ML20236N902
| ML20236N902 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1987 |
| From: | Wooldridge R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC), WORSHAM, FORSYTHE, SAMPELS & WOOLRIDGE (FORMERLY |
| To: | Bloch P, Johnson E, Jordan W, Mccollom K Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#487-4813 OL, NUDOCS 8711170051 | |
| Download: ML20236N902 (164) | |
Text
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THIRTY TWO MUNOREO. 2001.BRY AN TOWEA i
DALLAS, TEX As 75201
'87 MN 12 P3 53 TELEPHONE (214) 979 3000 M O $AMPELS ROBERT M FILLMORE fEQ @ Q@{'gg JOE A WOR $ HAM ROBERT A WOOLORLDGE WM STEPHEN BOYO ggj 188H976 NEIL O. ANDER$0N MARK R WASEM SPENCER C RELY EA CHRIS R MsLTENBERGER BRANCH *
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RONALD M HANSON ROBERT P OLIVER OF COUNSEL J DAN BOHANNAN CINDY JACK $0N BRUNER JOS tRiON WOR $ HAM TRAVi$ E VANDERROCL
' JOE A DAvi$
EARL A FOR$Y THE CHARO L ADAMS ALT R H TE DAvt? C LONERGAN L. SCOTT AUSTIN TELECOPiER (24) 880 00r$
UOHN W McREYNOLOS BLAKE L BECKH AM R
A IS TRA COM 39 FLAN N
TIMOTHY A MACK i
November 9,1987 Peter B. Bloch, Esquire Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom Chairman Administrative Judge Atomic-Safety and Licensing Board 1107 West Knapp.
b U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stiilwater, Oklahoma 74075 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Elizabeth B. Johnson q
Administrative Judge Oak Ridge National Laboratory l
,l Q.-
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 0ak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 l
381 West Guter Drive P. O. Box X, Building 3500 i
l Re: Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al L
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2); Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50 446 '
I
Dear Administrative Judges:
l TU Electric has this date delivered to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission f
- the following SRT approved Results Reports:
J i
I.c Train C Conduit and Supports II.a Reinforcing Steelin the Reactor Cavity j
II.d Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements These reports should be placed in sequence behind the tab " Civil / Structural" in the results reports binders previously transmitted. Also enclosed is a revised Table of. Contents reflecting the issuance of these reports. As with all previous a
Results Reports issued to date, this material is not being offered into evidence at this time but provided for information only.
I i
Respectfully submitted, 8711170051 871109.
L-PDR ADOCK 05000445 V
O PDR Robert A. Wooldridge h
RAW /kiw Enclosures
.cc:. Service List l
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CPRT-1046
-9 Log -# TXX-6943
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File #.10068 ftIELECTRIC
. wim.m c.' counsu November 9, 1987 Execume %ce lyesiden, V.' S. Nuclear' Regulatory' Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
20555 SUBJECTi COMANCHE PEAK. STEAM. ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NOS. 50-445'AND 50-446.
.CPRT RESULTS REPORTS Gentlemen:
We transmitLherewith the following SRT approved Results Reports:
j I.c.
Train'C Conduit'and Su) ports II.a-Reinforcing Steel in t1e Reactor _ Cavity II.d Seismic. Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements
'[ j These' reports should be placed in sequence behind the tab " Civil / Structural" b
in the results reports binders previously transmitted.
We are'also issuing a Volume V binder for Discipline Specific Action Plan (DSAP) Results Reports.
Volume IV binder is being reserved for Results Report VII.c, " Construction Reinspection / Documentation Review Plan."
The files which contain supporting documentation for_ these Results Reports-have been reproduced ~in their entirety and are'available for public inspection in our Dallas office.
Anyone wishing to inspect these files should contact Ms. Debra Anderson (214-812-4379).
We shall issue further Results Reports on a._ periodic basis as they are approved by the CPRT Senior Review Team.
l Very trul yours, W. G. Counsil 1
JCH/mgt Enclosures c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV Resident inspectors,-CPSES (3) bv 400 North Olive Street LB 81 Dallas, Tenas 7DM i
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r TABLE'0F. CONTENTS y
-J COLLECTIVE' SIGNIFICANCE ~RE ORT E
- Later -
R COLLECTIVE EVALUATION REPORTS
- Later --
1 1
RESULTS REPORTS Electrical a
- I.a.1 Heat-Shrinkable Cable Insulat' ion Sleeves -
Revision 1 I.a.2 Inspection Reports on Butt-Splices, R e v i s i o n ~.1 I.a.3 Butt-Splice Qualification Revision'l I.a.4 Agreement Between ' Iwings and Field Terminations
- Revision 2 I.a.5 NCR's on Vendor Installed Amp Terminal lugs
- Revision 1
)
-I.b.1 FlexibleEConduit to Flexible Conduit Separation Revision.1 I.b 2 Flexible Conduit to Cable Separation - Revision 1 I.b.3 Conduit to Cable Tray Separation - Revision 1 I.b.4 Barrier Removal - Revision 1 Civil / Structural I.c Train C Conduit and Supports - Revision 1 II.a Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity -
Revision 1 II.b' Concrete Compression Strength - Revision 1 II.c Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures
- Revision 1
.II.d-Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements -
l Revision 1 1
1(]}
II.e Rebar in the Fuel Handling Building - Revision i i
l
1 t'
Testing
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III.a.1 Hot Functional Testing - Revision 1 N./ -
lII.a.2
'JTG Approval of Test Data - Revision 0 III.a.3
' Technical Specification for Deferred Tests
- Revision 0 j
III.a.4 Traceability of Test Equipment - Revision 0 III.a.5 Preoperational Test Review and Approval.of Results, Revision 1 III,b Conduct of the CILRT - Revision 0 III.c Prerequisite Testing - Revision 1 l
III.d Preoperational Testing - Revision 1 Mechanical V.a Inspection-for Certain Types of Skewed Welds in NF Supports - Revision 1 with Errata V.c Design Consideration for Piping Systems Between
(~'s Seismic Cate
(_-)
Buildings gory I and Non-Seismic Category I Revision 1 V.d Plug Welds - Revision 1 V.e Installation of Main Steam Pipes - Revision 1 VI.a Gap between Reactor Pressure Vessel Reflective i
Insulation and the Biological Shield Wall, Revision 1 VI.b Polar Crane Shimming - Revision 1 j
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Guidelin'es for.A' ministration of QC Inspector. Test-
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Craft Personnel Training-:
Revision 1-VII:.a.1 Material Traceability - Revision: 1 l
VII.a.2-Nonconformance and Corrective Action System --
Revision-l q
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-l VII.a.3 Document Control.- Revision 1 l
l VII.a.'4-Audit Program.and Auditor Qualification -
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Revision 1-VII.a.5 Periodic Review of QA Program - Revision 1 VII.a.6 Exit Interviews
.' Revision'l 3
l VII.a.7 Housekeeping and System Cleanliness.--Revis~ ion 1 i
VII.a,8'
. Fuel-Pool Liner Documentation - Revision 1
.VII.b.1 Onsite Fabrication - Revision'.1 S
(~A VII,b.2 Valve Disassembly'- Revision 1 VII.b.'4 Hilti Anchor Bolt Installation - Revision 1 DSAPs IX' Piping and' Supports' Discipline Specific Action Plan I
- Revision 1 O
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COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM RESULTS REPORT ISAP: II.d
Title:
Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements
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. REVISION 1 i
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/o A.dt 7 Jo $ W. Beck, Chairman CPRT-SRT Dats Ob
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1 ll RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d'.
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Seismic' Design of Control' Room Ceiling Elements
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.k 1 0. DESCRIPTION OF ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC i
Technical issues and certain allegations.with potential safety j
implications were= identified and communicated by the NRC to TU Electric.
It was alleged that the field run conduit,-the drywall, and the lighting installed in the area above the ceiling panel in' I
the control room were classified as non-seismic and supported only by wires:and might fall'as a~ result of,a seismic event. The following' excerpts from the assessment of the' allegation were taken' from pages'K-83, -84, and -85 of SSER 8 (Reference 9.1):
i
" General Design Criteria No. 19 requires that safe occupancy of the control room during abnormal conditions be provided for in'its design. The Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station-(CPSES) control-1 room is in a seismic Category I structure, with certain seismic Category II and nonseismic components located in the ceiling..
.)
Seismic Category I refers to those systems,or components which must remain functional in the avant of an: earthquake. Seismic Category l
~g II' refers to those systems or components whose-continued functioning is not required, but whose failure could reduce the l
functioning'of any seismic Category I.syutes or component (as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29) to an unacceptable level or could result in an incapacitating injury to occupants of the control room. Seismic Category II systems or components are, therefore, designed and constructed so that a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) will not cause such fa$1ure or injury.
"In assessing this allegation, the TRT reviewed the CPSES nonsafety-related conduit, lighting fixtures, and the suspended 3
ceilings installed in the control room. Three types of suspended I
ceiling exist in the control room: drywall, louvered, and acoustical. The following list designates those ceiling elements present in the control room and their seismic category designation:
j 1.
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning -Seismic Category 1 2.
Safety-related Conduits
-Seismic Category I 3.
Nonsafety-related Conduits
-Seismic Category II 4.
Lighting Pixtures
-Seismic Category II 5.
Sloping Suspended Drywall Ceiling
-Nonseismic 6.
Acoustical Suspended Ceiling
-Nonseismic j
7.
Louvered Suspended Ceiling
-Nonseismic" i
"The TRT determined that none of the suspended ceiling elements
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were considered to be either seismic Category I or II; however, i
TUEC had modified the sloping suspended drywall to add more
- s) support. G&H could not provide backup calculations to support this E
acidification, nor could TUEC provide justification for their f
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ISAP II.d 1
(Cont'd)
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1.0 DESCRIPTION
'0F ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC'(Cont'd) position that the remaining suspended ceiling elements;(i.e., the louvered and acoustic elements) would not fall and cause an
-incapacitating injury to operating ' personnel. This would indicate failure of the quality assurance program to ensure that applicable provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29 were fully met."
"The TRT found that nonsafety-related conduits that were less than 1
or. equal to 2 inches in diameter were not supported by redundant seismic Category 11 cable restraints. The TRT also verified the -
')
adequacy of calculations for the nonsafety-related conduits larger j
than 2' inches in diameter.
"The TRT fcund that not all items in the Control Room ceiling fall i
under the seismic Category I or II designation. Specifically, these items are the suspended drywall, acoustical, and louvered ceilings. These components, designated as nonseismic, do not satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29,'since they were not designed to accommodate seismic effects. Nonsafety-related conduits that are 2 inches in diameter and less also were not l
designed to accommodate' seismic effects."
a I
"The TRT concludes that calculations supporting the seismic Category i
II'11ghting fixtures do not adequately reflect the rotational f
interaction with the nonseismic items.
In addition, the fundamental frequencies of the supported masses were not calculated to determine the influence of the seismic response spectrum at the control room ceiling elevation."
2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC The NRC (in Reference 9.1, Page K-85) identified that the following action should be taken on this issue:
"TUEC shall provide:
j 1.
The results of seismic analysis which demonstrate that j
the nonseismic items in the control room (other than the sloping suspended drywall ceiling) satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
2.
An evaluation of seismic design adequacy of support systems for the lighting fixtures (seismic Category II)
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(V) and the suspended drywall ceiling (nonseismic item with modification) which accounts for pertir.ent floor response characteristics of the systems.
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%f ISAP II.d j
(Cont'd)
I 2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC (Cont'd) 3.
Verification that those items in the control room-ceiling not installed in accordan'ce with the requireaants of Regulatory Guide 1.29 eatisfy applicable. design requirements.
4.
The results of an analysis that justify the adequacy of the nonsafety-related conduit support system in the control room for conduit whose diameter is 2 inches or less.
5.
The results of an analysis which demonstrate that the foregoing problems are not applicable to other Category II and nonseismic structures, systems and components elsewhere in the plant."
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3.0 BACKGROUND
Seismic requirements'for non-Seismic Category I commodities are
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defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, NRC Standard Review Plan V
Section 3.7.2, and CPSES FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 9.2) states, "Those portions of structures, systems,-or components whose continued function is not required ~but whose failure could reduce the functioning of any plant feature included in Items 1.a through 1.q* above to an unacceptable safety l
level should be. designed and constructed so that the SSE would not cause such failure." Specifically Item 1.n states, "The control j
room, including its associated vital equipment, cooling systems for
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vital equipment, and life support systems, and any structures or j
equipment inside or outside of the control room whose failure could j
result in incapacitating injury to the occupants of the control
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room."
l 3.1 Specific Control Room Ceiling Issue i
The specific issue identified by the TRT involved the ability of the control room ceiling and other non-safety-related ceiling elements, i.e., conduits and~1ighting fixtures, to remain in place during a seismic event, thus avoiding the potential of disabling operators or affecting equipment due to its failure. Portions of the initial ceiling were non-seismic, non-safety-related and did not have provisions of Seismic Category II (see definition in Appendix 1) installations which are seismically supported or restrained.
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Items 1.a through 1.q identify plant structures, systems and components that must remain functional during and after an SSE.
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'RESULTS REPORT R, V..
ISAP!II.d I
(Cont'd).
3.0 BAC'KGROUND-(Cont'd) i In reviewing the design of the control room ceiling,7the TRT
- requested that analyses be provided that demonstrate that. the l
f provisions.of Regulatory Guide l.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 have been satisfied for all non-safety-related items. This:
request encompassed the architectural ceiling system (other-
'than the sloping suspended drywall ceiling).and.
non-safety related conduit whose diameter is two (2) inches or j
less.
4 The TRT also requested that seismic calculations for'the.
l support systems of the lighting fixtures and the sloping 1
suspended drywall ceiling in the control room reflect all loading conditions ~ that would be experienced due to a seismic In addition, an analysis was requested by the TRT to
. event.-
show that the' design of the attachment of the drywall to.its frame would ensure that separation would not occur during a' seismic event.
q 3.2 Description of Initial Ceiling and Ceiling Elements The control. room ~ ceiling elements initially investigated by
{
the TRT have been replaced by a new ceiling system. The j
following provides a brief description of the original ceiling
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and the-other ceiling elements.
<j
.The control room ceiling at the location of the control board l
area proper was comprised of three (3) ceiling systems (refer i
to Figure 1).
The ceiling systems adjacent to the control j
boards and above the center of the control room were both.
l comprised of suspended h rizontal unistrut frames, lighting fixtures and louvered panels. The louvered panels were at elevations'839'-6" and 847'-2" respectively. The third ceiling system closed the gap between these two levels by
' incorporating a sloping, frame-supported gypsum wall (drywall) extending from the lower elevation (839'-6") to the underside of the floor above the upper ceiling system.
All lighting fixtures in the control room complex were seismica..ly restrained in accordance with the restraint details shown on Gibbs & Hill drawing 2323-El-1704-01.
For the lighting fixtures located in the control board area discussed above, the ur.istrut frames to which the lighting fixtures are' attached had seismic restraints consisting of l
O stainless steel cable attached to the frame and connected to
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the underside of the floor above (see Figure 1).
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ISAP II.d j
'(Cont'd)
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3.0 ' BACKGROUND (Cont'd)
'3.3 Action Plan Approach TU Electric reviewed the issue raised by the TRT, and a i
decision was made to remove and replace the control room i
ceiling in the interest of pursuing an expeditious resolution.
An assessment by the Project of the original ceiling design-indicated that the structural integrity of the three systems could probably have been demonstrated. Details of such qualification would involve modeling assumptions or test configurations for which it was anticipated that the required technical consensus would be time-consuming to achieve. Since such details were not likely to be discussed in published literature or-regulatory communications, the resolution could delay closure of the issue. The approach selected was to establish a design that could readily be qualified seismically and to subject the design to a third-party review.. This course of action was adopted by the Project in June of 1985.
1 ISAP I.c, " Evaluation of Two-inch and Under Conduit",
)
d addresses the other specific technical issue, Train C (non-safety-related) conduit two inches and less in diameter.
As stated in Item 5 in Section 2.0, the NRC requested that TU Electric address the generic ' implications stemning from the specific technical issues. TU Electric's program for addressing the seismic /non-seismic interaction issue was part of its Damage Study Program. This program also addressed potential commodity interactions associated with postulated high-energy pipe breaks and moderate-energy pipe cracks: pipe whip, jet' impingement, flooding, etc.
The purpose of the seismic interaction portion of the Damage Study Program (DSP*), initially established via TNE
~ Instruction CP-EI-4.0-36 (Reference 9.3) in November, 1982, was to demonstrate that the failure of adjacent non-seismic commodities due to an SSE would not impair the function of Seismic Category I commodities or affect the safety of control room equipment or occupants, as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
The DSP, I
Refer to Glossary of Terms (Appendix 1) for how "DSP" is used throughout this report. Note that the program is currently Os referred to as the " Systems Interaction Program". Ongoing i
activities of this program associated with ISAP II d are discussed j
in Section 5.6.
A Chronology of events is presented in Appendix 2.
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hESULTS REPORT-ISAP II.d
'(Cont'd)
' 3.0' BACKGROUND (Cont'd) o which was implemented primarily.in 1983, involved numerous.
walkdowns to evaluate all potential interactions using acceptance criteria developed for the study.' Methods of!
resolution of potential. interactions consisted of analysis, i
evaluation, use~of barriers, application of' administrative controls, or addition of seismic ~ supports or restraints (e.g.,
aircraft' cables). Esch of the~ activities included pertinent requirements of the'CPSES QA program. Maintenance of the DSP
-was performed in accordance with TNE Instruction CP-EI-4.0-53 (Reference 9.4).
As-identified by the TRT, the DSP had not produced a calculational basis that supported TU Electric's position that the original control room ceiling-system and Train C conduit
,two inches and'less in diameter met-appitcable requirements.
The DSP had not produced calculations for.thelceiling because
.it was lumped into a large class of; plant features labeled architectural features', most of which had been implicitly
- A.
'Q assumed to be sufficiently well attached.co rigid structures or so. light'in weight that their potential failure in a seismic event need ' not be ' addre seed. The. implications of the TRT finding were two-fold.
First, non-Category'I items labeled as plant architectural features needed to be explicitly. addressed through an extension of the DSP. Second, the DSP needed to address the interaction potential of.other
.non-Category I items adequately. Therefore, TU Electric committed to have the CPRT address these generic implications in'ISAP.II.d. along with the-specific control room ceiling issue. The additional DSP activities indicated above (those not dealing with seismic interaction), were not included for review within this ISAP because these other activities have oeen addressed within applicable Discipline Specific Action Plans (DSAPs) that comprise the Design Adequacy Program (DAP).
f The ISAP I.c Results Report makes specific reference to large-diameter (greater than two inches)' Train C conduit being 1
addressed in the ISAP II.d Results Report. This large o
diameter conduit had been explicitly addressed in the DSP by l
the Project.
The treatment of such conduit within the overall DSP was reviewad by the third party along with other potential source commodities during implementation of this ISAP.
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RESULTS REPORT m
i ISAP II d i
(Cont'd) 1
- 4. 0' CPRT ACTION PLAN The objectives or this ISAP are as follows:
2 Assure that the control room ceiling, including equipment and.
fixtures attached to or located in the space above the ceiling, satisfies the seismic interaction provisions of' Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8; j
Assure that the seismic interaction provisions of' Regulatory Guide 1.29 have been properly implemented for other Category.
_II and non-seismic structures, systems and components elsewhere in.the plant.
These objectives encompass the actions identified by the NRC and were implemented as three related but distinct tasks:
Design.of's new-control room ceiling system to resolve the seismic interaction concerns,
)
. Verification of seismic damage assumptions for Train C conduit
~-
.two inches and less in diameter, and Verification of the Damage Study Program methods and implementation and extension of the program to treat i
architectural features.
4.1 Scope and Methodology
. t The first task consisted of a technical resolution of the specific issue identified by the TRT regarding the seismic 3
interaction potential of the control room ceiling. The second task was incorporated in its entirety within ISAP I.c.
For the third task, generic implications regarding the DSP j
that were raised by issues associated with the first two tasks s
}
were evaluated through a joint effort involving the Project and the third party. This effort involved expansion by'the Project of the original DSP, third-party overview of these expanded activities, and a review by the third party of the original DSP.
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RESULTS REPORT I
ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4.1.1 Control Room Ceiling System Design The original design of the ceiling systets was based e the premise that the failure of architectural features with small masses would not be adverse to the equipment in or occupants of the control room. Although a preliminary design assessment by the Project concluded that the design complied with Regulatory Guide 1.29, l
the conclusion relied on that same design premise.
In lieu of efforts directed at developing further confirmatory analysis to support the position and to finalize the structural evaluation TU Electric elected-to remove and replace the ceiling in order to preclude unacceptable seismic interactions.
The existing ceiling structure was removed and a new ceiling system that could be readily qualified seismically was designed and installed. The sed.smic 9
design of the new ceiling structure, including attached architectural features, was reviewed by the third party. The process for evaluation of potential seismic interactions among components above the new control room ceiling or between these components and the ceiling structure was also reviewed by the l
third party.
4.1.2 Train C Conduit Two Inches and Less in Diameter i
This topic is addressed in the Results Report for ISAP I.c.
i 4.1.3 Damage Study Program Verification j
The third task assigned to this ISAP was to address the generic implications of the TRT issues associated with the control room ceiling and Train C conduit. This task involved an expansion of the DSP to address other architectural features and a review of the already-comp h ted parts of the DSP to verify that it had been performed adequately.
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'l ISAP II'dL (Cont'd) l 4.0 CPRT' ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
V Because the design of the ceiling.syst' ems in th's
~
control' room was. predicated on'the position that failure of architectural features with small masses-x would not. adversely affect safety-related commodities W
in or occupants of the control room, the civil / structural discipline of TNE had advised the Damage Study Group that.the control room architectural.
features'in question should~not be evaluated as part of the original DSP. Therefore, these festures were not.
evaluated by the Damage Study Group. _ Potential exclusion of other areas of evcluation-due to similar-inputs.and assumptions was one focal point used by the p,
third party for the original DS? verification.
The specific activities. included in this task, extension of'the DSP to treat-architectural features
- and verification of the adequacy of the original DSP,-
. are described'in more' detail in the. paragraphs.below.
- Treatiment of Architectural-Features In order to extend the. original DSP to treat W
architectural features, the Project performed an evaluationLof architectural specifications and drawings-to identify'non-seismic sources to be' evaluated in.
accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
Architsetural features in Units 1'and 2'that were determined to have a potentiti for seismic interaction have been or will he modified ^ or shown not to result in unacceptable seismic' interactions with i
safety-related commodities. The resolution of some of these interactions is ongoing, f-e The third party performed a roview of the Project's architectural features evaluation. This review addressed the following aspects of the Project evaluation:
J The assessment that was performed by the Project to determine which architectural features have a potential for seismic interaction, m
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RESULTS REPORT L
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,ISAP II.d-4 (Cont.' d) i 1
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4.0. CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) s
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The damage ~ study?of. architectural features' that :have the poter.tial to result in unacceptable seismic ~ interactions with safety-related commodities, and Resolution of unacceptable interactions..
f Specific Project implementation activities. reviewed by the third party in this area are' presented-in flow-chart form in Figure 2.
i
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Review of-Damage Study Program J
The third party reviewed the procedures and methods -
o used by the Project in the already-completed portions of~the DSP as the first step in ver1fying adequacy of' l
the DSP. This third-party effort: included a review of.
interfaces between the Damage Study Group'and the other
.Q disciplines that either provided input for the f
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evaluation or acted upon~the Damage Study Group's 3
recommendations. This evaluation examined whether there were other gen:ric areas in addition to the-l architectural features that may have been omitted.
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3 Selection criteria had been used by the Project to identify the set of all non-Category I systems, structures and components that were considered for k
seismic interaction with safety-related items. One of
.j i
these criteria was that. Category II items were excluded i
because they were supported or restrained to preclude seismic interaction. The third party reviewed the design criteria for Category II items and all other selection criteria used by the Project. The detailed
}
Category II design criteria were compared with Category I design criteria and methodology as well as the more
!p general Category II FSAR commitments. Where the Category II criteria were not the same as Category I or were less detailed, their acceptability was assessed by the third party based on engineering principles applicable to the specific methodology.
The third party also reviewed the basis used in the
,j original DSP for determining the nature of the physical l
interactions between the non-Category I items idt:ntified as described above and Category I items.
r The criteria used to evaluate the consequences of these j
interactions were reviewed as well.
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'4.01 CPRT ACTION PLAN' (Cont'd) l i
.i The third party conducted an. overview of Project J
documenta'cion-that was produced during-imp 1l,ementation 1
of.the DSP. This overview'ine_iuded.an engineering I
walkdown'of selected interaction and an~acsessment of the adequacy of the documentation.and the. validity of.-
1 the conclusions reached.. Specific. cases were selected' j
for review so,that implementation of each of the j
methods for analyzing interactions was reviewed.
A comparative interaction assessment was performed.by.
the third party in selected rooms to assess the-.
(
consistency with which interactions were identified.
1 This'was done by identifying potential interactions and
.i comparing the results with those obtained by the DSP
-l for the name rooms. The' rooms were chosen based on colection criteria that considered the following aspects:
Functional and physical aspects of the systems and. components within the space,-
Importance of components and systems to h
- safety,
]
Representativeness of the room from the standpoint of physical proximity of potentially interactive items, and~
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Balance of types of non-seismic items, i.e.,
architectural', conduit piping, equipment.
Specific Project activities applicable to DSP l
implementation prior to the identification of TRT concerns that were reviewed by the third party are presented in Figure 3.
4.2 Participants Roles and Responsibilities The following organizations and personnel participated in this effort:
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4.2.1 TUGC0 Nuclear Engineering (TNE) and Gibbs & Hill, Inc.
(G&H) 1
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4.2.1.1 Scope Designed new control room ceiling j
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(Cont'd)-
4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)-
i Performed architectural features evaluation Recommended design modifications to resolve issues resulting from architectural features evaluation-or third-party verification of DSP 4.2.1.2 Personnel
'Mr. C. R. Hooton TNE Civil / Structural Discipline Supervisor Mr. M. Wells Engineering Specialist Mr. D. A. West
',Q Damage:-Study Group (j
Supervisor (prior to Ebasco involvement)
Mr..J. Eichler Gibbs & Hill, Manager of Civil / Structural Department Mr. E. Bezkor Gibbs & Hill, Structural Job Engineer Mr. M. Pope Gibbs & Hill, Structural Engineer
.4.2.2 Ebasco Services Incorporated 4.2.2.1 Scope Performed seismic interaction evaluation t
portion of architectural features evaluation 4.2.2.2 Personnel Mr. C. Levine Systems Interaction
. t Group Supervisor
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'4.0 CPRT ACTION' PLAN (Cont'd) i 4.' 2. 3 Stone & Webster Engineering; Corporation.(SWEC) j 4.2.3.1 Scope Performed calculations to' verify the G6H control' room ceiling redesign-1 (ongoing)
Recommended and implemented design modifications to resolve. issues-Li resulting'from architectural.
features evaluation'and third-party review of DSP (ongoing) 4.2.3.2' Personnel Mr. N. Kennedy Engineering Support-Group-Assistant Manager
-l Mr. G. Dean Site Supervisor,~
1 Structural l
Mr. R. Murray Structural Engineer 4.2.4 Brown & Root, Inc.
4.2.4.1 Scope l
i Installed new control room ceiling Provided as-built data on architectural features j
Performed testing of handrails as part b
j of the architectural features evaluation 4.2.5 TUGC0 Quality Assurance 4.2.5.1
. Scope
.l Inspected control room ceiling j
modifications
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Inspected other modifications
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j implemented as a result of damage study interaction resolution i
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. ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
I Witnessed handrail testing as part of' Q
the~ architectural features evaluation 4.2.5.2 Personnel Mr. P. Halstead.
Site Quality Control Manager 4.2.6 Third Party 4.2.6.1 Scope l
Reviewed control room ceiling analysis.
and design' Reviewed architectural features evaluation Reviewed DSP procedures and criteria Reviewed implementation of DSP procedures L
1 Performed independent-walkdowns to i
identify interactions lI Prepared Results Report 4.2.6.2 Personnel j
Mr. H. A. Levin TENERA - CPRT Civil /Struc tural Review Team Leader
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l Dr. J. R. Honekamp TENERA - CPRT TRT
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Technical Manager Mr. J. C. Miller TENERA - CPRT TRT' l
Issues Manager Mr. P. Streeter TENERA - Issue Coordinator (DSP)
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ISAP II.d o
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-4.0CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
Dr. J. Arros TENERA - Issue Coordinator (control room ceiling) i 4.3. Personnel Qualification Requirements Third-party participants ia the implementation of this Action Plan meet the personnel qualification and objectivity requirements of the CPRT Program Plen and its implementing
. procedures. Other participants were qua31fied to the '
L requirements of the CPSES Quality Assurance. Program or to the
(,
specific requirements of the CPRT Program Plan. Activitica performed by. other than third-party personnel were governed by the' applicable principles of Section III.K, " Assurance of CPRT Program Quality", of the CPRT Program' Plan (Reference'9.5).
4.4 Procedures Used
[)
Gibbs & Hill issued the procedure DP-3, " Control Room
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Ceiling" (Reference 9.6), for the design of the control roca ceiling steel frame. Procedures directly applicable to and used in performing the damage study afforts for this action plan have undergone a series of changes during the implementation of ISAP 21.d-(note that these changes have not been effected by revisions but instead by issuance of new procedures superseding the previous procedures). These changes are described for each procedure as part of the Chronology presented in Appendix 2.
4.5 Standards / Acceptance Criteria The FSAR was used as the base document for establishing acceptance criteria. Where the criteria in the FSAR required
= increased detail to define specific requirements not covered by the standards and regulatory guidaace referenced in the FSAR, the bases used were accepted engineering principles and/or practices applicable to the same or similar situations.
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS The implementation of this action plan involved the following areas
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Design of a new control room ceiling to resolve the seismic interaction concerns, and
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Vl ISAP II.d (Cont'd) t 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd Damage' Study Program extension and verification.
' Sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively,' address each of these areas:
5.1 Control Room Ceiling Redesign i
3 5.1.1 Description of the Redesigned Control Room Ceiling lf (refer to Figure 4) i The control room ceiling presently installed is a completely new design.
It is a three-dimensional space frame with two horizontal grids separated by vertical hangers and diagonal braces. This structure expands over the entire area bounded by the control panels.
Discontinuity.es in the main grid at the north and south i
ends of the ceiling divide the ceiling into a central section (approximately 91 feet long in north-south
[
direction) and two end sections (approximately 12 feet (N
long in the north-south direction).
Q, The main grid, at' elevation 842'-6", is suspended from a concrete slab (top of concrete elevation 854'-4") by vertical hangers and diagonal braces,.which form a
{
stiff truss system in both north-south and east-west
.i directions. The end sections are only braced in the j
east-west direction. The mechanism for transferring j
north-south seismic loade from the two end sections to
~!
the central section is provided by north-south spanning tube sections that are attached to the bottom of the horizontal main grid.
The lower grid, at elevation 829'-4", is suspended from the main grid by hangers that ore provided in the
~
north-south direction with moment-resisting connections at the main grid.
Ir the east-west direction the connections of the hangers to the main grid are not fully moment-resisting, and the east-west loads are transferred to the beam along the exterior boundary of-the lower grid.
The lower grid, with the hangers between it and the upper grid, creates a frame to I
support the light diffusers.
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) l The concrete structure above the control room from.
which the steel frame is suspended consists of a j
rectangular slab system with T-bears spanning east-west i
and several rectangular beams spanning north-south.
The concrete slab was evaluated by G6H for the appropriate ceiling structuro. reactions and other loads on the slab.
5.1.2 Review of Design Adequacy of the Redesigned Control I
Room Ceiling Steel Frame The process of evaluating the design of the control room ceiling structure was initiated by reviewing the design procedure DP-3, " Control Room Ceiling". All design cm.lculations, including the equivalent static computer analysis that utilized the STRUDL program, were reviewed for compliance with the acceptance criteria indicated below.. The response spectrum J
(] '
computer analysis performed to justify.the adequacy of
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the equivalent static analysis as a design basis was spot-checked for inputs and reasonableness of results.
The evehation of the concrete structure at elevation 854'-4" was also reviewed by the third party.
,j l
Acceptance Criteria The first step in reviewing the design adequacy was to develop acceptance criteria for the review.
In accordance with the commitments of FSAR Section j
3.8.4.S.1 for steel structures, the acceptance criteria i
for this review were taken from the Specifications of the AISC manual, 7th edition (Reference 9.7). The l
applicable AISC criteria for members, beams, hangers, and braces are identified in an engineering evaluation (Reference 9.8).
