ML20237D788
| ML20237D788 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237D786 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712240186 | |
| Download: ML20237D788 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES 8"'
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fJJETY EVALUATION SY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SOFFORTING AMENDMENT NG. 101 TC FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION,,,E,T, AL,.
CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT NO. 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-302
_ INTRODUCTION By letter dated April. 15, 1987 Florida Power Corporation (FFC or the liccrste) requested an amendment to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-72 for the Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3). The proposed amendment would (1) change the current Techr.ical Specification (TS) Section 4.5.1.d by deleting the requirement to verify each core f1 coding tank isolation valve closed alare by an actuation test and replacing (2) add to TS bases 3/4.5.1 a description of it with a requirement to perforti a charr.el calibration of each alarm, and the actuation of the core flooding tank isolation valve closed alarm.
EVALUATION To demonstrate that the core flooding tanks are operable. TS surveillance requirement 4.5.1.d presently requires verification, at least once per le months, that each core flooding tank isolation valve closed alarm actuates htenever each core flooding tank isolation valve is not fully open and the
- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure exceeds 750 psig.
If an alarm should fail to actuate, the action statement requires that the inoperable tar.k be restored to operable status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or that the reactor be in HOT SHUTDOWN (Mode 4) within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
In the evert
-l the alarm should fail to actuate and shutdown continues per the action statement, or the 10 month surveillance interval elapses during a shutdown, the surveillance is difficult to satisfy, since TS Section 4.0.A prohibits raising the RCS pressure to the necessary test pressure in HOT STANDBY (Mode 3).
Although a test in Mode 4 at 750 psig is possible, such a test is net recomrrended because it takes the reactor close to the RC3 pressure / temperature limits.
Normally, the licensee performs this surveillance test during cooldown.
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f 8712240186 871214 gDR ADDCK 05000302 i
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l A channel calibration is an adjustnent, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with necessary ra0g6 ar.d BCCurdcy to knowr Valut.s cf the parameter which the char.rel monitors, and ta) be performed by any series of sequential steps such that the entire thennel is calibrated. The channel calibration proposed for this surveillance requirement is an equivalent tert cf the core ficed tank isolatico alarm; the calibration will be ccne by applying pressure tc the pressure sersing diaphram over the range fror 0 to i
2200 psig while mcVing the isolation valves with the RCS pressure safely below pressure / temperature limits. The licensee will continue to perform the actua-tion test by r.cVir.L the isolation valves with the RCS pressure abcre 7E0 psig, during cooldown, but not as part of the surveillance requirement. Because the channel calibration will be done in a ccid shutdown mode, the action statetent 4
and thf lindtations of TS Section 4.0.4 do not apply. Since the char.nel celibra-tion dces not increase the likeliheed of a low temperature overpressurizaticr ivent, safety will be enhanced. Based on the above, we find the prcposed o
change acceptable.
EXIGENT QRCUMSTANCES These TS changes are being issued without a norrnal 30-day notice period to preclude delay in startup of the plant from a refueling outage. The licensee subritted the amendnent request in April 1987, but due to administrative problerrs sclely attributed tc the staff, the proposed no significant hazards determination was not published in a timely manner. Therefore, the staff concluded that the licensee did take timely action in this issue.
In accordance with the Contrission's regulations contained in 1C CFR 50.91(a)(6) regarding exigent circumstances, the Cottissico published a notice in the Federal Register on November 25, 1907 concerning this action, with a request for putdic correients and allowing an oppcrturdty fcr a hearing by December 10, 1987.
STATE /PUBLILCONSULTATION No objections to the issuance of the amendnent were riadt by the representative of the State of Florida.
In addition, there were reo public connents er requests for a hearing in response to the notice published in the Federal Register.
FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HA7ARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION The standards used to arrive at a proposed determination that a request for er.
aniendment involves no significant hazards consideration are included in the
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Comission's regulations,10 CFR 50.92, which state that the operation of the j
facility in accordance with the proposed atendrent would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accidert pre-I viously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of new or different kird of accident fron any accident previously evaluated; or (3) invc1ve a signi-ficant reduction in a margin of safety.
The following evaluation in re16 tion to the three standards derenstrates that the proposed ar.endtent does nct involve a significant hazards consideration.
This anendment will not:
1.
Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of ar.
accident previously evaluated because an equivalent test of the cere flood tank isolation' alarm will assure alarm operability es discussed above.
The equivalent test will be performed in an acceptable r:anner consistent with tests perforred for other engineered safeguards actuation and reactor protection instrument channels.
2..
Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accider.t from any accident previously evaluated because the change does not modify the plant or require a significantly different plant equiptrer.t configuration.
3.
Involve a significant reduction in the ir.argir. of safety because the change will net revise the channel setpoint.
The margin of safety relative to RCS pressurc/ temperature litrits will be increased as discussed above.
5ased on the foregcing, the Contr.ission has concluded that the standards of 1
10 CFR 50.92 are satisfied. Therefore, the Conraission has made a final detere:1-nation that the proposed anendrent does not involve a significar.t hazards consideration.
ENVIRONMENTAL g NSIDERATION This amendnent involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to a surveillar.ce requirement.
tie have determined that the amendrent involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant charge in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is ne The Conrr.ission has previously issued a proposed finding tha involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been ne public comrrent on such finding.
criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).Accordi Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) ment need be prepar,ed in connection witi the issuance of this amendmen
_C0t'CLUSI0tl We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safet will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner,y of the pt,11c and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendnent will net be inimical to the coprnon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
i Dated: December 14, 1987 Principal Contribu, tors:
John Schiffgens I
S. C. Tingen k
s.
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