ML20244D678
| ML20244D678 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1989 |
| From: | Bisson J, Callendrello A, Littlefield P ABB IMPELL CORP. (FORMERLY IMPELL CORP.), PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244D592 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8904240074 | |
| Download: ML20244D678 (95) | |
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'89 APR 20 PS :27 April 18, 1989 UNITED STATES-OF! AMERICA GUG8U ff j ' :
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY bO5MMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
)
In the Matter of
)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW' HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
50-444-OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
(Off-site Emergency
)
Planning Issues)
)
APPLICANTS' REBUTTAL TESTIMONY NO. 26 (PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY NHY ORO DURING THE. EXERCISE).
Panel Members:' Joseph Bisson, Emergency Planner, Impell Corporation Anthony M.
Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Preparedness Licensing, New Hampshire Yankee Peter Littlefield, Manager, Radiological Engineering Group, Yankee Atomic Electric company h
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l TABLE OF CONTENTS l
I.
INTRODUCTION 1
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1 II.
CONCEPT OF PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONMAKING 1
A.
Purpose of Protective Actions 1
B.
-Range of Protective Actions Provided in SPMC 3
III. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISICNMAKING 3
A.
Protective Action Decision Process in the SPMC 3
1.
Plume Exposure PAR Decision Criteria 3
a.
PAR Initiated by Emergency 1
Classification Level or Plant Conditions 3
i 1)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY 5
2)
GENERAL EMERGENCY 7
b.
PAR Initiated by Dose Projections 11 1)
Deposition Doses 12 2)
(Cloud) Whole Body Dose Reduction Factor 12 3)
Thyroid Shelter Formula 14 4)
Key Hole Concept 15 B.
Coordination of Protective Action Recommendations With Other Response 0"ganizations 17 1.
Federal Guidance and Decision Criteria 17
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2.
Procedurally Required Interactions 19 3.
Joint Location of Emergency Facilities 21
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i 4.
Agreement to Coordinate Emergency I
Response Activities.
21 5.
Coordination During the Exercise 22 C.
Protective Action Decisionmaking Process q
During the Exercise 23 i
1.
Actions at the ALERT Classification.
24 2.
Actions at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY 28 3.
Actions at the GENERAL EMERGENCY 29
-l a.
The Initial PAR 30 b.
D.
Independent Assessment by NHY ORO 32 1
E.
Assistance Provided to Homebound Handicapped Individual Who could Not Evacuate During Exercise.
33 F.
By-Pass Route Around EPZ 35 G.
METPAC Was Utilized Correctly 36 I
H.
Use Of ETEs In The SPMC 40 Attachment A:
NUREG-0654, Pages 9 and 16 Attachment B:
NUREG-0654, Appendix'l at Page 1-16 Attachment C:
Plume Exposure EPZ Map i
Attachment D:
Massachusetts Attorney General's Answer to NRC Staff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Pages 4 and 5 Attachment E:
CERP, Appendix 3, Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Fixed Nuclear Facilities, Section A2.5 Attachment F:
NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Appendix 1, Page 1-17
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I Attachment G:
SPMC,-Appendix C) Letter of Agreement Between SONH and NHY-Representing Both the Emergency and Offsite Response Organization Attachment H:
NHY Offsite Response Director's Chronological Log at Page 5 Attachment I:
NHY Offsite Response Director's Chronological Event Log at Page 13 Attachment J:
EBS Message Announcing the Initial PAR for ERPAs B and E Attachment K:
IP 2.5, Attachment L:
EBS Message Announcing the Revised PAR for ERPA E Attachment M:
Special Vehicle Dispatch Form Attachment N:
ORO' Mini-scenario Message 8.2-20d :
Amesbury.Special' Population Liaison's Chronological Event Log Attachment P:
NHY ORO News Release No. 8 Attachment Q:
Diagram of Durham Access Control Post IV-1
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m I.
INTRODUCTION This testimony was developed in response to the assertions made by the Joint Interveners that the protective action decision criteria in the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC) are vague and not coordinated with those set forth in the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP)and that the New Hampshire Yankee (NHY) Offsite Response Organization (ORO) failed to make appropriate protective action decisions independent of the licensee during the 1988 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
(NRC) Graded Exercise.
Specifically, it is the Applicants' response to contentions JI-18F, JI-20 (partial), JI-23, MAG EX-11 Bases A, B(1), B(3), B(5), B(6) and B(7), and MAG EX-19 Bases A and D.
II.
CONCEPT OF PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONMAKING A.
Purpose of Protective Actions The SPMC is based on the planning guidance of NUREG-0654, which states at page 6:
"The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate lifesaving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). "
The SPMC is predicated on the understanding that emergency planning for a nuclear plant is not required to be l L________
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designed to address any particular accident sequence or a
" worst case accident."
NUREG-0654 states further at page 6:
"No specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in degree and nature."
The purpose of the SPMC is consistent with this guidance in that:
"A prompt coordinated response is desirable to achieve the maximum feasible dose reduction under the circumstances associated with a radiological release from Seabrook Station." (SPMC, page 1.1-1).
The protective action decision criteria of the SPMC take l
into consideration emergency classification levels, plant conditions, evacuation times, dose reduction factors, and other conditions that may exist at the tine of an accident.
f 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) directs that emergency plans include l
guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency that are consistent with federal guidance.
The cited federal guidance has been identified in NUREG-0654 at J.9 as the recommendations of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (EPA-520/1-75-001) for plume exposure pathway decisions and the recommendations of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (43 FR 58790) for ingestion exposure pathway decisions.
The SPMC relies on both the EPA and FDA guidance as the basis for the decision criteria for protective actions.
SPMC, Section 3.4.1. - _ _ _ _ -
- .t-G B.
Range of Protective Actions Provided in SPMC.
The SPMC provides for and relies upon a range of protective actions which includes sheltering, evacuation and beach closure (SPMC, Section 3.4.2.A), access control (SPMC, Section 3.6.5), and temporary relocation of the general public-(SPMC, Section 3.9.3).
This range of protective-actions has been developed for the Massachusetts portion of I
the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) as required i
by 10 CFR.50. 47 (b) (10).
III. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISIONMAKING A.
Protective Action Decision Process in the SPMC l
J 1.
Plume Exposure PAR Decision Criteria j
The SPMC provides specific criteria for determining protective action strategies during an emergency.
The criteria are emergency classifications, in-plant conditions, meteorological conditions, dose projections, field I
measurements and sample analyses.
(SPMC, section 3.4.2, Table 3.4-1, Table 3.4-2, Table 3.4-3, Table 3.9-1, and IP 2.5.)
j a.
PAR Initiated by Emergency Classification Level or Plant Conditions Four emergency classification levels have been established by the NRC and examples of initiating conditions for each are provided by Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654.
1 l
r A notification of UNUSUAL EVENT classification indicates that events are either in progress or have occurred which involve a potential degradation of the level of safety i
of the plant.
No releases of radioactive material requiring offs!.te response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs; An ALERT classification indicates events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual.or l
1 potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels; A SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification indicates events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.
Any releases are not expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary; A GENERAL EMERGENCY classification indicates events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with the
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i potential for loss of containment integrity.
Any releases l
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can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite beyond the site boundary.
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j The emergency classification is det ermined and declared I
by Seabrook Station ERO personnel.
Consistent with NUREG-0654, the SPMC provides for actions to be recommended to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts upon the declaration of two emergency classifications, SITE AREA and GENERAL EMERGENCY.
1)
SITE AREA EMERGENCY a)
Seasonal Populations The SPMC recognizes that summer transients at the beach areas represent a special population and reauire separate consideration.
Special consideration is given to the general public at the beach areas within the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ by the provision for a precautionary beach closure recommendation at a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SPMC, Sections 3.4.2.A and 3.6.1.E).
The ORO will, between May 15 and September 15, automatically recommend to Massachusetts officials the closure of beaches as a precautionary action.
(SPMC, IP.2.5.)
This recommendation is made regardless of the size of the beach population.
Therefore, there is no need to perform an assessment of the beach population beforehand.
The intent of this action is early removal of the transient beach population from the immediate beach area.
The early closure of the Massachusetts beach areas is also intended to alleviate traffic congestion at these areas in the event that evacuation is ordered at a later time..
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i The State of New Hampshire may choose to close New Hampshire beaches between Route 286 to the south of Seabrook j
Station and Great Boars Head to the north at the ALERT 1
classification as demonstrated during the Exercise.
This j
recommendation is directed primarily at the beaches within i
two miles of Seabrock Station.
Route 286 and Great Boars j
Head are used to designate the south and north boundaries for l
1 the beach closure recommendations because they are convenient j
landmarks, and although the beach area extends north to about 2.25 miles, the major portion (i.e. most populated during the summer) is within a 2-elle radius.
The recommendation to close Massachusetts beaches is not made at an ALERT classification because the distance from Seabrook Station to the closest-Massachusetts beach areas is greater than two q
miles.
Actions for areas at distances greater than two miles from the site are not considered appropriate at the ALERT classification.
In this regard, the SPMC is consistent with i
the planning in the NHRERP, which includes provisions directed at closing New Hampshire beaches within approximately a two mile radius at the ALERT classification and only under lintited circumstances (NHRERP, Vol. 4A, Appendix U), but does not provide for closing New Hampshire beaches beyond this area.
At a SITE AREA EMERGENCY, the NHY ORO will, between May 15 and September 15, recommend a precautionary closure of Parker River National Wildlife Refuge, Plum Island Beach, l
Salisbury Beach and ocean access (SPMC, IP 2. 5, step 5.2.1.b).
b)
General Public Protective actions for the general public would not be required at the declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
At the i
SITE AREA EMERGENCY any radioactive releases are not expected l
to exceed EPA protective action guidelines except near the site boundary.
The distance from Seabrook Station to the l
closest point on the Massachusetts border is greater than two miles.
This planning in regard to protective actions is also consistent with the NHRERP.
2)
GENERAL EMERGENCY a)
Seasonal Populations At a GENERAL EMERGENCY, the NHY ORO will recommend beach closure (if not previously recommended) regardless of other PAR (s) that may be issued for the general public.
IP 2.5 will reflect in the next revision of the SPMC that the beach closure recommendation is to be made at a GENERAL EMERGENCY regardless of the time of year.
Two general public PARS and associated beach actions are:
If a sheltering PAR is issued for the general public, the Massachusetts beaches within the EPZ are closed and the transier,t beach population without access to indoor locations (i.e., day trippers) leave the area, while the _ _ _
. general public (i.e., residents and transients with access to an indoor location) shelters; If an evacuation PAR is issued, the transient beach population evacuates along with the general public.
This approach to protective actions for beach transients as a special population is consistent with NRC regulations and FEMA /NRC guidance since sheltering for all population f
groups is not required by either 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10) or NUREG-0654.
i The beach population and the general public'will be l
notified of beach closure through the Vehicular Alert and Notification System (VANS) and Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) by the NHY ORO upon receipt of authorization to do so from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (SPMC, Section j
3.6.1E).
Statements of the beach closure are included in prescripted EBS messages.
The EBS messages will advise the transient beach population to leave the beach area and provide instructions for the resident population to refer to i
the public information calendar.
b)
General Public Protective actions such as shelter or evacuation for members of the general public in the Massachusetts portion of the EPZ are considered upon declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY.
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Attachments 1 and 2 of IP 2.5 will be used to determine protective action recommendations for cne general public based on in-containment radiation levels.
The in-containment radiation level, as measured by the Post LOCA or Haten monitors, and the wind direction determine which i
Massachusetts communities are to be affected by a shelter or evacuation recommendation.
If the Post LOCA monitor indicates that in-containment radiation levels are less than 5,000 R/hr, and the wind direction is towards Massachusetts (i.e., from 3040 0
to 101 ), the NHY ORO will recommend shelter for Amesbury and Salisbury in addition to beach closure (if not recommended previously).
If the wind direction is towards New Hampshire, the NHY ORO will recommend beach closure only.
l If the Post LOCA monitor indicates that in-containment radiation levels are bet. ween 5,000 and 10,000 i
R/hr and the wind direction is towards Massachusetts, the NHY ORO will recommend evacuation fe" Amesbury and Salisbury (including Salisbury Beach), shelter for the other Massachusetts EPZ communities, and closure of Plum Island Beach and Parker River National Wildlife Refuge (if not recommended previously).
