ML20236Y442

Submits Response to NRC RAI Re Request to Change Licensing Basis for Increase in Assumed Containment Pressure Following Design Basis LOCA

ML20236Y442
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	08/03/1998
From:	Roche M GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
1940-98-20329, NUDOCS 9808120197
Download: ML20236Y442 (22)

Text

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GPU Nuclear, Inc.

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U.S. Route #9 South NUCLEAN Post Office Box 388 Forked River, NJ 087310388 Tel 609-9714000

- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissu Attn: Document Control Desk 1940-98-20%'9 Washington DC 20555 August 3,1998

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Request for Change to the Licensing Basis Response to Request for Additional Information By letter dated May 5,1998, GPU Nuclear, Inc., requested a change to the Licensing Basis for the Oyster Creek Nodear Generating Station. The requested change was for an increase in the assumed containment pressure following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident.

Subsequent to that submittal, a teleconference was held in which members of the NRC staff requested additional information, in the form of eight questions. The attachment and enclosures to this cover letter provide the replies to those questions.

If any additional information or assistance is required, please contact Mr. John Rogers of my staff at 609.971.4893.'

Very truly yours, J

Michael B. Roche.

110004 vice President and Director Oyster Creek

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Attachment Enclosures MBR/JJR cc:

Administrator, Region I NRC Project Manager Senior Resident Inspector 9908120197 POR ADOCK 0 19 P

PM

l Attachment I i

Specific NRC Questions And GPU Nuclear Replies

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Question 1:

It was noted that although the change request specified an increase in containment pressure of 1.25 psig, actual design pressures were credited for the first several minutes of the evaluated accident. Why does the request not specify that greater than 1.25 psig are required for the first several minutes?

Reply 1:

The original submittal included the full containment pressure as it was calculated by the computer code prior to the low pressure pump trip Following the pump trip the pressure is assumed to remain constant at 1.25 psig as the accident progressed despite the calculated pressure increase. The additional pressure in the first few minutes was never required for the strainer design, and has been conservatively removed from the analysis. For the purposes of establishing Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH), it is now assumed that containment pressure is j

held constant at 1.25 psig for the first hour. After the first hour 0.0 psig overpressure is i

assumed. No credit for any pressure above 1.25 psig is requested.

1 i

Question 2:

Please provide the inputs and assumptions that were utilized in the NPSH and containment calculations.

l Reply 2:

i The requested inputs and assumptions are contained in Enclosure 1 to this letter.

l Question 3:

It was noted that the wetwell protective coating is blistered. Please provide additional information to justify allowing the blisters to remain rather than be repaired.

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1940-98-20329 Page 2 Reply 3:

The answer to this request is presently nearing completion and will be docketed under separate cover no later than August 7,1998.

Question 4:

It was noted that the break location was selected based on Regulatory Guide 1.46 and MEB 31. This methodology has previously been discouraged by the staff. Justification was requested to continue to use this methodology.

Reply 4:

The strainer was designed to accommodate breaks outside those identified in the OC FSAR. A location was specifically selected to maximize debris delivered to the suppression pool. A new design debris loading (242 ft' vs.140 ft' NUKON), based upon a break that is not among those identified in the FSAR, has been included in the table docketed in Reply 5 of this letter.

Question 5:

It was noted that the debris loading detailed on Attachment II, page 9 of the Oyster Creek submittal ~ contained zero ' Additional Operational Debris'. Oyster Creek was requested to consider assigning a larger value.

Reply 5:

There is sufficient conservatism in the other debris loading assumed in the design to accommodate any reasonable amount of unexpected debris within the containment. For example, while the strainer design includes an allowance for 300 lbs of iron oxide, inspections and projections predict less than 200 lbs will actually accumulate. Whatever operational debris may be in the drywell, it would appear to the NPSH as less than or equal to the head loss associated with 25 lbs of iron. Therefore, to accommodate this concern, the design debris load l

will be modified to include 25 lbs of operational debris while reducing the iron oxide to 275 lbs. The table on the next page replaces the table originally docketed in our May 5,1998, submittal, on page 9, in Section 3.3.5.

