ML20236S046
| ML20236S046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/13/1987 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236S026 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8711240181 | |
| Download: ML20236S046 (11) | |
Text
..
i TABLE 3,3-5 ENGINEERED ~ SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES 1
INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS i
1.
Manual.
a.
Safety Injection (ECCS)
Not Applicable Feedwater Isolation Not Applicable l
Not Applicable j
.)
Containment Isolation-Phase "A" NotLApplicable Containment Vent and Purge Isolation Not Applicable Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not' Applicable-Rx Plant River Water System Not Applicable b.
Containment Quench Spray Pumps-Not Applicable Containment. Quench Spray Valves Not-Applicable-Containment Isolation-Phase "B"
'Not Applicable c.
Containment Isolation-Phase "A"
Not Applicable-d.
Control Room Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable 2.
Containment Pressure-High a.
Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 27.0*
b.
Reactor Trip (from SI) 1 3.0 c.
Feedwater Isolation 1 75.0(1).
4 d.
Containment Isolation-Phase "A"
1 22.0(3)/33.0(2) l e.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable
-j f.
Rx. Plant River Water System 1 77.0(3)/110.0(2)'
l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-25 PROPOSED WORDING B711240181g[OOO34 PDR ADOCK PDR P
j TABLE'3.3-5 (Continued)^
ENGINEERED' SAFETY: FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES ~
INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION-RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS ~
3.
Pressurizer Pressure-Low' a.-. Safety Injection-(ECCS) 1 27.0*/27.0#~
l
'b.
Reactor Trip _(from SI) 1^
3.0' c.-
Feedwater Isolation-1 75.0(1) 1 22.0(3)-
l l
d.
Containment Isolation-Phase "A"
- e.,
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable' f '.
Rx Plant River. Water System 1 77.0(3)/110.0(2).
'l
[
s l
BEAVER' VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-26 PROPOSED: WORDING 2--
TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) 1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSF TIME IN SECONDS 4.
Steam Line Pressure-Low a.
Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 27.0#/37.0##
l b.
Reactor Trip (from SI) 1 3.0 c.
Feedwater Isolation 1 75.0(1) l d.
Containment Isolation-Phase "A"
1 22.0(3)/33.0(2) l e.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable f.
Rx Plant River Water System 1 77.0(3)/110.0(2) l g.
Steam Line Isolation 1
8.0 5.
Containment Pressure--High-High I
a.
Containment Quench Spray 1 77.0 l
l b.
Containment Isolation-Phase "B"
Not Applicable 1
c.
Control Room Ventilation Isolation 1 22.0(3)/77.0(2) l 6.
Steam Generator Water Level--High-High a.
Turbine Trip-Reactor Trip i
2.5 l
b.
Feedwater Isolation 1 78.0(1) 7.
Containment Pressure--Intermediate High-High a.
Steam Line Isolation 1 8.0 8.
Steamline Pressure Rate--High Negative i
a.
Steamline Isolation 1 8.0 i
9.
Loss of Power a.
4.16kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage
-< l.3 (Loss of Voltage) b.
4.16kv and 480v Emergency Bus Under-1 95 voltage (Degraded Voltage)
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 PROPOSED WORDING
TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) 1 TABLE NOTATION Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.
Response
time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps and Low Head Safety Injection pumps.
Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage' tank (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is not included.
Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included.
Offsite power available.
Response
time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps.
l Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume l
control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) l (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is included.
l Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.
Response
time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps.
Sequential transfer of charging pump suction from the volume control tank (VCT) to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) (RWST valves open, then VCT valves close) is 1
l included.
1 1
(1)
Feedwater system overall response time shall include i
verification of valve stroke times applicable to the feedwater
{
valves shown for penetrations 76, 77 and 78 shown in Table 1
3.6-1.
l l
l (2)
Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.
l (3)
Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included.
j l
l BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-28 PROPOSED WORDING
e 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)
INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor i
trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its
- setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a
channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the l
facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and l
transient conditions.
The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.
The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
The surveillance requirements for the Manual Trip Function, Reactor l
Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers are provided to reduce the possibility of an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) l event by ensuring OPERABILITY of the diverse trip features l
(
Reference:
l The
'asurement of response time at the specified frequencies l
- providr, assurance that the protective and ESF action function f
associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.
l l
ESF respont.e time specified in Table 3.3-5 which include sequential l
operation of the RWST and VCT valves (NOTES # and ##) are based on I
values assumed on the Non-LOCA safety analyses.
These analyses take credit 'for injection of borated water.
Initial borated water is I
supplied by the
- BIT, however, injection of borated water from the RWST is assumed not to occur until the VCT charging pump suction valves are closed following opening of the RWST charging pump suction l
l l
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 j
PROPOSED WORDING j
I
3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES j
3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) l INSTRUMENTATION valves.