If the wind is towards New Hampshire, the NHY ORO will recommend shelter for all six Massachusetts communities in addition to beach closure.
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If the Post LOCA monitor indicates that i
incontainment radiation levels 6xceed 10,000 R/hr,-
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and the wind direction is towards Massachusetts,
{
the NHY ORO will recommend evacuation of all six Massachusetts communities.
If the wind direction l
l is towards New Hampshire, the NHY ORO will recommend evacuation for Amesbury and Salisbury (including Salisbury Beach), shelter for tha remaining four Massachusetts EPZ communities, and closure of Plum Island Beach and Parker River National Wildlife Refuge (if not recommended I
previously).
The SPMC uses in-containment radiation levels, as indicated by the Post LOCA and Hatch monitors, to assess the potential for a release of large amounts of radioactivity based on the guidance in NUREG-0654 at page 1-17 and IE Information Notice No. 83-28:
Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations For General Emergencies.
The in-containment radiation level is a measurable and observable parameter that can be used to assess the status of core and in-containment radiation conditions.
Its use is intended to provide NHY ORO decisionmakers with a basis for formulating PARS at a GENERAL l
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EMERGENCY prior to a release.
Moreover, the SPMC's use of in-containment radiation level as indicated by the Post LOCA and Hatch monitors promotes consistency with PAR development I - ___
_ - -. _ _ _ _ _ _ = _
U by New Hampshire decisionmakers (NHRERP, Vol. 4A, Appendix U).
Other plant conditions are evaluated by Seabrook Station ERO personnel and may influence the PAR made to the NHY ORO.
b.
PAR Initiated by Dose Projections While initial protective actions will be recommended based on in-containment radiological conditions, data regarding actual or projected releases of radiation will be used to refine protective actions to ensure the greatest dose f
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savings (SPMC, IP 2.5 at 5.2.2, 5.2.5 and 5.3.1C).
- However, previously recommended evacuations underway would not he rescinded for the affected areas.
The calculation which compares the dose savings of i
shelter and evacuation is performed via the PAR Worksheet (SPMC, IP 2.5, Attachment 3).
This worksheet incorporates a l
i three step process in the dose savings analysis.
Step 1.
The projected dose is calculated assuming no j
protective actions are taken.
If the EPA l
Protective Action Guides (PAGs) are not t
exceeded then no protective actions are required.
If the EPA PAGs are exceeded then; Step 2.
the projected dose is calculated twice; once assuming an evacuation and once assuming sheltering; Step 3.
the shelter and evacuation doses are compared to see which action provides the lower dose.
The protective action that results in the lower dose is then selected. I
1)
Deposition Doses The EPA PAGs are specific for radiation' exposure received directly from the airborne plume (EPA-520/1-75-001,
-Chapter 2).
The intent of the EPA PAGs is to initiate y
protective action for direct whole body and inhalation (thyroid) exposure resulting from plume passage.
The EPA considers whole bcdy axposures from deposited material to be a long term dose, and maintains that, "It is not practical to consider the long term doses as part of the plume'PAGs" (EPA-l s
520/1-75-001, Appendix C).
Accordingly, the SPMC does not include the whole body dose contributions from ground, automobile or skin deposition in its decision whether to f
shelter or evacuate in the plume exposure pathway because it
[
has adopted the EPA guidance.
2)
(Cloud) thole Body Dose Reduction Factor During the comparison of the dose savings from evacuation and sheltering, a 0.9 cloud dose reduction factor, which is i
identical to that used in NHRERP, is used for calculating l
shelter doses.
The 0.9 dose reduction factor is applied to all housing within the ERPAs to facilitate the implementation f
of a single plume exposure PAR for the ERPA.
Since PARS are applied uniformly to Massachusetts communities within an ERPA (SPMC, Section 3.4.2.A), the formulation of PARS considers only one dose reduction factor.
The SPMC adopted its 0.9 dose reduction factor from "Public Protection Strategies for l l
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I Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents:
Sheltering Concepts with Existing Public and Private Structures" SAND 77-1725.
Also, based on the documents, Structure Shielding From Cloud and Fallout Gamma Ray Sources for Assessing the s
Consequences of Reactor Accidents, EG&G, Inc., Las Vegas, Nevada, EGG-1183-1670 (1975), and Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents:
Sheltering Concepts With Existing Public and Private Shelters by Aldrich, es al., February 1978, and their analysis of.
typical structures to be found in the Northeast region of the United States, Seabrook Station EPZ structures have a cloud dose reduction factor of at least 0.9; and this is, i
therefore, a reasonable dose reduction factor to be assumed i
by the SPMC.
The 1970 U.S. Housing Census cited by Interveners f
specifies only " year-round housing units" throughout the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the statistics may, in fact, be applicable to the year-round housing in the six Massachusetts communities within the 10-mile EPZ.
- However, i
there is a considerable number of seasonal housing units j
without basements in these communities, particularly in Salisbury, Newburyport and Newbury, which are considered and factored into the PAR decisionmaking criteria.
Additionally, the statistics cited by the Interveners indicate that a significant portion (approximately 7%) of the year-round -
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e housing units in e six Massachusetts EPZ communities do not have basements.
.4ese types of housing afford less protection than year-round housing units with basements.
3 I
Results from a study conducted by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation indicate that 52 percent of the houses in the Salisbury and Plum Island (Newburyport and Newbury) beach areas have no basements and are of wood frame l
construction.
When this statistic is considered together with the 7% value for year-round housing without basements, the use of a 0.9 dose reduction factor is appropriate.
{
l 3)
Thyroid Shelter Formula The formula used in the SPMC to determine a sheltered thyroid dose is a function of the duration of a radioactive plume and is intended to provide an estimate of the effectiveness of sheltering as a protective action in situations where the thyroid dose is. the controlling element.
The air exchange rate assumed by.'the formula is two exchanges j
per hour.
In addition, the rate of air exchange is consistent with those cited by the EPA for seasonal structures (EPA-520/1-78-001A at Table 2).
The thyroid sheltering formula is applied to all housing units within the ERPAs to facilitate the implementation of a single plume exposure PAR for the ERPA.
Since PARS are unifcrmly applied to the Massachusetts communities within an l
ERPA (SPMC, section 3.4.2.A), the formula of PARS considers l
only one rate of air exchange.
l Sheltering provides inhalation dose protection only for a short period of time and, generally, becomes ineffective
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l after two hours (EPA-520/1-75-001 at page 1.38).
The formula used in the SPMC is consistent with the EPA guidance in that it indicates that the effectiveness of sheltering decreases
)
as the plume duration increases.
l 4)
Key Hole Concept The SPMC directs decisionmakers to recommend protective actions by Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) (SPMC, Section 3.4.2 at 3.4-4), not sectors (22.5 degree segments).
The SPMC identifies ERPAs for evacuation using a response area shaped approximately like a keyhole.
Protective actions for the keyhole response area would include a 360 degree region centered on the power plant, plus an extended downwind region.
This approach is consistent with the recommendations in NUREG-0654 at pages 9 and 16 (Attachment A hereto).
3 In accordance with the guidance provided in NUREG-0654, Appendix 1 at page 1-16 (Attachment B hereto), IP 2.5 at Attachments 1, 2 and 3 identifies protective actions for Massachusetts communities.
These PARS are based upon two keyhole sizes, a two-mile 360 degree radial distance plus an extended downwind area to five miles, and a five mile 360 __
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l degree radial distance plus an extended downwind area to ten l
miles.
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The six Massachusetts communities within the 10 mile EPZ
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1 have been grouped into two ERPAs (see Attachment C hereto).
One, ERPA B, includes the Massachusetts communities which are i
completely or partially within a five mile radius fr'-
l Seabrook Station:
Amesbury and Salisbury.
The other, ERPA
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E, includes the Massachusetts communities which are outside a
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1 five mile radius:
Newburyport, Newbury, West Newbury and 1
i Merrimac.
Under the SPMC, implementation of a PAR is on an ERPA basis (SPMC at 3.4-4).
This means that if a protective action is recommended for the Massachusetts area between 2 and 5 miles of Seabrook Station, it will apply to all of Amesbury and Salisbury, rather than partially by sectors.
Similarly, if a protective action is recommended beyond 5 miles it will be applied uniformly to all of the remaining four Massachusetts EPZ communities.
(SPMC, IP 2.5 at Attachments 1, 2 and 3).
This planning also is consistent with the philosophy used for the development of Seabrook Station's evacuation time estimates (ETEs).
(NHRERP, Vol. 6)
The effects of wind shifts, sea breezes, or other I
uncertainties in wind direction are accounted for by the I
keyhole approach.
In the event that windshift or sea breeze conditions exist, the boundaries of the initial response area
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can be expanded.
Should a windshift occur, its first_ impact would be on the area close to the power plant in the new wind direction.
However, that area would be included in the 360-degree region of the original keyhole.
Post-windshift response efforts can then be focused on the previously unaffected area in the downwind region outside the 360-degree region.
Attachments 1 and 2 of IP 2.5 are Massachusetts-specific, representing only the Massachusetts portion of the total keyhole area.
These attachments ar6 consistent with the decision flowcharts used by decisionmakers for Seabrook Station and the State of New Hampshire.
B.
Coordination of Protective Action Recommendations.
With Other Response Organizations Coordination of the decision criteria in the SPMC with those set forth in the NHRERP is achieved through the use of the same criteria and federal guidance, procedurally required interactions, joint location of emergency facilities', and a written agreement between NHY ORO, State of New Hampshire and Seabrook Station Emergency Response' Organization (ERO) to coordinate emergency response activities.
1.
Federal Guidance and Decision Criteria I
As required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47, the Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) decision criteria included in the SPMC l
and the NHRERP are consistent with federal guidance.
The federal guidance adopted for use is that which is recommended q --- ------ A
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by NUREG-0654, J.9; namely, the EPA PAGs for plume exposure
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i pathway decisions (EPA-520/1-75-001), and the FDA guidance j
for ingestion exposure pathway decisions (43 FR 58790).
In I
addition, both plans use the draft EPA relocation guidelines (June, 1986) for post-plume decisions.
The decision process in the SPMC and NHRERP also facilitate PAR coordination with the Commonwealth's decisionmakers because the plan which the Commonwealth has i
stated it will rely upon during an emergency (Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan or CERP) uses the same EPA guidance for plume exposure PARS and the FDA guidance for ingestion pathway PARS.
(Massachusetts Attorney General's Answers to 1
NRC Staff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents at pages 4 and 5, Attachment D l
hereto).
The CERP, Appendix 3, Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Fixed Nuclear Facilities, Section A2.5 (Attachment E hereto) incorporates the EPA PAGs (EPA 520/1-75-001) as a basis for formulating plume exposure pathway PARS and the FDA guidance (43 FR 58790) as a basis for formulating PARS for the ingestion pathway.
Additionally, the FDA guidance is included in Nuclear Incident Advisory Team (NIAT) Handbook and the Massachusetts Ingestion Exposure Pathway Plan.
Therefore, Massachusetts decisionmakers are already familiar with the decision criteria in the SPMC and NHRERP. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - - -
e In addition to decision criteria based on federal guidance, the SPMC and NHRERP provide for protective action l
l recommendations at a GENERAL EMERGENCY based on plant.
' conditions and wind direction.
These actions. range from beach closing recommendations to shelter and evacuation recommendations.
Moreover, both plans used the same criteria (i.e., radiation levels as indicated by Post-LOCA or Hatch monitors) to determine how far a shelter or evacuation PAR should extend.
The response area defined by PARS developed in this manner follow the key-hole concept described in i
Section III.A.2 supra.
2.
Procedurally Required Interactions Specific interactions between key personnel in NHY ORO and the State of New Hampshire are directed in both the SPMC and the NHRERP to assure the coordination of PAPS.
In the SPMC for example, the NHY Offsite,Re.sponse Director is J
required procedurally to coordina'e Massachusetts approved t
offsite response activities with'the State of New Hampshire 1
(IP 1.1 at Attachment 3), including response actions on I
l proposed plume exposure PARS (IP 2.5 at 5.1.5), and ingestion l
1 pathway PARS (IP 2.6 at 5.1.4).
While the procedures of the NHY Offsite Response Director direct t!;a coordination of protective action recommend'ations with the State of New Hampshire (IP 2.5 at step 5.1.6), there is no requirement that the concurrence of I {IE
i
>y New Hampshire be obtained prior to the implementation of a PAR in Massachusetts.
