ML20236N922

SER Accepting Util 840229 & 860529 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.1 & 3.1.2 Re post-maint Testing of Reactor Trip Sys Components

ML20236N922
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	10/07/1986
From:	NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20236N915	List: ML20236N913 ML20236N922
References
GL-83-28, TAC-57384, NUDOCS 8711170061
Download: ML20236N922 (2)

Text

.

SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEMS 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING (REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM COMP 0NENTS) 1 WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION l DOCKET NO: 50-482 )

I. INTRODUCTION l

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the '

Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip l signal from the reactor protection system. This incident occurred during the plant startup and the reactor was tripped manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to the sticking of the under voltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant startup. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip. Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000,

" Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."

As a result of this investigation, the Coninission (NRC) requested (by l Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8,1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to certain generic concerns. These i

concerns are categorized into four areas: (1) Post-Tri (2) Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface, (3)Post-Maintenance p Review, i Testing, and (4) Reactor Trip System Reliability Improvements.

l The third action item, Post-Maintenance Testing consists of Action Item 3.1," Post-MaintenanceTesting(ReactorTripSystemComponents)"and Action Item 3.2, " Post-Maintenance Testing (All Other Safety-Related Components)." This safety evaluation report (SER) addresses Action Items 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 only.

II. REVIEW GUIDELINES The following review guidelines were duveloped after initial evaluation of the various utility reponses to Items 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 of Generic Letter 83-28 and incorporate the best features of these submittals. As

) such, these review guidelines in effect represent a " good practices" I

approach to post-maintenance testing verification review. We have reviewed the licensee's response to Items 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 against these guidelines:

A. The licensee or applicant shall submit a statement indicating that he has reviewed plant test procedures, maintenance procedures, and '

P

. 2 1

Technid. Specifications to assure that post-maintenance operability testing of reactor trip system components is required.

B. The licensee or applicant shall submit a statement verifying that vendor reconnended test guidance has been reviewed, evaluated, and where appropriate, included in the test and maintenance procedures or the Technical Specifications.

III. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION By letters dated February 29, 1984 and May 29, 1986, the licensee provided infonnation regarding its post-maintenance testing verification of the reactor trip system components. We have reviewed the licensee's response against the review guidelines as described in Section II. A brief description of the licensee's response and the staff's evaluation of the response against each of the review guidelines is provided below:

A. The licensee stated that Technical Specifications pertaining to post-maintenance testing would be in place prior to fuel load along with the appropriate test and maintenance procedures. The NRC performed inspections prior to fuel load to assess the licensee's degree of confonnance to Generic Letter 83-28. The NRC inspectors reviewed Technical Specifications, administrative procedures, surveillance procedures and maintenance procedures.

B. The licensee stated that Technical Specifications and procedures would be in place prior to fuel load for the checking of vendor and engineering reconnendations. The NRC inspectors verifie'd prior to fuel load, that all vendor-related reconnendations were completed for the reactor trip breakers and specified functional testing was adequate.

Based on our review and the results of NRC inspections documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-482/84-44, dated January 23, 1985, and 50-482/85-11, dated May 8,1985, we conclude that the licensee's response to post-maintenance testing verification of the reactor trip system components for the Wolf Creek Generating Station is acceptable.

Principal NRC Contributor: R. Mullikin o