Text

Informs That Office of Administration Reviewed & Concurs on Final Rule Entitled, Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel & High-Level Radioactive Waste. Comments Provided
	ML20237A470
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/15/1998
From:	Halman E; NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:	Ten Eyck E; NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
Shared Package
ML20237A366	List: ML20237A367; ML20237A369; ML20237A377; ML20237A386; ML20237A390; ML20237A394; ML20237A399; ML20237A408; ML20237A421; ML20237A424; ML20237A445; ML20237A448; ML20237A451; ML20237A456; ML20237A470; NUREG-1619, Forwards,For Review & approval,NUREG-1619, Standard Review Plan for Physical Protection Plans for Independent Storage of Spent Fuel & High-Level Radioactive Waste;
References
	FRN-63FR26955, RULE-PR-60, RULE-PR-72, RULE-PR-73, RULE-PR-74, RULE-PR-75 AF32-2-021, AF32-2-21, NUDOCS 9808140113
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% # January 15, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safe uards l FROM: Edward L. Halman, Dir l

Office of Administration

SUBJECT:

OFFICE CONCURRENCE ON FINAL RULE ENTITLED

" PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE" The Office of Administration has reviewed and concurs subject to comments provided on the attached rule and accompanying documents that codify the standards for protecting spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel storage installations. We have attached a marked copy of the final rule that presents editorial and format correction,s.

These corrections should be made before this rule is submitted for publication in the Federal Register, if you have any questions regarding this review, please have a member of your staff contact ,

Michael T. Lesar, Rules and Directives Branch at 415-7163 (MTL) or Alzonia Shepard at 415-6864 (AWS1).

Attachments:

As stated l I

9808140113 980806 PDR PR ,g 60 63FR26955 PDR li'

COMMISSION PAPER i I

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EQB: The Comnussioners ERQM L Joseph Callan Executive Drector for Operations SuluECT: FINAL AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PARTS 60,72,73,74, AND 75, "PHY8K:AL PROTECTION FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE" l

PURPOSE-l W /e-iLd- final amendments to w To obtam Commission approval 4of ;f _ f16 the Federal Reaiste 10 CFR Parts 60,72,73,74, and 75f and make consistem hl protechon o_ g/

requwoments for the independent stor of spent nuclear fuel and hTgh-level raccactive waste at the vanous types of facihtees where fuelis stored.

BACKGROUND- fhE A kW rule was pubhshed for pubic comment in the Eadatal Register on August 15,1 l

(60 FR 42079) with the pnmary objective of estabkshmg a cohesive set of physical protechon y requwements for the storage of spent fuel and higMovel r=6aar*ive waste. Various minor amendments involving material control and accounting and intomaf%al Atomic Energy Agency achwihes were included. The amendments proposed to codify and consohdate, inder Part 73,

" Protection of Plants and Material," the various regulations and current prachces used to perform l

physical protechon boensmg reviews of affected facilities. Affected licensees are those that store spent fuel and higMovel radioactive waste at independent spent fuel storage installations, power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operatens, monitored-retrievabk storage metallabons, and operabons areas of the geologic repository.-

CONTACTS: Pnsedia A. Dwyer, NMSS/FCSS (301)415-8110 Naiem S. Tanmus, NMSS/FCSS (301) 415- 6103

The Commissioners 2 DISCUSSION /p/f l{L.O N 1

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& n U.. y Twenty commer$' letters were received on the propersed rule. An analysis of these comments is included in Atta6hment 1. Commenters included Nuclear Energy institute, one national laboratory, nuclear utshbes, the Envvonmen Protechon Agency, and the Department of Energy. The ig%emmentsAambeen a number of modifications to the proposed rule "

f that decrease,pmposed requwements, reduce redundancies, add,flexdnhty to implementation, and clarify uncertambes The resulhng requwoments the final rule represent a level of physcal l protocedn menincantly less than that required at opera power reactors. The five base J These performance )

performance T " **; = "i: {the proposed rule y ur '

p ep ntu! in 4 ppg y ;

(1) Store the material only within a protected area (PA);

(2) Grant only authorized access to the PA; (3) Deted and assess unauthonzed penetrations and activities within the PA:

(4) Provide tunely communicabon for response; and (5) Estabbsh and manage an effechve security organization. ~

As part of this effort, the staff studied the need for protechon against the malevolent use of a yy vehicle at facikties that store spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste.(SECY 96-145), The V results of the study and =4=t"mt peer review indcate that there is no compelhng jusefeation to requwe vehicle bomb protechon for those sites where spent fuel is stored in -

storage casks or below-ground spent fuel pools plans to O___ evalusta a -- : 5+-- : p potential need for addshonal protechon for se limited number of stored m above-ground pooyl in staff to pubbsh the proposed rule (Staff Requirements Memorandum dated June -

comments on five questions

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30,1995 Commission requested the staff to solicit deshng with the impact of the proposed rule on the pubic s and staff recommended "/

responses are summartzed in Attachment 2. \/

The beddit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 does not apply to this final rulemaking because the rule does not impose new requwoments on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. The packfet rule in 10 CFR 72.62 may be applied, if needed, but only on a site-specific basis in a manner that takes muomum advantage of: (1) unique site characteristics that contribute to physcal protection and are cunently approved by NRC, and (2) the regulatory flexibility of the final rule.

COORDINATION The Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection to this final rule. The Offee of the Chief Financial Of5cer has reviewed this Commission Paper for resource impacts and has no obpecisons. The Of5ce of the Chief Information Officer has reviewed the rulemalung for informahon todmology and information management implications and concurs in it.

ptECOMMENDATIONS f

That the Commission k /k .ffb y ?v y.. W j

1. Approve the notice of final rulemaking for publicatiorWAttachment 1).

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The Commetsioners 3

! 2. Certify that this rule.jf. promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a l

substanhal number of small entities, to satisfy requirements of the R Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b).3. ulatory Flexib[ility. l NGit:

y sa y } a m e 6 /.ve /D hd s Q f & blr**

(Attachment 1) L - =J in the Federal Register-a.f final NUREG 1619, " Standard Review Plan for Physical Protechon Plans for the Storage of b.

Sp lmt Fuel and High Level Radioactive Waste," has been developed and 7 will be pulikshed in support of the (Attachment 3); ,>

c. regulatory analysis for the rule has been revised to reflect public comment and will be made pubhcly avaliable (Attachment 4)M ]

d. Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration will be informed f of1 W cartslicahon reganhng economic impact on small entities and the reasons for it as Y reqstod by the Regulatory Flexitality Act; -)

l e.' to Congressional committees will be informed (Attachment 5);

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- d a pubhc will be issued (Attachment 6);

g. pthis final rule amends information collection requirements that are subsect to the Pa perwork Pde*% Ad of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requwements were 4 l

. ap proved by the Offlos of " W+ Tat et a and Budg? pproval numbers 31500002, 3 150 0055,3150-0123, and 3150 0132; -

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h. pin a;xiordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996, this action is not a " major rule" and this determmation will be submitted to the General - Ad Ollice in the Congress, as required (Attachment 7); 7 l

1. .y this rule has been reviewed for potential changes to.the Criminal Penalties l

provisions and the NRC Enforcement Policy; and --- 7

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J.@1bdsummary of the final rule appeared in the Commission's Reg L Joseph Executive Drector for Operations 5 ,

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ATTACHMENT 1 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE I

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7590-01-P I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Parts 60,72,73,74 and 75 RIN: 3150- AF32 Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel

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and High-Level Radioactive Waste i

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final [ule.

SUMMARY

The Nuckar Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to clanfy )

physical protection requirements for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSis), power reactors that have pt nently ceased reactor operations, monitored-retrievable storage (MRS) installations, and , ;.)gic repository operations areas (GROAs). These amendments also present specific requirements for power reactor licensees that choose to obtain e-specific license for the physical Ige p protection of spent fuel at operating sites. ~>

- dhse amendments $ codify I d standards for protecting spent fuel at the various storage sites licensed under ? ? C" I;- 71 V

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U r these'ambhdrnenti,'a 30 CFQa 50 licerIsee with a ' sessi[>n-only license may maintain resent physical protection pihNQd is not required t piement any attemate /

measures, if r.;;4d, before transitioning to a Part 72 license -

EFFECTIVE DATE: (Insert 180 days after publication of this final rule in the Federal Reaister.)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, e-mail PAD @nrc. gov, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or Naiam The et '301) 415-0102, : .:2 NET @arcru V

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' SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

1. Backaround.-

On August 15,1995 (60 FR 42079), the Commission published for public comment a proposed rule that would clarify its regulations on the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The proposed regulation would apply to spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at ISFSis, power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations, MRS installati[ ne and the GROAJ. *ruposed rule stated that the requirements for physically protecting material lacked clarity in defining which regulations were to be face applied at adsites. This resulted in a non-cohesive regu! story base. This proposed rule would provide a set of performance-based requirements, consistent with current programs that are currently licensed and implemented at sites under a unified policy for physical protection.

Under these amendments, a 10 CFR Part 50 licensee with a possession-only license can maintain its present physical protection plan and is not required to implement any attemate measures, if needed, before transitioning to a Part 72 license

.The proposed rule also indicated that the Commission was studying the need for specdic protection fe against w theplalevolent U" up'asrof apcie at sites affected by the rule (this is d=m==ad Munder goal). The rule also proposed a conforming amendment to 10 CFR Part 60 - to recraire material control and accounting (MC&A) measures at the GRO that would be identical to that required of ISFSis under Part 72. Tim proposed rule a provision under 10 CFR Part 75 to clarify that if GROAs are subject to intemational Atomic Energy Agency VfA) safeguards, then NRC's nuclear material accounting and con:al regulations for implementing the " Agreement between the United States and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in the United States" apply. Finally, the Commission requested specdic comment on five questions regarding impacts of the proposed regulation on licensees.

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II. Summarv and Analysis ^f Public Comments.

The proposed rule was subject to a 90-day public comment period which ended on November 13,1995. Twenty letters of comment were received. Sources '~ for these comments * ~~

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included a nuclear industry group (the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI));1'" National lab utilities involved in nuclear activities ederal agencies [the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE)]; and one citizen's group. Twelve letters of comment explicitly endorsed, either in total or in part, the views expressed by the NEl. Four letters of comment, in part, supported the general objectives of the proposed rulemaking.

Correspondence received from EPA indicated no comment. The comments have been l grouped under the following general topics: f I

1. Protection Goal.

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2. Basis for Requirements.

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3. Required Level of Physical Protection. l

4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.

5. Rule Language Specifics. !

6. GROAs.

7. Staff-Generated Conforming Amendments. .

8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions.

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1. Protection Goal.

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Comment Commenters noted that, although it was ppropriate that a protection goal for

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spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste be defined, needed to be less stringent than the I

codified design basis threat for radiological sabotage it was further stated that a 10 CFR Part 100 release, the unofficial criterion for determining radiological sabotage of power reactors, would be extremely difficult to realize with respect to spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The citizen's group commented that any protection goal developed for spent fuel should also counter the malevolent use of an airbome vehicle.

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Resoonse The grees that the establishment of a protection goal should be the first step in the development of any physical protection standards. One issue that may have caused confusion in the proposed rule is that the assumptions for determining " radiological sabotage" differ between Part 72, " Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of ,

Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," and Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and t e ddfuises erwMho .1 ases Material." Thid appropriate,4~ . because " radiological sabotage," as used under Part 73, applies to[ power reactor and implies the unofficial criterion of a Part 100 release for power reactors. " Radiological sabotage" as used under Part 72 applies to the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste and is ba on the consequences of a ign basis accident AHbons / '

as defined under Part 72. 7he same term is used under both 10 CFR Pa s,yM . . .. I '

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is based on different assumptions and results in different levels of required protection. The c) Commission agrees that this is confusing and that " radiological sabotage," as used for operating reactors, is not an appropriate protection level for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The Commission concludes that the protection goalis best characterized by the phrase: " protection against the loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to cause a design basis accident in accordance with 10 CFR 72.106." The final rule has been modified accordingly.

e With regard to protection against the malevolent use of a land-based vehicle, NRC has determined, based on the opinions of expert study and a peer review of findings, that there is no compelling justification for requiring a vehicle barrier as perimeter protection for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste dry-cask storage or storage in below-ground pools at this time.

Those sites where spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste is stored in above-ground pools may require additional consideration regarding protection against a vehicle bomb threat and will i be treated on a site-by-site basis. Inclusion of an airbome vehicle was assessed for possible inclusion into the protection goal for this rule. However, protection against this type of threat has not yet been determined appropriate at sites with greater potential consequences than spent fuel storage installationgshpL[herefore, is not included within the protection goal for this l

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2. Basis for Requirements. !

Comment. Commenters frequently questioned the need for tying Part 72 requirements to Part 73. The commenters assumed that by involving Part 73 in the rulemaking, it was implied that the level of physical protection normally attributed to power reactors was being required.

Phraseology used in the proposed requirements, such as using the term " protected area,"(PA) tended to further foster this impression.

ResDonse The Commission disagrees that placing requirements under Part 73 implies any i

association with the physi I protection requirements for power reactors. It is noted that Part j

73 provides, do'ne consolidate 10 C , all of the requirements for those y facilities needing physical protection. This is one reason why an explicit requireme r the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste is being added MPa$ 73. Part 73 includes more stringent requirements for power reactor and Category I fuel cycle facilities and l much less stringent requirements for the protection of Category 111 facilities. With regard to use of the term " protected area," the Commission has determined that the term is correctly used in review of its definition under 10 CFR 73.2. Nonetheless, the Commission has reviewed the physical protection terminology found in the final rule to ensure that it does not imply a different level of physical protection than intended.

3. Level of Physical Protection Needed. ,46 Comment. Some commenters expressed the opinion that the lesel of physical protection described by the proposed amendments was unnecessary and ovehurdensome. The industr/

group noted that what was truly needed was a level of physical protection comparable to

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" enhanced industrial security." Cited examples of sur4 protection were: use of suitable fencing, locked access points, sufficient illumination, and periodic security patrols. Other commenters questioned the d for some of the redundancy 'ncluded in the proposed rule. One citizen's j group tMt ec x-Od cr. 'h: rh believed physi I protection measures should be more 1

stringent than those described in the pro sed rule.

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Resoonse. The Commission believes that th appr riate level of physical protection for

! spent fuel and hi h vel rad;oactive waste lies som here between industrial-grade security r ue level 1 -

andithatgequired t operating power reactors. W also notes that the nature of spent fuel and of

/J r a) its storage mechanisms offers unique advantages e4he protectio #ge material. This factor, g along with revised consequence considerations, leads the Commission to conclude that -

physical protection at sites where spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste are storedr,an be l more flexibly applied than previously proposed. Accordingly, the final rule has bee evised to minimize redundancy and add flexibility. Specific changes are outlined under$ection Ilyf ".h

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Summary of Specific Changes Made to the Proposed Rule as a Result of Public Comment.-

! 4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.

