ML20237A421
| ML20237A421 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/12/1998 |
| From: | Larkins J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237A366 | List:
|
| References | |
| FRN-63FR26955, RULE-PR-60, RULE-PR-72, RULE-PR-73, RULE-PR-74, RULE-PR-75 AF32-2-010, AF32-2-10, NUDOCS 9808140046 | |
| Download: ML20237A421 (10) | |
Text
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/ % UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M y,
,E ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 0, 4 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e , , , e **~,
February 12,1998 MEMORANDUM TO: L. Joseph Callan Executive Director s FROM: John T. Larkins ive Director ACRS/ACNW
SUBJECT:
FINAL RULEMAKING, " PHYSICAL PROTECTION FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE"(10 CFR PARTS 60,72,73,74, AND 75)
During the 448th meeting of the Advisory Commatee on Reactor Safeguards, February 5 7,1998, the Committee decided not to review the sutpct final rule.
\
Reference- '
Memorandum dated January 9,1998, from Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck, Director, Dmsion of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS, to Addressees,
Subject:
Final Rulemaking, Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste cc: J. Hoyle, SECY J. Blaha, OEDO J. Mitchell, OEDO M. Knapp, RES E. Ten Eyck, NMSS P. Dwyer, NMSS J. L. Funches, CFO H. T. Bell, OlG I
9808140046 980806 ?"
PDR PR l' 60 63FR26955 PDR g _
f
M 32-2. AF32-2 26955 t
Rules and Regulations rea rei nesister Vol 63. No 94 Friday. May 15.1998 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER clarity in defining which regulations 5. Rule 1.snguage Specifics.
contains regulatory c:>cuments having general were to be applied at these sites. This 6. GROAs.
apphcabsty and legal effect, most of which resulted in a non-cohesive regulatorv 7. Staff-Generated Amendments.
base. The proposed rule would prov'ide Responses to e at e ulat o is pub hed under a set of performance-based 8.( Summary ommission of,s Specific Questions.
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C.1510.
requirements. consistent with current J. Protection Gool The Code of Federal Regulations is sold t>y Programs that are currently licensed and Comment. Commenters noted that, implemented at sites under a unified the Supenntendent of Documents. Prices of new t>ooks are hsted m the first FEDERAL policy for physical protection. although it was appropriate that a REGISTER essue of each week. The proposed rule also indicated that Protection goal for spent fuel and high-level radioacuve waste be defined, the the Commission was studying the need for specific protection against the Protection goal needed to be less NUCLEAR REGULATORY malevolent use of a vehicle at sites strtngent than the codified design basis CONSSION threat for radiological sabotage. It was affected by the rule (this is discusse.d further stated that a 10 CFR Part 100 further under the " Protection Goal. release, the unofficial criterion for 10 CFR Paets 80,72,73,74, and 75 heading).The rule also proposed a determining radiolo ical sabotage of RIN 3150-AF32 conforming amendment to 10 CFR Part Power reactors, wou d be extremely 60-to require material control and difficult to realize with respect to spent Physical Protection for Spent Nuclear accounting (MC&A) measures at the Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste GROA that would be identical to that fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
The citizen's group commented that any 5 "
AGENc7: Nuclear Regulatory p,$,d o ad e a Protection goal developed for spent fuel d rule should also coumer the malevolent use Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
10 CFR Part 75 to clarihrov sion under that if GROAs are subject tolnternational Atomic " * * '
, g.he agrees that the
=-alY:The Nuclear Regulatory Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, then establishment of a protection goal Commission is amending its regulations NRC s nuclear material accounting and saould be the first step in the to clarify physical protection control regulations for implementing the development of any physical protection
^
requirements for spent nuclear fuel and angreement standards. One issue that may have the IAEA forbetween the United the Application of States caused confusion in the proposed rule high-level radioactive waste stored at ards in the United States independerit spent fuel storage is that the assumptions for determining Safefly, the Commission request "rartiologicz! ply. sabotage" differ between installations (ISFSIs), monitored- U"" .
retrievable storage (MRS) installations, spectfic comment on five questions Pan 72. "1.icensing Requirements for the regarding impacts of the proposed independent Storage of Spent Fuel and and geologic repository operations areas regulauon on licensees. High-Level Radioactive Waste." and (GROAs). These amendments codify standards for protecting spent fuel at the II. Summary and Analysis of Public Part 73. " Physical Protection of Plants various storage sites licensed under the Comments and Material." The differing Commission's regulations. assumptions are appropriate because The proposed rule was subject to a 90- .. radiological sabotage." as used under EFFECTIVE DATE: November 12,1998, day public comment period which Part 73, applies to a power reactor and FOl1 FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: ended on November 13.1995. Twenty implies the unofficial criterion of a Part Priscilla A. Dwyer. Office of Nuclear letters of comment were received. 100 release for power reactors.
Material Safety and Safeguards. U.S. Sources for these comments included a " Radiological sabotage" as used under Nuclear Regulatory Commission, nuclear industry group (the Nuclear Part 72 applies to the storage of spent Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone Energy Institute (NE!)l: one national fuel and high level radioactive waste (301) 415-8110 e-mail PADeNRC. GOV. Irboratory; fifteen utilities involved in and is based on the consequences of a SUPPt.ERAENTARY INFORMATION: nuclear activities: two Federal agencies design basis accident as defined under (the Environmental Protection Agency Part 72. Although the same term is use '
- l. Background (EPA) and the Department of Energy under both 10 CFR Parts:it is based on On August 15.1995 (60 FR 41079). (DOEll: and one citizen's group. Twelve different asumptions and results in the Commission published for public letters of comment explicitly endorsed. different levels of required protection.
