ML20236N396
| ML20236N396 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 11/10/1987 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Goldberg J HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8711160145 | |
| Download: ML20236N396 (2) | |
Text
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.NOV i 01937 In Reply Refer To:
Dockets: 50-498 50-499
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Houston Lighting & Power Company 1
ATTN:
J. H.,Goldberg, Group Vice i
President, Nuclear h
P.
0.- Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 i
Gentlemen:
Attached is a. copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Region VI exercise evaluation report of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, April 8, 1987 exercise.
The report indicates that FEMA obsorved no deficiencies during the exercise, but identified several-improvement areas.
If you have any further questions, please contact Mr. Nemen M. Terc at (817) 860-8129.
Sincereiy, L. J. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Attachment:
As stated cc w/ attachment:
Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN:
M. Wisenberg, Manager Nuclear Licensing P. O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN: Gerald E. Vaughn, Vice President Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 1700 1
Houston, Texas 77001
.RIV:NMEPB C:NMEP8 C:Gk D D:
AI 87-413 NMTerc;ap WLFisher LGConstable LJCallan
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, Houston Lighting & Power Company.
Central-Power.and Light Co.
R. L. Range /R. P. Verret P. O.-Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 City Dublic Service Board A. Von Rosenbert/M. T. Hardt i
P. O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 City of Austin M. B. Lee /J. E. Malaski P. O. Box 1008 I
Austin, TX 78767-8814 1
Texas Radiation Control Program Director cc w/o attachment:
Chief, Radiological Preparedness Team FEMA Region 6 Federal Center 800 North Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201-3698 bec w/ attachment:
j DMB'(A045)'
Resident Inspector Section Chief DRP/D Inspector i
RIV File bec w/o attachment:
R. D. Martin 1
R. L. Bangart W. L. Fisher R.
E.- Hall RPB Project Inspector, DRP/D DRS DRP.
NMEPB MIS System G. F. Sanborn 3
D. B. Matthews, NRR 1
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( Fe.deral Emergency Management Agency
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Washington, D.C. 20472 SEP 30.!9E I
l MDOPANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel Director Division of Radiation Protection and Dietgency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations U. S 1 r tory Ca mission-Smwd FIOM:
W.
I Assistant Associate Director j
Office of Natural and Tedurlogical Hazards SLBJET:
Final Exercise Report for the April 8,1987, Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the South Texas Project Electric Generating i
Station i
Attached is a ecpy of the final exercise report for the April 8,1987, I
exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for l
the South hxas Project Electric Generating Station.. h is was the
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l initial qualifying exercise involving the full-participation of I
the State of hxas, Matagorda County, and two local jurisdictions.
he final exercise report was prepared by the Region VI staff of the
. Federal Emergency Management Agency.
%ere were no deficiencies identified as a result of this exercise.
Several areas requiring corrective action (AICA) were identified.
s Based on the results of the exercise and the schedule of corrective actions subnitted by Texas for the ARCAs, FDiA considers that offsite i
radiological emergency plans and preparedness are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that qss qstiate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station.
If you should have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871.
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FINAL i
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT i
i Nuclear Power Plant -South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Applicants Houston Lighting and Power l
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Location of Plant State of Texas Matagorda County I
Bay City, Texas
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3-Date of Report: August 17,1987 j
Date of Exercise April 8,1987 f
Participants:
State of Texas
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Matagorda County, Texas Bay City, Texas Palacios, Texas Taylor Brothers Ambulance Service Matagorda General Hospital 3
y FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l
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Region VI 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, Texas 76201 NLooSM%
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L CONTENTS AB B R EVI ATIO N S.'.........................................................
v INTRODUCTION AND AUTHO RITY..........................................
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' l EXE R C ISE B A C KG R O U N D ~............................................... -
1 1.1 Exercise Su m m ary...................................................
2 1.2 Federal Evaluators...................................................
3
- 1.3 Exercise Obj ec tives.................................................
4 1.3.1 STPEGS......................................................
4
- 1.3.2 State and Local Objectives.....................................
7 o.
1.4 Exercise Guidelines and Participant Information......................... 13 L
- 1. 5. Sc e nario Su m m ary................................................... 15 1.5.1 Scenario Timeline............................................. 16-l J
1.6 Evaluation C riteria.................................................. 18 1
21 EXERCISE EVALU ATIO N................................................ 20 2!1 ' Texas State Operations.............................................. 2 0
'i 2.1.1
' Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) Headquarters l
t-Opera t i ons.................................................. 20 l
2.1.2 - Division of Emergency Management (DEM)/ State EOC............ ' 21 d
2.1.3 STPEGS EOC (BRC Operations)................................ 22 r
n (2.1.4 Disaster District EOC - Pierce, Texas........................... 25
-3 2.1.5 Bureau of Radiation Control Staging Area....................... 27 2.1.6 Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Lab......................... 28 1
jdi 2.1.7 BRC Field Monitoring Team #1................................ 29 2
2.1.8 BRC Field Monitoring Team # 2................................ 30 2.1.9 BRC Fleid Monitoring Team # 3................................ 31 j
m 2.1.10 BRC Field Monitoring Team # 4................................ 32 W
2.1.11 BRC Contamination Control Team.............................. 33 BRC Decontaminate 1 n Assistance Team......................... 34 I
2.1.12
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9 2.1.13 - Media Information Center..................................... 34 g
- 2.2 Local Gov ern ment Operations......................................... 36 1
d 2.2.1 Matagorda County EOC....................................... 36 l
2.2.2 Reception Center (Monitoring / Decontamination Function)......... 40 j
P 2.3.3 Reception Center (Reception / Care Function).................... 43
{j 2.2.4 Taylor Brothers Ambulance Service............................. 44 l
2.2.5 Matagorda General. Hospital................................... 45 46 p
- 2. 3 U tility Issu es.......................................................