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1940-98-20329 t

I Page 3 IWis lhva 6 om Quantit3 to tw awunel DW Coating Inorganic Zinc 47 lbs Paint Chips (DW equipment) 40 lbs Paint Chips _(torus coating) 10 lbs

, Dust / Dirt / Concrete 150 lbs Rust 50 lbs Additional Operational Debris 25 lbs Iron Oxide, Wetwell (See Section 5.0 ' 1 275 lbs Fiber (Nukon) _

242 ft'

' Letter, GPUN to NRC, dated May 5,1998 Question 6:

The graph on page 21, " Suppression Pool Temperature", shows a slight temperature increase at approximately the 8000 second point. What is the cause of the bcrease?

Reply 6:

This problem was associated with version 5.0E of the GOTHIC code. The conminment was modeled as a subdivided volume with two channels and six elevations. GOTHIC 5.0E did not properly model the channel to channel horizontal flow of liquid that accumulates as a pool.

Therefore, the inner channel (the outer defined to be communicating directly with the wetwell vent system) accumulated a greater volume of water (resulting in a pool depth 3 ft above expected). At the point where the temperature anomaly occurs, the accumulated water in the inner channel flowed to the wetwell. The sudden inflow of this accumulated hot water caused the pool temperature to rise.

This anomaly was identified and determined to be of minor significance. However, in response to your question, the calculation was rerun using the latest version of the code which 1

had cor rected the problem, and the anomaly no longer occurs. The calculation change has no impact on the strainer design. The graphs that are provided in Enclosure 2 demonstrate this i

change. The calculations supporting these graphs have been revised and are currently in the

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design verification process.

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1940-98-20329 Page 4

- Question 7:

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Would GPUN put the curves for Containment Response, Worst Case NPSH, and Suppression l

Pool Temperature vs. time on the same graph?

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Reply 7:

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The requested graph is contained in Enclosure 2.

Question 8:

It was noted that credit is taken for operator action at approximately 3.75 minutes to secure the drywell cooling flow. Discuss the responsibilities and distractions that could be placed on the licensed operator assigned to control containment pressure.

I Reply 8:

During a design basis LOCA scenario, one control room operator would be assigned to initiate and operate the Containment Spray system which would control containment pressure.

Emergency Operating procedure EMG 3200.02, " Primary Containment Control", requires an operator to enter Support Proceedure 29 " Initiation of Containment Spray System for Drywell Sprays". These procedures direct, and operators are trained, to maintain containment pressure within a narrow band (presently four to twelve pounds). During simulator exercises, the Control Room Supervisor practices effectively distributing tasks to the operators. The control of containment pressure would be assigned to a single operator and would be his only major duty. Any task which could diminish the operator's ability to monitor and control containment pressure would not be assigned to him.

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lL______---___-_---_--.----

ENCLOSURE 1 Inputs and Assumptions For the Containment and NPSH Calculations I

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CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE CALCULATION INFORMATION 1.0 Purpose This calculation is written to proside an evaluation of the Oyster Creek suppression pool temperature response following a large break loss of coolant accident. The results are intended for use in evaluating the available NPSH of the core gay pumps that initiate in response to the accident. This calculation will supersede the resultsdocumentxL tference2.

2.0 References

1. C-1302-241-5450-073 Rev. 0 ' Acceptable Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Fouling Resistance'

2. C-1302-241-5450 039 Rev.1 ' Containment Response To A DBA LOCA with 3200gpm containment spray and 3000gpm ESW Flows'

3. Procedure 607,4.004/005 ' Containment Spray and Emergency Senice Water System 1/2 Pump Operability and Inservice Test'

4. TDR 808 Rev.1

• Evaluation to Eliminate Containment Spray System Automatic Start Logic Feature'

5. Procedure EMG 3200.02 Primary Containnx:nt Control

6. NEDC-31462P ' Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Safer /Corecool/Gester-LOCA Loss-Of-Coolant Accident Analysis'

7. C-1302-241-5360-006 Rev. 0 ' Containment Spray System Pressure Profile'

8. C-1302-226-E620-379 Rev. 0 'OC D;: cay Heat Power With Uncertainty'

9. C-1302-212-5310-091 Rev.1 'OCNGS: LPCS Opembility Criteria'

10. C-1302 241-E540-100 3.0 Summary of Results The results of this calculation are summarized in the table below.

Case #

Peak DW Pressure Peak WW Pressure Peak Suppression Peak Suppression Pool (psia)/ Time (sec)

(psia)/ Time (sec)

Pool Level (in)/

Temperature ( F)/

Time (sec)

