ML20238B683
| ML20238B683 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1987 |
| From: | Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8709010347 | |
| Download: ML20238B683 (52) | |
Text
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August 27, 1987 b'/
Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9, NPF-17 Du.ke Power Company t, ATTN:
Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) has recently completed an assessment of your Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for McGuire 1 and 2 as a part of the NRC's Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program.
This assessment was performed to support a SALP period of March 1, 1986, to July 31, 1987, and is being f orwarded at this time for your use and information in order to pattern future i
submittals.
l The summary to the report highlights the findings of the evaluation.
This is the j
second evaluation of McGuire 1 and 2 LERs.
Compared to the first evaluation, there has been an overall increase in quality.
There was a significant improvement in the quality of discussion of safety consequences.
The quality of discussions of operator actions and safety system responses remains very high.
Details of these findings, together with some items for attention, are discussed in the body of the evaluation report.
l Please let us know if you have any questions.
Sincerely, Original Signed by l
Luis A. Reyes Luis A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
LER Quality Evaluation for McGuire 1 and 2 cc w/ encl:
T. L. McConnell, Station Manager Senior Resident Inspector - Catawba bcc w/ encl:
&LNRC Resident Inspector, McGuire Document Control Desk State of North Carolina T. Peebles, RII g p-, ; Y,,, 30
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1 ENCLOSURE l
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i LICENSEE EVDTP REwtc (IER)
QUALITY EVAIDATICH FOR 1
MCGUIRE 1,2 l
DJRDG 'IHE PERIOD FROM MARCH 1 1986 TO JUIX 31 1987
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SUMMARY
An evaluation of the content and quality of a representative sample of the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted by McGuire 1,2 during the period from March 1, 1986 to July 31, 1987 was performed.
This evaluation provides an overview of the quality of the LERs by comparing their contents to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(b) and the guidelines contained in NUREG-1022 and its Supplements Nos. I and 2.
This is the second time the McGuire LERs have been evaluated using this methodology.
The results of this evaluation indicate that the overall quality of the McGuire LERs, for the three areas that are evaluated (i.e.,
the text, abstract, and coded fields), has improved from the previous evaluation.
The first evaluation's overall average LER score was 8.3, which was above the industry average (7.7) at that time.
For the current evaluation, McGuire's overall average LER score is 8.9, while the current industry average has increasad to 8.4.
This indicates that the licensee is keeping pace with the overall industry's efforts to provide LERs of consistently high quality. The quality of the discussions concerning.
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safety consequences and operator actions has increased since the previous l
l evaluation.
Two deficie.:ies found in this evaluation concern the requirements to j
discuss the corrective actions and to adequately identify failed l
components.
The score *for the corrective actions decreased somewhat since the previous evaluation.
The score for the requirement to identify those components that failed (e.g., by manufacturer and model number) increased from the previous evaluation but is still considered inadequate.
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c LER QUALITY EVALUATION FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 i
INTRODUCTION 1
In order to evaluate the overall quality of the contents of the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) submitted by McGuire 1,2 during the period from March 1, 1986 to July 31, 1987, a sample of the unit's LERs was evaluated.
This evaluation was performed by comparing the contents of each LER to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(b) and the guidelines 1
2 and 2.3 The contained in NUREG-1022 and its Supplements Nos. 1 sample consists of a total of 15 LERs, which is considered to be the maximum number of LERs necessary to be evaluated for a unit / station.
See Appendix A for a list of the LER numbers in the sample.
This is the second time that the McGuire LERs have been evaluated i
using the same methodology. As before, it was necessary to start the evaluation before the end of the assessment period because the input was due such a short time after the end of the assessment period. Therefore, those LERs prepared by the unit late in the assessment period were not available for selection.
METHODOLOGY The evaluation consists of a detailed review of each selected LER to determine how well the content of its text, abstract, and coded fields meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(b).
In addition, each selected LER is l
compared to the guidance for preparation of LERs presented in NUREG-1022 and Supplements No. I and 2 to NUREG-1022; based on this comparison, suggestions were developed for improving the quality of the LERs.
The purpose of this evaluation is to provide feedback to improve the quality of LERs.
It is not intended to increase the requirements concerning the
" content" of these reports beyond the current requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(b).
Therefore, statements in this evaluation that suggest 1
measures be taken are not intended to' increase requirements and should be viewed in'that light.
However, the minimum requirements of the regulation must be met.
The evaluation process for each LER is divided into two parts. The first part of the evaluation consists of documenting comments specific to the content and presentation of each LER.
The second part consists of determining a score (0-10 points) for the text, abstract, and coded fields of each LER.
The LER specific comments serve two purposes:
(1) they point out what the analyst s considered to be the specific deficiencies or observations concerning the information pertaining to the event, and (2) they provide a basis for a count of general deficiencies for the overall sample of LERs that was evaluated.
Likewise, the scores serve two purposes:
(1) they serve to illustrate in numerical terms how the analysts perceived the content of the information that was presented, and (2) they provide a basis for determining an overall score for each LER.
The overall score for each LER is the result of combining the scores for the text, abstract, and coded fields (i.e., 0.6 x text score + 0.3 x abstract score + 0.1_x coded fields score = overall LER score).
The results of the LER quality evaluation are divided into two categories:
(1) detailed information and (2) summary information. The cetailed information, presented in Appendices A through D, consists of LER sample information (Appendix A), a table of the scores for each sample LER (Appendix B), tables of the number of deficiencies and observations for the text, abstract and coded fields (Appendix C), and comment sheets containing narrative statements concerning the contents of each LER (Appendix D).
When referring to Appendix 0, the reader is cautioned not to try to directly cor elate the number of comments on a comment sheet with the LER j
scores, as the analysts have flexibility to consider the magnitude of a deficiency when assigning scores (e.g., the analysts sometimes make comments relative to a requirement without deducting points for that 1
requirement).
