix B Criterion XVII while the records were in their possessins. Once these records were turned over to the utility they would be maintatsud for the life of the plant in accordance with ANSI N43.2.9.
Concerning@dit of the QA records control system at the CB&I records t proposed violation regarding TUGCO's failure to document un au facility related that after the NRC inspection was completed, he learned from the audit had been rformed; however. TUGC0 could not locate any deammartion thereof.
at that time, decided to make the finding as usesabied item until C0 located the paperwork.
Subsequently. M pupared a January 9,1986, memorandum to the file documenting the Act uditor had found no problems with the CB&I records contreingstus accepted this memorandum and deleted the violetion fra te ragert.
provided OIA with a copy of the January 9,195.M memoran ttachment1.).
The next propassivishtlons discussed bM'nvolved TUGCO's failure to preclude ralstementering the QA records vault over several years and the l
failure to preclub fise hazards in the records vault.Mwas concerned that the recort tcfMties were in violation of 10 CFR 50 A endix B.
Criterion XVII suf did met conform to ANSI N45.2.9.
acknowledged that the roof en k setords vault had leaked over a period of time, and the licensee had rupised the roof on several occasions. Additionally,TUGC0 imediately acteth aumove the potential fire hazards from the records vault.
Mopfand Set te requirements in ANSI N45.2.9 w.re nelear and subject to intay=888== in these areas. Additionally, stated J
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l there were no housekeeping codes or standards applicable to CPSES. These vio-lations were downgraded in the final inspection report.
The next issue was TUGCO's failure to provide a temporary or permanent storage facility for QA records that were comingled with in-process documents in the paper flow group. M explained this violation concerned the installation of fire rated cabinets for storage of permanent records.
6 contended that he could consider these QA records to be in-process records and net permanent records, in which case they would not be subject to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9. M stated the issue revolved around the legal definition of a final record. WMwas not certain which records @fied by the TRT in SSER 11 under allegation AQ 45.
was referencing but he be'ieved the records were the same ones identi SSER 11 stated that ANSI N45.2.9 did not address protection of incomplete or in-process record documents. If thest in-process documents were destroyed or lost, the TRT had determined it would be the contractor's responsibility to reconstruct them. The TRT aise noted that when permanent plant records are taken from the permanent plant records vault to record modifications to previously accepted hardware, the records become in-process records again and are not covered bu ANSI N45.2.9. 6 believed that the utility had the leeway to decide'
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how they were going to classify and ndle their records. Based on the findings documented in SSER ll, deleted this violation from the inspection report.
The final proposed violation discussed byMwas a finding involving weld rod control, i.e., labels taken off or lost on E-309 electrodes at the main distribution station. M referred to a memorandum prepared by as justification for deletin this violation from the inspection report i
ttachment D, Exhibit 12).
read from the W memo which stated I
was informed b6 that the report was unacceptable because the proposed weld rod violation was the shme iss that was previously documented as an unresolved item and closed out by in the same inspection report. W did not consider it proper to close an unresolved item on weld rod control based is part on a current Region IV inspection that showed no
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finding, then have a pesed violation n the same issue in the s me re ort.
Additionally, stated that memorandum noted that
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I agreed to drop the vio' tion (Attachment D, pages 325-328).
6 stated he was at CPSES about four days a week a's part of inspection 85-14/11. He vsvally acted as a sorter of issues that were developed during,
the inspection in an effort to detemine where to go with the findings. He coordinated betwas the utility and NRC inspectors to ensure they were communicating with each other concerning inspection findings. He also arranged for meetings between the inspectors and TUGC0 to ensure the findinos were properly idestified and that TUGC0 had the chance to respond. 6 I
comented that the meetings served to get more infomation on comitments from the utility and to give the utility the opportunity to provide the NRC with infomation to ensure th inspectors were looking at the issues with the proper perspective.
considered this to be the nomal way to conduct j
i an inspection. He expected that when the NRC arrived at an exit meeting there I
would be no surprises for the utility.
6 related that although there was interface with M concerning tne paragraphs of tis inspection report that he was responsible for, most of l
the findings is.the draft inspection report were written After the first draft inspection report was prepared, he and a
is-cussions and' subsequent draf r orts were then prepared.
said that during his discussions wit did not to obtain additional information to further support violations disagreed with.
Mbelieved that if id not a ree that d violation should be do ded, then should have brought the facts that supporte e vio on.
also stated the for most of the violations proposed byM if e thought additional information or another opinion was needed, then he would make the findi an unresolved item pending receipt of the additional guid-
- ance, sserted that although the discussions he had withM may have become heated differences of opinion, he never ressured or intim-idateMto drop any violation. In fact stated although there were disagreements concerning violations, no issues were dropped from the report.
In commenting as the status of April 29, 1986, memorandum rdi certain issues identified by in inspection report 85-14/11 said he prepared his fir t memo by Ma 21 1986 his was a transmitt
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memorandum addressed to from said he was then directed by to write a memorandum that gave the egion's position on the issues, said that M still had the memorandum.
(In response to OIA's inquiry as to the status of April 29,1986, memorandum Msaid it was in final form an t at e still had it.
Mcon,sented that it " kind of languished" because of all the other things to do for the Impestigation.)
also cannented thatMwas not involved with the various ra ts o inspection report 85-14/11 except for discussions M had with
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him concernin ndings and conclusions being drawn by the ins ectors.
According to never provided an feedbeck to to indicate he disagreed w s positions.
concurred with the final inspection report without comment (Attachment D, pages 208-348and515-571),
was interviewed by OIA concerning the conversat between M and him pertainin to tion report 85-14/11.
recalled a conversation he had with concerning certain QA deficiencies ass d with records at CPSES that unre identified bygM ined that his conversation withMtook p ace in ear.y une 986, an as seekt inion on how severe the deficiencies were. M stated that d not reference an inspection report during the conversation, and did set think that the conversation was related to an inspection report. He believed the conversation was related to recent allegations made by said the deficiencies as explained by are transpor a ion of records and the filing of records in the interim presass prior to being stored in a final storage facility, and (2) fin in s related to the construction of the final r ords storage facility, said the first deficiency, based on explanation, was not a violation. In separd to the second deficiency, he stated he was unsure of the exact problem, het said that the applicant could use alternate methods
( Attachment M).
18 6 was interviewed concerning his involvement with in report 85-14/11.
sta t had on1 moderate involv nt with these issues, and he relied heavi"y on input.
as the deputy QA/QC leader of TRT. 6 b opined that the inspection report repeated basically the same infomation that was contained in $$ER 11.
Concerning the proposed violations identified by rtaining to a weld rod not identified at the main distribution station, told OIA he believed t ' proposed weld rod violation was the same as a previous unresolved item losed out in the construction appendix of the inspection report.
opined that either the unresolved item should remain open if the inspectors thought there was a viola ion or the unresolved item should be closed and the violation dro ed.
discussed this matter with 6 and several da s later informed that he had discussed the matter with and the violation was dropped. M instructed 6 to continue to follow-up on the issue because the weld rods should be identified. 6noted that he did not discuss his other concerns with inspection report 85-14/11 directly withM. He relayed this pages 25-45). M who did the necessary coordination (Attachment J, infomation to was interviewed concerning his involvement with ins ion report 85-14/11 6 stated that in June 1985 he and since that time he has had the responsibility for addressing issues at CPSES. W commented that he did not review inspection report 85-14/11.
Instead, he was involved in discussions concerning the appropriateness of proposed violations. 6 commented that scoe of the discussions he was asked to take part in dealt with the propriety of a finding regarding the handling of records bein shipped off-site. The records were Stone and Webster and CB&I records.
as also involved in discussions concerning the design of the records facility and a de^ermination of een a record becomes a final record.
Concerning the shipment of the Stone and Webster original records off-site,
@ opined that, based on the infomation provided to him, once the records were removed from the records vault, they became in-process documents and were not subject to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.9 or 10 SFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion Although he thought the utility used poor judgment and took a big risk, did not believe there was a violation. Mcomented that if TUGC0 had a procedste for handling these records which they violated, then they could be cited for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
Regarding the shipment of all the CB&I site documents Msaid that until the records became part of the utility's record system they would not be classified as site records subject to ANSI N45.2.9. W comented that if something happened to the site records during shipment, then CB&! would have to regenerate the records. Once again, if the utility had a procedure that was violated, thee the utility would have a problem.
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19 f
Concerning the poposed violation regarding TUGCO's failure to provide a temporary or persument storage f 111ty for records comingled with in-process records in the,pger flow group ommented that when records were taken from the permanas records storage facility they again become in-process documents. Censuyently, they were no longer s ect to ANSI N45.2.9.
Therefore, he ditnot consider this a violation noted that although SSER 11 addresselen issue involving in-process ocuments in the paper flow group, it was est the same issue raised in inspection report 85-14/11. The difference was M in SSER ll, the records had never been entered into the permanent recort center; however. in the inspection report the records were part of the pernment records center and were then removed and placed back into the paper flu group.
Concerning the $1 cal condition of the records storage fa li and TUGCO's failure to precast rain from entering the QA record vault mmented that ANSI M45.2.fis not specific in this area acknowledged that it was a situation thatneeded to be corrected; however. he thought there were other means besides isadng a violation to get the utility to correct the problem.
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Concerning the puyos d violation that food stuffs and fire hazards were found in the records sesit said that he would have tempered the action based on the circumstames surrounding the situation. If the situation was a one-time occurrence een he would have verbally instructed the utility to correct the problem. If he situation had been goin issue a violatise(Attachment N. pages 6-63)g on for some time, then he would
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viewed the concerns expressed by M that violations propose and other inspectors in inspection report 85-14/11 were stif ly daugraded to unresolved items by Region IV management.
cented his technical assessment of these proposed violations on pages of MrJuly 8,1986, memorandem and page 3 of his November 25, 1986, memorandus 9ttachment HH).
fonned a review of the technical issues contained in inspection reportES-14/11. He reviewed six issues that were specifically related to OIA asallegations byM His assessment is documented on pages g-14 of Atamhment M4.
Inspection leert 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 (85-16/13)
Mwhes 1erviewed about inspection report 85-16/.13, stated its purpose was a unene, unannounced inspection of CPSESs Unit 1 to review the applicant's actium on previous NRC inspection findings and IE Bulletins, the-applicant's on construction deficiencies and a review of electrical '
1 inspections related that had been trying to inspect constnssen deficiencies reported per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and IE Bulletins dealisewith hardware modifications. Because the utility,could not produce auditablesecords concerning hardware modifications associated with 10 CFR 50.55(e) reputs and IE Bulletins after four mon h concluded that TUGC0 recertswere not readily retrievable.
considered this a violation. Accustng to disagreed and stated that if the NRC gave the utf% enough time, t ey cou find anything.
I l
l
Additionally,6 stated that IE Bulletin 79-28 required a certain model and serial maber 850 switch to be replaced. However, the inspection disclosed the actual switch replaced was not the switch identified by the paperwork. Scoesidered this to be a violation. Another finding that was considered to be a violation was a failure to revise all CPSES implementing processres regarding 50.55(e) issues to conform to the TUGC0 corporate procedure.
6 contissed by stating that in December 1985,6 took draft inspection report 5-16/13 to Region IV for review becauseMad findings writtaa as violations that M had instructed him to write as unresolved i M reviewed the draft report and wrote on the ibit 17 Attachment A)paragra hs three and four were not recting that copy back to violations (
wrote next to paragraph three of the draft report that "most of the apparent violations cited are not vio-1ations. Records for the convenience of the NRC are not required." @
considered the records asked for during the inspection to be records required j
by the NRC to be istained. M also wrote next to paragraph four of the j
draft report that was " citing them for a potential hardware problem q
on NAMCO switches - find ont if there is a hardware problem or not - otherwise there is no citaties." 6 disagreed with this coment because 10 CFR 50, Appendix 5 Criterion IVII, required that the utility have records regard-I less of whether or est there was a hardware problem.