When sequential operation of the RWST and VCT valves is not included in the response times (Note
- ),
the values specified are based on the LOCA analyses.
The LOCA analyses take credit for injection flow regardless of the source.
Verification of the
{
response times specified in Table 3.3-5 will assure that the assumptions used for the LOCA and Non-LOCA analyses with respect to operation of the VCT and RWST valves are valid.
Response
time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the tota:1 channel response time as defined.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.
The Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:
P-4 Reactor tripped Actuates turbine
- trip, closes main feedwater valves on T
below
- setpoint, prevents the opening of the mainfeedw!tervalveswhichwereclosedbya safety injection or high steam generator water level signal, allows safety injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.
Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of safety injection.
P-11 Above the setpoint P-ll automatically reinstates safety injection actuation on Low pressurizer
- pressure, automatically blocks steamline isolation on high steam t
pressure
- rate, enables safety injection and steamline isolation on low steamline pressure with (Loop Stop Valves Open), and enables auto actuation of the pressurizer PORVs.
Below the setpoint P-ll allows the manual block of safety injection actuation on low pressurizer
- pressure, allows manual block of safety injection and steamline isolation on Low steamline pressure (with Loop Stop Valves Open) and enabling steamline isolation on high steam pressure rate, automatically disables auto actuation of the pressurizer PORV's unless the Reactor Vessel Over Pressure Protection System is in service.
P-12 Above the setpoint P-12 automatically reinstates an arming signal to the steam dump system.
Below the setpoint P-12 blocks steam dump and allows manual bypass of the steam dump block to cooldown condenser dump valves.
BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-la PROPOSED WORDING
A T-T A'C H M E N T-B Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 144 I
Safety Analysis l
J 1
Description of amendment request:
The proposed amendment would' revise the applicable Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) response times provided in. Table 3.3-5 to include that. time required for the I
sequential operation of the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) valves.
The following changes' are-l proposed:
i 1.
Page 3/4 3-25, the
- and'## notes' applicable to Functional J
Units 2.d and 2.f were. changed to-notes (3)
.and (2) respectively.
2.
Page 3/4 3-26, the response time applicable to Functional Unit 3.a was changed from 1 27.0*/13.0# to 1 27.0*/27.0#.
l The note applicable to Functional Unit 3.d was changed from #
I to (3).
The notes applicable to Functional Unit 3.f were changed from # and ## to (3) and (2) respectively..
3.
Page 3/4 3-27, the response-time applicable to Functional l
Unit 4.a was changed from i 13.0#/23.0##.to 1 27.0#/37.0##.
l The notes applicable to Functional Units 4.d, 4.f and..c 5
were changed from # and ## to.(3) anf. (2) respectively.
4.
Page 3/4 3-28, the
- note was revised to specifically exclude VCT
- RWST valve sequencing.
The # and ## notes were revised to specifically include VCT
- RWST, valve sequencing.
Note-(2) was added which includes diesel generator starting and sequencing.
Note (3). was added ~which. excludes diesel generator starting and sequencing..
5.
Page B
3/4 3-1, Bases Section 3/4.3.1 has been revised to address the assumptions used in the LOCA and Non-LOCA-analyses concerning operation of the VCT and RWST valves.
The proposed changes clarify the applicable Safety Injection response times.
Section 6.3.1.1 of the UFSAR identifies the following accidents were Safety' Injection is utilized.
Pipe breaks and spurious lifting of RCS relief or safety valves.
Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) ejection.
Pipe breaks and spurious lifting of secondary system relief or safety valves.
Steam generator tube rupture.
e l
l j
ATTACHMENT B Page 2 UFSAR Section 14.3 describes the LOCA analysis.
Section 14.3.1 describes a small break LOCA (6" diameter) where the Safety Injection System is delivering water to the RCS 25 seconds after the safety injection signal was initiated and includes the delays associated with diesel generator startup and loading.
The safety injection signal is generated on-low pressurizer pressure 1.52 seconds after the LOCA occurs (Table 14.3-1).
I UFSAR Section 14.3.2 describes the design basis LOCA with the sequence of events summarized in Table 14.3-11.
The safety injection signal for this event is generated by containment high pressure and safety injection is initiated at 30 seconds after the LOCA occurs.
UFSAR Section 14.1.15 describes the effects of opening a
pressurizer safety valve, safety injection is not discussed.
UFSAR Section 14.2.6 describes the RCCA ejection accident and references WCAP-7588.
Section 4.6.1 of the WCAP notes that the I
function of safety injection for this evert is the same as for a small break LOCA.
l UFSAR Section 14.1.13 describes the effects of opening a steam j
- dump, relief or safety valve.
The safety injection signal is i
generated on either low pressurizer pressure or low steamline j
pressure.
Borated water reaches the RCS at 263 seconds after event I
initiation via the safety injection system (Table 14.1-2).