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Comment NEl and a few licensees commented that the proposed regulation imposes a l generic backfit as defined under.10 CFR 50.109 and 72.62. NRC asserted in the proposed rule that the amendments merely codified and standardized physical protection measures that, through license amendment, were already in place at existing sites. Hence, it was concluded that no backfit was involved. Commenters further stated that, in terms of backfit requirements, the cost to implement the proposed rule was not justified based on the potential increase in protechon that the rule would afford public health and safety.

Other commenters specifically responded to the Regulatory Analysis that accompanied the

! rule. These commenters expressed concem that certain provisions of the regulatory analysis could tum into de facto requirements.

Additionally, it was recommended that affect sites should be " grandfathered" under any l

theJ e, finalrulemaking. Accordingly, sites wo not be required to meet the provisions of the l

new physical protection rule because an adequate level of physical protection was already in l *

! place at the site, based on an NRC-approved physical protection plan.

Response Under the proposed rule, the Commission stated that the backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 did not apply because the amendments did not impose any additional l 6

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requirements on Part 50 licensees. Furthermore, it stated that the backfitting requirements in i d

10 CFR 72.62 did not apply because the proposed amendments neither imposed nor modified procedures or organizations of currently licensed ISFSis. The Commission considers these

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statements true based on their assessment of the proposed regulation and its intended implementation. However, on further review, it acknowledges that, under a few limited situations, adjustments to existing physical protection programs would have to be made ta meet the provisions of the new rule. The Commission notes that Part 50 licensees that store spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste under a possession-only license and hold a current NRC-approved physical protection plan are not required to meet the provisions of the new rule (10 CFR 73.51) until transitioned to a Part 72 license. Licensees operating under a Part 72 license are required to meet the provisions of 10 CFR 73.51. In the final rule, this factor, the definition of a protection goal, and a reconsideration of measures needed to achieve this goal, are intended to eliminate concems in this area.

With respect to grandfathering existing sites, the Commission believes that implementation of this final rule at these sites presents no undue burden to affected licensees and provides a minimum level of physical protection to adequately protect the public health and safety. l Accordingly, there is no need for a grandfathering provision and no change has been made in l l

the final rule in response to this comment. .^?::, X ;. . -- Chat the Regulatory Analysis for the final rule has been revised to reflect changes made in ose to public comment and to eliminate ambiguities. - - ,// a W f)n (ciu;"! *

5. Rule Language Specifics.

Comment A variety of comments were received regarding specific rule terminology. The suggestion was made that the term " protected area" be revised to "lSFSI controlled a area." #g ,

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Response As indicated previously in this notice, the use of the, term " protected area (PA),"

l is consistent with its definition in 10 CFR 73.2. Furthermore, emee it is the Commission's position that a site where spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste is stored be surrounded by a fence, it is not considered adequate to call the enclosure a controlled access area (CAA).

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l Under 10 CFR 73.2, the definition of a CAA requires only a demarcation of the area. not a i fence.

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Comment. Another commenter supported the Commission position that operating power reactor licensees that store spent fuel under a general license should have the option of using the physical protection measures of either 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5) or the proposed 10 CFR 73.51.

The commenter also questioned whether the muirements of 10 CFR 72.182,72.184, and 72.186 apply to a general license, in addition to Subpart K. A related question sted -

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clarificatum on how general license holders were to notify NRC regardi o n they

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Response. T(he Commissionccordance notes with thatthe' general license requirements in Subpart K to a licensee having a Part 50 license does not have to submit separate ISFSI physical protection plan commitments for NRC review if there is no reduction in effectiveness. However, if desired, the licensee's power reactor physical protection plan can be revised under 10 CFR 50.54(p) to include the ISFSI PA physical protection system commitments. The requirements in 10 CFR 72.180,72.182,72.184, and 72.186 provide informaton for those licensees who choose to submit a site-specific ISFSI plan. This type of submittal requires an NRC review process l

Comment One commenter requested clarification on the specific exclusion of an exemption for ISFSis from the malevolent use of a vehicle threat within the design basis threat. The commenter indicated that it was not readily apparent and also a cumbersome process to determine the current exempt status of an ISFSI undar present regulations.

Response The Commission agrees ..id has revised the text of the rule to exclude reference to the design basis J,/h<threat A described under 10 C[FR 73 he proposed rule [epplie o a permanently

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Comment One commenter questioned shutdown power plant where spent fuelis stored and operating with a Part 50 possession-only license.

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Resoonse. Swellicense holders may maintain their current NRC-approved physical protection plans until they have transitioned to Part 72 licenses at which time they would be subject to 10 CFR 73.51.

Comment. A commenter requested clarification on the need for back-up power for physical protection-related equipment.

Resoonse. The Commission believes that it is necessary for affected licensees to assure either continuous operation of required physical protection equipment during power failure or to demonstrate the ability to provide immediate compensation for such failures.

Comment. Required illumination levels, assessment techniques, required frequency of physical protection patrols, and searches before entry to the PA were all subjects of comment.

A commenter suggested that illumination be provided only during periods of assessment and that the entire PA need not be illuminated to a level of 0.2 footcandle.

.ResDonse The Commission agrees that illumination to a 0.2 footcandle level represents a f large operating cost and may be difficult to achieve, given cask structure. This provision has been amended to more clearly indicate that only adequate illumination for the assessment means used is required within the PA. kequired performance capabilities regarding detection V

are also clarified in the final rule by s cifying the use of active intrusion detection equipment, as opposed to passive systems. Jo o/// gor .

Comment. Some commenters noted that the frequency of patrols should coincide with watchmens' duty shift lengths, as opposed to once every a hours as recommended in the proposed rule.

l Response The Comm' sion does not agree that the frequency of patrols should coincide with duty shift length wever, the Commission agrees that some flexibility can be provided.

Accordingly, this provision of the final rule is revised to require daily random patrols, only.

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Comment. Licensees cited the burden of maintaining expensive and delicate explosives detection equipment to meet the proposed requirement for explosives searches conducted before entry to the PA.

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Response The Commission agrees. To clanfy this iss e, the Commission has revised the proposed rule to require only a visual search for explosives. pedestrian and vehicular traffic is not expected to be high volume at facilities affected by the rule, this type of search is l not considered an undue burden to affected licensees.

Comment Other commenters noted redundant records retention requirements in 10 CFR 72.180 and 10 CFR 73.51 (c).

Response. This concem has been corrected in the final rule.

Comment One comment noted an apparent contradiction in the proposed regulation regarding use of deadly force in the protection of an ISFSI. The commenter had been advised by NRC staff that use of deadly force was not expected of members of the security organization at ISFSis. The commenter reasoned that this was not consistent with the requirement to protect against radiological sabotage under the proposed rule.

Response. The issue involving the se of the term radiological sabotage has been resolved as discussed previousigfntmmehoe. Further, the Commission never intended that onsite physical protection personnel at an ISFSI provide response to a safeguards event other than calling for assistance from local law enforcement or other designaied response force unless their timely response could not be ensured. g Comment Commenters believe that the requirements for redundant a arm monitoring l

stations and specified staffing levels for the primary alarm station are ovet xJrdensome and unnecessary.

Response The Commission agrees that the requirement for redundant alarm stations is excessive. Regarding alarm monitoring, this provision is revised in the final rule to require, in 10

the redundant location, only a summary indication that an alarm has been generated. This location need not necessarily be located onsite and could, for example, be a simple readout in a continually-staffed locallaw enforcement agency office. This is contingent on the assurance that communications with the local law enforcement agency or the designated response force ;

can be maintained. Regarding required staffing i els of the primary alarm station, the Commission has deleted he final rui specific requirement that the physical protection ,

organization be comprised of at least two watchme This deletion is contingent on the Commission's expectation that a human presence be maintained in the primary alarm station at all times. To acheve this, the Commission clarifies its position that the primary alarm station must be located within the PA, be bullet-resisting, and be configured ausk tbt activities within the station are not visible from outside the PA. The intent of these measures is to ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of an onsite watchman to call for assistance. The final rule has been modified accordingly.

Comment Finally, concoming the actual terminology ano format of the proposed rule, commenters expressed support for its performance-based nature but rejected the set of provisions under 10 CFR 73.51(d) as being overly prescriptive.

Response The Commission responds that the proposed regulation found in 10 CFR 73.51 (d) is needed to provide additional clarity in meeting the performance capabilities in 10 CFR 73.51(b) and notes that many of the physical protection measures desenbed under

.10 CFR 73.51(d) are relaxed in the final rule and are less prescriptive in a number of cases.

6. GROA.

Comment Two comments were received from DOE on the amendments to Part 60 dealing with the geologic repository. The first commenter requested that it be emphasized in the i

Statement of Considerations

for the final rule that the requirement for physical protection of GROAs be applicable only during their operational phases and not after closure.

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Resoonse. The Commission agrees with this observation and has clarified the exemption in the final rult u specifically exempt GROAs from the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51 after permanent closures.

Comment. The second commenter requested clarification on apparent conflicts in Part 60, "DispoG of High-Level Radioactive Waste in Geologic Repositories," regarding the level of detail required of physical protection plans during the different phases of the certification process, pc 0 )

Response The Commission that NUREG 161g, " Standard Review Plan for Physical Protection Plans for the Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste,"

issued concurrently with the effective date of the final rule, containj guidance in this area.

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7. IStaff-Generated Conforming Amendments.

Subsequent to publication of the proposed rule, the NRC review indicated that the was some '

WA G confusion pertaining to MC&A requirements for ISFSis. Specifically, thefstaff a ked if ISFSis were exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51 and, if not, why not. Specific MCgg C requirements for ISFSis are found under Part 72. After consideration of the issue, thelstaff has decided to include an amendment to 10 CFR that Partspecifically exempts 7[the fina ISFSis from 10 CFR 74.51f V t/

8. Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions.

Questum 1 Would the proposed amendments impose any significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?

Summary of Responses Five responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this

! issue. Allindicated that the amendments, as proposed, would significantly increase costs.

Manpower-intensive measures, such as the requirement to maintain a minimum of two watchmen per shift, were most often cited as creating an undue burden. One licensee 12

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estimated costs of $1 to 2 million to implement, and a continuing cost increase of 30-50 percent, annually, to physical protection operations.

NRC Resoonse The final rule has been revised to minimize redundancy and add flexibility to its implementation. There should be no significant increase in cost to current licensees.

l Questen 2 is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to differ substantially from those of current licensees?

Summary of Responses Four responses from nuclear utildies specifically addressed this issue. Three utilities cited both higher current and annual operating costs. One utility noted that, to the extent that current licensees have been required to commit to the practices recommended in the proposed rule in initial licensing, there is no anticipated difference in cost.

NRC Response The final rule has been amended to be more consistent with physical

' protection implemented at sites with currently-approved physical protection plans. Hence, there should be no significant increase in costs to future licensees.

Question 3 Are the cost estimates in Table ill of the Draft Regulatory Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are there significant costs that have not been

( mcluded in the table?

Summary of Responses Three responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. One respondent indicated that the cost estimates in Table ill of the " Draft Regulatory Analysis" are sufficiently broad to address industry experience. However, the inclusion of a continual surveillance system is not covered and the respondent suggested that it should be a i

separate line item. Another respondent indicated that the cost estimates appear to be comprehensive except they do not include construction and maintenance of physical protection office space, a records retention area, and alarm station (s).

NRC Response The " Regulatory Analysis" has been revised to reflect public comment to 8

include any omissions or changes made to the final rule.

13 f

j

Question 4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there attematives that would afford essentially the same benefits but be more cost-effective?

Summary of Resoonses. Three responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. All three indicated that costs were not justified by benefits derived from the proposed rule. One respondent stated that the individual measures of 10 CFR 73.51(d) have ment, but, when taken in aggregate, they are not necessary to protect public health and safety. This respondent further stated that redundancy in the propnsed rule was not needed and the rulemaking should give affected licensees latitude in selecting and justifying the means of physical protection Altematives that were suggested involved the deletion of specific provisions of the proposed rule and also the restructuring of the rule so as to not group all ISFSis under one set of physical protection criteria.

NRC Resoonae The Commission has revised the requirements of the proposed rule to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, add flexibility in implementation, and reduce manpower-intensive measures while maintaining an adequate level of physical protection.

Question 5 Are the proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate for an MRS or geologic repository operated by the U.S. Department of Energy?

Summary of Resoonse The NEl was the only respondent to this issue. NEl noted that NRC should be mindful of the evolving nature of MRS installations and the geologic repository in the development of physical protection regulations for these sites.

i NRC Response NRC staff continues to work closely with DOE staff in the development of the certification process for MRS installations and the3sROA.

' i

! Ill. Summarv of Aame'Ae Chariaae h to the Prana =ad Rule as a Result of Public Comment.

l Major changes made in response to public comment include:

14

___.__.________..._-._m____.___._.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _

- _ _ - _ _ = _ _ _ - _ _ _ .

(1) The incorporation of a protection goalband ,

I (2) Regarding required levels of physical protection, redundancies have been reduced, flexibility added, and manpower intensive m,easures minimized, for exampler d Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant alarm station need only l

provide a summary indication at a continually staffed location; u Redundant records retention has been eliminated; yThe required staffing level for members of the security organization has been r eliminated and required siting and configuration of the primary alarm station i clarified; J s Hand-held equipment searches for explosives are replaced with visual searches; and J illumination levels need only permit adequate assessment of the PA according to the assessment means used. Detection equipment must be active in nature.

f A section-by-ssction comparison of the proposed and final rules follows.

Part 60 -- N===I of Hiah-Level Radicedive Weeta= in Geoloaic Repositories.

Sl l @*

1.h.eclrs 21, Content of application. This section is unchanged from propos( /1

,5cefic" W 6,

2. { 40.31, Construction authorization. This section is unchanged from[ propose l -s* /

3. !$0.41, Standards for issuance of a license. This section is unchanged from /* s

/

s fnf4

.Su itn l

4. h.78, Material control and accounting records and reports. This section is l

? UL unchanged fro propose Ead2 - 1 irer.sino Ranuirements for the Independent Storaoe of Soent Nuclear Fuel and Hiah-Level Radioactive Waste l

15

(etW

' 5. 72.2 onte,nts of application: Technicalinformation. This section is unchanged from' proposed The term " radiological sabotage"is based on Part 72 assumptions and not a Part 100 radiological rete

, Se e th*

as unofficially used for power reactors.

th r?

/

T 6 072.180, Physical secunty plan. This section is unchanged from proposed rule

%s - k except for changing the title tophysical Protection Plan ,

to be co 4

F f ( Part 73.' Je cW W

Y- hsnf*/

gg han 3

f 7 072.212(b)(E Conditions of generallicense issued under $72.210. pevised to read:

" Protect the spent nuclear fuel against a threat level in g fce with either $73.51 of this Chapter or the requirements of Subpart ge@esHE " This is intended to lead the reader away from the design basis threat for radiological sabotage as defined under $73.1 and to the lesser protection goal under 573.51 and Subpart H of Part 72.