1 i
t 3 TRACEING SCHEDULE FOR STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION............. ' 48 4 EVALUATION OF OBJE CTIVES........................................... 54 l
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4.1 Summary of FEM A Objectives Remaining to be Met...................... 54 4.2 FEM A Objectives Tracking - South Texas Project........................ 54
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' TABLES 1 Remedial Actions for the April 8,1987 South Texas Project
. Exercise..................'.............................................
49
' 2. Summary of Objectives Remaining to be Met................................ 55 3' FEMA Objectives Tracking Chart South Texas Project Electric l
G e ne ra ting St a ti o n...................................................... 56 j
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ABBREVIATIONS t
Argonne National Laboratory ANL'
' American Red Cross.
ARC Bureau of Radiation Control BRC' Division bf Emergency Management DEM Department of Health and Human Services DHHS Department of Energy DOE-Texas Department of Public Safety l
DPS Emergency Broadcast System ESS Emergency Operations Center-EOC' Environmental Protection Agency EPA
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' Emergency Planning Zone EPZ
. Emergency Response Facility.
ERF Food and Drug Administration FDA
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Federal Emergency Management Agency FEMA Houston Lighting and Power i
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- Loss-of-Coolant Accident
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- E Media Information Center J.
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' Millirems per hour -
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
.NRC Protective Action Guide-t g
$j Protective Action Recommendation PAR Protective Actica Section PAS Public Information Officer PIO g
Regional Assistance Committee W
RAC Radiologleal Defense RADEF Reactor Coolant System -
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r RCS
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REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness j
Radiological Officer j RO s
Standard Operating Procedure j
P-SOP South Texas Project Electric Generating Station l
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STPEGS Texas Department of Health TDH United States Department of Agriculture q
USDA
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t INTRODUCTION AND AUTHORITY th' ' Federal Emergency.
j On December 7,
1979, the President directed e
Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead role responsibility.for all off-site nuclear power facility planning and response.
FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological
' Emergency Response Planning include:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency response planning and in the.
review and evaluation of State and local government emergency 4
plans ensuring that the plans meet the Federal criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 FEMA REP-1,'Rev.1 (November 1980).
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- - Determining whether the State and local emergency response plans
' can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of an exercise conducted by' the appropriate - emergency response jurisdictions.
Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other e'
involved Federal agencies. Representatives of these agencies listed below serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.
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.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) l
- U.S. Department of Interior (DOI)
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- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (FDA) i f
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1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND The initial (qualifying) Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise' for the South Texas Project ~ Electric Generating Station (STPEGS), Bay City, Texas, was conducted on April 8,1987. The State of Texas and Matagorda County (the single county within the 10-mile Plume EPZ) fully participated in the exercise. A Federal Emergency c
Management Agency Evaluation Team evaluated the State and local off-site emergency response' capabilities at this exercise.
The results of the exercise evaluation ~ are contained in this report.
Exercise Objectives _of the STPEGS exercise, for State and local off-site i
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response, were submitted to FEMA Region VI on January 21, 1987 and, after review,,
were approved on January 27,1987. The exercise scenario was submitted to the Region
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. on March 9,1987 and, after review by the Region and Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Inc., a FEMA contractor, was approved on March 26,1987.
Following the exercise, on April 9,'1987, three review / critique meetings were held in Bay City, Texas. The first meeting, of the 23 member FEMA Evaluation Team, provided to. the acting ' RAC Chairman a detailed preliminary review of evaluator
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- findings. The second meeting > later that day, with Federal, State, Local and Utility x
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' representatives in ' attendance, presented a brief critique and preliminary findings i~
resulting from the exercise. "The third meeting, the same evening, a critique for the general public from.the area of the nuclear facility, presented a synopsis of the
' preliminary findings. Following the Public Critique meeting, a "Public Meeting", as i
. required by 44 CFR 350.10, was conducted and recorded.
All preliminary exercise findings have now been reviewed and consolidated in this 3
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report.
Section 2. of this report provides detailed narratives of exercise events,
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Deficiencies noted in exercise emergency response, Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) noted: by the evaluators and Areas Recommended for _ Improvement (ARFis) y suggested by the evaluators, for each of the field activities tested in the exercise.
Section 3 provides a tabular summary listing of any Deficiencies (that would lead ~ to a negative finding) and ARCAs, including those that require priority action. The tabular summary provides space for State and local jurisdiction response and their schedule for corrective actions.
The ' Federal evaluators found no deficiencies in this exercise.