1 M noted that traft lespection report 85-16/13 contained five violations for CPSES, Unit 1 and three violations for CPSES, Unit 2.
In the final report, this number uns rehced to no violations and a number of unresolved items which applied to both units. M ccamented that by the time the final inspectica report uns written, he had capitulated to the point where he
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believed it was best to present his findings in his draft inspection reports j
the wa insted. It had become apparent to M that a 6 l
was telling him not to write violations and to I
only write un ved iters (Attachment B, pages 199-215).
M was interviewed about his involvement with inspection report 85-16/13. The purpose of this inspection report was, among other things, to review TUGC0 actisms concerning IE bulletins and construction d ficiencies.
As with inspecties report E-14/116 had provided with a I
matrix of the differences between the draf nspection report and the final inspection report {Attacissent 0).
referred to this matrix during his discussion wie WA concerning is rationale for changes to the draft Si ion report. M noted that, as with insp 85-14/11, signed $15 report, after which no other changes were made.
did recall, is cannection with signing the inspection report, that stated to ble they could not continue with all the interaction between them. W replied by telWngM thatWwas not making it any easier.
W rela the first group of changes included six proposed violations b originating from attempts by M and an NRC contractor to fel op on corrective action on hardware taken by TUGC0 as a result of TUGG satuitting 50.55(e) deficiency reports to the NRC. M and the contractar mere enable to locate pa erwork to perform the follow-up.
6 said the stelations proposed by were (1) a failure to
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develop)and implanet's procedure to show or reference objective evidence 50.55(e defittescles were corrected; (2) a failure by TUGC0 to revise conflicting partisms of implementing procedures concerning 50.55(e) reporting; (3) a failure ty TED to maintain 50.55(e) files that were retrievable; (4) a i
failure by TMS to nport to the NRC corrective action actually taken on i
50.55(e) reports, and changes to commitments regarding corrective etion reported to E; (5) a failure by TUGC0 to have a procedure (whic said duplicated the first proposed violation); and (6) TUGC0 files were not auditable with respect to corrective action on 50.55(e) deficiencies.
With respect to the first two proposed violations.Mtold DIA it was his position that there was no requirement under 10 CFR 50, Ap ndix B to have a procetre to tuplement 50.55(e) reporting requirements.
i added that the escuents necessary to show closure of a 50.55(e re ort are
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documents that am secompassed as part of the utility's QA program j
opined thathanted TUGC0 to have a file for every 50.55(e report which he could reriew to detennine the status of corrective action and then close out the report.
knew of no requirement that directed the utility to han this in ormat on in files for the convenience of the NRC.
Mtated this infonnation is part of th lit 's nonconfomance system that is unletained by QA. To the best o knowledge TUGC0 maintained the status of all nonconfonnances; however, he not as to determine est becausMwas not raising that question.
Concerning the retrievability of records Melaimed the utility offered to guide the inspectors through the paperwork and locate the documents
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required by 9e E to show closure of each 50.55(e) report. However, the j
approach prefernd by the utility was to gather together all the records i
concerning St.5(e) sports into one comprehensive package so that a number of I
issues could be addressed at once. The utility requested time to put the package together.Mthought that was a reasonable request by the utility, and te ruguest for time did not indicate the records were not available. Re added that putting all the documents t ther in one effort instead of piscussel would also make better use of I time.
geostended that instead of going to the TL records vaults and obtaining the escart associated with the hardware,Mwanted the utility to parlde een with a list of'all the documentation that they could quickly retrisme. Because were not able to obtain the required documents, tiny sure unable to accomp the purpose of the inspection, i.e.,
inspect the hu6sre. liowever, because there was no ur ene for the records as the planties set pending an operating license left the recordst retrievability issue as unresolved until TUGC0 put all the records together.
Misesstad that, inM opinion, corrective action reported to the NRC on SLE(el reports must contain information that the utilityJas actually tats actism.M:entended that corrective action 'to close a 50.55(e) repet enh has to include the action the utility plans to take to correct the 6ficissy.Mdid not believe the utility)'s failure to provide a couplette date for the corrective action on 50.55(e deficiencies was significs6 stated the corrective action will have to be completed prior ta tuel load, which is the critical date.M considered the stHttr's failure to have corrective action completed by a certain date ti he a deviation to a comitment and not a violation.-
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S.
As to TUGCO's failure to have auditable files with respect to corrective action on 50.55(e) deficiencies M stated TUGC0 committed to fem a task force to locate and put in a convenient place all documents TUGC0 would need to demonstrate close-out.
It was never shown these record > did not exist. Although act in a file that ould put his hands on, M stated Gere have always been re ords to show corrective action.
conuested that the seccnd series of proposed findings concerned U
s actions resulting from IE Bulletins. The proposed findings pertained to (1) TUGCO's failure to respond to all aspects of IE Bulletin 79-14 (2) incomplete TUGCS IE Bulletin files, (3) NAMCO switches referenced in IE Bulletin 79-28 ast properly identified on travelers, (4) a deficiency in TUGCO's procedures to handle IE Bulletins, and (5) no focal point at TUGC0 to track IE Bu11etta actions.
M provided some back round to this portion of the inspection by explaining he had askedEl to look at the utility's response to all bulletins and to ensure a t ose still open had been inspected. This was done with the istant tham review the utility's response on all IE Bulletins and aussre the NRC had conducted the appropriate inspections of hardware.
opined that in perforining this inspection,M concluded t e verified the utility's corrective action in most cases by only reviewin Se documentation which supported hardware replacements or repairs.
disagreed with this overall conclusion. He stated he talked to some of the inspectors who had conducted some of the inspections on IE Bulletins and they told him that, when appropriate, they inspected hardware to ensure the stility properly took corrective action as a result of IE Bulletins.
ConcerningM proposed finding regard n TUGCO's nported failure to respond to all aspects of IE Bulletin 79-14 tated that when IE Bulletin 79-14 ins issued in July 1979, CPSES was in the early stages of pipe support work and, therefore, it was very difficult for TUGC0 at that time to operly respond to the Bulletin.
It was M understanding that lletin B-14 in that the responses did not indicate that all seismiccontastion w o
category I piptag (regardless of size) would be evaluated to the action items in the IE Bulletis.
Additionally,Mstated thatMreported that TUGC0 never r ssed the reporting of nonconfomances as required in the Bulletin.
refersaced a TUGC0 internal letter, CPPA No. 24.163, dated October 22,1982, in which wrote that the reporting of nonconformances uns an area o te u etins at TUGC0 must take exception to and that TUES would not identify nonconforming conditions. This exce tien by TUGC0 was not documented in their final report to the NRC.
stated thatMbelieved the action taken on the bulletin was incomplete, and the file was closed prematurely because the utilit was taking exception and was not going to state the exception to the NRC.
related that Meported the finding pertaining to TUGCO's failure to respond to all aspects of IE Inlictin 79-14 as an unresolved item.
Concerning6 contention that TUGCO's response to IE Bulletin 79-14 did not indicate that all seismic Category I piping (regardless of sire) would be evaluated, M believed that only high energy lines over one inch in diameter were computer analyzed by TUGC0 to limit the number of postulated energy breaks. Those lines under one inch in diameter were not computer analyzed and were excluded by the bulletin. 6 further noted that pipe and pipe support issues at CPSES are still being reviewed by Stone and Webster and NRR.
RegardingM issue that TUGC0 never addressed the requirement in the IE bulletin to report nonconferinances 6 opined that for a construction facility, the reporting re uirement is met by filing reports in accordance with10CFR50.55(e).
stated that from his review of IE Bulletin 79-14, the reporting requirements for nonconforinances appear to have been established for an operating plant. The reporting requirements for a facility under construction are not clear. Therefore, TUGCO's exception to the reporting requirements in IE Bulletin 79-14 were not appropriate for inclusion n
in TUGCO's reply to the NRC concerning the IE Bulletin. 6 removed this proposed unresolved item from the inspection report because he did not believe there was a potential for a violation.
Concerning the second finding that TUGC0 IE Bulletin files did not contain sufficient records to show action has been completed.M stated that the IE Bulletin file maintained by the utility was not intended to track every piece of paper associated with the bulletin. That was accomplished by other systems. All the file was intended to contain was th9 response back to the NRC concernin what actions the utility planned O i;ake in response to I
bulletins, noted that he and p t at CPSES with utility management and obtained an oral commitment from the utility to review records to determine the adequacy of their procedures and completeness of associated records involving IE Bulletins.
Concerning 6 proposed violation that NAMCO switches replaced by TUGC0 per IE Bulle in 79-28 were not properly identified on the installation travelers, stated that during this portion of the inspection an NRC consultant looked at equipment in the field to determine if it actually matched the documentation in the control center. The inspector found that two of the fourteen RANCO switches inspected by the NRC consultant were not properly identified on the documentation. M stated he~ believed that before the final inspection report was issued, he went,to the TUGC0 QA supervisor and obtained documentation e neerning the two NAMCO switches with which the inspector had a problem, found that the first of the two' switches was safety-related, and there were travelers issued subsequent to the one reviewed by the NRC inspector which properly identified the switch that was installed. This resolved the issue with the safety-related switch. The second switch was act safety-related and eventually the paperwork cbncerning that switch was also resolved.
q M connented that all the NAMCO switches purchased TUGC0' were qualified, even those installed in non-safety systems.
stated the reason there was same difficulty with the paperwork was that a number of the switch were replaced during testing and this required additional paperwork.
made this violation an unresolved i em u til it could be determined whether the final paperwork was correct.
comented that some of the
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paperwork delay was because some travelers dated between 1982 and 1984 were still in the paper f1'ow group and had not been sent to the Document Control Center.
The next proposed finding discussed by@WM comented that when an was that W procedures for handling IE Bulletins wers. deficient.
Bulletin was received, the utility would inform the NRC as to what they planned to.io to respond to the requireme:its in the bulletin. The NRC then riormall verified what the utility did what it had stated it was going te do.
l did not believe there was any regulatory requirement that the
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utility have a separate syAtem to track the status of IE Bulletins.
6 considered WM proposed violation that TUGC0 had no focal point for tracking actions on IE Bulletins as being the same issue as the previous proposed violation. M did not believe the utility was required to have a central point where an inspector could go to locate all the paperwork on an IE Bulletin. Additionally, these issues were going to be addressed by TUSCO during their ongoing overall review of their actions in response to IE Bulletins.
6 noted that after Region IV management reviewed and comented on M 'for typing.
drafts of inspection re ort 85-16/13, the drafts were returned to Therefore.
was aware of all the changes made by Region IV to his inspection report. Additionally, M stated that after the final report was prepared, it was taken to CPSES for si nature b the inspectors who were responsible for the various sections.
dded there was no pressure put on the inspectors to sign the final report.
acknowled
, however, that although the changes were discussed with and signed the final inspection report, he may have not been in full agreement with all the changes.
Nstated he was having problems withh reports and had a lot of conversation with M about the problems. M noted that although M ma have displayed an attitude of giving up and writing anything that wanted, in actuality M never wrote a report that way. 6 stated that he tried to calibrate 4 to his way of thinking, but he never told M that he could not write violations.
However,6 noted that if M wanted to write violations, then they had to be proper and had to be based on the facts.
Region IV had to be able to prove that the violation was,M stated that a factual and technic' ally competent violation.
6 also believed that M felt a lot of pressure because M was under a lot of pressure, and he was going back and forth with M over various issues. M asserted that while there were many discussions with M about technical issues, he never attempted to harass or threatenM Mstated he kept Region IV management inforined about the diffievity he was having with M reports, and he provided a draft version of inspection report 85-16/13 to M M reported that M went to CPSES and had a discussion withm (Attachment D, pages 348-409, 573-631, 643-653, and 670-673).
, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects. W told O!A t t inning in November 1985, when he became the 6
Division of tesctor Safet and Projects. Re ion IV. M came to him and explained the efficulty and were having with the quality of the irspection mports coming from the construction N p,M In December 1985 discussed a draft of inspection espart 85-16/13 with him, tol that he had been discussing the emft inspection report with W
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said tot M was so frustrated with the re ort that he l
) asked kle for a copy of the draft report.
read the draft i
inspection made some connents on it, and sent it back to M through There were items in the report that M regarded as totally unacceptaMe. These items included overstated conclusions and technically weg ud incoinplete findings. One issue involving NAMCO switches was indeterstate b the report; however, the inspector was going to cite the utility. Wput a connent on the draft that additional infomation should be obtsteed concerning whether there was a hardware problem in order to either cite a ylelation or to determine that the switches were acceptable.
A second issue is the report involved 50.55(e) reports by the utility.
6 had a preposed citation that there was no auditable file for 50.55(e) reports which mew allow an inspector to track the action from point to point. Wststed the utility was required to maintain records, but there was no requisuse that the records be in a form that would make it convenient for an NRC tuspector to look at. M noted that he and M held a meeting withuta annagement over this issue, and TUGC0 was told that before they got theirlicasse, the NRC would follow up on all the 50.55(e) reports.
TUGC0 had the ds4ce of either making it convenient for the NRC, thereby allowing the E to perfom the review faster, or making it difficult for the NRC. Nevertheless. MRC would take the time to complete the review.
M stater that he wrote on the draft report of inspection 85-16/13 that the proposed violatior, concerning the NAMCO switches was unsatisfactory because the Issystter had not supported a violation in the inspection report.
Mbelissed te inspector had left as indeterminate an issue with an important ptsca siequipment.
ooined this, along with previous inspection findings. indicated t at was not spending as much time looking at lutou items as he was lucking at records. He wrote on the report he ttm$tWshould spend less time apparently sitting and lookin at suures and more time out in the field looking at what was eing stated that be did not discuss the draft ceport with on.
after he revisut 9t. He gave the report to M and told him to send 1.t back to the shL additionally, M conclusions about the draft report' were drawn utissh from what was written in the report. He opined if he misread the aputer did not understand what he was reading then someone I
should have tid Mm.
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M em tat when he reviewed the report, he focused just on phs ther ud four and only skinsned the remainder of the report.
l r
comaamme hath para raphs be an unsatisfactory product by a M l
st the Concerning comments in the draf t reportgwtstring to IE Bulletin 79-14. M noted on the report.
" stick to thesmytremerits." W wrote this note because he considered comunes to be opinion and not based on any written requirements.
alseaute a the report "I'm very concerned that we can't seem to get l
l
I better quality reports.ts a first draf t," because M thought that the draft, report uns iezuglete in a number of areas.
Concerning the comuust '95" thatWwrote on the report, he stated it tied in with another cement he made that "Most of the apparent violations cited are not violettoms. Records for the convenience of the NRC are not required." Mapised that the reason for these coments was the report was poorly written. AdStlonally, M coment on the re > ort, "do not use this ters unless Jos can define it," pertained to WI use of the words " objective evidence" and was intended to convey the guidance that the inspection report should document what the file actually contained and not a judgement on the part of the inspector.
Overall, M stated his coments to N were intended to get him to write a better report. Mnoted that other than the written coments based on his review of inspection report 85-16/13, he had no direct discussion with M concerving his preparation of inspection reports. M did not believe his criticisms were harsh considering they were levied against the product of a M (8ttadment P. pages 5-12, 48-77 and 85-111).
M was interviend encerning his involvement with inspection report 85-16/13. In regard to Se proposed violations involving TUGCO's actions on 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports.Mstated that M handled these issues by himself. Regarding R tulletin 79-14 M stated that TUGC0 hired Stone and Webster to verify that all the analysis had been perfonned with respect to the Bulletin. This uns a engoing endeavor. Concerning the issue of records retrievability with suspect to documentation of actions taken in response to IE Bulletins, Mstated that if the NRC inspectors went to the quality engineerin supervisar,le could locate any record requested. M acknow1 edged that us set the only inspector that had trouble from time to time retrieving recart. However, the records have always been retrieved.
Additionally,Msffered that TUGC0 did not have the best records re-trieval systes and at ties they have had difficultly retrieving records.
In essence, TUGC0 has retrkwed the records asked for; however, sometimes, in W judgement, it did take too long.
BISCO Electrical Penetration Seals Memoranda re u to an ca e it inflammatory. Per instrvettens, rewrote the memorandum on December 2,1985 (Attachment B. Exhibet 14 and addressed it throughM to teatr Program Branch, IE. This memorandum was taken by On about January 23. BN.M returned the memorand and he also criticized it fur behug inflammatory, old that he should have directed tenemorandum to him (
ccepted the criticism and revisai the amorandum as W wanted. On March 6,1986, the I
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memorandum (Attutant1, Exhibit 19) was sent to 6 m concern over this incidst as that he raised a potential safety issue in November 1985, and became seassement wis worried about the protocol in documenting the infonnation, esting uns done with the allegation until March 1986 (Attachment 8, pages 215-220).
M related to El that while conducting a follow u inspection t CP oncernin the B KS el rical enetration is h related that des he raised the issue of the validity of BISCO's certification of neir seals, it was ncp well-received by M (W provided doW concerning BISCf penetration seals -- Attachment I, Exhibit 2.)
M opined thst, tesed en his observations of
' interaction with Region IV ma
. if M had his way, would just say "yes,
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sir" to ad. thereby, eliminate a lot of problems. M commented that the large ammut of time M spent talking tom plus the direction to narite and rewrite reports, could make6 look unproductive as fur as conducting inspections was concerned (Attachment I, pages 61-85).
With regard ts te preposed violation pertaining to the certification he BISCO electrical penetration seals M related to OIA that M had findings involving (1) TU s
fat ure adepuse ; evaluate, document and report a construction deficiency in accordance uit B CFR 50.55(e). (2 insufficient evidence o cessful testin of BIES see Regarding Wamcars about the lack of an adequate. engineering evaluation causamens the BISCO seals and TUGCO's failure to report a deficiency is aceptsce with 10 CFR 50.55(e), M stated since the utility preparada M Besign Deficiency Report (TDDR) on the lack of documentation gustaining to test results there was no violation concerning TUGCO's documettes of the deficiency. M stated he told M that if he unsted te cite the utility for not reporting the deficiency in accordance wie B GR 50.55(e) or 10 CFR 21 then he would have no problem with that vicistish Rouever, the conflicting paperwork involved with the certification atte BISCB seals M was not certain it was a clear violation, and teasted that there would be paperwork that indicated there was no probles. Mstated he did not direct M to write the violation tW was the inspector and he signed the report.
statelle used his prerogative and left the decision to M If used te led at something more, W stated he was not going to stop hit l
l. '
Because the initial memorandum addressed actions and conclusions enlated only to CPSES. M asked M to prepare a memorandum to y a the Vendor Branch, IE. M asked that the memorandum he messal so the Vendor Branch could use it as a basis for reviewing potestjel BISCO generic issues identified by As a result, M prepared a December 2,1985, memorandum through to the W of the Bushr Branch.
To the best ofM knowledge, M found the memorandum to be opinionated and ts contain recommendations that M thought the Vendor Branch should ductie. Masked h to rewrite the memorandum and gave the instrurtlen that correspondence with IE was the responsibility of the 1
He told M, hat anything going to IE should go throu$W stated the next memorandum was still opinionated and estained unnecessary recommendations. This memorandum was rovided by and was the topic of discussions between nd rote the final memorandum, dated March 6, i
1986, through to M in January 1986, he had a meeting with M Mrelatet t DIA that, 6 had prepared on the BISCO fire seals.
I concerning a asumendum that j
M comestad that M had written several versions of a memorandum on the BISCO seats which even was sent to IE. 6 stated the original menerseds was from o 6 6M I
Branch, IE. M believed should have sent the memorandum through Region IV managmart.
on the inspection flut. He thought that the Vendor Program Branch could use the infomation in tutmemorandum sent to IE as background to highlight some of
the areas the kmier Program Branch should inspect. Mcomented that the purpose af die memorandum that he sent to NRC Headquarters (April 4,1986) was to point est possible generic concerns (Attachment P, pages 15-18, 78-85 and99-102).
p
%,IE,wasinterviewedbyOIAconcerning his involvemut with the issue involving the BISCO electrical penetration seals at CP5E5. g stated he had previous involvement with respect to BISCO as part of the E allegations management system. This resulted from problems identified on III.
iewed the April 4, 198 morandum from 6 to
,and comented that t problem ran was sent to the
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wrong office. Because there was a technical requirement at issue, the memorandum shesid have been sent to NRR. Mensured the memorandum went to l
NRR for resoluttes. Based on his review of the memorandum,5 stated there
)
appeared to be a safety concern which needed to be addressed by NRC. M further opiasi that the BISCO issue could be a generic issue (Attachment Q.
pages 7-13).
q l
viewed the concerns expressed by M that violations I
proposed by and other inspectors in inspection report 85-16/13 were u
ifiably raded to unresolved items by Region IV management.
dammented his technical assessment of these proposed violations on pages
- 7 af his July 8,1986, memorandum and pages 4 and 5 of his November 25,55, memorandum (Attachment HH).
6 performed a review of the technical issues contained in inspection resurt 85-16/13. He reviewed five issues that were specifically related to 55 as allegations byh His assessment is documented on l
pages 14-18 af ktachment MM.
J Comments Regress Region IV Management's Enforcement Attitude Toward CPSES M M, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, I
Region IV, nesses January 1984 and January 1985, was interviewed concerning his knowledge of the attitude of Region IV management towards identifying and documenting steintions at CPSES. W stated he did not consider Region IV to have a strug enforcement program, and he believed the lack of a strong enforcement puFm had its roots in the attitude of the senior managers, which he statsdiscluded M andM He conwented that, in his opinion, the un6or managers did not evidence a strong' commitment to ensure conformance de regulations and did not take a tough attitude regarding enforcement.
M stated est when he reported to Region IV, it was clear to him that the
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senior and atMe management's attitude towards a utility influenced the decision of uister to take enforcement action. This attitude came to bear on the individual tapectors and how they perceived their job as guided by their senior mangmuut. Welieved that the attitude of Region IV management towards TIME 8 uss not to do work which would cause more problems for the utility. At er time W arrived in Regior IV, he found the amount of inspection artisity compared to the need was very small and, for a considerable of time, almost all the inspections at CPSES were done by the with very little regional support. % stated that
- 30 i
tr tion spe ion ut the Region did not respond.
I In addition to not providing assistance to inspect the plant, Mstated a favorite approach to discourage inspectors from writing violations was to worry the ins tors' work product to death and to question it to a great extreme.
added hat he had a sufficient number of discussions with M,did not really believe in enforcement as a means of a who uns the to conclude that
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compliance with the regulations.
worrying the paperwork to the point that less than the nTherefore, W participa
)
that could have been written were actually written.
er of violations connented the manner used by Mto reduce the number of violations was to argue with the inspectors that a finding was not a violation and to defend the utility on
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a violation.
W acknowledged that all of M contributions were not negative.
W called the inspectors' attention to the need for greater precision
]
in their language, and that was beneficial. B t overall. Mtated, N attitude anti-enforcement.
also stated he was told a j
number of times that did not think a violation was an appropriate l
MtatedM would prefer to
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vehicle to achieve correct we action.
handle the matter by discussing it with the utility and have any documented j
record be observations in the inspection report rather than clear violations.
l 1
4 related that when6 handled a disagreement between himself and an ins ector,Wwould normally interact with the
,M s
to gain acceptance of his conclusions, oted that would result in e
ng lined up against the inspector who wrote the violation.
and a Branch Chief, attempting to make a decision based on th addition to being infivenced byM who basically had an anti-enforcement attitude.