Part 73'-- Physical PM dier, of Plants and Materials

$**y;,r d f,o>Pf lb'

8. <i73.1, Purpose and Scope. (b)(6)is unchanged fromfpro }

- See fion

g. 073.50l Require ntsyysical protection of licensed activities. This section remains unchanged fromfproposed j ylJen N.j f 10 - d i73.51, Requireme for the physical ' ection of stored spent nuclear fuel and amun bility ""

high-level radioactive waste. (a)," ^ -- has been revised to more precisely define the type of material affected by the rule.

b

, ,, paurn,h / }lt -

59iF# (b)(3), General Performance Objectives, devised to read: "The physical protechon system must be designed to protect against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to cause a design basis accident in accordance with 972.106 of this Chapter." This revised statement describes a more appropriate protection goal that is censistent with Part 72.

It also allows for a physical protection system less stringent than required to protect against j.

l radiological sabotage at operating power reactors.

16 t

.$p panoy arN (d), Physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures 76e

}191 bre c $

introductory text [ revised to read as follows: "The following systems, subsystems, components and procedures are methods acceptable to NRC for meeting the performance capabilities of 973.51(b)(2)." This change has been made to underscore that the methods described in -

3.51(d) are acceptable for meeting the performance capabilities of the rule. Other methods may be acceptable,if approved by NRC.

Jr> prepeph (d)(1 /he last se nce a N e naragr , as been deleted because it is no longer necessary #Yby sion cited in the previous paragrap= --

/%euesh N!i be'C (d)(2)hevised to read: "lliumination must be sufficient to pennit adequate assessment of penetrations of or activities within the protected area." This revision has been

- made to permit flexibility in illumination levels.

- laAoy/of h1 IO 073.51(d)(3 evised to read:"The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system that is monitored in a continually staffed primary alarm station located within the protected area, and in one additional continually staffed location to ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of the onsite watchman to call for assistance. The primary alarm station must be located.within the protected area; have bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling and floor; and the interior of the station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely means for assessment must also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant location need only provide a summary indication that an alarm has been generated." This clarifies the Commission's position that the necessary level of protection should ensure that a single act cannot destroy the capability of the onsite watchman to call for assistance, koges/1 1(d)(4)J'l: ?-- :== ' has been revised to reduce the frequency of patrol from "not less than once every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ' to " daily random patrols" with additional discussion provided in guidance issued to support the rule.

. 01ramiw ),o h

c (d)(5) med to read: "A security organization with wntten procedures must be established. The security organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for t

17

monitonng of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access corvol, and communications to assure adequate response. Members of the security organization must be trained, equipped, qualified and requalified to perform assigned job duties in accordance with Appendix B to Part 73, l.A, (1) (a) and (b); B(1)(a); and the applicable portions of II.* This change eliminates a required staffing level and describes qualification and training levels for watchmen, only, as the primary members of the security organization.

C ^huuyetsh t 7 M(d)(6)N F...mi ph has been changed to require " timely" response from the designated response forces. If timely response cannot be provided, additional protective measures may be required, to include use of armed guards.

h'W9AOfn n (d)(7). The-pecageept n: ;c.:..;;c _

0nyat b lW E" hasAbeen*l'U9 mdeleteglW "S NM*/ 5 1(d)(8) d)(7)f"i p;;,. W. revised to read as follows: "A personnel ontf identification system and a controlled lock system must be established and maintained to limit access to authorized individuals." This eliminates the unnecessary coupling of the identification system with the system used for key and lock control as requested by commenters.

00y/cr..

(d)(9)_ =Paraar has been deleteg i 29; if a person is authorized access to the PA, property identified, and subject to search, there is no need for the individual to be escorted, p f ,/ f. ,h /

f hd*

pay r! a, pad W'l* T W(d)(10) (d)(8).) Regarding communications, the term " security organization" has been revised to "onsite security force members' to more precisely define communication channels. g.f. pd;' f#d'-

faM]/oph gr l'0 #W crpgl

. (d)(11) (d)(9).) TN0 p 7- ^ '. revised to read as follows: "All individuals, vehicles and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper authorization and visually searched for explosives before entry." This is permissible because only large quantities of explosives that could cause damage to the casks are of concem.

18 t

i

g/<.;!J'H 4 -

p p; O y

Q ,4 *f- US ,/hc (d)(12) (d)(10). is paragraph is unchanged from/ proposed p q AL lb' Yed *N (V'a, pup t~ll*3 been ne/u/yefe/ a, ,

l7251(d)(13) Ibled (d)(11)4 TP.b R..@ $ds, revised to read as follows: "All )

L o c/ y detection systems, surveill nee / assessment systems, and supporting subsystems including illumination system that ust be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be maintained in operable condition. Timely compensatory measures must be taken after discovery of inoperability to assure that the effectiveness of the physical protection system is not reduced." I

/n*ncaph })n her /eohr&n6/ e jw-ua/h p;c PB44(d)(14) )(12).f 's paragraph remains unchanged fro oposec}jg/c

,i '4 The %f o f yf y (lg**W*f" V p f bpvg t 72.51(d)(1p (d)(13) rovision added to assure that duplication of records i

/d) m)

Y.h/

pi under 972.180 is not required. Paragraphkii) 1' revised to read as follows: " Screening re has been p of members of the security organization." Finally, the log of patrols must contain all patrols, not just routine patrols.

( ' h u ospeth y }io N"O

?B(e) M mmb revised for clarity.

$esfDn

11. 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events. remains unchanged from N tveIC Part 74 -- Material Control and Accountino of Snecial Nuclear Material. .

-$n

12. 74.51 Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuciear material- H het been

/aragraph (a) ibevised to re d as follows: " General performance objectives. Each licensee who is authorized to possess)!f or more formula kilograms of strategic special nuclear material 4

(SSNM) and to use such material at any site other than a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, an irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved with waste disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter, shall establish, implement, and maintain a Commission approved material control af)d J-- Pwow' /

accounting (MC&A) system that will achieve the following objectivetV..." Thisppe exempts Part 72 ISFSis from the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51.

19 l

t .________________ _ _

Part.75 - Safeauards on Nuclear Material-Implementation of '$/lAEA Aareement.

- [e siI' n fjc 13 375.4, Definitions. This paragraph remains unchanged from propose sude Criminal Penalties NRC notes that these final amendments are issued under Sections 161b an ofthe Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended. Therefore, violation of these regulations may subject j

a person to criminal sanctions under section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.

Environmental impact: Categorical Exclusion The Commission has determined that this fina! rule is the type of action described as a g categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)f and (iii). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an environmental assessment has been prepared for this final rule.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the aperwork Reduction Act o. f 1995 (44 U S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were i

approved by the Office oi Management and Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0002, 3150-0055, 3150-0123, and 3150-0132.

Public Protection Notification

! If a document used to irnpose an information collection does not display a currently valid l\ OMB control number, NRC may not conduct r sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, an information collection.

t Regulatory Analysis

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g, g},ht;.i:i 20 l /)fjd.i:r 5'i vi iis s

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l The Commission has prepared a " Final Regulatory Analysis" for this final rule. The final analysis examines the benefits and alternatives considered by the Commission. The " Final Regulatory Analysis" is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document room,2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from i Naiem S. Tanious, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

The " Final Regulatory Analysis" is available for viewing and downloading from the NRC's rulemaking bulletin board.

l Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act,5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The final rule affects operators of ISFSis and DOE as the operator of the MRS and GROA. The affected licensees do not fall within the scope of the definition of"small entities" set forth in Section 601(3) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or thefSmelFBesmese@ee-

/

c'andards set od in raa"intiane ie="ad hv the Small Business A&rne.6.,n Ad-1S_%Paj:

W* 4(MJ llze rfcseder!'

/ci rFx .2.

Etci)3 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Faimess Act in accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Faimess Act of 1996, /3 (

" this determination NRC has determined that this action is not a " major rule" and has LL ...1

- i Gwi ~. ! ^ ~~ 'aW;-O",- ,,, u ~ Ox;::::, ;. . ,,,, wm NW Backfit Analysis The Commission has determined that the backfit rule in 10 CFR 50.109 does not apply ,

because this final rule does not imposehw requirements on existing 10 CFR Part 50 licensees. Also, it is not the intent of he t Commission to impose generic backfit, under the f

provisions of 10 CFR 72.62, on ct.rrently licensed ISFSis. Therefore, a backfit analysis was not prepared for this final rule.

l l 21 I r

Y gg (YNe c/ b/w

5t'* '"*l YP! 9 ~'

i

List of Subjects 10 CFR Part 60 Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Nuclear materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Waste treatment and disposal.

10 CFR Part 72 Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Spent fuel.

10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Export, herg: :t.':n 4 O O ,1 --~~_ Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

10 CFR Part 74 Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Material control and t-accounting, Nuclear materials, hckaging and containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and

' recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear material.

10 CFR Part 75 Criminal penalties, Intergovemmental relations, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy y Act of 1954,- a amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C.

AL ,

552 and 55 RC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 60,72,73,74, and 75.

22 l

PART 60 - DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC REPOSITORIES

1. The authority citation for Part 60 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 51,53,62,63,65,81,161,182,183,68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); seco. 202, 206, 88 Stat.1244,1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846);

secs.10 and 14, Pub. L.95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec.102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs.114,121, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2213g,2228, as amended (42 U.S.C.10134,10141) and Pub. L 102-486, sec 2902,106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851).

2. In 960.21, paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (c)(10) are revised to read as follows:

960.21 Content of anolication (b)'"

(3) A detailed plan to provide physical protection of high- level radioactive waste in accordance with 573.51 of this Chapter. This pian must include the design for physical i protechon, the licensee's safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel training and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.

(4) A desenphon of the program to meet the requirements of $60.78.

I l

(c) "*

(10) A description of the program to be used to maintain the records described in 5560.71 and 60.72.

23 j i

l e

L_________________________________.__

3. In 660.31, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

660.31 Construction authorization.

(b) Common defense and security. That there is reasonable assurance that the activities proposed in the application will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

4. In 960.41, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:

660.41 Standards for issuance of license.

1 (c) The issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and secunty and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public.

I l

l S. A new $60.78 is added to read as follows:

l i

l 680.78 Material control and accountino records and recorts.

DOE shall implement a program of material control and accounting (and accidental criticality reporting) that is the same as that specified in 99 72.72,72.74,72.76, and 72.78 of I l this chapter.

24 l

1

l

[

PART 72 - LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE l 6. The authority citation for Part 72 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 51,53,57,62,63,65,69,81,161,182,183,184,186,187,.189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234,83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,2073,2077,2092,2093,2095,2099,2111,2201,2232,2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L.86-373, 73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat.1242, as amended, 1244,1246 (42 U.S.C.

5841,5842,5846); Pub. L.95-601, sec.10,92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L 102-486, sec. 7902,106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec.102, Pub. L.91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C.

4332); secs.131,132,133. ~135,137,141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec.148, Pub. L.100-203,101 Stat.1330 235 (42 U.S.C.10151,10152,10153,10155,10157, 10161,10168).

. Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs.142(b) and 148(c), (d), Pub. L. 100-203,101 Stat.1330-232,1330 236 (42 U.S.C.10162(b),10168(c), (d)). Section 72.46 also issued under sec.189,68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec.134, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C.

10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec.145(g), Pub. L 100-203,101 Stat.1330-235 (42 U.S.C.10165(g)). Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2),2(15),2(19),117(a),141(h),

. Pub. L.97-425,96 Stat. 2202,2203,2204,2222,2224 (42 U.S.C.10101,10137(a),10161(h)).

Subparts K and L are also issued under sec.133, 98 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C.10153) and sec.- 218(a),96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C.10198).

7. In $72.24, paragraph (o) is revised to read as follows:

6 72.24 Contents of manlicatian: Technicalinformation.

9 9 9 9 9

\

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(o) A description cf the detailed security measures for physical protection, including design features and the plans required by Subpart H. For an application from DOE for an ISFSI nob or MRS, DOE wfl provide a description of the physical protection plan for protection against radiological sabotage as required by Subpart H.

1 i

8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as follows:

l 6 72.180 Physical Dist-ction olan.

The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a detailed plan for physical protection as described in $73.51 of this chapter. De licensee shall retain a copy of the current plan as a record until the Commission terminates the license for which the procedures were developed and, if any portion of the plan is superseded, retain the superseded material for 3 years after each change or until termination of the license. The plan must describe how the applicant will meet the requirements of $73.51 of this chapter and provide physical protection during on-site -

transp04.tkwi to and from the proposed ISFSI or MRS and include within the plan the design l for physical protection, the licensee's safeguards contingency plan, and the security l organization personnel traini,ig and qualification plan. The plan must list tests, inspections, l

l audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.

json =venh

g. In 572.212, paragraph (b)(1)(iv) is added andf(b)(5) is revised to read as follows:

l l

t 672 212 Conditions of oenerallicense issued under 672.210.

I l

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(b) *

(1) ~

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)

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5 t/

v) Notify the NRC as to whether they willimplement 73.51 of this chapter or their approved physical protection plan pursuant to 573.55 of this chapter. If a licensee implements 973.51 of this chapter, its approved physical protection plan must be modified to clearly indicate that 973.51 of this chapter will be followed for protecting spent nuclear fuel. For those persons who have not begun use of the general license, this notice must be included in the 90-day letter i required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section. For those persons who have begun use of the general license, this notice must be provided no later than 30 days after implementation of

$73.51 to the appropriate NRC regional office listed in Appendix D to Part 20 of this chapter.

(5) Protect the spent nuclear fuel to a level required by either 973.51 of this chapter or the requirements of Subpart g 10 OFR ran m PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF Pl. ANTS AND MATERIALS

10. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53,161,68 Stat. 930,948, as amended, sec.147,94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073,2167,2201); sec. 201, as amended,204,88 Stat.1242, as amended.1245, sec.1701,106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f).

Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135,141, Pub. L 97-425,96 Stat. 2232,2241 (42 U.S.C,10155,10161). Section 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L.99-399, 100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169).

11. In $73.1, paragraph (b)(6) is revised to read as follows:

i l

27

6731 Puroose and scope.

(b) ~

(6) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored in either an independent spent fuel storaDe installation (ISFSI) or a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation licensed under Part 72 of this chapter, or stored at the geologic repository operations area licensed under Part 60 of this chapter.

pp aytt*Ph

12. The introductory f $73.50 is revised to read as follows:

673.50 Raouirements for ohvsical orotection for licensed activities.

Each licensee who is not subject to $73.51, but who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material that are not readily separable from other radioactive material and which have total extemal radiation dose rates in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surfaces without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor facility licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, shall comply with the following:

13. A new $73.51 is added to read as follows:

673.51 Requirements for the ohvsical orotection of stored soent nuclear fuel and hiah-level l radioactive waste 1

l 28

i (a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of QS73.20,73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this section apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (ii), (iii),(2), and (3) of this section. Ik? HJ'l"'lT ~ ~ .~

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored under a specific license ;

issued pursuant to Part 72 of this Chapter (i) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI);

(ii) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation; or (iii) At a nuclear power reactor that has certified, in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 82, the permanent cessation of reactor operations and transfer of all fuel out of the reactor vessel, or (2) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at a geologic repository operations area (GROA) licensed pursuant to Part 60 of this Chapter; or ;

(3) Spent nuclear fuel stored under a general license issued pursuant to Part 72 of this g chapter and the licensee has exercised the option provided by 972.212(b)(5) of this chapter to use the provisions of 973.51 for the physical protection of spent nuclear fuel.