Several ' ARCAs have been noted that will require action by the State and local-participants. -
Section 4 compiles, in tat $ular format, a listing of FEMA Objectives yet to be met and a tracking table depleting the status of all Objectives including those met, those partially met, those not yet met and any defielencies or ARCAs related to those Objectives.
- The findings presented in this report were reviewed by the Acting RAC Chairman of. FEMA Region VI. FEMA suggests that State and local jurisdictions take remedial actions in response to each of the problems indicated in the report, and that the State
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submit's schedule for addressing _ these problems. The Regional Director of-FEMA Region VI is_ responsible for cet!fying to the FEMA Associate Director for State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any Deficiencies ^ and Areas
, Requiring Corrective Action have either been corrected or scheduled for correction and i
that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans, as appropriate.
The following narrative summary provides a belef overview of the exercise f_
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' performances of the State of Texas and Matagorda County. More detailed discussions of performances by individual. agencies or response organizations are provided under the appropriate location in Sec. 2.
1.1 EXERCISE
SUMMARY
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k State of Texas Operations:
The Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, and the Texas Department of Public Safety, Division of Emergency Management, together with
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selected representatives of other State departments and agencies, fully participated in the STPEGS exercise. State operating locations included: the State EOC in Austin, the
. State Disaster District EOC at Pierce, the BRC staging area in Bay City, tha STPEGS 4;
EOC on the plant site, and various field locations within and near the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the plant site.
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With the exception of a few minor problems, mostly involving communications, detailed in the individual. site narratives in Sec. 2 of this report, the State demonstrated an adequate level of readiness for responding to a radiological emergency at the STPEGS plant.
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Local Government Operation (:
Matagorda County, the only county with the 10-mile EPZ, fully partic! pated in l'
the exercise. The cities of Bay City and Palacios participated as described in the local
,L plan. The county developed the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and procedures, and the elected county officials,< emergency staff and volunteers participated in accordance with the plan. County participants demonstrated a high level of training, l
active interest and enthusiasm toward their role in the emergency response efforts. An outstanding demonstrationof leadership, coordina'tlon and team effort was exhibited by n
county participants.
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Individual activities cf county participants are described in Sec. 2 of this report.
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.- i-1.2 FEDERAL EVALUATORS Twenty-three (23) Federal evaluators participated in evaluating the April 8,1987 STPEdS qualifying exercise.
These individuals, their agencies 'and their evaluation 1
assignments are listed below Evaluator At:ency Evaluation. Location Gary Jones FEMA Overall Coordination, Matagorda Co. EOC p
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Hank May EPA STPEGS EOC Bill Gasper ANL STPEGS EOC Ken Bertrarn ANL Disaster District EOC, Pierce Travis Ratcliff FEMA State EOC, Austin
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~l Carl McCoy FEMA BRC HQ, Austin and State EOC, Austin t
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Gary Easzynski ANL Matagorda Co. EOC, Bay City, Texas Harry Harrison FEMA BRC Staging Area and BRC Field Monitoring Team #1 Leon Zellner FDA BRC Field Monitoring Team #2 w
Leland Peyton FEMA BRC Fleid Monitoring Team #3
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Frank Wilson FEMA
-BRC Field Monitoring Team #4 John Benton FEMA BRC' Contamination Control Team (Access Control)
Jim Opelka ANL BRC Mobile Lab u
Gary Sanborn NRC Media Information Center, Bay City Q
Mike Brooks FEMA Media Information Center, Bay City U
Dana Cessna FEMA Media Information Center, Bay City 7
Jim Cox DOT Reception Center (Monitoring /Decon Function) k.
John Lewis DOE Reception Center (Monitoring /Decon Function)
Tom Goertz FDA Reception Center (Reception / Care Function)
Gene Nunn FEMA Reception Center (Reception / Care Function)
Don Newsom ANL Ambulance Service - Taylor Brothers Funeral Home y
a Phil Edgington HHS Matagorda General Hospital
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Tom Carroll ANL Matagorda General Hospital l'
The State of Texas also stationed one or more evaluators / controllers at each of the exercise sites who participated in site critiques and evaluations.
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- 1.3 - EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 3
1.3.1 STPEGS j
A.' General Objectives m4 1
'7.
- 1. : Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to implement and execute the STPEGS Emergency Management s
.and: appropriate Emergency Plan Implementing Plan Procedures.
2.
Demonstrate' the ability.' to alert, mobilize and augment
- station emergency response personnel..
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- 3. ' Demonstrate the ability to alert Federal,- State and. local authorities within the specified time constraints.
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' 4.
Demonstrate.the ability to activate the Technical Support
' Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC),.and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and the Media Informa--
7:.
' tion Center..-
t 5.
Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC, OSC, EOC, and the Media Information Center.
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. 8. - Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of 7,
emergency communications ~ equipment, and the adequacy of communications procedures and methods.
- 7.. Demonstrate the ability to communicate and Interface with..
r the - Nuclear Regulatory. Commission. (NRC) J Headquarters Incident Response -Center, and appropriate state and local governmental organizations, in an emergency situation.
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- 8. ' Demonstrate the ability to provide the proper information to the county to support the Prompt Notification System.
= 9.