The acceptance criteria for torsion i
effects in the members were taken from the recommendations of the AISC publication " Torsional Analysis of Steel Members," 1983 (Reference 9.9).
The acceptance criteria for the evaluation of the concrete d
slab at elevation 854'-4" above the control roem ceiling steel f ramirig follow ACI-318-71 (Reference 9.10).
Tension and shear allowables for Hilti anchor bolts are in accordance with the G&H Specification SS-30 (Reference 9.11).
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-(Cont ? d);
i 5.0' IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF,RESDLTS (Cont'd)
The acceptance criteria for the computer models used were that they accurately reflect:(1) the geometry. (2) material and member section properties, and (3).the l
j member end conditions'as shown on the design drawings listed in Tabb 1 of Reference 9.8 as well as (4) all specified loads and load combinations. The loads and load combinations used were in accordance with FSAR Section 3.8.4.3.3.
Seismic analysis was performed in-accordance with'FSAR Section 3.7B.3.
Evaluation of Design Procedure DP-3 The design procedure DP-3, " Control Room Ceiling",
classifies the control' room ceiling steel frame as a seismic Category I structure. The load combinations in
(
the procedure are in accordance with the acceptance i
criteria specified in FSAR Section 3.8.4.3.3.
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DP-3 specifies the equivalent static method as the method to'be used for'the design analyses.
In light of 1
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the complexity of the-frame structure, ard also to assure that the equivalent static analysis was appropriate and conservative for the ceiling frame, G&B performed a response spectrum analysis of the frame to verify that the accelerations within the frame were less than the 1.5 times the floor response spectra peak accelerations specified for the equivalent static analysis. 'FSAR Section 3.7B.3.5 allows for equivalent static analysis of structures when such structures can be conservatively modeled.
Evaluation of Design Calculations and Equivalent Static galysis The equivalent static analysis was performed in two parts:
(1) the main space frame by computer analyses L
(STRUDL program), and (2) the portion below the main horizontal grid, i.e., che lower grid with the hangers.
by hand calculations.
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- lSAP II.d-(Cont'd) 15.0 L (IMPLEMENTATION Or ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESU r
During theLreview of these calculations and computer-
-f analyses,-questions. raised.by the third party resulted:
'in the identification'of discrepancies in.the calculations and in the computer model.::The' identified-discrepancies'were documented on'a.C-type DIR (C-0428).
Gibbs & Hill resolved and corrected. the identified '
discrepancies and issued revisions to the drawingsfand j
calculations.
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-The third-party review of the design.calculattone is
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1 documented in checklists (Appendix 1 of Referenca 9.8).
1 These checklists identify the appropriate acceptance criteria for each component and provide's mechanism for assuring that all criteria have been addressed and met.
Evaluation of Response Spectrum Analysis-
.1 The response ~ spectrum analysis utilized a computer..
model.(NASTRAN program) identical to the one used for
.the. static analyses. It included spring-mass systems 1,
below the main grid to represent the effects of the 1
lower grid on the main grid. The parameters of these
" equivalent" apring-mass, systems were determined such that their mass and natural frequencies'in three i
directions were identical to those of the actual lower I
Irame.
Because of'the relative uniformity of the distribution of the mass and stiffness in the ceiling structure and the-expected uniformity of the acceleration pattern within the structure, modal acceleration was selected
.I as a basis for comparison of results between those predicted by the equivalent static and response spectra I
methods.
I j
The accelerations from the response spectrum analysis
)
were shown'to be less than 1.5 times the floor response spectra peak accelerations everywhere in the structure with a few exceptions. All members and connections q
l adjoining the nodes where acceleration exceeded 1.5 l
times spectral peak were evaluated in the G&H l
calculations for loads corresponding to'the higher
.f vertical accelerations obtained from the response spectrum analysis and found to meet the design criteria. The third party reviewed this evaluation and p s concurred with the conclusion that the design critt.ria j
are met by the redesigned control room ceiling.
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ISAP II.d.
(Cont'd)
'5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION.0F RESULTS (Conc'd)
~
5.1.3-Review of Conunodities Attached to'or Above the Controli Room Ceiling.
4
-The identification of potential-interactions was performed by the Project in accordance with TNE Instruction CP-EI-4.0-36 and Procedure THE-DC-23
.(Reference 9.12).
The rasolution methodology for i
potential interactions is addressed in' Specific' L!
Technical Issue Report STIR-CPRT-S-008, " Resolution of ISAP II.d Open Issues" (Reference 9.13)., This effort is ongoing as part of the Systems Interaction Program (SIP) in accordance with THE Procedure ECE 2.24, (Reference 9.14), TNE Design Basis Document DBD-ME-005..
.j (Reference 9.15), TNE Field Verification Method CPE-EB-FVM-SI-40, (Reference 9.16), and TNE Mechanical Engineering Technical Procedure EME 2.24-01-(Reference 9.17).
i The third-party review of the conunodity and interaction
\\.
identification approach and the interaction resolutions
.and methods all presented in STIR-CPRT-S-008'and the 1
SIP procedures noted above, concludes that reasonable approaches have been and are being taken.
5.1.4 Summary of Control Room Ceiling Issue The original ceiling was replaced with a design that is in conformance with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
Methods have been identified that, when implemented,'will assure that i
conmaodittee attached to or above the ceiling satisfy these same provisions.
E-type DIRs were prepared to document initiating e
external source concerns;.one about the ceiling and six about commodities on or above the ceiling. These are discussed in Section 5.3.
Because all of these were categorized as unclassified deviations, a root cause
.a evaluation was performed and is discussed in Section 5.5.
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ISAP II.d.
(Cont'd)
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.5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont 5.2. Damase Study Program Verification The Damage Study Program (DSP) has been an ongoing activity at j
CPSES since 1982 (refer to the Chronology in Appendix 2).
The L.
DSP includes the identification, evaluation, and. resolution of potential seismic interactions. 'These particular aspects of the DSP are the focus of this ISAP. This section addresses:
the Project effort to identify, evaluate, and resolve those potential seismic interactions involving architectural features as sources that were not included in the original DSP;..
the third-party review of the above Project effort;?
.the third-party evaluation of DSP procedures'and
.I criteria; s
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the third-party evaluation of DSF implementation; and, f
a comparative interaction assessment conducted by the third-par ty.
The above five-sub-topics are addressed.in Sections'5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.4, and 5.2.5, respectively.
1
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5.2.1 Project Evaluation of. Architectural Features c
Process of Evaluation.
k t
The objective of this Project activity was to extend the DSP to include an appropriate treatment of architectural features. To do this,'TNE Instruction CP-EI-4.0-63 (Reference 9.18) was prepared by the l
Project specifically to address the identification of potential sources of seismic interactions involving architectural features. This procedure required a complete review of all architectural specifications and drawings in order to identify potential source commodities. Following commodity identification.
potential interactions were identified and resolved in the same manner as for other interactions involving non-architectural feature source commodities through the use of TNE Instructions CP-EI-4.0-36 and CP-EI-4.0-53.
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ISAP II.d i
(Cont'd) 1 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd). j During implemen'tation of the portion of the review.
I entailing resolution of interactions, the Project determined that certain aspects of the process were in question. These aspects primarily involved the I
completeness of potential uource commodity identification. As a result. TNE Instruction l
CP-EI-4.0-63 was revised and reissued as TNE Procedure THE-DC-26 (Ref erence 9.19) to improve the identification process. Proj ect implementation of. the reissued procedure was then followed by interaction
-identification and resolution in accordance with j
Procedure TNE-DC-23.
The timing and content of these 3
activities is presented in the Chronology in Appendix
{
2.
. Acceptance Criteria i
The decision / acceptance criteria used by the Project in' the architectural features evaluation were the same as
, p) for other aspects of the DSP except for an initial
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seteening activity specifically associated with j
CP-EI-4.0-63 and TNE-DC-26.
These procedures required
)
that there be documented concurrence between.
~'
civil / structural personnel and DSP personnel about which types of architectural feature' source commodities might be excluded from subsequent DSP evaluation.
a Evaluation Results The Project's architectural features evaluation l
resulted in the identification of several interactions involving various groups of source commodities. Many of these interactions were resolved by the Damage Study Group in accordance with DSP procedures. However, remaining unresolved interactions were identified to the Project's civil / structural discipline for l
resolution. Although the Project efforts were initiated by the G6H civil / structural discipline to resolve the interactions, none of these efforts were completed prior to SWEC's involvement in October, 1986.
Following this transfer of responsibility, the resolutions were ad k ussed in a series of Specific Technical Issur. Reports (STIRS). The timing of the issuance of the STIRS is presented in the Chronology in Appendix 2.
A discussion of each STIR is presented in
7 1
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ISAP II.d (Cont'd) m IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 5.0 Appendix 3. including a description of any ongoing 1
activities. The following groups of architectural feature source commodities are addressed by these STIRS:
I Source Commodity STIR No. (Reference)
H Sheet Rock (drywall) Walls STIR-CPRT-S-006 (9.20) i Doors and. Security Barriers STIR-CPRT-S-007 (9.21)
Floor Gratings STIR-CPRT-S-011'(9.22) j Handrails STIR-CPRT-S-012 (9.23)
Ladders STIR-CPRT-S-016 (9.24) 5.2.2 Third-Party Review of Architectural Features Evaluation Process of Third-Party Review The objective of this review was to provide an assessment of the following three activities:
the process by which architectural features were identified for seismic interaction consideration; the subsequent damage study of those architectural features; and the resolutions of any unacceptable interactions.
1 The third-party efforts primarily involved a review of documentation associated with the above activities, since the DSP implementation evaluation (Section 5.2.4) and the comparative interaction assessment (Section 5.2.5) included numerous physical inspections specifically related to the overall DSP process.
Acceptance Criteria In general, the third party reviewed procedures and implementing documents (including the STIRS) to insure that applicable FSAR commitments were satisfied.
Implementing documents as,sociated with potential source and interaction identification were also reviewed to assure compliance with the applicable DSP procedures.
Implementing documents associated with interaction
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resolution were also evaluated against the more
(_)
specific criteria identified in the various STIRS.
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ISAP II.d (Cont'd) l 5.0. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont{
Res'ults of the Procedures Review 1
Procedures CP-EI-4.0-63 and THE-DC-26, issued by the Project for identifying types of_ architectural feature source' commodities, were considered by the third party to provide reasonable bases for assuring that all appropriate architectural features were included in the
{
evaluation process.
I Results of the Implementation Review j
The review of the architectural features identification
.{
process produced examples where specific commodities that should.have been included for DSP evaluation were omitted.. This resulted in concerns involving i
documentation and the thoroughness of the Project's architectural features identification effort. While the number of such commodities appears to be limited, i
p T
I this situation remains to be confirmed by ongoing Project activities. The concerns were documented on C-type DIRs (C-0327 through C-0331). All other aspects of the Project interaction identification and evaluation activities were found to be performed consistent with the same processes applied for all other source commodities.
Interaction resolutions for all identified interactions involving architectural feature source commodities are addressed in the STIRS. Ac discussed in Appendix 3, several resolution activities are ongoing.
5.2.3 Review of Damage Study Program Procedures and Criteria Process of Thit1-Party Review The review of the original DSP included evaluation of the following areas:
DSP Procedures.
Interfaces between the Damage Study Group and other disciplines, GV
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' 'vf ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 5.0. IMPLEMENTATION OF' ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
- -Potential for omission of generic areas.
W DSP selection criteria for sources and targets including seismic Category II criteria.
Basis for determining interactions, t
DSP criteria for interaction evaluation,'and Method of identifying classified and' unclassified o
rooms.
The objective of this review was to ensure that these criteria and procedures were compatible with associated FSAR commitments and accepted engineering practices.
The review specifically addressed the DSP procedures and criteria that were in effect prior to the TRT
. actions that initiated this ISAP.
. rh
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Acceptance Criteria The process being reviewed was compared with general
,I FSAR licensing commitments. However, the DSP procedures generally provided methods for implementing FSAR commitments that were more detailed than the FSAR.
In these situations, acceptability was based on meeting i
the intent'of FSAR c'onsniements regarding source commodity structural intg rity or potential interaction resolution. That.is, the FSAR requires that potential source commodities be shown to remain in place'during and efter an SSE, or, if source commodity damage and/or failure does occur, that there will be no unacceptable effects on adjacent safety-related commodities.
Results of Review 7
Concerns were identified by the third party about several aspects of the DSP. These aspects are summarized below. Disposition of associated DIRs is addressed in Section 5.3; associated ongoing corrective actions arc addressed in Section 5.6.
Docuinentation of the third-party review is contained in an engineering evaluation (Reference 9.25).
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,s ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 5.0. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN.AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont Relative Building Motions:
This concern 1nvolved the failure of the DSP to identify potential interactions between Seismic Category I commodities attached to different buildings or portions of buildings (e.g., the clearance between a pipe support attached to the containment internal structure and and a pipe support attached to the containment shell, where relative structural motions exceed thfa clearance). DIR D-1841 was prepared to doctcnent this concern.
Related to-the above concern, there also was an apparent failure to identify potential interactions involving commodities attached to secondary (non-load bearing) walls (e.g., a Train A or B conduit support attached to a secondary wall and a Class 5 pipe support attached to the adjacent ceiling, may have a clearance between them' that is insufficient' to accomanodate the n
(~")
relative motions of the wall and ceiling). This concern was identified during implementation of ISAP
.II.c (Reference 9.26) but was more closely related to I
this ISAF and is addressed here. DIR D-2132 was prepared to document this concern.
Horizontal Motion of Suspended Lighting Fixtures:
This issue involved the failure of the DSP to identify interactions resulting from the horizontal swaying of suspended lighting fixturesi even when stainless steel
{
cable had been added to prevent falling. DIR D-1843 was prepared to document this concern.
f A related area of concern involved certain l
frame-supported lighting fixtures that had been assumed by the Damage Study Group not to be potential sources on the basis of the presence of stainless steel cable.
The cable, however, was secured to the supporting frame H
for which there was no analytical documentation of seismic adequacy.
DIR D-2183 was prepared to document J
this concern.
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ISAP II.d v
(Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd Attachments to Large Seismic Equipment:
This concern involved the failure to identify interactions associated with source commodities not seismically-qualified but attached to large seismically-qualified equipment (primarily cranes) after the equipment was installed. DIR D-1840 was prepared to document this concern.
Line-Mounted Items on Small Bore Piping:
l This concern involved the failure to identify potential interactions resulting from source commodities that were line-mounted on small-bore piping. These commodity weights were well in excess of standard in-line items such as valves. DIR D-2200 was prepared to document this concern.
Horizontal Motion of Piping / Conduit:
7s
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For cable-restrained piping and Train C conduit greater than two inches in diameter and for all small bore piping, it was assumed by the Damage Study Group that there would be no adverse impact of potential targets due to horizontal motion of the source commodities.
There was documentation for these assumptions for cable-restrained piping and conduit greater than two inches in diameter (G&H civil / structural discipline study), but review by the third party indicated the documentation to be inadequate to support the assumption. There was no such documentation for small-bore piping even though the third party identified specific potential interactions. DIR D-1842 was prepared to document these concerns.
Pipe / Conduit Over Cable Trays:
This concern involved an inadequate basis for one of the Dynamic Impact Criteria (Reference 9.27) used by i
the Damage Study Group during walkdowns to resolve i
potential interactions. Specifically, the criterion in question allowed walkdown personnel to resolve interactions in instances where potential source i
pipes / conduits were above safety-related cable trays, j
g (^3 The resolution was implemented on the basis of judgment
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but without regard for pipe / conduit size, distance above the cable tray, tray support span, etc.
DIR j
D-1844 was prepared to document this concern.
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'ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 3'~
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION.0F ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Co Use of Nomogram to Support Class 5 Large Bore Pipe:
' Seismically:
Some large bore Class 5 piping-that was designated as
'i Seismic Category II was seismically supported based on_
use of a nomogram in G&H specification.2323-MS-46B l-(Reference 9.28). The third party identified.a concern that the lack of. guidance for determining support loads might leadi o underprediction of loads and potential.
t L
invalidation of the Seismic Category.II designation.
.DIR D-1845 was prepared to document this concern.
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5.2.4 Review of Original Damage Study Program Implementation Objective and Process of Third-Party Reviev The primary oojective of this' review was to assess the
.j overall implementation of the DSP. This was done by-evaluating the entire DSP process..The review-I O'
specifically, addressed implementation of the DSP
{
procedures prior to the TRT actions which initiated.
-l this ISAP. A limited number of source commodities with.
l and without interactions were selected to represent the l
types of commodities encountered during the DSP.
i Existing DSP documentation was provided by the Damage
)
Study Group, with the source commodities being selected as much as possible from different rooms or areas.
Additional documentation was provided as neesssary by other discipline groups on site (e.g.,' calculations, l
designs for physical modifications). Each package was J
evaluated against a standard checklist (Reference 9.25).
A secondary objective of the third-party review was to verify the adequacy of interactions resolved.using the Dynamic Imoact Criteria (DIC). This objective was a result of the procedures and: criteria evaluation discussed in 5.2.3.
The verification was done by first selecting a sample of the interactions resolved using the DIC.
Each interaction was-then independently resolved by quantitative means based on accepted engineering principles.
It was not intended that this effort specifically evaluate whether the appropriate n'.
DIC was selected to resolve an interaction.
- Instead, each of the selected interactions was quantitatively w.J i,,I.,
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(Cont'd)
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v 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN' AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS L(Cont'd) l assessed so as'to measure the acceptability of interaction resolution whenever any of the qualitative
.DIC were employed.
Acceptance Criteria Acceptability of DSP implementation.was based on consistency of application and compatibility with
-applicable procedures. Because the FSAR does not include criteria specific enough for the. level of methodology reviewed.here, analytical' resolutions were i
primarily compared to accepted engineering principles.
However, where it was clearly indicated in available l
documentation that seismic-Category I criteria were
~'
applied, application of such criteria was considered
~to be acceptable without further review.
The acceptability of the DIC was based on satisfactory
[_
conclusions being reached for each of the selected interactions. This involved performing independent calculations to verify the DSP results. The calculations were not intended to' insure strict compliance with FSAR criteria for seismic Category I items but rather to provide reasonable assurance either that source failure would not occur or that, if it did, target function would not be impaired.
Results of Review Based on physical walkdowns and a review of documentation, evaluation checklists were completed for twenty-two (22) sources for which there were f ourteen (14) identified interact 1ons. Based on these efforts, it was concluded that overall DSP implementation was adequate. Documentation of this evaluation is contained in Reference 9.25.
For the DIC, calculations were performed for the selected. interactions based on physical measurements and other data gathered during third party walkdowns.
It was concluded that use of the DIC was an acceptable method of interaction resolution with the exception of Criterion 6, which is applicable to source pipe / conduit
Revision:
1 Page 30 of 58 RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) over safety-related cable tray. This concern is discussed in Section 5.2.3.
The Project responded to this concern by reviewing all interactions that had been resolved through use of this Criterion. Some hardware modifications resulted and the SIP procedures do not include the criterion.
Associated ongoing corrective actions are addressed in Section 5.6.
5.2.5 Comparative Interaction Assessment (CIA)
Process of CIA The objective of this evaluation was to provide an additional measure of the adequacy of the DSP by I
identifying interactions (by a walkdown process) in l
particular areas, and then comparing the results with existing DSP interaction identification documentation for those same areas. The results of the CIA are documented in Reference 9.25.
Acceptance Criteria The most obvious basis for acceptance was.for the interactions identified during this assessment to match those already identified by the Damage Study Group (DSG). However, strict agreement was not expected for the following reasons:
- Some of the interactions identified initially by the DSG would have been resolved by physical modifications. Therefore, they would no longer be
~
interactions and would not be identified as such during this assessment.
Some differences might occur simply as a result of i
differences in judgment.
Where differences in judgment resulted in third-party identification of a potential interaction not previously identified by the DSG, an assessment was O
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RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d (Cont'd) t 5.0 ' IlfLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Con i
.made to verify'that the basis! or'the DSG conclusion, f
i.e.. that no unacceptable interaction occurs, was' still valid. This assessment was based primarilyfon a
- accepted engineering principles, 3
1 i
3 CIA Results The rooms that were walked down contained what is
' considered by the third party to be representative of components typically encountered in nuclear plant.
installations. Except for architectural features and Train C junction boxes, there were no-particular, disparities between CIA results and existing DSP
~
results.
Train'C junction boxes'were generally not considered by-DSP walkdown. teams to be of consequence relative to.
source potential. For the specific junction ~ box that n
initiated this area of concern, the third party-
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concluded that junction box attachment failure.was not D
credible;1this could not be readily verified for the more general application to all Train C junction boxes.
However, further third-party investigation was considered unnecessary because of~other on-going Project programs that are addressing the seismic capability. of conduit and cable tray including junction boxes.. These other programs and associated criteria are described in STIR-CPRT-008.
It also was determined that-the architectural features i
identified as part of the CIA walkdowns were also e
identified as part of the DSP architectural feature walkdowns discussed in Section 5.2.2.
'It is concluded that the comparative interaction assessment (in conjunction with other parts of this evaluation) provides) reasonable assurance that DSP walkdowns (including architectural features walkdowns) have included all general categories of source commodities with the possible exception of Train C junction boxes.
Associated ongoing corrective actions are addressed in Section 5.6.
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~ ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.2.6 Summary of Damage Study Program Verification
.The Project extended the DSP to 1.iclude architectural l
features. The third-party review of this effort and the original DSP identified several areas of concern.
i In response to these concerns, the Project has identified severa1' actions that, when implemented, will assure that all potential seismic interact 1ons are identified and resolved consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
Nine D-type DIRs and two E-type DIRs were prepared to document concerns associated with the DSP. These DIRs are discussed in Section 5.3.
5.3 Sumary of DIRs
/
A total of 18 DIRs (D-Type and E-T,pe) were written to j-.
document discrepancies identified in the implementation of
(
this ISAP. These discrepancies reside in two major categories. The first of these involves discrepancies related to the development of the DSP and the second involves discrepancies related to the development of Project engineering design criteria and their application by the Proj ec t.
[
Fourteen DIRs* were issued to document concerns related to the original DSP. These DIRs included. discrepancies involving the control room ceiling and other architectural features, commodities attached to/above the control room ceiling, and relative building motion. A complete list of the D-Type and E-Type DIRs and their classification and disposition are contained in Appendix 4.
=Six DIRs* were issued to document concerns identified regarding the development of Project engineering design criteria and their application by the Project. These DIRs document discrepancies involving support of Class 5 piping.
Note that two DIRs (D-1842 and D-2132) contain elements of both DSP and engineering criteria concerns.
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- RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d
'(Cont'd)
I 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) horizontal pipe / conduit. motion,Lsecondary. wall motion,' -
and adequacy of.. frame supports for lighting fixtures. The classification and disposition of these DIRs.are also presented in; Appendix 4.
I In addition to the D-Type and E-Type DIRs discussed above.. a total of.6 C-Type'(in-process) DIRs were. prepared'to document I
concerns associated with Project ISAP implementation L
activities. -DIR-C-0428 was resolved during the completion of the control room ceiling redesign. dis
- C-0327 through C-0331 remain open and are discussed in Sectic 5.6.
5.4 Safety Significance Evaluation The discrepancies-identified on three of the D-type DIRs (D-1840, D-1843, and D-2200) were determined not to constitute deviations'because no unacceptable. interactions were identified and the DIRs were closed as observations. The discrepancies identified on the remaining six D-type DIRs
--,?
.(D-1841, D-1842, D-1844, D-1845, D-2132, and D-2183).and on 1
all nine E-type DIRs (E-0266, E-0267, E-0887 E-0988. E-0989 E-1045, E-1210, E-1218, and E-1221) were determined to be design deviations. Because of.the extensive corrective actions instituted by the-Project, it was determined.co be more expeditious to proceed directly to an analysis of the l
root cause and generic implications without evaluating the
-safety significance of the deviations. Therefore, these
' discrepancies were classified as unclassified deviations.
5.5 Root Cause and Generic Implications As discussed in Section 5.3, the unclassified deviations fall into two general categories:
- 1) the development of the DSP and 2) the development of Project engineering design criteria
'and their application by the Project. Similarly, the root cause evaluation summarized in this section focuses on these two categories. Specific details associated with this root cause evaluation applicable to individual unclassified deviations are documented within an engineering evaluation (Reference 9.25).
This evaluation describes how specific unclassified deviations are associated with each category.
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1-Page 34-of 58 RESULTS REPORT D-ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 5.0. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION.0F.RESULTS-(Cont,'d)
The. criteria.in Regulatory Guide 1,29 for. addressing.
seismically-induced' interactions betwoen Seismic Category.I' commodities and non-seismic ccamodities focus largely on an.
I
_ identification of those commodities that must remain functional
.during and after an SSE. Potential source commodities, on'the
'other hand,'are addressed.only to the extent that.it_is stated that they should not impa1r the function of the safety-related connodities listed in the Regulatory Guide..Using the terminology of the Regulatory Guide, potential source commodities include all portions of structures, systems, or components whose continued function is not required to mitigate the consequences.of an SSE.
The.FSAR commits to Regulatory Guide 1,29 without excaptions.- In
. contrast to.the generality of the Regulatory Guide requirements, the DSP, procedures'were rather specific in identifying source I
commodities to'ba considered. However, this identification did not include all possible source commodicias (or groups of cotamodities),
nor was there explicit direction to DSP walkdown team members to consider any source' commodities not specifically listed in the l7 procedures.
j
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.Given this background, two root causes can be postulated for the failure of the DSP to identify and/or evaluate properly all l
. potential source commodities:
- 1) less-than-adequate procedures and
- 2) DSP personnel had less-than-adequate experience and/or training.
l Considering the first of these postulated causes, the nature-of the physical features of the plant makes it impractical to identify all potentia 1' sources of interactions in such procedures prior to their implementation. Accordingly, sufficient guidance is typically built into similar programs in the industry to assure that source commodities that may not be specifically addressed. in procedures are addressed during seismic interaction walkdowns. However, for the specific area of architectural features, it is judged inappropriate to address such a broad category of commodities in this been, manner. Instead, architectural features should either have explicitly identified at least as a category of source
{
commodities for consideration during DSP walkdowns, or justification for exclusion should have been documented.
Therefore, the third party concludes that the DSP procedures did not include sufficient guidance to assure that, in particular, the broad category of architectural features was addressed, or that, in
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general, all-unspecified source commodities would be considered.
Thus, the root cause is the failure of the DSP procedures to provide such guidance.
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RESULTS REPORT V,
'ISAP II.d (Cont'd)
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
.Despite the' inadequacies in the procedures DSP personnel were not precluded from identifying potential interactions involving source.
' commodities not specifically identified in the DSP procedures, and l
E they did so in several cases.. Therefore, it is possible that had j
the' personnel involved in walkdowns had a higher level of.
1 experience, they might.have' identified more such interactions. On the'other hand, DSP_ personnel, generally implemented the procedures acceptably for source commodities specifically identified in the j
DSP' procedures. With' respect to the second postulated root cause, j
therefore, the third party concludes that DSP walkdown personnel.
-generally demonstrated sufficient capability.to' implement toe procedures.as written and that the' failure in the architectural l
festures area cannot be'directly, attributed to,less-than-adequate training of personnel. However, it is judged that personnel may.
have had less than desirable experience based on the incomplete l
identification of source conunodities beyond those specified in the DSP procedures.-
The second group of DIRs addressed problems in the development and application of criteria by the G&B engineering disciplines. These
. criteria helped form the engineering bases for certain DSP input assumptions (e.g., seismic capability of architectural features) and for resolving seismic interactions (e.g., impact of a non-safety related item with a safety-related item). The reviews conducted during the implementation'of this ISAP identified a lack
))
of desi n calculations and analyses supporting engineering 6
assumptions incomplete consideration of certain sources and associated motions, and the failure to consider loads in the design i
of structures. These findings are the result of weaknesses in the-design control elements of the engineering program.
An investigation into the specific nature of these weaknesses and their possible causes, e.g., less-than-adequate procedures or i
inazparienced engineering personnel, was not conducted as part of thia.ISAP. However, the third party notes that tasy are similar to findings against the design control program identified during the conduct of the CPRT Design Adequacy Program.
l The ongoing and recommended corrective actions described in Section 5.6 will address, when implemented, the root cause and generic implications of the less-than-adequate DSP procedures and less-than-desirable experience among DSP personnel, and will assure that the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29 are met. The Systems Interaction Program is being implemented as part of the TU Electric Corrective Action Program (CAP). The CAP has sufficient O.
breadth and depth to address the root causes and generic implications of the design control program weaknesses.
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I RESULTS REPORT i
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ISAP II.d i
(Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) l 5.6 Ongoing Correc_tive Actions and Recommendations l
l The ongoing Project activities described in the previous sections form corrective actions in response to ISAP II.d implementation. These corrective actions are sumarized here and are supplemented in some cases by third party j
l recomenda tions. Where appropriate, the identified corrective actions will be overviewed in accordance with SRT direction to j
assure that the actions taken address these recommendations and adequately satisfy ISAP II.d comitments.
5.6.1 Comoditics On/Above Control Room Ceiling (from 5.1.3) i Resolutions of interactions associated with commodities I
attached to or above the control room aailing are present2d in STIR-CPRT-S-008 and are based, to some extent, on engineering judgement. Because of this, the Project is confirming these resolutions using the j
m f
)
industry experienced-based methods addressed in the new i
SIP procedures (Ref erences 9.14 through 9.17). This l
uffort is ongoing.
5.6.2 Architectural Features Identification (from 5.2.2) i It is recomended that implementation of the new SIP l
procedures (References 9.14 through 9.17) include a validation of the architectural features process currently based on Procedures CP-EI-4.0-63 and I
TNE-DC-26.
Specifically, it should be assured that reasons for including and excluding particular architectural feature comodities are clearly j
identified / documented. Additionally, the responsibilities of the Systems Interaction and Civil / Structural groups should be clearly established for this effort. including control / documentation of all l
interface c.ctivities between these groups. These recommendations are based on concerns documented in DIRs C-0327 through C-0331.
5.6.3 Architectural Features Interaction Resolutions (from 5.2.2)
The activities associated with implementation of
/~'g STIR-CPRT-S-006 and -016 are complete. Most of the
(,/
activities associated with implementation of STIR-CPRT-S-007 and -011 are o7 going.
Several i
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Pcge 37 of 58 RESULTS kEPORT ISAP II.d (Cont'd)
I 5.0 i
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) calculations are to be performed to assure structural integrity of the potential source commodities (doors, floor gratings, etc.) associated with these latter two STIRS. Because these STIRS do not necessarily limit such commodities to Seismic Category I design requirements, it is recommended that the design criteria used be clearly identified / referenced in each calculation. Where criteria might be less conservative than Seismic Category I requirements, justification for use of the criteria should also be included.
5.6.4 Relative Building Motions (from 5.2.3)
Implementation of the commodity clearance program presented in STIR-CPRT-S-018 (Reference 9.29) is ongoing. This program addresses the adequacy of clearances around all safety-related commodities in the plant and includes consideration of relative building ry motions. Several specific third party concerns have
()
been identified regarding the implementing documents 3'
which support the commodity clearance prograr. These concerns are presented in Appendix 2.2D of the Engineering Evaluation (Reference 9.25) and vill not be repeated here. It is recommended that these concerns be addressed as appropriate during implementation of the associated documents.
5.6.5 Secondary Walls (from 5.2.3)
Implementation of STIR-CPRT-S-009 (Reference 9.30) for
~
secondary walls is onboing. This effort is based in part on satisfaction of fairly general critaria. It is recommended that associated calculations identify the specific criteria used (by reference to the FSAR, AISC/ASME codes, or other existing project criteria decuments with specific icad combinations /allowables).
Additionally, where the criteria used are not the same as FSAR criteria for similar commodities, the j
justification for any differences should be identified / documented.
I 5.6.6 Frame-Supported Lighting Fixtures (from 5.2.3)
Implementation of STIR-CPRT-S-008 for frame-supported (xx- ')
lighting fixtures is ongoing. This effort is based on satisfaction of general criteria.
It is recommended 1
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.ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 9..
i
'5.0 -IMPLEMENTATION!OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS'(Cont'd that associated calculations identify the specific p,
criteria used (by reference to the FSAR,'AISC code, or, other existing project criteria documents with specific
^
load combinations /allowables).- Additionally, where the; criteria used-are not the,same.as FSAR criteria for l
similar commodities, the justification for-2ny differences should be' identified / documented.