(b) General performance objectives.

(1) Each licensee subject to this section shall establish and maintain a physical protection system with the objectives of providing high assurance that activities involving spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety. ,r e rh #<#m (2) To meet the general objective of paragraph (b)(1 ach licensee subject to this l l section shall meet the following performance capabilities.

l

(i) Store spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste only within a protected area; (ii) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are authorized to enter

( the protected area; (iii) Detect and assess unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the protected area; (iv) Provide timely communication to a designated response force whenever necessary; and j 29

(v) Manage the physical protection organization in a manner that maintains its effectiveness.

(3) The physical protection system must be designed to protect against loss of control of the facility that could be sufficient to cause consequences equivalent to a design basis accident in accordance with 72.106 of this Chapter.

(c) Plan retention. Each licensee subject to this section shall retain a copy of the effective physical protection plan as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which procedures were developed.

(r.i) Physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures. The following systems, subsystems, components and procedures are methods acceptable to NRC for meeting the performance capabilities of 973.51(b)(2).

(1) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste must be stored only within a protected area so that access to this material requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and one barrier offering l substantial penetration resistance. The physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area must be as defined in $73.2. Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this barrier, must be provided to facilitate assessment. T' ' harrier offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an approved storay W or building walls such as those of a reactor or fuel storage building.

(2) illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment of unauthorized penetrations of or activities within the protected area.

(4 The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system which is capable of detecting penetrations through the isolation zone and that is monitored in a continually staffed primary alarm station and in one additional continually staffed location. The primary alarm station must be located within the protected area; have bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and floor; and the interior I of the station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely means for )

assessment of alarms must also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring, the redundant location need only provide a summary indication that an alarm has been generated.

(4) The protected area must be monitored by daily random patrols.

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(5) A secunty organization with written procedures must be established. The security organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access control, and communications to assure adequate response. Members of the secunty organization must be trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned job duties in accordance with Appendix B to Part 73, sectionh, (1) (a) and (b), B(1)(a), and the applicable portions o[

(6) Documented liaison with a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA) must be established to permit timely response to unauthorized penetration er activities.

(7) A personnel identification system and a controlled lock system must be established and maintained to lim 2 access to authorized individuals.

(8) Redundant communications capability must be provided between onsite security force members and designated response force or LLEA.

(9) All individuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be' checked for proper authorization and visually searched for explosives before entry.

(10) Written response procedures must be established and maintained for addressing unauthorized penetration of, or activities within, the protected area including Category 5,

" Procedures," of Appendix C to Part 73. The licensee shall retain a copy of response procedures as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for which the procedures were developed. Copies of superseded material must be retained for 3 years after each change or until tennination of the license.

(11) All detection systems, surveillance / assessment systems, and supporting subsystems, including illumination systems, must be tamper-indicating with line supervision and be maintained in operable condition. Timely compensatory measures must be teken after discovery of inoperability, to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced.

(12) The physical protection program must be reviewed once every 24 months by individuals independent of both physical protection program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the physical protection program. The physical protection program review must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the physical protection system and a verification of the liaison established with the designated response force or LLEA.

31 l I

(13) The following documentation must be re tained as a record for 3 years after the record is made or until termination of the license. Duplicate records to those required under 72.180 of Part 72 and $73.71 of this Part need not be retained under the requirements of this (

l section.

A log of individuals granted access to the protected area; (ii) Screening records of members of the security organization; l

(iii) A log of all patrols; (iv) A record of each alarm received, identifying the type of alarm, location, date and I time when received, and disposition of the alarm; and j (v) The physical protection program review reports.

(e) A licensee that operates a GROA is exempt from the requirements of this section for that GROA after permanent closure of the GROA.

14. In 973.71, paragraphs (b)(1) and (c) are revised to read as fatows: ,

i 673.71 Reportino of safeauards events.

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f (b)(1) Each licensee subjed to the provisions of SS 73.20. 73.37. 73 50. 73 51. 73 55 73.60, or 73.67 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months of discovery of the j l

safeguards events described in paragraph [a)(1) of Appendix G to this Part. Licensees subject to the provisions of $$73.20,73.37,73.50,73.51,73.55,73.60, or each licensee possessing strategic special nuclear material and subject to 973.67(d) shall notify the NRC Operations

/

Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphsfla)(2),

- (a)(3), (b), and (c) of Appendix G to this Part. Licensees subject to the provisions of $573.20, 73.37,73.50,73.51,73.55, or 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraphed) of Appendix G to this Part.

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(c) Each licensee subject to the provisions of $ 73.20, 73.37,73.50,73.51,73.55, 73.60, or each licensee possessing SSNM and subject to the provisions of 573.67(d) shall maintain a current tog and record the safeguards events described in paragraphs ll (a) and (b) of Appendix G to this Part within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of discovery by a licensee employee or member of the licensee's contract security organization. The licensee shall retain the log of events recorded under this section as e record for 3 years after the last entry is made in each log or until termination of the license.

Part 74 - MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

15. The authority citation for Part 74 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 57,161,182,183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 948, 953, 954, as .

amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282, 2237f); secs. 201, as amended 202, 206, 88 Stat.1242, as amended, 1244,1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846). j,ck,i

}N' h 5

16. In $ 74.51, aragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:

674 51 Nuciaer material control and accountino for soecial nuclear material.

i (a) General performance objectives. Each licensee who is authorized to possess five or more formula kilograms of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) and to use such material at any site other than a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, an -

irradiated fuel reprocessing plant, an operation involved with waste disposal, or an independent spent fuel storage facility licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this chapter shall establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved material control and accounting (MC & A) system that will achieve the following objectives:

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._ _ .J

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PART 75 - SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL - IMPLEMENTATION OF US/lAEA l AGREEMENT

17. The authority citation for Part 75 continues to read as follows:

AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 63,103,104,122,161, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 936, 937, 939, 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2133, 2134, 2152, 2201); sec. 201, 88 Stat.1242, as i

amended (42 U.S.C. 5841).

I Section 75.4 also issued under secs. 135,141, Pub. L.97-425,96 Stat. 2232,2241 (42 U.S.C.10155,10161).

,c(U) l 18. In $75.4, paragraph (k) is revised to read as follows:

675.4 Definitions.

(k)***

(5) Any location where the possession of more than 1 effective kilogram of nuclear material is licensed pursuant to Parts 40,60, or 70 of this Chapter, or pursuant to an agreement

! state license.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, b

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i John C. Hoyle, Secretary of the Commission 34 l'

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ATTACHMENT 2 ~

SUMMARY

OF RESPONSES TO i

COMMISSION'S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS l

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Summary of Responses to Commission's Specific Questions.

Question 1. Would the proposed amendmen's impose any significant additional costs for safeguards of currently stored spent nuclear fuel beyond what is now incurred for that purpose?

Summary of Resoonses. Five responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue.' Allindicated that the amendments, as proposed, would significantly increase costs.

Manpower-intensive measures, such as the requirement to maintain a minimum of two watchmen per shift, were most often cited as creating an undue burden. One licensee estimated costs of $1 to 2 million to imp!ement, and a continuing cost increase of 30-50 percent, annually, to security operations.

NRC Resoonse. The final rule has been revised to minimize redundancy and add flexibility to its implementation. There should be no significant increase in cost to current licensees.

Question 2. Is there reason to expect the costs to future licensees to differ substantially from those of current licensees?

Summarv of Resoonses. Four responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. Three utilities cited both higher current and annual operating costs. One utility noted that, to the extent that current licensees have been required to commit to the practices recommended in the proposed rule in initial licensing, there is no anticipated difference in cost.

NRC Resoonse. The final rule has been amended to be more consistent with physical protection implemented at sites with currently approved physical protection plans. Hence, there should be no significant increase in costs to future licensees.

Question 3. Are the cost estimates in Table ill of the Draft Regulatory Analysis representative of current industry experience? Are there significant costs that have not been included in the table?

Summarv of Resoonses. Three responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. One rescondent indicated that the cost estimates in Table ill of the " Draft Regulatory Analysis

are t'.:fficiently broad to address industry experience. However, the inclusion of a continual surveillance system is not covered and the respondent suggested that it should be a separate line item. Another respondent indicated that Me cost estimates appear to be comprehensive except they do not include construction and maintenance of security office space, a records retention area, and alarm station (s).

l NRC Response The " Regulatory Analysis' has been revised to reflect public comment to

! include any omissions or changes made to the final rule.

Question 4. Are the costs justified by the benefits that would be afforded by the proposed amendments? Are there alternatives that would afford essentially the same benefits but be more cost-effective?

Summarv of Resoonses. Three responses from nuclear utilities specifically addressed this issue. All three indicated that costs were not justified by benefits derived from the proposed rule. One respondent stated that the individual measures of 10 CFR 73.51(d) have ment, but, when taken in aggregate, they are not necessary to protect public health and safety. This -

f respc,ndent further stated that redundancy in the proposed rule was not needed and the rulemaking should give affected licensees latitude in selecting and justifying the means of physical protection. Alternatives that were suggested involved the deletion of specific provisions of the proposed rule and also the restructuring of the rule so as to not group all ISFSis under one set of physical protection critena.

NRC Resoons.g. The Commission has revised the requirements of the proposed rule to eliminate unnecessary redundancies, add flexibility in implementation, and reduce manpower-intensive measures while maintaining an adequate level of physical protection.

Question 5. Are the proposed amendments to 10 CFR 73.51 appropriate for an MRS or geologic repository operated by the U.S. Department of Energy?

Summarv of Resoonse. The NEl was the only respondent to this issue. NEl notad that NRC should be mindful of the evolving nature of MRS installations and the geologic repository in the development of physical protection regulations for these sites.

NRC Resoonse. NRC staff continues to work closely with DOE staff in the development of the certification process for MRS installations and the GROA.

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ATTACHMENT 3 STANDARD REVIEW PLAN ,

(NUREG - 1619)

I f-

. CONTENTS Abstract 1 introduction -

1.1 Background and Applicability 1.2 Purpose of Document 1.3 Description of Document 1.4 Modular Format 1.5 Protection of Plan 2 Basic Steps in the Physical Protection Licensing Process

( 3 Incorporation by Reference l- 4 Physical Protection Plan Components 4.1 Module 1 -Introduction and Effective Date of Rule 4.1.1 Introduction l- 4.1.2 Effective Date of Rule

4.2 Module ll - General Performance Objectives and Protection's Goal 4.2.1 Objectives 4.2.2 Performance Capabilities 4.2.3 Protection Goal 4.3 Module lli - Security Organization

4.3.1 Establishment of Security Organization 4.3.2 Security Audits j . 4.3.3 Qualifications for Employment t

4.3.4 Security Force Training 4.3.5 Records 4.4 Module IV - Physical Barrier Systems 4.4.1 General Layout 4.4.2 Physical Barriers 4.4.3 Primary Alarm Station and Security Posts 1 4.4.4 lilumination {

l 4.5 Module V - Access Control Subsystems and Procedures / ]

5.1 identification System l

.5.2 Access to Protected Area 4.5.3 Access Controls at the Protected Area 4.5.4 Escotts 4.5.5 Key'and Lock Control 4.5.6 Records 4.6 Module VI - Detection, Surveillance, and Alarm Subsystems 4.6.1 Isolation Zone Penetration 4.6.2 Alarm Annunciation at Security Post 4.6.3 Power Sources 4.6.4 Component Supervision iii )

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_______-_____-_A

I 4.6.5 Protected Area Monitoring and Assessment 4.7 Module Vil - Communications Subsystems 4.7.1 Security Force Communications 4.7.2 Alarm Station Communications 4.7.3 Power Sources 4.8 Module Vill - Equipment Operability and Compensatory Measures 4.8.1 Equipment operability 4.8.2 Compensatory Measures 4.8.3 Testing and Maintenance 4.9 Module IX - Contingency Response Plan and Procedures 4.9.1 Contingency Plan documentation 4.9.2 Res'ponse Force Liaison 4.9.3 Response Procedures 4.9.4 Records APPENDIX A - PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN FORMAT APPENDIX B - GLOSSARY OF TERMS .

APPENDIX C - SAMPLE LICENSE CONDITION i

iV

NUREG 1619 JANUARY 1998 STANDARD REVIEW PLAN FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLANS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards P.A. Dwyer

NUREG - 1619 STANDARD REVIEW PLAN FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLANS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE l

Manuscript Completed: January 1998 Date Published:

P. A. Dwyer Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 l

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ABSTRACT This document is a standard review plan (SRP) for the evaluation of physical protection plans for the protection of spent fuel and high-level radioactive wastes stored at (1) l independent spent fuel storage installations, (2) power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations, (3) monitored retrievable storage installations, and (4) the

]

l geologic repository operations area. The purpose of an SRP is to assure that license

! applicants address every applicable Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirement in their NRC-approved physical protection plan and to assure consistency and comprehensiveness of plan review by NRC. The information is presented in a new l matrix or " modular" format to streamline the information and facilitate its use.

Comments, which would make future revisions of this NUREG more useful, are invited and should be directed to:

Ms. Priscilla A. Dwyer Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Reputatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 W

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I 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background and Applicability U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations for the physical protection of j spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste stored at: (1) independent spent fuel storage 1

installations (ISFSis), (2) power reactors that have permanently ceased operations, (3) monitored-retrievable storage (MRS) installations or (4) the future geologic repository operations area are codified under 10 CFR 73.5',. These regulations were issued (insert date of issuance) (Federal Register Notice citation) and specify the physical l protection measures a licensee must implement at affected sites and that a licensee must commit to in its NRC-approved physical protection plan.

i 1.2 Purpose of Document This document is a standard review plan (SRP) for use by NRC license reviewers in evaluating physical protection plans prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 60.21(b)(3) (for MRS installations and the geologic repository),10 CFR 72.24 (for ISFSis) and 10 CFR l 72.180 (for power reactors that have permanently ceased reactor operations). The SRP contains the requirements that a licensee must meet and address in its physical

! protection plan and also contains additional information to be used as guidance in the implementation of the regulations. The SRP is used by NRC to assure comprehensive and consistent license reviews. This document is of use to license applicants or licensees seeking an amendment to their license because it provides a format acceptable to NRC for the required physical protection plan and concisely describes the l requirements that the applicant or licensr,e must meet. This document supersedes any

[

interim licensing guidance published bef are the issuance of 10 CFR 73.51.