M stated he observed on the part of
, M and a few others, a continual stress of comments about watchini not trusting M i
and watching your back M performance at which M conc,luded was based upon where he identified a number of deficiencies in the utill s operation.
opined th'ere was some distrust and some dislike and apprehension about having,a strong-willed, meticulous and capable person on the staff who was not easily swayed to a different point of view. M further opined that N and W
~
were of like sind se an appeal of an inspector would not likely be heard strictly on its merits. They would back each other up (Attachment R. pages 3-15,18-19 and 55-56).
DIA interviewed a number of Region IV inspectors concerning whether Region IV placed a stron the QA areas. g emphasis on hardware inspections and downplayed inspections in Additionally, the inspectors commented on whether they had been pressured by Region IV. gene nt to downgrade or delete valid violations from inspection reports.
(Attachment S) stated he did not believe Region IV downplayed ($ issues. Instead, he thought there was overkill in the QA area.
NRC recently developed 500 open items on CPSES and 90 percent of
1,
l them were minor. The issues were paper problems and he thought that was I
ridiculous.
(Attachment T) believed Region IV excessively concentrated on QA.
believed Region IV needed more engineers who were qualified to inspect hardware and understand technical issues and who could make engineering judgments in the field. M was never harassed or pressured by Region IV s.anagement to downgrade or delete viclations from inspection reports.
6(Attachment U) stated Region IV management has not directed his inspection effort away from QA areas. Re ion IV management never pressured him ta mot write violations.
(Attachments)statedthat he is exclusively involved with QA issues at CPSES. M stated he has the freedom to identify, document, and report deficiencies. He said he has never encountered diffievity in presenting facts he believed were appropriate.
)
N(Attachment W) related that if Region IV assigned priorities to areas, then immediate operational safety concerns are higher than QA issues.
However, there has not been an attitude by Region IV to lessen the impact of QA findings.
W (Attachment X) related that as ah, he expected his inspectors to focus their efforts on finding real safety issues
~
as opposed to wasting a lot of time on paper work issues that had no safety significance. His instructions to his inspectors were to inspect the plant as thoroughly as time allows, document inspection results and findings, and present them, hopefully. in a way that represents the agency view. He thought this was the policy in Region IV. He did not believe QA was separate from hardware. When an inspector looked at hardware he was also looking at how the utility's program functioned which caused the hardware to be properly built.
If a problem was found with the hardware, then the inspector would start looking at the paper behind the hardware to determine what led to the problem.
He opined the hardisre was the real issue, not the paperwork. M stated that to his knowledge, Region IV inspectors have been allowed the freedom to conduct their inspections ard to document their findings on inspection reports.
W(Attachment Y) stated it was his impression that the QA emphasis at Re ion IV may not have been as strong as at Region III. the previous region that was assigned to. At Region III, there was a section assigned only to QA areas. Whas not encountered any problems with identifying and documenting findi in inspection reports. However, he pas told by N
had observed what he thought were violations at CPSES r, sked him to change his inspection re rt. M told M that he M refused to change the report.
said M was upset over the issut and his main objection was that he was asked to change the report.
told M he did not agree with changing the report, and he told management if they wanted to change it, then make the change themselves.
,a at CPSES, were interviewed by stated that Region IV had not directed them to avoid looking at @ issues in favor of inspecting hardware. They all believed i
they had the freedes to inspect any area that required inspection.
Additionally, all of these consultants stated they had not been directed or
1
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l pressured in any may by tagion IV to not document inspection findings or to l
downgrade or Altta taspectice, findings documented in an inspection report.
j None of the causltants ned any problem with Region IV not issuing inspection reports the usy try unre written by the inspectors (Attachments Z-EE).
was interviewed CIA to obtain perc ptions cancerni er activities involving PSES.
has I
been ince October 1985. Although had no first-hand i les specifically concerning the matters under investigatias OIA wit M observations and opinions of interactions Mand NRC consultants at CPSES and between i
g and Eagles If ammagement (Attachment FF).
with Region IV, was interviewed by OIA concerning informatie he had regarding Region IV's regulation of the construction of CPSES. M was employed by Re ion IV ftom 1973 to July 4, 1984, when he retired. Stace October 1984, has been employed as a consultant far te utility at CPSES. Although unable to provide any direct 1
information cacerning the matters under investigation, based on his i
involvement with Ref em IT and his knowledge of the issues at CPSES, M f
provided 01A vie genersi observations and opinions that were critical of Region IV's sumsymust of the inspection program at CPSES (Attachment GG).
was interviewed by OIA concerning at dich print the NRC should no longer eccept input from a utility concarving proposed violations developed during NRC inspections.
W stated that geur Tb it is the NRC's policy that the exit briefing is the utility's appartmity te dispute inspection findings. The exit briefing concludes the inspecties period, and the subsequent inspection report I
documents activity cardseted during the inspection period. Information provided by the stility sesequent to the exit briefing could be used by the utility in its respasse to a Notice of Violation if issued by the NRC. M noted that the stility has 20 to 30 days to reply to a Notice of Violation.
Additionally, the lefenution developed by the utilit would be considered by the NRC during the felleulag inspection period.
commented that an exception to this policy neuld be an instance where the utility's infomation f
showed6ande an obvious mistake in fact. However, the additional imeurustta uut have existed during the period of inspection to be considered dertug the prgeration of an inspection report. Melated that he is not ausreaf myurttten instructions which specifically address the question of de lapst steld no longer be considered;'however, guidance published is sortens It usual chapters concerning the conduct of inspections and the decantatin af slo 1ations makes this unstated policy clear (Attachment 4 1
t from a utility relcting to prepued violations during the period the draft NRC inspection rupert is betag processed.6 stated nonna11y inspection reports are tenist uitkla 30 daye, of the exit briefing with the utility.
Althoug Wlmeraf se specific guidance in IE Manuals addressing the iss accapting tupst trem a utility after the conclusion of an inspection, bellest here are instances where it would be appropriate to accept t e additional infernetta and delete the proposed violation from the
inspection report. Generally these instances would depend on how soon after completion of the inspection the new information was provided, as well as the nature of the proposed violation and the new infomation. As an example, M stated that shortly after completion of an inspection, if the utility provided the IRC with a record that was difficult to locate and which resolved an issue, then it would be proper to delete the proposed violation from the report. However, if the proposed violation was an indication of a possible widespread problem, n it would be appropriate to document the finding in the final report.
further explaiend that if the infomation provided by the utility was created subsequent to the inspection in response to a proposed violation, then it would not be proper for the NRC to use this input to delete a proposed violation from an inspection report (Attachment PP).
Summary of Review of Technical Aspects of Allegation 1 i
d ce s
proposed by as a result of their inspections findings were owngraded unresolved items by Region IV
' management.
reviewed the proposed violations in Region IV inspection reports 85-07/05, 85-14/11, and 85-16/13, and the transcripts of OIA interviews with NRC inspectors and consultants. Based on his review, l
M found that while the downgrading of violations in some instances was well withis annagement's prerogative, there was sufficient evidence to support 6 concern that several violations were downgraded without cause. Of the 16 issues that were specifically related to OIA as allegations by M M found seven to require more information be ea violation could be imposed. For nine of the allegations, j
considered either that sufficient infomation existed to impose a violation or that management's reasoning for down ra ing, or otherwise treating the violation, was questionable.
stated that although he found no evidence that the downgrading of proposed violations had an adverse effect on plant safety, he did consider certain instances of downgrading to represent poor management in Region IV (Attachment HH).
l performed a review of the techn cal issues containe n taspection reports 85-07/05, 85-14/11 and 85-16/13. He reviewed the 16 issues that were specifically related to OIA as allegations by M This review was to determine if Region IV mpnagement improperly l
downgraded, changed or deleted inspection findings and violations. Based on his review of 16 issues, he found nine instances where more work was required l
before any enforcement action could be imposed on TUGCO, and five instances l
where the reasoning used by Region IV management to downgrade the proposed violations appeared questionable.
In addition, Regional management identified issues as unresolved items without directing the inspectors to take specific
- 34 action to resolve those items. T'his practice was contrary to the requirements l
in Chapter 0400 of the IE manual (Attachment MM).
l l
The technica1' advisors were not in agreement on all issues. A comparison of the results of their reviews is set forth below.
Inspection Report 85-07/05 Concerns 1 and 2 l
Reactor Vessel Installation Inconclusive Inconclusive i
Concern 3 1
Audit of Reactor Vessel Installation Inconclusive Inconclusive Concern 4 Spool Piece Marking No Violation Inconclusive Concern 5 2
Cement Mixing Blades Questionable No Violation
~
Handling of Violation
/
Inspection Report 85-14/11 Concerns 1, 2.)and 3 Records Shipment to Stone Questionable
- Questionable and Webster (85-14/11 cont.)
Concerns 4 and 5 Records Shipment of CB&I Inconclusive Questionable Concern 6 i
Temporary Storage of Records Questionable Inconclusive 3
I Inconclusive - There was insufficient infonnation te detennine whether a violation was appropriate.
2 Questionable - There was sufficient information available to cite a violation.
a.
~
1 i
e Inspection Report 85-76/13 Concerns 1, 2, and 3 10CFR50.55(e)
Questionable Inconclusive Concern 4 NAMCO Switches Not Properly Identified Questionable Inconclusive Concern 5 81500 Seals Refer to IE; Refer to IE; Inconclusive Inconclusive Summary Inconclusive or No Violation Questionable 6
7 9
g 11 5
Conclusions Allegation I: Region IV Management Harassed and Intimidated Inspectors to Pressure ? hem to Downgrade or Delete Proposed Inspection Findings at CPSES M had lengthy disagreements with M regardin the o
downgrading of inspection findings. One witness stated
@ grilled" on an issue.for five hours and he considered that as to e point of being " badgered."
There were comments exchanged by M and which o
M claimed were harassing and/or trireaten ng, either denied the comments or denied the coments were intended to harass or threaten OIA could not substantiate the comments through i pen ent sources.
W established a higher than nonnal threshold for assessing o
violations at CPSES. While at another plant he might have been more l
liberal in citing violations, he stated that at CPSES he was being:
l very " tight" to make sure violations were absolutely corre l
Because CPSES was in a contested hearing before the ASLB, did not want to write violations the utility could argue w l
technically incorrect. He believed that would create unnecessary paperwork and could even raise questions regarding Region IV's technical competency.
M believedM unjustifiably downgraded or deleted o
proposed inspection findings concerning CPSES from R inspection reports 85-07/05, 85-14/11, and 85-16/13.
on the other hand, responded that he downgraded or dele proposed findings because he believed the inspectors had proposed violations
i
\\
a against TUGC0 that were either technically incorrect or inadequately
~
developed. 01A determined there were 26 proposed violations and four proposed presolved items that were either downgraded or deleted from the three inspection reports reviewed by6 o
0!A' nical reviews of 16 proposed violations detemined that used G prerogative as a manager to downgrade proposed vietattens when there did not appear to be sufficient information to support the violation. However, CIA found that in many cases the rationale used b6to downgrade the violations was faulty.
Examples where O'A' technical advisor believed faulty reasoning was applied bM downgrade violations were the lack of a TUGCO audit of the installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure i
vessel. the use of travelers as design control documents, findings involvlag the Stone and Webster and CB&I records. TUGCO's handling of recards in the paper flow group, and the application of SSER 11 to TUSG's failure to provide a temporary or permanent storage facility for records coceningled with in-process documents in the pager view grow.
Midentified several progosed violations as unresolveJ items o
i to duumstrate to the inspector 5 did not avoid issues 3ven though Wbelieved further inspection tetivity would not develop violattens. This practice was contrary to the requirements in IE Mammal Chapter 9400 and 0610. Examples included the issues of whether the traveler could serve as a design control document, whether travelers could be changed in the field without issuance of a asacesfomsace report, and whether TUGC0 needed to audit the installation of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel.
o when believed Region IV inspectors did not develop sufficient aformation to adequately support to osed violationsg questissed the proposed violations. However did not provide adegata direction or guidance to the inspectors to obtain the additismal information believed necessary to either develop vietattmas or resolve the issues.