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RESULTS A discussion of the analysts' conclusions concerning LER quality is presented below. These conclusions are based solely on the results of the evaluation of the contents of the LERs selected for review and as such represent the analysts' assessment of the unit's performance (on a scale of 0 to 10) in submitting LERs that meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(b) and the guidance present in NUREG-1022 and its supplements.
Table 1 presents the average scores fo the sample of LERs evaluated for the unit. In order to place the scores provided in Table 1 ir, perspective, the distribution of the overall average score for all units / stations that have been evaluated using the current methodology is provided on Figure 1.
Figure 1 is updated each month to reflect any changes in this distribution resulting from the inclusion of data for those units / stations that have not been previously evaluated or those that have i
been reevaluated.
(Note: The previous score for those units / stations that
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are reevaluated is replaced with the score from the latest evaluation).
Table 2 and Appendix Table B-1 provide a summary of the information that is the basis for the average scores in Table 1.
For example, McGuire's
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average score for the text of the LERs that were evaluated is 9.1 out of a possible 10 points.
From Table 2 it can be seen that the text score actually results from the review and evaluation of 17 different requirements ranging from the discussion of plant operating conditions prior to the event [10 CFR 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(A)] to text presentation.
The resultant percentage scores in the text summary section of Table 2 provide an indication of how well each text requirement was addressed by the unit for the 15 LERs that were evaluated.
Based on similar methodology, the percentage scores for the various sections of the abstract and the items in the coded fields were also computed and are shown in Table 2.
As indicated in Table 2, certain requirements or areas within the text, abstract, and coded fitids are causing the unit difficulty when preparing LERs. Relatively low percentage scores may indicate that the unit needs additional guidance concerning these requirements, or it may indicate that the unit understands the basic requirement but has either:
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TABLE 1.
SUMMARY
OF SCORES FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 Average High Low Text 9.1 9.9 7.5 Abstract 8.5 10.0 5.5 1
i Coded Fields 9.3 10.0 8.5 1
Overall 8.9 9.9 7.8 1
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See Appendix B for a summary of. scores for each LER that was evaluated.
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TABLE 2.
LER REQUIREMENT PERCENTAGE SCORES F0F MCGUIRE 1,2 TEXT 1
Percentage a
requirements [50.73(b)] - Descriptions Scores ( )
l (2)t;;)(A)
- - Plant condition prior to event 93 (15)
(2)(;;)(b)
- - Inoperable equipment that contributed b
(2)(;1)(C)
- - Date(s) and approximate time (s) 93 (15)
I (2)(ii)(D)
- - Root cause and intermediate cause(s) 88 (15) i
- Mode, mechanism, and effect 98 ( 7) l (2)(ii)(E)
(2)(ii)(F)
- - EIIS codes 63 (15) l (2)(ii)(G)
- - Secondary function affected b
(2)(1;)(H)
- - Estimate of unavailability 86 ( 7) i (2)(11)(I)
- - Method of discovery 100 (15) l I
(2)(ii)(J)(1) - Operator actions affecting course 100 ( 8) l l
(2)(li)(J)(2) - Personnel error (procedural deficiency) 88 (10) l (2)(ii)(K)
- - Safety system responses 100 ( 8)
(2)(i:)(L)
- - Manufacturer and model no. information 68 ( 7) j (3) - ----
- Assessment of safety consequences 99 (15)
(4) - - -- - - Corrective actions 85 (15) i (5) - - - - - - Previous similar event information 93 (15) i
(.2 ) ( ; ;
- - - - Text presentation 92 (15) l l
l ABSTEACT Percentage a
l Requirements [50.73(b)(1)] - Descriptions Scores ( )
- Major occurrences (immediate cause/effect) 98 (15) i
- Plant / system / component / personnel responses 88 ( 8)
- Root cause information 83 (15) l l
- Corrective action information 72 (15) 1
- Abstract presentation 83 (15) l I
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TABLE 2.
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CODED FIELDS Percentage a
Item Number (s) - Descriptions Scores ( )
1, E,
and 3 -
Plant name(unit #), docket #,
page #s 100 (15) j 4- - - ---
Title 76 (15) 5, 6,
and 7 -
Event date, LER no.,
report date 98 (15) 8------
Other facilities involved 100 (15) 9 and 10 Operating mode and power level 100 (15) l l
11 Reporting requirements 100 (15) 12 Licensee contact information 100 (15) 13 Coded component failure information 93 (15) 14 and 15 - -
Supplemental report information 97 (15) l a.
Percentage scores are the result of dividing the total points fer a requirement by the number of points possible for that requirement.
(Note:
Some requirements are not applicable to all LERs; therefore, the number of points possible was adjusted accordingly.)
The number in parenthesis is the number of LERs for which the requirement was considered applicable, b.
A percentage score for this requirement is meaningless as it is not possible to determine from the information available to the analyst whether this requirement is applicable to a specific LER.
It is always given 100*4 if it is provided and is always considered "not applicable" when it is not.
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(1) excluded certain less significant information from a number of the discussions concerning that requirement or (2) totally failed to address the requirement in one or two of the selected LERs. The unit should review f
the LER specific comments presented in Appendix 0 to determine why it received less than a perfect score for certain requirements.
Specific Deficiencies and Observations The more important deficiencies and observations.for the text, y
abstract, and coded field sections of the LERs are discussed separately below.
Text Deficiencies and Observations The discussions of corrective actions, Requirement 50.73(b)(4), are considered to be marginal for eight of the 15 discussions as they lacked certain information necessary to a complete discussion.