1 5.6.7 : Line-Mounted Items on Small Bore Piping (from 5.2.3) a Implementation of new Systems Interaction Group procedures -(Ref erences 9.14 - through. 9.17) 1si ongoing.
i These procedures include. line mounted items on small -
bore piptug as source commodities.'
5.6.8 Horizontal Motions of Piping and--Conduit (from 5.2.3)-
- t Implementation of STIR-CPRT-S-008 for the horizontal j
motions of all sizes of non-seismic piping and large diameter Train C conduit involves application of the i
commodity clearance program.
In addition to the reconnendations for this'progrca referred to in Sectior 5.6.4, it is recommended that the program implementation documents CPE-FVM-CS-068 and CPES-S-1021 (References 9.31 and 9.32,' respectively) specifically identify small bore non-seismic piping as part of the program.
In addition, the bases for the tabulated motions (in the program documents) for all types of pipin's and conduit should be justified and documented.
5.6.9 Class 5 Large Bore Piping Supported Based on Nomogram (from 5.2.3)
-l l
Implementation of STIR-CPRT-S-008 is. ongoing for Class
~
5 large-bora piping which had been seismically supported based on a nomogram method. Implementation is by way of Project procedare CPPP-30 (Reference 9.33).
I 5.6.10 Train C Junction Boxes (from 5.2.5)
Implementation of STIR-CPRT-S-008 is ongoing for activities associated with Train C junction boxes.
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.ISAP-II.d (Cont'd).
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS_(Cont'd)j i
5.6.11 Systems Interaction Program Procedures
.As indicated in some of the specific areas above.
~ implementation of the new Systems Interaction Program i
procedures addresses certain areas of concern identified during implementation of ISAP II.d.fThese procedures were prepared. based in part on-ISAP II.d activities and results and~the procedures are being
!1mplemented by personnel with significant previous
~
t experience in seismic. interaction, assessment (refer.to the root cause discussion in Section 5.5).
As such..
t the ontoing' implementation of the' procedures for all aspects of seismic interaction evaluation is considered j
to be part of Project corrective actions:in response to-l overall ISAP II.d efforts.
L
6.0 CONCLUSION
S 1
Conclusions reached by the third-party during the investigation of the control room ceiling and Damage Study Program issues discussed j
in this report are summarized in this section.
6.1 Control Room Ceiling Element Redesian Based on the engineering review and evaluation performed by the third party, the redesign of the control room ceiling meets the design commitments and acceptance criteria defined l
in the FSAR.
l 1
6.2 Damase Study Verification The Project review of architectural features resulted in several design and hardware modifications to assure compliance with FSAR commitments regarding seismic interaction.
Third-party review of these activities resulted in identification of concerns primarily regarding the completeness of the Project review (it appears that Project resolutions to the concerns will result in a small increase.
if at all, in the number of potential interactions). The procedures that govern implementation of the Systems Interaction Program and the commitments made in the several relevant STIRS that cover civil / structural discipline issues provide assurance that all these concerns have been or will be adequately addressed.
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(Cont'd)
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l Damage Scudy Program procedures'and their implementation: prior.
l
.to ISAP II.d were reviewed by the third party. While.DSP-x implementation was found to be' satisfactory, severa1' concerns-were' identified'related to procedures and criteria. Current-Systems Interaction. Program procedures and commitments in
-l civil / structural discipline Specific Technical Issue' Reports i
provide assurance that all these' concerns have been or will be'
{
adequatelyLaddressed.-
'lj 7.0' ONGOING ACTIVITIES l
.The majority lof on. going activities associated with ISAP II.d are f
.part of the corrective actions described in Section 5.6.. Two
.l additional: activities are related to the.ISAP. The first activity j
involves the control. room ceiling calculation; the Project q
activities are-described in STIR-CPRT-S-013L(Reference 9.34). The
-second activity involves suspended lighting fixture sway.
q calculations; the. Project activities are described-in j
i' y
STIR-CPRT-S-008.
In both cases, the efforts involve confirmation j
by the SWEC civil / structural discipline of previously-completed ';&H I
civil / structural calculations. Because the G&H calculations were I
completed and reviewed by the third party, the additional confirmation efforts are not considered by the ~hird party to be H
corrective actions.
8.0 ' ACTION TO PRECLUDE OCCURRENCE IN THE FUTURE i
Successful implementation and completion of the corrective actions described in Section 5.6 will provide assurance that the provisions i
of' Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 are satisfied.
1
9.0 REFERENCES
9.1 " Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2," USNRC Document No. NUREG-0797, Supplement No.8, February, 1985.
9.2 " Seismic Design Classification", U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29. Revision 2, February 1976.
9.3 " Control of Seismic & Non-Seismic Component Interaction O
Evaluations", TUSI Instruction No. CP-EI-4.0-36 Revision 0, November 8, 1982.
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.d ISAP II.d (Cont'd)
9.0 REFERENCES
(Cont'd) 9.4 " Maintenance of Damage Study Analysis", TUSI Instruction No.
CP-EI-4.0-53 Revision 0, March 19, 1984, t-9.5 Comanche Peak Response Team Program Plan and Issue-Specific Action Plans, Revision 4, 6/18/87.
9.6 " Control Room Ceiling," G&H Procedure No. DP-3, Revision 1.
9.7' AISC Manual of Steel Construction, 7th Edition, 1969.
9.8 "CPRT Engineering Evaluation for the Control Room Ceiling".
Engineering Evaluation Nc. II.d.4b.1.
9.9 " Torsional Analysis of Stell Member," AISC publication, 1983.
9.10 " Building Code Requirements for Reinforu d Concrete," American Concrete Instii:ute Docu:sent No. ACI-318-71,1971.
9.11 " Structural Embedment Specification", G6H Specification No.
SS-30, Revision 1.
9.12 " Unit 1 Damage Study Analysis", procedure number TNE-DC-23 Revision 0, September 3, 1985.
l 9.13 " Resolution of ISAP II.d Open Issues," STIR-CPRT-S-008, Revision 0, 7/2/87.
9.14 " Systems Interaction Program," TUEC Engineering and Construction Procedure No. ECE 2.24, Revision 0, 7/21/87.
9.15 " Seismic /Non-Seismic Systems Interaction Prcgram," CPE CPSES Design Basis Document No. DBD-ME-005, Revision 0, 2/10/87.
9.16'"Saismic/Nonseismic Walkdowns Systems Interaction Program Ebasco," TUEC Engineering CPSES Units 1 and 2 Field Verification Method No. CPE-EB-FVM-SI-40, Revision 0, 6/15/87.
9.17 " Evaluation of Seismic /Nonseismic Interactions " CPE Mechanical Engineering Technical Procedure No. EME 2.24-01, Revision 0, 7/21/87.
9.18 " Review of Architectural Specifications and Drawings to Identify Non-Seismic Sources " TUGC0 Instruction No.
=
CP-EI-4.0-63, Revision 0, 10/15/84.
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"Q, RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d (Cont'd) 9.0.. REFERENCES (Cont'd) i 9.19'" Review of= Architectural Specifications and Drawings to.
Identify Non-Seismic Sources," TNE Procedure No. TNE-DC-26 s
j Revision 0, 05/08/86.
9.20'" Seismic /Non-Seismic' Interaction of Sheet Rock Walls,"
i STIR-CPRT-S-006, Revision 0, 4/3/87.-
9.21 " Doors'and Security Barriers," STIR-CPRT-S-007, Revision 0,
'I i
6/12/87.
9.22. Seismic /Non-Seismic Interaction of Floor Gratings,"
' STIR-CPRT-S-Oll, Revision 0, 6/12/87.
4 9.23." Hand Rail Upgrade," STIR-CPRT-S-012, Revision 0, 4/30/87.
9.24 " Upgrade of Ladders," STIR-CPRT-S-016. Revision 0, 6/12/87.
p 9.25 "CPRT Engineering Evaluation of Seismic Interaction Portions
'Q of the Damage Study Program" Engineering Evaluation No.
II.d.4b.2.
9.26 " Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures" ISAP II '. c.
]
9.27 " Comanche Peak Seismic Interaction Criteria Document". TUGC0 memo CPPA 27912, 2/13/83.
j i
9.28 "Non-Nuclear Pipe Hangers and Supports," G&H Specification No.
2323-MS-46B, Revision 3.
j Jf 9.29 " Commodity Clearance," STIR-CPRT-S-018, Revision 0, 7/2/87.
9.30 " Commodities Attached to Secondary Walls," STIR-CPRT-S-009, 1
' Revision 0, 6/26/87.
l i
9.31 " Field Verification Method Commodity Clearance", Stone &
j Webster Engineering Corporation, TU Electric Procedure No.
{
CPE-FVM-CS-068, Revision 0.
9.32 " Commodity Clearance", TU Electric Specification CPES-S-1021 Revision 0.
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9.33 " Validation of Seismic Category II Large Bore Piping and
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Support Designs", TU Electric Project Procedures No. CPPP-30, Revision 0.
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1 Page 43 of 58 (d
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RESULTS REPORT l
ISAP II.'d I
(Cont'd)
'4 9.0" REFERENCES (Cont'd) 9.34 " Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling," STIR-CPRT-S-013 Revision 0, 6/26/87.
j t
9.35." Unit 2 Damage Study Analysis," TNE Procedure No. TNE-DC-9. -
]
Revision 1, 11/12/85.
i 9.36 " Gypsum Dry _ Wall,".G&H specification 2323-AS-036, Revision 0, 2/4/76.
9.37 " Miscellaneous Metal," G&H specification 2323-AS-005, Revision 0, 11/21/75.
9.38 " Hollow Metal Doors and Frames," G&H specification 2323-AS-018 Revision 0, 12/18/75.
l 9.39 " Finishing Hardware," G&H specification 2323-AS-022A, Revision g
1, 5/15/79.'
j 9.40."Ro111ng Steel Doors " G&H specification 2323-AS-025,' Revision 0,-4/7/76.
9.41 " Watertight Doors " G6H specification 2323-AS-027, Revision l',
6/13/78.
-i 9.42 " Missile resisting Doors," G&H specification 2323-AS-054 Revision 1, 8/11/80.
9.43 " Bullet Resisting Doors and Penetration Resisting Docru," G&H specification 2323-AS-061, Revision 0, 4/30/79.
9.44 " Design Basis Document Seismic Category I Structural Steel,"
DBD-CS-085, Revision 0, January, 1987.
9.45 " Metal Gratings," G&H specification 2323-AS-007, Revision 0.
2/18/76.
9.'46 " Metal Stairs Railings, and Handrails," GsH specification 2323-AS-006.. Revision 0, 2/12/76.
Reviaion:
1 Page 4'+ of 58 s
i RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d (Cont'd)
Figure 1 Original Control Room Ceiling Design 4
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. ISAP II.d i
(Cont'd)
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V ISAP II.d (Cont'd)
Figure 3 Project Activities Completed Priot to TRT and Reviewed by the Third Party
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Figure 4 Redesigned Control Room Ceiling Frame (Computer-Drawn Model) up p
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RESULTS REPORT
's ISAP II.d (Cont'd)
Appendix 1 i
Glossary of Terms Architectural features i
Any item specifically identified in i
an architectural specification or on 4
an architectural drawing (specification containing an "AS" in the number as in "2323-AS-5"; and i
drawings containing an "A" in the number as in "2323-Al-0531").
CIA t
Comparative Interaction Assessment l
DIC l
Dynamic Impact Criteria: a series of nine criteria used by the DSG to resolve postulated interactions (see Reference 9.27).
The criteria T
were non-quantitative in nature and necessitated using engineering
-~ -
judgment to apply.
DSG Damage Study Group DSP i
Damage Study Program; although the DSP encompasses other areas besides seismic interaction, when used in this report "DSP" refers only to j
those portions of the program that j
involve' seismic interaction.
It should be noted that the Damage Study Program has undergone a name j
change during the period of ISAP implementation (refer to Appendix j
s 2).
The new name is Systems j
Interaction Program.
In most casos, l
the report uses the earlier name.
However, in certain instances where the discussion is strictly applicable to the present progran,
" Systems Interaction" is used i
instead of " Damage Study."
h 1
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1
'j Page 49 of 58 l
s fm-RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d t
(Cont'd)
Appendix 1 1
(Cont'd)
'j Interaction Physical contact between a source
.and a target which occurs as a j
direct result of an SSE. Da:aage to the functional capability of the target (either structural or operational) is postulated as a consequence of this physical i
contact.
Seismic Category I Ref era to comodities - that must 1
remain functional during and following an SSE and to control room occupants. This list is discussed j
in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 and'is committed to with no excepcions in the CPSES FSAR (see FSAR Appendix 1A (B)).
O l
Seismic Category II Unique designation for CPSES defined in FSAR paragraph 3.2.1.2.
Refers to those comodities whose continued function is not required
,)
but whose failure could reduce the
'l functioning of any Seismic Category I commodity to an unacceptable level or could result in incapacitating injury to occupants of the control room. These commodities are to be designed and constructed so that a SSE will not cause such failure.
SIP Systems Interaction Program (refer to definition of DSP)
Source
(
Any physical commodity on the plant site that is not designated as Seismic Category I or Seismic Category II.
A source commodity might be " upgraded" to Seismic Category 11 so that it would no longer be a source.
)
i j
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1 Page 50 of 58 L
i
'~'
RESULTS REPORT 1
j N
ISAP II d t
(Cont'd)
Appendix l-ui (Cont'd) 4 SSE Safe-shutdown earthquake..
STIR Specific' Technical Issue Report.
inrget-Any commodity on the plant = site that is designated as Seismic Category'I; also, any occupants of the control room.
I i
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1 l
'Page 51 of 58
( "jj
_RESULTS REPORT
(/
IS AP II.d (Cont'd)
)
' Appendix 2 Chronology of events associated with the Damage Study / Systems f
Interaction program and implementation of IS AP II.d 11/8/82 Issuance of CP-EI-4.0-36,~" Control of Seismic & Non-Seismic Component Interaction Evaluations" (Reference 9.3)
Seismic interaction program initiated on the basis of this procedure. Procedure addressed scope of program and how to identify and resolve poteuttal interactions.
t 2/84 Implementation of CP-EI-4.0-36 completed (date approximate).
3/19/84 Issunace of CP-EI-4.0-53, " Maintenance of Damage Study Analyses" (Reference 9.4)
Procedure identified how to maintain the DSP that had been initiated based on CP-EI-4.0-36.
Generally, this provided for i'~'j ongoing walkdowns to identify any new potential interactions that might result from continuing construction activities.
9/18/84 NRC Heating with TUEC Identified TRT concerns regarding the control room ceiling and requested. review of the overall DSP, 10/5/84 Issuancs of ISAP II.d, " Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements" to address issues identified during NRC meeting above.
10/15/84 Issuance of CP-EI-4.0-63, " Review of Architectural Specifications and Drawings to Identify Non-Seismic Sources" (Reference 9.18)
Architectural features review initiated in response to paragraph 4.1.3.1 of ISAP II.d.
Procedure provided method for identifying architectural features for subsequent evaluation by the Damage Study Group.
11/2/84 Implementation of CP-EI-4.0-63 and subsequent DSP valkdowns are completed.
O f
9
m Revision:'
1-
'Pese 52 of 58 RESULTS REPORT-I I
ISAP II.d
-)
(Cont'd),
Appendix 2 (Cont'd) 8/20/85 Issuance 'of. TNE-DC-9, " Unit 2 Damage Study Analysis" (Reference 9.35)
Consolidated and r:tplaced. DSP procedures CP-EI-4.0-36 and -53 for Unit 2. efforts.. Issued as part of internal Project reorganization.
9/3/85 Issuance.of TNE DC-23, " Unit 1 Damage Study Analysis" (Reference 9.12)
Consolidated and replaced DSP procedures CP-EI-4 0-36 and -53 for Unit 1-efforts.
Issued as part of internal coject reorganization.
5/8/86 Issuance of TNE-DC-26, " Review of ' Architectural. Specifications :
and Drawings to; Identify.Non-Seismic Sources" (Reference 9.19)
Project identifies. concerns with implementation of f
Concerns were related primarily to completeness of review. Procedure revised to address these concerns and reissued as part of internal Project reorganization.
8/86 Ebasco takes over the DSP.
10/86 SWEC replaces G&H for civil / structural discipline.
10/20/86 Implementation of TNE-DC-26 and subsequent DSP walkdowns are completed. Documentation of earlier commodity identification' effort (per CP-EI-4.0-63) is retained. As a result of the implementation of CP-EI-4.0-36 and TNE-DC-26, several groups of architectural feature commodities are identified as having unacceptable potential interactions. Because all these commodities are within the scope of the civil / structural discipline, SWEC
_ initiates program to address resolution of the various interactions (STIRS-006, -007. -011, -012
-016, and (to a limited extent]
-008).
10/22/86 " Damage Study Program" changed to " Systema Interaction Program" (name change only).
2/10/87 Issuance of DBD-ME-005**, " Design. Basis Document.
Seismic /Non-Seismic Systems Interaction Program" (Reference 9.15)
Provides criteria and general methods for performing seismic interaction evaluations.
s
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1 Page 53 of 58-p
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RESULTS REPORT j
C/
ISAP II.d (Cont'd).
Appendix 2 (Cont'd) a 4/3/87' Issuance of STIR-CPRT-S-006, " Seismic /Non-Seicnic Interaction' of Sheet Rock Walls" (Reference 9.20) -- refer to Appendix.3
]
for discussion of STIR.
4/30/87 Issuance of STIR-CPRT-S-012. " Handrail Rail Upgrade" (Reference 9.23) -- refer to Appendix 3 for discussion of
]
i STIR.
3 6/12/87 Issuance of STIR-CPRT-S-007, " Doors and Security Barriers" (Reference 9.21) -- refer to Appendix 3 for discussion of STIR.
6/12/87 Issuance of STIR-CPRT-S-011. " Seismic /Non-Seismic Interaction of Floor Gratings" (Reference 9.22) -- refer to Appendix'3 for discussion of STIR.
6/12/87
. Issuance 'of STIR-CPRT-S-016. " Upgrade of Ladders" (Reference 9.24) -- refer to Appendix 3 for discussion of STIR.
t j
\\
t 6/15/87 Issuance of CPE-EB-FVM-SI-40**, " Field Verification Method.
Seismic /Nonseismic Walkdowns, Systems Interaction Program" (Referenct 9.16)
Provides criteria and methods for performing walkdown portions f
of soismic interaction evaluations.
i 6/26/87 Issuance of STIR-CPRT-S-009, '.' Commodities Attached to
')
i Secondary Valls" (Reference 9.30)
Addresses identification and resolution of interactions j
]
aesociated with secondary wall motions. Resulted from' concerns identified during implementation of ISAP II.c,
" Maintenance of Air Gap Between Concrete Structures," but j
i
' addressed within the II.d Results Report because of potential eff ects of safety-related commodities due to the walls' j
seismic motions. Project implementation is ongoing and may result in hardware modification in some cases.
6/26/87 Issuance of STIR-CPRT-S-013. " Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling" (Reference 9.34) i Addresses SWEC civil / structural review of G&H calculations for redesigned ceiling. Review is ongoing.
i h
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1 I
Page 54-of 58 RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.d b,<
(Cont'd)
Appendix 2 (Cont'd) i 6/30/87r Issuance.~of STIR-CPRT-S-008." Resolution of ISAP II.d Openl j
Issues" (Reference 9.13)
I
.)
Addresses resolutions of,various third party. concerns
-1 identified ~during ISAP II.d implementation (not related.to
]
architecturni features)..Also addresses resolutions of.
interactionsLinvolving commodities'ateached to or'above the control room ceiling. Various resolution activities.are ongoing; hardware modifications may be required but likelihood I
considered minimal by the Project for commodities attached to or above the~ control room ceiling.-
7/2/87-Issuance of STIR-CPRT-S-018. " Commodity Clearance" (Reference 9.29)
Addresses identification and resolution of potential interactions' assoc!ated with potentially insufficient clearance between commodities, one or both of which 'are safety-related. Based on concerns' identified by third party 3,i.
during implementation of ISAPs II.c and II.d.
Implementation
.of the.! STIR is ongoing; hardware modifications may result.
7/21/87 Issuance of ECE 2.24**, " Systems Interaction Program" (Reference 9.14)
Identifies overall purpose:of Systems Interaction Program including seismic interaction portion.. Describes general methods for performing' seismic interaction evaluations.
7/21/87 Issuance of EME-2.24-Ol**, " Evaluation of Seismic /Nonseismic Interactions" (Reference 9.17)
Presents methods for resolving identified seismic
" interactions.
.These four procedures consolidate applicable portions of TNE-DC-23 and -9 and include program changes in response to third party concerns noted during implementation of ISAP II.d (unrelated to r
architectural features effort).
Procedures were issued as part of internal Project reorganization. The third party concerns are
- m discussed in Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.4, and 5.2.5 of the body of this results report.
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, ;C1 i
-RESULTS REPORTT
-:7 m
'f iE ISAP II.d y
a
'(Cont'd)~
t 7
- l Appendix 3; V
.~.
Specific Technical Issue. Reports Issued toL
' Addreas Resolution of Interactions Identified -
as a Result of the" Project's ISAP II.d 1 e'
Architectural Features Review Sheet Rock' Walls (STIR-CPRT-S-006)
- o This applies to specification 2323-AS-36 '(Reference 9.36)'.
Num;rous
. interactions were identified by the Damage Study Group'.(DSG)., Except I
for the sloped shest rock,above:the~ control; room (which was removed as.,
part of'the control room ceiling redesign'-- see discussion in' 4.lil of
);
this tresults ; report), the project determined that it was unnecessary.co -
remove or otherwise restrain sheet sock installations throughout the.
~
plant.
This determination was made en the T asis.of existing test date
.y e
which demonstrated that' failure modes.were limited to cracking and/or-G.6,
9 minor. spalling, popping of a few wa11 board ' screws, and miner distortion i
t, of framing l elements., Such failures occurred at mid-spanLacceleratiou:
' values;in: excess,of design values ' et CPSES.
In addition,'it was concluded ' that required inspection and maintenance' programsjwould assure 1
'j
- that any: sort.of operating damage (e.g.., moisture) which might affec:
structural integrity would not go undetected.:
~
Doors-and Security Barriers (ST7R-CPRT-S-007).
This:spp11's to seven architectural feature specifications (References e
i 1-
'i9.~37"to 9.43). 'Several interactions were'identifind by the DSG'for'the l
various types of doors and security barriere. As a result, the project
~
has couraitted to assuring thatlall cuch', commodities will remain in place-during an SSE. This commitment will be= satisfied initial.ly by a review of the associated specifications and vendor documents to determine swhat 1
load capacities have been used for design. These vould tren be coinpared with CPSES seismic loadings to determine'if further ana'.yses are required to asaura structural integrity..Where analysse are performed (either with or without any hardware modifications), criteria used will i
be compatible with existing project criteria for Seismic Catigory I
. commodities (e.g.. Reference 9.44).
DCAa will be' issue 4 as necessary for any hardware modifications. STIR implementation is ongoing.
Floor Gratings (STIR-CPRT S-Dil)
This applies,to specifications 2323-AS-605 and -007 (References 9.37 and 9.45; noteLthat -005 is a miscellaneous metal specification; only the portion of the specification dealing with checkered plate is addressed Lr
-by this STLR). Numerouw interactions were identified by the DSG. As a 4
result, the' project has committed to. assuring that all such commodities
- {
will remain in place during an SSE. This commitment will be satisfied 4
j Alj_'____L--._-_--------
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' Peg:2: 56'of 58 i
L,
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,O RESULTS REPORT ff I ISAP II.'d-kg 3 (Cont'd)'
. Appendix 3 (Cont'd) initially by a review of drawings and performance of walkdowns to--
identify all gratings.'and checkered plates installed in Seismic Category
)
J
,I areas.
Calculations will then~be performed to assure that all
= commodities are consistent with existing project criteria for Seismic
- Category I commodities (Reference 9.44). DCAs will be issued as-necessary for any hardware modifications. STIR implementation ~is l
' ongoing.
Handrails (STIR-CPRT-S-012).
4 i
This applies to specification 2323-AS-006 (Reference 9.46;. note that
-006'also applies to stairs; only the portion of the specification-dealing with handrails is addressed by this STIR). Numerous J
interactions were identified by the DSG. As a result, the project has committed to assuring that all such commodities will remain in place during an SSE. This-commitment has been completed.: The approach taken was to perform tasting of certain configurations of handrails and handrail' connections to' assure that all handrails installed in Seismic
'O Category I buildings at CPSES will. remain in place during.and after an
-l
[;
d' SSE. Test loads were' developed to conservatively represent worst case l
SSE loads and also to address 10SHA requirements.- As a result of the ll testing, four. actual handrail anchorages were modified to conform to.
i tested. configurations;.all others were determined to be' adequate. All future installations will be designed / installed in conformance with one
'j of the tested' configurations thereby assuring structural adequacy.-
Ladders (STIR-CPRT-S-016)
This applies to specification 2323-AS-005 (References 9.37; note that i
-005 is a miscellaneous metal specification; only the portion of the l
specification dealing with ladders is addressed by this STIR).
Several interactions were identified by the DSG. As a result, the project has committed to assuring that these ladders will remain in place during an SSE. This effort is complete. The ladders were qualified in accordance with the seismic design requirements of Reference 9.44.
No hardware modifications resulted.
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- v COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM
'RESULTS REPORT-
.l ISAP:
II.a i
Title:
Reinforcing Steel in the Reactor Cavity REVISION 1 aa,$r b_.+
k.
to. 4 8 7 Issue Coordinator Date
-,-, L/w
- iohle, Re7Iew Team Lea'd W N%/
Date W.k tolz a k,
John 64. Beck, Chairman CPRT-SRT Date
- F
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.Rsvision:T
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Page
'1 of 30=
/[D.d '
J RESULTS REPORT.
-ISAP II.a-
. Reinforcing St' eel'in:the Reactor Cavity
1.0 DESCRIPTION
OF' ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC-Techrical issues and certain allegations with potential safety I
impli,ations were identified and communicated by the.NRC to TU Electric.. The following. technical' issue wasidescribed'in an'-
enclosure to NRC letter dated September 118, 1984 (Reference 9.1, enclosure page 7):-
The TRT investigated a documented ~ occurrence.in which q
reinforcing steel was omitted from a Unit I reactor cavity y
concrete placement.between the 812-foot and 819-foot 1/2-inch elevations. ~This reinforcement was installed and, inspected.
.according to drawing 2323-SI-0572,' Revision 2.
However, after~
the-concrete was placed, Revision 3 to the drawing was issued'
- showing a substantial increase in reinforcing steel over that j
which was installed. Gibbs & Hill Engineering was informed of-
.the omission by Brown &' Root Nonconformance Report.C-669*.
Gibbs & Hill Engineering replied that the omission in no.way r
'.. impaired'the. structural integrity of the structure.
r Nevertheless,the additional reinforcing steel was added as a j
^
precaution'against cracking which might. occur in the vicinity d
of the' neutron detector slots should'a' loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occur. A portion of the omitted reinforcing
- I steel was also placed in the next concrete lift above the 819-foot 1/2-inch level. This was done to partially
. compensate for the reinforcing ~ steel omitted in the previous concreta lift:and to minimize the overall area potentially.
subjact to' cracking.
I The TRT requested documentation indicating that an analysis
]
was performed supporting the Gibbs & Hill conclusion. The TRT was subsequently informed that an analysis had not.been j
performed..Therefore, the TRT cannot determine the safety j
significance of this issue until an analysis is performed l
veri,fying the adequacy of the reinforcing steel as installed.
. Reference 9.1, the Brown & Root Non-Conformance Report is incorrectly cited as "CP-77-6".
According to Reference 9.2 (page K-52), the correct Brown & Root NCR number for this issue is C-669.
(-
The Brown & Root NCR-C-669 was addressed and disposed of under TUSI
O
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.Pags.
2 of~30:
a
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RESULTS REPO,RT q
)
'U ISAP II.a j
,(Cont'd)'
l 1
2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC
.The NRC (Reference 9.1, enclosure page 7) identified that the following action should be taken on this issue:
.Accordingly,'TUEC shall provide.an analysis of the as-built condition of the Unit i reactor cavity that verifies the adequacy of the reinforcing. steel between the 812-foot 'and 819-foot 1/2-inch elevations. The analysis shall consider all required lord combinations.
3.0 BACKGROUND
The reactor cavity wall is essentially a right circular annulus constructed of concrete that rests on the basemat of'the Containment Building.,The wall rises about 22 feet above'the containment floor to the reactor vessel flange level and supports the. reactor vessel from its inside surface. A total of eight slots for the neutron detectors are equally spaced around the interior of
[N-the reactor cavity wall. These slots, 9 inches. wide,-are recessed 2 feet 9-1/2" inches. deep within the 8 feet ~6-1/2. inch thick ~
concrete wall.
The concrete placement of the reactor cavity wall between the 812-foot and 819-foot 1/2-inch level was made according to Revision 2 of Gibbs & Hill drawing 2323-S1-0572. Subsequently i
Revision 3 of the same drawing'was issued to add additional-rebar* to the area around the neutron detector slots to provide additional assurance that cracking at-the corners of the slots would not occur in the event of a LOCA. Upon receipt of Revision 3 of the drawing in the field, Brown & Root issued NCR-C-669 and Texas Utilities Services, Inc. issued NCR CP-77-6 to document that i
the concrete placement had already been performed to Revision 2 of the drawing-and the rebar added per Revision 3 could not be ~
l installed. Starting at the 819-foot 1/2 inch level, Brown & Root
' installed the additional rebar called for in Revision 3 of the i
drawing.
Gibbs 6 Hill assessed the as-built condition against their original design (results forwarded by GTN-19823, Reference 9.3) and found that omission of the rebar did not affect the structural integrity of the reactor cavity wall, because the additional rebar had been added'only to minimize the possibility of thermally-induced cracking occurring at the corners of the slots.
The term rebar as used throughout this report is synonomous with the term reinforcing steel.
=
Rsvision:
1 Paga 3 of 30 l
l 4
~-
RESULTS REPORT
)
V' ISAP II.a (Cont'd)
)
3.0 BACKGROUND
.(Cont'd) p At the. completion of the internal disposition of the NCRs issued by TU Electric and Brown &' Root, and prior to the review by the NRC, Revision 4 of Drawing 2323-S1-0572 was issued to reflect design acceptance of the as-built rebar condition.
I 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN i
l The' objectives of this action plan were to:
l
}
Assess the design adequacy of the existing Unit I reactor cavity wall,
]
i Aosess the circumstances that led to the addition and 1
subsequent deletion of the subject rebar.
Review other cases of rebar omission for proper engineering i
documentation, 1
I Review pour cards to determine if current design drawings were used during. construction, 1
Review installation records for major embedments to determine if current design drawings were used during construction, Review procedures governing design cha.nges and verify their effectiveness, Determine if it was necessary to expand the scope of the Action Plan.
4.1 Scope and Methodolcay This action plan included an assessment of the design adequacy of the existing as-built condition of the reactor cavity wall and other areas within Units 1 & 2 where rebar was omitted.
Also included in this action plan was an evaluation of the engineering / field design change interface.
An analysis of the as-built reactor cavity wall was performed to evaluate the adequacy of the installed rebar, considering all applicable loading combinations. Engineering calculations with assumptions stated therein were completed to evaluate the subject wall with "as-installed" rebar between the 812-foot
(
and the 819-foot 1/2-inch level. A third-party reviewer verified the adequacy of the calculations.
?
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~RESULTS REPORT-q
,J1.
ISAP II.a.,
p (Cont'd)'
4.0' -CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
The circumstances and engineering evaluation thiat. led to the' L
provision for,.and sub'equent. deletion of, the' subject:
s rebar.in the reactor cavity. wall'were analyzed in light of design' intent and structural integrity of:the wall.
. All: identifiable' instances of robar omissions for Unita 16-2, as documented-in Project NCRs, were researched.. This research included al1 safety-related Seismic Category I building
~
structures.. Each-~ case was reviewed to. ascertain if proper engineering evaluation and documentation existed to support the disposition.of-the NCRs. Additional documentation was.
developed as required to insure appropriate NCR disposition.-
f To provide. increased. assurance char. all instances'of'
- rebar' omissions similar to. the subj ecr ease were identified,- a random sample of pour -cards was ' reviewed' to determine if the current design documents'were used during construction. ?The pour card. review determined whether.any revisions-to-the-y r
~ N, applicable. drawings issued;af ter the pour-was made: changed the required'rebar in the selected pour.