1.3 Description of Document This document contains eight modules that make up the major elements of physical protechon plans for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.51. These plans must meet every requirement presented in each module. Following each module is a

" Guidance" sechon that contains sup?I emental 4. formation on the NRC's interpretation I of the regulations, acceptable means for'neeting the regulation, and any other pertinent information. Three appendices are included that contain recommendations on plan format, a user's glossary, and a sample license condition. (See Appendices A, B, and C.)

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1.4 Modular Format This SRP has been developed in a new modular format. This effort is part of a new initiative by NRC to simplify and gain efficiencies in the NRC licensing process by presenting information in a user-friendly format.

1.5 Protection of Plan Physical protection plans for the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste should be protected as Safeguards Information in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21.

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2 BASIC STEPS IN THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION LICENSING PROCESS There are a number of steps in the NRC evaluation of physical protection plans required to be submitted by NRC regulations. These steps are: (1) the submittal process, (2) the initial review process, (3) the final review process, and (4) the issuance of a license condition.

The submittal process can be prompted by the issuance of a new rule or amendments to an existing regulation or it can be a voluntary request on the part of the licensee.

During this period, the applicant or licensee develops its protection strategy for meeting the new or amended requirement (or the voluntary request) and documents it in a letter to NRC licensing, for review and comment.

l The initial review process is an iterative process in which discussions take place between NRC and the license or applicant to arrive at a proposal acceptable to NRC A number of proposals may be submitted and evaluated during this period. The license reviewer, using such guidance as an SRP, informally assures that the proposal agreed to is adequate and sufficient in meeting NRC requirements.

The licensee then makes a formal and final submittal of its proposal. The license reviewer documents his or her formal review of the proposal in a Safeguards Evaluation Report (SER) which is stored and maintained on file for the life of the license.

The physical protection licensing process is completed by the issuance of a license condition attached to the main license. The licente condition contains the commitments made by the licensee to meet the i3 m or amended proposal and becomes a permanent part of the license, unless amended at some future time.

Appendix C to this document contains a sample license condition that has been attached to a license in response to new or amended physical protection requirements or measures.

3

3 INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE in addition to the information contained in this SRP, the following documents are incorporated by reference, as guidance to support the review process:

Regulatory Guide 5.12, General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Materials, November 1973.

Regulatory Guide 5.44, PerimeterIntrusion Alann Systems, rev.3, October 1997.

NUREG 0794, Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information.

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4.1 MODULE I-INTRODUCTICNIoND EFFECTIVE DATE OF RULE 4.1.1 Introduction The licensee should provide a general description of the facility including name,

! location, corporation, type of facility, etc.

4.1.2 Effective Date of Rule The rule is effective (insert 180 days after rule issuance date in the Federal Reaister.)

GUIDANCE:

l No additional guidance is provided for this module.

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l l 4.2 MODULE II-GENERAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION GOAL 4.2.1 Objectives Each licensee shall establish and maintain a physical protection system with the

. objectives of providing high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.10 CFR 73.51 '

(b)(1).

4.2.2 Performance capabilities To meet the general objective of paragraph 73.51(b)(1)(10) each licensee shall meet the following performance capabilities:

(1) Store the spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste only within a protected area; .

(2) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area; }

(3) Detect and assess unauthorized I penetration of or activities within the protected area; (4) Provide timely communication to a designated / response force whenever p necessaryj and (5) Manage the physical security organization in a manner that maintains its effectiveness.10 CFR 73.51(b)(2).

t ,

4.2.3 Protection goal The physical protection system must be designed to protect against loss of control of the facility which could be sufficient to cause consequences equivalent to a design basis accident in accordance with 10 CFR 72.106.10 CFR 73.51 (b)(3). !

J GUIDANCE:

l 4.2.3 The design basis threat for radiological sabotage of power reactors under 10 CFR 73.1 is not considered appropriate for the types of facilities subject to 10 l

CFR 73.51. Hence, a separate protection goal is defined for these facilities.

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4.3 MODULE Ill - SECURITY ORGANIZATION 4.3.1 Establishment of security A security organization with written

! organization procedures must be established. The I security organization must include sufficientpersonnel per shift to provide for monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, assessment, l access control, and communications to l assure adequate response.10 CFR 73.51 l (d)(5).

4.3.2 Security audits The physical protection (PP) program must be reviewed once every 24 months by individuals independent of both PP program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the PP program. The PP program review must include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the l physical protection system and a verification of the liaison established with the designated response force or local law

~

enforcement agency. 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(12).

O V 4.3.3 Qualifications for employment in Members)f the security organization must security be ...quilified... to perform assigned job duties in accordance with Appendix B to Part 73, sections 1.A., (1)(a) and (b);

B(1)(a); and the applicable portions of II.

10 CFR 73.51 (d)(5) 4.3.4 Security force training Members of the security organization must be trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned job duties in accordancewith Appendix B to Part 73, sections 1.A., (1)(a) and (b); B(1)(a); and the applicable portions of II. 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(5).

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4.3 MODULE Ill - SECURITY ORGANIZATION 4.3.5 Records The following' documentation must be retained as a record for three years after the record is made or until termination of the license. Duplicate records to those required under 10 CFR 72.180 and 10 CFR 73.71 need not be retained. (1) A log of individuals granted access to the protected area, (2) screening records of members of the security organization, (3) a log of all patrols, (4) a record of each alarm received identifying the type of alarm, location, date and time when received, and disposition of the alarm, and (5) the security program review reports.10 CFR 73.51 (d) (13), V A

GUIDANCE:

4.3.3 Appendix B to Part 73, l.A.(1)(a) requires that the individual possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent performance examination designed to measure basic job-related , mathematical, language and reasoning skills, ability and knowledge, required to perform security job duties.

Appendix B to Part 73, l.A. (1)(b) requires that the ino':vidual have no felony convictions involving the use of a weapon and no felony convictions that reflect on the individual's reliability.

Appendix B to Part 73, B (1)(a) requires that individuals whose security tasks

! and job duties are directly associated with the effective implementation of the licensee physical protection and contingency plans must have no physical weakness or abnormalities that would adversely affect their performance of assigned security job duties.

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4.4 MODULE IV - PHYSICAL BARRIER SYSTEM 4.4.1 General layout Spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste must be stored only within a protected area so that access to this material requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and one barrier offering substantial penetration resistance. 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(1).

4.4.2 Physical barriers The physical barrier at the perimeter of the protectedyrea must be as defined in 10 CFR 7321 solation zones, typically 20 feet 7 wide eadh, on both side.; of this barrier must be provided to facilitate assessment.

The barrier offering substantial resistance to penetration may be provided by an approved storage cask or building walls such as those of a reactor or fuel storage building.10 CFR 73.51 (d)(1).

4.4.3 Primary alarm station and security The perimeter of the protected area must posts be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system that is capable of detecting penetration through the isolation zone and which is monitored in a continually staffed primary alarm station and in one additioral continually staffed location. The primary alarm station must be located within the protected area; have bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and floor; and the interior of the station must not be visible from outside the protected area. A timely means for assessment of alarms must also be provided. Regarding alarm monitoring,the redundant location need only provide a summaryindication that an alarm has been generated 10 CFR 73.51(d)(3),

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4.4 MODULE IV - PHYSICAL BARRIER SYSTEM 4.4.4 Illumination Illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment of unauthorized penetration of or activities within the y protected area 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(2),

A GUIDANCE:

4.4.2 A physical barrier means: 1) fences constructed of No.11 American wire gauge or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30 and 45 degrees from the vertical with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed

/ f,/g/f topping; 2) Building walls, ceiling, and floors constructed f stone, brick, ci p:*/#' q block, concrete, steel, or comparable material openings in hich ar cured by grates, doors, or covers of construction and fastening of suffic' strength such that the integrity of the wall is not lessened by any opening) r wag of similar . "

construction, not part of a building, provided with a barbed topping, described /fn paragraph (1) of this definition of a height of not less than eight feet; or 3) any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of material suitable for the purpose for which the obstruction is intended.

Vehicle barriers to protect against the malevolent use of a vehicle are not

. presently required at sites subject to 10 CFR 73.51 where fuel is stored in approved storage casks or below ground storage pools. Sites where fuel is stored in an above ground pool should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine need for protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle.

4.4.3 The attemate station may be located at the local law enforcement agency or a commercial alarm monitoring station with redundant capability for contacting local law enforcement.

l 4.4.4 Illumination should be maintained during all periods of darkness (not just during periods of assessment.) The level of illumination should be sufficient for the assessment means used. No required illumination levelis specified in 10 CFR 73.51. It is also recognized that due to the physical nature of an ISFSI, it may be difficult to maintain a consistent level of illumination throughout the protected j area due to required structures, e.g., storage casks.

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4.5 MODULE V - ACCESS CONTROL SUBSYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES 4.5.1 Identification system A personnelidentification system ... must be established and maintained to "mit access to authorized individuals.10 CFR 73.51 (d)(7).

4.5.2 Access to protected areas Allindividuals, vehicles, and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for proper authorization ...

before entry.10 CFR 73.51 (d)(9).

4.5.3 Access controls at the protected area All individuals, vehicles and hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be ... visually searched for explosives before entry.10 CFR 73.51(d)(9).

4.5.4 Escorts and escorted individuals N/A (See Additional Guidance.) ^

4.5.5 Key and lock control A ... controlled lock system must be established and maintained to limit access to authorized individuals.10 CFR 73.51 (d)(7).

4.5.6 Records The following documentation must be

. retained as a record for 3 years after the record is made or until termination of the license. Duplicate records to those required under 10 CFR 72.180 and 10 CFR 73.71 need not be retained under the requirements of this section: % a log of indiv isgranted access to the protected area; screening records of members of the urity organization; (iii) a log of all patrols; (iv) a record of each alarm

. received, identifying the type of alarm, location, date and time when received and l

disposition of the v'erm; and (v) the PP

! program review reports. 10 CFR l 73.51(d)(13),

GUIDANCE: [

4.5.1 The personnelidentification system should provide unique identification of individuals granted access to the protected area through such means as a 11

picture identification system using a driver's license photograph, a name badge system using a difficult to counterfeit badge medium, or facial recognition.

Justification for use of facial recognition should be provided, such as, long term employment and small site population.

4.5.4 If an individual can be conclusively identified, is authorized access, and has been searched for explosives withu! positive result, then no escort is required.

If the individual cannot meet any of these three criteria, access to the protected area should be denied.

4.5.5 Regulatory Guide 5.12, General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Materials, November 1973, should be used as guidance in the development of a controlled lock system.

4.5.6 The applicant or licensee need not describe redundant recordkeeping -

requirements under each module of the plan. The records pertinent to the J particolar module need only be described. )

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i l 4.6 MODULE (DETECTION, SURVEILLANCE, AND ALARM SUBSYSTEMS 4.6.1 Isolation zone penetration Spent nuclear fuel and high-level I radioactive waste must be stored only within a protected area so that access to this material requires passage through or penetration of two physical barriers, one at the perimeter of the protected area and one barrier offering substantial penetration resistance. The physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area must be as l

defined in 10 CFR 73.2. Isolation zones, I typically 20 feet wide each, on both sides of this barrier must be provided to facilitate assessment... 10 CFR 73.51(d)(1).

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4.6.2 Alarm annunciation at security posts The perimeter of the protected area must be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system that is capable of detecting )

penetrationthrough the isolation zone and J which is monitored in a continually staffed i alarm station and one additional continually staffed location... A timely means of assessment must also be provided. With respect to alarm monitoring, the redundant location need I only provide a summary indication that alarm has been generated. 10 CFR 73.51(d)(3);

4.6.3 Power sources All detection systems, surveillance / assessment systems, and supporting subsystems including illumination systems must be... maintained in operable condition. 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(11).

! 4.6.4 Component supervision AII detection systems, surveillance / assessment systems, and supporting subsystems must be tamper-indicating with line supervision... 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(11);

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t 4.6 MODULE % DETECTION, SURVEILLANCE, AND ALARM SUBSYSTEMS I

4.6.5 Protected area monitoring and The perimeter of the protected area must assessment be subject to continual surveillance and be protected by an active intrusion alarm system that is capable of detecting penetration through the isolation zonepn {

which is monitored in a continually staffed j alarm station and in one additional continually sjaffed location. 10 CFR 73.51(d)(3) 'Jsolation zones, typically 20 feet wide each on both sides of this barrier (the PA barrier} must be provided to i facilitate assessment.10 CFR 73.51(d)(1)

The protected area must be monitored by daily random patrols.10 CFR 73.51(d)(4)

A timely means of assessment of alarms must also be provided. 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(3) .

A GUIDANCE:

4.6.2 The licensee or applicant should follow the guidelines of R.G. 5.44, Perimeter

. Intrusion Alarm Systems, rev.3, regarding alarm annunciation.

4.G.5 Factors that should be considered in determining frequency of random patrols include: remoteness of facility, nature of activities located adjacent to the site, and size of the storage facility. For example, a minimum of two patrols per day should be conducted unless in a remote area where more patrols may be necessary.

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4.7 MODULE VI - COMMUNICATIONS SUBSYSTEMS 1

4.7.1 Security force communications A security organization with written l procedures must be established. The security organization must include sufficient personnel per shift to provide for...the conduct of... communications to I assure adequate response. 10 CFR 73.51(d)(5) $

4.7.2 Alarm station communications Redundant communications capability must be provided between onsite security force members and the designated response force or local law enforcement agency.10 CFR 73.51(d)(8) $

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4.7.3 Power sources All detection systems, i surveillance / assessment systems, and l I

supporting subsystems including illumination systems must be... maintained in operable condition. 10 CFR 73.51 (d)(11) , ,

A GUIDANCE:

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No additional guidance is provided under this module.

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4.8 MODULE Vil- EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND - COMPENSATORY MEASURES 4.8.1 Equipment Operability A11 detection systems, surveillance / assessment systems, and supporting subsystems including illumination systems... must be maintained y in operable condition. 10 CFR 73.51(d)(11) .

4.8.2 Compensatory Measures Timely compensatory measures must be taken after discovery of inoperability to assure that the effectiveness of the system is not reduced. 10 CFR 73.51(d)(11).

4.8.3 Testing and maintenance AII d ek tio n systems, surveillance / assessment systems, and supporting subsystems including illumination systems... must be maintained in operable condition. 10 CFR 73.51(d)(11) .

A GUIDANCE:

4.8.3 The test and maintenance program described in Regulatory Guide 5.44, PerimeterIntrusion Alarm Systems, rev.3, is an acceptable program for maintaining equipment in operable condition.