Four of these eight failed to adequately discuss those actions that appeared necessary to prevent recurrenct of the event; two failed to adequately discuss the generic implications of the failure or error; and one failed to adequately discuss the immediate corrective actions.
Corrective actions, both immediate and planned, should be discussed for all causes ider.tified in an LER.
The requirement to provide adequate identification for failed components, Requirement 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(L), was considered deficient in four of the seven LERs involving a failed component.
In most cases this requirement can be met by simply providing both the manufacturer and model number for each failed component.
For certain components (e.g., pipes, i
fitting, et'c.) the material and size of the failed component may be more appropriate information. Whatever information is provided, it should be specific enough to allow the reader to determine if the failed component is the same as one that is used at his facility.
In addition, there are instances when component identification can be important to the reader, even though the component did not fail.
For example, if the design of a component contributes to the event, it would be helpful to provide 8
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information that would enable others to specifically identify that component.
I The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes were not provided for the components mentioned in nine of the 15 LERs, and another LER failed to include any EIIS codes.
These codes should be provided for all components and systems referred to in the text.
> Abstract Deficiencies and Observations While there are no specific requirements for an abstract, other than those given in 10 CFR 50.73(b)(1), an abstract should, as stated in 4
NUREG-1022, Supplement No. 2, summarize the following information from the text:
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1.
Cause/Effect What happened that made the event reportable.
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Responses Major plant, system, and personnel responses as a result of the event.
3.
Root / Intermediate The underlying cause of the event. What Cause caused the component and/or system failure or the personnel error.
4.
Corrective Actions What was done immediately to restore the I
plant to a safe and stable condition and what was done or planned to prevent recurrence of the event.
Items 1 and 2 above had acceptable scores; but the cause summaries were inadequate in eight LERs; and the corrective actions summaries were inadequate in ning LERs.
Summarizing all corrective actions and causes discussed in the text will help eliminate many of the problems found.
Eight of the abstracts were deficient in the area of presentation.
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The use of a more concise summary would have improved the abstract score for the four LERs that exceeded the specified maximum length of 1400 spaces; while three abstracts failed to use the space available to provide the nuessary information.
l Coded Fields Deficiencies and Observations The main deficiency in the area of coded fields involves the titles, Item (4). Nine of the 15 titles failed to include adequate cause information, two failed to include the result of the event and three failed
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l to include the link between the cause and the result.
While the result is considered to be the most important part of the title, cause and link information (as suggested in NUREG-1022, Supplement No. 2) must be included l
to make a title complete.
Example titles are presented in Appendfx D for many of the LERs which were considered to have poor titles.
SUMMARY
l Table 3 provides a summary of the areas that need improvement for the McGuire LERs.
For additional and more specific information concerning deficiencies, the reader should refer to the information presented in Appendices C and D.
General guidance concerning requirements can be found i
in NUREG-1022, and NUREG-1022 Supplements No. I and 2.
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As was mentioned earlier, this is the second time that the McGuire i
I LERs have been evaluated using the same methodology.
The previous evaluation was reported in March of 1986.
Table 4 provides a comparison of I
the scores for both evaluations.
Improvements in the information provided for nearly all the requirements resulted in increased scores for the texts, the abstracts, and the coded fields.
The overall average LER score of 8.9 remains above the current industry overall average of 8.4.
(Note: The ind:.stry overall average is the result of averaging the latest overall average LER score for each unit / station that has been evaluated using this methodology.)
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TABLE 3.
AREAS MOST NEEDING. IMPROVEMENT FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 LERs Areas Comments
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1 Corrective actions All actions planned or taken to address the various causes (problems) mentioned in the text should be discussed, especially those j
actions considered necessary to prevent recurrence of the event or similar events'.
l Manufacturer and model number Component identification information should be included in the text whenever a.
i component fails.
In addition, (although not specifically required by the current regulation) it would be helpful to identify a component if its design is suspected of contributing to the event.
EIIS codes EIIS codes should be provided in the text for each component or system referred to in the text.
Abstracts Cause and corrective action information from the text should be mentioned in the abstract. Discuss all information in the text that is to be summarized in the abstract.
Be sure to use the full space available, but abstracts should not exceed
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1400 spaces in length.
Coded fields a.
~itles Titles should be written such that they better describe the event.
In particular, cause should be included in each title.
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TABLE 4.
COMPARISON OF LER SCORES FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 Report Date March-86 August-87 Text average 8.4 9.1 Abstract average 7.9 8.5 Coded fields average 8.3 9.3 Overall LER average 8.3 8.9 4
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REFERENCES 1.
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Licensee Event Report System, NUREG-1022, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, i
September 1983.
2.
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Licensee Event Report System, NUREG-1022 Supplement No.1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1984.
i 3.
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Licensee Event j
Report System, NUREG-1022 Supplement No. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1985.
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e APPDIDIX A E N SEIICTIQi INFOIMATIQi M N 1,2 l
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'.f TABIE A-1.
IER SAMPIE SEIECTION'FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 Sample Number IER Number Unit Number Cwme.nts 1
86-007-00 1
SGAM, ESF 1
2 86-008-00 1
3 86-014-00 1
ESF 6
4 86-018-01 1
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5 86-019-00 1
1 6
87-004-00 1
SGAM J
7 A7-005-00 1
1 1
8 87-008-00 1
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86-007-00 2
ESF 10 86-008-00 2
l 11 86-014-00 2
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1 12 86-020-01 2
ESF 13 86-021-00 2
SGAM, ESF I
14 87-003-00 2
SGAM, ESF j
15 87-005-00 2
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APPDOIX B 1
i EVAIllATICH SCORES OF l
INDIVIDUAL LERS FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 i
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TABLE B-1.