An overall review of~ procedures governing, design' changes was performed to verify the adequacy. of. methods for. controlling
'implemention of design. changes during-construction.. Emphasis was placed on review of the Project procedures' used to convey -
impending design changes'immediately affecting ongoing construction activity. 'The effectiveness'of proced2res controlling such construction activities was verified by reviewing implementation of all NCRs related to rebar placement, pour cards and records of installation of major embedments. The review of installation records for major embedmonts to determine if current design drawings were used during construction served as another " test" of the adequaf.y of n
controls implemented by the civil discipline. The' flow of activities initiated by engineering to convey impending design changes to the field as well as action leading towards appropriate construction hold were identified'and evaluated.
1 The results of the review of procedures for handling rebar
'l omissions and embedaents were evaluated to determine the potential applicability.to other areas within the civil engineering discipline. The results of the review of the engineering / field design change interface were evaluated to 1
determine if the scope of the review needed to be broadened to other disciplines.
I i
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,n..-,
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'RESULTS REPORT l,
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.J
' )L[
~ ISAP.II.a i
(Cont'd).
l 14.0 'CPRT ACTION PLAN'(Cont'd) 1 Although'not. required by the'results of the reviews discussed above, an assessment of the rebar. exposed as part of:the effort associated with ISAP II.b, " Concrete Compressive Strength" was madq. 'The rebar that had been exposed in each area was compared to thic specified by' design.
The overall process for' closure of this issue wasl reviewed by-the third-party.-
4.2 Participants Roles and Responsibilities The organizations and personnel that participated, in this -
effort are described.below with their respective scopes of
. work.-
.4.2.1 TUGCO. Nuclear Engineering (TNE) - Civil / Structural Discipline p
4.2.1.1 Scope Reviewed Project NCRs for,rebar omission cases.
Developed additional documentation as required to insure' appropriate
. J disposition of rebar omission NCRs.
Reviewed pour cards for rebar placements.
Reviewed pour cards for major einbedments.
Assisted in review of procedures governing design changes and control of construction activities.
i Assisted in overall engineering evaluation.
4.2.1.2 Personnel j
Mr. C. R. Hooton Project Civil Engineer
(
Mr. D. G. Patankar Civil / Structural Lead Engineer 1
4 i
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RESULTS REPORT
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ISAP.II.a'
!(Cont'd)'
l a;
4
.i
~
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. 4.0 CPRT ACTION' PLAN'(Cont'd) 1 4.2'.2. : Gibbs & Hill, Inc.
,s.
4.2.2.1 Scope o
w-Performed analysis / design
' calculations as required under this 30 j,
action plan, including-the required ~
- j design' review of these calculat' ions.
j r
t 4.2.2.2
' Personnel-
- Mr. E. L. Bezkor'
-Structural Job-
. Engineer Mr.
A.~-M. Kenkre Structural Squad-Leader
'Mr. S..Sengupta Senior. Engineer.
i O)'
4,,,. f<
Mr. C. Zion
' Senior Engineer i
l Mr. M. N. Shah Senior Engineer.
14.2.3: Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.'(SWEC) l l
4.2.3.1.
Scope.
.a s
Provided Specific Technical Issue Report (STIR) to address overall' rebar situation.
t Provided resolution and calculations in response to DIRs issued by the third party, j
i 4.2.3.2 Personnel Mr. R. Ciatto Asst. Lead Engineer
]
Mr. S. Malhotra Principal Civil Engineer Mr. D. Bhatia Civil Engineer
.[)
Mr.
R., Murray Civil Engine 6r y
j
a.
X y,:','yt(f[ll f f j ty.
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- pag 3-
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- 5 RESULTS REPORT j
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^~
ISAP II.a (Cont'd).
4
.4.0 CPRT-ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)'
4'. 2. 4 Third-Party Activities; x
4.'2.'4.1 Scope-
- Reviewed calculations. prepared by -
Gibbs & Hill,~Inc. and TNE..
I-Reviewed engineering / field design change interface..
i Overviewed NCR and pour. card 1
reviews.
l Reviewed SWEC calculations and DIR.-
resolutions.
Provided evaluation and overall conclusions, nh..
Prepared Results Report.
4.2.4.2 Personnel
~Mr. H. A. Levin
'TENERA.- CPRT t
-Civil / Structural Review Team Leader Dr..J. Honekamp TENERA - TRT Issues l
Technical Manager Mr. J. C. Miller TENERA - TRT Issues Manager-Mr. R. Sanan TENERA - Structural Engine <4r, Issue Coordinator Prof. M. Holley TENERA Consultant.-
Hansen/Holley &
j Biggs 4.3 Personnel Qualification Requirements
.p Third-party participants in the implementation-of this Action Plan met the personnel qualification and objectivity requirements of the CPRT Program Plan and its implementing procedures.
f
~
.c.
y-y..
Revision:
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?V ISAP II.a i
(Cont'd)-
1 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) ia
,0ther participants were qualified to the. requirements:of the f
'CPSES Quality Assurance. Program or.to the specific
" requirements of the CPRT Program Plan. ' Activities p'erformed:
by other than third party personnel were governed by the-applicable principles.of Section III.K, " Assurance.of CPRT.
j Program Quality", of the CPRT Program Plan.
4.4 Procedures; Calculations and evaluations performed by TNE Civil j
Engineering, Gibbs & Hill, and SWEC were performed in j
accordance with the procedures'normally applicable to those-activities for CPSES.
4.5 Standards / Acceptance Criteria Building' Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete,.
j
'ACI-318-71, and stipulations of Section 3.8 of the FSAR form j
'the basic standard / acceptance criteria for calculations
(
' performed under this action plan.
When ; documentation supporting. "use 'as-is" rebar omission approvals was found to.be insufficient, it was-supplemented as required to provide complete justification for prior j
engineering.judgements.
J l
i 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
'The principal concerns surrounding this issue are the adequacy of the existing Unit i reactor' cavity wall and the circumstances that
.I led to the addition of and subsequent deletion of rebar in that wall. These concerns and the third party assessment are addressed in Sections E.1-and 5.2 respectively. Five additional tasks were
_j established to datermine if similar situations exist elsewhere in
.l the plant and to assess any problems found. To accomplish these j
objectives, the third party investigation included:
Review of other cases of rebar omission.
Review of pour cards for rebar placement, Review of installation records for major embedments,
ry 4
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i, m
7
'Rovision:'-
'li j
Pags 9.of 30
..g o-
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RESULTS REPORT d',
ISAP II.a l
-(Cont'd) 4
, i-;
~
8 5.0 ' IMPLEMENTATION 0F. ACTION. PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd)
-.' Review o'f' procedures,'and na
<t 1
-. Determination.'of need to expand' Action Plan scope.
l These tasks.are addressed in Section-5.3 through.5.7 respectively.
Section-5.8 describes out-of-scope observations.
5.1 Assessment of the Desian Adequacy of the Existing Unit 1 Reactor-Cavity Wall-i As' describe'd in'Section 3.0,'the thickness of.the reactor cavity wall is 8 feet 6-1/2 inches.- This thickness is dictated by: biological shielding requirements. Structural-load carrying capabilities are then assessed to assure the designer that theidesign is; adequate.
.l In accordance with the. scope of this Action Plan, Gibbs & Hill prepared calculations (Reference 9.4) to investigate.the
-l
.,q adequacy of:the as-built rebar in the cavity wall between the' Q
812-foot and 819-foot 1/2 inch level..
s lt Three separate approaches were used in evaluating the as-built
-j wall. condition. These approaches are described briefly.as 1
follows:
-l Approach 1 The reactor cavity wall'was' analyzed assuming f
it to be'a thick-walled concrete cylinder j
without any rebar. This simplified analysis
~
demonstrated that when subjected to the most i
critical' loads the unreinforced concrete cylinder is still capable of sustaining'the load without loss of structural integrity.
Approach 2 The reactor cavity wall was analyzed as a ring with outside face hoop reinforcement alone carrying all the load. The calculations showed that the stress in the rebar was well below the yield strength of the steel. Therefore outside face hoop reinforcement alone is adequate to resist the hoop forces.
Approach 3 In this approach the reactor cavity wall was analyzed as a beam spanning from the base mat to a ring at the 819'-0 1/2" elevation where the rebar added per Revision 3 of drawing
n-
'Ravisiont
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-Pagsc 10 of 30 t
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~RESULTS REPORT 4
f
.P
- ISAP II.a (Cont'd).
i 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS-(Cont'd)-
2323-SI-0572 was subsequently included. This calculation demonstrated that there is approximately four times as much vertical-rebar specified as would be required for~the
-l
-postulated loads.
Based on these calcula'tions, as reviewed by the third party,
-it was concluded-that the Unit 1 reactor cavity wall, as constructed, is adequate to: resist the most critical load combination as required.per FSAR Seetion 3.8, Article 3.8.3.3.2.
I The-rebar that was the subject of the NRC's concern had'been
[
.added by the Structural Job. Engineer to minimize superficial' cracking at the corner.of the slots.. However, the third party concluded that even'if cracking were to occur at those
. locations, Lit would'be of no significance to the shielding
-function of the. wall'for the following reasons:
The cracks would normally remain closed due to the i:
presence of the circumferential rebar near the outer edge'of the. cavity wall.
Cracks-from the corners of the slots would tend not to be' perpendicular to the surface of the' cavity wall and L
thus would not represent a radiation streaming path.
Most of the cavity wall in the subject area has.
additional shielding provided:by concrete buttresses i
located outside the circumferential rebar.
Considering the above assessment, it was concluded that the~
as-built section of the Unit 1 reactor cavity wall meets the structural and shielding design requirements.
5.2 Assessment of Circumstances That Led to the Addition and i
Subsequent Deletion of the Subject Reinforcement Steel Based on professional experience, the Structural Job Engineer l
concluded that minor cracking of the concrete at the corners i
of the slots provided for'the neutron detectors could occur in j
the event of a LOCA. The Structural Job Engineer therefore l
estimated the additional quantity of rebar required to minimize this thermally-induced cracking. No backup calculations were prepared by the engineer to substantiate i
i j
H c.] ".
Revis'on:
.1 i
{
~4 Pags~ -
11 of.30
- a p g.
RESULTS REPORT i
'ISAP ll.a 3
(Cont'd) 5.0' IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN'AND DISCUSSION-OR RESULTS-(Cont this. decision.since the only purpose for the additionalt rebar was:to control superficial cracking. Structural drawing 2323-SI-0572,-Revision 2 was modified'to include'the additional rebar...
'After. receipt of-the drawingLin the-field, Brown & Root determined that the pour had already been made and issued NCR'
.C-669.to: document the discrepancy between. Revision.3 and the-as-built condition.. The Brown & Root NCR was dispositioned' under TUSI NCR CP-77-6.
The disposition of the NCR involved a review by-Gibbs'& Hill and TU Electric that concluded that the addition.of the rebar-was discretionary and thus did not affect-the structural integrity of.the wall. Revision 4 of the rebar drawing was subsequ'ently issued to reflect the.
actual as-built condition. 'At that time, no further actionJin.
the. disposition of this. NCR:was taken by Gibbs '& Hill ~or.TU'
-Electric, nor was any. required, since the design calculation of record' supported Revision'2, which was identical to Revision 4.
'This asses'ement of the circumstances led to a conclusion by
~
the third; party that the documentation of the circumstances j
regarding-the subject'omitted rebar was consistent with Project' procedures.
5.3 ' Review of Other' Cases of Reinforcement Bar Omission 1
A computerized and handwritten listing of civil / structural i
NCRs'that noted reinforcing steel omissions was obtained from the permanent plant records vault. Review of.this. listing indicated'~21 cases of rebar omission in Units 1 und'2 j
safety-related' Category I building structures in addition to.
the subject case. A complete listing of these 22 NCRs and their resolutions is provided in Appendix A to this report.
Review of these cases indicates that, except for the subject case, all of the omissions were due to errors in placement of
.j rebar. They were not caused by failure of the
]
engineering / field design change interface to convey impending
~{
design changes.
Thirteen of these NCRs pertained to missing dowels. Dowels are generally used to start additional rebar in the next pour,
.or to start rebar at different spacing. The function of the dowel is to provide continuity of a new bar into an old pour.
The industry accepted practice is to replace missing dowels j
1 x_ _ --_ - - -
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'Page- ' 12 of 30 :
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~ RESULTS REPORT O
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'ISAP II.a (Cont'd) d y.
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- 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd).
'l 4
~
by-drilling and grouting in the dowels. This practice was-followedJat CPSES and meets the intent'and purpose'of-3 applicable:ACI Codes.
-Six NCRs pertained to missing vertical or. horizontal rebar an'd-
'l two NCRs' pertained to missing shear ties. Each of these NCRs 1
was dispositioned by the Project.
The original NCR dispositions _ ware based on engineering judgment in 11 of the 21 cases.. Supplementary calculations
.' {
were prepared.by the Project to verify these ' judgments u In all-cases.the supplementary calculations confirmed the I
original judgements. The most-common judgement-involved; li t
estimating the length of rebar to be grouted in place for the' repair of concrete with missing rebara This is a' simple
)
calculation which was included in the disposition for some of the other 11 NCRs.
!(
i j
J pf In one instance of'an NCR involving a column where a N
calculation previously existed, a review of that calculation
. revealed that an incorrect assumption had been ussd'in the original ~ disposition.(the dowel pla_ cement was accepted:
use-as-is based on a calculation which assumed symmetrical
' dowel placement when the dowels were actually' arranged
~
asymmetrically). 'DIR-D-0692 was writtei to document this error. Rea'nslysis of the column by SWEC using the as-built asymmetrical reinforcement' demonstrated that the use-as-is disposition was' acceptable. The third party reviewed the.
4 analysis and concurred with the results.
j The third party reviewed all 22 NCRs and concluded that they were appropriately dispositioned.
5.4. Review of Pour Cards for Rg nforcement Bar Placement l
Poar cards are maintained to document the installation of rebar and other embedments, the date, location and quantity of each concrete pour, the field drawings used to establish the pour. requirements and the documentation of inspections perforwed.- Over 7,600 pour cards exist for Units 1 and 2 and all safety-related Seismic Category I buildings. Each of these pour cards contain documentation of inspection for 3
verification of any rebar installation or major embedments.
A 4
.r random sample of these pour cards was selected to verify that:
,t i
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RESULTS' REPORT
~
9
-w ISAP.II'a Y
i j,
(Cont'd).
1 Y
5'.0 ' < IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION' PLAN 'AND DIS'CUSSION OR RESULTS (C$nt'd) the reinforcement steel drawing revision number'and any.
7
.deoign. change documents referenced 'on the' pour card -
l match.the applicable design documents; or.
'that any discrepancies between the pour card and design
]
drawings with respect to rebar had been appropriately q
documented,by Brown &! Root'and/or.TU Electric NCRs.
In all cases reviewed, the rebar placement documents'_
referenced on the pour card were.in' agreement with"the
- applicable dasign documents.
5.5 Reviw of Installation-Records for Major Embodments
]
A review of NCRs and' pour cards.for major.embedmonts-was l
performed to determine if current design drawings were used
.i
~
during construction'.'LThis review was similar to the review-
.j for rebar.(Sections 5.3 and 5.4) except that it exa' mined the 1!
1 1
'NCRs and' pour cards associated with the placement'of~the major 1
embedments in'th'a Unit.1 ' reactor building. However, in this
~
case.the number of NCRs and pour cards associated with major embedments was considerably smaller and therefore a 100%-
review was performed.
a A major sabedmont isJdefined as a support or support bracket whose location ~was predetermined by the fixed location'of the i
component attached to the support or bracket. The embedment types reviewed included:
'l Valve isolation tank' supports, Equipment hatch cover supports.
Reactor vessel supports,
' Polar crane support brackets, Rotating platform support brackets,
)
n' Reactor coolant pump tie supports,
)
Steam generator lower lateral supports, q
j Steam generator upper lateral supports, v
'E Fuel transfer tube supports.
)
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' Revision:
1-0, a Paga
'14 of 30' 4
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p-RESULTS REPORT-sp}
g h4 ISAP II.a
.a E
+
(Cont'd) i
.1 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION: PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd)-
These nine major ~ embedment types: represent a total;of 124 embedments. All 124 of-these~embedments were reviewed. The:
NCR review did not identify anyl deviations associated with the placement of these embedments.
i a
The pour card review confirmed'that the drawing revision' numbers and change documents referenced on the pour cards were in agreement with the applicable design documents.-
5.6 Review of Procedures i
A two-step process involving a review of the procedures and a determination of the effectiveness of those procedures was y
used to assess the adequacy of the controls governing the placement. of rebar and other major embedmonts.
The procedure J
review was based on identifying the extent of administrative
-controls related to the issuange of: design documents, including design: changes, and'the.inste11ation~and' inspection'
, Jg of embedded items prior to concrete placement. LThe'results of I
this1 effort.are discussed in Section 5.6.1 and-5.6.2 below.
~
~
The datormination of the effectiveness of.these procedures was y
based on the results of the.NCR' review-(Section 5.3), the i
' reinforcement pour card review (Section 5.4) and the review of
.NCRs and pour cards associated with major embedments in-the Y
Unit i rsaccor building (Section 5.5).-
5.6.1 Document Control Procedures t
During the initial phases of the Project through' May 1976, design changes were issued exclusively by j'
revising the appropriate engineering. drawings. Project procedure No. DCP-5 then became the document control procedure for all design documents, including changes, and remained in effect until August, 1980. At that
]
time it was incorporated in DCP-3, Revision 10.
DCP-3 is currently-in effect, l
Provisions were made in DCP-5,.to issue design changes 4
either by issuing revised design drawings or by design change documentation generated either by site engineering or by Gibbs & Hill. At the time of incorporation of DCP-5 into DCP-3, Component Modification Cards (CMCs) and Design Change Authorizations (DCAs) were the exclusive' means by which
.((
the design could be changed.
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Pass 15 of:30 n
RESULTS REPORT c
- \\ ^) '
1 ISAPLII.a
_(Cont'd)L i
t.
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF' ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR'RESULTS'(Cont'd) i i
~All design change documents.were reviewed and approved by Gibbs & Hill.
~
L 5.6.2 Installation and Inspection' Procedures The. current procedures governing the activities prior j
to the placement of concrete are:
35-1195-CCP-14 Generation of pour. card, pour
-number assigned to particular i
pour, concrete pre-pour inspection and pour-card sign-off (construction procedure),
'i QI-QP-11.0-2' Reinforcing steel, miscellaneous'ateel and embedded item placement-r~~s inspection (Quality
()
Control Instruction),
QI-QP-11.0-3 Concrete and mortar placement inspection (Quality Control
. Instruction).
)
-These proceduras require that rebar and other miscellaneous / embedded steel that is'to be included in a particular pour, be' checked and verified against the applicable design drawings prior to concrete placement.
As noted above, construction procedure.35-1195-CCP-14 requires that a pour card be generated with a pour number assigned for the particular pour. For all Category I structures the -following pour card sign-of f is mandatory prior to concrete placement:
Field Engineering (Surveyors)- responsible l
for the correct location, line and grade of
{
all items that constitute a pour, Brown & Root Construction Supervisors -
{
responsible for 100% inspection of all items
'{
concerning the pour, i
TNE Civil Engineer - responsible for conducting spot-checks and monitoring overall activities involving the pour,
'l
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p7 RESULTS REPORT e
'w s' ISAP II.a (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd)
QC Inspectors - QC inspectors of. civil,-
mechanical and electrical disciplines, responsible for verification per QC procedures in.their particular discipline.
Verification of proper signoff by other j
responsible parties.
Construction procedure 35-1195-CCP-14. Rev. 0 was introduced in March 1975..The procedure's basic requirements regarding pour card signoff and inspection
,(pre-placement) have remained essentially the same t
since its inception.
Quality control inspection of concrete pours involving rebar or other embedments was performed in accordance with Quality Control Instruction CP-QCP-2.4 until July, 1978. Per this procedure, QC inspectors were required to signoff a checklist for rebar and embedded items.
/'
inspection prict to concrete placement, in addition to 1
signing off on pour cards., After July 1978, quality j
control activities performed under QC Instruction CP-QCP-2.4 were split into two separate instructions, QI-QP-11.0-2 and QI-QP-11.0-3.
5.6.3 Construction Hold Procedures In addition to the review of procedural controls described above, the third party reviewed the flow of activities initiated by engineering to convey impending design changes to the field.
In March 1977, a Construction Hold Notice (CHN) form was instituted by Project memorandum TUF-2731 (Reference 9.5).
The Project instructed G&H in New York to inform the field via TWX of any pending changes to drawings previously issued to the field and to follow up with the CHN form. Although not formally proceduralized, the CHN process was instituted as a construction management tool to minimize rework through this advanced notification.
It was not instituted as a QA program requirement for control of work activities.
The process was proceduralized in February 1980 by incorporation into Procedure CP-EP-9.0, " Construction
.,c Hold Notice Procedure".
Since March 1977, 451 CHNs were processed, although none was issued for the subject case.
3.
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.Rsvicions.,\\1 ij Paga 17'of 30 d
j jaq.
RESULTS REPORT-i j
D)
ISAP II.a I
(Cont'd)-
- l I
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS. (Cont'd) f 5.6.4 Procedural Adequacy i
Based on this review of the procedures, and on the determination of the effectiveness of the' procedures as 1
evidenced by the discussions in Section.5.3, 5.4'and.
'5.5,-it was concluded that the' controls associated with-concrete pours, placement of rebar and/or other. major
~
embedments were adequate to require that installations are in accordance with the design documents released for construction.
Although th'e existence of a formalized CHN procedure and the processing of a CHN for.the subject. case might-have forestalled the problem that became the issue of this ISAP, the fact that a CHN was not processed does not constitute a violation.of the QA. program'as it i
relates to document control or. installation and' l
inspection'procedn es.
5.7 Determination of Need to Expand the Action Plan Scope In order to develop further confidence'in the accuracy of the-placement of rebar at CPSES, the third party elected to assess the actual placement'of rebar-that had been exposed as
. I part of the effort associated with ISAP II.b, " Concrete
- 1 Compressive Strength". There were 87 such exposed areas. The
]
Project generated as-built sketches of the areas exposed. The third party verified the as-built sketches and compared the 1
rebar in the areas exposed to the design requirements. A number of discrepancies were observed and were documented via DIRs. These discrepancies are discussed below.
i 1
5.7.1 Detailing Changes / Errors t
Two of the discrepancies were determined to have been I
caused by rebar being installed differently from that j
specified by the design because of the different
{
detailing by the supplier of the rebar (Bethlehem Steel l
Corp.).
In both cases the Project evaluated the change
)
and determined that the change did not affect the ability of the structure to perform its intended 5
function.
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J m
RESULTS REPORT
- {
CV ISAP II.a I
(Cont'd)
~~5.0' IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) 1 I
DIR D-473: As-Built' Field Sketch FE-8181 The design drawings specified'C-type shear. ties'at 12
. inches.'on center horizontally and 6 inches on center
')
vertically. The exposed ' area as-built did not show -
'1 shear ties placed per design drawings.
.A review of the
{
detailer's drawing revealed that the detailer had.
fabricated two L-shaped ties to replace each C-type shear ties. Further review revealed that this substitution was 1nstituted by the-detailer without engineering approval. The Project performed calculations to qualify this substitution. A generic DCA 31557 was then issued authorizing this change in.
all areas of the plant.
DIR-474: As-Built Sketch FE-8226~'
1 The design:drawines.specify the' vertical reinforcement;
':()i.
- 11 and #9 rebar. Project ' review of the 'deta11er's
'l
- f-to be #9 rebar. The exposed area was found to contain
.I
~
drawings showed #111 dowels /rebar (embedded.in the foundation mat) to be spliced with #9 rebar. Therefore rebar in the exposed rea appear to be properly installed'in accordance with the detailers-drawing.
5.7.2 Spacing / Installation Discrepancies Three discrepancies involving' spacing requirements were identified. Two of.the discrepancies were related to non-uniformly placed rebar and one discrepancy involved exceeding the ACI code spacing requirements for non-contact lap splices. These discrepancies have been evaluated by the Project. The Project performed calculations that demonstrated the~ adequacy of the as-built conditions.
DIR D-475: As-Bu11t Sketch FE-8225 Shear ties in the exposed area were found to be present but placed non-uniformly. Per design drawings, shear ties should have been installed at 12 inches on center horizontally and 8 inches on center vertically.
Because some of the as-built spacings exceed the design
~.
spacing, a DIR'was generated to document th1s
' - l, deviation. The Project analyzed and confirmed the
'?
adequacy of the as-built condition.
[
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Page 19 of 30 t
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.RESULTS REPORT
>O ISAP II.a-(Cont'd) 5".0<
IMPLEMENTATION'0F ACTION. PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd)'
w.
DIR-D-476: As-Built Sketch FE-8137
'An area that was' exposed did not' appear to have rebar per design drawings.: Additional chipping was y
performed to expose the adjacent vertical' rebar. As a result of additional chipping, it was determined that vertical reber was present but not uniformly placed., Calculations performed by the Project demonstrated the adequacy of the as-built condition.
DIR D-477: As-Built Sketch FE-8151 FE-8151,-Rev. 1 and~
FE-8151, Rev. 6 During field verification of the expos 6d area the
. spacing of two vertical rebar appeared.to be in excess of.ACI' code requirements..To resolve this concern,'the Project chipped additional area 'and produced. as-built
.j sketch FE-0151, Rev. 1.
The enlarged chipped area
.j revealed a cond1 tion that appeared to be two rebar Q-missing and two non-contact lap splices in excess of j
the ACI code requirement'of 6 inches. This concern was documented via DIR D-477, Rev. 1.
In order to understand the actual situation fully, the q
Project chipped additional area as dccumented in.
j as-built sketch FE-8151, Rev. 6.
The additional chipping revealed that the number of vertical rebar specified by design are present, but are installed non-uniformly, and at 4' locations the non-contact lap splice spacing is in excess of the ACI code requirements.
Evaluation of this condition by the Project (Reference 9.6) demonstrated that the as-built condition has no effect on the structural 1
integrity of wall. The evaluation of these lap splices makes use of calculations that are based on the 1
strength of the splice. Testing currently being performed at Cornell University is focused on the
]
relative strength of non-contact lap splices of i
different spacing and will be used to support these j
calculations (Reference 9.6).
The third party has reviewed the Project evaluation and concurs with the conclusion pending completion of the tests at Cornell.
(Reference 9.7)
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Page; 20'of 30
.9
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'; R7 RESUI.TS REPORT s -
~ISAP.II.a-
.(Cont'd) ~
J.
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd).
$.7.3.0ther Discrepancies
'.Three 1n' stances wherein minor-discrepancies were idantified were also investigated. The Project i
-evaluated.these. discrepancies and confirmed the; adequacy:of the as-built condition..
]
DIR D-2357: As-Built Sketch FE-8220, FE-8171 and FE-8206 Field engineering as-built sketches reported the rebar
.(
diameter to,be 1-1/16 inches versus 1-1/8 inches (#9
'j rebar) specified in the-design drawings. ' Based-on a q
more precise measurement.it was concluded by both'SWEC
]
and the third party that the subject-bars are actually-
-1
- 9 bars as required by design.
t DIR D-2358: As-Built' Sketch FE-8169'
, p' In the as.-built sketch,. column reinforcement was l
' :(
' labeled to be #11 rebar'instead of the #10 specified by-J design.- From a strength point of view,' #11 rebar is
]
^
better than #10 rebar.. Installation of #11 rebar in this case is.therefore acceptable.
i i
Goused~Bar FE-8173 Durin8 verification of the "As-Built" sketches,'a column rebar was found gouged.
It is considered l
probable that the gouge was made during the chipping
)
operation. The Project analyzed the column without l~
taking credit for the rebar. The analysis confirmed-that the column is' adequate to perform its design
'l l
function.
L 5.7.4 Conclusions Regarding Action Plan Scope Based on the breadth of the original Action Plan, the satisfactory conclusion from its investigation and the
]
l acceptability of the as-built conditions. observed j
l-whenever rebar was exposed during the CPRT l
investigations, the scope of the Action Plan as l
completed was concluded to be acceptable.
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Page 21;.of 30-m,
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RESULTS REPORT' i
7 J
ISAP.II.a
.(Cont'd).
't
.a.
5.0-IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR'RESULTS~(Cont'd)-
(
5.8' Out'-of' Scope Ob'servations
.j Since the action' plan was initiated..a nuinber of' instances have arisen in'which rebar was exposed. In each case, the
. observed rebar was compared to the design requirements.
In' 1
most instances the rebar conformed to-thoee design requirements. The following discussion identifies four
~ discrepancies that were identified:
Q' ' '
DIR D-478: Condensate Tank, Reactor Water Make-up, Refueling
'{
Water Tank Tunnel Walls for Unit 1 and Unit-2 J
The Refueling Water Tank Tunnel wall corner, at.the interface of the refueling tank of Unit 2, was damaged when'a truck
'j
-backed into the wall. At that time it was discovered that the extended. corner of the wall, overlits entire height, had no
]
reinforcement *. Further investigation into pipe tunnel walls o
indicated that the extended corners of condensate water
]
storage-tank ~ and the refueling water storace tank pipe walls
\\
-have similar. discrepancies. These walls were evaluated for postulated. missiles (Reference FSAR ~ Section 3.5.6.4) hitting the walls'and potentially dislodging the unreinforced sections., The Project-evaluation, based on SWEC Topical Report (Reference 9.8), demonstrated that the unreinforced i
sections have. sufficient ' strength to withstand these postulated missile loads without failure. This. evaluation was reviewed and concurred with by the third party (Reference
.)
9.9)..
Fuel Building East Wall l
1 During the seismic gap cleaning operation (ISAP II.c), the j
chamfered edge of the wall at EL 860'-0" cracked and was 1
partially dislodged. The east face of the' wall was chipped, cleaned and repaired. During the chipping and cleaning i
operation, it was discovered that a #4 face rebar was present
]
but placed farther from the face than specified by the design
-drawing. NCR C85-101778 was issued'and dispositioned
)
"use-as-is" based on a Project cvaluation. This evaluation
}
was reviewed and concurred in by the third party.
j I
Beckuse the wall abuts a round tank wall, the end of the wall does not have 2-90* corners. One of the corners is extended and ends in I
an acute angle.
j
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Pags 22 of 30
< \\]j RESULTS REPORT
/
ISAP II.a (Cont'd).
5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION' PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.9 Summary of DIRs Nine DIRs were written to document discrepancies identified during the implementation of this ISAP. These DIRs were g
related to five-areas.
DIR-E-1054 and 2-1223 identified the subject case.'
Because the structural integrity is not affected and because Project procedures were followed, these DIRs were closed as observations.
i DIR-D-0692 identified a discrepancy-involving th.
assumptions used in dispositioning an NCR. Since the 1
third party review concluded that the'NCR was properly dispositioned, the DIR'has been closed as an observation.
DIR-D-473 and D-474, identified discrepancies between i
the as-built condition and the design drawing caused by
~
.V changes made by the rebar detailer. Since~the rebar
~
specified by the detailer were equivalent to sr' larger than that specified by design,'these DIRs hAve been-closed'as observations.
1 DIR-D-475, D-476 and D-477 identify' discrepancies
-e related to spacing of rebar. Each of these instances has been evaluated, and it was confirmed that the load-carrying capacity of the structure was not affected. However, since the discrepancies involve the failure to meet ACI code requirements, they are a
classified as deviations.
1 DIR-D-478 documents a discrepancy wherein the rebar specified by the designer could not be bent as sharply 1
as specified..This resulted in the rebar not extending into the extended corner of the wall as far as called i
for in the design.
Evaluation demonstrated that the i
t wall still retained sufficient strength to withstand j
l.
patulated loads. Therefore this DIR was closed as an j
observation.
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Pags
.23 of 30 y
RESULTS' REPORT kI ISAP II.a'
' ( Con't ' d)..
. g
.5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF' ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OR RESULTS (Cont'd) m DIR-D-2357 and D-2358 documented apparent
' discrepancies. LBothlwere closed as observations when further evaluation revealed the presence of equivalent or larger rebar than specified.
j
.1 The three DIRs involving rebar spacing'were classified as 1
deviations. _However,:on>the basis of the calculatio'ns
- I performed ithe as-built. condition was: demonstrated to have.no
- (
effect on the structural.iutegrity of the' walls involved..
t Therefore tne deviations are not safety significant and DIRs-
"]
D-475 D-476 and D-477 are closed. The' existence of these q
DIRs suggests the existance of a trend. :Hewever, since the DIRs-in each area involved-discrepancies in different categories and because'none of the discrepancies affected the-integrity of'the structure,'such a trend is,not-adverse.-
)
i The number of discrepancies found and the' nature of these l
discrepancies'are-not considered unusual occurrences'at large 9]f l construction sites. However. the lack of any Project
.(
documentation identifying or authorizing lthose' discrepancies, l
indicates a potential weakness in the-Quality Control Inspection program at CPSES. As discussed above.the structural integrity was not affected in any of the instances
'and.the original design margin remained. Thus,'further?
investigation of the'issuaiof rebar. placement is not.