Demonst* ate the ability to perform post exercise critiques, q
B.
Direction and Control 1.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response fac!!!ty b
- manager to maintain command control over emergency response activities conducted from his facility throughout the exercise.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability te initiate and coordinate emergency response activities in an efficient and timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to call upon and utilize outside support organizations if station capabilities are exceeded or if the additional assistance is warranted.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of the STPEGS Security group to respond to an emergency situation.
.s.
5.
Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room to the TSC staff and EOC staff.
5 6.
Demonstrate the ability of Corporate Public Information personnel to support the STPEGS Emergency Response
}l Organization.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to periodically brief personnel within his facility concerning the status of the emergency.
a 8.
Demonstrated through discussion, the ability to mobilize manpower and material to support protracted (long-term) operations to include recovery and reentry activities.
s C.
Accident Assessment 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the On-shift Emergency Organization and the STPEGS Emergency Response Organiza-tion to evaluate the causes of incidents and' perform E
iti ti tie
- eei rrete==it<>i stable condition.
I 2.
Demonstrate the ability of the appropriate emergency response facility personnel to classify an emergency condition.
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3.
Demonstrate thel ability of the appropriate emergency response facility personnel to analyze current plant conditions, Identify projected trends and potential f
consequences, coordinate with radiological assessment teams, and provide recommendation actions.
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Radiological Assessment fj 1.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate and conduct on-site, in-plant and off-site radiological monitoring activities.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability to assess and provide projections of off-site radiological conditions to support the formulation of protective action recommendations (regardless of the system used).
3.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate radiological data between the TSC and the EOC.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate STPEGS off-site radiological assessment activities with those conducted by the State.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to direct and coordinate the deployment of on-site and off-site radiological monitoring i
teams, and coordinate with state radiological monitoring p..
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6.
Demonstrate the ability of survey personnel to perform dose rate surveys, collect and analyze radiological samples and perform other prescribed on-site, in-pint and off-site radio-logical monitoring activities.
I 7.
Demonstrate the ability to obtain and analyze samples from the in-plant normal or post-accident sampling systems, and assess the resultant data.
E.
Protective Response i-
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1.
Demonstrate the ability to inform and update STPEGS, State and local emergency response personnel regarding the status
.y of the emergency.
J 2.
Demonstrate the ability to control the spread of contamina-7 tion and emergency workers' exposure.
1 3.
Demonstrate the ablHty to formulate and implement on-site protective action measures.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to formulate protective action q
recommendations for the general public and emergency
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workers within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate protective action recommendations to State and local authorities, and coordinate the protective action recommendations with the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control.
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.6.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously account for personnel assigned to, and operating out of, each emergency response 3
facility.
7.'
Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to provide emergency first aid to an injured, contaminated Individual-prior to the arrival of the ambulance service.
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F.
Public Information
'1.
Demonstrate the capability to coordinate the preparation, p
review and release of information with coroorate personnel and Federal, State and local government agencies; and provide r
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Information releases to the media.
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2.
Demonstrate the ability of rumor control personnel to address questions concerning the status of emergency situations.
. 3.
Demonstrate the ability of the Media Information Director or his designee to conduct media conferences..
0 1J.2 State and local Objectihes
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JURISDICTIONAL-NUREC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE
-State Local (See Note A)
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1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize E.1, E.2 X
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- 1 staff and activate facilities
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promptly.
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2.
Demonstrate ability to fullyt A.2.a, A.4 X
X 1,2,3,4 staff facilities and main-1 J.
tain staffing around the clock..- (See Note B.).
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.'3. Demonstrate the ability to <
A.1.d, A.1.e, I
X 1,2,3,4,5 3
make ddels' ions and coordinate A.2 emergency activities.
4.
Demonstrate adequacy of j
G.3.a, H.2, X
X 1,2,3,4,5,6 facilities, equipment, i
H.3 maps and displays to support emergency opera-tions.
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5.
Demonstrate ability to commu-F X
X all nicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.
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8-i JURISDICTIONAL NUREC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION
- FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE ~
State Local (See Note A)'
f' 4,6,7 6.
Demonstrate ability to.
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' mobilize and deploy field L
monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
(See Note C.)
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7._ Demonstrate appropriate I.8, I.11
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equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation-levels.
'7,8 8.
Demonstrate appropriate I.9 X-
_j equipment and procedures for i
1 measurement of airborne
..,l aslowas10~9ncentrations radiciodine c pCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
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9.
Demonstrate appropriate I8 X-equipment and procedures for collection, transportation and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water
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k and milk,.-
(See Note D.)
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- 10. Demonstrate ability to project I.10, J.10 X
r-I dosage to the public'from plume exposure, based on
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plant and field data and to
. determine appropriate pro-ilj; tactive measures based on PACS A
t available shelter, evacuation time estimates'and all other.
' appropriate factors.
'13.
Demonstrate ability to alert h.6 X
1 the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within o
15 minutes.
(See Note E.)
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- 14. Demonstrate ability to formu-E.5, E.7 X
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'inte and distribute appro-g priate instructions to the public;in a timely fashion.