EVALUATION SCORES OF INDIVIDUAL LERS FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 a
LER Sample Number 1
2 3
4 5
6 7
E Text 9.7 9.2 9.8 8.3 9.2 8.8 9.3 9.9 Abstract 9.1 8.8 9.3 8.8 7.0 5.5 9.5 10.0 Coded Fields 9.9 10.0 8.5 8.8 9.0 10.0 9.5 9.5 Overall 9.5 9.1 9.5 8.5 8.5 7.9 9.4 9.9 a
LER Sample Number l
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Average Text 9.4 9.3 9.5 9.8 8.8 8.8 7.5 9.1 l
Abstract 9.2 8.9 8.4 7.7 9.4 7.4 8.1 8.5 1
Coded Fields 9.0 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.0 9.3 l
Overall 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.4 7.8 8.9 See Appendix A for a list of the corresponding LER nun.bers.
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1 APPDIDIX C l
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l DEFICIDCl MID OBSERVATIGJ l
COUNIS EDR MCGUIRE 1,2
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TABLE C-1.
TEXT DEFICIENCIES AND OBSERVATIONS FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)'b a
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(A)--Plant operating 1 (15) conditions before the event were not included or were inadequate.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(B)--Discussion of the status 0 ( 4) of the structures, coa;onents, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contribu ed to the event was not included or was inadequate.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C)--Failure to include 4 (15) sufficient date and/or time information, a.
Date information was insufficient.
3 b.
Time information was insufficient.
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50.73(b)(2)(ii)(0)--The root and/or 7 (15)
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intermediate cause of the component or system failure was not included or was 1
inadequate, a.
Cause of component failure was not 6
included or was inadequate.
b.
Cause of system failure was not 1
j included or was inadequate.
l 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(E)--The f ailure mode, 1 ( 7) mechanism (immediate cause), and/or effect (consequence) for each failed component was not included or was inadequate.
a.
Failure mode was not included or was 0
inadequate.
b.
Mechanism (immediate cause) was not 0
included or was inadequate.
c.
Effect (consequence) was not included 1
or was inadequate.
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TABLE C-1.
(continued)
Number of LERs with Deficiencies and
'Obse rva tion s Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)b a
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry 10(15) l Identification System component function identifier for each component or system was not included.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(Gj--For a failure of a
--(--)
component with multiple functions, a list of systems or secondary functions which were also affected was not included or was inadequate.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(H)--For a failure that 1 ( 7) rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, the estimate of elapsed time from the time of the failure until the train was returned to service was not
- included,
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i 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(I)--The method of discovery 0 (15) l of each component failure, system failure, I
personnel error, or procedural error was not
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included or was inadequate.
a.
Method of discovery for each component failure was not included or was inadequate.
i b.
Method of discovery for each system l
failure was not included or was inadequate.
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Method of discovery for each personnel error was not included or
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was inadequate.
d.
Method of discovery for each procedural error was not included or l
was inadequate.
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TABLE C-1.
(continued)
Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)b a
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(1)--Operator actions that 0 ( 8) affected the course of the event including i
operator errors and/or procedural deficiencies were not included or were inadequate.
50 73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2)--The discussion of 5 (10) each personnel error was not included or was l
inadequate, a.
OBSERVATION: A personnel error was 2
implied by the text, but was not explicitly stated.
b.
- 50. 73( b)( 2 )( i i )(J )( 2)( i )--Di scu s si on 0
as to whether the personnel error was cognitive or procedural was not included or was inadequate.
c.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2)(ii)--Discussion 0
as to whether the personnel error was contrary to an approved procedure, was a direct result of an error in an approved procedure, or was associated with an activity or task that was not covered by an approved procedure was not included or was inadequate.
d.
- 50. 73( b)( 2 )( i i )(J )( 2)( i i i )--Di sc us s i on 0
of any unusual characterist'ics of the work location (e.g., heat, noise) that directly contributed to the personnel error was not included or was inadequate, e.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2)(iv)--Discussion 3
of the type of personnel involved (i.e., contractor personnel, utility licensed operator, utility nonlicensed operator, other utility personnel) was not included or was inadequate.
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i TABLE C-1.
(continued)
Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub parag aph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals' Totals (
)b 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(K)--Automatic and/or manual 0 ( 8) safety system responses were not included or were inadequate.
50.73(b)(2)(11)(L)--The manufacturer and/or 4 ( 7) model number of each failed component was not included or was inadequate.
50.73(b)(3)--An assessment of the safety 0 (15) consequences and implications of the event was not included or was inadequate.
a.
OBSERVATION:
The availability of other systems or components capable of mitigating the consequences of the event was not discussed.
If no other systems or comocnents were available, the text should state that none existed.
b.
OBSERVATION:
The consequences
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of the event had it occurred under l
more severe conditions were not discussed.
If the event occurred under what were considered the most severe conditions, the text should so state.
50.73(b)(4)--A discussion of any corrective 8 (15) actions planned as a result of the event including those to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the future j
was not included or was inadequate.
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TABLE C-1.
(continued)
Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)b i
a a.
A discussion of actions required to I
correct the problem (e.g., return the component or system to an operational condition or correct the personnel error) was not included or was inadequate.
b.
A discussion of actions required to 4
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reduce the probability of recurrence of the problem or similar event (correct the root cause) was not included or was inadequate.
c.
OBSERVATION: A discussion of actions 2
required to prevent similar failures in similar and/or other systems (e.g.,
correct the faulty part in all components with the same manufacturer and model number) was not included or was inadequate.
50.73(b)(5)--Information concerning previous 2 (15) similar events was not included or was inadequate.
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I TABLE C-1.
(continued)
Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)b a
50.73(b)(2)(i)--Text presentation 7 (15) inadequacies.
a.