comment a proposed rule that would either in total or in part.the views The Commission agrees that this is l
i clarify its regulations on the physical expressed by the NEl. Four letters of confusing and that " radiological t protecuon of spent nuclear fuel and comment, in part. supported the general sabotage." as used for operating high level radioactive waste. The objectives of the proposed rulemaking. reactors. is not an appropriate l protection level for spent fuel and high-l proposed regulation would have applied Correspondence received from EPA to spent fuel and high level radioactive indicated no comment. The comments level radioactive waste. The waste stored at ISFSIs power reactors have been grouped under the following Commission concludes that the that have permanently ceased reactor general topics: protection goal is best charactenzed by operations. MRS installations, and the 1. Protection Coal. the phrase:" protection agamst the loss GROA.The proposed rule stated that 2. Basis for Requirements. of control of the facility that could be the requirements for physically 3. Required Level of Physical Protection. sufficient to cause radiation exposure protecting this type of matenal lacked 4. Backfit and Regulatory Analysis exceedmg the dose as desenbed in to
2G956 Federal Register / Vol. 63. No. 94 / Friday. May 15.199P ' Rules and Replat.ons CFR 72.106." The final rule has been group noted that what was truit needed provisions of the new physical I modified accordmgly. ~
was a level of physical protection With regard to protection against the protection rule because an adequate l comparabla to " enhanced industnal les el of physical protection was already malevolent use of a land based vehicle. security." Cited examples of this type of in place at'the site, based on an NRC-NRC has determined, based on the protection were: use of suitable fericmg. approsed physical protection plan I opinions of expert study and a peer locked access points, sufficient Response Unoer the proposed rule, review of findings, that there is no illumination, and penodic secunty the Commission stated that the backfit compelling justification for requiring a patrols. Other commenters questio'ned rule in 10 CFR 50.109 did not apply vehicle barrier as perimeter protection the need for some of the redundancy because the amendments did not for spent fuel and high. level radioactive that was included in the proposed r'ute. impose any additional requirements on -
waste stored under a Part 60 or Part 72 One citizen's group believed that Part 50 licensees. Furthermore, the license. Inclusion of an airborne vehicle physical protection measures should be Commission notes that all references to 1 was assessed for possible inclusion into more stringent than those described in Part 50 licensees are deleted in the fmal the protection goal for this rule. the proposed rule. rule.
However, protection against this type of Response. The Commission believes The Commission further stated that threat has not yet been determined that the appropriate level of physical the backfitting requirements in 10 CFR appropriate at sites with greater protection for spent fuel and high-level 72.62 did not apply because the potential consequences than spent fuel radioactive waste lies somewhere proposed amendments neither imposed storage installations. Therefore, this between industrial-grade secunty and nor modified procedures or type of requirement is not included the level that is required at operating organizations ofISFSis licensed under j within the protection goal for this final power reactors. The Commission also Part 72. The Commission considers rule. notes that the nature of spent fuel and these statements true based on their
- 2. Basis for Requirements of its storage mechanisms offers uni assessment of the proposed regulation advantages in protecting the materiakue and its intended implementation.
Comment. Commenters inquently This factor, along with revised However, on further review, the backfit questioned the need for tying Part 72 consequence considerations, leads the requimments to Part 73. The rule in 10 CFR 72.62 may be applicable Commission to conclude that physical to one facility which has only one commenters assumed that by involving protection at sites where spent fuel and isolation zone exterior to the perimeter Part 73 in the rulemaking,it was high-level radioactive waste are stored barrier. The NRC staff has identified implied that the level of physical under a 10 CFR Part 60 or 72 license can altemative measures currently in place protection normally attributed to power be more flexibly applied than that provide an equivalent level of reactors was being required. previously proposed. Accordingly, the physical protection. The staff does not Phraseology used in the proposed final rule has been revised to minimize intend to require this facility to requirements, such as using the term redundancy and add flexibility. Specific establish an intenor isolation zone.
" protected area," (PA) tended to further cheqce are ou' lined in Section III,
. Thus, no backfit occurs due to the new foster this impression. " Summary of Specific Changes Made to rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does not Response. The Commission disagrees the Proposed Rule as a Result of Public cover reporting and recordkeeping that placing requirements under Part 73 Comment." requirements, the inclusion of to CFR implies any association with the
- 4. Bockfit and Regulatory Analysis 73.51 in 73.71 event reporting is not a physical protection requirements for backfit.
power reactors. It is noted that Part 73 Comment. NEl and a few licensees With respect to grandfathering provides, in one consolidated Part, all of commented that the proposed regulation existing sites, the Commission believes the requirements for those facilities imposes a generic backfit as defined that implementation of this final rule at needing physical protection. This is one under to CFR 50.109 and 72.62. The these sites presents no undue burden to reason why an explicit requirement for NRC asserted in the proposed rule that affected licensees and provides a the protection of spent fuel and high. the amendments merely codified and minimum level of physical protection to level radioactive waste is being added to standardized physical protection adequately protect the public beelth and Part 73. Part 73 includes more stringent measures that, through license safety. Accordingly, there is no need for requirements for power reactor and amendment, were already in place at a grandfathering provision and no Category I fuel cycle facilities and much existing sites. Hence,it was concluded change has been made in the final rule less stringent requirements for the that no backfit was involved. In response to this comment. The protection of Category III facilities. With Commemers further stated that. in terms Commission notes that the Regulatory regani to use of the term " protected of backfit requirements, the cost to Analysis for the final rule has been area," the Commission has determined implement the proposed rule was not revised to reflect changes made in that the term is correctly used in review justified based on the potential increase response to public comment and to
{ ofits definition under to CFR 73.2. in protection that the rule would afford eliminate ambiguities.
Nonetheless, the Commission has public health and safety.
reviewed the physical protection Other commenters specifically iRu;eW uose F S ecific8 P
terminology found in the final rule to responded to the Regulatory Analysis Comment. A variety of comments
. ensure that it does not imply a different that accompanied she rule. These were received regarding specific rule level of physical protection than commenters expressed concem that terminology. The suggestion was made j intended. certain provisions of the regulatory that the term " protected area" be analysis could turn into de facto revised to "!SFSI controlled access
- 3. Level of Physical Protection Needed 7,qu'irements. ' area "
Comment. Some commenters Additionally, it was recommended Response. As indicated previously in expressed the opinion that the level of that affected sites should be this notice,the use of the term physical protection desenbed by the " grandfathered" under any final " protected area."is consistent with its proposed amendments was unnecessary rulemaking. Accordmgly, these sites defmition m 10 CFR 73.2 Furthermore, and overly burdensome. The industry would not be required to meet the because it is the Commission s position I
l
l f
l Federal Register / Vo!. 63. No. 94 / Friday. May 15.1998 / Rules and Regulations 26957 that a site where spent fuel and high- Thus,it is necest3ry for licensees to Response. This concern has been level radioactive waste is stored be assure either continuous operation of corrected in the final rule surrounded bv a fence. it is not required physical protection equipment Comment. One commenter noted an considered adequate to call the during power failure or to demonstrate apparent contradiction in the proposed )
enclosure a controlled access area the abihty to provide immediate regulation regarding use of deadly force j (CAA). Under 10 CFR 73.2. the compensation for such failures. in the protection of an ISFSI. The' l l definition of a CAA requires only a Comment. Required illumination commenter had been advised by NRC~
l l demarcation of the area, not a fence. levels. assessment techniques, required staff that use of oeadiv force was not l Comment. Another commenter frequency of physical protection patrols. expected of members'of the security ,
supported the Commission position that and searches before entry to the PA organization at ISFSis. The commenter operating power reactor licensees that were all subjects of comment. A reasoned that this was not consistent store spent fuel under a general license commenter suggested that illumination with the requirement to protect against should have the option of using the be provided only dunng periods of radiological sabotage under the physical protection measures of either assessment and that the entire PA need proposed rule.
l 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5: or the proposed to not be illuminated to a level of 0.2 Response. The issue involving the use l CFR 73.51. The commenter also footcandle, of the term radiological sabotage has questioned whether the requirements of Response. The Commission agrees been resolved as discussed previously.