Therefore,. delays in making offsite 1
PARS due to coordination with New Hampshire will not occur.
The only authorization required.by NHY ORO is-that of the
' Commonwealth of-Massachusetts.
In the NHRERP, the New Hampshire Office of Emergency a
Management (NHOEM) is required procedurally to coordinate the activation of sirens and the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) with the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and NHY ORO (Vol.
4 at pg. 3-4), to ensure that Massachusetts and NHY ORO are aware of precautionary actions planned by New Hampshire (Vol.
4 at pg. 3-3), and to notify Massachusetts and NHY ORO of changes (Vol. 4 at pg. 3-5).
PARS which are developed and issued under the SPMC and NHRERP may not be identical for all situations because the I
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two plans deal with different portions of Seabrook Station's EPZ that may be subject to different radiological conditions' I
due to wind direction and distance from Seabrook Station.
l However, even if differing PARS are recommended for different portions of the EPZ, it does not mean that the PARS are l
" conflicting."
Rather, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (at page 9, Attachment A hereto, and Appendix 1 at page 1-17, Attachment F hereto) anticipates different protective actions for j
different portions of the EPZ.
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3.
Joint Location of Emergency Facilities The NHY offsite Response Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the State of New Hampshire Incident Field Office (IFO) are located at the Newington Station facility on Gosling Road in Newington, NH.
This facility also houses the Seabrook Station Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
The joint location of the three emergency facilities allows for the expeditious exchange of information regarding the emergency conditions and facilitates the coordination of emergency response efforts and recommendation of protective actions.
The SPMC provides two diagrams (Figures 5.2-1 and 5.2-2) showing the location of each emergency response facility inside the Newington Station.
)
4.
Agreement to Coordinate Emergency Response Activities The three emergency response organizations (i.e.,
NHY ORO, Seabrook Station ERO and State of New Hampshire) have l
committed in writing to coordinate response activities during an emergency (SPMC, Appendix C, Letter of Agreement Attachment G hereto).
The Letter of Agreement specifically provides that the NHY ORO and State of New Hampshire will coordinate evaluation and implementation of precautionary actions for special populations, share and exchange all available data to facilitate a rapid and accurate evaluation of the emergency, coordinate notification of the public by )
l 6-the public notification system, EBS, news releases and rumor control activities, and share and review field data and air sample analyses.
Moreover, the agreement further provides that the State of New Hampshire and the NHY ORO will use the EOF Coordinator as the point of contact for radiological assessments and protective action recommendation discussions thereby ensuring that each organization uses the latest available data and that each understands the basis for each other's PARS.
5.
Coordination During the Exercise l
The ability of the NHY ORO to effectively coordinate emergency response activities related to PARS has been successfully demonstrated during the Exercise.
During the i
Exercise, decisions by the NHY ORO were coordinated with the i
Seabrook Station ERO and State of New Hampshire during l
-i briefings held in Seabrook Station's EOF at approximately half-hour intervals.
Moreover, during the exercise the NHY Offsite Response Director coordinated (via telephone) emergency activities such as PARS, siren activation and EBS messages with the Director of NHOEM and Massachusetts i
Governor's Representative A (simulated by the FEMA Control Cell).
FEMA stated in its exercise report at Objective No. 3 l
that protective action decisions and implementation of these i
decisions by the NHY ORO were coordinated effectively with
)
, j 1
s J
i all appropriate organizations (FEMA Exercise Report, Applicants' Exhibit 43F, at page 211 of 428).
Although the SPMC makes provisions to accommodate l
Massachusetts emergency response personnel at the NHY Offsite Response EOC (SPMC at Figure 5.2-2), the current policy of the Governor of Massachusetts (and local municipal q
governments)-regarding emergency planning.for Seabrook 1
Station has prevented Massachusetts personnel from participating in training, drills and exercises since 1986.
However, the roles of Massachusetts state and local officials i
have been simulated by control cells (i.e., NHY personnel and/or FEMA) during drills and exercises, and NHY ORO personnel interacted with the simulated officials as they would with Massachusetts officials during a real emergency.
In addition, there is also a well-established relationship between the NHOEM and the Commonwealth.
There have been joint training sessions and exercises involving the NHY ORO, the State of New Hampshire, and Seabrook Station ERO during 1
which personnel for the three emergency organizations have become familiar with the planning documents and their respective working arrangements.
C.
Protective Action Decisionmaking Process During the Exercise Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 18 (School Protective Actions) addresses the issues raised by Interveners I
- i
pertaining to Massachusetts school protective action
-recommendations and their implementation.
[
1.
Actions at the ALERT Classification During the June 28-29, 1988 Exercise, the protective action decisionmaking process for the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook Station EPZ began as NHY ORO decisionmakers reported to the NHY Offsite Response EOC following the initial notification to the NHY Offsite Response EOC Contact at 0916 that an ALERT had been declared at 0909 at Seabrook Station.
NHY ORO responders were notified of the emergency at Seabrook Station through the activation of MELITA, an automatic callout system, at 0920.
At 0930, the NHY Offsite' Response Director called the NHY Offsite Response EOC Contact from Seabrook Station to verify the emergency and at 0934, called the Seabrook Station Control Room for a briefing on the emergency conditions and obta'ined a. telephone number for the Massachusetts Department'of Public Health (MDPH) Duty Officer in accordance with IP 2.l'4.
Initial contact between NHY ORO and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts occurred before the NHY Offsite Response Director left Seabrook Station for
+
the NHY Offsite Response EOC when the NHY Offsite Response Director called MDPH Duty Officer (simulated by the FEMA Control Cell) to provide a briefing of the emergency.
At 0938, the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Support Liaison arrived at the NHY Offsite Response EOC and l
1 i
assumed the role of the NHY Offsite Response Director.
The 1
Assistant Offsite Response Director, Re'sponse Implementation arrived at the NHY Offsite Response EOC at 0947, was briefed on emergency events, and began carrying out his emergency functions in accordance with IP 1.1.
At 0951, the NHY Offsite Response Director informed the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Support liaison via telephone that he was enroute to the NHY Offsite Response EOC.
After that i
telephone conversation, the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Support Liaison met with Seabrook Station Response Manager at the EOF to receive an update on emergency events.
While acting as the NHY Offsite Response Director, the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Support Liaison established initial contact with Massachusetts Governor's Representative A (simulated by the FEMA Control Cell) at 1001, provided a status of the emergency to Governor's Representative A, and reviewed the legal authority checklist in accordance with IP 2.14.
Subsequent to the contact with Governor's Representative A, the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Support Liaison, established initial communications
=
with the Director of NHOEM at 1014.
The NHY Offsite Response Director arrived at the NHY Offsite Response EOC at 1019, was immediately briefed by the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Support Liaison and assumed his emergency role.
At 1035, the NHY Offsite l 1 i
Response Director contacted Seabrook Station's Response Manager to-provide information regarding the activation
-i status of the NHY Offsite Response EOC and to obtain a status i
of plant conditions.
At 1039, the Director of NHOEM called
]
the NHY offsite Response Director to inform him of that State's intent to issue a news release at 1100 announcing the closure of Hampton Beach and Seabrook Beach.
The details behind this precautionary action on the part of New Hampshire are provided in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 25 (New Hampshire Exercise Performance).
I By 1040 the principal NHY ORO decisionmakers had reported to the NHY Offsite Response EOC in Newington.
These were the NHY Offsite Response Director, both Assistant Offsite Response Directors, Radiological Health Advisor and Technical Advisor.
Other NHY ORO responders also reported to the NHY Offsite Response EOC by this time and were supporting emergency functions.
The NHY Offsite Response Director declared the facility operational at 1043.
Governor's Representative A was advised of New Hampshire's precautionary action to close the beaches by the NHY Offsite Response Director at 1055.
At 1104, Governor's Representative A placed a telephone call regarding closure of Massachusetts beaches to the NHY offsite Response Director.
During that conversation, the NHY Offsite Response Director stated that closure of Massachusetts beaches at an ALERT was l
y i
)
l not necessary because the beaches were beyond two miles from i
the plant (NHY offsite Response Director's Chronological l
Event Log at page 5, Attachment H hereto).
This response by the NHY Offsite Response Director has been inappropriately viewed by the Joint Interveners as NHY ORO " actively" discouraging Governor's Representative A from making that decision on his.own and also as a " refusal" to consider precautionary beach closure at the ALERT on NHY ORO's part.
The NHY Offsite Response Director was acting in accordance with his procedures, IP 1.1 and IP 2.5, neither of which direct the recommendation of beach closure at an ALERT classification.
Further, there was no information available to NHY ORO during the Exercise that warranted recommending beach closure at the~ ALERT classification.
Although the initiating event for the ALERT classification during the Exercise was high activity in the Reactor Coolant System, there was no indication at the time for a potential
< escalation to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
Moreover, the initiating event for the SITE AREA EMERGENCY itself was not related to the event which caused the ALERT, nor was'it predictable (i.e., an oxygen bottle that fell and damaged an emergency pump).
The actions taken by NHY ORO regarding beac'h closure at the ALERT were consistent with those taken by the State of New Hampshire because the New Hampshire precautionary closure _
l l
was directed at the beaches within 2 miles of Seabrook l
i Station.
See Section III. A.1.a (1) (a).
The details of New
(
Hampshire's precautionary beach recommendations are provided in Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 25 (New Hampshire Exercise Performance).
All of the beaches in the i
Massachusetts portion of the EPZ are beyond 2 miles.
2.
Actions at the SITE AREA EMERGENCY NHY ORO received notification at 1151 that a SITE AREA EMERGENCY had been declared at Seabrook Station.
Governor's Representative A was advised by NHY ORO of the escalation of the emergency at 1155.
During that same telephone conversation, NHY ORO recommended closure of Salisbury and Plum Island beaches and Parker River National Wildlife Refuge.
At 1210, Governor's Representative A authorized NHY ORO to issue the precautionary PAR for beach closure.
The EBS message announcing the closure of the Massachusetts beaches and Parker River National Wildlife Refuge was broadcast simultaneously with the sounding of the sirens at 1222.
After the precautionary PAR was issued, NHY ORO assessment personnel continued to collect and evaluste data from the Seabrook Station ERO.
At 1325, a meeting of NHY ORO decisionmakers was held during which school children, the priority of response actions for schools and the potential for a radioactive release were discussed (NHY Offsite Response Director's Chronological Event Log at page 13, _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _
L le Ja" I
I l
fAttachment I hereto) indicating that NHY ORO was engaged in an independent assessment of the emergency.
3.
Actions at the GENERAL EMERGENCY Seabrook Station ERO declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY at l
1332.
While no release was inLprogress, the in-containment radiation: levels in excess of 10,000 R/ hour led to an i
immediate protective action recommendation by the Seabrook Station ERO.of-evacuation within a 5-mile radius of the plant and to 10 m'iles in downwind sectors (i.e., evacuation of Seabrook, Hampton Falls, Hampton, Kensington, South Hampton, North:Hampton, Amesbury and Salisbury) and' shelter for the rest of the EPZ communities.
NHY ORO received notification of the GENERAL EMERGENCY and the licensee's PAR at 1337.
NHY ORO decisionmakers reviewed plant data (i.e., an instantaneous increase in containment radiation levels of greater than 10,000~R/ hour) and existing wind direction, then referred to Attachments l'and 2 o'f IP-2.5 to formulate the NHY ORO's PAR.
At 1341, Governor's Representative A was contacted by NHY ORO decisionmakers, briefed on the events leading to the GENERAL EMERGENCY, and provided an initial PAR to evacuate ERPA B (Amesbury and Salisbury) and shelter ERPA E (Newburyport, Newbury, West Newbury and Merrimac).
During
.the same conversation, NHY ORO also discussed with Governor's Representative A protective action for schools.
The details 1
of the PAR for schools are provided in Applicants' Rebuttal
! I i
i I
i i
Testin.ony No. 18 (School Protective Actions).
Governor's Representative A authorized NHY ORO at 1405 to issue the l
initial PAR to the general public.
The EBS message (Attachment J hereto) announcing the PAR for ERPAs B and E was broadcasu simultaneously with the sounding of the sirens i
at 1417.
a.
The Initial PAR The initial PAR was made based on in-containment radiacion levels and existing wind direction in accordance with IP 2.5.