OBSERVATION: A diagram would have 0
aided in understanding the text j
discussion.
j b.
Text contained undefined acronyms 5
and/or plant specific designators.
c.
The text contains other specific 2
deficiencies relating to the j
1 readabil1ty.
i The "sub paragraph total" is a tabulation of specific deficiencies or a.
observations within certain requirements.
Since an LER can have more than one deficiency for certain requirements, (e.g., an LER can be deficient in the area of both date and time information), the sub paragraph totals do
~
not necessarily add up to the paragraph total.
b.
The " paragraph total" is the number of LERs that have one or more requirement deficiencies or observations.
The number in parenthesis is the number of LERs for which the requirement was considered applicable.
1 l
I i
1 C-6 w
i l
TABLE C-2.
ABSTRACT DEFICIENCIES AND OBSERVATIONS FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 l
Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)b a
A summary of occurrences (immediate cause 2(15) and effect) was not included or was inadequate.
A summary of plant, system, and/or personnel 1 ( 8) responses was not included or was inadequate.
a.
Summary of plant responses was not 0
included or was inadequate.
b.
Summary of system responses was not 1
included or was inadequate.
c.
Summary of personnel responses was not 0
included or was inadequate.
I A summary of the root cause of the event 8 (15) was not included or was inadequate.
A summary of the corrective actions taken or 9 (15) planned as a result of the event was not included or was inadequate.
j l
l C-7 1
L
TABLE C-2.
(continued) i Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals' Totals (
)b Abstract presentation inadequacies.
8 (15) a.
OBSERVATION:
The abstract contains 0
information not included in the text.
The abstract is intended to be a summary of the text, therefore, the text should discuss all information summarized in the abstract.
b.
The abstract was greater than 4
1400 spaces.
c.
The abstract contains undefined 0
acronyms and/or plant specific designators.
d.
The abstract contains other specific 4
deficiencies (i.e., poor summarization, contradictions,etc.).
The "sub paragraph total" is a tabulation of specific deficiencies or a.
observations within certain requirements.
Since an LER can have more than one deficiency for certain requirements, the sub paragraph totals do not necessarily add up to the paragraph total.
b.
The " paragraph total" is the number of LERs that have one or more deficiency or observation.
The number in parenthesis is the number of LERs for which a certain requirement was considered applicable.
C-8 I
t
TABLE C-3.
CODED FIELDS DEFICIENCIES AND OBSERVATIONS FOR MCGUIRE 1,2 Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)b a
Facility Name 0 (15) a.
Unit number was not included or incorrect.
b.
Name was not included or was incorrect.
c.
Additional unit numbers were included but not required.
Docket Number was not included or was 0 (15) incorrect.
Page Number was not included or was 0 (15) incorrect.
Title was left blank or was inadequate.
11(15) a.
Root cause was not given or was 9
~
inadequate.
b.
Result (effect) was r,ut oen or 2
was inadequate.
c.
Link was not given or was 3
inadequat'.
Event Date 0 (15) a.
Date not included or was incorrect.
b.
Discovery date given instead of event date.
LER Number was not included or was incorrect.
0 (15)
Report Date 1(15) a.
Date not included.
I b.
OBSERVATION:
Report date was not 0
within thirty days of event date (or discovery date if appropriate).
C-9
f I
1
=
TABLE C-3.
(continued) 1 Number of LERs with' Deficiencies and Observations
)
Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Total s - (
)b a
Other Facilities information in field is 0 (15) inconsistent with text and/or abstract.
l Operating Mode was not included or was 0 (15) i inconsistent with text or abstract.
I Power level was not included or was 0 (15) inconsistent with text or abstract.
Reporting Requirements-0(15) a.
The reason for checking the "0THER" requirement was not specified in the abstract and/or text.
b.
OBSERVATION:
It may have been more appropriate to report the event under a different paragraph.
c.
OBSERVATION:
It may have been
~
appropriate to report this event under an additional unchecked paragraph.
I Licensee Contact 0 (15) a.
Field left blank, b.
Position title was not included.
c.
Name was not included.
d.
Phone number was not included.
Coded Component Failure Information 3 (15) a.
One or more component failure 0
i sub-fields were left blank.
b.
Cause, system, and/or component code 2
i is inconsistent with text.
c.
Component failure field contains data 0
when no component failure occurred.
d.
Component failure occurred but entire 2
field left blank.
l C-10 l
L.
TABLE C-3.
(continued)
Number of LERs with Deficiencies and Observations Sub paragraph Paragraph Description of Deficiencies and Observations Totals Totals (
)b a
Supplemental Report 2 (15) a.
Neither "Yes"/"No" block of the 0
supplemental report field was checked.
b.
The block checked was inconsistent 2
with the text.
Expected submission date information is 0 (15) inconsistent with the block checked in Item (14),
The "sub paragraph total" is a tabulation of specific deficiencies or a.
observations within certain requirements.
Since an LER can have more than one deficiency for certain requirements, the sub paragraph totals do not necessarily add up to the paragraph total.
b.
The " paragraph total" is the number of LERs that have one or more requirement deficiencies or observations.
The number in parenthesis is the number of LERs for which a certain requirement was considered applicable.
C-11
~
l l
I i
l 1
l 1
1 j
i 4
l l
1 l
l
'l APPDIDIX D MCGJIRE 1,2
TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 1 (369)
Section Comments l
1.
LER Number: 86-007-00 Scores: Text = 9.7 Abstract = 9.1 Coded Fields = 9.9 Overall = 9.5 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes for each component referred to in the text were not included.
2.
Acronym (s) and/or plant specific designator (s) are-undefined (e.g., PORV wasn't defined).
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary _of root cause is not included.
The fact that the fuse failure was probably a j
manufacturing defect was not mentioned.
j i
Coded Fields 1.