10 CFR 72.182. 72.184, and 72.186 that illumination to a 0.2 footcandle Further, the Commission never intended apply to a general license. in addition to level represents a large operating cost that onsite physical protection Subpart K. A related question requested and may be difficult to achieve, given personnel at an ISFSI would provide a clarification on how general license cask structure. This provision has been response to a safeguards event other holdera were to notify NRC regarding amended to more clearly indicate that, than calling for assistance from local which option they would exercise. while illumination should be law enforcement or other designated Response. The Commission notes that maintained during all periods of response force unless their timely a licensee having a Part 50 license does darkness, only an adequate level of response could not be ensured. The not fall within the scope of the final illumination is required within the PA Commission also notes that 10 CFR l rule The Commission Delieves it is for the detection assessment means 73.51 only calls for unarmed watcht .<n.
l premature to bring these licensees under used. In addition, required performance not a'rmed guards.
the provisions of the final rule because capabilities regarding detection are Comment. Commenters believe that continued protection for spent fuel in clarified in the final rule by specifying the requirements for redundant alarm storage pools at Part 50 sites is currently the use of active intrusion detection monitoring stations and specified under study by the NRC. equipment, as opposed to passive staffing levels for the pnmary alarm Comment. One commenter requested systems. station are overly burdensome and clarification on the specific exclusion of Comment. Some commenters noted unnecessary.
, an exemption for ISFSIs from the that the frequency of patrols should Respcase. The Commission agrees l malevolent use of a vehicle threat coincide with watchmens' duty shift that the requirement for redundant within the design basis threat. The lengths. as opposed to once every eight alarm stations is excessive. Regarding commenter indicated that it was not hours as recommended in the proposed alarm monitoring, this provision is readily apparent and also a cumbersome rule. revised in the final rule to require, in process to determine the current exempt Response. The Commission does not the redundant location. only a summary status of an ISFSI under present agree that the frequency of patrols indication that an alarm has been regulations. should coincide with duty shift lengths. generated. This location need not 1 Response. The Commission agrees However, the Commission agrees that necessarily be located onsite and could. I and has revised the text of the rule to some flexibility can be provided. for example, be a simple readout in a
! exclude reference to the design basis Accordmgly, this provision of the final continually staffed locallaw I
threat described under 10 CFR 73.1. rule is revised to require daily random enforcement agency office. This is l Comment. One commenter questioned patrols, oniv. contingent on the assurance that I whether the proposed rule would apply Comment. Licensees cited the burden communications with the local law to a permanently shutdown power plant of maintaining expensive and delicate enforcement agency or the designated l
where spent fuelis storea and the plant explosives detection equipment to meet response force can be maintained.
is operating with a Pr.rt 50 possession- the proposed' requirement for explosives Regarding required staffing levels of the ;
only license. searches conducted before entry to the pnmary alarm station, the Commission <
i Response. A facility with a Part 50 PA. has deleted the specific requirement license is not subject to the provisions Response. The Commission agrees. To that the physical protection organization of the final rule. This revision to the clarify this issue, the Commission has be comprised of at least two watchmen i
final rule has been made because the revised the proposed rule to require from the final rule. This deletion is l Commission believes it is premature to only a visual search for explosives. contingent on the Commission's include these hcensees within the scope Because pedestrian and venicular traffic expectation that a human presence be of the rule because continued protection is not expected to be high volume at mamtained in the pnmary alarm station for spent fuelin storage pools at Part 50 facilities affected by the rule. this type at all times. To achieve this. the sites is currently under study by the of search is not considered an undue Commission clanfies its position that NRC. burden to affected hcensees the pnmarv alarm station must be Comment. A commenter requested Furthermore, the amount of explosives located within Phe PA. be bullet-clarification on the need for back up that ma) cause a radiological release is resisting. and be configured such that I power for physical protection related not easily concealed. activities within the station are not equipment. Comment Other commenters noted visible from outside the PA. The intent Response. The Commission believes redundant records retention of these measures is to ensure that a that affected licensees should not be requirements in 10 CFR 72180 and to single act cannot destroy the capabihty vuinerable to loss of offsite power. CFR 73.51(c) of an onsite watcnman to call for
26958 Federal Register /Vol. 63. No. 94 /Fricay May 15.1998 'Ruies and Regulations assistance. The final rule has been pe taining to MC&A requirements for significant costs that hate not been modified accordingly. ISFSis Specifically. the NRC staff askea m'ciuded in the table?
Comment. Finally. coricernmg the ifISFSis were exempt from tne Summon of Responses Three actual terminology,and format of the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51 and, if responses from nuclear utihties proposed rule, commenters expressed not, why not. Specific MC&A specifically addressed this issue One support for its performance based requirements for ISFSIs are found under respondent indicated that the cost nature but rejected the set of provisions Part 72. After consideration of the issue. estimates in Table Ill of the " Draft under 10 CFR 73.51(d) as being overly for clarification, the NRC staff has Regulatory Analysis"are sufficientiv prescriptive. included an amendment to 10 CFR Part broad to address industry experienc'e.
Response. The Commission responds 74 that specifically exempts ISFSIs from However, the inclusion of a continual that the p;oposed regulation found 'n 10 10 CFR 74.51 in the final rule. surveillance system is not covered and CFR 73.51(d) is needed to provide the respondent suggested that it should r 'ditional clarity in meeting the & Summ0f7 of Responses to Cornmission's Specific Questions be a separate Jine item. Another prformance capabilities in 10 CFR respondent indicated that the cost 73.51(b) and notes that many of the Question 1. Would the proposed estimates appear to be comprehensive physical protection measures described amendments impose any significant except they do not include construction under 10 CFR 73.51(d) are relaxed in the additional costs for safeguards of and maintenance of physical protection final rule and are less prescriptive in a currently stored spent nuclear fuel office space, a records retention area.
1 number of cases, beyond what is now incurred for that and alann station (s).
