ML20238E588

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Proposed Tech Specs,Permitting Use of Functioning Channels of Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) W/One or More TIP Measurement Locations Inaccessible or Inoperable
ML20238E588
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle  
Issue date: 09/04/1987
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20238E584 List:
References
NUDOCS 8709150086
Download: ML20238E588 (13)
v • d • e


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INSTRUMENTATION i %

I' TRAVERS 1NG IN-CURE PROBE SYSTEM

.1 LIMITING CCNDITION FOR OPERAT.'ON (TIP)

The traversing in-core probe" system shall be OPERABLE with:

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3.3.7.7.

++ve hable detectors, drives and readout equipment to map the cor*x ***~ in fhe required measun: men} foca+iont and a.

m ;m Indexing equipment to allow all fL4*e detectors to be calibrated in b.

a common location.

required When the traversing in-core probe is used for:

APPLICABILITY:

  • a Recalibration of the LPRM detectors, and l

t Monitoring the APLHGR, LHGR, MCPR, or MFLPD.

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1 The traversing in-core prebe systers shall be demonstrated CPERABLE by 4.3.7.7 normalizing each of the above required detector outputs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to use for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

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i "Only the detector (s) in the required measurement location (s) us required i

to be OPERABLE.

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3/4 3-73 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 e

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LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 1 INSERT A - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE 3/4 3-73 ACTION:

i a.

With one or more TIP measurement locations inoperable, required I

measurements may be performed as described in 1 and 2 below, provided the reactor core is operatii.g in an octant symmetric control rod pattern, and the total core TIP uncertainty for the present cycle has been measured to be less than 8.7 percent.

1.

TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from that string's redundant (symmetric) counterpart l

if the substitute TIP data was obtained from an operable measurement location.

2.

TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from a 3-dimensional BWR core simulator code normalized with available operating measurements, provided the

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total number of simulated channels (measurement locations) does not exceed; a) All channels of a single TIP machine, or b) A total of five channels if more than one TIP machine is involved.

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Otherwise, with the TIP system inoperable, suspend use of the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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.,A, INSTRUMENTATION BASES MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) 3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRI"'tNTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor I

and assess important variables following an accident. This capability is con-sistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations."

3/4.3.7.6 SOURCE RANGE MONITORS The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown.

At these power levels, reactivity additions should not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the inter-mediate range monitors are on scale adequate information is available without i.

the SRMs and they can be retracted.

3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSIfj,G_IN-COREPROBESYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core prebe# system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from Jse of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribu-tion of the reactor core.

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3/4.3.7.8 AMMONIA DETECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the ammonia detection system ensures that an accidental ammonia release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated to provide protection for control room person-nel. Upon detection of a high concentration of ammonia, the control room I

emergency ventilation system will automatically be placed in the recirculation J

mode of operation to provide the required protection.

The detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.78 " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release."

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate This l

j warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires.

capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early

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Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to stages.

safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility

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fire protection program.

I LA SALLE UNIT - 1 B 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 38 1

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LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 1 INSERT B - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE B 3/4 3-5 The specification allows-use of substituted TIP data from symmetric

. channels if the control rod pattern is symmetric since the TIP data is adjusted by the plant computer to remove machine dependent and power level dependent bias.

The. source of data for the substitution may also'be a l-3-dimensional real data. Since uncertainty could be introduced by the simulation and normalization process, an evaluation of the. specific control rod pattern and core operating state must be performed to ensure that

. adequate margin to core operating ~1imits is maintained.

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INSTRUMENTATION TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Tse)

The traversing in-core probe # system shall 6e OPERABLE with:

3.3.7.7.

-f4ekvable detectors, drives and readout equipment to map the a.

and in ne regwred measurement /ocahons,and core x required Indexing equipment to allow all 44us. detectors to be calibrated in b.

a common location.

APPLICABILITY: Wren the traversing in-core probe is used for:

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' Recalibration of the LPRM detectors, and

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Monitoring the APLHGR, LHGR, MCPR, or MFLPD.

ACTION:

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6ps:!"icati;ns 2.0.0 ;nd 2.0.4 are as; epp!icaMe.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT $

The traversing in-core probe system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by normalizing each of the above required detector outputs within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior 4.3.7.7 to use for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

  • 0nly tne cetector(s) in the required measurement location (s) are required to be OPERABLE.

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3/4 3-73 LA SALLE - UNIT 2

LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 2 INSERT A - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE 3/4 3-73

- ACTION:

a.