Ll necessary. The.results of this ISAP. investigation'have been I
submitted ~.co the QA/QC Review Team for evaluation.during the collective evaluation phase of the QA/QC Adequacy Program.-
I
6.0 CONCLUSION
S 1
The technical issue identified by the TRT involved the omission of 1
rebar from a Unit i reactor cavity concrete placement. Luring the investigation of this issue it was determined that the rebar in questien does not affect the structural integrity of the reactor cavity. wall and that all appik,able Project procedures appear to
-have been properly followed.
4
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Rsvision:'
l' Pego 24 of 30 i '-
;wg "RESULTS REPORT ISAP II.a=
L(Cont'd) 6.0. CONCLUSIONS (Cont'd)
The-investigation-of this issue also revealed that:
- The review.of NCRs and pour cards involving rebar placement-and major'embedment placement did notLidentify any circumstances,similar to the subject case.
' - : Project procedures for control of concrete pours.and placement
,of rebar.were adequate'to' assure proper installation.
- -Although some reber elements identified in exposed areas were
.not in accordance'with design, none of the situations affected
' structural: integrity and'no adverse trends were identified.
Therefore,: the ~ administrative controls 4.sd the resulting placement of rebar is~ adequate to meet or exceed design requirements.
7.0 ONGOING ACTIVITIES fT
- (,,/
The testing of non-contact lap splices at Corne11' University is ongoing and is expected to provide confirmation of the validity of assumptions made'in evaluating the spacing of non-contact lap u-splices. This activity is scheduled for completion in October 1987..The third party will review these test results and issue a supplemant to this-report, if appropriate.
8.0 ACTION TO PRECLUDE REOCCURRENCE OF THE ISSUE No further action is required.
9.0. REFERENCES 9.1 USNRC letter to TU Electric Company Dockcts #50-445 & 50-446, dated September 18, 1984.
-i 9.2 NUREG-0797-Supplement No. 8 " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2", Appendix K, Page K-52, February 1985.
9.3 GTN 19823 R. E. Hersperger to H. C. Schmidt, " Reactor Cavity Rebar", July 11, 1977.
k-
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.RESULTS REPORT-
-1 y
N ISAP'II.'a (Cont'd)
'9.0' REFERENCES-(Cont'd)-
9.4
~'
Gibbs & Hill Calculations No. SRB-115C,' Set. 5, Rev. 0, "R B 3'
- 1 Cavity Wall'Between Elevation'812'-0" to Elevation 819_'-0".
9.5' TUF-2731, C. H..Gatchell to-H. C..Schmidt,'" Construction Hold
-Notice", March 1, 1977.
-4
- 9.6 SWEC's' Calculation, 16345/6-CS(S)-238, Rev. O.
l 9.7 -Memorandum, M. J.:Holley, Jr..to J. Miller, "SWEC Calculation, 16345/6-CS(S), Rev..O, ' Structural Adequacy'ef the L-A Wall in-Rm..189 of Aux. Bldg. Based on As-Built Conditions'",
4 09/21/87.
~
9.8 "SWECO 7703/EMTR 801,' Appendix B, "Empirica1' Design forl Local-Response", September 1977.
9.9 Memorandum, M. J. Holley,-Jr.'to J. Miller, "S&W Calculation-
- 16345/6-CS(B)-117, Rev. 0 ' Technical Justification for the Disposition of DIR #D-0478'", 09/21/87.
l i
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Paga 26 of 30 g-s.
RESULTS REPORT 1
i 'l ISAP II.a L
(Cont'd)
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY
OF REBAR OMISSION CASES SR.
NCR SUPPORTING NO.
NO.
ITEM DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION REMARKS ( }
1 C-669 Reactor Building #1 Use As Is TUF-3239 Calc. Book No.
(Subject Reactor Cavity Wall SRB 115C Case)
Between El. 812'-0" and Set 5 819'-1/2" NC 2
C-267 Auxiliary Building Use As Is DC/DDA-112 Calc. Book No.
Mat at E1. 790'-6" S AB-113C,
6-#7 Shear ties Omitted Set 1, OC 3
C 735 Fuel Building at EL.
Use As Is DC/DDA-361 No calculations 810'-6" vertical dowels were required r"'
not installed for to resolve the
(,T) equipment pad.
NCR.
(These dowels were not required as equipment mounting details were to be issued later reflect-ing exact dowel require-ment) 4 C-763 Auxiliary Building Wall Use As Is DC/DDA-216 Calc. Book No.
4'-4" South of 7A Col.
SMI 102C 2-#8 dorizontal Rebars Set 2 omitted from wall.
NC 5
C-789 Fuel Building #1 Repair DC/DDA-679 Calc. Book No.
Column at 4-F/D-F (drill and SFB 1341 2-f11 Dowels at El.
Set 2 810'-6" Omitted.
NC y
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(
Page 27. of-30
'1
.W RESULTS REPORT-(
ISAP II.a
.(Cont'd)
APPENDIX A'-
-(Cont'd) i.
.SR..
NCR SUPPORTING U)
NO.
NO.
ITEM DESCRIPTION' DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION' REMARKS "64 C-792 R1:
' Aux. Bldg..,
' Repair (Drill-GHF 2743.
.No calculations
~
Elevator Wall;
&' grout.&' cut required'to rebars at E-A. Wall misdrilled resolved the.
E1. 831'-6"-
.C-806 Auxiliary Building' Use As,Isi DC/DDA-486 Calc. Book No.'-
'12-#8 Wa11' vertical.
SAB 124 C1 rebars'at column Set =1' i
locations E-A/4-A.'
OC E-A/3-A E-A/6-A and E-A/7-A were.omitted.
8 C-809 Auxiliary Building Use As Is DC/DDA-558.
Calc. Book No.
construction opening No. 1342
'betwoen column lines Set 8 6-A & 7-A on' column OCNL-line K-A 6-#10' additional
'NC rebars abova opening at EL. 810'-6" omitted..
9 C-810
. Reactor Building #1 Repair (Drill DC/DDA-477 Calc.. Book No.
Elevator shaft wall, and grout 9-#9 SMI 102 C,
)
9-#9 and 2-#4 dowels dowels. 2-#4 Set 3 omitted at slab EL.
to be NC 832'-6".
installed from EL.
832'-6")
10 C 811
. Reactor Building #1, (Repair) Drill DC/DDA-696 Calc. Book No.
46-#9 Dowels (Vertical) and Grout SMI 102 C, omitted.at S.G.
Set 2 Compartment #1 Wall EL.
OCNL j
832'-6"
- HCP 32039 NC l
O
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RESULTS REPORT A.)
ISAP II.a
'(Cont'd)
APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
SR.
. SUPPORTING NO.-
NO.
ITEM DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION REMARKS (1) 11:
C-815 Safeguard Building #1, Use As Is GHF 2186 No calculations 10-#8 dowels for required to horizontal rebars running resolve the NCR.
across construction (Construction opening in wall on 7-S opening re-between C-S & D-S-located.to i
provide enough embedment length for #8 bars, eliminating the i
need for dowels )
17 C-858 Fuel Building, 1-#9 Repair GHF 2287' Calc. Book No.
G vertical wall dowel (Drill and SFB 1341, omitted at Mat EL.
Set 1 810'-6".
NC 13 C-974 Safeguard Building #1, Repair DC/DDA-1734 Calc. Book No.
6-#8 dowels for slab' (Drill and SSB 108C, at EL. 841'-6" were Grout)
Set 1 omitted.
OC j
14 C-1155 Auxiliary Building, Repair Items DC/DDA-2250 Calc Book No.
Following column dowels 1 & 2, (Drill SAB-125C1 were omitted:
and Grout),
Set 6
- 1. Col.at 7-A/G-A,8-#10 Use As Is for OC 3
- 2. Col.at 8-A/G-A,4-#10 Items 3 & 4
- 3. Col.at 7-A/H-A,4-#10
- 4. Col.at 8-A/H-A,4-#10
' 15es C-1168 Auxiliary Building, Use-as-is DC/DDA-2250, SWEC Calc.
l]
Column 7-A/G-A Rev. 1
- CS(S)98 Elv. 873'-0" NC l
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Pags 29 of 30-(
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ISAP II.a (Cont'd)
APPENDIX A (Cont'd)
SR.
NCR-SUPPORTING NO.
NO.
ITEM DESCRIPTION DISPOSITION DOCUMENTATION REMARKS (
116 C-1275 Safeguard Building #1, Use.As Is for For Item 1 &
Calc. Book Nos Following dowels for wall Items 1 & 2.
2 DCA-3247, SSB-115C. OC on column line 2-S were Repair for For Item Set 1, and omitted..
Item 3 (Drill 3 DCA-3581 SSB 1343
- 1. 3-#10 per dwg. SI-0656 and Grout)
Set 11
?
- 2. 6-#8 & 6-#4 per dwg.
Sb 0625, Sect. 19-19 NC
- 3. 32-#8 per dwg. S1-0624
'Section 16-16 i
17 C-1534 Reactor Building #2, Repair CPP-A-2386 Calc. Book No.
Compartment #1 Wall 11 (Drill and SRB 1342 11-#9 vertical dowels Grout)
Set 8
(N omitted.
NC t) 18 C-1653 Reactor Building #2, Use As Is DCA-5536 Cale. Book No.
3 rows of additional and DCA-SRB 122C shear ties omitted 5632 Set 4, between EL. 991'-6" OC and 997'-6".
19 C-2221 Safeguard Building Use As Is DCA-7358 Calc. Book No.
- 2, EL 873-4" roof SSB-2368 slab between SET 12 13-S & 14-S and NC F-S & E.5-S 8-#10.rebars missing
.20 C-81-0243 Reactor Building #2, Repair Procedure Calc. Book No.
Compartment Wall (Drill and CCP-12 SRB 1342 4-#7 dowels omitted.
Set 10 NC mv
5 M, Rsvision 1
t-7,.
Pass l-30'of:30-3
. p]g' l
RESULTS REPORT.
1A ISAP II.a (Cont'd) ij APPENDIX A i
s
- (Cont 'd).-
]
E SR. -
NCR SUPPORTING L NO.
NO.
ITEM DESCRIPTION
' DISPOSITION-DOCUMENTATION REMARKS (
E 21!
C-82iO523 Reactor Buil'ing #1, (Rework)
DCA-13353 Calc.' Book'No.
d Two rows of.#6 Z bars SRB:122C.
-omitted at EL.-820'-8".
. Set 6 OC.
' 22.,
- C-82-1079 Reactor Building #2,
.Use As Is GTT'8985-No calculations
- 9:U Shsped. dowels for
.DCA-14261 required =to-Reactor l Coolant pump
' resolve the t.
-pad omitted.in NCR...(Omission.
[
Compartments 2-& 3.
was not of~
structural significance.):
f(
LEGEND:
OC-
- Original calculation-
' NC 4 -. - New calculation-
.0CNL - Original calculation not located
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1
,d,-
COMANCHE PEAK RESPONSE TEAM l
RESULTS REPORT 1
i ISAP:
I.c
Title:
Train C Conduit and Supports REVISION 1 l
u
.f'%
O 10 76 BY i
Issue Coo dinator Date oluin
-u Re h Team Leader N
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Date '
Y.
< 4.
/0 f2 !ff'1 Jnif/W. Beck, Chairman CPRT-SRT Date t
-e 1
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Rcvicion:
l' Pags 1 of 68 l
yr~
RESULTS REPORT e
i
\\s-ISAP I.c E
H Train C Conduit and Supports
'I m.
1
.i 1.0. DESCRIPTION OF ISSUE IDENTIFIED BY NRC (Reference 9.1)-
a The Nuclear Regulatory' Commission.(MRC) Technical Review Team (TRT) i
. examined the.non-safety-related conduit support installation in l
selected ~ seismic Category I' areas of the plant. The support-installation >for non-safety-related conduit.that is less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter was inconsistent with seismic i
requirements, and no. evidence could be found that substantiated the adequacy of the installation for non-safety-related ' conduit of any.
~
size. According to Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 9.2) and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 (Reference 9.3), the seismic Category II and' non-seismic items should be designed in such a way that their failure would not adversely affect:the function of safety-related components or cause injury to occupants of the control room.
2.0 ACTION IDENTIFIED BY NRC
'j The NRC (Reference 9.1) specified that the following action'should
. r--.
be taken on the Train C conduit (non-safety-related) and supports issue.
"Accordingly, TUEC shall propose a program that assures the adequacy of.the seismic support system installation for non-safety-related conduit in all seismic Category I areas of the plant as follows:
1.
Provide the results of seismic analysis which demonstrates that all non-safety-related conduit and their support systems, satisfy the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
2.
Verify that non-safety-related conduit less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter, not installed in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29, satisfy applicable design requirements."
ISAP I.c was formerly titled " Electrical Conduit Supports". The title has been changed to reflect the fact that ISAP I.c pertains l
only to non-safety-related conduit.
Safety-related conduit and supports are being addressed in Discipline-Specific Action Plan VIII.
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Prga 2 of 68 a
RESULTS REPORT
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ISAP I.c f
j (Cont'd) j
3.0 BACKGROUND
Seismic requirements for non-Category I structures are defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 9.2), NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.7.2 (Reference 9.4), and CPSES FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 (Reference 9.3).
The seismic qualification acceptance criteria are verification that Train C conduit supports and anchorages will maintain their structural integrity or, assuming that failure
}
occurs, verification that they will not adversely affect the function of safety-related components or cause injury to occupants of the control room. Alternatively, passive seismic restraints (e.g., aircraft cable restraints) can be installed to prevent collapse in the event of support failure and therefore preclude unacceptable interactions.
For Unit 1 and commen areas, the seismic adequacy of Train C j
hardware was originally addressed by the Project through the CPSES Damage Study Program (Reference 9.5).
This program included an assessment of potential seismic interactions between non-seismic commodities and safety-related commodities in seismic Category I buildings. The assessment included Train C conduit runs as source
[
}
commodities where conduit diameters were greater than 2 inches.
j J
The purpose of the Damage Study Program was to demonstrate that the failure of adjacent non-seismic items due to a Safe Shutdown l
Earthquake (SSE) would not impair the function of seismic Category i
I systems and components or affect the safety of control room operators, as defined in Positions C.I.a through C.1.q of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
The Damage Study, which was performed in 1983, involved numerous walkdowns to evaluate all potential interactions to the acceptance criteria developed for the study. Methods for resolution of potential l
interactions consisted of analysis, evaluation, use of barriers, i
application of administrative controls, or addition of seismic supports or restraints (e.g., aircraft cable). Each of these activities included pertinent requirements of the CPSES QA program.
Maintenance of the Damage Study Program was performed in accordance with Reference 9.6.
For Unit 2, Train C conduit greater than 2 inches in diameter has been designed for seismic loading to the same criteria as Train A &
I B (safety-related) conduit. Thus, it was not necessary to consider i
these Train C conduit runs as potential source commodities in Unit 2.
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1 Page 3 of 68
- y RESULTS REPORT
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ISAP I.c
.(Cont'd)
3.0 BACKGROUND
(Cont'd)
For both Units 1 and 2 and common areas, the support of conduit less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter was assumed to'be adequate. This assumption was based upon consideration of the inherent capacity of the' anchorage and supports for these relatively lightly loaded installations. Uncontrolled calculations were generated in support of this assumption. Accordingly, conduit less than or' equal-to 2 inches in diameter was not considered in the Damage Study Program.
An inspection of the Train C. conduit system was conducted as part of the TRT activity in 1984.. The inspection identified a concern l
(TRT Issue I.c) that the support installation.for non-safety-related conduit may be unsatisfactory. More specifically, the NRC stated in its finding th.t the support installation for the non-safety-related conduit less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter was inconsistent with seismic requirements and that no evidence could be found that substantiated the adequacy of the installation of Train C conduit of any sies with respect to the requirements of n) '
- (Reference 9.3).
Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 9.2) and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8
(
In response.to TRT Issue I.c the Comanche Peak Response Team (CPRT) developed Issue-Specific Action Plan (ISAP)- I.c to address
- this concern and to assure compliance with regulatory requirements l
and FSAR commitments.
ISAP I.c~specifically addressed the issue.
related to Train C conduit less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter. The issue regarding the lack of demonstrated evidence of the adequacy of the inst.allation of conduit greater than 2 inches in diameter was referred to ISAP II.d (Reference 9.7), which examined the adequacy of the Damage Study Program (Reference 9.5),
and'to the corrective ac on program for safety-related conduit and supports (Reference 9.8)
ISAP I.c originally specified that the seismic analysis of a sample of 2-inch-diameter-and-less conduit runs be performed to confirm the original assumption of restraint adequacy. Two samples were selected. The first saeple was selected to obtain a distribution i
l 1
l Certain Unit I and common and all Unit 2 Train C conduit larger than 2 inches in diameter have been designed for seismic loading to l'
the same criteria as safety-related (Train A & S) conduit.. The balance of the Train C conduit larger than 2 inches in ameter is addressed under ISAP II.d.
t I
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'k-Rsvision:
1 Pags 4 of 68-
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', id RESULTS REPORT-ISAP I.c (Cont'd)
^
3.0 BACKGROUND
(Cont'd)
C Lof support types:that would be' statistically representative of supports'throughout the plant. The second sample.was selected.
based on an engineering criterion that would identify supports more U
susceptible-to seismic excitation..:Since'the conduit had beeni field'run,2 isometric drawings and support-details were generally' not available. Thus, it was necessary to develop as-built-information for the sample conduit runs to be design verified..
g The first sample consisted;of 126 conduit runs selected from the
-i population:of approximately 3,738-runs of 1-1/2 and 2 inch diameter l
conduit using a table of random numbers, thus providing an. equal-chance that.any. single conduit'run might be selected, regardless of
-its identity... physical attributes.or quality. Runs so selected;
~
that were_found in the field to be inaccessible for:as-builting,-
1
.( -
were excluded from the' sample for. reasons of practicality.
The second sample of 131 conduit runs was selected for evaluations based upon engineering parameters such as= conduit size, span length', number of supports, type of supports, etc..The' intent of' this selection was to define a subset of the population of' conduit 5
runs that might exhibit more' extreme behavior in a seismic event.
The analyses of the sample conduit runs, which were performed by Gibbs & Hill, Inc., indicated'that there was an approximate 10 percent-failure rate of the supports in the sample 1(Reference 9.9).
Subsequent to this study, Gibbs &' Hill and Impe11 jointly performed a second~ sampling study using a refined set of acceptance criteria.
This' study resulted in a failure rate'of 1.8. percent. Although it might have been possible to demonstrate seismic. adequacy with a more rigorous analysis approach (e.g...non-linear analyses), TU Electric elected to resolve the concern through a 100% seismic-qualification program.
The seismic qualification program was developed and implemented'by Impe11 Corporation. The third party evaluated the qualification program methodology. This qualification program and the third-party evaluation are presented in the subsequent sections of i
this report.
4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN The original ISAP I.c provided for the analysis of sample conduit A
runs to verify the adequacy of the population of Train C conduit 1
4 less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter. As discussed in
(..-
Section 3.0 above, the results of the sample analysis prompted TU l
Electric to implement a comprehensive seismic qualification program j
4
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Ravision: 'la Pass 5.of 68'.
F<
g RESULTS REPORT K
ISAP~I.c (Cont'd).
'4.0 CPRT. ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) that encompassed 100% of the Train C conduitlless than or equal to~
i 2 inches in diameter. Therefore,,ISAP I.'c'was modified consistent' M
'with the change'in program direction. The issue regarding Train C j
conduit greater than 2 inches in diameter continued 'to be ref erred m
to ISAP II.d.
4'1 -Scope and Methodology The objective of ISAP I.c was to address'the actions specified'by the NRC by demonstrating that Train C conduit.is in compliance with the seismic requirements defined in
The CPRT tasks that were.
implemented. to ' achieve this objective 'are:
The? Damage-S' udy' Program for Unit.1 and. common areas t
was reviewed by'the third party in ISAP II.d.
Since Train C conduit greater than 2 inches in diameter was included-in the Damage Study Program, this third-party
(~
review provided the documented basis-needed to assure that Train C conduit-greater than 2. inches in diameter in Unit 1 and common areas : satisfies the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
Train C conduit greater than 2 inches in diameter in Unit 2
~1s being seismically qualified.using the same criteria as for Train A & B conduit, thus meeting the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29 and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8.
A multi-level screening process was used to verify the seismic adequacy of Train C conduit supports with' conduit less than or equal'to 2 inches in diameter.
The criteria employed in this process are based on parametric studies, tests of generic support types, and-dynamic analyses of representative supports. Other supports were qualified by specific analyses. The remaining supports that could not be qualified by inspection or by engineering analyses are being structurally modified.
4.1.1 Train C Conduit Greater Than 2 Inches in Diameter i
The Damage Study Program evaluated all Train C conduit greater than 2 inches in diameter located in seismic Category I areas in Unit 1 and common (approximately 500 runs). Approximately one-half of these runs were
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'T Rcvision 1 ~.
Page 6 of.68,
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O '.
RESULTS REPORT, 1;
ISAP I.c' i
(Cont'd)
-4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) initially. identified'as having unacceptable
' interactions.with safety-related items. The majority
.of these interactions (about.2/3) were resolved by the-addition of' seismic restraints'.: The remainder were' c
resolved by; analyses and evaluations.
'Since.the-Damage' Study Program utilized the.same basic approach-to evaluate interactions involving Train C conduit as was~done for other.non-seismic source commodities,.a separate evaluation for. Train C conduit greater-than 2 inches is not necessary..-The results of the third-party review of:the Damage Study Program is y
included in the ISAP II.d-Results Report (Reference-9.10).-
4.1.2 TrainLC Conduit Less Than or Equal ~to 2' Inches in Diameter A multi-leve1' screening process, referred to as'the
_h(
. Train'C conduit seismic qualification program,'has been 4
implemented to verify the adequacy of~all Train C 1
conduit supports for conduit.2 inches and less in diameter. A plant walkdown of all conduit'and junction box. supports for such conduit is being conducted as an integral part of.this process.
The multi-level screening process was based on the.
alternative approaches for demonstrating seismic adequacy of non-safety-related conduit as described in Section 3.0:.
Verification that Train C conduit and supports and anchorages will maintain their structural integrity; Assuming that failure occurs, verification that Train C hardware will not adversely affect the function of safety-related components or cause injury to plant personnel; Seismic design of the Train C conduit support system or use of passive seismic restraints (e.g., aircraft cable) to prevent collapse in the event of support failure and therefore O
preclude unacceptable interactions.
L___-
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Pago 7'of.68 g.
'RESULTS REPORT
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ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 4.0CPRT ACTION PLAN'(Cont'd) j The three~ approaches were translated-into the criteria
.for:the different screen' levels..'The multi-levs1-l
-screening process, including rework' options,'
.is shown schematically-in Figure 4-1.
Each of the-screen levels is briefly described below:
m'
-Level 1 - Lightly Loaded Supports: Conduit i
-and junction box supports. meeting predefined l
criteria for light.ly. loaded supports. Su::h supports are to be qualified by.. engineers l
during the walkdown and require no further 1
engineering evaluation.
Level 2. Good Supports:' Support types ~
q having significant capacity and determined'to-have adequate se;rength for' seismic loading-provided certain limitations are met. These
~
supports are to be' qualified by engineers' during the walkdowns and require no further-engineering evaluations.
v Level'3 - No Interaction Potential: Supports on conduit runs that would not interact with safaty-related features in the event of failure. Such supports'are to be identified by engineering walkdown.
(Used in conjunction with Screen Level 6.)
Level 4 - Seismic Load versus. Capacity Check:
Check of predetermined support capacities against seismic loads determined in the field. This involves simple hand calculations.
l
. Level 5 - Seismic Analysis: Engineering analysis of conduit runs and associated supports.- These analyses will consist of hand calculations or computer analyses and will utilize as-built information obtained by engineering walkdown.
Level 6 - Impact Analysis: Evaluation of the t'
acceptability of impacts due to falling or swinging conduit runs on safety-related features. Thess evaluations are to be conducted during the walkdowns.
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_L_______1_i_____
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1.
'Paga 8 of 68:
i
- ,sy RESULTS REPORT
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i 4
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'{
ISAP I.c (Cont'd)'
.4 4.0 CPRT' ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) i Level 7 - Safe Shutdown Analysis:
In I
situations where-it is determined that a
' j particular safety-related feature is not j
needed for safe shutdown of the plant, any J
Train C conduit support whose failure could 1
have an adverse effect on this safety-related
)
feature is cons'idered to be acceptable.'
- ]
Level 8 - Seismic Restraint Capacity Check:
Check of existing seismic restraints (also known as aircraft cable restraints) that had j
been previously designed and installed for Train C conduit greater than 2 inches in.
i diameter and non-safety-relatsd piping to l
Assure that they will sustain incremental loads due to postulated failures of 2-inch-diametar-and-less conduit runs.
Only Screen Levels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have been used
(~~'
to date in the seismic qualification program. Screen Levels 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have been used in the s
evaluation of conduit supports, and Screen Levels 1, 2, and 3 have been used in the evaluation of junction boxes.
Screen Levols 7 and 8 have not been used.
Room closeout procedures were developed by Impell to-assure that all supports in a given room were properly identified, qualified, and documented. Room closeouts were utilized once all supports had been qualified by appropriate seismic screening.
For supports that did not meet one of the eight levels of the screening criteria, three rework options were available:
structurally modify the support, add seismic restraint cable (aircraft cable),
or reroute the conduit.
Impe11 established a preventive action plan to preclude j
seismic adequacy concerns in future installations of Train C conduit. The plan provided for the development of procedures to control support drawing preparation,
,\\-
instal 1+.tfon, and engineering inspection.
)
_-___mmm._
I R: vision:
1 Pagi 9 of 68 RESULTS REPORT ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT, ACTION PLAN (Cont'd) 4.2 Third-Party Review The third party overviewed the procedures and methodology developed by the Project for performing the activities described in Section 4.1.
This keaults Report documents the results and conclusions of the third-party overview with respect to both the adequacy of the Train C conduit support 1
qualification program methodology and the resolution of i
external source issues. The scope of the third party effort l
included the following activities:
)
External Source Issues Identification - The third party identified, reviewed, and tracked external source issues that were raised regarding the original Gibbs 6 Hill conduit / support design. This activity consisted essentially of examining the Train A & B (safety-related) conduit issues to Aetermine which issues might potentially be applicable to Train C conduit 2 inches and less in diameter. The objective was to provide reasonable assurance that external
)
scurce concerns regarding the original design were fully identified, even if the external concerns did not specifically refer to Train C conduit.
Design Criteria / Commitments Identification - The third party identified the design criteria and' commitments i
that govern the design of Train C conduit supports for j
CPSES. The primary commitment sources included the I
FSAR (Reference 9.3), NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29 l
(Reference 9.2), NRC Standard Review Plan 3.7.2 l
(Reference 9.4), and the AISC and AIEI Specifications (References 9.11 and 9.12).
These criteria were used as the acceptance criteria for the review of specific program areas.
l Walkdown Procedures Review - The third party reviewed the procedures for the walkdown program performed by Impell. This review was performed to provide reasonable assurance that the procedures provided l
adequate instructions for field qualification or for obtaining accurate and sufficient design attribute l
information for qualification by analysis.
Support Qualification Procedures Review - The third party reviewed the procedures developed by Impe11 for the seismic qualification of supports for Train C
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Ravision:-
1
'Paga.10 of 68 3
c RESULTS REPORT g
ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT ACTION PLAN'(Cont'd) q conduit 2 inches and less in diameter. These reviews:
'were performed'to provide. reasonable assurance that the 3
seismic analysis procedures ~were in compliance with;the committed'CPSES design criteria.
Special Studies Re' view - The thirdiparty xeviewed-special studies performed by'Impell as a basis for tschnical methods and assumptions included in their i
. procedures or for' resolution of' external source issues.
These reviews were performed for the same~ purpose as the procedure reviews.
i
.j Test Programs Review'- The third party reviewed test'-
specifications procedures, and :.esults for
- conduit / supports tests that.were performed by the Project as a basis for Impell's procedures'or the resolution 'f external source issues. These reviews o
were performed to provide reasonable assurance that the tests were properly specified and performed in
[]
accordance with appropriate testing standards, and that V
the results'were properly interpreted and used.
s Issue Resolution Review - The third party reviewed the methodologies used by Impe11 in the resolution of the axternal source issues. The review included special studies, test results, and portions of procedures that were related-to the specific issues.- This review was performed to provide reasonable assurance that the
'i resolution methodologies used by Impe11 adequately address all identified issues.
This scope included the review of the items noted above for both Units 1 and 2.
The third party did not complete reviews for Screen Levels 7 and 8 because they have not been used to date in the Train C conduit support qualification program.
The review of preventive action plan procedures was also not within the scope of the third-party review.
Impell's implementation of the seismic qualification program (specifically, walkdowns and analysis calculations) and future development, revision or use of procedures not reviewed by the third party will be overviewed by the TU Electric QA Technical Audit Program.
O-
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1 Pags'11 of 68 f
RESULTS REPORT ISAP I.c (Cont'd).
.4.0.CPRT. ACTION PLAN.(Cont'd)=
.g 4.3 Participants' Roles and Responsibilities The organizations and personnel that participated in this effort are listed below with their respective-vork scope.
q 4.3.1 TUGC0 Nuclear Engineering (TNE) Civil / Structural Discipline 4.3.1.1 Scope (under original ISAP I.c)
Sample selection
- As-built documentation Damage analysis.
Assistance in overall evaluation 4.3.1.2 Personnel m
Mr. R. Hooton TNE Civil / Structural Discipline Supervisor Mr. T. Wright Civil Engineer Mr. D. West Field Damage Study.
Group Supervisor 4.3.2 Gibbs & Hill. Inc. (under original ISAP I.c; did not participate in modified action plan activities) 4.3.2.1.
Scope Seismic qualifir-tion methodology Desit,n review 4.3.2.2 Personnel Mr. J. Jan Chief Structural Engineer Mr. P. Huang Principal Structural Engineer Mr. W. Thonguthat Senior Engineer
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1 IL Page 12 of 68'-
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.A RESULTS' REPORT l h i
ISAP I.c (Cont'd).
4' 0 CPRT' ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)'
4.3.3 Impell Corporation i
4.3.3.1 Scope (under modified'ISAP I.c)
Seismic qualification methodology l
Seismic qualification implementation Specification of rework' p
4.3.3.2 Personnel t
l-Mr. R. Grubb Site Manager i
Mr. K. Warapius Project Manager
' j Mr. M. Manrique Project Engineer, Office tO Dr. T. Desmond' Project Engineer,
' 's/
Site 4.3.4 Third-Party Activities 4.3.4.1 Scope o
External Source Issues Identification, Design Criteria / Commitments Identification,
,t Walkdown Procedures Review, Support Qut.lification Procedures Review, Special Studies Review,
- Test Programs Review, Issue Resolution Review, and Preparation of Results Report.
O 4
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j"c 31 Rsvision:
1-1 Pag 3 13 of 68 RESULTS REPORT Aj
-ISAP.I.c (Cont'd) 4.0 CPRT. ACTION PLAN (Cont'd)
'4.3.4'.2 Personnel Mr. H. A. Levin TENERA CPRT Civil / Structural
-Review Team Leader Mr. J. Miller TENERA TRT-Issues Manager Dr. C. Mortgat TENERA, TRT Issue Coordinator T
Dr. D. J. Nyman TENERA. TRT Group Leader Dr. F. A. Webster.
JBA Associates (CPRT Statistics Advisor) 4.4 Personnel Qualification Requirements
,s The third-party participants in the implementation of this Action Plan met.the personnel qualification and objectivity requirements of the CPRT Program Plan and its implementing procedures.
Other participants were qualified to the requirements of the CPSES Quality Assurance Program or to the specific requirements of the CPRT Program Plan. Activities performed by other than third-party personnel were' governed by the applicable provisions of Section III.K, " Assurance of CPRT Program Quality", of the CPRT Program Plan.
4.5 Procedures
-Work performed by the third party in this ISAP was conducted in accordance with applicable CPRT wo.rk instructions (Reference 9.13).
4.6 Standards / Acceptance Criteria The acceptance criteria for non-safety-related conduit are compliance with FSAR Section 3.7B.2~8 (Reference 9.3), NRC F.egulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 9.2), and referenced industry codes and standards, u
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1 Pag; 14 of 68 l
RESULTS REPORT
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^j ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS This section of the report describes the third-party activities performed in the overview of the Project's seismic qualification of Train C conduit supports in the areas of methodology development and external source issue resolution. These activities consisted of the following:
External Source Issues Identification.