Purpose? NRC Response. The " Regulatory
- 6. GROA Summary of Responses. Five Analysis" has been revised to reflect Comment. Two comments were responses from nuclear utilities public comment to include any received from DOE on the amendments specifically addressed this issue. All omissions or changes made to the final to Part 60 dealing with the geologic indicated that the amendments, as rule.
repository. The first commenter proposed, would significantly increase Question 4. Are the costs justified by requested that it be emphasized in the costs. Manpower intensive measures, the benefits that would be afforded by
" Statement of Considerations" for the such as the requirement to maintain a the proposed amendments? Are there final rule that the requirement for minimum of two watchmen per shift, alternatives that would afford physical protection of GROAs be were most often cited as creating an essentially the same benefits but be applicable only during their operational undue burden. One licensee estimated more cost effective?
phases and not after closure, costs of $1 to 52 million to implement, Summary of Responses. Three Response. The Commission agrees and a continuing cost increase of 30-50 responses from nuclear utilities with this observation and has clarified percent, annually, to physical protection specifically addressed this issue. All the exemption in the final rule to operations, three indicated that the costs were not specifically exempt GROAs from the NRC Response. Licensees holding a justified by the benefits derived from requirements of to CFR 73.51 after 10 CFR Part 50 license are no longer the proposed rule. One respondent permanent closures. within the scope of this rule. The final stated that the individual measures of Comment. The second commenter rule has been revised to minimize to CFR 73.51(d) have merit, but, when requested clarification on apparent redundancy and add flexibility to its taken in aggregate, they are not conflicts in Pa'rt 60," Disposal of High- implementation. There should be no necessary to protect public health and Level Radioactive Waste in Geologic significant increase in cost to current safety. This respondent further stated Repositories " regarding the level of licensees. that redundancy in the proposed rule detail required of physical protection Question 2. ls there reason to expect was not needed and the rulemaking plans during the different phases of the the costs to future licensees to differ should give affected licensees latitude certification process, substantially from those of current in selecting and justifying the means of Response. The Commission notes that licensees? physical protection. Alternatives that i
NUREG 1619. " Standard Review Plan Summary of Responses. Four were suggested involved the deletion of l for Physical Protection Plans for the responses from nuclear utilities specific provisions of the proposed rule l
Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and specifically addressed this issue. Three and also the restructunng of the rule so High-level Radioactive Waste," to be utilities cited both higher current and as to not group all ISFSIs under one set issued concurrently with the eflective annual operating costs. One utility of physical protection criteria.
date of the final rule, will contain noted that, to the extent that current NRC Response. The Commission has guidance in this area. licensees have been required to commit revised the requirements of the to the practices recommended in the proposed rule to eliminate unnecessary
- 7. NRC Stoff-Generated Amendments pronosed rule in initial licensing, there redundancies, add flexibi;ity in Subsequent to publication of the is :o anticipated difference in cost. implementation, and reduce manpower-proposed rule, a technical issue arose MC Response. Licensees holding a intensive measures while maintaining involving the cooling time of spent fuel 10 CFR Part 50 license are no longer an adequate level of physical protection.
as it relates to the degree of physical within tae scope of this rule. The hnal Question S. Are the proposed protection needed. Because a response rule has been amended to be more amendments to 10 CFR 73.51 to this issue continues to evolve within consisten' with physical protection appropriate for an MRS or geologic the NRC, the Commission believes it implemented at sites with currently repository operated by DOE?
would be inappropnate to apply the approved phys;ral protection plans. Summary of Response. NE! was the provisions of the final rule at this time Hence, there shou'd be no significant only respondent to this issue, NE! noted to a licensee holding a 10 CFR Part 50 increase in costs to iYure licensees. that NRC should be mindful of the license. Hence, licensees holding a 10 Question J. Are the coa emates in evolving nature of MRS installations CFR Part 50 license are not within the Table !!! of the Draft Regulatory ' and the peologic repository in the scope of the fmal rule. Further review Analysis representative of current devekpr,.ent of physical proteri.on indicated thrt there was some confusion industry experience? Are there rege Waras to; he mes 4
Federal Repister /Vol. 63. No. 94 / Friday. May 15.1998 / Rules and Regulations 26959 NRC Response. NRC staff contmues tc the proposed rule except for changmg a ea must be subject to continual work closely with DOE staffin the the title so Pnpical Protection Plan to surveillance and be protected bv an development of the cemfication process be consistent with 10 CFR Part 73 active intrusion alarm system tiiat is for MRS installations and the GROA. 7 Section 72.212. Conditions of {
capable of detecting penetration through Ill. Summarv of Specific Changes Mode generallicense issued under 5 72.210. the isolation zone and that is monitored to the Propo' sed Rule as a Result of Revisions to this section have been in a continually staffed pnmary alarm Pubhc Comment deleted in their entirety, station located within the rotected Major changes made to the proposed 7 icol Protection of Plants ,'af an in on dd rule mclude: ho )) , 9n t en ure & a (1) The incorporation of a protection act cannot destroy the capability of the
- 8. Section 73.1. Purpose and Scope. '
goal, and onsite watchman to call for assistance.
Paragraph (b)(6)is unchanged from the (2) Regarding required levels of proposed rule- The primary alarm station must be physical proter 4on, redundancies have located within the p tected area; have
- 9. Section 73.50 Requirements for been reduced, a.axibility added. and physical protection of licensed bullet-resisting walh, doors ceiling, and manpower-for example- floor; and the interior of the station activities. This section remains
- Regarding alarm monitoring, the unchanged from the proposed rule. must not be visible from outside the redundant alarm station need only protected area. A timely means for
- 10. Section 73.51. Requirements for provide a summary indication at a assessment must also be provided.
the physical protection of stored spent continually staffed location; nuclear fuel and high level radioactive Regarding alarm monitoring. the e
Redundant records retention has redundant location need only provide a waste. Paragraph (a). Applicability, has summary indication that an alarm has been eliminated; been revised to more precisely define
- The required staffing level for the been generated." This clarifies the the type of material affected by the rule Commission's position that the security organization has been and to eliminate 10 CFR Part 50 eliminated and required siting and necessary level of protection should licensees from the provisions of the configuration of the primary alarm rule- ensure that a single act cannot destroy station clarified: the capability of the onsite watchrnan to Paragraph (b)(3), General Performance call for assistance.
- Hand-held equipment searches for Objectives, has been revised to read:
Paragraph (dl(4) has been revised to explosives are replaced with visual "The physical protection system must searches; and reduce the frequency of patrol from "not be designed to protect against loss of
. Illumination levels need only less than once every a hours" to " daily control of the facility that could be random patrols" with additional permit adequate assessment of the PA sufficient to cause radiation exposure according to the assessment means discussion provided in guidance issued exceeding the dose as described in 10 to suppon the rule.
used. Detection equipment must be CFR 72.106." This revised statement Paragraph (d)(5) has been revised to active in nature, describes a more appropriate protection read: "A security organization with As discussed previously, the final rule goal that is consistent with Part 72. It written procedures must be established.
does not apply to a licensee holding a also allows for a physical protection The security organization must include to CFR Part 50 license. system less stringent than required to sufficient personnel per shift to provide A section-by-section comparison of protect against radiological sabotage at for monitoring of detection systems and the proposed and final rules follows. operating power reactors. the conduct of surveillance, assessment.