Item (13)--Cause, system, and/or component code l
appears inconsistent with information provided in the j
text. The proper EIIS code for a fuse is "FU".
l l
9 D-1
'.i
i TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC'LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 1 (369) l Section Comments 2.
LER Number:
86-008-00 Scores:
Text = 9.2 Abstract = 8.8 Coded Fields = 10.0 Overall = 9.1 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C)--When are the pressure and level instrumentation impulse line compression' fittings scheduled to be replaced with welded fittings?
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System code for each component referred to in the text'is not included.
3, 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2)--It appears that personnel
)
error and/or procedural deficiency may be involved in this event, but a discussion concerning the broken wiring connector that occurred during the transmitter replacement is not included.
4.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(L)--The model number of the Barton transmitter is not included.
5.
The title " Introduction" could be used before the first paragraph.
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is inadequate.
The planned replacement of the instrument line fittings i
with welded fittings is not mentioned.
2.
The abstract contains greater than 1400 spaces.
1 Coded Fields 1.
No comments.
D-2 C
?
TABLE D-1.-
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 1 (369)
Section Comments
]
3.
LER Number:
86-014-00 Scores: Text = 9.8 Abstract = 9.3 Coded Fields = 8.5 Overall = 9.5 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C)--At what time was the Safety Injection reset and secured?
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System code for each component referred to in the text is not included.
3.
50.73(b)(4)--Discussion of corrective actions taken
{
or planned is inadequate.
Given that this incident was considered recurring, are the planned corrective actions sufficient to prevent recurrence?
Although there is no requirement to do so, a supplemental report may be appropriate to describe the results of the evaluation into the need of incorporating independent verification on steps requiring signoffs and/or providing additional training if these results significantly change the reader's perception of the event and/or require
~
additional corrective actions be taken.
4.
Acronym (s) and/or plant specific designator (s) are undefined (IAE, ND, NC).
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is inadequate.
The planned corrective actions are not mentioned in the abstract.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Cause and link are not included. A better title might be "ESF Actuation (Safety Injection Signal) During Testing Due To Deficiencies In Test Procedure and Implementation".
D-3 r
TABLE D-1.
SPECIFlc LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUlRE 1 (369) 1
\\
l J
Section Comments 4
LER Number: 86-018-01 Scores:
Text = 8.3 Abstract = 8.8 Coded Fields = 8.8 Overall = 8.5 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)( A)--Be sure to define all operating mode numbers referred to in the text (mode 3 was not defined).
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(D)--The root and/or intermediate cause discussion is inadequate. Why were the position indicators either wrong or not working, and why didn't the S/G throttle valves close properly?
l 3.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes for each component referred to in the text were'not included.
4.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(L)--Identification (e.g.,
manufacturer and model no.) of the failed component (s) discussed in the text is not included.
5.
50.73(b)(4j--Discussionofcorrectiveactionstaken or planned is inadequate.
Details as to what actions were taken to return various valves to service were not discussed.
Although there is no requirement to do so, a supplemental report may be appropriate to l
describe the results of the evaluation into the need 1
for a new Digital Control system if these results significantly change the reader's perception of the i
event and/or require additional corrective actions be taken.
6.
Acronym (s) and/or plant specific designator (s) are undefined (PORV wasn't defined).
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of cause is inadequate.
The loss of the program was not mentioned.
2.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event-is inadequate. The continuing investigation into the DEH control system l
problem wasn't mentioned.
Coded Fields 1.
_I_ tem (4)--Title:
Cause (unknown) is not included.
2.
Item (7)--The report date for revision "1" is the same as for revision "0".
Is this really the case?
D-4 l.
4 TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 1 (369)
Section Comments 4
LER Number: d6-018-01 (Continued) 3.
Item (13)--The component in the first line (speed control valve) would more appropriately be the computer. If any of the position indicator or S/G throttle valves failed then there should be a line filled out for them.
l i
l l
1 l
l l
0-5 L
r TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 1 (369)
Section Comments 5.
LER Number:
86-019-00 Scores: Text = 9.2 Abstract = 7.0 Coded Fields = 9.0 Overall = 8.5 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System code for each component referred to in the text is not included.
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2)(iv)--Discussion of the type of personnel involved (e.g., contractor personnel, u'tility licensed operator, utility nonlicensed operator, other utility personnel) is inadequate.
The term " personnel" is used for several different types and could be defined more explicitly.
3, 50.73(b)(5}--Information concerning previous similar events is inadequate.
LER numbers of the previous similar events are not included.
4.
Acronym (s) and/or plant specific designator (s) are undefined for PMPT.
5.
The title " Introduction" coLid be used before the
~
first paragraph.
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is not included.
2.
Additional space is available within the abstract field to provide more information but it was not utilized.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Cause (personnel error) and link (inadequate test scheduling) are not included. A better title might be:
" Nuclear Service Water Valve Surveillance Missed Due To Inadequate Test Scheduling and Monitoring (Personnel Error)--Technical Specification Violation".
i l
D-6
TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC l.ER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE I (369)
Section Comments l
6.
LER Number: 87-004-00 l f, Scores:
Text = 8.8 Abstract = 5.5 Coded Fields = 10.0 Overall = 7.9 Text 1.
50.73(b.)(2)(ii)(C)--When was the NSM submitted (see second paragraph under Conclusion)?
2.
50.73(b)(2)(11)(D)--The root and/or intermediate cause discussion concerning a possible reason for the failed capacitor is not included. Given that the text implies that Westinghouse provided service life and preventative maintenance after this incident but nothing is discussed concerning this information, is the reader to assume that the failure was not related to end of life failure due to radiation or high temperature?
3.