Design Criteria / Commitments Identification.
Walkdown Procedures Review, Support Qualification Procedures Review, Special Studies Review, Test Programs Review, and Issue Resolution Review.
(
)
i/
These activities were performed to assess the overall adequacy of i
the Project's seismic qualification methodology and the approach for resolution of specific external source issues.
j l
A flow chart of the activities performed by the third party is provided in Figure 5-1.
Section 5.1 describes the review methods j
and Section 5.2 provides the results for each of the overview l
activities. Section 5.2.7 contains a discussien of individual i
external source issues, the Project's resolution methodology, and the results of the third party's evaluation.
l 5,1, Review Methodology The third-party review methodology for the activities noted i
above is described separately in the following subsections.
I 5.1.1 External Source Issues Identification As discussed above, a single generic issue was 1
identified by the TRT in its examination of the non-safety-related conduit support installation in selected seismic Category I areas of the plant. The TRT concluded that installation for non-safety-related conduit that are less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter was inconsistent with seismic requirements
-w 7 s (v)
(Reference 9.1) and that no evidence could be found
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Pass 15 of 68 a
c ifN)
RESULTS REPORT V
.' ISAP ' I. c '
l (Cont'd) j 5.0llIMPLEMENTATIONOFACTIONPLANANDDISCUSSIONOF'RESULTS(Cont'd)
. that substantiated the. adequacy of the. installation j
with respect to the' requirements of Regulatory Guide D
1.29 (Reference 9.2) and FSARiSection 3.7B.2.8'
!.r (Reference 9.3).-
The selection and review of external source documents,.
l
. including preparation of external' source DIRs for the Civil / Structural discipline, was-performed.within.the j
scope of the: Design Adequacy Program,'specifically 1
Discipline Specific Action Plan (DSAP) VIII, for Train.
A & B conduit and eupperts (Reference 9.14). The Train A'& B issues were then examined for potential applicability'to Train C conduit. Those; issues identified as potentially applicable were assessed by-the third party.
a 5.1.2 Design Criteria / Commitments Identification This third-party review activity was conducted to p
identify the design criteria and' commitments that are
\\
applicable to CPSES Train C-conduit-supports. The' criteria and commitments for Train C conduit supports were-identified from reviews of the FSAR, applicable a
Regulatory Guides -and. referenced industry codes and l
standards. These criteria and. commitments provided the acceptance criteria for all reviews of Project procedures and supporting documents'.
5.1.3 Walkdown Procedures P.eview Walkdowns are being conducted for all Train C conduit runs 2 inches and less in diameter, either to perform
)
seismic qualification directly or to' assure the accuracy of design drawings used for seismic qualification. This activity was undertaken by the Project since the Train C conduit was field run and no as-built documentation was available. The walkdowns are being performed by Impell for both Units 1 and 2.
'I For Screen Levels 1, 2, and 4 (see Section 4.1.2), the walkdowns are.being performed to qualify the support based on its type, geometry and loading. For Screen 1
Level 5 a detailed as-built of the system geometry is being developed in order to perform a detailed
.O.
engineering evaluation of the conduit supports. 'For
'U.
Screen Levels 3 and 6, the walkdown provides the basis for acceptance or rejection of interaction analysis, l
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1 Pags 16 of 68 q
RESULTS REPORT
)
ISAP X.c (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
In all cases the walkdowns are being performed to examine and document the attributes considered important to assess the appropriate screen level. The end product of the Project's effort is documentation to support or confirm the seismic qualification of specific sapports under the selected screen level.
The third-party review of this Project activity included the review of all generic Impell walkdown procedures and selected screen level qualification procedures. The third-party review was documented using review memoranda. The acceptance criteria for procedure reviews were defined based on the third party's assessment of which physical attributes are important to I
qualification.
Any apparent discrepancies noted in the course of the walkdown procedures reviews were documented by Discrepancy / Issue Resolution (DIR) Reports and
)
T communicated to the Project. The DIRs were generally i
()
resolved by revision to the procedures or provision of additional justification. Resolution of these items was confirmed by the third party.
5.1.4 Support Qualification Procedures Review l
Screen Level 5 provides for qualification of supports l
through analysis of conduit configurations.
Impell developed procedures to define and control the seismic qualification process, the interfaces, and the l
technical methods employed.
In certain cases it was not possible to qualify supports for Train C conduit 2 inches and less in diameter by the screening process. For such cases, Impell developed procedures to control the design of required modifications, i.e., rework.
The third-party review of specific procedures was documented using review memoranda.
In general, the acceptance criteria for third-party review were design attributes judged by the third party to be important to qualification and supplemental criteria imposed by the special studies that served as the basis of procedural methods. The review of these special studies is
[_'
. v) described in Section 5.1.5 below.
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-(Cont'd)
- 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) l
'In conjunction with the review of specific procedureo.
I
'the third party reviewed the overall program
. methodology, which defines project organization, i
project controls and. documentation requirements.. This was done in'a qualitative manner and documented in
. review memoranda. The purpose of this review was to i
assess the ability'of Impe11'to perform effectively 1
with the level of detail provided in their procedures.
1 As noted in Section 4.2,'the third party did not-complete reviews for Screen Levels 7 and 8 because they j
have not been.used'to.date in the support qualification i
program.- The review of preventive action plan:
l procedures was also not within the scope of the l
third-party review.
'Any apparent discrepancies noted in the course of the procedures reviews were documented by DIRs and transmitted to the-Project.- The DIRs were generally O
resolved by modifications to the procedures or Nd provision of additional information. -Resolution was confirmed by the third party.
i 5.1.5 Special Studies Review
-)
i Impe11 performed-special studies to support the development of criteria and procedures for the various screen levels. Most of these studies. provide a basis for the technical methods'and assumptions included in the screen level instructions. Some studies were performed for the resolution of specific Train C-related issues. Other studies were also performed for items that did not directly relate to procedures or issues.-
Most of the special studies performed by Impell were reviewed by the third party. The selection of special studies for review was based on their respective significance to the qualification program.
In effect, all special studies that were judged to provide a necessary basis for procedural methods and resolution of issues were selected for review.
Most of the special studies selected for third-party f-evaluation were reviewed completely. Others were f
reviewed in a manner that provided a detailed
_.- - ~ _ _.,,. _., -.
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ISAP I.c-(Cont'd) 5.fi IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF.RESULTS (Cont *d) assessment of specific attributes judged /by the i
reviewer to be of. primary importance with a scan of the l
remaining information. All reviews were documented in-review memoranda in accordance with Reference 9.13..
These review memoranda included a description of:the method and extent of the review performed.
In general, the acceptance criteria for third-party reviews were developed on a case-by-case basis for each 9
respective review and consisted of the applicable
. portions of the seismic qualification criteria described in Section 5.1.2 above.. The_special studies were evaluated _for compliance'with these criteria, use j
of accepted engineering' approaches, verification of-assumptions, and technical and numerical accuracy.
l Any apparent discrepancies noted in the course of the special studies reviews were documented by DIRs and communicated to the Project. The DIRs were_ generally
- (q resolved by revision to the special studies and procedures or the provision of additional
~
justification. Resolution of these items was confirmed-by third-party review.
5.1.6 Test Programs Review i
A series of test programs were performed by Impell in support of the Train C qualification program. These tests were performed for the following reasons:
to resolve external source issues; and to provide information and data required for specific hardware component qualification.
Test programs implemented to resolve specific issues included those performed to justify the safety factor used for Hilti Kwik bolts and te festify the damping value used in Train C analysis.
A significant portion of the Train C support population is constructed of Unistrut components and clamps.
Since insufficient data was available to determine realistic support capacities, several tests were G
conducted to provide data required for specific
!Q component qualification.
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ISAP I.c l
4 (Cont'd)
>]
5.0. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS'(Cont'd)
The tests were performed by Anco Engineers, Inc. (' ANCO) and Corporate Consulting and Development Company, Ltd.
(CCL) in accordance with the requirements;specified by Impe11. The testa performed by these'two testing laboratories were as follows-ANCO Dynamic tests of conduit systems,
[
l Static and cyclic' testing of Unistrut components,
- CCL, Static testing of Unistrut components and l
threaded rod coupler nuts, Static and cycl.ic testing'of Hilti Kwik bolts and Unistrut moment connections, Static testing of beam clamps and Unistrut
- hangers, Tensile and shear strength testing of Hilti Kwik bolts for conduit supports.
l In all cases, the respective organizations performing the testing developed their test plans from the test specifications, conducted the tests, and produced test reports. The test results were incorporated either.
directly or indirectly through special studies by.
Impell into their procedures for seismic qualification.
l The third-party review of the test program included the
{
' review of the test specifications, test procedures, and l
test reports for.most of the programs within the scope of review noted above. These third-party reviews were documented using review memoranda.
The test specifications and test procedures were reviewed to verify their ability to achieve the test objectives and their compliance with standard industry I
testing specifications and requirements.
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd).-
~I Theitest results, as documeni:ed.in' test reporta were
+
a reviewed to determine that the' tests complied with the.
~
. test procedures and that the. required resvits. data were
,provided.
Impe11 special studies of test results were, also reviewed by the~ third party as described int n
'Saction 5.1.5.-
s M
' Any apparent discrepancies noted.in the ' course 'of the-test program reviews:were documented by DIRs and cosaunicated to'the Project..The DIRs were generally resolved by clarification of' test results or through.
submittal of additional information. Resolution.of
~
p
,these. items was' confirmed by third party.
5.1.7.-Issue Resolution Review' The' third-party activities-associated with the review-of. external source. issue resolution methodologies included the review of Impe11' procedures, special
- /
studies, and test program'results as they relate to
(
each issue. These reviews were performed as an integral part of the third-party review activities described in Sections 5.1.3 through 5.1.6.
I 1
5.2 Results The results of the third-party review are described separately i
for'each overview'. activity in the.following sections.
5.2.1 External Source Issues Identification As described in Section 5.1.1 above, the review of external source documents for the-Civil / Structural' discipline under the DAP resulted in i
the identification of the single generic issue l
regarding the seismic adequacy of Train C conduit.
- This 1ssue was the NRC findirig that Train C conduit less than or equal to 2 inches in diameter was not seismically designed or evaluated for potential j
interaction with safety-related equjpment.
J In addition, two issues were raised by the NRC during i
technical audits of the Train C qualification program:
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l5.0' IMPLEMENTATION'0F ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
Justification of the' factor offsafety of 3.0 i
'for'Hilti Kwik' bolts used to anchor Train C.
conduit ~ supports; o
Justification of;7L damping value used in 3
~
seismic' analysis of Train'C conduit.
Also, each-external issue identified fer Train A & B conduit was reviewed to determine 1ts relevancy to
~
Train C cotiduit. A number of Train A 6'B~related issues are not relevant to Train.C because of'.
~
i differences in hardware or analysis methods. 'Others.
are.of,a general' nature uct specifically applicable'to-Train C and are implicitly captured by the adequacy-review of the overall seismic qualification program.
In su.smary, four such issues'were determined to require J
particular attention:
l Violation'of AISC edge distance requirenants for oversize holes; I
<
- Q4 OteissionLof support self. weight; j!
Consideration of prying and' applied moment j
for-anchor bolte; i
Reaming-of bolt holes in conduit clamps.
The external source DIRs~that were generated to
)
document and track the issues are presented in Attachment A.
The methodology necessary to resolve the
~
DIRs were identified / developed by the Project as part of the Train C seismic qualification program.
5.2.2 Design Criteria / Commitments Identification The design criteria for Train C conduit supporta explicitly delineated in the CPSES criteria and commitment source documents (References 9.2 nnd 9.4) were considered to be consistent with the level of i
detail generally provided'in the industry in auch documents for conduit supports. Most of the detailed criteria were derived from the AISC and AISI Specifications (References 9.11 and 9.12) that were specified in the FSAR as the governing documents for p O) structural steel design.
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ISAP Gc (Cont'd)
~5.0 ; IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd l
" L Based on the above reviews, the conclusion'was reached-that the CPSES; criteria,;together with the extraction.
J-M
~$
Jof detailed criteria from the committed codes and.
l
~
standards, provide'a complete,. consistent, Land adequate.
d set.of design criteria for~ conduit supports.
1 s
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.5.2.3' Walkdown Procedures Review' Screen Levels 1, 2,'4,'end 5 1
.I The specific'Impell documents for Screen Levels 1, 2,.
4, and'5 and the corresponding third-party review sf documentation are listed in Attachment B.
R The review of Impe11 procedures encompassed.several:
'~
levels of' document revisions. Based en the review, it i
-O is concluded that the walkdown' procedures related to-s Screen Levels'1,.2, 4. and 5'are adequate.
- l u-
. Screen Levels 3 and'6 3*.
.The specific Impe11' documents for Screen Levels 3 and 6 l
and the corresponding third-party review documentation are listed. in Attachment B.
.y
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- ..L The third party has concurred with the basic concepts
~
'of Screen Levels 3 and.6"as presented in the
= procedures. Given the subjective nature of these j
screen level procedurea, the third party h.as concluded that they are adequate provided that their implementation is verified by the TU Electric QA J
Technical Audit Program.
5.2.4 ' Support Qualification Procedures Review Screen Level 5 The. specific Impe11 docucients for Screen Level 5 and 3
the corresponding third-party review documentation 'are
~-
listed in Attachment B.
The third party has conclud(d 3
that the procedures for Screen Level 5 are adequate.
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(Cont'd) i R
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5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF' ACTION PLAN"AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)
\\j Rework Options' The specific Impell rework option procedures and the 1
corresponding third-party review documentation are listed in Attachment B.
The third party has concluded 4 -
that the criteria and instructions for. rework options are acceptable.
_ Program Me_fhodology.
In conjunction with the reviews of the various procedure documents, the third party assessed the-
~
verall Impell program methodology.. This assessment o
covered the following:
Mh project organization, project controls,
{A documentation requirements including Quality Assurance procedures, room closeout procedures, maintenance program which tracks the impact of future construction on Train C seismic qualification by interaction analysis.
I I
The Train C conduit criteria document (Reference 9.15) and Impe11 Project Instruction 0210-053-001, Part I (Reference 9.16) provides details on the Train C conduit program methodology. The corresponding third-party review documentation is list.ed in Attachment B.
f 4 i The third party has concluded that the overall program t",
methodology for the Train C qualification program is
)
adequate.
green Levels 7 and 8 The third party has reached no conclusions with respect to the procedures associated with these screen levels.
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ISAP-I.c (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION-OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) 5.2.5 Special Studies Review I
The specific Impell documents.related to special studies'and the corresponding third-party review documentation are listed in Attachment B.
.The.
j third party has concluded that the special studies l
performed by Impe11 to support the Train C qualification criteria and procedures are adequate.
]
.~ 5. 2. 6 Test Programs Review
1 i
The specific Project ' documents related to test programs i
and the corresponding third-party review documentation are listed in Attachment B.
j The test specifications and procedures were found to
)
meet the test objectives and to be in compliance with appropriate standard industry' testing specifications and requirements.- The third-party review of the test D'(
reports indicated that the test procedures were executed properly and that the test results are j
accurately presented and sufficient to meet the test i
program objectives.
Future use of the test results is controlled by an f
Impe11 Project Instruction (Reference 9.17)..The third j
party concurs with this controlled use of test data.
.{
In summary, the third party has concluded that the test j
programs have been adequately performed and that the test data is justified for use in each currently i
identified application.
5.2.7 Issue Resolution Reviev l
The results of the third-party review of the Project's methodology for the resolution of the issues identified in Attachment A are presented in individual subsections below. These include a description of the issue, a description of the Project's resolution methodology, and a discussion of the third-party evaluation.
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, the external source issues consisc of the single generic issue regarding
,,5 the seismic adequacy of Train C conduit, the two
Revision:-
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~N RESULTS REPORT sy& l ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 5.0 ~ IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS!(Cont'd) issues identified specifically for Train C conduit during NRC technical audits, and the four issues from Train A & B conduit judged to be potentially applicable to Train C as discussed-in Section 5.2.1.
The single generic issue regarding the seismic adequacy of Train C conduit is the basis for the entire ISAP I.c program. It is included.in this discussion of issue resolution for the sake of consistency in addressing all external issues.
For clarity of presentation, the specific references to Project documents reviewed and the corresponding third-party documents that detail the reviews are not
. included directly in the text of each issue discussion.
These are referenced instead in Attachment B.
5.2.7.1 Seismic Adequacy of Train C Conduit j/}
Issue Description w--
During the TRT's inspection of non-safety-related conduit in selected seismic' Category I areas of the plant, it was concluded that the installation of Train C conduit 2 inches and less in diameter was inconsistent with seismic requirements (Reference 9.1) and that no evidence.could be found that substantiated the adequacy of the installation with respect to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.29 (Reference 9.2) and FSAR Section 3.7B.2.8 (Reference 9.3).
Resolution Methodology The CPRT program initiated ISAP I.c to L
address the issue of seismic adequacy for Train C conduit that are 2-inch diameter and less. As described in Section 3.0, Impell has developed and implemented a multi-level screening process to qualify Train C conduit supports for compliance with SRP 3.7.2 (Reference 9.4), (i.e., verification that supports and anchorage will maintain their
,-g structural integrity or, assuming that
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1 Paga 26 of 68 RESULTS REPORT i\\s;.
ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 5.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS,(Cont'd) failure occurs, verification that no l
unacceptable interactions occur).
In cases where supports cannot be qualified in their current as-built configuration, the situation I
will be corrected by either retrofit or addition of passive restraints.
i Third-Party Evaluation The third party evaluated Impell's walkdown and seismic-qualification procedures, special studies, test programs, and overall program methodology to determine if they are in j
compliance with identified criteria and I
commitments. As discussed in Section 6.0 j
following, the third party concurs with l
Impell's approach and methodology for seismic j
qualification of. Train C conduit. 'The third party has concluded that Impe11's program, if (O
properly implemented, is capable of resolving-1
/
the issue of seismic adequacy of Train C conduit. Therefore, this issue is' closed.
5.2.7.2 Hilti Kwik Bolts Factor of Safety Issue Description For the evaluation of Hilti Kwik bolts in the l
Train C qualification program, Impell has
{
.used a safety factor of 3.0 applied to the-l average ultimate strength. The 4
manufacturer's recommended factor of safety l
is 4.0 for working loads. Industry practice has been to use this factor of safety (4.0)
{
for SSE loads on safety-related equipment.
During an audit in June 1986, the NRC l
requested justification for a factor of
)
safety of 3.0 for Train C conduit.
l Resolution Methodology Impe11 reviewed a number of industry available Hilti Kwik bolt test results and L
.n determined that at loads corresponding to a l.
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5.0. IMPLDIENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) factor.of safety of~3.0:
- 1) no failure occur' red under static'. loads in over 800 tests;-2) cyclic loading has noieffect on the l
ultimate capacity of Hilti Kwik bolt;-and 3) i.
loss-of preload has no effect-on the cyclic-h strength of Hilti Kwik bolts.
r In addition, a subsequent' test program was conducted by CCL'(Reference 9.18) to i
determine the strength of selected sizes of
.Hilti Kwik bolts.in test slabs of concrete which are representative of the concrete.used in CPSES structures.
Impell evaluated these test.results in a special study (Reference-
)
9.19) which confirmed the industry available tests. The.sununary of these. efforts.which -
constitute the principal justification'for the use of safety factor of 3.0 for non-safety-related components is presented'in
-Reference 9.20.
Third-Party Evaluation.
'The thirdiparty has reviewed the CCL test report (Reference 9.21).and Impe11's justification of.a factor of safety of.3.0 for.Hilti Kwik' bolts (References 9-22, 9.23, and 9.24) and concurs with Impe11's position.
The Impe11 report (Reference 9.20) provides 1
adequate. justification for the use of a.'
safety factor of 3.0 for Hilti Kwik bolts.
l This issue is closed.
5.2.7.3 Train C Conduit Damping Issue Description
,i
)
Seven percent damping has been used in the j
analysis of 2-inch-diameter-and-less' Train C conduit. Gibbs & Hill used 7 percent damping.in their sampling study for Train C conduit.
Impell adopted the same 7 percent damping for their analyses with the justification that NRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 allows the use of 7 percent damping response j
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ISAP I.c
.j (Cont'd) j 5.0 ' ' IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF -RESULTS (Cont'd) spectra in the. evaluation of bolted-structures subjected to SSE level motions.
The NRC requested' justification for 7 percent.
damping in the analysis of Train C_ conduit and supports during an audit in June 1986.
Resolut' ion Methodology Dynamic testing of representative CPSES Train C. conduit was performed by ANCO Engineers to demonstrate that 7 percent damping was realistic for conduit supported by one-hole clamps (which have a minimum of elements for.
producing damping). The conduit and supports tested were representative of the same type used at CPSES. The amount of cable-in the conduit was varied over_the range of typical-cable fills found at CPSES. The test motions' applied to the conduit were to be p\\
representative of CPSES SSE motions.; Impell i
performed a special study to analyze the test I
data (Reference 9.25).
The results are documented and summaria.ed in Reference 9.26.
Third-Party Evaluation i
The third party has' reviewed (References 9.27, 9.28, and 9.29)' the Impell report which summarizes the ANCO tests and the Impell special study. The third party concurs with the use of 7 percent damping for Train C conduit.
Impell's report (Reference 9.26) provides adequate justification for the use of 7 percent damping in Train'C conduit analysis. The seven percent damping issue is
{
closed.
5.2.7.4 Edge Distance Violation Is. sue Description l
During CYGNA's Independent Assessment Program (IAP) review of Train A & B conduit work, it was noted that some Gibbs & Hill support designs did not comply with AISC
. (3 -
requirements. Specifically, support Types
]
()
CSM-42 and CA-Sa violate minimum edge distance requirements for oversize holes.
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]
Resolution Methodology
' Support Type CSM-42'was notLused on Train C conduit;;therefore,-it.is of no concern.-
Impell performed,a:special study 1(Reference 9.30) to evaluate. plate stresses. due to edge
' distance violationsLin Type CA-Sa supports.
This study demonstrated _a high margin of safety for this condition.-
H
. Third-Party Evaluation s
The third-party review (Reference 9i31) of'
- t Impell'.s special study-'(Reference 9.30)-
confirmed that a high margin of safety exists:
for the stresses in Type CA-Sa. supports.with.
.j 6
' edge distance violations..The edge distance-4 violation issue-is closed.
5.2.7.5 Support Self-Weight 1
Issue Description
'i CYGNA's IAP review for-the Train A & B-l
!v conduit work noted that support self-weight.
,(
was not' uniformly ~ considered in Gibbs & Hill support designs.' Support self-weight was' l
sometimes ignored,'or considered '
nonconservatively. Some such supports,had-anchor bolt interaction. ratios'as high as 1
1.0, and any additional load.would produce
')
unacceptable interaction ratios'over 1.0.
Impell has relied upon Gibbs'& Hill Train C conduit calculations to substantiate Screen Level 2 criteria for Type 6 supports.
Resolution Methodology Project Instructions for the Iepell analyses and walkdowns required the consideration of support self-weight Ac the support
)
evaluation (References 9.16 and 9.32).
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(Cont'd)
]
j 5,0 IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS-(Cont'd).
The screening criteria for Type 6 supports were based on the Gibbs & Hill calculations in which support self-weights were not included..Impell performed an evaluation (Reference 9.33). of the Gibbs & Hill:-Type 6 I
supports including support weights. The results showed that the qualification criteria for Type'6 supports.were unchanged by inclusion of support self-weight.' Thus, self-weight.of Type 6 supports had no impact on the Type 6 support screening criteria.
-)
Third-Party Evaluation The third-party review (Reference 9.34) of Impe11's' analysis and walkdown procedures confirmed that support self-weight is to be included in the support evaluation.
(\\
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The review (Reference 9.35) of Impell's evaluation confirmed that inclusion of support self-weight does not affect the results of the Gibbs & Hill calculation for 4
Type 6 supports. Hence, the inclusion of l
self-weight of Type 6 supports has no impact 4
on the Type 6 support screening criteria.
The support self-weight issue is closed.'
1 5.2.7,6 Anchor. Bolt Design
{
t Issue Description CYGNA's IAP review for the Trains A and B conduit work had the following concerns regarding anchor bolts in Gibbs & Hill support designs:
l 1.
Prying action was not addressed consistently and lacked justification.
2.
Moments due to shear on anchor bolts were neglected in a specific. case (CST-17 Support).
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-ISAP I.c P.
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,'(Cont'd) e S
/
5".0.
IMPLDIENTATION OF ACTION PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd).
Some support designs' neglected prying, some i
.c
.used a prying. factor of.l.3 without i
justification. and'others used a r y ing
-factor of 1.0 based on the method presented-in the AISC ' Specification (Reference 9.11)..
In the.latter, case, the applicability of this' method.was not juscified.
i, lc In addition, the moment loading on the anchor bolts for CST-17 Type 17 supports-is due,to shear. loading of.the bolts at a significant'
~
>i distance from the concrete surface, a
- Although CST-17, Type 17 supports were not
-used on Train C work, the effect of a similar j
situation should be investigated..
Resolution Methodology
. I ' 4:
Impell has' performed spec'ial studies to
. address prying and moment loading of anchor.
bolts ((References 9.36 and.9.37). : Prying factors were determined based on plate-flexibility obtained from' finite element
]
analyses.. Moment lo'adings of. anchor bolts were datermined by hand calculations performed on analytical models;that consider.
the relative' stiffness of the anchor bolt and' the Unistrut member through which the bolt-
]
passes.
In addition, instructions have been q
incorporated in1the seismic qualification procedures to provide consistent treatment of these considerations.
Third-Party Evaluation ji The third-party review (References 9.38, 1-9.39, 9.40, and 9.41) of'Impell's special i
studies indicates that prying and moment loading of anchor bolts have been satisfactorily' addressed. The' anchor bolt design issue is closed.
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7' (Cont'd) u 5.0.. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN'AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS-(Cont'd) p 5.2.7.7 Clamp Usage h
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- ' 3[
Issue Description-e -
i' l.
'CYGNA's'IAP review for Train A-&'B conduit
' work noted that certain Gibbs & Hill support
..e
- designs permit reaming.of, P2558 clamp bolt -
l 0
^
~holesLto accommodate larger bolts. This 1
.results in a violation of minimum! edge s
diutance requirements. Additionally, washers 1
4 were omitted. -One-of"the designs is.for Type-l CA-Sa supports, which are also.used in Train.
JC work.- The effect'of reaming of the. clamp; 1
7 bolt holes must be investigated.
- J
+
}'
>d Resolutilon ' Me thodology '
I 4
q A conduit clamp! testing program conducted by
.l o
CCL (References.9.42 and 9.43).for-the Train' l
y
'A &'B conduit program-determined allowables.
A for the clamps used for conduit supports'.
The..testiprogram considered the effects of E
oversized.holesi edge distance violations, bolt type'and size,, modification by. cutting ~.
off a' portion of'the clamp ears,~ omission'and' distortion of washers, and distortion of-
- clamps..The test.results were then utilized to' develop design allowable loads for the.
- ~'
conduit clamps taking into account the -
possible modifications.
-Impell uses the're' solution'for Train A &'B-conduit to resolve'this' issue for Train C.
Third-Party Evaluation I
The third-party revie'w (Reference 9.44) of'
'l the CCL clamp test program indicates that the clamp test allowables have been properly developed and have an appropriate factor of safety.. The clamp usage issue is closed.
~
I i
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Rsvisions 1'
,y n Pese 33 of 68
'~
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i RESULTS REPORT va a'
l.i i
.ISAP'I.c (Cont'd)
- (=
,g 5.01, IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION PLAN; AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd)L wW s'
4.3 Susmary of DIRS
,3
'Ak dlacusse'd in'Section $ 2.1,'.two external source DIRs were T
ji y.
' ? written toidocument the single generic issue identified by: the
-TRT!regarding.the seismic adequacy:of. Train C. conduit. These
.DIRsi.E4992 and E-1222,,were determined to. constitute design-
)
- deviations. They are addressed further in the sections below..
5.4. Safety Significan'e Evaluation c
1
, ~In'vAew'of.the: Ax' tensive corrective action program undertaken-
~!
by.tha Project for Train C conduit 2 inches and less in 1
diameter, the Third Party elected to proceed directly to the
' analysis'of root'cause and generic implications rather than performingia safety significance evaluation of the two' design 4
deviations delineated above..
5'5. Ruot Cause Analysis and Generic Implications Evaluation
..,p-The central issue identified by the NRC TRT regarding Train C
.h_
conduit'and supports was whether'such conduit installations
' ~
conformed with Regulatory Guide-1.29.. As' discussed in Section j.
~
3.0, thel Project-had assumed in its origina1' design evaluation
.that conduit 12. inches and less in diameter was inherently j
capable of withstanding seismic loads such that adverse
. interactions with safety-related items would not occur.
. Calculations that-were not a part of the design basis had been-
~ generated ~ in support of. this assumption; j
.In view of the fact that observations of'the performance of 3
similar hardware during actual earthquakes support this j
assumption, it was common practice within the nuclear industry l
during the time frame of these CPSES design activities to make j
these assumptions. In the current time frame, designers typically document the bases for'such assumptions. This was j
not formally done by the Project although, as -stated above, j
uncontrolled calculations had been generated.
i f
Whenever assumptions of this type are made, it is important to assure that designs fall within the bounds of appif: ability.
j For example, data developed by the Project during ne initial j
~
phase of the ISAP investigation suggests that the support of single conduit runs was generally acceptable. However, during the same initial ISAP investigation, the Project was not able j
to establish that a few supports on which multiple small O
4 l
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n; p.,
7 j
[(,
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1 W
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- F Page'34 of'68-p~,.
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RESULTS REPOR.
l ISAP I.c iG (Cont'd) q M-i 5.0 ' ' IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTION. PLAN AND ' DISCUSSION OF RESULTS (Cont'd) o.
diameter runs'had been hung would not fail under seismic conditions. Thus, the " extrapolation"'of thel experience base d
for' single conduit runs represented ~a weakness in the' logic.
'l supporting. the' Project's conclusion on' the-seismic adequacy of l
Train C conduit 2 inches and less in diameter.
i g
It is concluded by the third party that the root'cause'of the Train C conduit problem.is that the Project failed to L.
reconcile key' design assumptions-and.to recognize.the evolution ~of industry practice and regulatory requirements to c
support these. assumptions with formal calculations. This
')
n
_ problem is similar in' nature to those identified within the1 l
'LCPRT Design Adequacy Program (DAP). DAP-identified issues. as 3
well'as other design-related items, are subject to remedial-l actionsfunder the comprehensive ~ Corrective Action Program q
(CAP),' being conducted by TU Electric. Given the breadth and' i
depth of-the CAP, generic' implications associated.with this
~!
1
'ISAP are considered to be addressed. Accordingly, no further corrective action under this ISAP'is warranted.-
j 5.6 Corrective Action Recommendation
..As previously discussed, a comprehensive seismic qualification program for Train;C conduit has been. undertaken by Project.
l The program brings Train C conduit into compliance with.the; FSAR and licensing commitments'and resolves'known technical i
. issues. No further corrective-actions are required.
7
6.0 CONCLUSION
S The scope of third-party overview of the Project's seismic qualification program for Train C conduit 2 inches and less in
- i diameter included an assessment for compliance with FSAR.cri^eria and TU Electric commitments, as well as evaluation of the Project's resolution of external source issues. The third-party overview of the. seismic qualification program also included a review of walkdown and seismic' qualification procedures, special' studies, tests, and overall program methodology. Review of Impe11's implementation of the seismic qualification program (i.e.,
walkdowns, analysia. calculations, and systems interaction assessments) was not included in the third-party review scope.
The implementation of the seismic qualification program will be LN subject to audit by the TU Electric QA Technical Audit Program.
The conduct of the Technical Audit Program as well as selected 4
activities.of the seismic qualification program will be overviewed by the third party as directed by the SRT.
i-i6-
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Rsvision:J 1-Pese 35 of 68
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(RFSULTS REPORT l
'i p X/
ISAP I.c y-(Cont'd)
6.0 CONCLUSION
S'(Cont'd)
'I m
Six specific external' source issues in addition to the generic:
~
. issue raised by the NRC TRT were identified. The third party l
reviewed.Impell's pertinent procedures, s'pecial studies and. tests
.l that address and resolve-these issues.-
-The third party,has concluded that'Impell's Train'.C conduit / supports seismic qualification program is comprehensive end' l
l:
capable of meeting-the FSAR and licensing;conunitmento and' resolving' i
known technical issues'.
l 7.0' ONGOING ACTIVITIES The seismic qualification program for Train C conduit'is currently.