Instead, in most cases. D i
demynded the proposed violations in the final inspec ion orts.
Sese mesples of this practice were (1) not directing to twins the TUGG audit plan to determine f the Unit 2 reactor vessel ues incleded. (2) not directing to expand the samp.le stas of the EMD switches that were inspected to ascertain if i
a1 &cuentation problems existed. (3) not directing
~
to detemine the safety significance of the fin regardtag the BISCO fire seals, and (4) not directing to 1
restem the IUGG QA program to determine if the QA requirements for nescumformance documents such as 50.55(e) reports had been satisfled.
j dela ed two memoranda to NRC Headquarters o
whuk unre uritsen by to resolve ongoing technical issues 3
at EP55. In the first case, they delayed a November 25, 1985, i
menssumes for unre than four months because Q were dissatisfied 9
with er amner in whichMaddressed and worded it. This i
memormhs teio*.ved potentially significant information regarding a
- 'possek puerie issue with Bisco fire penetration seals. In the secostesse, an April 29, 1986, memorandum requested guidance from IE reydes the shipment of CB&I records off-site and TUGCO's recort seurege facility. As of July 22, 1986, the memorandum had not pt haar submitted to NRC Headquarters.
Mhleted proposed violations from draft inspection reports o
basade Wormation received from the utility well after completion of theInspections. The original issue and the additional inspa.timactivity was not documented in the final inspection reports. Bile this action a peared consistent with Region IV politys upressed b in several instances the implemassenes of this policy was inconsistent with the policy as sta E. An example of this inconsistency was acceptance by TUGCO's January 9,1986, memorandum to file to document a
WGC0 audit of the QA records control system at the CB&I recort furflity. TUGCO's original failure to document their audit of them QA records had been discovered during the conduct of inspectimsE-14/11 in Oc er 1985. Based on the January 9, 1986, TUGC8 mumundum, deleted the proposed violation citing TUG &stulture to nt their audit from the inspection report.
o acknowledged the inspectors' disagreement with the sumer w ic proposed inspection findin s were deleted or doweredin final inspect ts.
were also ame tat did not concur with changes made in lasputtlus re and signed the reports only because management wantedS ts.
accepted this situation and took mactta to address the inspectors' disagreements.
Allegation II: Be krion IV OA Inspection Program at CPSES Was Inadequate.
The pursumst mis inspection was to detemine i te corporate office was prepu%smaging corporate QA activities at CPSES. T inspection, attens encvmented
,was conducted duringAgat and Septem er 84 an ified severa weaknesses in the imple6 of the TUGC0 audit program.
In particular, several Level IV violettusure identified as a result of the applicant's failure to (1) regularly reiste status and adequacy of its QA program, and (2) establish and hghumst a comprehensive system of planned and periodic audits of safety-relatusastvities.
relatdtutduring the NRC inspection, the stated to thatals inspection was the first comprehensive u o the TUGC0 corporate sNlue by llRC since the construction permit was issued in 1974 (the Construc ts for Units 1 and 2 were issued in December 1974).
Consequently, reviewed past Region IV inspection reports and was able
. )
4 to identify only a few superficial, very focused technical audits but no comprehensive in-dayth-NAC inspection of TUGC0 QA management since 1974.
6 stated t's $!A that the NRC inspection program under Manual Chapter 2512 has been revised several times during the last few years. He stated the old program required a mid-QA inspection under procedure 35200, which should be a comprehensive look at all the activities that have occurred by mid-project. @t to TUGC0 corporate Headquarters.
said procedure 35200 was perfo d on-site; however, no inspectors ever mes added that 35200 was conducted so superficially, it was almost meaningless.
After d from th UGC0 corporate office in i
September asked at that ti to review previous Region IV inspection reports and l
compare them to requirements in IE Manual Chapter 2512. The results of l
The January 13,1986, assorandum addressed the NRC inspection program at CPSES and concluded that the implementation and documentation of the required ins e n program by Region IV at CPSES between 1974 and 1984 was weak.
review of inspection data for CPSES, Unit 1, revealed that inspections of the applicant's QA program required by IE Manual Chapter 2512 were weak or nonexistent after the QA inspections for the construction perinit were completed is 1974-1975.
review also disclosed that Region IV QA inspections and reviews for CPSE, nit 2, were not conenensurate with the construction status of the plant.
The memorandum also identified technical inspection procedures required by IE Manual Chapter 2512 that had not been completed by Regian IV or not completed as thoroughly as the inspection records indicated. However, the memorandum also stated that additional and supplemental NRC inspections were performed at CPSES which provided some assurance that the licensee's QA program was acceptable. It further stated that these inspections did not identify an overall breakdown in the CPSES QA program, and the specific areas of concern appeared to De salvageable.
6 emphasized the laportance of the NRC's QA inspec' tion program by noting the NRC inspectica program is three-pronged. The NRC inspectors are supposed to review and ensure that implementing procedures for work activities are in place prior to work starting. This inspection activity is followed by the NRC inspector reviewing actual work in progress.
Finally, the NRC inspector reviews the utility's QA records for the work completed to ensure that the documentation reflects that the completed work activity was properly controlled by the stility.
Some of the NRC technical inspection procedures that identified as not completed at CPSES were required to be conducted whi e construction work was in progress. Consequently, the opportunity for the NRC to inspect these activities was lost. In these situations, the NRC inspector must rely on the utility's quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC) records to have assurance the work was completed properly. Therefore, it was important for the utility 1
39 to have an effective 5 program to ensure their system for controlling and auditing work activities included making sure quality control personnel were ins cet ng daily work activities and were documenting their ins wetions.
consented that earlier NRC inspections had indicated tae stility's QA l
in on program uns not adequately reviewing QC inspection activities, pined that the 70600 audit program at corpora uarters should have disclosed this shortcoming; however, discovered the TUGCB arporate 'budit pr(gram was ot effe ive.
4 stated that becsese the NRC did not comprehensively inspect the TUGC0 corporate QA audit program until 1984, this weakness went undetected by TUGC0 and the NRC. Consegmently, NRC could not fully rely on the accuracy of the TUGC0 QA records whom NRC technical inspection procedures were not completed in time. (Attachment 3, paget 10-13,16-18, 29-36, and 38-68).
s interviewed conc g the adequacy of the Region IV QA ins ton progra at CPSES.
related that the inspection program required by IE Manual Chapter 12 had been a moving target" because over the years its scope and requirements have chan ed. Consequently, it would be difficult to ascertals if previous inspections complied with current y
requirements of the ammual chapter.
tated that for some inspection modules where a timely inspection was not performed, the window of opportunity may have passed. le those cases, NRC must perform compensatory inspection procedures.
M believed the geslity and quantity of Region IV's QUnspection program at CPSES outlined by Manual Chapter 2512 was a non-issue.W stated there was a breakdown in the stility't QA program at CPSES; however, by completing the Comanche Peak Response Team Plan (CPRTP NRC can gather enough information to make a licensing decision for CPSES.
acknowledged that by not performing timely inspections, NRC may contributed to the weakness of the utility's QA program at CPSES; however, phasized that NRC is not a substitute for the stility's QA program.
stated the best NRC can do is to make sure the stility is doing all it can, and even that's a very small sampling.
related that he asked to analyze the information provided in te anuary 13, randum o detemine if additional inspection effort was required.
noted that most of the observations in the memorandum had been overcome events.
explained that a significant development over the past year uns the CP, w ich had a program p113,1986,an that addre type of shortcomings identified in the January
, memorandum (Attachment P. pages 3-45 and 122-136).
Mwas interriaued concerning the adequacy of the Region IV QA inspection program at CPSES, and asserted that over the years the IE inspection program estlined in IE Manual Chapter 2512 had changed. 6 said that by virtue of the constant changes in the IE inspection program it was difficult to impiment some of the procedures in a timely manner 6 added, however, that sucent NRC inspection efforts such as the Construction Assessment Team, the Region IV Special Inspection, and the Technical Review Team (TRT) may have aNressed the QA requirements outlined in IE Manual l
Chapter 2512. Maeser Region IV had yet to detemine to what extent these i
inspections meet 512 5 requirements.
j
)
I i
l Mprovided an explanation regarding Region IV's application of the QA inspection procedures during the period of 1974 to 1984. W that up l
until 1980, there are only three QA modules for the construction phase. One l
of them was an as-required module, which means it may never be completed. In 1980/1981 IE added GA modules and within the same year the inspection program was changed to a Priority I, II and III, which gave the R p,t_ ion of determining the level of inspection effort. According to a
decision was made to cut back on the inspection effort at CPSES be use a had been assigned to the site.
said a decision was made" to do only Priority I and 11 modules, and hey dropped the QA modules under Priority III.
In 1984 IE revised the inspection program and did away with the Priority I, II and III system I
(Attachment D, pages 46-55 and 76-104).
Concernin the information contained in the Januar 13, 1986, memorandum from j
to directed to review the inspection 1
istor a umented the results of this review in a memorandum to (AttachmentII).
In that memorandum, stated:
1 I believe that all the changes made in the IE program, and in particular,
{
the prioritization established in the September 15, 1981, revision of l
Manual Chapter 2512 make it impractical to draw any conclusions without i
taking such aspects into consideration. The IE Manual Chapter 2512, 766 data provides so method to account for IE program changes.
I earlier reviewed the Manual Chapter 2512 QA modules and found that from j
1975 to 1980, there were only three QA modules and one of these was to be j
performed only once. Since 1980, there have been five changes and four QA modules added. The 1981 prioritization dropped three of these four QA
{
modules as well as many parts of the other Manual Chapter 2512 modules.
{
prioritization was in effect through 1984.
Mwas interviewed concerning the adequacy of the Region IV QA inspection progras at CPSES.was conducted, in Au@ gust and September 1984 related that Region IV inspection 84-32/11 l
inspection NRC learned TUGC0 had some deficiencies in its review of their QA program at CPSES. IRC found that TUGC0 failed to establish and implement a l
i required system of comprehensive, planned and periodic audit f
safety-related activities and vendors associated with CPSES.
I I
considered the finMags pertaining to the establishment and imp ementation of the utility's aedit program to be significant. The failure by the utility to review the status and adequacy of the QA program and the failure by the l
utility to implement an audit program indicated the utility did not have control of its On activities nor was assessing the adequacy of the QA activities that wre in place, also said g considered the findings to be significant in this particu se because the records of quality' l
assurance at CPSES sere placed in question by the efforts of the TRT.
i Mommented t[et when@made an overview of the types of problems being i
identified at C6ame to the conclusion that the Region IV inspection
@procram applied ts CPSES was less than appropriate and less than believed the reason that the TRT and the CPRT existed was an attempt to recover the quality of CPSES which should have been verified during the past ten years of construction.
W related that dur'ing 1984-1985, conducted a review to understand the status of the Region I spection program at CPSES. This was done for two purposes. First, it was to establish the status of the NRC inspection program and to use the status to modify or tailor the NRC inspection program of CPSES, Units 1 and 2, to strengthen any weak areas.
Secondly, the review was to provide input to the CPRT action plans so the licensee would fully address any safety concerns the NRC might now develop because the NRC had not inspected the TUGC0 corporate QA program during a 10-year period.
said that although Region IV conducted some inspections of TUGCO's QA p
gram, they were not extensive or fully adequate. Consequently, if neither the utility nor the NRC had reviewed the status and adequacy of the TUGC0 QA program, then there were some concerns relative to the quality of construction at CPIES. With the information6 developed during their review of the Region IV inspection program at CPSES, the NRC could modify inspection p(Attachment C, pages 5-11).rograms to provide the most assurance of the level of qua ES.
(For details of the results o review of
.-~
the Region IV inspection program at CPSES, see Attachment E.
was intervie e a equacy of the Region IV QA ins c-tion program at CPSE'..
related that during the sumer of 1984, was detailed to the TRT effort at CPSES wherehersaw the completion of t e routine inspection program required by IE manual chapters and was responsible for closin a number of miscellaneous allegations. UponWassigrenent to
- CPSES, found that because Region IV had been pursuing The resolution of many a egations that were associated with CPSES, the Region had fallen behind in the completion of tne inspection program. It was W initial impression there was a lot of inspection work still to be done.
