ML20237B952

Forwards Objectives,Scenario Summary & Sequence of Events for Emergency Plan Simulator Insp Scheduled for 980709.Util Requests That Encl Not Be Filed or Made Available for Public Disclosure Until After 980709

ML20237B952
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	06/12/1998
From:	Rainsberry J SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9808200115
Download: ML20237B952 (7)

Text

'1 50tJIHf RN Calif ORNIA EDISON '2"'"<">

Manager. Plant Licensing An (D/50% f % 71./O 17/O btL'" Compan)

June 12, 1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk 3

Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362-Simulator Scenario for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan Inspection July 9, 1998 In response to the telephone request of Mr. T. H. Andrews of the NRC Region IV, enclosed are the objectives, scenario summary, and the sequence of events for the Emergency Plan Simulator Inspection scheduled for July 9,1998.

These documents contain information about the inspection scenario. To assure the security of the scenario, they should not be disclosed until after the i inspection. Southern California Edison therefore requests that the enclosures i not be filed or made available for public disclosure until after July 9,1998.

i Please contact Mr. M. T. Hug at (714) 368-6881 if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

//

Enclosures d 2 4

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cc: (w/o enclosures) -

E. W. Merschoff, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV j K. .E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC Region IV l

J. A. Sloan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3 J. W. Clifford, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3 (w/ enclosures) l T. H. Andrews, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, NRC Region IV  ;

bec: (Seeattachedsheet) 9808200115 900612 PDR ADOCK 05000361  ;

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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION EMERGENCY PLAN SIMULATOR INSPECTION JULY 9,1998 SCENARIO PACKAGE

1. Objectives

2. Scenario Summary

3. Sequence of Events

EMERGENCY PLAN SIMULATOR INSPECTION July 9,1998 OBJECTIVES 1.

Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Superintendent to declare the appropriate emergency classification as soon as possible following the recognition of abnormal plant conditions.

2. Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Superintendent to perform one or more reclassifications as soon as possible following the recognition of a change in plant conditions that warrant reclassification.

3.

Demonstrate the ability of the Shift Superintendent to make timely and appropriate protective action recommendations for the public.

4. Demonstrate the ability of on-shift personnel to perform dose projections.

5.

Demonstrate the ability of on-shift personnel to notify site workers of an emergency.

6. Demonstrate the ability of on-shift personnel to notify local, state, and federal authorities of an emergency and of changes in the emergency classification within specified time limits.

7. Demonstrate the ability to initiate recall of off-shift emergency response personnel for augmenting the on-shift organization.

l SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Page 1 P.\SIM lNSP\1996\980003 June 12,1998 (11:17am)

EMERGENCY PLAN SIMULATOR INSPECTION July 9,1998 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

INITIAL CONDITIONS The drill begins at t=0 with Units 2 and 3 at full power. A 24' Radwaste ventilation system fire isolation damper is closed due to the failure of the fusible link retaining clips. This was not discovered by the previous shift, noris the oncoming shift aware ofit. The crud tank T073 is on recirculation using crud tank pump P193. The Unit 2 train 'A' hydrogen recombiner is operating to meet a surveillance requirement. The on-shift crew includes the Unit 2 and Common control room operating staff, an on-shift Health Physics (HP)

Supervisor, and the on-shift Nuclear Operations Assistant (NOA).

HIGH AIRBORNE ON THE 24' RADWASTE BUILDINQ An hour before the start of the scenario, an elbow on the outlet piping of crud tank pump P193 cracked due to corrosion, causing a spray of approximately three gallons per minute (gpm). One percent of the radioactivity contained in the liquid becomes airborne and results in airborne particulate activity of 2000 DACs. The airborne condition is discovered when a Maintenance worker attempts to exit the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) and alarms the beta booth. An HP Technician sent to investigate the area obtains a high volume air sampit, performs a field check, informs the HP Supervisor, and provides the sample to Chemistry for analysis. At t=0 the result of 2000 DACs is reported to the Unit 2/3 Shift Superintendent.

The Shift Superintendent (SS) should review the criteria listed in SO123-Vill-1, " Recognition and Classification of Emergencies." The unplanned plant area particulate airbome concentration greater than 1000 DACs meets the criterion for an ALERT in Emergency Action Level A2-4. The SS should promptly declare the ALERT and initiate emergency notifications to local and state agencies and to the NRC. There is no off-site Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for this condition. The NOA will simulate notifying state and local agencies by walking through the actions of using the Blue Phone and Yellow Phone systems.

Upon declaration of the ALERT, the SS assumes the Emergency Coordinator (EC) position, and the NOA cssumes the Shift Communicator (SC) position. On-shift personnel will simulate notifying emergency r sponse personnel of the emergency by walking through activating the automated recall system, making PA announcements and coordinating on-site siren activation to alert personnelin high-noise areas.

SEISMIC EVENT AND CEA EJECTION / LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 1

At t=00:35 a seismic event occurs, causing a fracture of Control Element Assembly (CEA) 20 drive mechanism housing, resulting in a 2 %" diameter hole in the reactor vessel head. The differential pressure )

j propels the CEA upward until it becomes wedged against the vessel upper intemals. Reactor power in the I quadrant with CEA 20 exceeds design limits, causing core damage, and releasing isotopes equivalent to 10 l percent of the clad gap. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurization will cause a Ssfety injection {

Actuation Signal (SIAS), Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS), Containment isolation Actuation I Signal (CIAS), and Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS).