Data available to the NHY ORO indicated that ire-containment radiation levels excaeded 10,000 R/ hour and the wind was steady from the west (i.e., from 282').
Examining Attachment 2 of IP 2.5 (Attachment K hereto), the NHY ORO decisionmakers were led to the PAR to evacuate ERPA B and shelter ERPA E.
At this particular point in time during the Exercise, Newburyport was not included in the area to be evacuated because it is part of ERPA E which lies totally outside the five mile radius.
Moreover, Newburyport was not in the down-wind direction and, for the previous 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, the wind was steady from the west at a speed of 1-2 miles per hour.
Separating Newburyport from the other communities in ERPA E would have run counter to the planning in the SPMC for the use of a key-hole response strategy and implementation of PARS by ERPA.
See Section III.A.2.
l l 1 I
b.
Revised' PAR.for ERPA E During the time subsequent to the initial PAR, NHY ORO continued to assess the emergency and the progress of PAR implementation.
The general public in ERPA E was protected by an initial shelter recommendation which was supported by existing wind direction (from 279-283*) and slow windspeed (1 mph) which, if a windshift occurred, would allow time'for i
implementing evacuation outside the 5-mile radius.- - At 1500, the NHY ORO was informed by the Seabrook Station ERO that analyses of stack samples indicated high iodine and particulate release components.
The NHY ORO assessment staff' used the sample analyses to revise thyroid dose rate projections.
Prior to this, the assessment staff had been reviewing the updated METPAC dose rate projections as they.
became available from Seabrook Station ERO personnel.
At 1528, NHY ORO determined that the wind direction was beginning to shift towards Massachusetts.
After making the l
decision to recommend evacuation of ERPA E (Newburyport, Newbury, West Newbury and Merrimac) to the Commonwealth, the NHY ORO Offsite Response Director called Governor's Representative A at 1530 to provide a briefing 'n the wind shift, revised dose rate projections and the recommendation to evacuate ERPA E.
This discussion with Governor's Representative A took place crior to the Seabrook Station ERO issuing a revised PAR calling for evacuation of ERPAs E and F (ERPA F lies in the New Hampshire portion of the EPZ).
Governor's Representative A requested NHY ORO to' stand by to.
allow the Commonwealth time to consider the new developments and PAR.
While: waiting for Governor's Representative A's response, the NHY Offsite Response Director contacted the Director NHOEM to update him on the proposed PAR for ERPA E.
At 1550, Governor's Representative A authorized the NHY ORO to issue the revised PAR for ERPA E.
The EBS message (Attachment L hereto) was broadcast simultaneously with the sounding of the sirens at 1556.
D.
Independent Assessment by NHY ORO The fact that the NHY ORO and Seabrook Station ERO developed identical PARS during the Exercise should not be interpreted as the NHY ORO acting "as a conduit" for the licensee's PARS.
Contrary tc the exercise contention raised by the Interveners, the NHY ORO demonstrated independent assessment capabilities and developed PARS in accordance with IP 2.5 during the Exercise.
As observed by FEMA, the NHY Offsite Response Director's protective action decisions were based "on input from other NHY ORO staff, including the Radiological Health Advisor, Accident Assessment Coordinator, Technical Advisor, and the two Assistant Response Directors" (FEMA Exercise Report., Applicants' Exhibit 43F, page 221 of 428).
The independence of NHY ORO was further demonstrated when NHY ORO gave special consideration to the school I !
---____-_--__-----_-.__._-.L-----_---_-------__----_--____L-_.-_____-._--__J--_.-
.--___.-____-_.___-___-____-___-___._-____------__.--.O
population and developed a school PAR (see Applicants' Rebuttal Testimony No. 18) which is a PAR not made by the licensee.
During the Exercise, NHY ORO demonstrated technical understanding, judgment and ability to assess.nd formulate PARS on its own as was evidenced by its discussion of the PAR for ERPA E with Governor's Representative A which took place before the licensee issued its revised PAR for ERPA E (FEMA Exercise Report, Applicants' Exhibit 43F, pages 64-65 of 428).
See Section C.3.b supra.
timelf recommendations to the Commonwealth after the i
declaration of the SITE AREA and GENERAL EMERGENCY and when conditions warranted evacuation of ERPA E (FEMA Exercise Report, Applicants' Exhibit 43F, Table 3, Significant Event Log, at pages 52-53, 58-59, and 64-65 of 428).
E.
Assistance Provided to Hon.ebound Handicapped Individual Who Could Not Evacuate During Exercise i
The interveners have alleged that NHY ORO's response to a homebound individual who refused to evacuate was deficient because of the person's physical condition and that other assistance should have been provided.
However, analysis of the exercise documentation pertaining to this specific mini-scenario indicates that the homebound handicapped individual was provided with an ambulance for evacuation and, after he refused to evacuate, he was given instructions on how to implement sheltering.
To illustrate NHY ORO'c response, it l
is helpful to outline the sequence of events pertaining to this mini-scenario.
Upon issuance of the evacuation recommendation for Salisbury and Amesbury (at 14:17 on day one of the Exercise),
i the Special Vehicle Dispatcher started dispatching vehicles to evacuate special facilities and homebound handicapped individuals.
As indicated on the Special Vehicle Dispatch Form (Attachment M hereto) an ambulance (simulated for drill l
purposes) was dispatched to pick up an Amesbury homebound handicapped individual at approximately 15:00.
The estimated pick up time for the homebound handicapped individual was at 15:45.
Specific confirmation of the pick up was not provided since the event was simulated.
At 18:05 ORO mini-scenario message 8.2-20d (Attachment N hereto) was called into the Amesbury Special Populations Coordinator from a Controller simulating a homebound handicapped individual.
This message stated:
Hello, my name is I live in Amesbury at an( I would need an ambulance to evacuate, but I am not going to move.
No, it would kill me.
I am 92 years old.
What can you do?
As indicated in the Amesbury Special Population Liaison's Chronological Event Log (Attachment O hereto) the homebound handicapped individual refused to evacuate and did not want a vehicle sent to his house even after " repeated attempts to convince him to evacuate."
following this he was l l l
l l
advised to implement sheltering procedures, "close all windows, doors and turn off all air handling equipment."
i Since the homebound individual did not indicate that he had a problem with implementing sheltering when'the instructions were provided, the NHY ORO's response was appropriate.
F.
By-Pass Route Around EPZ During the Exercise, the NHY ORO recommended a by-pass route around the EPZ to discourage northbound. travel through l
the EPZ.
The by-pass route, which was included in a news release (Attachment P hereto), was as follows:
"New Hampshire Yankee's Offsite Response I
Organization (NHY ORO) is urging motorists in Massachusetts communities surrounding the Seabrook, New ' Hampshi' e
?
area to avoid traveling through tha towns of Salisbury, Amesbury, Merrimac, i
Newbury, West Newbury and Newburyport.
These areas should be kept free of unnecessary traffic to facilitate the evacuation of Salisbury and Amesbury.
If traffic northbound is necessary, t
motorists are advised to use Rt. 128 to I-93. Motorists should then use Route 3 i
or I-93 to Route 4 in New Hampshire.
l From Route 4 in Dov0r, proceed to Kittery using Route 236, then take I-95 north."
The Interveners have alleged that this route " consisted of a series of routes which do not connect and, if followed, would send travelers right into the EPZ at Portsmouth."
l Additional detail will be provided in the route description.
l However, the diversion route would not have allowed motorists to travel into the EPZ as alleged in the contention due to l.
1 access control activities by the State of New Hampshire.
Durham access control point DU-l (see Diagram, Attachment Q hereto) directs all eastbound traffic on Route 4 north on to Route 108.
This ACP would have prevented eastbound traffic from traveling any closer to the EPZ.
Allegations that the by-pass route was inappropriate because it directed motorists to I-95 in Kittery, Maine, which purportedly, "is much too close to the EPZ", are without basis.
During the exercise it was not necessary to recommend any protective actions for Kittery.
Even after the wind shifted blowing the plume northward over Portsmouth and Maine, dose projections did not warrant protective actions in Kittery.
Thus, there was never a need to modify the by-pass route.
G.
METPAC Was Utilized Correctly METPAC is a computer model utilized by Seabrook Station ERO accident assessment personnel to produce dispersion and dose estimates.
These personnel are health physicists and are qualified to interpret the results of the METPAC analyses, including understanding the uncertainties involved regarding meteorology and sourc term.
The program allows for the analysis of radiologic releases from either a ground or elevated release path for periods of time up to twenty-four hours.
The program can be executed in near real- - - - _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ - _
l
-time or in a predictive mode (i.e., project results based on varying. input).
The result of the program execution is the calculation of the gamma (whole~ body) dose rates and the infant thyroid dose rates.
These dose rates are calculated for specific plume center line points which are determined by wind speed and direction.
They are also calculated on the straight-line direction at 0.6 mile and every mile out to ten miles.
The printouts display plume center line doses based on assumed exposure durations of 2, 4,
6 and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> assuming persistent meteorological and release conditions, and include protective action recommendations based on these doses compared to the US EPA Protective Action Guides.
The protective action guideline program of METPAC calculates a shelter dose and an evacuation dose.
Calculation of the evacuation dose necessarily requires consideration of ETE values for Seabrook Station EoZ municipalities.
The ETE values which are currently programmed into-the model are values derived'from a 1983 ETE study.
The ETE values used by METPAC will be updated based on the results of ASLB litigation of the i
current ETE study and the evacuation times will be incorporated into the program data base.
The METPAC model uses actual meteorological data from the Seabrook Station onsite meteorological tower to calculate plume trajectories.
These meteorological data which !
1
)
i I
include, among other variables, wind speed and wind j
direction, are near real-time inputs to the model provided in l
15-minute averaged increments, i
METPAC can also be used in the predictive mode to 1
-\\
provide "what if" calculations through direct input by dose assessment personnel of parameters utilized in the model to accommodate uncertainties in meteorological or release conditions.
In fact, the Seabrook Station ERO performed several "what if" calculations using METPAC prior to the 1
declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY at 1332 and the initiation l
of release conditions.
These calculations assumed a range of 1
postulated release pathways, including stack release, containment release, and steam line release.
They also l
considered variable meteorological, containment pressure, and release rate parameters.
j The Seabrook Station ERO dose assessment staff uses two METPAC computers which are located adjacent to one another at the EOF.
One computer is dedicated to calculation of dose rates and plume trajectory using real-time data.
The other is used for "what if" calculations using modified parameters as requested by the Seabrook Station ERO, the NHY ORO, or State of New Hampshire accident assessment personnel.
In addition to site specific meteorological data, NHY ORO and New Hampshire accident assessment personnel and decisionmakers had access to and considered weather forecast l
i i
data provided independently through the National Weather 1
Service.
The forecast data were available continuously throughout the course of the exercise.
During the exercise, protective action recommendations of.the Seabrook Station ERO were transmitted to NHY ORO and i
New Hampshire emergency response personne) in two ways.
First, they were transmitted to NHY ORO and NH IFO staff by the Seabrook Station EOF Coordinator directly.. Second, they j
were transmitted from the Seabrook Station ERO to the NHY Offsite Response EOC and the NH State EOC (and the l
Commonwealth of Massachusetts) over the Nuclear Alert System
.I (NAS) using the State Notification Fact Sheet which requires verification that the protective action recommendation has been transmitted.
Protective action recommendations were not
'I "nerely passed on copies of the METPAC printouts."
In fact, the protective action recommendation,s made by the Seabrook Station ERO to NHY.ORO and New Hampshire officials vere not i
~
those indicated by METPAC, but rather those formulated in i
accordance with ER-5.4 (Nuclear Production Emergency Response Program Manual).
METPAC printouts were provided to NHY ORO and NH IFO l
accident assessment personnel for the purpose of independent assessment of radiological consequences and projections.
The i
I FEMA Exercise Report actes that they were used extensively for this purpose.
The NHY ORO formulated PARS independently -
i using data gathered by NHY ORO personnel and data 1provided by i
Seabrook Station ERO.
During discussions with Governor's.
Representative A regarding PARS, the NHY Offsite Response Director.in additjon to providing the PARS recommended by j
I ORO, provided a review of PARS formulated by the Seabrook Station ERO and the State of New Hampshire.