While conducting inspections at CPSES, Region IV did not place any more emphasis than was called for by the IE inspection program on either QA inspections or hardware inspections.
However, Region IV inspectors discovered that QA type inspections, especially at the TUGC0 corporate Headquarters, had not >een completed according to the schedule called for by the IE manual.
$Wopined that Region IV was probably further behind,in terns of completing the QR inspection program than the inspections involving direct observation of work at the site.
As a result of an overview of the Region IV inspection program at CPSES that F requested, earned that the R on IV QA inspection program was not as complete as t s culd have been.
l recalled that as part of the
- review, ted an informal ation of the status of all Region to do additional in@spections at CPSES in the QA area,
!Y inspections.
pointed out t that as a result of the revie6 Hied the a
also noted that Region IV had missed some QA inspections required by the IE inspection program to be completed at various stages cf construction.
Consequently, in the sumer of 19846 instructed M to capture in one ir.spection effert as many of the previous inspection procedures as 8
' ~
e possible, althoug recognized this was not the perfect e ortunity to i
complete some of aspections. As an example of this,
.ited the Region IV QA inspecties effort relating to vendor QA programs. Some of the TUGC0 vendors had either templeted their work or had very little work remaining on site. Therefore, it was difficult from an inspection standpoint to achieve a full appreciation concerning how good the QA programs of these vendors were because they were no longer on site.
i
@ ions when required, them the Region would not have a complete data base ommented that if Region IV had not completed some of the QA inspect to judge the adequecy of plant construction.Wnoted that the QA program is one important part of a set of management con r that the utility has to assure the plant is constructed properly.
dded that the fact that the region may not have done an inspection did not necessarily mean the utility's program uns inadequate.
It just meant that NRC had no basis upon which to judge the program.
InWview, the ERC and Region IV have recovered sufficiently from this deficit because, since 1984, a tremendous number of resources have been used at CPSES and much of the effort has beer. related to the adequacy of the utility's quality assurance and quality ::ontrol programs. (AttachmentJJ, pages 2-B).
was interviewed concerni the adequacy of the Region i nspection ram at CPSES.
rela hat was not aware of any concerns wi y
gion V QA inspection program during the construe of CP5E tated that durin the time W was assigned as the l
, a group of inspectors rom the IIK Needgmarters oo e status of Region IV's implementation of the IE Nanus 1 Chapter 2512 inspection program and detennined that most of the undules had been completed. gadded that later on in the TRT effort, @ inspectars looked at the QA ins etion procedures and found that the QA modules had not been completed.
learned that only 50 or 60 percent of some of the modules had been completed and the modules had then been closed. 6then aslud by OIA =thether more effort by Region IV to complete the NRC QA inspection endules could have resulted in TUGC0 implementing earlier action to problems with its QA pro 1 ram,Meplied that it was hard to say.
lained that had Region ;V been able to do more at CPSES, they may have surfaced some of these problems and had a handle on them earlier.
Instead, it uns the TRT that identified many of the problems.
(Attachment ILX, pages 3 22).
as interviewed concerning the adegnaq of the Region ly QA inspection program at CPSES.
MstatedMllef that the attitude of Region IV maragement was that it did not want to create too sesy problems for the utilit.W added that this was difficult to detersfat conclusively; however, whe
. coked at the facts.
Found thet the amount of isspection activities compared to the need at the pTant was very sus 11. and that for a considerable period of time, almost all the inspections at CP25 ere done by*
with very little regional support. W stated that it was a fact that the inspections were not being done.
urther dehorsted on the Region IV inspection progra'n by ning tFat oc didat have a strong orientation to QA programs.
believed that had ReginH had such a strong orientation over the, years, e problems seen at CPSE5.Inth Texas and Waterford would never have arisen..When asked if greater emphsts by Region IV on the QA aspects of the NRC inspection program at CP55 muld have resulted in TUGC0 implementing a better QA program at an earlier shge stated that he believed this to be true. He added that if the pnyss is not strong, then any deficiencies which occur in the construct 1s ergestration will simply be magnified.
Wstated thatMB did not have a strong QA and the Region did not remedy that sinistles over a period of years.
further considered it a "very severe ihnetency" on the part of Region V to have not conducted an inspection of
's corporate QA program and taken corrective action
- However, did not believe the NRC should do the utility's job.6 comnented thatum though Region IV may not have fulfilled its responsibilities.the utility cannot blame the HRC for its mistakes. However.
the NRC would tue better represented the public, both in terms of health and safety and is amas of expense, had Region IV demanded and obtained better quality asserne fra TUSCO. (Attachment R, pages 6-9 and 23-29).
Muss tuterviewed conce the ad uncy of the Region IV A inspect at CP Surefme could not speak with any spe o events th cur priorto t date pertaining to the status of Region IV QA 2512 inspectissprogram has been a dyn%tated the IE Manual Chapter inspection prepen at CPSES. Hewever, amic program and in constant change.
Logically, if te program was continually changing, the changes would impact on what was him the pastM statemwould not be able to make any judgement ce er status of the Region IV inspection program untilE was able to detennine auctly that was required at various points in time.
(Attachment J.ppes 66-67),
was interviewed concerning the adequacy of thetegie IV QA inspection program at CPSES.
irst involvement um (F5E3 in Feb be commented that when irst becamem
)
wer required to perfonn nspectiessutlined in nual the r 512.
which 3
inspection produru in IE Manual Chapter 2512. @ pectors completed th co7tained the a a "C" modules, and e reg onal ins further noted that IE Manual Chaptr.rM did not contain any QA inspection modules.
Mcornistif tet inspectors concentrated their inspections on hardware instead of 5 asas beca he inspection program in IE Manual Chapter 2512 was structorsiest ca ed that until or 1985,as 5 laspection mo es in Manual Chapter 2512, concernir,g post constructts pmpit requirements, only contained inspection procedure 3
r 35200.@vrther re:alled that between 1979 and 1981, the South Texas project was consuming ala)st all of the Region IV resources that were not dedicated to the resiBent inspector program. Regional management had to decide where they were going to concentrate the finite manpower resources available. At that point in time, CPSES was not the priority.
In early 1982, the CPSES hearinqs began, and from 1982 until 1984, the hearings plus resolution of allegations were about all o inspection work that did at CPSES. He said that examination of nspection reports at C l
would disclose that they were published fu er and further apart until the point where almost a year of inspection activity was documented in one of then:.
(Attachment LL, pages 6-14, and 29-31).
Sumary of Technical Review of Allegation 2 At DIA's request, M revie concerns regarding the NRC inspection program for CPSES.
opined that based on his review, the QA in tion effort by Region Vf CPSES over the years was inadequate.
compared the content of various QA inspection reports by Regien IV with the nspection procedur dance provided in past iterations of IE Manual Chapter 2512.
considered as part of his review the history of frequencies speci ied in nual Chapter 2512 for the performance of the QA construction inspection procedures. He learned that a significant number of the QA inspections.specified by Chapter 2512 were not performed in a timely manner (Attachment HH).
In regard specific Manual Chapter 2512 inspection procedures reviewed by he found the following:
Inspection Procedure 35020, Audit of Applicant's Surveillance of Contractor QA/QC Activities. Although required since 1977 to be performed between 5 months after docketing and construction com-pletion, this procedure was not satisfied until CPSES was nearing completion.
Inspection Procedure 35060 Licensee Management of QA Activities.
s Since 1980, the IE Manual has provided that this inspection is to be performed every 18 months. At least two inspections 'on this area
-- were not performed as specified by Chapter 2512.
N-m Inspection Procedure 35061 In-Depth QA Inspection of Perfonnance.
Since 1980, the IE Manual has provided that this inspection is to be perfomed annually. At least three inspections were not performed in accordance with this inspection procedure.
Inspection Procedure 35065, Procurement, Receiving and Storage.
Since 1980, the IE Manual has specified that this inspection be performed annually. At least three inspections that were to have satisfied this procedure were not performed.
Inspection Procedure 35100, Review of QA Manual. Since 1976, this IE Manuel has indicated that this inspection is to be performed as required.
was concerned that the licensee needed to revise its manua late in the construction process.
' ^
... Inspection Procedure 35200, Mid-Term Construction Pemit QA Ins 9ec-tim. Since 1976, the Manual has provided that this inspection is i
to be performed between 18 to 30 months after the beginning of construction. This inspection was not satisfied,as specified by the April 1976 version of Chapter 2512.
Because the 15 inspection procedures required b'y IE Manual Cha r
12 were i
not satisfied by Region IV as to frequency of performance, opined I
that it would not be possible to rely on the QA inspection e t
on IV as evidence of the safe construction of CPSES. Consequently, believed that other efforts such as the Construction Assessment eam i
Inspection 8348/12 Region IV Special Inspection 84-26, the Technical Review Team activitief,, and inspections of technical work by Region'IV over the r
14 be relied upon to detemine the adequacy of plant construction.
4 cmcludpd that:
The fact that the Region IV QA inspection effort was weak is not the major concern at Comanche Peak by itself, because the applicant's QA program could have been satisfactory despite the weaknesses in the Region n
IV effort. However, the Technical Review Team in Supplement 11 to NUREG-0797 (dentified numerous deficiencies in the implementation of the
~
applicast's QA program. In particular, the Technical Review Team con-cluded that failures by QA and QA personnel to detect deficiencies suggested an ineffective Brown & Root and TUGC0 inspection system.
It therefore appears that the weaknesses on the Region IV QA inspection effort any have contributed to inadequacies in the applicant's QA pro-gram.
As a result I do not believe that the past Region IV QA inspection effort provides strong support for the safe construction of Comanche Peak.
Other efforts such as the Construction Assessment Team Inspection 83-18/12, Region IV Special Inspection 84-26, the Technical Review Team activities, and inspections:of technical work by Region IV over the years, should be relied upon to determine the adequacy of plant con-structim.
Because the requirements of IE Manual Chapter 2512 Light Water Reactor Inspection Program - Construction Phase, have changed over the past years OIA reviewed past iterations of the manual chapter and prepared an array which sunnarized the specified frequency of the QA inspection modules that were reviewed durlag this investigation (Attachment N).
Conclusles Allegatles II: The Region IV QA Inspection Program at CPSES Was Inadeousta j
Based on the available infomation, it appears that at CPSES Region' IV did not satisfy the frequency requirements for the IE Manual Chapter 2512 QA inspection procedures reviewed by OIA. DIA noted that the requirements of the IE inspectica program had changed over the years making it difficult, at this date, to determine if past Region IV inspections fulfilled the QA inspection procedures prescribed by the Manual Chapter. Additionally, none of the Region IV management efficials interviewed by OIA could state whether the Region IV
l.
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'QA inspection program at OSES met the IE Manual Chapter 2512 requirements.
The Region IV annagement efficials could only conjecture as to how the Region IV QA inspecties program amplied with IE Manual Chapter 2512. Consequently, it appears that'it would at be possible to rely on the Region IV QA inspection effort as evihce of the safe construction of CPSES. This,in combination with the deficiencies identified in TUGC0's implementation of its QA program, means that to detemine th2 adequacy of plant construction it will be necessary for the MC k rely largely on the detailed technical inspections of various structures, systems and components that have recently been conducted by the BC at GEES.
Allegation III: tota Docuented in Region IV's NRC Fom 766 Inspector's Report was Inaccurate WhenO intervised by 01A.Sstated that whileWwas reviewing the Region IV inspection pogram at CPSES forW, d
ed problems with Re ion IV's documentation of inspections at CPIES.
explained that discovered instances of inspection procedures being ocumented as completed; howewr, the actual inspections were not conducted or not conducted as thoroughly as the receed indicated. Mstated the problems ranged from inspection sort not encumented and perhaps not done, to what appeared to be false entri aise documentation reported on work done by NRC inspectors.
destified that the problem was with the information contained on IV's BC Foms 766. Inspector's Report, which were prepared by the laspectors to document the NRC inspection procedures addressed in inspection reports, and information provided by the 766 computerized system.