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- 15. Demonstrate organizational J.9, J.10.a ability and resources neces-J.10.g
-sary.to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
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JURISDICTIONAL NUREC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE State Local ~
(See Note A)
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- 16. Demonstrate' organizational-J.10.j ability'and resources'neces-sary to deal with. impediments to evacuation, inclement weather or traffic obstruc-
.tions.
X 1,9 17.
Demonstrate organizational J.10.j ability.and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
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- 19. Demonstrate organizational J.9, J.10.g ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the' plume EPZ.
L 20.
Demonstrate ability to con-K.3.a,'
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1,4,7,9 tinuously monitor and control K.3.b emergency worker exposure.
- 24. Demonstrate the ability to C.3.a, X
X 2,5 brief the media in a clear, C.4.a accurate.and timely manner.
- 25. Demonstrate ability to pro-C.4.b X
X 1,2,4,5 h
vide advance coordination of information released.
- 26. t # 9strare. ability to C.4.c X
X 5
4.u ablish Sad operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
27.
Demonstrate adequacy of pro-J.12 X
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cedures for registration and radiological monitoring of 3
evacuees.
X 10
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of J.10.h
-facilities for mass care of l
evacuees.
- 29. Demonstrate adequacy of K.S.a, X
X 9,10,13 equipment and procedures for K.5.b decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and l
1 vehicles.
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10 JURISDICTIONAL NUREC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION L
FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE State Local (See Note A)
X 12,13
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy of EMS L.4 transportation, personnel and
[1 procedures for handling con-l-
taminated individuals
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including proper decontamina-l tion of the vehicle ar.d l
equipment.
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- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of L.1 l
hospital facilities and pro-cedures for handling contaminated individuals.
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- 32. Demonstrate ability to C.I.a, X
identify need -for, request, C.1.b I
and obtain federal assistance.
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- 33. Demonstrate ability to M.4 X
estimate total population i
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- 34. Demonstrate ability to deter-M.1 X
X 1,4 m
l mine and implement appropriate L
L measures for controlled re-covery and reentry. (See l
Note F.)
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- 35. Demonstrate the ability to C.4
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l-utilize outside support agencies when local capa-I l
bilities are exceeded.
- 36. Demonstrate the adequacy, F.1 X
X all operability and effective use
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of emergency communications <
equipment and the adequacy of communications procedures and 89 methods.
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- 37. Demonstrate ability to monitor D.4 X
X all i.
Emergency Classification l
levels continuously and imple-ment procedures in a timely manner.
0 l
l 6
l
)h i
.,2 _, -..-
'll JURISDICTIONAL NUREC-0654 RESPONSIBILITY LOCATION FEMA EXERCISE OBJECTIVE NO. & TEXT REFERENCE State Local (See Note A) i ' 38. Demonstrate capability to E
X X-1,2,3,4 l
'. effectively process all incoming / outgoing messages in a timely manner, including the documentation of both actual and simulated messages.
- 39. Demonstrate that authority A.2.a, X
1,10 h.
. exists ~in coordinating and A.3 activating a reception center 14 (as necessary) in a timely manner.
m Notes j
A.
The locations 'where various exercise Objectives are to be demonstrated are.
~
. indicated by numerical codes as follow:
9 CODE TEAM ELEMENT OR FACTLITY NAME' LOCATION 1.
,Matagorda County-EOC Sheriff's Office, Bay City a.
2.
State EOC DPS Headquarters, Austin 3.
Disaster District Sub 2A EOC DPS District Office, Pierce n
4.
STPECS.EOC STPEGS Plant Site, Matagorda d
County
'5.
Media.Information Center Holiday Inn, Bay City 6.
BRC Staging Area Services Center, Bay City g-I 7.
Various Field Monitoring Teams 10-Mile EPZ 8.
BRC ERV and Noblie laboratory Pad adjacent to the STPECS EOC-P'.
9.
Access Control Point (s) 10-Mile EPZ Jt 10.
Reception Center McAllister Jr. High School, Bay City 11.
Matagorda General' Hospital Bay City 1
12.
Ambulance Service Taylor Brothers Funeral Home, Bay City Vehicle Decontamination Facility Designated Car Wash, Bay City 13.
B.
This objective will be met by presenting a roster of persons who would man the second shift, and the third where 31hift operations are planned. Rosters for all locations will be presented at the appropriate controlling EOCs.
i C.
Teams will be pre-positioned. Deployment will not be delayed to simulate travel time from normal duty stations.
__.n_ -
,---___--x_u-
--u
12 D.
Collection of milk and snow samples will not be demonstrated.
(There are no commercial daleles within the STPEGS 10-mile EPZ.)
E.
Sirens and Tone-Alert radios will not be activated. EBS messages will be prepared, but will not be broadcast.
F.
This demonstration will be limited to a discussion of actions which would need to be taken if the recovery and reentry phase of the exercise were to be fully played.
1 Discussion in the Matagorda County EOC will be minimal, since most county actions will be in response to recommendations issued by the Bureau of Radiation Control, and would, therefore, be merely speculative until the actual recommendations of the Bureau are known.
~.
Event
- Actual Simulation i..
1.
Declaration of Emergency I
m i
2.
Notification of Off-site Agencies X
i P
3.
Emergency Announcement X
4.
