ML20237H405
| ML20237H405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237H402 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8708250006 | |
| Download: ML20237H405 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES E
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMI0lSSION o
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- y WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 N...~ /
' SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 30 T0 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF AND AMENDMENT NO. 21 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF ;
l-CATAWBA. NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2
' DUKE POWER COMPANY, ET:AL.
I INTRODUCTION
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l By letter dated November 17, 1986, and supplemented July 1, 1987 Duke Power l
Company, et al., (the licensee) proposed changes to Tables 3.8-1A and 3.8-1B 3
l of TechnicLl Specification. (TS) 3/4.8.4_ " Electrical' Equipment Protective Devices" for Cetawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The changes would add two containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices to TS Table 3.8-1A for Unit'I and two to Table 3.8-1B for Unit 2.
EVALUATION The purpose of the overcurrent protective devices is to interrupt fault -
currents flowing through the electrical penetration that could cause it j
to lose its mechanical integrity as the result of a downstream fault. To meet the requirements set forth in IEEE'Std 317-1976 as augmented by the reconnendations of RG 1,63 revision 2, the containment electrical pene _
tration assemblies must be designed to withstand,' without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum available fault current long enough to allow backup l
circuit protection to operate, assuming a failure of the primary protective device.
The requirement, therefore, is for two protective devices in-series, both of which must_have the capability to clear a fault before loss of the mechanical integrity of the penetration can occur.
In the July-1,1987, letter, the licensee stated that the Type / Voltage Class of the applicable penetrations is identified in the Catawba FSAR Table ~
Q430.11-1 as Type F/ Low Voltage, and that FSAR Figure 0430.11-6 is the applicable figure for the electrical penetration assemblies and their over-current protective devices. This figure shows a circuit breaker and fuse in series to the electrical penetration and provides the fault corrent clearing time curves for the breaker and fuse-plotted against two test value-points for the current carrying capability of the penetration. These plots demonstrate there is sufficient margin between the fault current clearing time curves of the overcurrent protective devices and the current carrying.
capability of the penetration to allow the protective devices to clear the fault before damage to the penetration would occur. Therefore, the staff l
I finds this design acceptable.
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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendments involve a change in use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in requirements.
The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase.
in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in indivi-dual or cumulative occupational exposures.
The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there have been no public comments on such finding.
Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibilit clusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9)y criteria for categorical ex-Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) a no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
CONCLUSION The Comission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 26583) on July 15, 1987, and consulted with the state of South Carolina. No public comments were received, and the state of South Carolina 1
did not have any comments.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be J
conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors:
Kahtan Jabbour, PWR#4/DPWR-A J. Lazevnick, SELB/ DEST Dated: August 18, 1987 i
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