As backgrou ained that after the inspector prepares the 766 i
data foms, ttaches them to the referenced inspection report, and the information then used to update the Region IV computerized inspection and enforcement statistical data file. This file is a management information system used to track lasportions that have been e
' and to maintain a status of the inspection pogram at a project.
oted that during a review of the i tor's report it is nonnal to ntify some errors; how-ever, the e was fhding with the NRC Form 766 data were flagrant.
Mrelated that, as a result of $omparison of the Region IV. NRC Form 766 data with the achsal inspection reports,Midentified discrepancies between what was Ifsted as the NRC em and what was, documented in the l
inspection reports. Additionally, ated his. review showed QA program ins s at CPSES had not been adequately com)1eted by Region IV.
further explained thatSwas not disputing tie information from the stantoint of exactness in recording percentages of completion of verless inspection modules; rather.Meoncern was over inspection modules helag sucorded on the NRC Foms 765 as being 100% complete when in t impection reports there was no indication the area was looked at.
revMed two charts, one for Unit 1 CPSES and one for Unit 2 CPSES, that out11and the results ofMeomparison of the NRC Form 766 data with inspecties reports for Region !Y inspection program at CPSES (Attachment 8, pages 41-9 and 75-76; Exhibits 3-3 and 3-4 to Attachment B).
01A interviewed a ember d Region IV managers and inspectors concerning the accuracy of the lufsrustian recorded in the NRC Fom 766 system. The general l
l
47 consensus of ttsse interviewed was that because of carelessness, lack of knowledge abost the 766 system, and lack of quality control over infomation enti: red into the' system, the information in the automated inspection and enforcement statistical data system was inaccurate.
It was generally believed that little mile &ility could be placed on any infomation obtained from the system. However, then was no indication that inaccurate data was intentionally recorded and put into the system in an effort to make the Region IV inspection progra at CPSES look better, j
It appeared to SIA that Region IV personnel were uncertain about the proper method for complettag the NRC Foms 766 and whether there should be a direct corelation betuses a reference in an inspection report and an entry on the 766 form. There was aise confusion concerning how to detemine the percentage of
{
completion of as inspection module. These questions centered around whether i
percent of completion should be viewed as a percentage of the inspection i
modules completed or as a percentage of the inspected work activity that was completed at the construction site.
Frequent changes in the implementation of the 766 syste over the years has also created confusion. Additionally.
several individuals stated that certain infomation was recycled on the NRC Forms 766 merely to get the computer to accept the data.
Sumary of Technical Review At DI A's request.
reviewed the accuracy of the NRC Foms 766 that were hid11$ted by in the documentation ided to OIA.
Based on his rulew of a number of NRC Forms 766 for CPSES, determined the 756 dets for CPSES was unreliable, noted discrepancies between the information on the NRC Foms 766 and the information documented in the associated inspection reports.g concluded that some of the NRC Fom 766 data for CPSES overestimated the extent of completion of the Region IV inspection program (Attachment HH).
Conclusico A11egaties III: Data Documented in Region.IV's NRC Form 766 Inspector's Report tes laatzerste Based on the leformaties developed during this investigation, the data recorded in the BC Ferns 766 pertaining to CPSES is inaccurate and unreliable. The incervect nporting ranged from inspection activity recorded on the NRC Forms 166 ter which there was no documentation in associated inspection nports ta listing inspection modules as 100 percent complete on the forms withest cagleting the recommended inspection activity, merely to close the module. Its cause of the discrepancies appears to be a lack of understandir.g en the part of NRC inspectors as to the proper method of completing the E Fees 766.
J ATTACFFENTS A.
Technical Issues Raised byMDuring O!A Interview.
B. Interview cfM dtd March 19. 1986.
C.
Interview of M dtd April 10. 1986.
D.
Interview of M dtd July 10. 11, 21 and 23, 1986.
E. Memorandun free M to M 6 dtd January 13. 1986.
e F.
Draft Inspection Report 85-07/05, dtd February 3.1986.
)
l G.
Interview of M dtd April 9.1986.
H.
Interview of M dtd June 17, 1986 and November 25 1986.
I I.
Interview of M dtd May 29, 1986.
J.
Interview of M dtd July 25, 1986.
K.
Matrix of Drafts for Report 85-14/11.
L.
TUGC0 Speed lattar, dtd January 9.1986.
M.
Interview ofM dtd July 17,1986.
N.
Interview of Mdtd July 24, 1986.
O.
Matrix of Drsfts for Report 85-16/13 dtd May 12, 1986.
P.
Interview of M dtd July 22. 1986.
O. Interview of M. dtd July 17, 1986.
R.
Interview of m dtd June 24, 1986.
S.
Interview of M dtd May 28, 1986.
T.
Interview of N dtd May 28, 1986.
U.
Interview of dtd July 24, 1986.
V.
Memorandum fna to M dtd April 29, 1986.
W.
Interview of M dtd July 9,1986.
X. Interview of M dtd July 9,1986.
Y. Interview of M dtd July 9,1986.
l
- 2. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.
a AA. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.
- 88. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.
CC. Interview of 6 dtd June 26, 1986.
l DD. Interview of 6 dtd June 26, 1986.
EE. Interview of M dtd June 26, 1986.
FF. Interview of M dtd July 24, 1986.
I GG. Interview of td March 20. 1986 HH. Memoranda to
, OIA. from M dtd July 8. July ovem er 5 and November 25, 1986.
II. Memorandum tom fromM dtd May 23,1986.
JJ. Interview of M dtd June 25, 1986.
4 KK. Interview of M dtd July 23. 1986.
Lt. Interview of M dtd July 22, 1986.
PF. Technical Review of M !ssues Contained in Comanche Peak Inspection Reports, prepared by6 NN. Frequency of QA Modules Based on Past Versions of the MC 2512 Program.
- 00. Interview of 6 dtd November 24, 1986.
PP. Interview of M dtd November 26, 1986.
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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION Stello Roe p eau o
UNITED STATES Rehm g
8" NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Sniezek
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December 23, 1986 MEMOR ANDUM FOR:
Chairman Zech Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Carr FROM:
William C. Parler General Counsel
SUBJECT:
OGC REVIEW 0F OIA REPORT CONCERNING REGION IV flANAGEMENT ACTIONS RELATIVE TO COMANCHE PE A X (OI A IN V ESTIG ATIO N N O. 86-10)
In accordance with Chairman Zech's memorandum to the Executive Director for Operations dated December 4, 1986, the Office of the General Counsel has reviewed the subject report.
Principal matters reviewed were:
1.
the need to delete information in order to prevent unwarranted invasions of personal privacy et such time as the report and its attachments are made available to the public; 2.
the need to delete information in order to avoid compromising the N R C's ability to undertake appropriate investigations and/or referrels for investigation, e.g., to the Department of Justice; j
3.
whether the report justified the initistion of personnel actions; and, 4.
the potential effect of the report on the ongoing Comanche Peak licensing proceeding.
f Based on O G C's review of the report and its attachments, we have determined, with respect to the first inquiry, that, except for two documents (e consultant's resume which includes a home address and phone number end en identification of private contracts, and partial deletions of information in a 3
completed N RC staff member's performance appraisel) no deletions to protect privacy appear to be required.
Thus, the material in the report that was CONTACT:
L. Chandler, O G C 49 28658
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The Commissioners )]
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deleted for privacy reasons when it was initially released on December 11, 1986, can be left in the report.
As concerns the second area of inquiry, certain information concerning the certification of BISCO electrical penetration seals was deleted from the report itself prior to its initial release because of concerns that disclosure of the information could compromise the N RC's ability to investigate allegations of I
w ron g doin g.
Based upon our subsequent review of the report and relevant attachments, it appears that the technical concerns bearing on this issue were substantially disclosed in Inspection Report No. 50-445/85-16,50-446/85-13, issued on April 4,1986.
(Preparation of this Inspection Report was among the matters investigated by OIA.) 'The Inspection Report, however, does not characterize the concern in terms of possible " false certifications", i.e.,
wrongdoing, by BISCO, but otherwise contains sufficient information such l
that one might reasonably infer that an investigation and/or referral of the matter could be appropriate.
A review of Attachment P to the OIA report (Interview of Johnson at 17,79-80,99-101), discloses that, as stated in the OI A report, Johnson discussed the propriety of an 01 investigation with the Region IV OI issues coordinator; the latter appears to have advised Johnson i
that there was insufficient information to then undertake an investigation but does not seem to have ruled out the possibility of initiating (one at a later time should future facts warrant the action.
Attachment P at 15-16, 18,
~
78-80,99-100) as well as a related attachment ( Attachment Q, Interview of Fox), reveal that the matter was further reviewed by the Vendor Inspection 4
Branch, IE in the context of similar issues raised by other Regions, as well as by N R R.
The OIA report and its attachments do not refer to any i
subsequent action taken by either IE or N RR to refer the matter to 01 following their reviews.
In order to determine whether there is a need to delete any information from the attachments to assure that the N RC retains the ability to effectively pursue investigations or otherwise refer matters for investigation, OI A was asked, in the context of the several pending FOI A requests and the discovery request filed in the Comanche Peak licensing proceeding, to review the attachments and to provide its views regarding the need to withhold information from public disclosure.
In addition, IE and N RR have been requested to confirm that there is no need to undertake an investigation of the BISCO matter or any other issue identified by the subject DI A investigation because of concerns of wrongdoing.
On December 22,1986, we asked OI to review that portion of the OI A report which concerned BISCO and advise whether there was any investigative reason to withhold the BISCO metter from public release.
OI has conducted the requested review and concluded that further evaluation, including perhaps a preliminary inquiry, is a p p rop riate.
01 asked that no further release of the BISCO information occur until they have their opportunity to pursue it.
It appears, from O G C's perspective, that the information originally deleted from the OIA report, as well as relevant deletions from the attachments, should continue to be withheld subject to subsequent advice from 01.
( Although the report notes that OIA is undertaking two additional investigations at Region IV, we have
e The Commissioners been informek by OI A that release of the report and attachments would not be prejudicial to its activities.
Investigative work on one of the matters is complete and the report is being drafted and neither the report nor the attachments contain information concerning the second.)
With respect to the third area of inquiry, no clear-cut violations of the N R C's j
personnel regulations, policies or procedures are apparent.
We would note, l
however, that although the report and its attachments themselves do not contain any direct information that would sustain an action before a personnel i
tribunal, certain matters suggested by these documents but not investigated l
by OIA (and ancillary to the matters that are the subject of the report) are being pursued further to determine whether actions may be warranted.
Finally, in regard to the fourth area of inquiry, because the subject matter of the OI A report has a bearing on the quality assurance aspects of the Comanche Peak facility, which is among the central issues in the licensing i
proceeding, the report has the potential for protracting the hearing process.
4 As previously mentioned, there are, at this time, a number of Freedom of 4
Information Act requests pending before the Commission requesting that the report and its attachments be released.
On December 11, 1986, the Commission released a redacted version of the report itself.
Also on this date, the staff issued a Board Notification in the Comanche peak proceeding transmitting to the Licensing Board and parties a copy of the redacted version of the report.
In connection with the licensing proceeding, the staff received a discovery request from the intervenor, C ASE, seeking production of the report and all associated documents.
(The Commission was informed of this request by memorandum from the Executive Director for Operations dated December 9,1986.)
To facilitate a response to both the F0IA req, pests and the discovery request, OI A was requested to itself review the report and attachments to determine whether, from its perspective, any deletions are appropriately made prior to release.
By memorandum dated December 19, 1986, OI A advised that it had no objection to releasing the report and all associated documentation in response to the discovery request.