Activation of On-site Organization X
E.
1 5.
Activation of.0ff-site Organization X
1 l
Tio i
i l
[
6.
Emergency Response Facilities Accountability X
7.
RCS Post Accident Sample X
or f
I 8.
Decontamination of Contaminated Persons X
IT' 1
9.
Emergency Medical Assistance to Contaminated X
{
injured person i
- 10. Off-site Medical Response X
i j
l
- 11. Power Plant Component Operation X
12 Dispatching of Response Te.ams (Radiation Monitoring, I
~
i Fire Brigade, Repair, etc.)
i
\\.
if such 3
l l
- This list of items denotes the level of participation that may result action is requested or directed by the' participants in response to scenario situations. It is not intended to be an absolute list of actions that will be taken.
i
_1 1
h h____._._______._
13 1.4 - EXERCISE GUIDELINES AND PARTICIPANT INFORMATION The 1987 Graded Exercise will be conducted for the purpose of assuring proper emergency response by those personnel who are assigned responsibilities within the South Texas Project Electric Generating - Station (STPEGS), those. personnel ass!gned responsibilities.as delineated in the Matagorda County Emergency Plan, and those personnel who are assigned responsibilities as delineated in the State of Texas Emergency Management Plan. Accordingly, the following guidelines have been developed for the' l
conduct of the '1987 Graded Exercise to demonstrate the capabilities of the exercise i
participants to meet the objectives set forth in Section 2.0 of this scenario manual.
- 1.
The Graded Exercise wl31 be conducted on April 8,1987. Since u
exercise participants will not have prior knowledge of the exercise start time, all personnel should follow their normal routines for
~~
that day.
- 2. - Following the establishment of Initial conditions, the exercise will
~
i start with a postulated plant condition necessitating the declaration of an emergency at STPEGS.
The postulated accident conditions will result in a simulated 3.
radiological release which necessitates the consideration of protective. actions for the general public.
Meteorological conditions may be varied throughout the exercise.
J 4.
Media centers will be manned and will perform their prescribed functions; however, no exercise press release will be made to the
,g public.
5.
Exercise participants will perform, as appropriate, radiological ri(
monitoring and dose rate assessment activities.
6.
As appropriate to their mercise participation, State agencies will w
preposition themselves in the Matagorda County area so as to commence exercise participation at an appropriate point in the
~
y development of the exercise scenario.
h.
7.
STPEGS and BRC radiological monitoring field teams will be p
dispatched for the purpose of testing response
- time,
/.
communications, monitoring and sampling procedures. The field team will gather sample media and route such samples to the
^
appropriate laboratory' facilities for analysis.
Each radiological monitoring field team will be accompanied by a controller / evaluator team throughout the exercise.
Each field team will rendezvous with its controller / evaluator team at the location from which it is deployed. The rendezvous locations are as follows:
m--
--m.n
'3:
I.
m.
a.-
For the STPEGS teams, the OSC.
+
b.
For the State Off-site Field Monitoring teams, the designated off-site staging area.
8.'
Participation by STPEGS on-site personnel directly involved in responding to an emergency situation shall be carried out to the fullest extent possible,. Includ!ng the deployment of in-plant i
radiological monitoring teams, and the use of protective clothing und respiratory protection equipment.
9.'.
Use of protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment y
shall be' simulated by personnel assigned to the off-site STPEGS j
radiological monitoring field teams.
' 10.. Adappropriate, Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) announcements should be prepared and passed to the appropriate stations; however
]
these ' announcements should not be released to the general public.
m Sirens will not be sounded.
(
11.
The Bay l City Fire Department and/or the Palacios Fire
[jl Department may be involved in providing simulated on-site or off-site firefighting assistance. If required by the exercise scenario, the fire department (s) should be contacted for the purpose of checking communications only, but' not be required to mobilized (I
manpower or equipment.
12.
On-site security personnel should exercise their procedures for
[
restricting normal access to the STPEGS site without actually redirecting incoming and outgoing personnel.
y
- 13. ' All radio ' and written communications will be preceded and followed with the words "THIS IS A DRILL".
m 14.
In the event an actual emergency occurs during the course of the exercise, participants in the affectec. erea attend to-the r
emergency situation. The Controller in the affected area shall
~
advise the Lead Controller of the condition and the Lead Controller shall discuss with key participants the immediate course qj of the exercise.
j i
- 15. ' On-site and off-site Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs),
including State facilities in Pierce and Austin, will be manned and perform their prescribed functions as appropriate to the development of the exercise.
16.
If the use of barricades is directed to assist in Traffic and Access Control, the barricades will not be placed to. impede the flow of traffic. Placement will be simulated.
1 i
l l
)
U
m-1....:
15 l
17.
In order to demonstrate the capability to conduct an_ evacuation, the; movement' of people will be simulated. The ' organizational ability and resources necessary to manage the evacuation will be demonstrated. Evacuees are not essential to demonstrate shelter management.
1.5 SCENAR'O SUMM ARY The exercise is based upon a aircraft crash on-site, a fire and the subsequent loss of the 13.8 EV switchgear, the failure of all three Emergency Diesel Generators, the lifting of a Steam Generator PORV and a Steam Generator Tube leak.