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4.9 MODULE IX - CONTINGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AND PROCEDURES 4.9.1 Contingency plan documentation Written response procedures must be established and maintained for addressing unauthorized penetration of or activities within the protected area including Category 5, " Procedures," of Appendix C to Part 73.10 CFR 73.51(d)(10),

4.9.2 Response force liaison Documented liaison with a dhsignated response force or local law enforcement agency must be established to permit timely . response to unauthorized penetrations or activities. 10 CFR 73.51)(d)(6) $

4.9.3 Response procedures Written resp"onse procedures must be established and maintained for addressing unauthorized penetration of or activities within the protected area including Category 5. Procedures, of Appendix C to Part 73.10 CFR 73.51(d)(10);

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4.9.4 Records The licensee shall retain a copy of

. response procedures as a record for 3 years or until termination of the license for l

which the procedures were developed. 10 l

l CFR 73.51(d)(10)!

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GUIDANCE:

4.9.2 The designated response force could be a privately contracted security force that meets the requirements of Appendix B to Part 73 or the security force of an adjacent operating power reactor.

if the designated response force cannot respond in a timely manner, additional protective measures may be required, to include use of armed guards.

4.9.3 it is expected that the contingency plan for the storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste will not be as extensive as that described for power reactors under Appendix C to Part 73. The contingency plan for the storage of spent fuel and high level radioactive waste should, as a minimum, include Category 5 of Appendix C to Part 73, Procedures.

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APPENDIX A- PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLAN FORMAT If this format is used, the applicant should follow the numbering system of this NUREG.

Under certain circumstances, certain subsections may not be applicable to a specific application. If so, this snould be clearly stated and sufficient information should be provided to support this conclusion.

The applicant may wish to submit information in support of an application that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the description of tne applicant's physical protection program. Such information c0uld include, for exampleo Cliisioricai d3fa suomitted in demonstration of certain criteria, discussion of attematives consi6ered by the applicant, or supplementary data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This information should be provided in an appendix to the plan.

Upon completion of the plan, the applicant should use the table of contents of this document as a checklist to ensure that each subject has been addressed.

A.1. Style and Composition A table of contents should be included in each submittal.

The applicant should strive for clear, concise presentation ofinformation. Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided. Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent throughout the submittal, and consistent with generally accepted usage.

Whenever possible, duplication of information should be avoided. The information included in other sections of the application may be covered by specific reference to those sections.

Where numerical values are stated, the number of significant figures should reflect the accuracy or precision to which the number is known. The use of relative values should be clearly indicated. Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented more adequately or conveniently by such means. These illustrations should be located in the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to assure that the information presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are defined, and that drawings are not reduced to the extent that they cannot be read by unaided, normal eyes.

A.2. Physicai Specifications of Submittaf ;

i All material submitted in an application should conform to the following physical l dimensions of page size, quality of papers and inks, numbering of pages, etc. l l

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A.2.1 Paner Size Text: paper should be 8.5 x 11 inches in dimension.

Drawings and graphics: 8.5 x 11 inches, preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable provided the finished copy, when folded, does not exceed 8.5 x 11 inches.

A.2.2 Paper Stock and ink Suitable quality in substance, paper color and ink density for handling and reproducing by microfilming.

^ 2.3 Paper Marains A margin of no less than one inch is to be maintained on the top, bottom, and binding side of all pages submitted.

A.2.4 Printing l

Composition: text pages should be single spaced. Type face, and style should be suitable for microfilming..

Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced. A!! pages of the text may be printed on both sides, and images should be printed head to head. I I

A.2.5 Binding l Pages should be punched for loose leaf ring binding.

A.2.6 Page Numbering Pages should be numbered consecutively throughout the main part of the document.

Any appendices may be numbered separately, if desired. Each page of the physical protection plan should contain a page number; a revision number, if applicable, and a

! date.

A.3. Procedures for Undatina or Revisina Pages The updating or revising of data should be on a replacement page basis. The changes l or revised portion of each page should be highlighted by a vertical line. The line should !

I be on the margin opposite the binding margin for each line changes or added. All pages submitted to update, revise, or add pages to the plan are to show the date of the change. The transmittal letter should include the index page listing the pages to be 1

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inserted and the pages to be removed When major changes or additions are made pages for a revised table of contents should be provided.

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! A.4 Number of Copign i The applicant should submit the appropriate number of copies of each requested 1 l submittal in accordance with 10 CFR 72.16.

A.5 Public Disclosure l

i NRC has determined that public disclosure of the details of physical protection programs is not in the public interest and such details {uch detaiis)hould be protected R as Safeguards information pursuant to 10 CFR 73.21 t A.6 Compatibility The applicant should ensure that the physical protection plan is compatible with the other sections of the application.

I A.7 Schedule for Submittal The applicant should contact NRC to determine a schedule for physical protection plan submittal.

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APPENDIX B - GLOSSARY OF TERMS These terms are excerpted from Title 10 of the Code of federal regulations, Parts 72 and 73.

Independent spent fuel storaae installation or ISFSI - a complex designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage. An ISFSI which is located on the site of another facility may share common utilities and services with such a facility and be physically connected with such other facility and still be considered independent; provided that j such sharing of utilities and services or physical connections does not: (1) increase the j probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of components, structures or i systems that are important to safety, or (2) reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification of either facility.

Isolation zone - Any area adjacent to a physical barrier, clear of all objects which could conceal or shield an individual.

Monitored retrievable storage installation or MRS - A complex designed, constructed and operated by the Department of Energy for the receipt, transfer, handling, packaging, possessing, safeguarding, and storage of spent nuclear fuel aged l

for at least one year and solidified high-level radioactive waste resulting from civilian nuclear activities, pending shipment to a high-level waste repository or other disposal.

Physical barrier -(1) Fences constructed of No.11 American Wire Gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30 degrees and 45 degrees from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed topping, (2) building walls, ceilings, and floors constructed of stone, brick, cinder block, concrete.

l steel, or comparable materials (openings in which are secured by grates, doors or l covers of construction and fastening of sufficient strength such that the integrity'of the well is not lessened by any opening), or walls of similar construction, not part of a building, provided with a barbed topping described in paragraph (1) of this definition of i a height of not less than eight feet; or (3) any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of materials suitable for the purpose for which the obstruction is intended.

Spent nucl9ar fuel or spent fuel - Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, has undergone at least one year's decay since being used as a source of energy in a power reactor and has not been chemically separated into its constituent elements by reprocessing. Spent fuel includes the special nuclear material, byproduct material, source material, and other radioactive materials associated with fuel assemblies.

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Strategic special nuclear material - Uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium.

Watchman - An individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the course of performing other duties.

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APPENDIX C - SAMPLE LICENSE CONDITION "The licensee shall follow the physical protection plan entitled: "XXXX Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Physical Protection Plan," dated (insert date) and as it '

may be further amended under the provisions of 10 CFR 72.33(e) and 72.C4(d)."

(The requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, for guard training and qualification, are incorporated in Appendix C of the approved physical protection plan. The requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C, for contingency planning, are incorporated into the physical protection plan in Chapter 1.9.)

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i ATTACHMENT 4 FINAL REGULATORY ANALYSIS i

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FINAL REGULATORY ANALYSIS PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIG6+ LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND REGULATORY APPROACH 1.1 Pmblem On August 15,1995 (60 FR 42079), the Nuclear Regulacary Commission (NRC) i 1

l published, for pubic comment, a proposed rule to clarify physical protection requwements for spent nuclear fuel and higibievel radioactive waste (HLW) stored at independent spent fuel storage installabons (ISFSis); power reactors that have permanently ceased operations; monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installations; and the geologic repository operations area (GROA). The proposed rule would also allow general licensees the option of implementing the ;

rig-:::1 physical protechon requirements for spent nuclear fuel stored in approved casks at operstmg power reactor sites. Public comments were received on the proposed rule. The Commission revised this regulatory analysis and the proposed physical protection requirements in response to these public comments.

i The $i of the final rule I:s to reduce the regulatory uncertamty regardag the physica' pmtection requirements for the storage of spent nuclear fuel and HLW without reducmg the level '

of pmtechon for putwc health and safety. Currently, there are seven operating specific-3scense ISFSis.

1.2 Background

The Commission's regulations addressing the storage of spent nuclear fuel and HLW-10 CFR Part 72, "Limnsing Requirements for the independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level P% Waste * - refer th6 applicant or licensee to ".. appleable ,

I requwements of 10 CFR Part 73..." for requirements for physical protechon However, Part 73 f l

does not idenufy any physical protection requirements that are specific to the storage of spent l nuclear fuel and HLW. In prachce, NRC has imposed specific requireraents on affected facsistses through hoense cond4 sons usmg selected porbons of 10 CFR 73.50 and 73.55 and interim heenseg cntene as guidance L

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The Commission's regulations, in 10 CFR Part 60, for Department of Energy (DOE) f disposal of spent nuclear fuel or HLW at a GROA take a different approach. Instead of J-j specifying applicable requirements to protect the common defense arid cecurity, they for DOE to certify that it will provide "...such safeguards as it requires at comparable surface facehbes..." of DOE. They also require DOE to describe a physical protection plan for protection agamst radiological sabotage, but the contents of that plan are not specified. As a result, DOE does not need to idenhfy the requwements it will apply before filing its appiscation for a geologic repository. Therefore, the public would not have an opportunity to review or comment on the

( appmpnateness of those requwements until an application is filed. Finally, DOE's strategy for managing HLW has shelted from one of developing an MRS to one that uses mulhpurpose canisters located at nuclear power reactor sites. As such, under its current scheras, there would not be a comparable DOE surface facility.

l The or*/ physical protechon requirements in NRC regulations that are ;specsfic to the storage of spent nuclear fuel are those that apply to spent nuclear fuel stored in certified casks under a general license at operating nuclear power reactors. These requirements are found in 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5).

After considering public comments, the Commissson is issuing final regulabons to codsfy j l exishng prachos for the physacal protechon of stored spent nuclear fuel and HLW. As intended in f the y,-:-;- ::I rule, the final amendments would provide a set of physmal protection requwoments dweded at the storage of spent nuclear fuel or HLW, whether at an ISFSI, an MRS, or a geologic repository. In addebon, these final amendments are consistent with existing requwements for spent nucosar fuel storage under a general license at operating power reactors (10 CFR

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72.212(b)(5)). Because the final amendments mostly codify the existing regulatory qthere would not be any addshonal burden placed on cunent heensees Nevertheless some differences may exist in a few cases, as expressed in pubic comments The final rule has been revised to give flexibility to heensees and, where appropnate, reduce redundancies and burden These amendments would also make the requwoments of 10 CFR Part 75 appiocable to l

the GROA in the event it is soloded for inspechon by the intomational Atomic Energy Agency l

l (IAEA) under the agreement between the United States and the IAEA for apphcahon of IAEA safeguards in the U.S. This change is needed because the " Terms of Reference", dated August 1,1994, for the Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S., part of the Subcommittee on I

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l Intemational Safeguards and Monitoring of the IAEA Steering Committee, states that NRC shall be the U.S. agency responsible for maintaining necessary regulations for implementing the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement at NRC-licensed or -certified facilities, including the promulgation of l regulations, corporation of appropnate amendments in NRC licenses, and the issuance of such orders as may be necessary1; assure compliance. These " Terms of Reference" regarding the l agreement between the U.S. and the IAEA are available for inspection in NRC's public document room.

l The final rule does not require speedic protection against the malevolent use of a vehicle. As stated in the pier::I rule, the staff has been studying this issue and attempting to quantsfy the consequences of a vehicle bomb detonated in the wcwwty of an ISFSt. Based on the results of an expert study and a peer review of its findmgs, NRC has determined that at this time there is no compelhng U~ - := for requmng a volucie barrier as penmeter protechon for spent fuel or HLW dry cask storage, or storage in below-ground pools j

1.3 Regulatory Approach The final requwoments would amend 10 CFR Parts 60, 72,73, and 75. For Part 60, NRC has decided that the regulatory approach for protecting a GROA be the same as that whch appbes to spent nuclear fuel storage facehtees hconsed under Part 72. The basec reason for this decision is that the GROA opershons, at least insofar as they are expected to be conducted in surface facilibes, appear to present the same kinds of potenhal threats that are charactenstic of the storage of spent nuclear fuel, and the protechon that would required are deemed to be sulIlceent as well to protect agamst acts, affecting the underground facenty, that might be inimical to the common defense and secunty. This regulatory approach is predicated on mestarung the physacalintegnty of the spent nuclear fuel rods, if their physicalintegrity is not mentamed, additsonal hoonse condshons might be found to be necessary and would then be i moorporated in the boonse.

This final rule i.f.,-x:t a departure from the Conwrussen's prior position, as expleened

.) in the " Statement of Consideratens" accompanying its provnigation of Part 60 (46 FR 13971, b 13975hFetwuery25,1981). The prior view was that ' DOE, as a Federal agency operating under the Atomic Energy Act, has its own obhgebon to promote the common defense and security.

Indeed, DOE is responsible under the Atome Energy Act for protechon of materials and facihbes for more sensitive from a safeguards standpoint than nuclear waste materials in a geologic 3

repository. Therefore,10 CFR 60.21(b)(3) provided that a DOE certification that its repository operations area safeguards are equal to those at comparable DOE surface facilities shall constitute a rebuttable presumption on the question of inimicality to the common defense and secunty "

I implementation of Part 60 has proved to be difficult for two reasons. The first has been the idenhfication of DOE surface facelsbos that are " comparable," so that the protective measures are nedher too burdensome nor too tax. The second reason concoms the indefiniteness of the

" rebuttable presumphon" language Nedher DOE nor NRC nor any other potential party can be

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certam about the level of detail that rmght be necessary to support the certificahon or to rebut the presumphon of nonmirmcahty. It appears likely to the Commission that the specsficabon of reasonable requwoments, as in this final rule, will enable DOE to discharge its common defense and secunty obbgetoons more officsontly than would be the case under the existing language.

And there would be the added benefit of ensuring that smlar operations (i.e., at a GROA as well l

as at spent nuclear fuel storage facsisbes) are addressed in a consistent manner.

The final amendments would replace existing 10 CFR 60.21(b)(3) with a requirement for DOE to tuhmit a dotaded plan to provide physical protechon for the storage of HLW at a GROA in accordance with a new 10 CFR 73.51. Also, the final amendment would replace existmg 10 CFR 60.21(b)(4) with a requwoment for DOE to comply with a new $ 60.76, which requires DOE to provide a desenphon of a program to meet the requwoments of existing $$ 72.72,72.74, 72.76, and 72.76. The rahonale for these changes is, as discussed above, to ensure that ttw physical protechon for simdar facihbes are addressed in a consistent manner. In adddson, because these specific requwements are bemg provided, the general requwement for DOE to provide "...sach safeguards as it requires at comparable surface facilities..." would also be removed from $$ 60.31,60.41, and 72.24(o), because it would not be needed An adddsonal revision to Part 60 relates to the nuclear material control and accounting

! program that is refened to in $ 60.21(c)(10). To the extent that this pn gram relates to safeguards issues, it is more property addressed as " general informatic.n" under $ 60.21(b),

rather than as part of the Safety Analysas Report under $ 60.21(c). The final rule will m,p;,sh this. However, existing $ 60.21(c)(10) has a broader purpose that does impbcate safety issues.