Port 6G-Disposalof High.lsvel The introductory text of paragrapn (d) access control, and communications to <
Radioactive Wastes in Geologic has been revised to more clearly assure adequate response. Members of i N'Possiones indicate the Commission's intent that the security organization must be I alternative measures may also be trained. equipped, qualified and
- 1. Section 60.21. Content of available for meeting the provisions of requallSed to perform assigned job application. This section is unchanged (d). For example, several questions arose duties in accordance with Appendix B from the proposed rule, during final rule development as to to Part 73, I.A. (1) (a) and (b); B(11lah
- 2. Section 60.31, Construction whether the use of a hardened and and the applicable portions of fl." This authorization. This section is protected alarm station sited at an change eliminates a required staffing unchanged from the proposed rule. adjacent operating power reactor would level and describes qualification and
- 3. Section 60.41, Standards for meet the intent of paragraph (d)(3) to training levels for watchmen, only, as issuance of a license. This section is have a hardened alarm station within the primary members of the secunty
! unchanged from the proposed rule. the PA of the ISFSI. Staff considers this organization.
i
- 4. Section 60.78. Material control and to be an acceptable alternative measure Paragraph (d)(6) has been changed to
! accounting records and reports. This for meeting this provision of the final require " timely" response from the section is unchanged from the proposed rule. designated response forces. If timely l rule. In paragraph (d)(1), the last sentence response cannot be provided. additional Port 72-Licensing Requirements for the has been deleted because it is no longer protective measures may be required, to Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Yd "
8" grYp'h d ( as been deleted.
Fueland High LevelRodioactive Waste y,p'jy'i,us[d)
Paragraph a
has been revised to Paragraph (d)(B) has been
- 5. Section 72.24. Contents of read: "lliumination must be sufficient to redesignated as paragraph (d)(7) and application: Technical information. This permit adequate assessment of revised to read as follows:"A personnel section is unchanged from the proposed unauthorized penetrations of or )
identification system and a controlled rule. The term " radiological sabotage" is activities within the protected area ' lock system must be established and l based on Part 72 assumptions and not This revision has been made to permit maintained to limit access to authorized a Part 100 radiological release, j flexibihtv in illummation levels. individuals." This eliminates the
- 6. Section 72.180. Physical secuntv Paragraph (d)(3) has been reused to unnecessary coupling of the plan. This section is un' changed froni read. "The perimeter of the protected identification system with the system I
a
26960 Federal Register / Vol. 63. No. 94 / Friday, May 15,1998 / Rules and Regulations used for key and lock control as requested by commenters. performance objectives. Each licensee inspection in the NRC Public Docu2nent Paragrapft (d)t9) has been deleted. if a who is authorized to possess five or room. 2120 L Street NW (Lower Levell person is authorized access to the PA. more formula kilograms of strategic Washington DC. Smgle copies of the properly identified, aad subject to special nuclear material (SSNM) and to anah sis may be obtamed from Priscilla search, there is no need for the use such material at any site, other thar. A. Dwyer. Division of Fuel Cvcle Safety individual to be escorted. a nuclear reactor licens'ed pursuant to and Siftguards. Office of Nuclear
~
i Paragraph (d)(10) has been Part 50 of this chapter, an irradiated fuel Matenal Safety and Safeguards. U.S.
redesignated as paragraph (d)(8). reprocessing plant, an operation Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regardmg communications. tha term involved with waste disposal or an Washington, DC 20555-000L The
" security organization" has been revised independent spent fuel storage facility " Final Regulatory Analysis"is available to "onsite security force members" to licensed pursuant to Part 72 of this for viewing and flownloading from the more precisely define communication chapter, shall establish, implement, and NRC's rulemaking bulletin board.
channels. mamtain a Commission approved Paragraph (d)(11) has been matenai control and accounting (MC&Al Regulatory Flexibility Certification redesignated a paragraph (d)(0) and system that will achieve the following As required by the Regulatory revised to rad as follows: "All objectives: * * * " This paragraph Flexibility Act. 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the individu/ ,, vehicles and hand-carried specifically exempts Part 72 ISFSIs from Commission certifies that this rule does packaar, entering the protected area the requirements of 10 CFR 74.51. not have a significant economic impa1 must be checked for proper Port 75- Sofeguards on Nuclear on a substantial number of small authorization and visually searched for Materful-Implementation of US/lAEA entities. The final rule affects operators explosives before entry " This is Agreement ofISFSIs and DOE as the operator of the permissible because the amount of MRS and GROA. The affected licensees explosives needed to cause a 13. Section 75.4. Definitions, remains do not fall within the scope of the unchanged from the proposed rule. definition of "small entities" set forth in radiological release is not easily concealable. Criminal Penalties Section 60113)of the Regulatory Paragraph (d)(12) has been Flexibility Act, or the NRC's size NRC notes that these final standards (10 CTR 2.810).
redesignated as paragraph (d)(10). The text of this paragra amendments are issued under Sections the proposed rule.ph is unchangea trom 161b and i of the Atomic Energy Small ActBusiness ofAct Regulatory Enforcement 1954, as amended. Therefore, violation Fairness Paragraph (d)(13) has been of these regulations may subject a In accordance with the Small redesignated as paragraph (d)(11) and person to criminal sanctions under Business Regulatory Enforcement revised to read as follows:"All Faimess Act of 1996, NRC has detection systems, surveillance / section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act.
assessment systems, and supporting EnvimnmentalImpact: Categorical determined that this action is not a subsystems including illumination Exclushn "maior rule" and has verified this systems must be tamper indicating with determination with the Office of lme supervision and be maintained in The Commission has determined that Information and Regulatory Affairs of this final rule is the type of action OMB.
operable condition. Timely described as a categorical exclusion in compensatory measures must be taken Backfit Analysis 10 CFR 51.22(c)(3)(i) and (iii).
after discovery of inoperabihty tc assure Therefore, neither an environmental The Commissi that the effectiveness of the physical impact statement not an environmental de backfit n to Cmle a.on does R 50.109 has determined that protection assessment has been prepared for this nt p y be se this fin Paragraphsy(stem d)(14) hasisbeen not reduced."
final rule. ,,
e does
'8" f,*,'in u anh f te top sed Paperwork Reduction Act Statement existing to CFR part 50 licensees. The rule. backfit rule in to CFR 72.62 may be This final rule amends information applicable to one facility which has Paragraph (d)(15) has been collection requirements that are subject only one isolation zone exterior to the redesignated as paragraph (d)(13). This to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Penmeter barrier. However, the NRC provision has been added to assure that (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These staff has identified altemative measures duplication of records under 5 72.180 is requirements were approved by the currently m place that provide an not required. Paragraph (d)(13)(ii) has Office of Management and Budget equivalent level of physical peotection.