Initial conditions established that Unit 1 has been operating at or above 90%
(
power for the last 45 days. Unit 1 is currently operating at 100% power with most plant
-l l
parameters normal and stable. The unit is in its second fue! cycle at about the end of core life. Emergency Diesel Generator 13 has been removed from service to replace a i
J eracked piston. Repairs are expected to take 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. The Emergency Transformer has
- I been removed from service for routine maintenance.
{
Unit two is in cold shutdown (mode 5).
The initiating. event ocetN when security notifies the Shift Supervisor of an on-site crash'of the HL&P helleopter. There are no passengers and the pilot. suffers only minor cuts and abrasiona. However, conditions are met to declare a NOUE based on an aircraft ernsh on-site.
Thirty minutes later. the Emergency Director receives notification of a fire in
)
q
]
the 13.8 KV switchgear room. Conditions are met at this time to declare an ALERT based upon a fire potentially affecting safety systems. The fire continues to burn and after one hour spreads into switchgear 1F,1G,1H, and 1J causing a loss of off-site AC h
power and a Reactor trip. The Steam Driven Auxillary Feedwater pump fails to start.
' Emergency Diesel Generator 12 falls to start due to a failure of the fuel oil priming
~
I pump.
Emergency Diesel Generator 11 starts but its output breaker will not stay y
closed. Steam Generator D Power Operated Relief Valve falls open. An SAE should be declared 15 minutes later based upon the loss of off-site power and the inoperability of 1
all ESF Diesel Generators for more than 15 minutes.
l *M Forty-five minutes after the trip Steam Generator D suffers a 500 gpm tube f.-
rupture. Conditions at this time warrant the declaration of a GENERAL EMERGENCY l
based upon the loss of off-site and on-site power along with the loss of auxiliary l
feedwater OR loss of two of the three fission barriers with a high potential for the loss 4
of the third barrier.
1 Forty minutes later an automobile accident blocks the entrance / exit to Tres l
l Palacios Oaks.
Twenty minutes after the accident (four hours into the scenario) a contaminated Individual and his contaminated vehicle arrive at the reception center.
I I
i l
l
16 Four hours and fifteen minutes into the scenario an HL&P employee is injured and contaminated while working on the PORV isolation valve in the isolation valve I
cubicle. His injury consists of a compound fracture of his right femur and is severe enough to necessitate his removal to facilities off-site.
(
1.5.1 Scenario Timeline INITIATING f
MESSAGE TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT
SUMMARY
- I
~
0715 1
Initial conditions established.
0730 2
Security reports that the HL&P helicopter (H+00:15) has crashed on site at the landing pad. The pilot suffered only minor abrasions and q)
~
contusions. Conditions are met to declare a NOUE based upon an aircraft crash on site.
Reference:
OEPP01-ZA-001 Rev. 2, Addendum
,I 1LI 2, page 9.
0745 3e contingency Message: A NOUE should be C
(H+00:30) declared based upon an aircraft y
crash on site.
0800 4
The Shift Supervisor receives a call (H+00:45) informing him of a fire in the area of the laydown pad at the North end of the turbine building. Conditions are met to declare an I.
ALERT based upon a fire potentially i
affecting safety systems.
Reference:
OEPP01-ZA-001 Rev. 2, Addendum 2, page 15.
q' 0815 Se contingency Message: An ALERT should be (H+01:00) declared.
E 0855 6
The Shift Supervisor receives a report that (H+01:40) the fire continues to burn out of control
"~
and has spread into the 13.8 KV switchgear room.
0900 7,8 The fire causes the loss of buses IF, 1G, q
(H+01G5) 1H, and 1J. The reactor trips and turbine trips. On the resultant steam generator pressure surge, steam generator D PORV sticks open. The Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump fails to start. Emergency Diesel Cenerator 12 fails to start due to a failure of the fuel oil priming pump.
O Emergency Diesel Generator 11 starts but its O
output breaker will not stay closed.
l
.s 7
0915 9
Conditions are met to declare a SITE AREA (H+02:00)
EMERGENCY based upon the loss of off-site power and the inoperability of all ESF Diesel Generators for more than 15 minutes.
Reference:
OEPP01-ZA-001 Rev. 2, Addendum 2, page 11.
0930 11c Contingency Message: A SITE AREA (H+02:15)
EMERGENCY should be declared.
1015 13 Steam generator D suffers a 500 gpm tube (H+03:00) rupture. Conditions warrant the declaration of a CENERAL EMERGENCY based upon the 30 I
failure of off-site and on-site power along with a loss of auxiliary feedwater for several hours OR loss of two of the three i
fission product barriers with a high
_h-potential for the loss of the third barrier..
t
Reference:
OEPP01-ZA-001 Rev. 2, Addendum 2, page 6.
~
1030 15e contingency Message: A CENERAL EMERGENCY (H+03:15) should be declared based upon the failure of
~
off-site and on-site power with a loss of auxiliary feedwater for several hours OR loss of two of the three fission product 1
barriers with a high potential for the loss J
of the third barrier.
J
-9 1055 16 Matagorda County Sheriff's Office receives a
[]
(H+03:40) report of an automobile accident which is blocking the entrance / exit to Tres Palacios Oaks.