{
l UFSAR Section 14.2.5 describes the major secondary pipe rupture event.
The safety injection signal is generated on low steamline pressure and the 2000 ppm borated water reaches the RCS at 46 seconds l
with offsite power and at 53 seconds without offsite power (Table 14.2-2).
With the loss of offsite power the delay includes 12 seconds to start the diesel and 12 seconds to get the pumps to full speed (Section 14.2.5.1.3).
UFSAR Section 14.2.4 describes a
steam generator tube rupture event.
Safety Injection is initiated on low pressurizer pressure at approximately 5 minutes after the rupture (14.2.4.2.1).
l Based on the
- above, the most limiting response time for safety l
injection is 27.0 seconds including signal generation and diesel start and loading for the LOCA event.
For the Non-LOCA event the i
limiting response time for 2000 ppm borated water reaching the RCS is l
53 seconds including diesel start and loading.
Increasing the response time for safety injection for the Non-LOCA events will not change the consequence of the accidents described above because the initial borated water will be supplied from the BIT and, in accordance with the small break LOCA analysis, the charging pumps discharge pressure is required 25 seconds after receipt of a
safety injection signal.
As such, the additional time added can only be used for the transfer of the charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST.
ATTACHMENT B Page 3 Additionally, an analysis-review
.hasL been: performed
.by.
Westinghouse (DLW-87-552) which ' indicates that if the boratedcwater to. the RCS was delayed' an additional 15' seconds the UFSAR results i
would still be valid.
References:
RE-21FR, " Elementary'MOV-CH-115B, C, D, E" RE-21CE, " Elementary D..G. Sequencing" DLW-87-552,."FSAR Safety Analysis.on BIT", Unit 2 WCAP-7588, Section-4.6.1-Beaver Valley, Unit.2 Technical Specifications
-UFSAR Section 6.3.1.1 UFSAR Section.8.5.2.1 UFSAR Tables' 8.5-1, 8.5-2 UFSAR Section 14.3.1, 14.3.2 I
UFSAR Tables 14.3-1,'14.3-11 l
UFSAR Section 14.'2.4, 14.2.5, 14.2.6 UFSAR. Table 14.'2-2 UFSAR Section'14.l.13, 14.1.15 UFSAR Table.14.1-2 i
i 7
l
ATTACHMENT C
No Significant Hazards Evaluation Proposed Technical Specification Change No. 144 Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:
The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a
significant hazards consideration exists- [10 CFR 50.92(c)].
A proposed ' amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of-safety.
The proposed changes do not involve a
significant hazard consideration because:
1.
The most limiting response time for safety injection is 27.0 seconds including signal generation and diesel start and loading for the LOCA event.
For the Non-LOCA event the limiting response time for 2000 ppm borated water reaching the RCS is 53 seconds including diesel start and loading.
Increasing the response time for. safety injection for the Non-LOCA events Will not change the consequences of accidents previously evaluated because the initial borated water will be supplied from the BIT
- and, in accordance with the small break LOCA analysis,
)
the charging pumps discharge pressure is required'25 seconds after receipt of a safety injection signal.
As
- such, the additional time added can only be used for the transfer of the charging pump suction from the VCT to the RWST.
Additionally, an analysis ' review has been performed by Westinghouse (DLW-87-552) which indicates that if the borated water to the RCS was delayed an additional 15 seconds the UFSAR results.
would still be valid.
Therefore, those changes will not affect the probability l
of occurrence or the consequence of a
previously evaluated accident.
2.
No change in plant operations or to equipment or components is required.
In addition, testing of the VCT RWST valve sequencing can be performed when the plant l
is shutdown.
Therefore, these changes will not create the possibility of a
new or different kind of accident from those described in the UFSAR.
f
ATTACEMENT C Page 2 i
l 3.
For Non-LOCA events that require safety injection, borated water will be supplied to the RCS as specified in the UFSAR analysis from the BIT.
Also, analysis reviews performed by Westinghouse indicate that the conclusions of the UFSAR remain valid.
Therefore, the proposed changes will.not reduce the basis for this or any other technical specification and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.
The Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards for determining whether a
significant hazards consideration exists by-providing certain examples (50 FR 7751) of amendments that are. considered not likely to involve significant j
i l
hazards considerations.
Example (i) relates to "A
purely administrative change to technical specifications:
for example, a change to achieve
. consistency throughout the technical i
specifications, correction
'of an
- error, or a
change in j
nomenclature".
The proposed change relates to this example is that l
the proposed changes provide consistency between the UFSAR accident-analysis.
and the technical specification response times.
The y
proposed changes will ensure. the sequencing of the VCT-RWST valves will be tested.
Therefore, based on the above' considerations, it is proposed to characterize the changes as involving no'significant hazards.
l l
i l
l l
l 1
i l
_ _. _ _ _ _. _ -