Time (sec) 8 41.57/ 9.06 28.80/24.30 151.0 /23.28 141.9 /5901.00 9

41.58/ 9.05 29.19/24.25 151.2 /24.25 161.5 / 15200.00 4.0 Assumptions

1. During the reactor vessel blowdown, the core decay heat is input into the suppression pool using a GOTHIC heater component. This will produce a conservative result since, the first few seconds of decay heat is actually included in the blowdown energy. When the reactor vessel is de-pressurized following the accident the rapid flow and change in the fluid saturation conditions initially cool the metal and fuel. During this time the decay heat provides an energy input to the fuel. Since the temperature decreases during the initial stages of the blowdown rather than increases, energy in excess of decay heat is removed. Rather than attempt to identify the time period when the fuel begins to heat i

up the decay heat over the entire interval is input directly into the suppression pool.

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2. The containment spray heat exchanger is assumed to be fouled. This is to ensure that the results presented here are bounding and will not be inPuenced by seasonal cleanliness issues associated with the cooling water.

3. The suppression pool temperature is assumed to be at the maximum LCO of 95"F. This value is greater than any reported canal temperature. This is to ensure that the results presented here are bounding and will not be influenced by seasonal temperature variations.

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w____--____-_-_-_______-_-____-_____

4. The emergency service water temperature is assumed to be 957. This is to ensure that the results presented here are bounding and will not be influenced by seasonal temperature variations.

5. The suppression pool water level is assumed to be at the minimum LCO (82,000ff).

This value represents the minimum suppression pool heat capacity allowed during normal operations and will provide a bounding pool temperature rise within the plants operating envelope.

- 6. The emergency service water flow rate is assumed to be at the minimum allowed by the surveillance procedure (reference 3). This will minimize the heat removal capability of the system and help to maximize the suppression pool temperature rise.

This provides a bounding result within the plants operating envelope.

7. Wetwell Pressure is assumed to be 0.0psig. This assumption is selected to minimize

' the containment overpressure that is available for NPSH to the core spray pumps. The normal containment operating pressure is between 1.1 and 1.4psig.

8. Wetwell Humidity is assumed to be 100%. This assumption minimizes the total number of non-condensable gases within the primary containment. Minimizing the number of non-condensable will also minimize the containment pressure response to the accident conditions.

9. Drywell Pressure is assumed to be 0.0psig. This assumption is selected to minimize the containment overpressure that is available for NPSH to the core spray pumps. The normal containment operating pressure is between 1.1 and 1.4psig.

10. Drywell Humidity is assumed to be 100%. This assumption minimizes the total number of non-condensable gases within the primary containment. Minimizing the number of non condensables will also minimize the containment pressure response to the accident conditions.

I1. Drywell Temperature is assumed to be 150T. This is the maximum allowed drywell temperature and will serve to minimize the number of non-condensable gases present in the primary containment. Minimizing the number of non-condensable gases will also minimize the containment pressure response to the accident conditions.

12. The core and containment spray flow rates assumed in each of the cases 8 (which j

assumes maximum strainer flow) and case 9 (which assumes minimum flow and 1

maximum suppression poot temperature) as well as the assumed containment spray trip point are listed in the table below. Note that only the B&C pump combination is evaluated. This combination bounds the A&D alternative.

Case #

Time NZ01B NZOIC Contain Spray Total Flow Cont Spray Trip (gpm)

(gpm)

(gpm/#sys)

(gpm)

Press (psig) 8 0 to 10 min 5000 5000 7850/2 17850 1.25 10 to 60 min 5000 4350 8400/2 17750 60 min on 4350 4350 8400/2 17100 9

0 to 10 min 5000 5000 0

10000 1.25 l

10 to 60 min 5000 4350 3200/1 12550 l

60 min on 4350 4350 3200/1 11900 I

5.0 Methad.

This calculation is performed using the GOTHIC computer code version 6.

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ECCS Suction Piping Model 1.0 Problem Statement The purpose of this calculation is to establish an accurate model of the suction piping associated with the core and containment spray systems. The model will be used to assess l

the NPSH available for a new suction strainer design. The large break LOCA will be used to represent the bounding condition for the evaluation. This particular accident provides a l

combination of high pool temperature as well as maximum flow demand from the systems under consideration.