The FEMA Exercise Report, Applicants'. Exhibit 43F, at pages 164 and 221 of 428, concluded that the State of New l
Hampshire and NHY ORO, respectively, demonstrated the ability l
to make appropriate Protective Action Decisions, based on 1
projected or' actual doses, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate
]
shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors.
The FEMA evaluation concluded that exercise objective 11 was met by both emergency response organizations.
-1 i
H.
Use Of ETEs In The SPMC i
The development of the ETEs is discussed in Applicants' l
Rebuttal Testimony Number 16 (Evacuation Time Estimates).
)
i Provided in IP 2.5, Attachment 4 are ETEs for 10 scenarios and two distances (5 and 10 miles from Seabrook Station) which consider variables such as season (winter, 1
summer), day of the week (weekend or weekday), time of day l
l (mid-day, evening, all day), and weather conditions (normal,
)
l rain, snow).
A brief description of each scenario is also l
provided.
(IP 2.5, Attachment 4).
Even with this wide range I l t
u__.________________.___________.____________
_____._____________J
l of conditions, the 10 mile evacuation time estimates only vary over a range from 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes for off-season Midweek Evening Good Weather to t hours 10 minutes for Summer Weekend Midday Sudden Rain scenarios.
The SPMC's plume exposure pathway PAR procedure, IP 2.5, e
describes the responsibilities, actions and methods for determining an appropriate ETE.
The following is a summary of the procedure.
The Assistant Offsite Response Director, Response Implementation, who has primary responsibility for selecting an ETE, periodically reviews current meteorological conditions, weather forecasts and other factors which could impact the implementation of protective action recommendations (PARS), (IP 2.5, 5.5.1).
To assist him with this, he is directed to refer to IP 2.5,,
Local Conditions Interfering with Evacuation.
Additionally, the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Response Implementation, i
directs the Evacuation Support Coordinator to contact the Staging Area Leader, Special Populations Coordinator, School Coordinator, and the Bus Company Liaison to obtain i
information regarding road, traffic and weather conditions which may impact evacuation and the status of staff deployment.
(IP 2.5, 5.5.2).
This information identifies
)
factors which may influence an evacuation (e.g.,
adverse
],
l J
.5'?
d
-lj 1
weather and road conditions) and indicates the. impact on an evacuation and provides a course of action to improve travel.
j Following the determination and consideration of the foregoing factors, the Assistant Offsite Response Director,
~
Response Implementation, refers to IP 2.5, Attachment 4, Estimated Evacuation Times for the Massachusetts communities, to select a scenario and distance which most closely reflect the current conditions, and identify the associated ETE.
The variables identified on Attachment 4 of IP 2.5, specifically season, day, time and weather, were selected based on their significance to the.ETE and the availability of the information.
The ETE is provided to the Radiological Health Advisor (IP.2.5, step 5.5.4) who reviews it with the Accident Assessment Coordinator (IP 2.5, step 5.2.3) for input into the Protective Action Recommendation Worksheet, IP 2.5,,
(IP 2.5, 6 5.3.1.B).
IP 2.5, step 5.3.1.B will' be revised to indicate that the selection of the appropriate ETE will be made in consultation with the Radiological Health Advisor.
The Radiological Health Advisor then confers with i
the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Response Implementation, about potential evacuation problems or constraints which may affect the choice of protective actions. !
l
ATTACHMENT A (MUREG-0654, Pages 9 and 16) l l
f l
l
)
{
t t
i
1
' Attachment A (Page 1 of 2)
D.
Plannina' Basis (continued) days. For the plume exposure pathway, shelter and/or evacuation would likely be the principal immediate
)
- J protective actions to be recomended for the general f
)
public. When evacuation is chosen as the preferred protective measure, initial evacuation of a 360' area around the facility is desirable out to a distance of about two to five miles' although initial efforts would, of course, be in the general downwind direction. This concept is indicated in Figure 1.
The precise boundaries of such evacuations and sectors evacuated at extended downwind distances would be largely determined by political boundaries and would not fit the precise pattern of Figure 1.
The possible administration' of the thyroid blocking agent, potassium iodide, should also be considered. /
The U. S.
Department of Health and Human Services (OHHS) is preparing guidance on the potassium iodide issue which will be l
considered by NRC and FEMA. 'The ability to best reduce potential exposure under the specific conditions during the course of an accident should determine the appropriate response.
b.
Incestion exposure pathway - The principal exposure from this pathway would be from infistion of contaminated water or foods such as milk, fresh vegetables or aquatic foodstuffs.
5/
Potassium lodide as a Thyroid-Blocking Agent in a Radiation Emergency, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now U. S. Department of Health and Human Services), 43 FR 58798 of December 15, 1978.
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(Plume Exposure EPZ Map) 1 e
L Attachment C (Page 1 of 1) g 4
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.e-NOTE: Numbers are derived from the Seabroof Station Evacuation Ibna Study and Traffi: Management Plan Update, August 12, 1986, KI.D Associates Inc. and from data compiled through the serial survey of seacoast areas in Massachusetts and How Hampshire conducted July 18, 1987 by Avis Airmap of Braintree, Massachusetts. These figures are subject to update as part of the continuous planning process.
34 I
I 2
ATTACHMENT D (Massachusetts Attorney General's Answer to NRC Staff's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, Pages 4 and 5) f l
s i
i I
L_____._____
2
Attachmont D (Page 1 of 2) i be taken when mobilizing the Guard are Domestic Emergency Standing Operating Procedures
(" Mass NG DESOp") and the OPLAN 2 ("Mohaux")
(presently in draft form).
Soth plans have been produced to the Staff.
MB.T6 :
The MBTA would pull buses from scheduled routes and a t. t emp t to deploy additional personnel
.iat would be required to assist in evacuation of the EPZ.
The MBTA would cely on and attempt to implement the 1984 deployment plan if MCDA recommended to do so.
The MBTA would, in any case, attempt to deploy the numcer of buses needed for eacn evacuating community, as indicated by the MCDA.
The aforementioned plan was mailed to the Staf f with these Answers, under separate cover.
Decart ent cf cublic Health:
Secause there are presently no specific emergency plans for responding to a Seabrook emergency, DPH NtAT memcers would respond to an emergency by relying on previous training and experience in handling emergencies at other nuclear power plants.
NIAT member actions would correspond to those set cut in the NIAT handbook which was produced to the Staff.
The NIAT handbook would be relied on as a basic guide for this response.
Actions to be taken pursuant to the NIAT handbook j
are:
confirmation of radiological emergency; notification to appropriate response individuals apd agencies as identified in the l
Comprehensive Emergency Response hlan ("CERP") (CERP has also been
~
produced to the Staff); evaluation of the hazard; comparison of hazard against protective action guides as detailed in CERP; 1
recommendation of protective actions; performance of radiation surveys to confirm that ambient radiation levels are low enough to
-4
Attachment D (Page 2 of 2) l I
i permit re-entry of the general public.
1 i
MCDA:
The MCDA would, upon authori:sti0n, utilize ad hoc l
l 1
measures as determined by the Director or his designee.
MCDA would J
to look to t.".e CERP for guidance.
Where applicable and advisable, MCDA would use its best efforts to take the following actions:
alert state officials, FEMA and the American Red Cross; irform communities, agencies, Secretary of public Safety and the Governor:
1 activate emergency response organization and facilities; notify and mobilize state support agencies; coordinate support as requested from 1: cal c:rmunities: coordinate the status of resources available from support agencies; dispatch representative to utility's ECC: recommend protective actions; coordinate public notification: coordinate interstate response and maintain contact with civil defense agencies in other affected states; assist with media support: gather and analyze intelligence; coordinate provisions cf state support to affected communities.
The Direct:r of MCDA, or his designee, after consultation with the Commissioner of Public Health, the Commissioner of DEQE, local of ficials and possibly a nuclear engineer, meteorologist or other such private person as the situation warranted, would most likely have responsibility for making ad hoc judgments as to protective actions to maximize dose reductions.
These ad hoc judgments would be made in conjunction with one r more state and local officials, and, after consultation with the Secretary of Public Safety, or his designees, would result in a recommendation by the Secretary of Public Safety to the Governor.
However, because there is no site Il i
i ATTACHMENT E (CERP, Appendix 3, Radiological Emerger.cy Response Plan for Fixed Nuclear Facilities, Section A2.5) i j
s l
4
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Attachment E-(Page 1 of 5) e, A2.5 PROTECTIVE ACTICN GUICES Foi10 wing an accident involving a' release cf radioactive material : the atmosenere, there may ce a need fer rapid actien to protect the puclic fr:m raciati:n excesure. ~ The FA provices guidance for the initiati:n of pr:tective acti:ns in its Manual of Protective Action Guides anc'Pretective
' Acti:ns for Nuclear Incidents, GA-520/1-75-001.
Af ter a nuclear accident cccurs, an estimate is made of.the raciatien ecse wnich affectec peculation grotes may potentially receive. ' This ccse l
estimate is called the projected dese. A p;ctective acti:n is an acticn taken t: avoid.cr recuce this c cjected ccse when the benefits cerivec-fr:m suen acti:n are suf ficient to off set any uncesiracle features of the p;ctective acti:n. The protective action guide is the projectec cese to incivicuals in the peculatien wnich warrants taking pr:tective actien.
A pr:tective action guide never implies an acceptable cose. Since the protective acticn guide is based en a p cjected cose, it is usec as an effort to minimize the risk frem an event wnich has a high pr:cacility of eccurrance, c: wnich is cecurring er has al:nacy occurred. For p ctective acti:ns t: ce mest effective, they must ce implemented as seen as practical af ter the cecision to take the acticn has been mace.
P::tective acti:n guides are the ntnerical projected deses wnich act as trigger ceints to initiate protective actions. This projected cese cces not incluce the unavoidable ecse that has already been receivec prier to the time the projection is made nor does it include the cose receivec prior to inclementation of the protective action. P ctective action guices are provided for three principal pathways of-faciation exposure:
1.
External exposure to the whole cocy from the radioactive cleuc and deposited materials; I
2.
Internal excesure from the inhalation of racioiccines and particulate; and l
l APPDCIX 3 (1265/0973h)
A2 6 A/86
. Attachment E (Page 2'of 5)
.c P'
3.
Internal excesure f rem the ingestien of fccc, water, anc milk contaminated with radioactivity.
A2.5.1 Frotective Acticn Guides for Direct Excesure within the Plune Excesure Emergency Planning Zcne For cirect exocsure to a raccactive plune, the EPA celineates a range of protective action guide doses for the ceneral public, as 'notec in Table A2-1 These guidelines provide protection for the most' sensitive memDers of the general [:coulation: pregnant women and infants.
Massachusetts has chosen to base its protective action decisicns en the icwest values recensnended by EPA, that is, a 1 rem wnole body cose, ano a 5 rem thyroid cose. In the event of an emergency, unanticipated events may make achetence to the minimum values imocssible, but planning to case protective acticn decisions on the minimun ecses increases the procacility that the ucper end of the D'A prctective acticn guide range will not ce exceeded.
The oretective action guide deses fer emergency worker exposure are significantly higher than the lower level prctective action guides recentnenced for the public. These reflect the recuced sensitivity of emergency workers to radiological exposure (e.g., there are no inf ants er oregnant women in the emergency worker force), and the higher execsure warranted by the critical role played by. emergency workers in helping to protect the general public. Emergency worker protective action guice cosas (i.e., exposures greater than the protective action guide doses for the general public) must be specifically authorized by the Massachusetts I
Ceoartment of Public Health (MCPH).
~
s Lifesaving protective action guide doses-may be authorized by the MOPH for These volunteer emergency workers only when necessary to save lives.
protective action guide doses, however, have little applicability to offsite emergency resconse activity.
4/86 APPOOIX 3 (1265/0973h)
A2-7
Attachment E (Page 3 of 5)
)
1 l
l I
Authorization of ensite emergency workers to exceec normal excosure limits I
is the resocns'ibility of the utility.
a2.5.2 Protective Action Guides for Incirect Excesure within tne
)
Ingestien Pathway Emergency Plannirg Zone l
Protective acticn guides for ingestien excesure assune that the peculatien grouc receiving raciatien doses via the feed enain receive only insignificant ccses f=m ether pathways such as external excesure or excesure resulting frem innalatien of air orne radioactive materials. If this is not the case, the initiation of protective acticns will be basec en f
censideratien of the total radiatien cose f=m all pathways. As with the f
c=tective actien quices established for cirect exposure, tnese protective acticn guides are cefined in terms of projected dese, anc no prior accumulated dose is taken into acccunt. These cr tective acticn guices are listed in Table A2-2.