~
.being implemented by.Impell. The.TU Electric'QA Technical Audit Program is overviewing this implementation effort.
1 8.0 ACTION TO PRECLUDE OCCURRENCE IN THE FUTURE-i Preventive actions have.been developed b"y Impell for' Train C conduit.2 inches:and:less in diameter to preclude recurrence of the issues identified in Section 5.2.7. -These actions are discussed in-the sections below.
8.1 Construction Procedure ECP-19B n-A construction procedure, ECP-19B (
Reference:
9.45).,was developed to provide. guidance for installation of new, a
modified'and relocated Train-C conduit (2-inch diameter'and.
j less) supports. This procedure superceded the' portions of procedures ECP-19 (
Reference:
9.46) and ECP-19A (Reference
-9.47) that gave instructions for installation of these supports.
In addition, several'11mitations and restrictions on what is acceptable for installation were included to ensure seismic ~ adequacy of the supports. The third-party review (Reference 9.48) of ECP-19B concluded that adequate installation guidelines are provided.
8.2 Typical Drawings F
Original installation of Train C conduit (2-inch diameter and J
1ess) was based on design documents DCA-4693 (Reference 9.49),
which delineated support classification requirements, and DCA-5106 (Reference 9.50), which delineated typical support details.
Impell has issued several design dra. rings based on construction procedure ECP-19B that provide installation o
5 details for various typical supports. These drawings are to be used for new and modified support installations.
RAvision:
1 Peg: 36 of 68
- 3 RESULTS REPORT l
ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 8.0 ACTION TO PRECLUDE OCCURRENCE IN THE l'UTURE (Cont'd) 8.3 Support Drawings for Custom Supports In cases where typical drawings cannot be utilized for modification / replacement of Train C conduit supports, specific drawings that provide custom designs are being issued.
]
8.4 Engineering Inspection Procedure l-An engineering inspection procedure has been developed to provide guidelines for inspection of newly installed and modified conduit supports.
8.5 Interdisciplir.e Interf ace Impell has set up comprehensive interface control procedures (Referencer 9.51 and 9.52) to ensurc that controlled interfaces exist with the other contractors. In addition, the j
documents define lines of communication between the Project and vendors.
,)
8.6 Mai genance Program In cases where Train C conduit components are postulated to fail and/or potentially interact with safety-related plant features, tracking of any installation / removal of plant features is paramount in determining the effect on the previously performed systems' interaction work. To address this concern, I:npell has initiated a maintenance program to monitor all construction to identify if there is any effect on previous work.
9.0 REFERENCES
9.1
" Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of CPSES, Units 1 and 2", USNRC, NUREG-0797, Supplement 8, Attachment 3, February 1985.
9.2 USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification",
Rev. 2.
9.3 TU Electric, CPSES Final Safety Analysis Report.
1 9.4 USNRC Standard Review Plan 3.7.2, NUREG-0800, Rev. 1, " Seismic System Analysis".
7,
)
4 v
i
1 R: vision:
1 l
Pags 37 of 68 I
?
\\
c-RESULTS REPORT i
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ISAP I.c j
(Cont'd) l
9.0 REFERENCES
(Cont'd) j 9.5 TUSI Instruction No. CP-EI-4.0-36, " Control of Seismic and
]
Non-Seismic Interaction Evaluations", Rev. O, November 8, j
1982.
1 3
9.6 TUSI Instruction No. CP-EI-4.0-53, " Maintenance of Darr. age i
Study Analysis", Revision 0, March 19, 1984.
{
k 9.7 CPRT Program. Plan Issue-Specific Action Plan II.d, " Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements", Rev. 3.
9.8 DAP-RR-C/S-002, Discipline Specific Results Report:
Civil / Structural - Train A & B Conduit and Supports, Rev. 1.
9.9 Impell Report No. 01-0210-1449, " Train C Conduit, Two Inch and Under, Criteria Document, Regulatory Guide 1,29 Issue", Rev.
1.
9.10 ISAP II.d Results Report, " Seismic Design of Control Room Ceiling Elements", Rev. 1.
m i
4 G
9.11 AISC " Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel", 7th and 8th Editions.
9.12 AISI " Specification for the Design of Cold-Formed Steel Structural Members", September 3, 1980.
9.13 CPRT Work Instruction CSM-5, " Documenting Third-Party Reviews", Rev. O.
9.14 DAP-RR-C/S-002, " Discipline Specific Results Report:
Civil / Structural - Train A & B Conduit and Supports", Rev. 1.
9.15 Impell Report No. 01-0210-1479, " Train C Conduit (Two Inch Diameter and Less) Criteria Document", Revs. O, 1.
9.16 Impell Project Instruction 0210-053-001, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit (Two Inch and Under) at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station". Rev. 7.
I l
9.17 Impell Project Instruction 0210-052-011. " Procedure for Utilizing Test Data on Train C Components", Rev. O.
1 l
9.18 CCL Report No. A-736-86, " Tensile and Shear Strength 'Iesting of Hilti Kwik Bolts for Train C Conduit Supports", Oc.cober l
23, 1986.
lnl A/
9.19 Impell Calculation ROTC-50, " Analysis of CCL Test Report A-736-86", Rev. 1.
1
.iy Revision:
1 Page 38:of 68' I
4 I
i f.y RESULTS REPORT 1
\\
M ISAP 1.c
-(Cont'd)
9.0 REFERENCES
-(Cont'd) 1 9.'20 Impell Report No. 01-0210-1483, "Hilti Kwik Bolts Justification of Factor of Safety". Rev. 2.
9.21 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of CCL Test Report #A-736-86 dated October.. 23, 1986, " Tensile-and Shear Strength Testing of Hilti Kvik Bolts",-Review No. 33505-01 April 3, 1987.
9.22 TENERA' Memorandum,-J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Completion of Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1483 Rev. O, dated February
- 1986,-Portion of Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review No.
33105-01, June 23, 1986..
9.23 TERA Memorandum,'J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of Impell i
Report, " Justification of Factor of Safety", Report 01-0210-1483, Revision 2, Dec.,1986 (Draft for Comment),
Review No. 33105-02, March 4, 1987.
t 9.24 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of Impell 1
O
. Report #01-0210-1483, Revision 2,." Justification of Factor of
' i, Safety",' Review No. 33105-03, September 29, 1987.
9.25 Impe11 Calculation ROTC-37, " Damping Determination, Test vs.
Analysis", Rev. O.
i 9.26 Impell Report No. 01-0210-1527, " Justification of Damping Value", Rev. 1 December 1986.
9.27 TENERA Memorandum, D. Nyman to C. Mortgat, CPSES Train C Conduit," Justification of Damping Value", Impe11 Report No.
01-0210-1527, Review No. 33622-01, October 21 1986.
9.28 TRNERA Memorandum, D. Nyman to C. Mortgat, CPSES Train C Conduit. " Justification of Damping Value". Impe11 Report No.
01-210-1527, Revision 1 (Preliminary), Review No. 33622-02, November 25, 1986.
l 9.29 TERA Memerandum, D. Nyman to C. Mortgat, " Justification of i-Damping Values", Action Plan I.c, Review of Impell Report
- 01-0210-1527, Revision 1 Review No. 33622-03, September 30, j.
1987.
l L
9.30 Impe11 Calculation No. ROTC-16 " Development of talkdown Criteria for S-0910 Supports Similar to Type 6 Supports", Rev.
)
3.
i
.g 3
1
o q
Revision:
1 Pass 39 of 68 3
A i
)
RESULTS REPORT.
ISAP 1.c-(Cont'd)
J 9.0 ' REFERENCES (Cont 'd) 9.31 TERA Memorandum, J'.'Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4'.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-16 Revision 3 '
"Walkdown Criterin.for S-0910 Supports (Type 6)", Review No.
s 33627-01, June'5, 1987.-
9.32 Impe11 Project Instruction 0210-052-003, " Seismic Evaluation of Train C Conduit Supports", Rev. 3.
l 9.33 Impoll Calculation ROTC-60.." Summary of Impell's Two-Inch and 1
Under Train C Sample Analysis", Rev. O.
'9.34 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of Impell
]
Project Instruction 0210-052-003, Revision 3 "Saismic 1
Evaluation of Train C Conduit Supports", Review No. 33103-02,-
September 30,'1987.
9.35 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan 1.c.
]
Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-60. Revision 0, "Suminary of Impell's Train C Sample Analysis", Review No. 33604-01,
. (N September 30, 1987.
3 a
i 9.36 Impe11 Calculation ROTC-02, " Procedure to Calculate Anchor
^l Bolt Loads (Prying)", Rev. 2.
9.37 Impe11 Calculation No. ROTC-28, " Evaluation of Moment Loadings
(, !
on Anchor Bolts", Rev. 1.
'i 9.38 TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to C. Mortgat, Completion of I
Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-02, " Procedure to Calculate Anchor Bolt Loads, TUGC0 Train C Conduit 2" 9 Review No.
{
33611-01, June 25, 1986.
.I 9.39 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation.ROTC-02, " Procedure to Calculate Anchor Bolt Loads", Revision 2, Review No.
33611-02, May 29, 1987.
9.40 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Irupell Calculation ROTC-28, " Evaluation of Moment Loading on Anchor Bolts", Revision 0, Review No.
33628-01, June 4, 1987.
9.41 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-28 " Evaluation of 1
Moment Loading on Anchor Belts", Revision 1, Review No.
n
't 33628-02, July 1, 1987, i
C/
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..RESULTS REPORT'
(
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iISAP I.c-(Cont'd)
.r.
9.0' REFERENCES (Cont'd) iG 9.42 CCL ReportrNo..A-699-85, " Conduit Clamp Test' Report,LPhase I",.
December 17, 1985._
9.43.'CCL. Report No. A-702-86, :" Conduit Clamp' Test Report, Phase m'
II", April 7, 1986.
9.4'4 DAP-E-CS-308, " Engineering Evaluation for; Conduit: Clamps".1 Rev.'0..
9.45 Brown & Root. Procedure'No. ECP-19B', Rev. 2 '"Insta'11ation of New, Modified, and Relecated Train C Conduit Supports for Two Inches and Under Conduit".
9.46 Brown &RootiProcedureNo.ECP-19."ExposedConduit/ Junction-l' Box'and Hanger Fabrication and Installation".
9.47 Brown 4 Root Procedure No. ECP-19A, " Installation of Class 1B m
Conduit. Raceway Syatems".
j/'N 9.48 TERA Mesiorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan-I.c Task-i U
4.2.3 Review'of Procedure ECP-19B,'" Installation of New, J
. Modified and. Relocated TrainLC Conduit Supports",' Revision'2,.
Review No.' 33702-01, May 29, 1987.
9.49~DCA-4693, Through Revision'11.
.9.50 DCA-5106, Through Revision 9.
9.51.Impe11 Interface Control Instructions,-Job Nos.
056', and'058, Revision 7.
. 0210-052, 054, 4
9.52 Impe11 Interface Control Instructions, Job Nos. 0210-053, 055, 1
057,.059, Revision 6.
.4
Revision:
l Page 41 of 68 e<.
RESULTS REPORT--
ISAP I.c (Cont'd) i u
[
1 l
4,
.c,
~,
a oc, N.
m
.c u.. m a
g NONnmCTON
)
UGHTLY man
- ==
amm 8tA90RT5 M%CTEVAL1MTION m
l I
j lel 1
l I
i r
,_A a
n amur
.are nmec CAPACITY 94JTDCMN RESTRANT gygg OECM ANALYS8 CAPACITYC4GCK
-i YES -
I PA$$ES7
< r i
i cenous a
- ornow, m
- Cmm g
4 FIGURE 4-1 FLOW CHART OF SCREENING LEVELS
}
O
1 u
1 Revision:
I j
1
/
Page 42 of 68 t
I) f RESULTS REPORT
(
t.:
ISAP I.c j
(Cont'd)~
IDENnFY EXTERNAL REVIEW UCENSING SOURCE DOCUMENTS COMMITMENT DOCUMENTS 1
P 1
P REVIEW DOCUMENTS &
PREPARE ISSUE DEVELOPK4EPTANCECRITERIA RECORDSORs l
TEST PROGRAMS l
SPECIAL STUDIES
,l PROCEDURES EVALUATE PRCUECT SEISMIC i
OUAUFICATION PROCEDURES AND ISSUE RESOLUTION METHODOLOGY T DOCUMENT THIRD PARTY REVIEWS 4,
SUMMAR12E CONCLUSIONS IN RESULTS REPORT FIGURE 5-1 THIRD PARTY REVIEW ACTIVITIES O
l 1
y
- j. /.;
- } f r
- l Revision -
'11
.f4*
TPassc43:off68!
$y 4
V a
< I, h '
RESULTS' REPORT
' lfD ; <,
c
- V n; -
- ISAP I.c-(Cont'd)
,m -
m
, ATTACHMENT A
SUMMARY
OF TRAIN C CONDUIT RELATED EXTERNAL SOURCE: ISSUES:l
. DISCREPANCY / ISSUE, RESOLUTION!(DIR). REPORTS BY' SOURCE ANDl ISSUE GROUPS.
_ Issue Group No.
.DIRs:Related to and' Description Issue' Groups by Source Issues-Identified by 50therJ Cygna Independent Assessment.
-Sources.
~
' Program (IAP)
(Ref.'A1)
.(Ref.~A2)
.(Ref. A3)
'1.. Seismic-Adequacy of E-992.
Train C Conduit--
(NRCT-16)
-(Ref..A5)-
- E-1222.
W
.(NRC-45)
'(Ref. A4):
'l
~
?2. Edge DistanceLViolation'E-0165
.E-0761 E-1171 1I.;SupportSelfWeight E-0167
- E-0757 J.4 3
4.' Anchor: Bolt Design E-0170 E-0760 E-116'4 -
1 L5. Clamp Usage E-0178
- 6. Seven Percent Damping for Train C Conduit
- 7. Factor of Safety of Three
(}
I
.for Hilti Kwik Bolts R
'l O}
These issues were identified by the NRC during a technical audit of Impell's work in June 1986.
u b 1
7,____
s.. :
{
3 Revision::
1
)
Pags 44 of 68
.c RESULTS REPORT ISAP I.c (Cont'd).
]
ATTACHMENT A I
References A1.
IAP-16, Review Issues List Transmittal, Cable. Tray Supports, Rev.
'll)'and Conduit Supports (Rev. 2), August 13, 1985.
A2.- IAP-32, Review Issues List' Transmittal,. Conduit Supports (Rev. 3),
March 29, 1985.
A3. : IAP-34, Cygna Letter 84056.060 Generic. Issues Summary, IAP - All Phases, November 20, 1985.
'l A4. : NRC-45. Issuance of - Supplement No. 11 to NUREG-0797, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, June 10, 1985.
AS.
NRCT-10,. Meeting to Discuss the Applicant's Plan.for Resolution of
.l Requests for Additional Information from the Comanche Peak
- Technical Review Team (TRT) Effort, October 23, 1984.
(~\\
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1 I
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1 Page 45 of 68 RESUI.TS REPORT
<r X. /
'i ISAP I.c (Cont'd)
ATTACHMENT B
' PROJECT AND THIRD-PARTY DOCUMENT / ISSUE CROSS-REFERENCE LIST -
Third-Party Applicable Review i
Project Document Ref.
Screen Level Document Ref. _
.1.
WA1KDOWN PROCEDURES PI-0210-052-004, Rev. 1 Bl.1 5
33410-01 B4.1 i
- PI-0210-052-004, Rev. 1 5
33410-02.
B4.2 b
.PI-0210-052-005, Rev. 2 LBl.2 6
'33409-01 B4.3 PI-0210-052-005, Rev.' 3 6
33409-02 B4.4 PI-0210-052-005, Revs. 2 & 3 6
.33409-03 B4.5 i
PI-0210-053-001, I, Rev. 3 Bl.3 1-8 33401-01 B4.6 PI-0210-053-001.,I, Rev. 4 1-8 33401-02 B4.7 PI-0210-053- 001, I, Rev. 5 1-8 33401-03 B4.8 PI-0210-053-001,.I, Rev. 6-1-8 33401-04 B4.9 PI-0210-053-001, I,<Rev. 7 1-8 33401-05 B4.10 m ~
PI-0210-053-001, I, Rev. 3-7 1-8 33401-06 B 4.' 11 PI-0210-053-001, II, Rev. 1 Bl.4 1-3
~33402-01 B4.12 PI-0210-053-001, II, Rev. 2 1-3 33402-02 B4.13 PI-0210-053-001, II, Rev. 3 1-3 33402-03 B4.14 PI-0210-053-001, II,~Rev 4 1-3 33402-04 B4.15' PI-0210-053-001, II, Rev. 5 1-3 33402-05 B4.16 PI-0210-053-001, II, Rev. 6 1-3 33402-06 B4.17 4
PI-0210-053-001, II, Rev 7 1-3 33401-05 B4.10 PI-0210-053-001,. II,-Revs. 1-7 1-3 33402-07 B4.18 PI-0210-053-001,-III, Rev. 3 Bl.5 4-8 33403-01 B4.19 PI-0210-053c001, III, Rev. 4 4-8 33403-02 B4.20 l
PI-0210-053-001, III. Rev. 5 4-8 33403-03 B4.21 PI-0210-053-001, III, Rev. 6 4-8 33403-04 B4.22 j
PI-0210-053-001, III, Rev. 7 4-8 33401-05 B4.10 4
PI-0210-053-001,. III, Revs. 3-7 4-8 33403-05 B4.23 l
3
~PI-0210-053-001, IV, Rev. 3 Bl.6 Rework 33404-01 B4.24 PI-0210-053-001, IV, Rev. 4 33404-02 B4.25 PI-0210-053-001, IV, Rev. 5 33404-03 B4.26 PI-0210-053-001, IV, Rev. 6 33404-04 B4.27 PI-0210-053-001, IV, Rev. 7 33401-05 B4.10 PI-0210-053-001, IV, Revs. 3-7 33404-05 B4.28 j
PI-0210-053-001, V, Rev. 5 Bl.7 1-3 33405-01 B4.29 Q
~PI-0210-053-001, V, Rev. 6 1-3 33405-02 B4.30 l
.()
'PI-0210-053-001, V, Rev. 7 1-3 33401-05 B4.10 f
1 U
Rsvis' ion t '
1 i
Pegs 46 of 68 i
f3
.RESULTS REPORT-i,
)
v.
i ISAP 1.c (Cont'd)
)
ATTACHMENT B (Cont'd).
Third-Party, Applicable Review
-Project Document-Ref.
Screen Level Document Ref.
f PI-0210-053-001, VI Rev. 5 Bl.8 4-6 33406-01 B4.31
- PI-0210-053-001, VI, Rev. 6
.4-6 33406-02 B4.32 j
PI-0210-053-001, VI, Rev. 7 4-6 33401-05 B4.10 j
PI-0210-053-001, VI, Revs. 5-7.
4-6 33406-03 B4.33 PI-0210-053-001, VII, Rev. 5 Bl.9 Rework 33407-01 B4.34 PI-0210-053-001, VII, Rev. 6 33407-02 B4.35.
PI-0210-053-001, VII, Rev. 7 33401-05 B4.10
- ]
[
PI-0210-053-002, Rev. 3 Bl.10 4
33408-01 B4.36 PI-0210-053-002, Rev. 3-4 33408-02 B4.37 2.
SUPPORT QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES PI-0210-052-003, Rev. 3 Bl.11 5
33103-02 B4.38 i
PI-0210-052-003, Revs.-0-3 5
33103-03 B4.39 PI-0210-052-006, Rev. 1
-Bl.12 5
,33108-01 B4.40 f
PI-0210-052-006,.Rev. 2 5
33108-02 B4.41 i
PI-0210-052-006, Revs. 1 & 2 5
33108-03 B4.42 PI-0210-052-008, Rev. O Bl.13 Rework 33110-01 B4'43
'FI-0210-052-008, Rev. 1 33110-02 B4.44 PI-0210-052-008, Revs. 0 & 1 33110-03 B4.45 3.
SPECIAL STUDIES 1
l Calc. ROTC-02, Rev. O Bl.14 5
33611-01 B4.46 Calc. ROTC-02, Rev. 2 5
33611-02 B4.47 Calc. ROTC-02, Revs. 0 & 2 5
33611-03 B4.48 Calc. ROTC-03, Rev. O Bl.15 5
33615-01 B4.49 Calc. ROTC-03, Revs. 0.& 1 5
33615-02 B4.50 Calc ~. ROTC-04, Rev. O Bl.16 1,2,4 33310-01 B4.51 Calc. ROTC-04,'Rev. 1 1,2,4 33310-02 B4.52 q
f
-Calc. ROTC-04, Rev. 2 1,2,4 33310-03 B4.53 i
Calc. ROTC-04, Revs. 0-2 1,2,4 33310-04 B4.56 i
(
)
1
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Pags 47'of.68
.7 m
H[
~
-RESULTStREPORT
-j k
.ISAP I.c.
7(Cont'd)L
)
W y
- ATTACHMENT B-(Cont'd)J i
.Ihird-Party
'j Applicable-
.ReviewL' Project Document' Ref.
-Screen 1.evel -Documan't Re f. -
i
' Calc. ROTC-05,1Rev.-0 Bl.17 1,2,4' 33310-01 B4.51-
- Calc ROTC-05. Rev. 11 1,2,4 33310-02=
B4.52' 4
-Calc.:ROTC-06, Rev.._0 Bl.18 5
33610-01 B4.55-Calc..ROTC-06,'Rev.i1
'"~
5 33610-02.
B4'.56 ~
iCalc.'ROTC-08,Rev.-OL Bl.19 5 ~'
33618-01' B4.57
'. Calc,JROTC-08. Rev. 5 33618-02 B4.58 l
Calc. ROTC-16, Rev. 3 Bl.20 2
33627-01 B4.59.
- Calc. ROTC-18 'Rev..0
'Bl.21:
5 33605-01' B4.60 A
LCalc. ROTC-19,_Rev. 0 Bl.22 5
33619-01.
B4.61 Calc. ROTC-19,?Rev. 1 5.
33619-02 B4.62 Calc. ROTC-25,'Rev..1 Bl.23 2
'33621-01 B4.63-
~
Calc.-ROTC-25, Rev. 2l
- 2 33621-02
.B4.64 Calc. ROTC-26, Rev. 0 Bl.24 4
33312-01'?
B4.65 i!
Calc. ROTC-26, Rev. 0 4'
33312-02' rB4.66 i
Calc. ROTC-28, Rev 0 Bl.25
'5 33628-01 B4.'67 i
. Calc. ROTC-28, Rev. I 5
33628-02 B4.68 i
> Calc. ROTC-32, Rev. 1 Bl.26 5
33620-01 B4.69 Calc. ROTC-32, Rev. 1 5
33620-02 B4.70 Calc.'ROTC-36, Rev. 1 Bl.27 5
33623-01 B4.71 l.
' Calc. ROTC-43, Rev. O Bl.28 2,4,5 33624-01 B4.72 Calc. ROTC-43, Rev. 0 2,4,5 33624-02 B4.73 i
Calc. ROTC-60,.Rev. O Bl.29 2
33604-01 B4.74
- i j
' Calc. ROTC-62, Rev. 1 Bl.30 5
33625-01 B4.75 Yw 1
I...
l
y M.f '
M_.
h<,p Revision:
'1
- < ji Pags 48 of 68 0;go 4
a-..
-y
't il
.RESULTS' REPORT
.fAq MNw) wa ISAP.I.c)
.- j C
' ii.;
- (Cont'd),
- .c
- l i>
.ATTAC19 TENT-B i
o Y
'. (Cont ' d) 1 y.
s...
~y Third-Party 20
' Applicable-Review
-Project' Document
-Raf..
-Screen Level Document Ref.-
1 B1.31 33612-01 B4,76-Calc. ROTC 75,- Rev. 1 W
'(supercedes Rpt..01-210-1523, Rev. 1) i y
N
- Calc.iWDC-01, Rev.42 Bl.32 2-33302-01 B4.77 m
4 Calc.: WDC-02, Rev. 0 -
81.33 2-33303-01 B4.78 Calci WDC-02, Rev. 3
.2:
33303-02 B4.79'
' Calc. WDC-02, Rev 4 2
33303-02 B4.79
}
Calc. WDC-02,-Revs. O,u3, & 4 2
33303-03 B4'.80 Calc. WDC-03,-Rev.'0' Bl.34 4
33304-01
. B4. 81; Calc. WDC-03,~Rev. 0-4 33304-02' E4.82.
t jll f
Cale.LWDC-04, Rev.t0' Bl.35 4
33305-01 B4.03 -
> L C n c? WDC-04, Rev.11 4.
33305-02 B4.84' Ca'le. WDC-07,=Rev. O Bl.36 4
33307-01 B4.05 Calc. WDC-11,- Rev.;0-
,Bl.37 2
.33311-01 B4.86 i Calc. WDC-11)-Rev. 0 2
33311-02 B4.87'
. Calc. WDC-13, Rev. 0 Bl.38 8
33313-01 B4.88 c
Rpt. 01-0210-1479,-Rev. O Bl.39 33101-01 B4.89' Rpt.-01-0210-1479, Rev. 1 33101-02 B4.90
- ,Rpt.'01'-0210-1483, Rev. 0-Bl.40 33103-01 B4.91 e
's Rpt. 01-0210-1483, Rev. 2 (Draft) 33105-02 B4.92 Rpt. 01-0210-1483, Rev. 2-33105-03 B4.93 Rpt. 01-0210-1483, Revs. O 1,
33105-04 B4.94 2 (Draft), & 2 m
Rpt. 01-0210-1523 (5/86)
Bl.41 33617-01 B4.95 Rpt. 01-0210-1523 (8/86) 33617-02 B4.96 Rpt. '01 0210- 1523 (9/86) 33617-03 B4.97' i
'Rpt.'01-0210-1523 Rev. 1 33617-04 B4.98 (superceded'by Calc. ROTC-75) h j
Rpt. 01-0210-1527 (9/86)
Bl.42 33622-01 B4.99 h
Rpt. 01-0210-1527 (11/86) 33622-02 B4.100 Rpt. 01-0210-1527, Rev. 1 33622-03 B4.101
,. E l
c-v j
R:; vision:
1 1
Pegs 49 of 68 l
)
i RESULTS REPORT ISAP I.c i
(Cont'd) i ATTAChtC T B (Cont'd)
Third-Party Applicable
. Review Project Document Ref.
Screen Level Document Ref.
Rpt. 01-0210-1560 (11/86)
B1.43 33111-01 B4.102 Rpt. 01-0210-1560, Rev. 0 33111-02 B4.103 Rpt. 01-0210-1562 (1L/86)
Bl.44 33109-01 B4.104 Rpt. 01-0210-1562, Rev. O 33109-02 B4.105 Rpt. 01-0210-1583, Rev. A Bl.45 33609-01 B4.106 Rpt. 01-0210-1583, Rev. O 33609-02 B4.107 Rpt. 01-0210-1584, Rev. A Bl.46 33616-01 B4.108 Rpt. 01-0210-1584, Rev. 1 33616-02 B4.109
)
Rpt. 01-0210-1479, Rev. O B2.1 33106-01 B4.110
,(f (App. D only) 4.
TEST PROGRAMS CCL Rpt. A-707-86, 2/14/86 B3.1 33502-01 B4.111 Rpt. A-707-86, 2/14/86 33502-02 B4.112 Rpt. A-711-86, 4/4/86
'B3.2 33501-01 B4.113 Rpt. A-711-86, 4/4/86 33501-02 B4.114 Rpt. A-720-86, 7/10/86 B3.3 33504-01 B4.115 Rpt. A-720-86, 7/10/86 33504-02 B4.116 Proc. 1903.23-01, 5/9/86 B3.4 33503-01 B4.117 i
Proc. 1903.23-01, 5/9/86 33503-02 B4.118 Rpt. A-736-86, 10/23/86 B3.5 33505-01 B4.119 PI-0210-052-011 Rev. O Bl.47 33112-01 B4.120 5.
MISCELLANEOUS 0
Proc. ECP-19B, Rev. 2 Bl.48 33702-01 B4.12l
)
I
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RESULTS REPORT, 1
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9 i
,?
=ISAP.I.c; a
(Con t ' d).-
3 n;'
x v
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5
. ATTACHMENT'B NuL O'
a:
a q
i
REFERENCES:
.i-4 n.
q:
i
,v
,,a, Bl. 'Impe11 Documents:
m h
.n' gl.1'.
1 Project Instruction 0210-052-004, "As-Built Walkdown",
4
,e
~
- Rev.fl.-
s o
,, W {],
.)$
! Bl.2, Project ' Instruction 0210-052-005, " Procedures for i
-Implementing ScreenLlevel 6", Revs. 2, 3.
~
fd 1Bl.3 Project Instruction 0210-053-001, " Multi-Level' Screening.
J Criterio for Train C Conduiti Part '1,' Methodology'.', ' Revs.
,f m.,
c 3-7.
y
.w 1-LBl~ 4 Project Instruction'0210-053-001;'"Muh i-Level Screening Criteria for Train'C Conduit, Part II, Conduit Supports-Walkdown Instructions", Revs.'l-7.
Bl.5~
Project Instruction 0210-053-001, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit, Part III,' Conduit Support Engineering Evaluation Procedures", Rev. 7.
Bl.6 Project Instruction 0210-053-001, " Multi-Level Screening.
Criteria for Train C Conduit, Part IV, Procedures for Support Rework Options", Revs. 3-7.
x Bl.7 Project Instruction 0210-053-001,'" Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit, Part V, Junction Box-t Walkdown Instructions",' Revs.-5-7.
i_
Bl.8 Project Instruction 0210-053-001, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit, Part VI, Engineering
. Evaluation Procedures for Junc' tion Boxes", Revs. 5-7.
f a
Bl.9 Project Instruction 0210-053-001, " Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit, Part VII, Procedures for Junction Box I
Rework Options, Revs. 5-7.
i Bl.10 Project Instruction 0210-053-002, " Level 4 Screening Criteria for Type 1 Supports", Rev. 3.
Bl.11 Project Instruction 0210-052-003, " Seismic Evaluation of I
Train C Conduit Supports", Revs. 2, 3.
W Bl.12 Project Instruction 0210-052-006, " Rigorous Analysis of tj Train C Conduit", Revs. 1, 2.
i l
1
,g
{',
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1-L
,p Pag 2 51 of 68
(
- 'o l.d /.
RESULTS REPORT i
1' ISAP' I.c
.(Cont'd)
'T ATTACHMENT B REFERENCES'(Cont'd)'
Bl.13 Project Instruction 0210-052-008', " Procedure fori l'
Implementing Rework: Option 2 -' Seismic Restraint by Aircraft Cable", Revs. 0,1.
t.
'Bl.14 Calculation ROTC-02, " Procedure to Calculate Anchor Bolt Loads (Prying)",' Revs. 0, 2.
L Bl.15 Calculation ROTC-03, " Parametric Analysis of Multi-Conduit Supports", Revs. O, 1.
Bl.16 -
Calculation ROTC-04, " Train C Junction Box Criteria: Two
' Lug Support Type", Rev's. 0-2..
Bl.17 Calculation ROTC-05, " Train C Junction Box Criteria:
Four Lug. Support Type", Revs.TO,L1~.
i Bl.18-Calculation ROTC-06, " Multi-Mode! Factor Evaluation for-l Train C Conduit", Revs. O, 1.:
Bl.19 Calculation ROTC-08, "Junctibn or Stiffness",'Rev. O.
Calculation No. ROTC5 6. " Development of Walkdown Bl.20 1
Criteria for S-0910 Supports Similar.to Type 6 Supports",
,l
'Rev. 3.
{
'1 Bl.21 Calculation ROTC-18, " Justification of 1.2 Impact
~
Factor", Rev. 0.
Bl.22 Calculation ROTC-19, " Check of Width Thickness Ratio for Unistrut Members", Rev. O 1.
Bl.23 Calculation ROTC-25, " Allowable Conduit Span Lengths Adjacent to CI Boxes", Revs. 1, 2.
Bl.24 Calculation ROTC-26 " Train C Junction Boxes: Boxes with Two-Hole Mounting Lugs", Rev. O.
Bl.25 Calculation ROTC-28 " Evaluation of Moment Loadings on Anchor Bolts", Rsys. O, 1.
l Bl.26 Calculation ROTC-32, " Stiffness Calculation for Train C Supports", Rev. 1.
Bl.27 Calculation ROTC-36, " Metal Framing Joint Load Rating",
Rev. 1.