2.0 Summary of Results The table below provides a summary of the main results.

O to 10 min 5000gpm 5000gpm 7850gpm 2.51 R 4.94R 10 min to 60 min 4350gpm 5000gpm 8400gpm 9.15R 4.27R 60 min on 4350gpm 4350gpm 8400gpm 6 41R 8.25R 0 to 10 min 5000gpm 5000gpm Ogpm 4.56R 6.93R 10 min to 60 min 4350gpm 5000gpm 3200gpm 8.478 4.14R 60 min on 4350 m 4350 m 3200 m 3.32R 5.24R 3.0 References

1. C-1302-241-5450-069 Rev. 0 ' Core & Containment Spray Suction Header Flow Distribution'

2. Relap5 version 3.1.1 - UNIX Version

3. C-1302-241-E610-080 Rev. 2 ' Calculation of Torus Temperature as NPSH Input'

4. Idel' Chik ' Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance, Coefficients of Local Resistance and ofFriction' I

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4.0 Assumptions and Design input

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The following assumptions are used in this calculation. Credit is taken for the j

containment pressure when evaluating the NPSH available to each of the pumps. This assumption represents a change to the original design basis of the plant. The overpressure is established to correspond to the trip setpoint value (1.25 psig). The assumed pressure for the pump trip will be 1.25 psig - this will require a revision to the current plant setpoint of 0.6 psig.

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1 Compartson of Nominal And Minimal Containment inKlal Conditions 36 00

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2. The head loss associated with the suction strainers as well as the inlet to the wetwell nozzle, where they will be connected is ignored. It is not the purpose of this document to calculate the strainer head loss, but rather to calculate the head loss available to the suction strainer designer. The figure below illustrates the flow points where the designer must calculate contributing head loss.

Head Loss Across Strainer With Debris Head Loss Entering the nozzle as well as any Head Loss associated with the internal strainer structure

3. The initial torus level is assumed to be at the minimum Technical Specification limit prior to the accident. This assumption establishes the minimum suction head contribution from water level in the wetwell. The change oflevel as a function of time is based on the results I

documented in reference 3.

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4. Two containment response cases are considered in this evaluation. These cases are obtained from reference 3. The same case designations will be used in this evaluation for ease of review with that reference. These cases are selected to represent design basis conditions (cases 9) as well as EOP conditions (cases 8). The tables that follow are based upon the data obtained from the containment analysis that is used in this calculation. The strainer pressure is calculated based upon suppression pool level and wetwell pressure. The equation used is as follows.

'(Poollevel)' _ (3,,,j,,,,ra iariori)

Straincrinlet Yressure =

, + ll'etwellPressure Vitell Header Core Spray Punp l*

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416 4) 16 f

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leme (see) strainer Pool Time (sec) s anner Pool Tt5mp (F) inlet Temp (F).

ti et Temp (F).

j f~s Press P

ess -

,,,,,0. 01 20.00822 95.00 l 10.05 l 20.19596 120.30 249.00 1 20.08178 l 136.20 l

1.01 l 20.00102 l 95.03 l 14.08 l 20.25765 l 128.90 l 741.90 l 20.0918 l 139.70

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2.01 l 20.01061 l 96.51 l 20.24 1 20.29379 l 134.40 1 2857.00 l 20.0885 I 142.40 1

.l 3.02 l 20.02989 l 99.27 l 28.30 l 20.2993 l 135.70 l 3508.00 l 20.08837 l 142.50 I

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4.02 l ~ 20.04892 l 102.20 l 45.37 l 20.27704 l 135.80 l 3608.00 l 18.83837 l 142.50 l

5.03 l 20.06778 l 105.20 l 76.40 1 20.23517 l 135.80 l 3908.00 l 18.83862 l 142.30 1

6.03 l 20.0902 l 108.10 l 137.70 l 20.14994 l 135.70 l 5409.00 l 18.83936 l 141.70 l

7.03 l 20.11589 l 111.20 l 188.10 l 20.08249 l 135.60 l 6210.00 l 18.83997 l 141.20 l

8.04 l 20.14144 l 114.30 l 228.80 l 20.08569 l 135.90 l 6710.00 l 18.84046 i 140.80

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l 9.05 l 20.17055 l 117.30 l 238.90 l 20.08201 l 136.00 l 11910.00 l 18.83853 l 136.50 I

i Case 9 Time (sec) tramer Pool Time (Set) strainer Povl '

Time (sec) ~ l et

,. Temp (F) s amer Pool let Temp (F)

Inlet Temp (F)

' ress.