The F"0A has ceveleced protective action guides for use in protecting tre public f r:m radiation excesure via the ingestion pathway (43 FR 58790).
These guides are for ex=esures to racienuclides such as iccine-131, cesita-134, cesium-137, strentium-90, and strentium-89, wnich can ce cecesited en pastures, feed cr:cs, and orcharcs, or en precuce reacy for sale in retail markets. Of scecial imoortance is contamination of milk tnreugn the pasture-cow-milk-child pathway. The protective actien quices have ceen develoced for whole body and thyroid exposures. whole bocy excesure guides include censideratien of the effects of radiation on bene marrow and other organs.
Two categories of protective action guides for hunan fccc anc livestock feed have been promulgated by the FDA for radio _ logical accidents: preventive protective action guides and emergency pretective acticn guides.
l
- ENDIX 3 (1265/0973h)
A2-8 A/86 l
L -
Attachment E (Page 4 of 5)
A2.5.2.1 Preventive Prctective Acticn Guides
- reventive protective acticn guides are acclicacle te situations wnere c=cective actions will cause minimal imaet en the fccc succly. A creventive prctective action guide establishes a level at wnich rescensible efficials should take protective actions to prevent er recuce the cencentratien of radioactivity in feed or livesteck feed. By taking action at this level, feed and water can be censerved for use. Prevertive acticns can include sneltering feed sucolies, placing dairy herds en stored feed, wasning and ceeling vegetacles er fruits, and delaying distribution of' feces and milk to market until radioactive decay reduces centaminatien levels.
rhe fellcwing criteria are c=vided fer guidance en the need to inclement c=tective actions at the preventive protective acticn guide level:
0.5 rem dose cemitment to the bone marrew or wnole body. for an a
exposed individual in the peculatien 1.5 rem dose ecmitment to the thyroid rable A2-3 snows rescense levels ce=escending to preventive case cemitment s.
a2.5.2.2 Emercency Protective Action Guides Emer;ency protective action guides are acclicable to accidents wnere protective actions of great incact on the food sucoly are justified because -
of the projected health hazards. An emergency protective acticn guide
~
establishes a level at which responsible c'fficials should isolate radioactive food to prevent its sale and ay which the responsible officials must determine whether condematien or other disposition is appropriate (see Table A2 4).
l I
l APPDOIX 3 (1265/0973h)
A2 9 4/86
~
Attachment E (Page 5 of 5)
~
The felicwing criteria are previded fer guidance on the need te implement cretective act'icns at the emergency==tective acticn guide level:
5 rem cose cennitment t: the bene marrew or wnole becy for an execsed individual in the ccoulatien 15 rem cose commitment to the thyroid -
a j
A2.6 PROTECTIVE ACTICNS RR DIRECT EXPOSUPE WITHIN TT PLLE EXPOSUPE EERGEfCY PLAPNIPC ZOPE i
Three er tective acti:ns fer limiting cirect excesure of the general cucli:
will te censiderec witnin the plu.e excesure emergency planning z:ne. These are access cent =1, sheltering, ano evacuation.
A2. 6.1 Access Centr:1 Access cent =1 restricts entry into the plune excesure emergency planning rene. It is a necessary adjunct t: either sneltering or evacuatien. Access centrol restricts cersons f=m entering an area where they may te execsed te j
radiatien. It also helos clear traf fic f =m tne reads within tne emergency clanning zene so they may be better used for evacuatien and/or emergency venicles, if these measures are acvised. Access centrol also provices security for areas that have been evacuated.
A2. 6.2 Sheltering Sheltering involves remaining inside, elesjng au doors and wincews, turning off au ventilation systems, extinguisnirq.au unnecessary concustien, and sealing, to the extent possible, an other access to the outdoor air. Au these actions limit the exchango of indoor air with outdoor air that may be contaminated with radioactive materials. Heavier construction materials or increased layers of building material ircrease the amount of protection j
frem exeosure to radiation threugn increased shielding. Therefore, snelter should be sought in the lowest level of the building (e.g., in basements),
APPENDIX 3 (1265/0973h)
A2-10 4/86
ATTACHMENT F i
1 (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Appendix 1, Page 1-17) i 1
k 1
]
l i
q Attach:nont F (Page 1 of 1) 1 i
EXAMPLE INITIATING CONDITIONS: GENERAL EMERGENCY j
1.
a.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to I rem /hr W.B. or 3
5 rem /hr thyroid at the site boundary under actual m_eteorolooical condi tions.
b.
These dose rates are projected based on other plant parameters (e.g.,
radiation levels in containment with leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are measured in the environs Note: Consider evacuation only within about 2 miles of the site boundary unless these site boundary levels are exceeded by a factor of 10 or projected to continue for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> or EPA Pmtective Action 3
Guideline exposure levels are predicted to be exceeded at longer distances 2.
Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier, (e.g., loss of primary coolant boundary, clad failure, and high potential 1
for loss of containment)
]
I 3.
Loss of physical control of the facility
{
l Note: Consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation 4.
Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short time period possible, e.g., any core melt situation. See the specific PWR and BWR. sequences below.
Notes:
a.
For core melt sequences where significant releases from containment are not yet taking place and large amcunts of fission products are not yet in.the containment atmosphere, consider 2 mile precautionary evacuation. Consider 5 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector) if large amounts of fission products (greater than gap activity) are in the containment atmosphere. Recommend sheltering in other parts of the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone under this circumstance, b.
For core melt sequences where significant releases from containment are not yet taking place and containment failure leading to a direct atmospheric release is likely in the sequence but not imminent and _large amounts of fission products in addition to nobli gases are in the containment atmosphere, consider precautionary evacuation to 5 miles and 10 mile downwind evacuation (450 to 900 sector).
c.
For core melt sequences where large amounts of fission products other than noble gases are in the containment atmosphere and containment failure is judged imminent,
{
recomend shelter for those areas where evacuation cannot be completed before transport of activity to that location.
1-17 i
-_-_m-m__-.2m____
m.______-.___m.__
l ATTACHMENT G (SPMC, Appendix C,
'etter of Agreement Between SONH and NHY representing Both the Emergency and Offsite Response Organization)
=9 i
l 1
l l
i l
l l
Attachment G (Page 1 of 4) l.
Am:nc=ene 3 l
I i
Dage ' of A LETTER OF AGREE 9ENT BETWEEN i
THe STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE I
AND l
NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE REPRESENTING BOTH THE EMERGENCY AND OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS i
I I.
CURPOSE:
l The ourcose of the Letter of Agreement is to estaolisn ractological
{
emergency creoaredness, not1pication anc resconse snoule an event at j
Seacecox Station recutre Radiological Emergency Rescense P1an activation.
j i
DEFINITIONS:
A.
Ereecenev Ocerations Centers fEOCs) - Facilities estaolisned by the State of NH and the NHY ORO wnere emergency response commano and control occurs.
The State of NH EOC is located in Concord. NH, and the NHY ORO EOC ts co-located with the NHY EOF.
B.
Emercenev Ooerations Fac_11ity (EOF) - A center established at Newington Station, Newington, NH to coordinate the deployment cf NHY ERO cersonnel, to evaluate offsite acc1 cent conditions and to maintain communications with offsite authorities.
O.
EOF Coordinator - An NHY ERO memoer wno coercinates acc1 cent assessment and protective action recommendations with offsite authorities. ne conducts these functions within the EOF.
O.
Incident Field Office (!FO) - A center estsclishec in the vicinity of the New Homosnire portion of the Seabrook Station Emergency Planning Zone, where the State of New Hampshire response and assistance to local communities is coordinated. The IFO is co-located with the NHY EOF.
.c E.
Media Center - A center dedicated to the news media for the purpose of
~
conducting joint NHY ERO, NHY 05C, State of NH, anc Federal briefings concerning emergency conditions.- The Media Center is located at the Town Hall in Newington. NH.
F.
New Hampshire Yankee Emercency Response Organization (NHY ERO)
The licensee's organized personnel response to a SesorcoK Station Radiological Emergency.
O.
New Hamoshire Yankee Of fsite Response Organization (NHY ORO)
New Hamosnire Yankee's compensation organization for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
C-la 1
i
Attachment G (Page 2 of 4)
Amendesne 3 J
Page 2 of 4 H.
Nuclear Alert System (NAS) - A communication system der initial _
notification to the State of New Hamosnire ano the NHY CR0 of an emergency at Seacroon Station: and tne means of communication l
between the.three organizations for excnange of information
}
during the period of the emergency.
III. AGREEHENT The State of New Hamosn1re ano New HamcEnire Yankee, representing coth the NHY ERO ano'tne NHY CRO, agree as follows:
1 A.
The NHY ERO shall notify tne NH State Police ano the NHY CR0 Contact Point within H fteen (15) minutes after.an event nas caen classifiec as an unusual Event. Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.
This notification snall be mace over tne NAS.
Commercial teleonone ts the oackuo to the NAS.
8.
The initial message content used in the contact spec 1fied in A.
above, is in agreement among the emergency response proceoures of each of the enree organizations. After the initial contact, aeditional information shall be provided to the NH Oivision of Public Health Services Emergency Response Initiator ar.d the NHY CR0 Director anon eacn makes a call-back to the NHY ERO.
This information is soe-c1fied in the follow-up notification form containoa in the emergency response procedures of the three organizations.
C..The tnree organizations sna11 exenange and coordinate emergency resoonse plan enanges that certain to those elements of interface orter to isolementing tne enange.
The tnree organ 1zat1ons sna11 coordinate the effective date of suen changes.
D.
The NHY ERO shall provide space for representatives from the State of New Hampshire and the NHY ORO at the EOF and the Media Center.
This includes space at the EOF for the operation of the State of New Hampshire IF0, and.for the operation of the NHY ORO E0C.
E.
The three organizations agree t[-exchenge all information (i.e.,
radiological releases, meteorole%ical data, offsite radioleg1 cal projections and measurements, and onsite technical data) known and available to f acilitate a rapid and accurate evaluation of the emergency.
F.
The NHY ORO and the State of New Hampshire agree-to coordinate the
]
notification of the puolic cy the puclic alert and notification I
system and through EBS.
{
G.
The NHY ORO and State of New Hamoshire agree to coordinate the j
evaluation ano implementation of precautionary actions for special populations within the plume exposure EPZ.
n
.u
4 Attachment G (Page 3 of 4)
Amendm:nt 3 Page 3 of a The three organ 12attons shall coordinate plume exposure EPZ field H.
radiological monitoring efforts.
This coordination is to include the decioyment of each organization's offsite monitoring teams (i.e., tne State of New Hamosnire teams within the New Hampshire portion of the plume EPZ, the NHY ORO teams within the Hassacnusetts portion and the NHY ERO teams throughout the EPZ), the review and exchange of all monitoring results. and the radionuclides analysis of particulate anc racioiocine air samples at the NHY EOF.
I.
The NHY ERO agrees to-assist the State of New Hamosnire and the NHY ORO in ingestion oathway samoling and analysis efforts.
This incluces assistance' to the State of New Hamosnire coordination of ingestion patnway evaluations with the State of Haine.
The scope of the assistance can include samoling personnel ano equipment anc radionuclides analysts capacility.
J.
Once the EOF is activated, the EOF Coordinator of the NHY ERO is the point for contact for the State of New Hemosnire and the NHY ORO for radiolog1 cal assessments and protective action recommendation discussions.
K.
The three organizations agree to coorcinate news releases and rumor control activities.
Information shall be released to the ouelic in a timely, coordinated manner througn the Media Center.
Also, the three organizations agree to participate in a periodic emergency preoareo-ness ecucation and orientation program for news media representatives.
The State of New Hamoshire and the NHY ORO agree to the methodology
{
L.
estaclishec ey the NHY ERO to project offsite radiological consequences.
The NHY ERO agrees to provide any special projections that are beyona 1
the routine scope of the radiological assessment effort, as long as the metnocology used can cover the request.
H.
The State of New Hampshire and the NHY ORO have reviewed and agree to the proceoure established by the NHY ERO to classify emergency condi-tions, which includes the Emergency' Action Levels.
N.