There is a need for DOE to desenbe the materials inventory and record-keeping program that is desagned to assure protection of public health and safety during operations of the GROA and 4 )

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'J b after permanent closure. information is important, for example, for purposes of performance confirmation, potential retrieval, and archival documentation. Section 60.21(c) i would accordingly be revised to reflect this focus.

The final amendment to 9 72.180 would provide requirements for the storage of spent /

nuclear fuel and HLW under a specific license by referring applicants to the same newM5 /

73.51. The final amendment to $ 72.212 would allow the licensee or applicant the ophon of esther using 5 73.51 for the storage of spent nuclear fuel under a general license or continuing to use $ 73.55 with the addshonal conditions and exceptions provided in 6 72.212(b)(5). ;

in boensing the storage of spent nuclear fuel and HLW at an ISFSI, the NRC staff has had to sort through the many requwements of Part 73 to choose appropriate physcal protechon requeroments, and impose those requirements through license conditions. As a result of this exponence, however, a set of pnnciples has evolved that reflects both the nature of potential threats and the hazardous radioachve characteristics of the materials. Accordingly, the final J amendments in f 73.51 would codify physical protechon requirements currently imposed on spent nucisar fuel storage heensees and would provide a consistent set of reqmnts for future boensing. Specifically, this new sechon would have the objective of ensunng that the following basic physical protechon performance capabihbes are met-(1) Store spent nuclear fuel and HLW only within a protected area; (2) Grant access to the protected area only to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area; (3) Detect and assess unauthorized penetrations of, or activities within, the protected area; I

l (4) Provide emely communication to a designated response force, whenever necessary; and (5) Manage the physcal protechon orgaruzatior,in a manner that maintains its effechveness.

These amendments would not apply to spent nuclear fuel storage pools at operating nudear power plants. However, because these final requirements would for the most part codify the exasting regulatory prachce, there would not be any additional burden placed on current licensees Further, the industry would benefit from a reduction of current regulatory 5

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uncertamties. The public would benefit from a greater level of assurance that appropriate physical protechon requirements are being imposed on spent nuclear fuel and HLW storage )

licensees through public review and comment on the proposed rule. The DOE would benefit fmm the amendments by having a clear statement of the protection measures the Commission plans to require at the GROA. Also, NRC would benefit as a result of a more efficient licensing l process, in addebon, the current reportmg requirements in 5 73.71 would be amended to specifically include facsidses that are subject to this rulemalung However, since the amended reporbng requirements are equevalent to current prachce, no addebonal burden will be placed on cument hcensees as a result of these amended repo#1mg requirements.

i 2.0 ALTERNATIVES Two altomahves were considered (1) Do nothmg and use existing requirements, namely $560.21,60.31,60.41,70.24, 72.180,73.50,74.51, or 73.55, as appropnate, to license each facility on a case-by-case v -

basis -

(2) Rulemalung to codify kemisting regulatory prachce I

Telung no action and using existmg requirements to license these facchties is not an of5ceent use of NRC resources, because of the many licensing excepisons needed to ensure adequese protechon agamst radiological sabotage, but not theft of SSNM, and the nebulous nature of ensunne via hoensing for an MRS or the GROA that DOE provides " comparable safeguards". Taking no adion and using existing requirements does not ensure that consistent requirements are oppleed to all spent nuclear fuel storage Moreover, talung no achon does not provide the appiscant with sufficsont defirutsve guedance on what is expected in the way of physical protechon requirements, would continue the current state of uncertainty, and would not inform the public of the requromonts the NRC is using.

On the other hand, a rt. -Mg to codify the existing regulatory pinchce is the solution to the aforemenboned pmblems. It also would provide the benefits of pubbc nobce and comment on the pi+;-::M requeroments. The NRC believes that the 'mdustry would benefit from an elrrunabon of the current uncertamties regarding the regulatory requirements. The public would 6

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benefit from being assured that the physical protection required for these facilities are in place.

Also, the NRC would benefit from an increased efficiency in the licensing of these facilities.

Except for the possible cost of hardening the primary alarm station (estimated to be

$ 30,000), these final amendments would not impose any additional costs on the nuclear mdustry beyond what are currently required for protection of stored spent nuclear fuel, because

! no now major requirements are being added. Moreover, the staff revised the proposed rule, in ress.onse to the public comments, to ehmmate any redundant requirements, and to add flexabehty to rule implementation, both of whic'6 ; will reduce licensees' financial burden from this rule. [More ,

I he on this is given in Sechon 5.0.] l l

Therefore, the NRC costs of implementing these final amendments would be less than the current hcensang process because the extensive use of exceptions would no longer be necessary. The costs to future ISFSI, MRS, or GROA licensees are expected to be 9= ;,c'fi the same as those for current ISFSI licensees because the requirements for physical protechon contaened in the final amendments are designed to be the same as those for current ISFSis.

Table 1 lists the requwoments of the final rulemalung (column 3) and provides a i compenson of the current physical protechon via hcense condsbons at sites under the purvoow of the Ofilce of Nuclear Matenal Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) (column 1) and the Office of Nudear Reactor Regulation (NRR) (column 2), respectively.

l 3.0 IMPACTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE RULE l

3.1 Impacts on Current Licensees The impact of implemenbng the final rule for current licensees will be small. A compenson of the cunent hcense onndsbons with the requirements of the final rule revealed that in the mapority of cases the current hcense condsbons are equivalent to or exceed the

! requwements of the final rule. ;

A survey was conducted of current ISFSis whose physical protechon is the responsibehty of NMSS, as well as those ISFSis whose physical protection is the responsibility of NRR. Also,

^:':ys,i, intennows of iscensees were supplemented by a review of the license condebons.

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bconsees answered 30 questions describing the proposed requirements. The list of questions is provided in Table 2.

There is one requirement that certain current licensees do not meet. For one licensee whose physical protechon oversight is NMSS responsibility, an isolation zone is not present on the interior side of the penmeter barrier. This occurs when the perimeter barrier is a building wiih solid walls that meet the $ 73.2 definsbon of a barrier. Under current conditions, the licensee would receeve an excephon from the isolation zone requirement. Thus, there is no impact on this licensee. Mmor changes to recordkeeping practices at some NMSS licensed facilities may be required. In au other areas, the i friscsJ protechon programs of current bcensees are equivalent to or exceed the requirements of the final rule.

3.1 Impacts on Future Licensees The impact on future bcensees, to implement the final requirements, depends on whether the ISFSI is ce,FC f; independent from a Part 50 licensee site, or whether the licensee takes advantage of physical protechon measures available to an ISFSI operated by a Part 50 licensee with an operating reactor nearby These two cases have been p< spared for the proposed rule and will be used to develop both a low and high estimate for implementabon and annual operahng expenses for a future licensee.

A base set of characterishes for a typical ISFSI was developed to provide an astimate for implemenhng the proposed requirements, and is repeated here for completeness. It should be noted that, after staffs analysis of pubhc comments, some of these requirements were revised in the final rule (revised items are identified below). For a discussion on the impact of this revision, see Sechon 5.0. These characteristics are:

. A copy of the offechvo physical protechon plan retained until 3 years after the hconse expres Copies of superseded material retained for 3 years after each change.

. A penmeter bemer that meets the definition of a bemer in $ 73.2.

The cost of dismanting or secunng equipment used to handle the spent nuclear fuel as an altamate acceptable measure to the barrier offering significant resistance to penetrabon.

lilummation of the protected area to 2.1 lux (0.2 footcandles) for assessment (REVISED).

. An intrusion detochon system at the perimeter.

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An isolation zone, typically 6.1-meters (20-ft) wide, on both sides of the barrier at the perimeter. j

A secunty organization that has a minimum of two watchmen per shift (REVISED). j 4.0 "VALUE-lMPACT ANALYSIS" OF THE PROPOSED RULE This "Value-impact Analysis" has been prepared for the proposed rule, and is repeated l here for w,.r-;' 'r::: and to provide reference to the proposed rule, and the changes made in it in response to pubhc comments. This "Value-impact Analysis" is based on; and will review the

< costs incuned by ISFSI lecensees under current hoense conditions. Rar=== the final i requwements are essenhally the same as the current hcense condetsons, there would be no additional costs for esosting loconsees. Furthermore, if NRC continues its current regulatory polesses, the costs for apphcants would be approximately the same regardless of whether the final requwoments are promulgated. In general, several costs are incurred by the entities operating an 18F8t. However, a sigruficant factor that influeness cost is that of site location. A cost savings l

could be realized by siting the ISFSI within the protected area of a current Part 50 licensee and j usang the exishng guard force for routme patrol, alarm assessment, and response force functions. The current Part 50 bconsed facility may incorporate and absorb portions of the equipmerd and opershon costs for the ISFSI secunty costs into the currently bconsed facihty. In j l contrast to this, an 18F81 built and manned at a new location whors little or no security currently esosts would incur higher costs for both facihty equipment and annual operation costs.

E ;+::: ^: of these options, a high end a low estwnste are given for the physis,1 protection !

l portion of this storage installation. The high estwnate analyzes the costs associated with the construchon and opershon of a separate, offsite ISFSl; the low estimate anayzes the cost of construcean and opersbun of an ISFSI on the site of a currently operating Part 50 licensee, included in the eshmates are the costs of materials, labor, equipment, overhead, and profit.

These cost eshmates evaluate the followmg categones:

. Portmeterfonang, '

15uminsbon of the protected area to 2.1 lux (0.2 footcandles).

Constructmg a 6.1 meters (20 ft)isolabon zone on either side of the fenced perimeter boundary, e instaushon of a Penmeter intrusion Detection (PID) system, and

Secunty force and other general security requirements. j 9

A campreiwnsive evaluation of components and constituents within these categories was performed with the results all being adjusted to 1994 dollars. Cost estimates were developed from "Means Facilities Cost Data,1988", adjusted to 1994 dollars. Where Means' cost estimates were unavailable, manufacturers data or experienced judgment was used to arrive at current estimates. Additionally, the cost estimates were broken down into one-time costs and annual operating costs. Key assumptions within each of the above categories of evaluation are earn ==ad in the following sections.

The total costs for construchon and operation of the facility, in 1994 dollars, are presented in Table 3. The costs are broken out into annual operating costs and by categones consistent with those above Also, the low and high estimates given are for facilities constructed withm or outsede of an existing commercial nuclear plant security perimeter, respectively.

4.1 Penmeter Fencing The penmeter dimensions chosen for this analysis correspond to dimensions of 243.8 meters (800 ft) by 253 meters (830 ft). The fence is assumed to be 2.4-meters (S-ft) high, topped by 3 strands of barbed wire on angled brackets. The fence is 11 gauge industrial chain link with a motonzod entry gate that is 9.1-meters (30-ft) wide.

4.2 liluminsuon of Protected Area For the purposes of these estimates, the illuminated area was considered for the entare PA. Nations were performed using a point, hemispherical (i.e., spreading) light source located at the top of a 12.2-meter (40-ft) light pole. These results were compared to Means' illummabon data. The lowest cost type of lights was used (i.e., incandescent) and it was assumed that the light poles were mounted on concrete bases. It was also assumed that the lightsng system was only on durmg dark hours l

4.3 Isolation Zone The isolation zone was assumed to extend for 6.1 meters (20 ft) on either side of the l

i penmeter fencing Ground preparation work was assumed to consist of using a road grader to prepare the 12,114.6 square-meter (130,400-sq-ft) isolation zone area. As such, selechon of a candedate site was assumed to indude a level grade as one of the selection criteria. Major grade t

work beyond this was not considered. Also, use of a 5.1-centimeter (2 in) depth pea gravel ground cover over 6 mil (0.01 in.) plastic was incorporated into the facility design, 10 a

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I 4.4 Perimeter intrusion Detection System The cost of a PID system was estimated for this effort. Costs were based on manufacturers' quotes and using three zones per perimeter side for a total of 12 zones. It was assumed that each PID sensur location has an independent data channel rather than using a polkng-type system. The PID station's power supply cable and data conduits were assumed to I be buned in an underground trench.

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/ 4.5 Watchmen and Other Secunty 4.5.1 High Cost Facity The cost of three two-man, 8-hour watchmen shsfts with two addebonal supervisor or relief welchmen were eshmated for this analyses. A number of other costs were considered, including emplementabon of a badging system; initial secunty training; a 2-way radio pnmary communicahon system; a phone secondary communicabon system; security facitief access softwere; two independent 486 computer systems and backup software and hardware; alarm and operabng system hardware, software, and response procedures. In addition, other annual equipmer,i maintenance costs were included to cover the costs for facility upkeep.

4.5.2 Low Cost Fachty The cost of a 0.5 mart-year operation was estimated, even though it may be less than 0.5 morw, for the low-cost facWty, as a result of considenng only the addebonal watchman personnel burden. The cost of the emergency alarm response procedures was also included l Semdar to the high-cost facikty discussed above, other annual equipment maintenance costs were also included to cover the costs for facility upkeep.

l 5.0 SAVINGS / COSTS RESULTING FROM PROPOSED RULE REVISION The staff revised the proposed rule in response to the public mmments The map

%- f= of this revision are to elimmate any redutukant requirements, add flembelsty in the rule implemernabon, and reduce mst to licensees without reducmg the level of physical protechon in ISFSis. The following is a list of the estimated savings / costs which will be realized from the revisions for the case of a h6gh-cost ISFSI (one that is sited at a new location, where little or no security cunently easts - the total costs for construchon and operation of such a fac&ty without the rule revisions are presented in Table 3):

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REVISED REQUIREMENT SAVING CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATED OR COST OR ANNUAL DOLLARS EXPENSE

$ 73.51(d)(3)-Bullet-Resist. Coal Construction 30,000 Pnmary Alamt Staten

$ 73.51(d)(2)-lilummaten Savmg Construchon 150,000 (less than 2.1 lux (0.2 footcandles))

Saving Equ*p nent 10,000 l

$ 73.51(d)(3FRedundant Alarm Stabon (summaryindmahon oth)

$ 73.51(d)(5)-Guard Force. Saving Annual O' (less thari2 watchmen / shift)

$ 73.51(d)(9FExplosive search Saving Equipment 40,000 (visual search or$)

$ 73.51(d)(13)-8creening Saving Annual 2,000 Records (Secunty org. or$)

It can be seen from the above list that the only cost item, to licensees, that resulted from revismg the proposed rule, is the bullet-resisting construchon cost of the pnmary alarm staten, eshmated at 8 30,000. The other five revised requwements result in savings that to'W

$ 2,000 annually and 8 200,000 in facihty construchon cost.

t 2 The proposed rule required a minimum of two watchmen per shift. The final rule does not specify the number of watchmen. but requires sufficient personnel for monitoring of detection systems and the conduct of surveillance, assessment, access control, and communications to assure adequate response.

Perhaps some cost savings could be realized. but for the purpose of this estimation, no savings are assumed.