' Press P ess 0.00 20.00822 95.00 1 16.12 20.27939 131.60 3518.00 l 20.0877 l 151.4

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l 1.01 l 20.00102 l 95.03 l_,,

23.33 20.3031 l 135.50 l 3618.00 18.84085 l 151.7 l

2.02 l 20.01065 l 96.46 1 320.20 20.08853 l 136.50 l 6089.00 18.83923 l 155.6 1

3.03 l 20.0299 l 99.26 l 633.60 20.08066 l 140.10 l 10690.00 18.8379 l 159.2 l

4.03 l 20.04892 l 102.20 l 724.40 20.08642 1 141.20 l 14210.00 18.83965 l 160.5 l

6.041,,,20.07136 l 5.04 l 105.20 l 784.80 20.08556 l 141.90 l 17720.00 18.83937 {

160.7 l

20.09368 l 108.20 l 2116.00 20.08881 l 147.80 l 19920.00 18.83951 l 160.6 l

7.04 l 20.11937 l 111.30 l 2267.00 20.08817 l 148.30 l l

4 Case 8 Strainer inlet Pressure 20 4

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19 8 E 19 6 19 4 192 19 to8 18 6 1.00 to 00 100 00 1000.00 10000 00

? m 00 Time (sec)

Case 8 Suppression Pool Temperature 150 00 W

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Case 9 Suction Strainer inter Pressure 20.5

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• GOTHIC RESULT af m RFLAP5 fNPUT 99 18 5 18 1

to 100 1000 10000 100000 Tim e ises, Case 9 Suppression Pool Temp 170 00 160 00

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5. The assumed pump flows and combinations are consistent with that presented in reference 3.

However, rather than assume a volumetric flow rate, as was the case in the containment analysis, a mass flow rate was used for the input. In each case the maximum mass flow rate is l

assumed (i.e., for a given volumetric flow rate the peak calculated temperature is used to calculate the mass flow rate for each case). This assumption will produce a conservative result compared with assuming a constant volumetric flow rate. This is best understood by considering the implications that the water temperature has upon the velocity of the fluid when assuming a constant volume flow rate versus a constant mass flow rate. For the constant volume flow rate the velocity is unchanged with the increase in pool temperature, therefore, the head loss is only affected by density. For the constant mass flow rate the thermal expansion of the liquid will force the v61ocity to increase producing a greater head loss. The table that follows summarizes the mass flows assumed for each of the cases analyzed in this document. Note that in all cases the Core Spray pump NZ01C is included in the analysis presenting the greatest challenge to the strainer designer.

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0 to 10 min 139.2 691.3315 691.3315 504.672 0

574.8631 '

l-10 min to 60 142.5 595.4 691.3315 574.8631 0

574.8631 min 60 min on 142.5 595.4 583.0754 574.8631 0

574.8631 l

9 0 to 10 min 139.7 684.5 684.5 0

0 0

l 10 min to 60 151.7 595.4 684.5 437.9026 0

0 min l

60 min on 160.6 595.4 595.4 437.9026 0

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5.0 Overall Approach And Method i

Figure 1 shows the suction header nodal diagram used in the relap5 evaluation of this problem. Additional piping to the core and containment spray pumps is connected to junctions J130 to J136. Junctions designated as X68A, X68B and X69 represent the suction strainer penetrations. Each pump is represented by a flow boundary condition at l

the end of the associated piping.

I To assess the NPSH available, a variety of flow and temperature conditions were evaluated. Included among the cases considered is the DB A flow and pool temperature case (case 9). From these different conditions, an understanding of the NPSH available is obtained for use in developing requirements for a new suction strainer design to resolve the debris loading concerns associated with fibrous insulation materials inside the primary containment.

Each case is a dynamic evaluation of the system flow for different pump combinations.

J134 J135 J133

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T C j

=

7 1

ll l

wo lF y

)

a c

r 0 e p

0 s

(

S 00 e t

0 m

n 1

o Ti C

l e

ro C

4 00 0

l 0

l 4

1 4

=

=

=

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0 1 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 A

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

6 4

2 0

8 6

4 2

1 1

1 1

ob$ 32u.

.