been revised to read as follows: [OMB). approval numbers 3150-0002. The staff does not intend to rsquire this
" Screening recordt of members of the 3150-0055,3150-0123, and 3150-0132. facility to establish an interior isolation security organization. pin,33y, g,3og rone. Thus, no backfit occurs due to the atrol must co tain all patrols, not Public Protection Notification new rule. Because 10 CFR 72.62 does If an information collection does not not cover reponing and recordkeeping Paragraph (e) has been revised for display a currently valid OMB control requirements. the inclusion of to CFR clarit number, the NRC may not conduct and 73.51 in 10 CFR 73.71 event reporting it. Section 73.71, Reporting of a person is not required to respond to, is not a backfit. Finally, the trar.sfer of safeguards events. remains unchanged the information collection. j i sper,t fuel from a reactor, licensed under from ee proposed ruie. 10 CFR part 50 and subject to 10 CFR Regulatory Analysis Fort 74-MorerialControland 73.55 physical protection requirements.
Accounting of Special Nuclear Morerial The Commission has prepared a to an ISFS! licensed under to CFR part
" Final Regulatory Analysis" for this 72, and its associated physical
- 12. In Section 74.51, Nuclear material final rule. The final analysis examines protection provisions (e.g.,10 CFR control and accounting for special I nuclear material, paragraph (a) has been by thethe benefits and alternatives Commission. The " Finalconsidered 73.51)is not a backfit. A new license revised to read as follows:" General under 10 CFR art 72 is a matter of R'egulatory Analysis"is available for compliance with regulations. In all l
Federal Register / Vol. 63. No. 94 / Friday. May 15.1998/ Rules and Regulations 26961 cases. transition from 10 CFR 73.55 to 2. In b 60.21. p.araeraphs (b)(3). (b)(4). 929.930.932.933.934.935 94B.953.954.
73.51 is a relaxation of requirements and (c)(10) are revised to read as 955. as amended. sec. 234. 83 Stat 444, as and not a backfit. follows: amended 142 U.S C 2071. 2073. 2077. 2092 2093.2095.2099.2111,2201.2232.2233.
List of Subjects 5 60.21 content of application. 2234. 2236. 2237,2238. 2282L sec. 274. Pub 20 CFR Port 60 L 86-373. 73 Stat. 688. as amended (42
' ()... U.S C 2021L sec 201. as amended. 202.206.
Criminal penalties. High. level waste. 88 Stat 1242. as amended. 1244,1246 (42 Nuclear power plants and reactors, (3) A detailed plan to rovide USC 5841. 5842,58%6L Pub. L 95-601 sec.
physical protection of high-level Nuclear materials. Reporting and "* '
recordkeeping requirements. Waste radioactive waste in accordance with '[,cf*7$,\$'3 tN123
, 42 S S 73.51 of this chapter. This plan must 58:1); sec.102. Pub. L 91-190. 83 Stat. 853 treatment and disposal.
include the design for physical (42 U.S.C 4332). secs.131.132.133.135.
20 CFR Part 72 Protection, the licensee's safeguards 137.141. Pub. L 97-425. 96 Stat. 2229,2230, Manpower training programs, Nuclear contingency plan, and security 2232,2241. sec.148. Pub. L 100-203.101 organization personnel training and Stat.1330-235 (42 U.S.C 10151.10152, materials. Occupational safety and qualification plan. The plan must list 10153.10155.10157,10161.10168).
health. Reportmg and recordkeeping tests, inspections, audits, and other Section 72.44(g) also issued under requirements. Secun,ty measures. Spent means to be used to demonstrate fuel. secs.142(b) and 148(c). (d). Pub. L 100-compliance with such requirements. 203.101 Stat.1330-232.1330-236 (42
' 20 CFR Part 7J (41 A description of the program to U.S.C.10162(b).10158 (c). (d)). Section Criminal penalties. Hazardous meet the requirements of 560.78. 72.46 also issued under sec.189,68 materials transportation. Export. Im ort. Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C 2239); sec.134, Pub.
Nuclear materials. Nuclear power pfants (c) .' * . L 97-425,96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C and mactors Reponing and (10) A description of the program to 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued recordkeeping requirements. Security be used to maintain the records under sec.145(g). Pub. L 200-203.101
"'"" described in 556031 and 6032. Stat.1330-235 (42 U.S.C 10165(g)).
Subpart J also issued under secs. 2(2).
20 CFR Part 74 3. In 5 60.31, paragraph (b)is avised 2(15). 2(19) 117(a).141(h). Pub. L 97-Accounting Criminal penalties. to read as follows: 425. 96 Stat. 2202, 2203. 2204,2222.
Hazardous materials transportation. g 40.21 mm 2224 (42 U.S.C 10101.10137(a).
l Material control and accounting. . . . . . 10161(h)). Subparts K and L am also issued under sec.133. 98 Stat. 2230 (42 Nuclear materials'fon Protection. Packaging containers.Radiat mm n dehnseand and securny. U.S.C 10153) and sec. 218(a). 96 Stat.
That there is reasonable assurance that 2252 (42 U S.C 10198) req i en s Scien ifi u pment. fp*p*;'$tg 'dggPo Special nuclear material. ot i mfcal to the' to rea as lo'w '
common defense and secunty.
20 CFR Pan 75 * * * *
- 572.as coneenesof appuseson:Teeem# cal Criminsi penalties. InterBovemmental 4. 'n 5 60.41, paragraph (c)is revised Ia88*8#0a, relations. Nuclear materials. Nuclear to read as follows: ,
power plants and reactors. Reporting 6 00.41 standante forleeuence of licenas.
and recordkeeping requimments. . . . . .
security measures for physical Secunty measums. protection, including design features For the reasons set out in the (c)The issuance of the license will and the plans requimd by subpart H. For preamble and under the authority of the not be inimical to the common defense an application from DOE for an ISFS! or l
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
- and security and willnot cMtute an MRS. DOE will provide a description of the Energy Rao anization Act of1974. unreasonable risk to the beta.: and the physical protection Ian for as amended, an 5 U.S.C 552 and 553 safety of the public, Protection against radio ogical sabotage l
the NRC is adopting the following d b H me ents to 10 CFR parts 60. 72. 73. 5. A new $ 6C 78 is added to read as . . . .'
follows;
- 8. Section 72.180 is revised to read as g soJs basiertal contrW end accounun9 follows:
PART 80--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL reconsa one reporta.
RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC g 72.180 mW presc#en plan.
DOE shallimplement a program of REPOSITORIES The licensee shall establish, maintain.
material control and accounting (and accidental criticality reporting) that is and follow a detailed plan for physical
- 1. The authority citation for part 60 protection as described in 5 73.51 of this continues to read as follows: the same as that specified in $$ 72.72.
4 .a d chapter. The licensee shall retain a copy Authersty: Secs. 51,53,62. 63. 65. 81 ht. Pter of the current plan as a record until the 182.183. 68 Stat. 929. 930, 932. 933. 935- Commssion terminates the hcense for 948. 953. 954, as amended 142 U.S.C 2071- PART 72-LICENSING 2073.2092.2093.2095.2111,2201.2232. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE which the procedures were developed and. If any portion of the plan is 22331 secs. 202. 206. 88 Stat.1244.1246 (42 INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT superseded, retain the superseded
. U.S.C 584. 5846); secs. to and 14. Pub. L NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL 95-601. 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S C 2021a and RADIOACTIVE WASTE material for 3 years after each change or 5851); sec.102. Pub. L 91-190. 83 Stat. 853 until termination of the license. The
- 6. The authority citation for part 72 plan must describe how the applicant 425 9 at. 2 3g 228. s e ded (42 continues to read as follows: will meet the requirements of 5 73.51 of U.S C 10134.10141) and Pub. L 102-486, Authoriry: Secs. 51,53.57,62.63.65.69. this chapter and provide physical sec 2902.106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S C 5851) 81.163.182.183.184.186.187.189. 68 Stat. protection dunng on-site transportation
I I 20962 Federal Register / Vol. 63. No. 94 / Friday, May 15,1998 / Rules and Regulations I j k to and from the proposed ISFSI or MRS $ 73.51 Requirements for the physical NRC for meeting the performance l and include within the plan the design protection of stored spent nuclear fuel and capabihties of i73.51(b)(2h The for physical protection, the licensee's high-level radioactive waste.
Commission mas, on a specific basis safeguards contingency plan, and the (a) Apphcabihty Notwithstanding the and upon request or on its own
, security organization personnel training Provisions of SS 73.20,73.50, or 73.67, initiative authorize other alternative l and qualification plan. The plan must the physical protection requirements of measures for the protection of spent fuel list tests. inspections, audits, and other this section apply to each licensee that and high-level radioactive waste subject means to be used to demonstrate stores spent, nuclear fuel and high. level to the requirements of this section. if ccmphance with such requirements. radioactive waste pursuant to after evaluation of the specific paragraphs (a)(1)(i),(ii), and (2) of this alternative measures, it fir.ds reasonable )
PART 73-PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF section. This includes- assurance of compliance with the PLANTS AND MATERIALS l1) Spent nuclear fuel and high level performance capabilities of paragraph .
radioactive waste stored under a (b)(2) of this section.
- 9. The authority citation for part 73 specific license issued pursuant to part continues to read as follows: (1) Spent nuclear fuel and high level 72 of this chapter: radioactive waste must be stored only Authonty: Secs. 53.161. 68 Stat. 930,948. (1) At an independent spent fuel within a protected area so that access to as amended. sec.147,94 Stat. 78o (42 U.S.C. storage installation (ISFSI) or 2073. 2167. 2201): sec. 201, as amended. 204.
this material requires passage through or 88 Stat.1242, as amended.1245. sec.1701.
(ii) At a monitored retrievable storage penetration of two physical barriers, one (MRS) installation; or barrier at the perimeter of the protected 106 Stat. 2951. 2952,2953 (42 U.S.C. 5541. i (2) Spent nuclear fuel and high-level area and one barrier offering substantial 5644. 2297fl. i radioactive waste at a geologic penetration resistance. The physical i Section 73.1 also issued under secs. repository operations ares (GROA) barrier at the perimeter of the protected 135,141. Pub. L 97-425,96 Stat. 2232, licensed pursuant to part 60 of this area must be as defined in S 73.2.
2241 (42 U.S.C.10155,10161). Section chapter: Isolation zones, typically 20 feet wide 73.37(f) also issued under sec. 301. Pub. Ibl GeneroI Performonce objectives. each, on both sides of this barrier, must i L 96-295. 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 (1) Each licensee subject to this section be provided to facilitate assessment. The I note). Section 13.57 is issued under sec, shall establish and maintain a physical barrier offering substantial resistance tc l 606, Pub. L 99-399.100 Stat,876 (42 protection system with the objective of penetration may be provided by an U.S.C. 2169). providing high assurance that activities approved storage cask or building walls involving spent nuclear fuel and high- such as those of a reactor or fuel storage
- 10. In S 73.1 paragraph (b)(6)is revised to read as follows: level radioactive waste do not constitute building.
an unreasonable risk to public health (2) Illumination must be sufficient to 3 73.1 Purpose and scope. and safety. permit adequate assessment of
. . . . . (2) To meet the general objective of unauthorized penetrations of or j paragraph (b)(1) of this section, each activities wi thin the protected area.
(b) * *
- licensee subject to this section shall (3) The perimeter of the protected area 1
(6) This part prescribes requirements ' meet the following performance must be subject to continual for the physical protection of spent capabilities, surveillance and be protected by an nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive (i) Store spent nuclear fuel and high- active intrusion alarm system which is !
waste stored in either an independent level radioactive waste only within a capable of detecting penetrations j spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or protected area: through the isolation zone and that is a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) (ii) Grant access to the protected area monitored in a continually staffed installation licensed under part 72 of only to individuals who are authorized primary alarm station and in one this chapter, or stored at the geologic . to enter the protected area; additional continually staffed location.
repository operations area licensed (iii) Detect and assess unauthorized The primary alarm station must be under part 60 of this chapter, penetration of. or activities within. the located within the protected area; have
. . . . . protected area; bullet resisting walls, doors, ceiling, and 1L The introductory text of S 73.50 is (iv) Provide timely communication to floor; and the interior of the station revised to read as follows: a designated response force whenever must not be visible from outside the necessary; and pwtected area. A timely means for i 6 73.50 Requirements for physical (v) Manage the physical protection assessment of alarms must also be i protection for lesensed activit6es, organization in a manner that maintains provided. Regarding alarm monitoring.