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EMERGENCY PLAN SIMULATOR INSPECTION July 9,1998 S.CENARIO

SUMMARY

(Continued)

The leak rate from thi: loss of coolant accident (LOCA) will be about 4800 gpm initially, and will decrease with RCS pressure. When the RCS leak rate is estimated, the SS should classify the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY in accordance with EAL B3-1 in SO123-Vill-1, " Recognition and Classification of Emergencies". The SS will also direct that non-emergency response personnel go to assembly areas prepared to leave the site. The site assembly will be simulated. The PAR should be to evacuate the state )

j beach adjacent to the plant. I Control Room operators will perform post-seismic actions for the earthquake and respond in accordance with SO23-12-1, " Standard Post Trip Actions" They will diagnose the LOCA, transition to SO23-12-3, "LOCA", and commence a cooldown toward Shutdown Cooling (SDC) entry conditions.

CONTAINMENT FAILS At t=00:55, a ground develops on the 480 volt feeder cable leading to Containment Emergency Cooler E-401 at the containment penetration. A ground alarm annunciated in the Control Room and the operators take steps to locate and isolate the ground. At t=01:00, the feeder enbles for the Containment Emergency Cnoler inside containment penetration BP-09 fault to ground. The cucuit breaker at the penetration fails to trip, and the resultant fault current vaporizes one phase of the cable before breaker 2B0411 trips and clears the fault. The resultant loss of conductor inside the penetration creates an opening in the containment barrier. Fission products from Containment escape through the opening to the penetration building and are released to atmosphere via the plant vent stack. Radiation monitors 2(3)RE7865 and 2/3RE7808 will trend upward and alarm.

The containment breach coincident with fuel failure and LOCA meets the criteria for a GENERAL EMERGENCY listed in EAL B4-1. The SS should reclassify the event to a GENERAL EMERGENCY, initiate PA announcements and siren activation, and order a Site Evacuation. The PAR for this should be to shelter all sectors to the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) boundary.

The HP Supervisor will calculate less than one rem TEDE and five rem CDE thyroid for the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB). This dose projection will confirm the PAR to shelter all sectors to the EPZ boundary.

SCENARIO TERMINATION The scenario will be terminated at approximately t=01:30 when all objectives have been evaluated. '

Termination will be followed by debriefing.

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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Page 2 G AslM_INsP\1998\980005.WPD June 10.1998 (12.32pm)

EMERGENCY PLAN SIMULATOR INSPECTION July 9,1998 J

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ELAPSED TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION ANTICIPATED RESPONSE Pre-drill Set up of Simulator. See Machine Operator instructions.

Pre-drill Staging and pre-shift briefing of drill crew. Review initial conditions.

Stage evaluators and NOA controller.

Pre-drill Sequester NOA and HP foreman behind simulator electric panel.

00:00 The on-shift HP supervisor calls the SS and 1. CCO check rad monitors.

reports 2000 DACs particulate in Rad waste. 2. SS declares ALERT LAW EAL A2-4 and SO123-Vill-10

• Emergency Coordinator Duties".

~ 00:10 SS declares an Alert (A2-4). 1. SS assigns OPS Ldr.

2. NOA reports to CR.

3. HP reports to CR.

~ 00:20 The NOA initiates emergency recall and verbal 1. Activate emergency recall system notifications to offsite agencies. (test mode).

2. Notify the State OES via the Blue phone (simulated).

3. Notify local agencies via the Yellow Phone system (simulated).

- 00:20 The SS directs an on-shift crew member to 1. An available operator notifies the contact the NRC via Red Phone. NRC via the Red Phone.

2. When an open line is requested by the NRC, the SS will direct a Unit 3 operator (simulated) to staff the phone.

00:35 The simulator machine operator initiates: 1. CRS directs reactor trip and

1. Seismic event with an ejected rod. SPTAs (SO23-12-1).

l 2. -4800 gpm RCS leak. 2. Crew transTons to LOCA EOl

( 3.10 % clad damage. (SO23-12 'e i

3. SS delcare.s SAE LAW EAL B3-1.

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EMERGENCY PLAN SIMULATOR INSPECTION July 9,1998 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ELAPSED TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION . ANTICIPATED RESPONSE

- 00:45 The SS directs NOA to perform notifications upon 1. SS issues PAR for state beach reclassification.

evacuation (simulated).

2. Notify the State OES via the Blue phone (simulated).

3. Notify local agencies via the Yellow Phone system (simulated).

- 00:50 The SS directs Site Assembly. 1. The SS evaluates assembly areas.

2. The OPS Ldr prepares the PA announcement.

01:00 The simulator machine operator initiates Operators initiate search for the ground on emergency cooler E-401. ground.

- 01:05 The simulator machine operator will: 1. SS declares GE LAW EAL B4-1.

1. Trip breaker 2B0411. 2. HP Foreman calculates the EAB

2. Initiate trigger e1 Plant Vent Stack Rad dose and confers with SS.

monitors rising.

- 01:15 SS declares GE based on loss of 3rd fission 1. Notify the State OES via the Blue product barrier. phone (simulated).

2. Notify local agencies via the Yellow Phone system (simulated).

3. Direct site evacuation (simulated).  ;

4. SS issues PAR to shelter all sectors to the EPZ Boundary (simulated).

- 01:30 Tem.,nate scenario.

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