50.73(b)(4)--Discussion of corrective actions taken or planned is inadequate.
Even'if this capacitor failure was not due to radiation or temperature affects, isn't some action appropriate corcerning service life based on the information provided by Westinghouse?
4.
50.73(b)(3)--Is it possible that this purge capacitor is the first of many to fail?
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of cause information for the capacitor failure is not mentioned.
If unknown, this should be stated; however, see text comments number.2 and 3.
)
2.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of system and component responses are inadequate.
3.
50.7.3(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is inadequate.
TNse actions taken to prevent recurrence are-not mentioned.
If, indeed none are required, this as well as the reason why, should be stated.
4.
Additional space is available within the abstract field to provide more information but it was not utilized.
Coded Fields 1.
No comments.
D-7 i
[
TABLE D-1.
SPECTFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE I (369)
Section Comments 7.
LER Number: 87-005-00 Scores: Text = 9.3 Abstract = 9.5 Coded Fields = 9.5 Overall = 9.4 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C)--When were the corrective actions completed?
?.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System code for each component and/or system referred to in the text is not included.
3.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2)(iv)--Discussion of the type of personnel involved (e.g., contractor personnel, utility licensed operator, utility nonlicensed operator, other utility personnel) is not included.
Abstract 1.
The abstract contains greater than 1400 spaces. To help meet the space limit-requirement the sentence about the operating conditions and the sentence ataut the health and safety of the public could be left out of the abstract.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (1)--The title should contain the unit with the
~
lowest unit number (see Page 22 of NUREG-1022) if
~
more than one unit was involved.
2.
Item (4)--Title:
Cause (improper installation and
~
quality control) is not included.
t I
s D-8 1
T6BLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE I (369)
Section Comments 8.
LER Number:
87-008-00 Scores:
Text = 9.9 Abstract = 10.0 Coded Fields = 9.5 Overall = 9.9 l
Text 1.
No comments.
Abstract 1.
No comments.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Cause (personnel interpretation of Technical Specification) is inadequate.
e I
l l
I i
i l
l l
D-9 l
l L
.~
T,ABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 2 (370)
Section Comments 9.
LER Number:
86-007-00 Scores:
Text = 9.4 Abstract = 9.2 Coded Fields = 9.0 Overall = 9.3 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(D)--Was the bad solder connection considered to be a random failure?
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System code for each component and/or system referred to in the text is not included (relay).
3.
50.73(b)(4)--Are any corrective actions needed concerning the bad solder connection?
4.
Some ideas are not presented clearly (hard to follow).
The first paragraph under the CONCLUSION section is not very clear.
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of cause information is inadequate.
The bad solder connection is not mentioned.
2.
The abstract contains greater than 1400 spaces.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Cause and link information is inadequate.
A better title might be "4160 Volt Bus B Blackout When U;dervoltage Relay Malfunctioned Due To A Bad Solder Connection".
I D-10
l TABLE D-1.
SPECIFTC LER COMMENTS FOR HCGUIRE 2 (370)
+
l I
Section Comments l
10.
LER Number:
86-008-00 Scores:
Text = 9.3 Abstract = 8.9 Coded Fields = 9.7 Overall = 9.2 i
Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(D)--What was the source of debris?
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry l
Identification System codes for all components j
referred to in the text were not included (e.g., coil i
and fuse).
l I
3.
50.73(b)(4)--Is any action needed to prevent debris from causing this or other rods from sticking in the future (see text comment 1)?
Abstract 1.
The fact that the debris were proba;.ly washed out by cycling the rod was not mentioned.
Coded Fields 1.
No comment.
i l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
D-11
TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUfRE 2 (370)
Section Comments 11.
LER Number: 86-014-00 Scores: Text = 9.5 Abstract = 8.4 Coded Fields = 9.2 Overall = 9.1 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry Identification System code for each component referred to in the text is not included.
2.
-50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2)(iv)--Discussion of the type of personnel involved (e.g., contractor personnel, utility licensed operator, utility nonlicensed operator, other utility personnel) is inadequate.
The term " personnel" is used for several different types and could be defined more explicitly.
l 3.
The title " Introduction" could be used before tha first paragraph.
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary 'of the type of personnel, the contributing work characteristics, and the lack of documentation to remind operators is not included.
2.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of. corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is inadequate.
The review of the incident with appropriate personnel and the provision for a timer set to alarm to remind operators of surveillance due are not mentioned.
3.
Additional space is available within the abstract field to provide more information but it was not i
utilized.
I i
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title: Cause (personnel error) is not included.
0-12 l
l I
T4BLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 2 (370)
Section Comments 12.
LER Number: 86-020-01 Scores: Text = 9.8 Abstract = 7.7 Coded Fields = 9.0 Overall = 9.1 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C)--How long ago was the problem of excessive cycle alarms on valves 2CF-30 and 35 identified.
See the next to last paragraph on page 4.
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(1)--The first paragraph under the heading CONCLUSION appears to be saying that the operators took an action that was not typical.
Is there a procedure that calls for the actions taken under the circumstances?
3.
Some conclusions reached are inconsistent with the facts presented.
If the IPB procedure states "the IPB cooling system should be in continuous operation", it is not clear how it was concluded that "there is no requirement for continuous operation".
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of occurrences [immediate cause(s) and effects (s)] is inadequate. The fact that the event was not reported within four (4) hours was not mentioned in the abstract.
2.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of cause information is inadequate.
The moisture and the reason for it were not mentioned in the abstract.
3.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is inadequate.
The
" Subsequent" and " Planned" actions were not mentioned in the abstract.
4.
Abstract does not adequately summarize the text.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Cause information (Ground Fault Due To Moisture in IPB) is not included.
0-13
TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 2 (370) l 1
l l
Section Comments 13.