To summarize the foregoing in terms of a decision on the public release of the report and its attachments, it is recommended that, subjett only to the limited deletions identified above and, upon completion of the reviews being undertaken, any additional deletions, the report and its attachments be released to the public at the earliest possible time.
Because of the nature of the issues involved, OGC has not, in this memorandum, addressed whether the OI A report has broader implications in terms of the functioning of Region IV or even more broadly, whether it raises concerns affecting other Regions, i
One additional observation is in order.
It is unclear to OGC why reliance on the Regional ~ Administrator and adherence to the N R C's longstanding procedures for handling Differing professional Opinions, as set forth in N RC Manual Chapter, N R C-4125, would not have sufficed to permit a timely and effective resolution of all issues without having the situation escalate at the
'e The Commissioners -
4 outset to the point of a full-scale OIA investigation involving charges such as harassment and intimidation.
The central issues which gave rise to this matter appear to involve differences in professional views on several matters.
00
&f.4a illiam C. Parler General Counsel cc: SECY OIA 01 ADO NRR IE
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Docket Nos.:
50-445 50-446 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FR0k:
Vincent S. Noonan, Director PWR Project Directorate #5 Division of PWR licensing-A
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION - 0FFICE OF INVESTIGATION REPORTS SYNOPSIS COMANCHE PEAK (BOARD NOTIFICATION NO.86-141 1
This Notification is being provided to the Comission in accordance with the revised Commmission's notification policy of July 6, 1984, to inform the
- Commission on all issued on the cases before the Comission.
This notification provides the synopsis of Office of Investigation (01) report nuinber 4-84-039 " Alleged Intimidation QC Inspector" and 01 report number 4-84-050 " Alleged Intimidation of TUGC0 Auditors by QC Management".
These two reports are relevant to certain instances of intimidation and harassment at Comanche Peak.
The parties to the proceeding are being notified by copy of this memorandum.
A-
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nt o nan irector Projec Direct ate #5 Division oj PWR 1.icensing-A
Enclosure:
1.
Synopris Report No. 4-84-039 2.
Synopsis Report No. 4-84-050
Contact:
Arnette Vietti-Cook (492-8525) cc: See next page 5-7 n
e cc:
P. Bloch, ASt.B W. Jordan, ASI.B K. McCollom, ASLB E. Johnson, ASI.B P. Grossman, ASt.B SECY (2)
Parties to the Proceeding See next page O
e
EECLOSURE e
SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated to determine if Brown & Root, Inc.
(B&R) Quality Control (QC) supervisors at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) improperly ordered a B&R QC inspector to' make late entry sign off's on liner plate inspection travelers using QC acceptance recorded on construction documents made years earlier. This investigation into the propriety of the QC supervisors' instructions focused specifically on how the QC supervisors allegedly ordered the QC inspector to interpret what the construction documentation represented.
During 1978 and 1979, liner plate for the spent fuel pools in Unit I,
, Unit II, and the transfer canals was under construction.
Liner plate inspection travelers were used by QC inspectors to record their QC acceptance at various hold points during construction.
During this same period of time, B&R construction procedures required the use of a nondestructive examination (NDE), which served as a request (chit) by craft employees for a QC inspection at predetermined hold points.
The QC inspectors signed off the NDE chits as well as the inspection traveler.s as a record of their inspections.
In 1983, in anticipation of the resumption of work on the liner plate, a determination was made by site managers that liner plate inspections were to become the responsibility of the non-American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) QC group. When the. liner plate inspection travelers were initially transferred from the ASME QC group to the non-ASME QC group, it was determined that some of the inspection travelers had In an effort to find a solution to the unsigned inspection hold points.
incomplete documentation, non-ASME personnel discovered the existence of j
i the NDE chits. The non-ASME QC inspectors proceeded to transfer f
information from the old five-point ASME travelers to the new eight-point non-ASME travelers. Confusion soon arose among some of the non-ASME inspectors when they were told they may have misinterpreted what inspection step the NDE chits represented. Some of the ASME inspectors recovered the eight-point non-ASME travelers which they had completed, j
and they destroyed them.
Consequently, the non-ASME QC group refused to j
accept the incomplete five-point travelers, and these travelers were
)
returned to the ASME group.
Discussions were held among the two QC inspection groups to find a solutic,n to the incomplete documentation.
Subsequently, an agreement was reached between the two groups that old NDE chits signed by QC inspectors during their original inspections in the construction of the liner plate could be used to substantiate that the QC inspections had been perfonned.
In this regard, by using the corresponding NDE chits, the unsigned lines j
on the liner plate inspection travelers could be signed by a QC inspector j
referencing a late entry. A QC inspector was assigned to conduct a t
document review of the travelers and the NDE chits; and sign off the travelers if supporting NDE chits were available.
An allegation was subs,equently made that the sign off of the inspection travelers using the NDE chits was improper because the QC inspector had not actually performed the inspections.
It was also alleged that some of Case No. 4-84-039 f
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the NDE chits might not represent the corresponding hold points.
This allegation was investigated in coordination with a representative of the l
Comanche Peak Technical Review Team (TRT).
The TRT assumed the responsibility for determining the validity of the use of the NDE chits j
for making the late entry sign offs.
During the course of the j
investigation, it was learned that two QC supervisors in charge' of the liner plate inspection traveler review may have improperly ordered the QC inspector to sign off incomplete inspection hold points whether or not there were corresponding NDE chits.
It was further developed that one of the QC supervisors threatened to make the QC inspector stay over a weekend if necessary to complete the task.
The focus of this investi-gation was changed to determine if such improper instructions were given Jo the QC inspector.
Fifteen present and fonner employees were interviewed as part of this investigation.
Five employees provided testimony regarding their recollection of how the liner plate inspection travelers and NDE chits i
had been used during 1978 and 1979. Although these employees' under-standing was not exactly the same, their recollections indicated that Category 1 on the five-point traveler had bem reserved for the fit-up and cleanliness inspection on the inside weld. The five employees' testimony indicated that the five-point liner plate inspection traveler had not contained a line for sign off on fit-up and cleanliness for the inside weld. These employees believed that the NDE chits in question had been used for fit-up and cleanliness in preparation for the initial tacking of the plates. This general understanding was also repeated by an EBASCO QC supervisor representing the utility during testimony before "the CPSES Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB).
A TUGC0 senior engineer testified he was aware that the B&R ASME super-visor in charge of transferring the travelers to the non-ASME group was attempting to use the NDE chits to complete the unsigned inspection steps on the travelers.
Two EBASCO QC specialists testified they were in the millwright shop on the evening the QC inspector received the traveler project instructions.
Both QC specialists said the QC inspector expressed concern to them about the ASME supervisors' instructions.
An EBASCO employee working for TUGC0 as a non-ASME supervisor confirmed that his inspection group had refused to accept the incomplete travelers.
This supervisor said he heard portions of the QC inspector's conversations with the ASME supervisors. This non-ASME supervisor said he heard the ASME supervisors explain to the QC inspector that the chits could be used to sign the. incomplete hold points. The non-ASME supervisor said he recalled that the QC inspector expressed confusion about these instructions.
/
The non-ASME supervisor said he recommended that the QC inspector reference l
a late entry on the travelers. The non-ASME supervisor said that one of l
his non-ASME QC inspectors represented him during the discussions between the ASME supervisors and the QC inspector assigned to complete the travelers.
Case No. 4-84-039 2
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This non-ASME QC inspector who was present during the discussion between the ASME supervisors and the QC inspector in the millwright shop I
confimed thr.t he heard one of the ASME supervisors order the QC-inspector to sign off the incomplete hold points on the travelers whether or not there were corresponding NDE chits present to substantiate that the originel inspections had been performed. This non-ASME inspector I
testified that he knew the ASME supervisor's instructions to the QC I
inspector were improper.
He added, however, that the QC inspector did not sign off traveler hold points which did not have corresponding chits.
Additional testimony confirmed that a nonconformance report (NCR) was prepared on travelers which had not been signed off due to the absence of supporting documentation.
The B&R ASME QC supervisor who was identified by the QC inspector as the
)
I one who ordered the sign off of the travelers testified that he did not I
recall being present when the ASME QC supervisor in charge of the project gave the QC inspector instructions for completing the travelers. The other B&R ASME QC supervisor responsible for the liner plate inspection travelers said he assigned the QC inspector to conduct a document review and deterinine which travelers had corresponding NDE chits that could be used for signing off the travelers by referencing a late entry. This supervisor said he instructed the QC inspector to write an NCR if corres-ponding NDE chits were not found which could substantiate that the original inspections had been performed. This supervisor denied ordering the QC inspector to sign off travelers which did not have corresponding chits, and denied saying the QC inspector would have to stay over the weekend to complete signing off the travelers if it took that long. This supervisor said that to the best of his recollection, no one else had been present at the time he instructed the QC inspector how to complete the inspecticn travelers.
The TRT prepared a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which reflects there were apparent record anomalies in the travelers which included instances of hold points being signed off improperly; however, none of these irregularities were attributed to the QC inspector who made the late entry sign offs on the travelers.
The weight of the testimony obtained during the OI investigation indicates the independence and organizational freedom of the QC inspector was interfered with by at least one of the QC supervisors.
Further, if the QC inspector had succumbed to the improper order and implied threat, inspection records would have been falsified. The QC supervisors' actions appeared to have been solely based on production demands.
e Case No. 4-84-039 3
ENCLOSURE SYN 0PSIS In early 1983, a confrontation occurred at the Comanche Peak Steact Electric Station (CPSES) site Quality Assurance (QA) audit office between the site Quality Control (QC) supervisor and members of two corporate QA j
audit groups.
The site QC supervisor mistakenly believed that one of the QA auditors with whom he had a continuing personality conflict had directed craf t personnel to remove a weld on a support in contravention j
to an existing agreement between QA and QC management.
Another QA auditor, the one actually involved in identifying the suspect weld, explained to the QC supervisor that craft personnel had initiated the issuance of an item removal notice for the weld of their own volition.
Subsequent to the auditor's explanation, the site QC supervisor made a statement to the auditors in which he referenced potential physical or political harm to the auditors as related to their audit activities.
The circumstances of the incident were investigated by utility staff personnel. A report was issued in which the staff concluded that although i
the QC superviscr's behavior was improper, none of the auditors had been intimidated.
1 In November 1984, one of the QA auditors, who had been present during the 1983 confrontation in the audit office, made an allegation to the NRC l
that the site QC supervisor had threatened and attempted to intimidate j
the QA auditors. A copy of the utility's investigative report on the l
incident was reviewed by a representative of the NRC Office of Investiga-l tions (01).
The utility staff investigators were also interviewed, and
{
they reported that the notes from their interviews with the witnesses had been destroyed following the issuance of the report in consideration of the confidentiality they had granted the employees. An 01 investigation was initiated.
In addition to the interview of the site QC supervisor accused of intimi-
)
dation, five employees who were present in the QA audit office when the l
i incident occurred were interviewed. None of the QA auditors reported evidence of discrimination or any adverse change in their work conditions I
as a result of this incident. One witness did not recall the site QC supervisor making a statement related to physical or political harm. The remaining four witnesses recalled that the QC supervisor had made the statement. Two of the four said they did not believe the QC supervisor
)
had intended to intimidate the auditors, nor did they believe any of the j
auditors had been intimidated. The remaining two witnesses concluded the r
the site QC supervisor's statement regarding " political" hann constituted a threat which was intended to adversely influence the auditors' freedom to conduct audits and report findings.
The site QC supervisor declined to be interviewed citing the fact that I
his testimony had already been taken in a deposition for the CPSES Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. A review of the deposition confirined that l -
the site QC supervisor'had made the statement regarding physical and i
political harm. The site QC supervisor said that his remarks had been addressed to one auditor only. The site QC supervisor said his reference I
I to physical harm was an unfortunate statement and was unintentional. The I
Case No. 4-84-050 l
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site QC supervisor said he intended to convey in his reference to political harm that he was prepared to report the auditor's performance (invalid findings) to his QA supervisors if necessary.
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