The NHY ERO agrees to make the radfilogical analysis services of the Yankee Atomic Environmental Laceratory available to the State of New Hamosnire and the NHY ORO.
The priority for sample processing my the Yankee Atomic Environmental Laboratory would be established througn joint agreement my the NHY ERO, NHY ORO and the NH Oivision of Public Health Gervices at the time of an incident.
O.
The State of New Hemoshire agrees to notify the State of Haine (inges-tion pathway zone) for all emergency classifications and coordinate the evelation of offsite radiological consequences with authorities in j
that State curing an event which is classified as either a Site Ares j
Emergency or General Emergency at Seabrook Station.
C-lc j
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Attachment G (Page 4 of 4)
Amendment 3 1
Page 4 of a P.
The State of NH agrees to notify and co of the United States Coast Guare for tne watordinate the res i
plume EPZ.
erway portions of the Q.
for any necessary atr space restrictiThe State ederal Aviation Administration ons.
R.
The State of NH agrees to notify the B necessary restrictions on rail oston and Haine Railroad for any travel.
S.
The State of NH agrees to request as i Engleno state agency comoacts in respons stance available thro se to a request
?.
The State of NH agrees to arrange f by the NHY ORO.
NHY ORO emergency resoonse personnelor tne clearance of NH Points in NH.
througn EPZ Access Control U.
i This agreement may ee amended at any the parties.
time ey written agreement between V.
This agreement snail be effective as of the last cate signed below.
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE NHY EMERGENCY kESPONSE ORG By s__
h Director, Offic'fr of Emergency By _
Management si A a Vice Pr(sident ' Eclear
(
Production Dete 5JV $6
' Date
~
i:
NHY OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZA O.*JA By Oirector, Public HealtK Services _
By
/
C j/
ecutive Director, rgency Preparedness /
j and Community Relations
{
23tM
{
Date
~
,.7 3
kE
'/
Osyte
7--______--_
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i 1
I ATTACHMENT H l
l (NHY Offsite Response Director's Chronological Log at Page 5) i i
i 1
W
Attachment H (Page 1 of 1)
CHRONOLOGICAL EVENT LOG Position:
Name:
U1 s Io Eh&58 o,,..
Assigneo Facility:
Time
/pm Activityg (y sf, }
h<b : col alb
^ainco A'Rucennw a.unen b lema ') EA5 0-Ahrh 7 I 'rchhc w, - ~c ma a w w Phb i Warm. 43u,h nMrmumhs awd.,
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f ra ' tvinch rwert L-rruA -#mu.t Ind e n x r e. G rrw s e 63 -%
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o
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& M in arsno a cen L
)
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((1l WM6.
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ATTACHMENT I l
(NHY offsite Response Director's i
Chronological Event Log at Page 13) w W
9 l
l l.
Attachment I (Page 1 of 1)
CHRONOLOGICAL EVENT LOG Position:
Name:
D-In N =4 0.ie:
Assigneo Facihty:
Time am@g/
Activity G
Y(% lhA.,$
ID T
ICCh
$kf' I
L rxfo u t
SrAry,s srN rn we li in A*
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Y O blM 1l I Q1c1 Crre h tu LU w cbrcNuw l
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l en l' ? 6 ICSD ACYY4fnfd td 60ffN Eh.UdBD @$
CerE. Imn !CdH Ad atrth, M b Ndh.[ht)aff, llfdAh htch. MthtR;6TOf F 00hdu g lCwshiS. Gaci Mn & nan enLu erdo-alouT o r e Jb h ac&m J/ b ocrd i ds ce do an in',, c%wl9 ' A.g runa lc1wihow bu $oO. & RonM ' all be lon /( cd a 'r i e u d % v,'
Mfm o to
,o R ceD I Al MMO Uuta AI N. 6TrmL Wl Shecl l
l6NNV(n Un d0(714la N$mM6dfs 9hmIs !
Un@ E Acutn u arce - %
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ATTACHMENT J (EBS Message Announcing the Initial PAR for ERPAs B and E) 1 i
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Attachment J (Page 1 of 4)
[b b
,h ~.... y *- g 1 4 11 Page 1 of 4 GENERAL IMEP~EICY MESSAGE (EVAC 1!ATION AND SHEL"IRUG; SEASONAL CDSURE OF BEACHES AND WTTDLTFE RERGE) i
( '(d 2 J
RELEASE OF-PADIOM'E MATERIAL)
I Date Message Released *****6 88
\\
f Time Fa== age Relaa=ai}*****
20 OM j
Relaaaai by:
2h NHY Offsite!
Director
(
).'92f//
A GENERAL DGPGENCY ns declared at ****** today at Seabrock Nuclear Power Station. A GDERAL DERGENCY means that events are in p.+ ass that could result in scue significant release of radioactive materials with relaa=
expected to go beyald levels set t*/ the United States Envha satl Protect.ian Agency curside the Seabrock Station site bxndary.
/Wh/
A release of radioactive material into the air occurred at ******.
The New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization has been activated ard is 1 ormaling to the problem. Mastu+.usetts gehau.aus. cfficials have been notified.
The Governor of Massachusetts r+2 -- %.is the following:
T=aiiate evacuation is re
-.--a.;ed fcr people in alichw and ma=Hw.
c For Amesbary, the Recepticn Center is located at the Massachusetts Electric Facility at 1101 Turnpike Street in North Andover. For ca14=h n, the Reception Center is at the Macumusetts Electric Facility at 44 River Street in Beverly.
SIV2.-
The United States Coast Guard has bevrt requested to enforce a ****** mile safety zone in the ocean waters near Seelrook Station. All offshare teatars near the plant are advised to relocate or dock in waters further than ******
niles frun the plant.
- /pe -
Perscruis at M and mrk armaa frm e,a14=hwv to Plum in1ard. ircitviitry the Parker River Natienni Wildlife P.aftme, shoulli leave thmm ama imediately.
There is a good m==4h414ty for this suscgency to prodLos a wd-ainating MM.
It is strongly room aanded that as a pc==*4m, persons leaving the towns told to evacuate go to
(
their designated r@crt centers for nonitoring.
)
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Attachment J (Pags 2 of 4)
Dub Page 2 cf 4 GDG:RAL DERG21CY MESSAGE (EVACATICN AND SHELTIRING:
SEASONAL C.CSURE OF BEACHES AND hmmE REFUGE)
(RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL)
(om1tirraad)
Services offered at the Raception Centers and rootzsnanded for all evacuees in::lude: ex:nitoring for contamination; decontamination if ranaamat y; information and maaamrfe centers; and referral to %..w te care centars.
e i
Persons in the ccexmanities directed to evacuata are advised to taka the nest cxrivenient roads south to main rautas - Rauta 1, Rauta 1A, Interstates 95 or 495 - and travel south in the direction of tha Reception Centers.
(Trafficguicaswinassisty]ou
(
All schools within the mn=rrtities directed to evacuata are being evacuated to the designated Reception Cantars for the cxzununity in which they are I
locatad. Parents should not drive to scnool to meet their children since scnools are now being evacuated and children are being taken safely by bus directly to their Reception Centars. School children will that be sent to
'Ibe Host Facility in A where they may be picked up.
l If you have been advised to evacuate but do not have your own L.-w.u.stion and cannot get a ride from a neighbor or sanecne else, tuses r
will travel along main emergency rautas to pick you up and taka you to a Reception Cantar. Wait for an announcement statinJ what' time b.2ses will begin traveling these emergency rautas in your crasuunity. For reru information on the bus and evacuation rautas, look up the -y cy information bcochures about Seabccok Station whicts ware mailed to you.
If you have a bedridden, handicapped or other person in your bane who needs special evacuation help and who has not made ptwvious arra.wus with New F-ahlre Yankam, please call the New Hampshire Yankee Offsita Respmse E-v.cy Operaticrus Cantar at 555-1234. If you have already registered, there is no need to call now; help will socm be m its way.
All perscxis in the area to be avecuated are urged to be goed neighbors and help cne another by sharing rides and helping others with problems.
If you know of any rai?% or cxMerkars with language or hearinJ probluna, planne check on them to be sure they have been informed of the emergency and understand what they should d6.
Before you leave your hcans or workplace, neRin sure you have put out all fires armi < 1r=ad firaplar= dampers. Iock all doces when you leave. Take blankats agd pillows with you for your own uma and any musicines which you regularly taka. Peck enough clothing fca several days. If you are at ucrk outside the avecuation area, but live inside it, you may return home to mi4mh these chores and collect fsaily maahars or par =amary belongings.
Attachment J (Page 3.of 4)
D/2lLL-i Page 3 of 4 GDERAL INERENCY MESSAGE (EVJGATICN AND SHELTIRDG; SEASONAL CI.CSURE OF BEACHES AND WILDLIFE R!7UGE) i\\
(RE MASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL)
(continuad)
People living in the mn=wtities of hmae/ Newturv/ West Newburv/
Newtue/ port will be safer if they SHELTER IN PLACE immediately. This means to remain in$cors. Staying indoors will prwida you with increa=ad protection frtan radioactive raatarial released from Seabrook Station. Tb get the greatest benefit from protection providad by shaltaring, you should taka the followig actions:
o shaltar indoors.
o Maka sure all windows and doors are closed tightly.
If your are in your car, close all windows and vents while you travel c
to your destination.
Turn off all fans, heatig er air conditioning systams if they bring in o
outside air..
o Taka a radio with you and move to the rocn with fewest windows and doors.
Faep all members of your household indoors and stay tuned to your 1
o local h p y Br * =c System radio station.
i o
Remain indoors until told by local or stata officials that it is safe to go outsida, or until further protective actions are rammmaridad.
Schools, hospitals arri other institutions in tt6 cx:neunities advised to shaltar are takim similar shaltaring actions. Officials have instructims for protectim the children or other persons in tMir care until shaltaring is no Imger r*,a==ary.
Parents and relatives are advised DQr,to call the schools or other institution, ner to drive to the sdicols to attempt to pick I
up their children. Cramunity safety will be battar protacted if the adicols are permittmi to ocziduct shaltarig activities over the next several hours.
According to State officials, farmers and dairy operators in the ccumunities of c.a 14 =h av. V - -S av.
- =
N=*mv. West N=*wv, and Newburypert, j
should:
Hove all milk-producing livestock inside a barn or other shaltar.
i l
~
Provide the animals with stored feed and water and reduce sources of outside air into their b2ildi gs.
ltwo cutside feed supplies indcors or cover them, if passible.
Store 1:ack-up supplies of water inside biild5gs and cover outdoor walls, rainbarrals, tanks or other sources of collected water.
Pleans do not uma the itz:rie except in case of personal emergency.
I If you are at home, look up the annual emergency informaticri mailed to you.
l If you are shaltaring at your we=4m1='= or other public bi41d5g, check the local +=1M book for additional information. This information oculd be useful in ts4-.
Jing future messages.
i i
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ORILl,-
GDERAL DERGENCY FE:SSAGE (S'AClaTICN AND SHELTERING: Page 4 of 4 SEASCtRL NME OF BEACHES AND WTTninE REFT.lGE)
(gRELEASE OF RADICACTn'E FRTERIAL)
(continued)
If you are at he:ne,1:ck up the annual ersge.rcy information railed to you If you are sheltering at your workplace er other public tuildits, check the 1ccal telephone bcck for additional inferration.
useful in urrierstaniing future rwtuges.
This inferration c6uld te' Parents with children attendirg school within Newtirry West Newtuv and Newturvoort are advised that their children are currently being safely raintained at school, khare they will be kept urril is determined that they can be safely ruved.
This ressage applies to all p.iblic, private and paruchial sebools and preschool facilities within the affected area. Tb avoid confusion, parents are urged ng to attempt to pick up their children at schools within the affected area.
i To repeat:
Seabruck Station has declared a General Emergency condition.
This muge will be repeated every fifteen minutes er LM1 new information is available.
official information.