12

l Moreover, one of the major revisions in the rule is that it now allows current Part 50 Imensees with possession-only-licenses to maintain their present physica taction plans Those licensees are not required to implement this final rule until they apply for and are granted a Part 72 ISFSI site-specific license. This revised feature will result in future savings to current Part 50 licensees because NRC expects that these licensees will exercise the storage option that will be least costly to them, while maintaining compliance with NRC regulations.

I 6.0 DECISION RATIONALE l The Commission has previously decided for earlier rulerr.akings what level of physical protechon requirements are adequate for spent nuclear fuel storage while considenng the costs and other impacts to the industry. The final rulemaking continues the level of protection previously selected by the Commission. The associated costs have been reviewed in this regulatory analysis Also, current licensees should have uniform requirements and future imensees should have equivalent requirements. This regulatory goal may be accomplished by esther conhnuing the status quo or by promulgating the proposed rulemaking. The first allemative, usang existing requwoments to license the facilities on a case-by-case basis, is not an afliceerd use of NRC resources, does not provide the appicant with definitivs regulatory requirements for what is expected for physical protechon, and continues the current state of regulatory uncestaanty.

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The final rulemalung would make clear the expected level of protection that is adequate for the actual threat - radiological sabotage - to the public health and safety, and is the preferred opbon. The final rulemalung would provide consistent, explicit requirements for physmal protedson or all storage of spent nuclear fuel.

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The industry would benefit from a reduchon of the current regulatory uncertainties attendant to r 7 W- imposition of regulatory requirements, the pubic would benefit from a greater level of assurance that appropnate protection requirements are being imposed upon spent nudear fuel storage licensees, and NRC would benefit as a result of a more efficient l licenssng process. Also, the industry would not incur any additional costs. In ad&: 1,there would not be any increase in occupational exposure as a result of implementing the final rule.

6.0 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE - NRC RESOURCES AND TIMETABLE FOR THE RULEMAKING 13 l

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No need for additional resources is anticipated after the rule is promulgated. The final rulemaking is expected to be published in early 1998.

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Table 2 - Questions pt:vided ts Ucensees i

. Do you have a pian which demonstrates 16. %%at is the redundant communications capability?

how you weilf congdy with the anolocable reeuwements of Part 73?

2. Does it hint test, inspections, audts, and 17. What is the training and qualification program for other means used to demonstrate ISFSIs guards, watchmen, etc.?

W;^ .;i with the renuwommts?

3. what are the two physicalbemers for this 18. k this separate from other training programs pu ISF$l? mey heve?

4. Does the bemer at the penmeter at the 19. k there a trommg and oveHfication pien?

perimeter meet the definftson in i 73.27

5. As there a 20 ft wiele inotetion none on both 20. Do you have a program to screen incVwduals for '

sidae of she phyencelbemer at the smescorted acceos?

penkneenr?

6. k the omtected aree alkmuneted to 0.2 ft- 21. Hhet ab you ck to screen an kdviciualfor conden? Unescorted access?

7. in this aE the time or only okmng periods 22. Is this separate from other screenmg programs you of reeeenment? may hen?

8. %het method of intruston detection at the 23. %%et access controlmeasures ab you use? %het p oneter ab you see? typas of hardware ab pu use? Do you use heches?

2. How many security Mdwnnels are on a 24. Hhet type of searches are performedonior to aMt? Three aMts per alsy? access to theprotectedaree?

10. . Now often are petmin? 25. Do you han kakpmalent sources of power for nietection, surveillance, and ainem systems?

11. %het methoef k anned so annens storms? 26. Do you have tamper protection on the survenence soutement Anes? Detection equewnent Anes?

12. %here 60 the anorms sounaf? k this 27. %%et type of cask 00 pu sne? How many cooks mennect - _%?

Can the faciGty hoicf?

13. As there a rodadent aserm Ascation? 28. Do you have written peceslwres for elesime with an amouthorited penetration or actMties within the protected aren?

i

14. %he k she alnetmetent renconne force? 29. Do you have a tort onet meintenence poorem for egusement?

15. %het in the conununk:stion Jink with 30. Do you meintain recorals of:

alseqpnotesf responne force? - Anelveduels granted accees to the protecrecf i

aree?

. Screenmg records of indviduels granteef amencartentaccess to theprotecteef aree?

noutinepetrois?

- Alemn recorved, tpe ancf Jocation? Dete?

Ynme? Deposition of?

Safeguerd events?

17

Table 3 - Costs to Ucensees for Spentg* clear Fuel Physical Protection, (1994 4)

Feemty Coats Anand Opereakp Coets low - Mah low telph Penmeter Fencmq $46.500 $46.500 $200 $200 Anummetion $301,400 $301,400 $600 $600 tsolation Zone $45.000 $45,000 $0 $0 MO System $379.200 $385,200 $ 7,300 $ 7,300 Wntchmen/Secwiry $2.500 $40.300 $37,400 $ 724,300 TOTAL $ 774,600 $818.400 $45.500 $ 732,400 Means Electrical Cost Data,1988.

Means Fac4 ties Cost Deta,1988.

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ATTACHMENT 5 CONGRESSIONAL LETTERS I

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ciog y* -t UNITED STATES j

2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 205 % 4001

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%, . . .J..

The Honorable Den Schaefer, Chauman Subcommates on Energy and Power Commates on Commerce Unned States House of Ref r ^ ^ ;;;

Washmglon, DC 20515 Deer Mr. Chairman:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commissen has sont to the Office of the Federal Register. for publicaten, the enclosed final rule to amend 10 CFR Parts 60,72,73,74, and 75, promulgating physical protechon requwaments for storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste.

1 This final rule will codify standards for geMg spent fuel at the vanous storage fachties imensed under Part 72. Previous physical protechon requusments for go;eews such material lacked darity in defining which physmal protection regulations were to be applied at such sites.

r/tt,v/d /A rcAmu d II4 The final rule has been revised, in response to the pubic to elmnate any redundant papand i requwements, add flexibsty to rule implementation, and clanfy issues Nientified by y p/c affected hcensees.

Sincerely, i

Dennis K Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs Endoeurs. j l fadamlBagialet Noboo i oc: Representahve Ralph Hall .

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j e cra g

/ t UNITED STATES

g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fo e WASHINGTON, D.C. 206f&C001

/

The Honorable James M. Inhofe, Charman Subcomrmttee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety Commdtse on Envronment and Pubhc Works Unded States Senate Washmgton, DC 20510 Deer Mr. Chairman.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has s(

to the Olfice of the Federal Register. for 1

\.

p%, the enclosed final rule to amend 10 CFR Parts 60,72,73,74, and 75, promulgating physical protection requwoments for storage of spent fuel or high-level radeosctive waste.

This final rule will codify standards for protecting spent fuel s' the various storage facilities bconsed under Part 72. Previous physical protechon requirernents for protecting such material lacked cienty in defining which physical protection regulations were to be applied at such sites.

u urd in (U M re b 4 The final rule has been revised, in response to the public comment eliminate any redundant ypc/M requwements, add flexsbehty to rule implementation, and clarify issues identified by g.

affected bconsees.

Sincerely, Dennis K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs Enclosure Esdmal Register Nohce cc: Senator Bob Graham l

1

ATTACHMENT 6 PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT l

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NRC ISSUES FINAL RULE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is emending its physical protection regulations for the storage of spent nuclear reactor fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The revisions clarify the requirements and reduce regulatory uncertainty, without reducing the level of protection of the public health and safety.

Currently the Commission's regulations do not contain comprehensive physical psotechon requirements for the storage of such materials. Affected facilities are licensed, using selected portions of the Commission's regulations for the protection of nuclear reactors and certain other licensed facilities, as well as interim licensing entena The final rule will codify requirements and physical protection requirements currently imposed on spent fuel storage licensees, and provide a consistent set of requirements for future licensees.

The final rule will require licensees to:

Store this type of material only within a protected area (an area with controlled access and physical barriers, such as chain-link fences with barbed wire topping or concrete walls);

Protect the material by an additional barrier offering significant penetration resistance, such as an NRC-approved cask, or reactor building; e Ensure that only authonzed individuals are granted access to the protected area; l

Detect and assess unauthonzed penetration of, or activities within, the protected area; e Provide the capability for timely communication to a designated response force whenever necessary; and e Estsblish a secunty orga'nization with written procedures.

l NRC added a protection goal to the final rule. The protection goal is defined as: l i protection against a loss of control of tha facility that could be sufficient to cause a design basis accident exceeding the dose limit specified in 10 CFR 72.106.

Other requirements are desenbod in a Federal Register notice published on (insert .

date and citation).

6

Types of storage facilities affected by the revisions are:

e independent spent fuel storage installations that are located either at, or away from, reactor sites and are designed, constructed, and licensed specifically for the interim storage of spent fuel; e A geologic repository that could be developed in the future by the Depasnent of Energy (DOE); eM e Future monitored retrievable storage facilities where interim waste storage activities may be conducted by DOE.

The amendments do not apply to spent fuel pool storage at operating nuclear power plants. Holders of general licenses for storage of spent fuel in NRC-approved casks will have the option of either implementing the requirements of this final rule, or continue to use their general license physical protection requirements under Subpart K of 10 CFR Part 72. Finally, the final rule allows current 10 CFR Part 50 licensees with a possession only license to maintain their present physical protection plans, and does not require them to implement any alternate measures. When and if Part 50 licensees decide to apply for a Part 72-specific independent spent fuel storage installation license, then they will be subject to the requirements of this final rule. ,

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ATTACHMENT 7 NOTIFICATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW "SMALL BUSINESS REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT FAIRNESS ACT OF 1996" i

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accg ye

UNITED STATES j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055f4001

% . . . . . /g

.ne Honorable Al Gore Pmsident of the United States Senate Washngton, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Presi6 nt:

Pursuant to Subtido E of the Small Busmess Regulatory Enforcement Faimess Act of 1996,5 U.S.C. 801, the Nuclear Regulatory Commissen (NRC) is submrthng a final rule amending its regulabons in 10 CFR Parts 60,72,73, 74, and 75, for physcal protechon requwements for storage of spent fuel and higMovel radmactive waste. This final rule will codsfy standards for protectsng spent fuel at the vanous storage facilibes licensed under Part 72. Previous requwements for protechng such material lacked clanty in defineng which physical protechon regulatons were to be apphed at sudi sites. The NRC is also submitting a companion document entitiod: "NUREG-1619: Standard Review Plan for Physmal Protechon Plans for the independent

, Storage of Spent Fuel and High Level Radioachve Waste." NUREG-1619 is a standard review plan for the NRC review and evalumbon of physcal protechon plans submstted by bconsees in ecoordance wth this final rule.

i

! We have determmed that this rule is not a " major rule," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 804(2). We have made,the same determinston with regard to NUREG 1619. We have confirmed these.15 c:^_ M ^1:= the Office of Management and Budget.

Endosed is a copy of the final rule (see Endosure 1), which is being transmitted to the Office of the Federal Register for PW The Regulatory Flembihty Cortsficaten is induded in the final rule. Also endoned are copies of NUREG-1619 (Enclosure 2) and the "Rv':'.:=f Analyses" (Endoeure 3) that was prepared for this final rule whch contains NRC's cost-benefit determinsbons This final rule is scheduled to become effective 180 days after pubicebon in the

! Eadmal.'taoister.

Sincerely, Dentus K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs E.h As stated e

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f anc

, ,y " 4 UNITED STATES s* g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o 2 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20%H201

%...../

Mr. Robert P. Murphy General Counsei General Accounting Office Room 7175 441 G Street, N. W.

Washington, DC 20548 i Dear Mr. Murpty Pursuant to Subtstle E of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,5 U.S.C. 801, the Nuclear Regulatory Comrmssion (NRC) is sutettsng a final rule amending its regulabons in 10 CFR Parts 60,72,73,74, and 75, for physical protechon requirements for storage of spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. This final rule will codify standards for protechng spent fuel at the vanous storage facilities licensed under Part 72. Previous requirements for protectang such material lacked clanty in defining which physical protect;0n regulebons were to be applied at such sites. The NRC is also sutettmg a companion document enhtled: "NUREG-1619: Standard Review Plan for Physical Protechon Plans for the independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste." NUREG-1619 is a standard review plan for the NRC review and evaluation of physical protection plans submitted by licensees in accordance with this final rule.

We have deteraned that this rule is not a " major rule," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 804(2). We have made the same detenninetion with regard to NUREG-1619. We have confirmed these-. /J it:-d;"'= with the Office of Management and Budget.

Encioned is a copy of the final rule (see Enclosure 1), which is being transmitted to the Office of the Federal Registerfor Phm The Regulatory Flexibility Certificabon is included in the final rule. Also enclosed are copies of NUREG-1619 (Enclosure 2) and the " Regulatory Analysis" (Enclosure 3) that was prepared for this final rule which contains NRC's cost-beneet determnahons. This final rule is sched:aled to become effective 180 days after publication in the !

EAdAtalBA918 TAC Sincerely, i

Dennis K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congresasonal Affairs l Enclosures As stated

_. _ .w__.. .

e" oposeg$ r UNITED STATES j

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o 8 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 0001

\,,,/

The sonorabie Nowi Gmgoch Speaker of the Unded States House of "+ ::::.;-Wes Washington, DC 20515 Deer Mr. Speaker.

Pursuant to Sutatitle E of the Smau Business Regulatory Enforcement Fawness Act of 1996,5 l U.S.C. 801, the Nudear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is sutathng a final rule amendm0 its reguistens in 10 CFR Parts 60, 72,73,74, and 75, for physcal protection requirements for storage of spent fuel and high level radmachve waste. This final rule win codify standards for protechng spent fuel at the vanous storage facilities hconsed under Part 72. Previous requwements for protechng such maternal lacked clarity in defining which physmal protechon regulations were to be applied at such sites. The NRC is also sutathng a companion document entitled: "NUREG-1619: Standard Review Plan for Physmal Protechon Plans for the independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioachve Waste." NUREG-1619 is a standard review plan for the NRC review and evaluahon of physical protechon plans sulatted by hconsees in l accordanos with this final rule.

l We have determined that this rule is not a "mayr rule," as defined in 5 U.S.C. 804(2). We have

made the same detemunetion with regard to NUREG-1619. We have confirmed these-Jg i

!' t'_:.,,_ r':-rkwith the Office of ":=+Te.it s,nd Budget.

Enclosed is a copy of the final rule (see Enciosi.re 1), which is being transmitted to the Office of the Federal Register for!=%. The Regulatory Flexibikty Certificate is included in the final rule. Also enclosed are copies of NUREG-1619 (Enclosure 2) and the " Regulatory Analyses" (Enclosure 3) Stat was prepared for this final rule which contains NRC's cost-boneAt determinstons. This final rule is scheduled to become effechve 180 days after pubicaten in the EndacalBegislat.

i Sacerely, j Dennes K. Rathbun, Dwector !

Office of Congressional Affairs Endoeures: As stated i

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ML20237A470

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SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

1.2 Background

Dear Mr. Presi6 nt:

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