With one or more T1P measurement locations inoperable, required measurement may be performed as described in 1 and 2 below, provided the reactor core is operating in an octant symmetric control rod pattern, and the total core TIP Uncertainty for the present cycle has been measured to be less than 8.7 percent.

1.

TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from that string's redundant (symmetric) counterpart if the substitute TIP data was obtained from an operable measurement location.

2.

TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from a 3-dimensional BWR core simulator code normalized with available operating measurements, provided the total number of simulated channels (measurement locations) does not exceed:

a) All channels of a single TIP machine, or b) A total of five channels if more than one TIP machine is involved.

b.

Otherwise, with the TIP system inoperable, suspend use of the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

c.

The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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. INSTRUMENTATION BASES' t

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)'

3/4.3.7.5 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring. instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor

- and assess,important variables following an accident. This capability is con-sistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, " Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," December 1975 and NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations".

3/4.3.7.6' SOURCE RANGE MONITORS, The source range monitors provide the operator with information of the status of the neutron level in the core at very low power levels during startup and shutdown. At these power levels, reactivity additions should not be made without this flux level information available to the operator. When the intee-mediate range monitors are on scale adequate information is available without{

e the SRMs and they can be retracted.

j 3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM (f'h Y

The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core prebe system inith the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained fits use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron ficx distribu-tion of the reactor core.

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3/4.3.7.8 /NMONIA DETECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the ammonia detection system ensures that an accidental ammonia release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically ~ initiated to provide protection for control room per-l sonnel.

Upon detection of a high concentration of ammonia, the control room l

emergency ventilation system will automatically be placed in the recirculation mode of operation to provide the required protection.

The detection systems required by this specification are consistent with the recommendations of Regula-tory Guide 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Ouring a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release."

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION I

. OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires. This

' capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages.

Prompt detection of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

j' LA SALLE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 20 i

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1 LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 2 INSERT B - TECl!NICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE B'3/4 3-5 b

The specification allows use of, substituted TIP data from symmetric channels if the' control rod pattern is symmetric since the TIP. data is

' adjusted by the plant computer to remove machine dependent and power level

' dependent bias. The source of data for the substitution may.also be's

. 3-dimensional BWR, core. simulator calculated data set which.is. normalized to

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available real data. 'Since uncertainty could be introduced.by.the-simulation ~and normalization process,; ar. evaluation of the' specific control rod pattern and core operating state must be performed to ensure that adequate margin to core operating limits is maintained.

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0 4 i ATTACHMENT C l

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REOUEST LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 and 2 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDP. RATION m

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4 commonwealth Edison hrs cvsluated the proposed Technical Sp:cific: tion Am:ndm:nts cnd determinzd that thsy do not repressnt h:zards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendments will not:

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:

l This change does not involve any safety system and does not affect the operation of any equipment. The primary containment isolation function (TIP withdrawal) is not affecterd. The TIP system is not safety related. This change does not change the fundamental process involved in calibrating neutron instrumentation (LPRMs), but requires that only the equipment associated with the TIP channels necessary for recalibrating LPRMs and for core monitoring functions be operable.

Collection and storage of TIP data without using all TIP channels is allowed because TIP machine normalization factors are ultimately derived from the most recent full core TIP set, which intercalibrates the TIP machines in a common core location. The use of symmetric detectors and, analytical values as substitute data in inaccessible TIP channels does not compromise the ability of the computer to accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The core monitoring methodology is presently based on symmetry of rod patterns and fuel loading. This is not changed, but extended to use a higher order of symmetry (octant symmetry) which exists with " type A" sequence rod patterns. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability' or consequences of an accident.

2) Create the possibility of a naw or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

The inoperability of the TIP system or portions thereof has no effect on any accident initiator. Therefore, no new or different kind of acci' 3t is postulated to occur, j

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3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because, j

The previously measured uncertainties are within the assumptions of the l

licensing basis. When not using redundant channels, evaluations will be I

performed to ensure the uncertainty is within the licensing basis assumptions. The ability of the computer to accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reacotr core is not compromised. Therefore, the margin of safety is maintained within previously reviewed limits.

Guidance has been provided in 51 FR 7744 (example vi) for the application of standards to license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards considerations.

In this case, however, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident and no reduction in the safety margin. Based on the preceding discussion, it is concluded that the proposed amendments clearly fall within all acceptable criteria with respect to the system or components, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the margin of safety will not be decreased. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(e), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

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