____ _ _______ _ s
Revision:
1 Page 52 of 68 RESULTS REPORT ISAP I.c (Cont'd)
ATTACHMENT B REFERENCES (Cont'd) l Bl.28 Calculation ROTC-43, " Minimum Edge Requirements for Bolts l
Near a Concrete Chamfer Edge". Rev. O.
l Bl.29 Calculation ROTC-60, " Summary of Impe11's Two Inch and Under Train C Sample Analysis", Rev. O.
B1.30 Calculation ROTC-62, " Evaluation of Grouted l
Penetrations", Rev. 1 (Supe.rcedes Report No.
01-0210-1523).
Bl.31 Calculation a0TC-75, " Evaluation and Resolution of Cygna l
Train A & B Conduit Issues as Applicable to Train C Conduit Supports", Rev. 1.
l Bl.32 Calculation WDC-01, " Screen Level 2 Criteria for Type 6 l
Supports", Rev. 2.
l O
Calculation WDC-02, " Screen Level 2 Cr.iteria for Type 5
'B1.33 Supports", Revs. O, 3, 4.
l l
Bl.34 Calculation WDC-03, " Screen Level 4 Criteria for Type 4a Supports", Rev. O.
Bl.35 Calculation WDC-04, " Screen Level 4 Criteria for Type 1 Supports", Rev. O, 1.
Bl.36 Calculation WDC-07, " Screen Level 4 Criteria for Type 5 Supports", Rev. O.
Bl.37 Calculation WDC-11, " Level 4 Screen Criteria for Type 6 Sopports", Rev. O.
Bl.38 Calculation WDC-13, " Lateral Displacement of Cable Restraints", Rev. O.
Bl.39 Report No. 01-0210 1479, " Train C Conduit (Two Inch j.
Diameter and Less) Criteria Document", Revs. O, 1.
Bl.40 Report No. 01-0210-1483, "Hilti Kwik tbits Justification of Factor of Safety", Revs. O, 2 (Draft), 2.
Bl.41 Report No. 01-0210-1523, " Impact of Cygna Train A & B Issues on Train C Conduit Support Evaluation", Revs.
O May 1986, August 1986, Eepte.nter 1986 and Rev. 1 (superceded by Calculation ROTC-75).
.,q
'Ravision:'
.1 1
, s
- i. Y Pags 53 of 68
.0 3p RESULTS REPORT b
ISAP I.c l
(Cont'd)
' ATTACHMENT B
.f REFERENCES (Cont'd) l l
B1'42.
Report No.'01-0210-1527, " Justification of Damping.
Value", Revisions September.1986,' November'1986 and
.Rev.
1.-
.Bl.43
' Report No.'01-0210-1560, " Engineering Inspection of Train C Conduit", Revision November 1986 and Rev.-0.
j l
- B l.' 44 -
Report No.. 01-0210-1562, " Justification for Screen Level:
'6.- Conduit Having Lightly Loaded Supports" Revision j
dated November 1986 and.Rev 0.
i
.Bl.45
-Report No. 01-0210-1583, Anchor Bolt Insta11ation Torque j
Issue", Revs. A, O.
B 1. 4'6 Report No. 01-0210-1584, " Rod Hanger Coupler Issue",
-j Revs.'A, 1.
I l
'. f..;,
Bl.47
- Project Instruction 0210-052-011. " Procedure for Utilizing Test Data on Train C Components", Rev. O.
t Bl.48 Brown & Root Construction Procedure ECP-19B,
)
'" Installation of New, Modified and Relocated Train C
-Conduit Supports",' Revision 2.
B2.
Ebasco Documents i
B2.1 Ebasco' Report on Impact Evaluations (Appendix D of Impe11 Report No. 01-0210-1479, Rev. 0), March 6, 1986.
B3.
CCL Documents B3.1 CCL Report No..A-707-86, " Static and Cyclic Testing of Train C Support Components", February 14, 1986.
83.2 CCL Report No. A-711-86, " Static Testing of Train C Support Components", April 4, 1986.
B3.3 CCL Report No. A-720-86, " Static Testing of Train C Beam Clamps and Unistrut Hangers", July 10, 1986.
B3.4 CCL Procedure No. 1903.23-01, " Static and Cyclic Testing of Train C Beam Clamps and Unistrut Hangers", May 9, 1986.
B3.5 CCL. Report No. A-736-86 " Tensile and Shear Strength Testing on Hilti Kwik Bolts for Train C Conduit Supports", October 23, 1986.
c_.
u
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.R
, r 4
y-!
e 3.:
,y h
R'avision:
1 f
! Pass ~54 of 681 c
L 3
+i RESULTS REPORT v
ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 1 ATTACHMENT B
- )
REFERENCES (Cont'd)'
'j h
' B4.'
Third-Party Documents
- B4.1
' TERA Memorandum, J. Croncki to'C. Mortgat,' Review of I
Impell Instruction PI-0210-052-004,' Revision'l', " Train C, r
Conduit As-Built Walkdown".. Review No. 33410-01, March 24, 1987.
1 B4.2
~ TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Supplemental 1
Review of Impell' Instruction.PI-0210-052-004, Rev. 1, d
" Train C Conduit As-Built Walkdown Progras,- Review No.
33410-02,' October 14, 1987.
B4.3~
TENERA Memorandum, J.-Groncki to C' Mortgat, Action Plan
- 4 n.
I.ci: Task 4.2.3, Review of'Impell Instruction PI-210-052-005,' Revision 2, " Procedures for-
. Implementation of Screen Level 6", Review No.' 33409-01, December 5, 1986.
B4.4.
TERA Memorandum
'J. Groncki to C. Mortgat,' Action Plan I'.c,' Task 4.2.3', Review of Instruction PI-0210-052-005, i
Revision 3 (Including PICN #030), " Procedure for-Implementation of Screen Level 6", Review No'.. 33409-02, February 27, 1987.
1 B4.5 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Supplemental Review of Impell Instruction PI-210-052-005, Revs. 2 & 3 "L'evel 6
'l Walkdown", Review No. 33409-03,.0ctober 14,-1987.
B4.6 TENERA Memorandum, J.'Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of k
PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 3, Part I, Portion of Action Plan I.c,-Task 4.2.3, Review No. 33401-01, August 11, 1986.
B4.7 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3,' Completion of.the Review of Impell Report PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 4, Part I, Review No.
33401-02, Sepcomber 8, 1986.
B4.8 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c,. Task 4.2.3,: Completion of the Review of Impell Report PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 5, Part I, Review No,-
33401-03, September 15, 1986.
=.
t, Rsvision':-
'1
- Paga 55 -of: 68 p l[N-RESULTS REPORT A
ISAP I.c (Cont'd)-
1 ATTACHMENT B REFERENCES.(Cont'd)
B4.9-TERA Memorandum, R.' Brown to C.'Hortgat,. Action Plea I.c..
Task 4.2.3,' Review of Impell Instruction _PI-0210-053-001,
'Rev. 6, Part I, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33401-04, December 30, 1986.
B4.10 TERA. Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Project Instruction.-
1 0210-053-001, Revision 7. " Multi-Level-Screening Criteria
.for Train C Conduit", Parts I through.VII, Review No.
33401-05, September 30, 1987.
B4.11 TENERA Memorandum, J.' Groncki to C...Mortgat, Action Plan-
.I.c, Supplemental. Review of Impell' Project' Instruction PI-0210-053-001,'Part I, Revs. 3.through 7, " Train C
~
Walkdown Criteria",-Review No. 33401-06, October 14, 1987.
~
B4.12 TENERA Memorandum, R. Mackie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan' h'
I.c, Task 4,2.3, Completion of Review of Impell Report PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 1, Part II (Excluding Level 3),
Review No. 33402-01, June 24, 1986..
B4.13 TENERA Memorandum, R. Ma'ckie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instructions PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 2, Part II. " Multi-Level Screening j
Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33402-02,
{
July _14, 1986.
B4.14 TENERA Memorandum, R'. Mackie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan-I.c, Task 4.2.3, Completion of Review of Impell Report l
PI-0210-053-001,' Rev. 3, Part-II, Review No. 33402-03, July 22, 1986.
~B4.15 TENERA Memorandum, R. Mackie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan
.l I.c, Task'4.2.3,-Review of Impell Instructions PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 4, Part II, " Multi-Level Screening.
Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33402-04, August 11, 1986.
B4.16 TENERA Memorandum, R. Mackie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instructions PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 5 Part II, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit, Review No. 33402-05, lj October 1, 1986.
Revision:
1 Page 56 of 68
. (
RESULTS REPORT
-q u
ISAP I.c (Cont'd)
ATTACHMENT B
-REFERENCES (Cont'd)
B4.17 TERA Memorandum, R. Mackie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 6, Part II, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33402-06, January 15, 1987.
B4.18 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Supplemental Review of Impe11 Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Part II, Revs. I through 7..
" Train C Walkdown Criteria", Review No. 33402-07, October.
14, 1987.
B4.19 TENERA Memorandum, R. Mackie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Instructions PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 3, Part III, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit". Review No. 33403-01,
.,fS July 21, 1986.
.\\')
B4.20 TENERA Memorandum, R. Mackie to C. Mortgat'. Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Instructions'.
PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 4 Part III, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33403-02, September 24, 1986.
B4.21 TENERA Memorandum, R. Mackie to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 5, Part III, " Multi-Level Screening.
Criteria for Train C Conduit". Review No.- 33403-03, December 3.-1986.
B4.22 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat,. Action Plan I.c.
Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 6. Part III, " Multi-Leve2 Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33403-04, January 21, 1987.
B4.23 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Supplemental Review of Impell i
l Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Part III, Revs. 3 through 7
" Train C Walkdown Criteria", Review No. 33403-C5, October 14, 1987.
1.
v t.
i____m.__.__m.-_
.c La l'
Rsvision:
1-
.3 Paga 57.of 68 y; <
i/~~ C RESULTS REPORT pet L,
It:AP I4e (Cont'd)
If
~
ATTAC10CNT B
'l
. REFERENCES (Cont'd):
I t
B4.24-TENERA Memorandum,'J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan-I
.I.c Task 4.2.3, Completion of the Review of Impell
' ~
' Report PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 3, Part IV, Review No.
'33404-01,- August 14, 1986.
p t
j
,B4 25, TENERA Memorandum,-J. Groncki.to C. Mortgat, Action Plan l
I.c,; Task 4.2.3, Completion of the Review of.Impe11 p
Report PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 4, Part IV, Review No..
33404-02, September'2, 1986.
jb'
- B4~26 TENERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task.4.2.3,' Completion of the Review of Impell Report PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 5,'Part IV, Review No.
t 33404-03,-September-15, 1986.
. 34.27 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c,
- p. _.
Task 4.2.3, Review'of Impe11 Instruction PI-0210-053-001, y
Rev. 6,-Part IV, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for
'g Train C Conduit Supports", Review No. 33404-04, January i
13, 1987.
I B4.28 lTENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3. Supplemental Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Part IV, Revs. 3 through 7
" Train C Walkdown Criteria". Review No. 33404-05, October 14, 1987.
B4.29 TENERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instructions PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 5, Part V, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33405-01, September 17, 1986.
B4.30 --
TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 6, Part V, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33405-02, January.14, 1987.
B4.31
. TENERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Rev. 5, Part VI, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33406-01, September 26, 1986.
.-_.a----..-a---a.
..__..n
u Revision:
.- 1
]
Page 53 of 68 i
I]
(N RESULTS REPORT i
ISAP I.c i
.(Cont'd)
ATTACHMENT B
.r REFERENCES (Cont'd)
B4.32 TERA Memorandum,'R.' Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c.
Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Instruction PI-021.0-053-001, 1
Rev. 6, Part VI, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit Supports", Revie,r No. 33406-02, January 14, 1987.
I B4.33 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impe11 Project Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Part VI, Revs.' 5 through 7. Review No.
33406-03, October 14, 1987.
B4.34 TENERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell. Instruction PI-0210-053-001. Rev. 5,.Part VII, " Multi-Level Screening Criteria for Train C Conduit", Review No. 33407-01, October 20, 1986.
'.(./
B4.35 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c.
Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-053-001, Rev 6, Part VII, " Multi-Level Screnning Criteria for Train C Conduit Supports", Review No. 33407-02, January 14, 1987.
)
1 B4.36 TERA Memorandum, J. Grencki to C. hortgat, Action Plan l
I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instruction i
PI-0210-053-002, Rev. 3. " Level 4 Screening Criteria for Type'l Supports", Review No. 33408-01, January 27, l
1987.
B4.37 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Supplemental Review of Impe11
-j
-Instruction PI-0210-053-002, Rev. 3, " Level 4. Type 1 l
Walkdown", Review No. 33408-02, October 14, 1987.
1 B4.38 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of Impe11 Project Instruction 0210-632-003, Revision 3,
" Seismic Evaluation of Train C Conduit Supports", Review No. 33103-02, September 30, 1987.
]
6
n Rsvision:
1-Page'59 of 68
'.f [9 RESULTS REPORT-J-
ISAP.I.c (Cont'd) p ATTACHMENT B l
s REFERENCES (Cont'd) 34.39 TENERA Memorandum J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impell Project Instruction 0210-052-003, Revs. O, 1, 2, & 3 " Seismic Evaluation of
- Train C Conduit Supports", Review No.. 33103-03, October 13, 1987.
B4.40 TERA Memorandum, S.'t. Shein to C. Mortgat, Action Plan (n
I.c, Taak 4.2.3,' Review of Impell Instruction
/^
PI-0210-052-006, Revision 1, " Rigorous Analysis of Train C Electrical Conduit", Review Nc. 33108-01, December 16 j
1986.
j 1
B4.'41 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-032-006, Revision 2, " Rigorous Analysis of Train-C Electrical Conduit", Review No. 33108-02, July 20, 1987.
V B4.42 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impell Project Instruction
- 0210-052-006, Revs. 1 & 2 " Rigorous Analysis of Train C 1
Electrical Conduit", Review No. 33108-03, October 14, 1987.
B4.43 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-052-08 Revision 0, " Rework Option 2 - Seismic Restraint by Aircraft Cable", Review No. 33110-01',
February 6, 1987.
B4.44 TERA Memorandum, J._Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan
')
I.c, Review of Impell Instruction PI-0210-052-08, Revision 1, " Rework Option 2 - Seismic Restraint by Aircraft Cable" Review No. 33110-02, August 28, 1987.,
B4.45 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impell Instruction
- 0210-052-08, Revs. 0 & 1, " Rework Option 2 - Aircraft i
Cable", Review No. 33110-03, October 13, 1987.
t v
I
____________._________.-m_--
-m
'i
. ip.
- i,
3
'Rchision:
1~'
i,.
.Page 60 of.68
-. 0/^ ',3
'I.
J \\.
s RESULTS REPORT-p 4=
ISAP I.c (Cont'd)
ATTACHMENT B REFERENCES (Cont'd)-
B4.46 TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to C. Mortgat, Completion of s
Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-02, " Procedure to Calculate Anchor Bolt Loads, TUGC0 Train C Conduit 2" 9",
Review No. 33611-01, June 25, 1986.
B4.47-TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to:C. Mortgat, Action' Plan I.'c, Task.4.2.3, Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-02,.
" Procedure to Calculate Anchor Bolt Loads", Revision-2, Review No. 33611-02, May 29. 1987.
B4.48 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki toIC Mortgat, Action Plan:
I.c, Supp haental Review of Impe11; Calculation ROTC-02, P.n o. U 6 2, " Prying Factors", Review No. 33611-03, 4
o October.. 14,,1987.
B4.49 TENERA Memorandum, C.. Savant to C. Mortgat, Review of Impe11-Analysis ROTC-03, Review No. 33615-01,, June 30, 1986.
,x B4.50 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Supplemental Review of Impe11 Analysis ROTC-03, Revs. 0 & 1, 4
" Combining Multi-Conduit Loads", Review No. 33615-02, October-14, 1987.
B4.51 TENERA Mamorandum, P. McCarraher ~ to C. Mortgat, ' Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Completion'of the Review of Impe11-Calculations ROTC-04, Rev. O and ROTC-05, Rev. O, q
" Junction' Box Calculations", Review No. 33310-01,
)
September 18. 1986.
I B4.52 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortsat, Action Plan I.c.
]
Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculations ROTC-04, Rev. 1 and ROTC-05, Rev. 1. " Junction Box' Calculations", Review J
No. 33310-02, December 17, 1986.
B4.53 TERA ~ Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan
)
I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-04, J
s Revision 2, " Train C Junction Box Criteria", Review No.
-j 33310-03, June 9, 1987.
?
. i-B4.54 TENERA Memorandum,.1 Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-04, A
Revs. O, 1, & 2, " Junction Box Calculations", Review No.
-Q 33310-04, October 14, 1987.
b
p:
I' s
6
'Q4 Rsvision:-
1-
,Page 61 of 68' yb/
RESULTS REPORT
,1 :
ISAP I.c i
.(Cont'd).
ATTACHMENT B 1
' REFERENCES-(Cont'd)-
B4.55.
TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to C. Mortgat, Completion o'f' Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-06,."Multimode Factor-r Evaluation Train C",. Review No. 33610-01,-June 25,
-1986..
B4.56 TENERA Memorandum,LC.. Savant.to C. Mortgat, Review'of
.(
Impe11 Calculation ROTC-06,. Revision 1, " Multi-Mode Factor Evaluation for Train C Conduit", Review No.'
d 33610-02, December 10,'1986.
j B4.57; TERA Memoranden R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, e
Task,4.2.3, Review of Impell' Calculation ROTC-08,-
Revision 0, " Junction-Box Stiffnesa", Review No.
j 1
33618-01', March 10, 1987.
t B4.58 TENERA Memoran'duin, J. Groncki to C, Mortgat, Action Plan y
I.c Supplemental Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-08,
,1 Rev. O, " Junction Box Study". Review No. 33618-02,
^
4 j-October :14, 1987.
B4.59 TERA Memorandum,' J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-16, Revision 3."Walkdown Criteria for 5-0910 Supports (Type L
~
6)",' Review No.: 33627 01,' June 5. 1987.
B4.60 TENERA Memorandum,.R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Review of'Impe11 Calculation ROTC-18, Revision 0,
" Justification of 1.2 Impact Factor", Review No.
33605-01, September 28, 1987.
B4.61 TENERA Memorandum, S. L. Shein to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-19,-
j Revision 0, " Check of Width-Thickness Ratio for Unistrut Members", Review No. 33619-01, December 2, 1986.
B4.62
-TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan 1.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-19, l
Revision 1, " Width-Thickness Ratio of Unistrut Members",
Review No. 33619-02, June 1, 1987.
B4.63 TENERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-25, O
Rev. 1, " Allowable Conduit Span Lengths Adjacent to CI Boxes", Review No. 33621-01, December 11, 1986.
w-a
g i
Rcvision:
1 Page 62 of 68
~~
)-
RESULTS REPORT v
ISAP I.c (Cont'd)
ATTACHMENT B REFERENCES (Cont'd)
B4.64 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c.
Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-25, Rev. 2,
" Allowable Conduit Span Lengths Adjacent to CI Boxes",
Review No. 33621-02, January 21, 1987.
1 B4.65 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-26, Rev. O,
~
" Train C Junction Boxes: Boxes with Two Hole Mounting Lugs", Review No. 33312-01, January 23, 1987.
i B4.66 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-26, Rev. O, "Juntion Box Calc. - Two Hole Lugs", Review No.
33312-02, October 14, 1987.
B4.67 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-28, 1
3/
" Evaluation of Moment Loading on Anchor Bolts", Revision i
- 0. Review No. 33628-01, June 4, 1987.
B4.68 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Calculation ROTC-28,
" Evaluation of Moment Loading on Anchor Bolts", Revision 1, Review No. 33628-02, July 1, 1987.
B4.69 TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-32, Revision 1, " Stiffness Calculations for Train C Supports", Review No. 33620-01, October 17, 1986.
j B4.70 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impe11 Calculations ROTC-32, Rev.'1, " Stiffness Calculations for Train C Conduit",
Review No. 33620-02, October 14, 1987.
B4.71 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-36. Revision 1 " Metal Framing Joint Lead Capacity", Review No. 33623-01, August 18, 1987.
B4.72 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, O
Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-43, tN Revision 0, " Minimum Edge Requirements for Bolts Near a
(_,)
Concrete Chamfer Edge", Review No. 33624-01, January 13, 1987.
'I Rsvision:
1
~Page 63 of 68 s
RESULTS~ REPORT ISAP I.c (Cont'd):
ATTACHMENT B REFERENCES (Cont'd)
.B4.73 TENIRA Memorandum,' J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Supplemental Review of,Impe11
~
Calculation;ROTC-43, Rev. O, " Minimum Edge Distance Requirements", Review No.- 33624-02,- October 14, 1987.
-34.74.
TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action' Plan-i 1.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-60, Revision 0, " Summary of Impe11's Train C Sample Analysis", Review No. 33604-01, Septembe'r 30, 1987.
j
.B4.75L TENERA Memorandum,'J. Groncki to C.'Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Review of Impe11 Calculation ROTC-62, Rev. 1,
" Evaluation ~of Grouted Penetrations", Review No.
'33625-01, September 29, 1987.
1 B4.76 TENERA Memorandum F Brown to C. Mortgat, Review'of
/7.
.Impe11 Calculation RO*2C-75, " Evaluation and Resolution of Train A & B'Condutt Issues as Applicable to Train C (j./
Conduit Supports", Revision 1,~ Review No.'33612-01, September 25,.'1987.
B4.77 TERA Memorandv;n, J. Giova to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3,-keview of Impe11 Calculation WDC-01, Revision 2 " Screen Level 2 Criteria for Type 6 Supports", Review No. 33302-01, April 13, 1987.
B4.78 Calculation Review Checklist 33303-01,c" Screening Criteria f or Type 5 Supports". Impe11 Calculation WDC-02, 1
Rev.'0, G. Jackson.
B4.79 TERA Memorandum, R.' Brown'to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Review of Impe11 Calculation WDC-02, Revisions 3 & 4.-
" Screening Criteria for Type 5 Supports", Review No.
33303-02, August 12, 1987.
1 B4.80
'TENERA Memorandum,.J. Gronckt to C. Mortgat, Action Plan j
I.c, Supplemental Review of Impe11 Calculation WDC-02, Revs. 0, 3, " Screen 2, Type 5 Calculation", Review No.
33303-03, October 14, 1987.
B4.81 Calculation Review Checklist 33304-01, " Screening 1
Criteria for Type 4a Supports", Impe11 Calculation WDC-03, Rev. O, G. Jackson, August 26, 1986.
r i
i p( q
- v' o
Ravision 1
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'Page 64 of.68-F 33 4
j
{'
.pa L 7 T
.RESULTS REPORT s
l, i_/
h' ISAP I.c l ;t (Cont'd) l ATTACHMENT B REFERENCES (Cont'd)'
)
B 4.~d2 -
TENERA Memorandum, J..Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Supplemental Review of Impe11 Calf.ulation WDC-03, j
Rev. 0, " Screen 4,' Type 4a' Calculation,", Review No.
'33304-02, October 14, 1987.
E B4.83 TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to C. Mortgat, Review of Impe11 Calculation WDC-04, Rev. O, " Screen Level 4 Criteria for Support Type 1", Review No.
December 11, 1986.
. 33305-01, B4.84 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat,' Action Plan I.c.
i Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11' Calculatic,n WDC-04, Revision -
1, " Screen Level 4 Criteria for Type.1 Supports",.Revieu No. 33305-02, April-8, 1987.
B4.85 TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to.C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of.Impe11 Calculation, WDC-07, fs i
[].
Revision'O, " Screen Level 4 Criteria for Type 5-
\\
Supports", Review No. 33307-01 December 12,'1986.
B4.86 TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impe11 Calculation WDC-11, Revision.0, "Scre n Level 4 Criteria for Type 6' Supports", Review No. 33311-01, December 2, 1986'.
B4.87 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan 1.c, Task 4.2.3 -Supplemental Review of Impe11 Calculation VDC 11, Rev. O, " Screen 4, Type 6 Calculation", Review No. 33311-02, October 14, 1987.
B4.88 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Review of Impe11 Calculation WDC-13. " Lateral Displacement of Cable Restraints", Revision 0,-Review No.
33313-01, April 27, 1987.
B4.89 TENERA Memorandum, R. Pages to C. Mortgat, Review of Impe11 Report #01-0210-1479, Rev. O, Sections 1.0 through 5.0, Review No. 33101-01, June 30, 1986.
B4.90 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1479, Revision 1 " Criteria Document", Review No. 33101-02, March 24, 1987.
A
' N.)
i b
1.
8,1 u.
b 1
[
Revisiontj 1
.,p Pagc 65=of 68' q
.w
'RESUI!TS REPORT f,
ISAP I'c (Cont'd).
ATTACHMENT.B REFERENCES'(Cont'd)
B4.91-
. TENERA Memorandum, ~J. 'Groncki to C. 'Mortgat, Comple cion,
of. Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1483, Rev. O, dated February'1986.. Portion of Action' Plan 1.c' Task 4.2.3, Review No. 33105-01,-June 23, 1986.
t b
B4.92 TERA Memorandum, J.,Groncki.to C. Mortgat, Review of Impe11. Report, " Justification of Factor of Safety", '
i Report 01-0210-1483, Revision 2 Dec. 1986 (Draft for i
' Comment), Review No. 33105-02,' March 4, 1987, i
.B4.93 ETENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat.-Review of i
Impe11 Report #01-0210-1483, Revision 2, "Just1fication
~
of. Factor of Safety",-Review No. 33105-03, September 29,.
-1987.
1 B4'.94
' TENERA Memorendum,' J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Supplemental; A
Review of Impe11 Report #01-0210-1483, Revs. O, 1, G
2 (draft), & 2, "Hilti Bolt Factor of Safety", Review No.
33105-04, October 14, 1987.
'B4.95
,TENERA Memorandum, R. Pages to C. Mortgat,- Completion of Review of Impe11 Report No. 01-0210-1523, Rev. A. Portioa of Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review No. 33617-01, June-23,'1986.
B4.96 TENERA Memorandum D. Nyman to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3,. completion of~In-Process Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1523, Rev. A, Aug. 1986,
" Evaluation of Cygna Train A & B Issues for Train C c
Conduit Supports", Review No. 33617-02,-October 22, 1986.
B4.97 TENERA Memorandum, D. Nyman to C. Mortgat, Action' Plan l
I.c Task 4.2.3 Completion of.In-Process Review of Impe11 Report #01-0210-1523, Rev. A, September 1986, " Evaluation of Cygna Train A & B Issues for Train C Conduit
?
Supports", Review No. 33617-03, October 22,.1986.
l B4.98 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Review of Impe11 Report 01-0210-1523, Revision 1, " Generic Technical Issues Report of Cygna Issues as Applicable to Train C Conduit Supports", Review No. 33617-04, August 27, 1987.
u t
L Rinricion:
1-Page 66 of 68 j
1:
A
./
\\
RESULTS REPORT
%.]
l ISAP I.c (Cont'd) 1 ATTACHMENT B-l, REFERENCES (Cont'd) i i
B4.99 TENERA Memorandum, D. Nyman to C. Mortgat', "CPSES Train C' Conduit., Justification of Damping Value", Impell Report
'i No. 01-0210-1527, Review No..33622-01, October 21, 1986.
B4.100 TENERA Memorandum, D. Nyman to C. Mortg'at. "CPSES Train C Conduit Justification of Damping Value", Impell Report No.~01-0210-1527, Revision 1-(Preliminary), Review No.
33622-02, November 25, 1986.
i B4.101 TENERA Memorandum,.D. Nyman to C.'Mortgat, Action Plan s
I.c, Review of.Impell Report #01-0210-1527 Revision 1, "Justi.fication of Damping Values", Reviev Mo. 33622-03, September 30, 1987.
B4,102 TERA Memorandum, J.. Groncki to C. Mortgat,. Action l'la*
{
I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1560, A(
Nov. 1986, (Draft for Ccwment)', " Engineering Inepection
'")
of Train C Conduit", Review No. 33111-01, December 18, 1986.
B4.103 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1560, Revision 0, " Engineering Inspection of Train C Conduit",
Review No. 33111-02, July 20, 1987.
B4.104 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1562, Revision A, (Draft for Comment), " Justification for Screen Level 6 for Conduit Systems Having Lightly Loaded Supports", Review No. 33109-01, December 11, 1086.
B4.105 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Report #01-0210-1562, Revision 0, " Justification for Screen Level 6 fcr Conduit Systems Having Ligh"cly Loaded Supports", Revier No.
33109-02, October 14, 1987.
B4.106 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Murtgat, Review of Impell Report " Relevance of Anchor Bolt Installation Torque Verification", Report No. 01-0210-1583, Revision A l
(Draft for Comment), Review No. 33609-01, March 3, 1987.
{
C\\
V 1
l l
l I
I
n ; m g,.
3.
1' 3
e
.. y o q].
2
,i Revision:
1 l
Pa'ge 67.of 68-l RESULTS REPORT
]
v ISAP I.c (Cont'd)
{
<o g
ATTACHMENT B
-REFERENCES (Cont'd)
L B4.107 TERA Memorandum,~J. Gronchi to:C. Mortgat, Review ofi l('
l Impe11 Report #01-0210-1583,' Revision 0, " Anchor Bolt L
Installation Torque Issue". Review No. 33609-02, April 3, 1987.
+
o B4.108 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Review of' l
Impe11 Report." Rod Hanger' Coupler Issue".. Report No.-
> ~
01-0210-1584, Revision A (Draft for Comment), Review No.
33616-01, March 3, 1987..
~B4.109-1 TERA Memorandu?., J. Gronchi to C. Mortgat, Review of Impell Report F1-0210-1584, Revision 0,=" Rod Hanger Coupler Issue", Review No. 33616-02,. April 2, 1987.
B4.110 TENERA Memorandum. F.. E. Pages to C. Mortgat, Review of Appendix D of Impe11 Report 01-0240-1479, Review No.
q 33106-01, July 8, 1986.-
. q G.
n
-B4.111 TENERA Memorandum, C. Savant to C. Mortgat, Completion of Review of CCL Report #A-707-86 dated February 14, 1986, 0
' Portion of Action Plan I.c Task 4.2.3, Review No.
33502-01, June 19, 1986.
B4.112 TENERA Memorandum,.C. Mortgat to.CPRT'I'ssue I.c Fils, Supplemental Review of CCL Test Report-#A-707-86, " Static
',l 6 Cyclic Component Capacity Tests", Review No. 33502-02, i
October 13, 1987.
B4.113 TENERA Memorandum, J. F. Giova to C. Mortgat, Review of 4 ;
CCL Report No. A-711-86, " Static Testing of Train C 1
Conduit Support Components", 4/4/86, Review No. 33501-01, June 26, 1986.
B4.114 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Supplemental Review of Impe11 CCL T6st Report A-711-86, " Static Testing of Train C Components", Review No. 33501-02, October 14, 1987.
E4.115 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan I.c, Tack 4.2.3, Review of CCL Report #A-720-86' dated July 10, 1986, " Static Testing of Train C Beam Clamps and d
Unistrut Hangers", Review No. 33504-01, January 22, 1987.
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RESULTS REPORT
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L ISAP I.c (Cont'd) l ATTACHMENT B~
REFERENCES (Cont'd) l 4
B4.' 116 TENERA Memorandum', J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action. Plan-I.c, Supplemental Review of CCL Test Report #A-720-86,.
L
" Beam Clamp Test", Review No. 33504-02, 0ctober 14. 1987.
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I B4.117.
TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan-
- i I.c,' Task 4.2.3, Review of CCL Test Procedure ~
- 1903.23-01, Review No. 33503-01, June 30, 1986.
B4.118 TENERA Memorandum, J. Groncki'to C. Mortgat, Action Plan
' }
L I.c, Supplemental Review of CCL Test-Procedure l.
- 1903.23-01, " Beam Clamp Test Procedures", Review No.
33503-02, October 14, 1987.
i i
B4 '.119 -
TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat.-Review of CCL
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Test Report #A-736-86 dated October 23,11986, " Tensile I
l-and Shear Strength Testing of Hilti' Kwik Bolts", Review L
No. 33505-01, April'3, 1987.
pp-'j o : 4,,
B4.120 TERA Memorandum, J. Groncki to C. Mortgat, Action Plan i
I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Impell Project Instruction 1
PI-0210-052-011, Revision 0, " Procedures for Utilizing Test' Data on Train C Components", Rev. 0,-Review No.
33112-01, August 28, 1987.
N' B4.121 TERA Memorandum, R. Brown to C. Mortgat, Action Plan-I.c, Task 4.2.3, Review of Procedure ECP-19B " Installation of New, Modified and Relocated Train C Conduit Supports",
Revision 2, Review No. 33702-01, May 29,'1987.
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