Keep tuned to this EBS staticn for the latest If you are in any of the New Kmhire eastern Rockiranam Ccunty 1
cermunities, you should tune to a 1ccal radio station in New Ha=pshire for news about your ccrmunity.
j W
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l ATTACHMENT K (IP 2.5, Attachment 2) i M
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Attachmont K (Page 1 of 1)
Atendment 5 IP 2.5 Page 13 Rev. O Page 1 of 1 C0890 UNITIES AFFECTED BY PLUME EXPOSURE PROTECTIVE ACTION FLOWCHART FOR GENERAL EMERGENCY Post LOCA Monitor Wind Direction IR/Hr)
Toward*
Evacuate Shelter
< 5,"O Massachusetts Amesbury, Salisbury Close Salisbury Beach
<5,000 New Hampshire N/A N/A
>5,000 but <10,000 Massachusetts
- Amesbury, Neweury, Newburyport, Salisbury Merrimac, West Newoury Close Plum Island i
Beach and Parker River National Wildlife Refuge
>5,000 but <10,000 New Hampshire Amesbury, Newoury, Newouryport, Merrimac, Salisbury, West Newbury. Close Plum Island Beach, Salisbury Beach and Parker River National Wildlife Refuge
>10,000 Massachusetts Amesbury, Newbury, Newouryport, Merrimac, Salisbury, West Newbury
>10,000 New Hampshire
- Amesbury, Newbury, Newburyport,
' Salisbury Merrimac, West Newoury I
Close Plum Island Beach and Parker River l-National Wildlife Refuge
- Wind is considered heading toward Massachusetts if it is from NW, NNW, N, NNE, NE, ENE or E (from 304' to 101').
_____m__
____._.____m
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l ATTACHMENT L 1
(EBS Message Announcing the Revised PAR for ERPA E) l
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Attachment L (Page.1'of 3)
W heonaf
. l@
Page 1 of 3
- 1HLS IS A DRII1**
- THIS IS A DRILL **
- THIS IS A DRILL **
7-GDERAL DERGCICY MESSAGE (EVACLRTICN; SEASCNAL CICSURE OF EDGES AND WIIILIFE RE IVGE)
(RELEASE 3/E MATERIAL) l
- ,PN I
j Data Massage Releasai Tim. Massage Ral,
- g=,+
Released by:l
/A)YN
/
ffsi Resp21se DiiAL' l
A GDEPAL lared at 1:32 p.m. today at Sentrook Nuclear Power Staticr1. A GDERAL DEEGENCY means that events are in progress that could result in scas significant release of r=dir=r+1ve materials with releases expected to go beytrid levels set by the Uhitad States Envim d.41 Prota:: tion Agency outside the Seatrook Station site boundary.
A release of radioactive material into the air occurred at 1:45 p.m.
The New F=== hire Yankee Offsite hp e Organization is 1 p-ding to the problem. Massac:husetts gmu i officials have been notified.
The Governor of Mammachusetts rar-ww1ds the following actions.
Innadiata evacuation is rar==ridad for people in sa14=hw/ Ar==hrrv/
Marri::nc/ Newburv/ West Newbury/ Newburyport.
For >==hW. West Newhrev and Marr4-me* the Reception Centar is located at the Mannachusetts Electric Facility at 1101 Turnpljem Street in Na:th Andover.
For Salisbury Newbury and Newbur'@crt. the PWim Centar is at the Mannachusetts Electric Facility at 44 River Street in Beverly.
The Uhited States Coast Guard has been requestad to enforce a tarMaile safety 2cne in the ocean waters near Seabrook Staticn. All offshcre b: stars near the plant are advised to relocata or dock in waters further than ten-l Miles frGR the plant.
1 N _ a at * - +, and ruvic m== frezn R.a14 =herv to Pitan Teland, incind4 rrr the Parker River Natimal Wildlife Rafnr=, aber11d laava ttvwa arame inendiatalv.
[
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1 Attachment L (Page 2 of 3) r~
- g{IS IS A TRILL **
- g{IS IS A [EILL**
- M ts IS A DRILL **
Page 2 of 3 GDERAL IMERCENCY MESSAGE (EVACUATICNr SEASCNAL CIDSURE OF BDOEE AND WrTntTFE REMXE)
(RELEASE OF RADICE IVE MATIRIAL)
T (ccrftinued)'
Services offered at the Racepticn Centers and recxamannded for all evacuses include: unitoriruf for u cation; d.u.Ation if r=,maang; infonnation and message cantars; arri referral to congregata care cantars.
Persons in the ccumunities directed to evacuata are advised to take the"mcat ocnvenient reeds south to main routes - Route 1, Route 1A, Interstates 95 or 495 - and travel south in the direction of the Recepticn Centers.
Traffic guidas will assist you.
All schools within the connunities directed to evacuate are being evacuated to the designated Reception Centers for the ccanunity in which they are located. Parents should not drive to school to most their children since schools are now being evacuated arxi children are being taken safely by bus directly to their Reception Cantars. School children will than be sent to Cuvoyota Care Center A in Walthan where they may be picked up.
If you have been advised to evacuata but do not have your own L.r.untion arri canrot get a rida from a nai?* ce ammeria else, buses will travel along main emergency rautas to pick you up and take you to a Reception Centar. Wait for an announcement stating what time buses will begin traveling these emergency routes in your town. Ibr more information cm the bus and evacuatim reutas, look up the amargency incarnation brochures about Sealfxnk Staticn which were nailed to you.
If you have a bedrie' dan, harwiir-===4 or other person in your hee who needs Wal evacuaticr. help and who has not made previous arrangements with New F== hire Yankee, please call the New F='-Mrs Yanhos offsita Responsa E
v-cy Operatir,ns Centar at 555-1234. If you have altsedy registered, l
there is no need to call now; help will samt be cm its way.
All perscms in the area to be evacuated are urged to be good neighbors ard help one another by sharing ridas are helpire others with probleen.
If you know of any r-i?% ar hw with language ar hearing petblass, plasse check crt than to be sure they have been informed of the energency and understand what they should de.
i 4
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Attachment L (Page ] of 3)
Page 3 of 3
- THIS IS A IRILL**
- THIS IS A IRILL**
- ' DIES IS A IRILL**
GDERAL DGBGENCY HESSAGE (EVACIATICH; SEASONAL CIDSURE OF BEACHES AND W1TntTFE REEU3E)
(RELEASE OF RADICACITVE NAITRIAL)
(continued)
Before you leave your home or werim1=, naka sure you have put out all fires and cloemd fireplam dangers. Icck all doces when you leave. Take.
blankets and p411r= with you for your own una and any medicines which you regularly taka. Peck enough clothing for several days. If you are at work cutside the evacuation area, but live inside it, you any return home to m14=h thema chores and M1e family===hers or r=-ary balcrgings.
According to State officials, farmers and dairy operators in the comunities
-1* W Marri mar *, NewhW. West Mr %W, and Newburvp3rt, of h14=hW.
should:
1 eve all milk-producing livestock insida a barn or other shalt:er.
Provide the animals with sta.iui feed and water and reduce sources of cutside air into their buiMings.
Move cutsida feed supplies irxtoces or cover then, if possible.
Store back-up supplies of water inside hiildig and cover outdoor walls, rainbarrels, tanks or other sources of cc11ected water.
Please do rot use the phens emmept in anos of personal emergency.
If you are at hemu, taka with you the amual emergency informatial nailed to you, which inclu$es avecuation routes and proomdures. If these are unav=41=h1=, check the local +=!=:*wie book for additiaial informaticrt.
To repeat: Sentrook Staticut has declared a General E psy ocnditicrt.
This=====rfa will be repeated every fifteen minutes or until new infm
- im is available. IGesp tuned to this EBS statim for the latest official information.
1 If you are in afly Of the New Heinshire eastern A3ckin@iam 03unty ocuennities, you =hr=M tune to a local radio staticrt in New Hengshire for news abcut your casamity.
(
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ATTACHMENT M (Special Vehicle Dispatch Form) i M
e e
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Attachment M (Page 1 of 1)
I SPECIAL VEHICLES DISPATCH FORM O
Tcwn:
i Salisbury Dispatch Form No.:
[
Amesbury (Number sequentially) 1 Newburyport i
Merrimac Newbury i West Newburf Section A? Pick-uo information dre I~
Tefepnene Numcer:
@ Ambulance
[
North Andover i
l Wheelenair Van J 8everly l Van Section E: Discaten informatten
/
Criver/Venic:e No.
Assigned Driver:
Company Name:
(Time)
(Oate)
Peleased from Staging Area at:
C -(4, (Initials)
M Dispatened by:
1/ V t Section C: Follow-uo information Pick-up Time:
Arrival Time at thalloring/Decen Facility:
J I
I Yes I No
< a. -
l Contaminated: '-~' '
Yes if yes, Decoritaminated:
I No
?
~~
If decontamination is to be handled by hospital:
Assigned Hospital:
Time Released from Monitonng/Decon Facility:
Arrival Time at Receptlen Location:
Part I (White copy) - Olspatener Part 11 (Yellow copy) - Drtvers
==
ATTACHMENT N (ORO Mini--scenario Message 8.2-20d) e M
1 l
Attachment N (Page 1 of 1)
NHY OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MESSAGE FORM MESSAGE NO.:
ORO - 8.2-20d (Run concurrent w/ 8.2-20e) TIME: Upon FEMA Evalua-ter return to the TO:
Amesbury Special Population Liaison Staging Area as called in by the FROM:
Control Cell Simulating Special Needs Persons Staging Area Lead Controller LOCATION:
' Simulated Amesbury EOC
-- ; a;- e e a a a a a a a a a a a a;a*****THIS IS A DRILLe a-a a a a a; a a a a a a a a a---
a a a-a Hell, my name is I live in Amesbury at and I would need an ambulance to evacuate, but I am not going to move.
No, it would kill me.
I am 92 years old. What can you do?
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a;;;;;;;;;a. ;a ;;e- ;;;; ;;;eeee;- ;; ;- eee;;ee ;ee;;;;e;aae;;ae eea; aae--ee THIS IS A ORILL l
00 NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION l
I 00 NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY l
00 NOT INITIATE ACTIONS WHICH VIOLATE THE LAW a a a a ;;- ;;- a ; ; e -- ;;;;;; ; e a e ;;;; e ; ; ;;;;;;;;; e a a - ;; a e e e e e a ; ***********
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8.2-20.8 E/8.2-74 l
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d ATTACHMENT O (Amesbury Special Population Liaison's Chronological Event Log) i i
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CHRONOLOGICAL EVENT LOG i
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ATTACHMENT P (NHY ORO News Release No. 8) l
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Massacnuset:s Offsite Rescanse Organization of New Hamosnire Yankee UIIS Ib CRIII SIIS IS A DRIIL *** ':HIS IS A CRIII Release i 06 9AFF'c C-*TIPDL ESTW T*HED Page 1 of 2 NENDEIGN, N.H. - 6/28/88 - New Hampsnire Yankee's Offsite Resp 21se Cmanizaticn (NHY CRO) is urgirq retarists in Ma=ut'1usetts surrounding the seacrocx, NH area to avoid travelling t.tm.the towns of Salisci.rf, Arwnny, Merrimac, Newcury, West Newoury and Ne.turyport. h treas snould be kept free of unnarweg traffic'to facilitate the j
evacuation of ca!iW/ arn Aw, If traffic nortiteurd is nmary, notorists are'advicea to use Rt.128 to I-93.
Matcrists snould then use Route 3 or I-93'to Route 4 in New i
Hamesnire. From Route 4. in Dover, s. -- i to Kittery using Route 226, then j
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taka I-95 North.
x New Hmmnire Yankee's G vill continue to tenitcr the situation at Seabeccx Stat:Lon;. additional traffic control measures will..be armunced as
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they harme Fry.
N For tha. latest infcrmtion, Ma==aequsetts. residents should listan.to their local-hw=cp Broaocast System radio station: WIXMM (92.5) and WHAV-AM (1490)'...
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.7 To adL.wirdmars ard questicns,itell-free nutters have been established for Massachusetts residents.g 'Itase shouldlbe used to check questionable information about the emergency.
,WN To receive informatiantMassachusetts Insidents can call 1-800-111-2222.
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For X M inforationMsbation errriitions oniv, residents can call 1-800-111-2n21:"..
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.u.M IM=tiemm drag Masachuretts, residents can call i
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For re. information uhdng New Fa=*iire, residents can can
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Massachusetts Offsite Resocnse Organization of New Hamosnire Yankee Page 2 cf 2 14aurers of the media with cuestions on tra New Harmriire Yankee NHY 090 can call 1-800-111-2223. Mencers of the mecia are urged to ccme to the 14adia Center in Newmgten, N.H.
':HIS IS A DRIIL*
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ATTACHMENT Q i
(Diagram of Durham Access Control Post IV-1)
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