8 its effectiveness. the redundant location need only
- 57. , ut w o Pos sses. (3)The physical protection system provide a summary indication that an stores formula quantities of strategic must be designed to protect against loss alarm has been generated.
special nuclear material that are not of control of the facility that could be (4) The protected area must be readily separable from other radioactive sufficient to cause a radiation exposure monitored by daily random patrols.
matenal and which have total extemal exceeding the dose as described in (5) A security organization with l 5 72.106 of this chapter, written procedures must be established.
radiation dose rates in excess of100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet (c) Plan retention. Each licensee The security organization must include from any accessible surfaces witnout subject to this section shall retain a copy sufficient personnel per shift to provide intervening shielding other than at a of the effective physical protection plan for monitoring of detection systems and I as a record for 3 years or until the conduct of surveillance, assessment.
nuclear noctor facility licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, shall termination of the license for which access control. and communications to procedures were developed. assum adequate response. Members of I comply with the following: (d) Physicolprotection systems.
the security organization must be I components, and procedures. A licensee trained, equipped qualified,and
- 12. A new 5 73.51 is added to read as shall comply with the following requalified to perform assigned job l follows: provisions as methods acceptable to duties in accordance with appendix B to l l
l l
l l
I FedIrri Regist:r/Vol. 63, No. 94 / Friday, May 15,1998 / Rules and Regulations 26963 part 73, sections I.A. (1) (a) and (bl.
(iv) A record of each alarm received. 15. In S 74.51 the introductory text of B(1)(a) and the applicable portions ofII. identifying the type of alarm location.
(6) Documented liaison with a paragraph (a)is revised to read as l date and time when received, and designated response force or local law follows:
disposition of the alarm; and enforcement agency (LLEA) must be (v) The physical protection program 6 74.51 Nuclear material control and established to permit timely response to review reports. accounting for special nuclear matenal.
unauthorized penetration or activities. (e) A licensee that operates a GROA I
5 (7) A personnelidentification system is exempt from the requirements of this (a) Genem/ performance objectives.
,' and a controlled lock system must be section for that GROA after permanent Each licensee who is authorized to established and maintained to limit closure of the GROA. possess five or more formula kilograms access to authorized individuals. 13. In S 73.71, paragraphs (b)(1) and of strategic special nuclear material (8) Redundant communications (c) are revisod to read as follows: (SSNM) and to use such material at any capability must be provided between site, other than a nuclear reactor onsite security force members and 573.71 mmng of safeguards ennts.
designated response force or LLEA. * * * *
- Licensed pursuant to part 50 of this (9) Allinditlduals, vehicles and (b)(1) Each licensee subject to the chapter, an irradiated fuel reprocessing provisions of SS 73.20,73.37,73.50, plant, an operation involved with waste hand-carried packages entering the protected area must be checked for 73.51,73.55,73.60, or 73.67 shall notify disposal, or an independent spent fuel proper authorization and visually the NRC Operations Center within 1 storage facility licensed pursuant to part searched for explosives before entry. hour of discovery of the safeguards 72 of this chapter shall establish, t
(10) Written response procedures events described in paragraph I(a)(1) of implement, and maintain a (
I Commission-approved material control must be established and maintained for ap endix G to this pan. Licensees I addressing unauthorized penetration of, su ject to the provisions of $$ 73.20, and accounting (MC&A) system that will or activities within, the protected area 73.37,73.50, 73.51,73.55,73.60,or each din & fdlW dMm including Category 5. " Procedures," of licensee possessing strategic special * * * *
- a pendix C to part 73. The licensee nuclear material and subject to -
s all retain a copy of response S 73.67(d) shall notify the NRC PART 75-.-SAFEGUARDS ON procedures as a record for 3 years or Operations Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after NUCLEAR MATERIAL-until termination of the license for discovery of the safeguards events IMPLEMENTATION OF US/lAEA which the procedures were developed. described in paragraphs !(a)(2). (a)(3), AGREEMENT Copies of superseded material must be (b), and (c) of appendix G to this part. .
retained for 3 years aftet each change or Licensees subject to the provisions of 16. The authority citation for part 75 until termination of the license. SS 73.20, 73.37, 73.50. 73.51, 73.55, or continues to read as follown ,
(11) All detection systems, 73.60 shall notify the NRC Operations Authority: secs. 53.63.103.104.122.161, surveillance / assessment systems, and Center within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of 68 Stat. 930. 932,936. 937. 939. 948 as supporting subsystems, including the safeguards events described in amended (42 U.S.C. 2073. 2093. 2133. 2134, paragraph I(d) of appendix G to this illumination systems, anust be tamper. 2152. 220th sec. 201,88 Stat.1242, as indicating with line supervision and be part.
amended (42 U.S.C. 5s411 ely mpens o measu s must be (c) Each licensee subject to the Section 75.4 also issued under secs.
taken after discovery of inoperability, to provisions of SS 73.20. 73.37. 73.50. 135.141, Pub. L. 97 -425. 96 Stat. 2232, assure that the effectiveness of the 73.51, 73.55, 73.60. or each licensee 2241 (42 U.S.C.10155,10161).
security system is not reduced. possessing SSNM and subject to the
- 17. In S 75.4. paragraph (k)(5) is (12) The physical protection program pmvisions of S 73.67(d) shall maintain a l
must be reviewed once every 24 months current log and record the safeguards revised to read as follows:
by individuals independent of both events described in paragraphs II (a) and S 75.4 Dennitions.
physical protection program (b) of appendix G to this part within 24 . . . . .
management and personnel who have hours of discovery by a hcensee I
' direct responsibility for implementation employee or member of the licensee,s g,,,
of the physical protection program. The contract security organization. The (5) Any location where the possession physical protection program review licensee shall retain the log of events of more than i effective kilogram of
' must include an evaluation of the recorded under this section as a record nuclear materialis licensed pursuant to
' effectiveness of the physical protection f r 3 years after the last entry is made parts 40. 60, or 70 of this chapter, or system and a verification of the liaison in each log or until termination of the pursuant to an agreement state license.
established with the designated hcense. . . . . .
I response force or LLEA. * * * *
- l (13) The following documentation Dated at Rockville. Maryland, this 11th day
' " PART 74-MATERIAL CONTROL AND "U after e ec d s nad or un il ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
termination of the license Duplicate MATERIAL John C. Hoyle, records to those required under S 72.180
- 14. The authority citation for part 74 ** ""#
of part 72 and S 73.71 of this part need continues to read as follows: [FR Doc. 98-12978 Filed 5-14-98. 8 45 aml not be retained under the requirements " " "
of this section' Authonty: Secs. 53. 57.161.182.183. 68 (i) A log ofindividuals granted access Stat. 930,932. 948. 953,954. as amended.
to the protected area: sec. 234. 83 Stat. 444. as amended [42 U.S C.
2073. 2077. 2201, 2232. 2233. 2282,2297fh (ii) Screening records of members of secs. 201, as amended 202,206. 88 Stat the security organization. 1242, as amended. 3244.1246 (42 U.S.C l till) A log of all patrols: 5841. 5842. 5846L j l'
l i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______w