LER Number:
86-021-00 Scores: Text = 8.8 Abstract = 9.4 Coded Fields = 9.1 Overall = 9.0 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(0)--The root and/or intermediate cause discussion concerning the failed components is not included.
The reasons why the hose ruptured, the valve failed to close, and the detector was out of j
calibration were not discussed.
j 1
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(F)--The Energy Industry i
Identification System codes for all components
)
mentioned in the text were not included.
l l
3.
50.73(b)(2)(11)(L)--It would be helpful to identify J
the hose, at least, by material type and size if I
manufacturer or model number is not appropriate.
i Model numbers weren't given for the stop valves or k
detector.
l l
4.
50.74(b)(4)--Although there is no requirement to do I
so, a supplemental report may be appropriate to describe the results of the investigations into the
]
~
valve and detector problems if these results significantly change the reader's perception of the event and/or require additional corrective actions be taken.
Abstract 1.
No comment.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Cause (personnel error) is not included.
2.
Item (14)--The block checked appears to be l
inconsistent with information provided in the text; see text comment number 4.
i D-14
1 j
, TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 2 (370) i Section Comments i
14.
LER Number:
87-003-00 Scores:
Text = 8.8 Abstract = 7.4 Coded Fields = 9.3 Overall = 8.4 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C)--When was the CF pump 2A repaired?
i l
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(D)--The root and/or intermediate l
cause discussion concerning HP stop valves 2A, 2B is i
i r.sdequate. What caused the valve servo linkage l
tinding and the weak servo spring (normal wear, I
improper adjustment, etc.)? Did valve 2A experience l
any failure?
]
1 3,
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(E)--What damage occurred around CF 1
l pump 28 as a result of the water hammer?
4.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(H)--A time estimate of the unavailability of the failed train / system is not included for CF pump 2A.
See text comment number 1.
5.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(L)--Identification (e.g.,
manufacturer and model no.) of the failed component (s) discussed in the text is not included i
for CF pump 2A and HP stop valve 28.
6.
50.73(b)(4)--A discussion of actions required to I
correct the immediate problem and return the l
applicable systems / component (s) to an operable status is inadequate. What repairs were performed for the stop valves and the water hammer damage?
Although there is no requiremer.t to do so, a supplemental report may be appropriate to describe the results of the investigation of all three hotwell J
level switches during the 1987 refueling outage if these results significantly change the reader's perception of the event and/or require additional corrective actions be taken, i
7.
Acronym (s) and/or plant specific designator (s) are undefined for 0AC.
Abstract 1.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of occurrences [immediate cause(s) and effects (s)] is not included for the stop valve leakage.
D-15 J
v.
T4 BLED-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 2 (370)
Section Comments 14.
LER Number: 87-003-00 (Continued) 2.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of the cause information for the stop valve failures and the opening of vaives 2CM-150 and 2CF-124 is not included.
J 3.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is inadequate.
J Repairs of the stop valves and the water hammer damage, the procedure changes for testing the stop valves, the procedure changes to prevent the CBPs from restarting following a trip of the HWPs and i
CBPs, and the changes of preventative maintenance for all trip switches are not mentioned.
l 4.
The abstract contains greater than 1400 spaces. To j
help make space for the comments made above, the last paragraph could be eliminated since it contains information not necessarily needed in the abstract.
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Result (subsequent feedwater system watre hammer and pump damage) is inadequate, i
2.
Item (13)--Component failure occurred but entire field is blank for the CF pump 2A.
1 D-16
-J
l I
,, TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 2 (370) l
{
I i
Section Comments 15.
LER Number:
87-005-00 Scores: Text = 7.5 Abstract = 8.1 Coded Fields = 9.0 Overall = 7.8 Text 1.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C)--At what time on March 12 did the DRPI indication for Control Rod D-2 begin to jump sporadically?
2.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(D)--The root and/or intermediate cause discussion concerning the problem is I
inadequate. Although there is no requirement to do so, a supplemental report may be appropriate to I
describe the results of the troubleshooting efforts if these results significantly change the reader's perception of the event and/or require additional I
corrective actions be taken.
3.
50.73(b)(2)(ii)(J)(2j--It appears that personnel error and/or procedural deficiency may be involved in I
this event, but it is not discussed. Are the operators required to respond to the " Control Rod Position Unreliable - Yes" alarm by observing the l
video display?
4.
5_0;73(b)(4)--Discussion of corrective actions taken or planned is inadequate.
Although there is no i
requirement to do so, a supplemental report may be j
appropriate to describe the results of the i
troubleshooting efforts if these results I
significantly change the reader's perception of the l
event and/or require additional corrective actions be taken.
Would it help if the video display information was alta directed to the printout?
5.
50.73(b)(5)--Information concerning previous similar events is inadequate.
The number of the LERs for the previous incidents (at least the four involving circuit card failures) would be helpful.
Abstract 1.
50.73(bl(,1}--Summary of cause information is inadequate. The reason that the OAC Rod Position Indication program "could not be verified operable during all portions of this event" would be good information to mention in the abstract.
D-17
e
- ,, TABLE D-1.
SPECIFIC LER COMMENTS FOR MCGUIRE 2 (370)
Section Comments 15.
LER Number: 87-005-00 (Continued) i 2.
50.73(b)(1)--Summary of corrective actions taken or planned as a result of the event is inadequate.
Although there is no requirement to do so, a supplemental report may be necessary to describa the results of the Work Request to complete additional troubleshooting concerning "necessary repairs".
Coded Fields 1.
Item (4)--Title:
Result (Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entered) is not included.
2.
Item (14j--The block checked appears to be inconsistent with information provided in the text; see text comment numbers 2 and 4.
1 l
0-18
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