1100 18s Local resident (Andy Anderson) calls (H+03:45)
Matagorda County EOC for information and "J
guidance.
d 1100 19s Missouri Pacific RR representative (Lewis (H+03:45)
Carner) calls State EOC for guidance on v
routing trains through Matagorda County.
U.
1100 20 Three evacuees (not contaminated) arrive at
}
(H+03:45) the Reception Center.
1115 22s Concerned citizen (Mary Sweeny) calls (H+04:00)
Matagorda County EOC and requests assistance in contacting fisherman who may be returning home by boat through the plume.
1115 23s Wharton County Judge calls Disaster District (H+04:00)
Sub 2A and requests assistance in obtaining a Federal Disaster Declaration.
_u-___m_. _ _ - - -. _ _. _. _ - ----- -------
t
.*
- - V 18-1115 24s concerned citizen (Bill-Farber) calls-I
-(H+04:00)
- Matagorda County EOC and requests. testing of, j
.J water supply in Blessing.. a. 1115 25 Contaminated evacuee (Walter Rumson) arrives -(H+04:00) at Receptio,n Center. ,1130-28 A worker is injured and contaminated while j (H+04:15) working on the PORV isolation valve in the s Isolation. Valve Cubicle at STPECS. 1130 - 29c' Local resident (Sue Bob Barker) attempts to ~ (H+04:15) reenter the evacuated area through Access m. Control Point.- 1145 -31 Contaminated evacuee.(Bill French) arrives '(H+04: 30 )' at the Reception Center. 1150 29c Contingency Message.If she was allowed to -(H+04:35) enter the evacuated area, Sue Bob Baker now e returns to the Access control Point. (Both J'i .she and her vehicle are contaminated.) s l
- 1215 38s MIC receives Disaster Welfare Inquiry from (H+05
- 00)
Martha Downs concerning Walter Rumson. (See message number 25.) 1215 39-Traveler (W.T. Horne) arrives at the Access (H+05:00) Control Point and seeks permission to-drive through the affected area. 1230 43 State EOC receives telecopied request for (H+05:15) Federal Disaster Declaration from Wharton y,, County Judge. 1315 50s Disaster District Sub 2A receives request -(H+06:00) for information from concerned Jackson (T" County resident (Creg Fuller). d, 4 1 -1430 58 Repairs are completed on the PORV isolation r 1 -(H+07:15) valve and the valve is closed. The release 1 is stopped at this time. ~ 1515 (APPROI.) 67 Drill activities are terminated as directed ] p -(H+08:00) 'by ths Lead Controller in the STPECS EOC. l 1.4 EVALUATION CRITERIA . The STPEGS exercise evaluations that follow in Section 2 of this report are based ) on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of ] NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1 (November 1980). Region VI evaluated the exercise J using the ~ modular format. Federal evaluators were instructed to mark those sections of the modules "not applicable" which did not correspond to the objectives of the exercise. j L i 1
.i 19 Following the narratives for each jurisdiction or off-site response activity, Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action. and Areas Recommended for Improvement are. presented with accompanying recommendations. Any identified Deficiencies would cause a finding that off-site preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the STPEGS plans in - the event of a radiological emergency. At least one Deficiency in this category would. necessitate a negative finding and require that a Remedial Drill, to demonstrate correcticn, be scheduled within 90 days. Areas Requiring Corrective Action include those activities where demonstrated. performance during the exercise was evaluated and considered faulty; corrective actions are. considered necessary but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance 'could be' given that, in the event of a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. This category should be. relatively easy to correct in comparison to 'those classified as Deficiencies, and correction must be demonstrated at the next regularly scheduled exercise. n Areas Recommended for Improvement are also listed, as appropriate, for each ..d jurisdiction or offsite activity. These recommendations are advisory in nature and the appropriate jurisdiction may or may not act on them as they see fit. h m 71 W i w e. v r i 4 i f I { I 1 1
20 i 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION On the basis of general criteria set forth in NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev. I ff (November 1980), and exercise objectives and observations, an evaluation has been performed of the April 8,1987 exercise at the South Texas Project Electric Generating p Station. This evduat'on, including Deficiencies, Areas Requiring Corrective Action and L Areas RecommeMed for Improvement is presented herein. - FEMA Region VI will maintain close liaisons with the State and local governments in determining the required as-l corrective actions (including timeframes for accomplishing the corrections) in I accordance with all established criteria and guidelines. There were no Deficiencies j um i identified during this exercise. J l b{ 2.1 TEXAS STATE OPERATIONS The following includes evaluations of the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of f Radiation Control (TDH/BRC) operations at their Headquarters in Austin, at the State e EOC, and at various operating locations in Matagorda County. Operations of the State { Emergency Management Council at their EOC in Austin and at the Disaster District EOC j j in Pierce are also included. ~ w 2.1.1 Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) Headquarters Operations 4 State BRC Field response elements and personnel were, for the exercise, pre-positioned in Bay City. Therefore, mobilization and activation, as would be carried out in a real emergency, was not observed. However, the State plan and procedures were .g' discussed and appear to be functional in all respects. The Austin BRC office maintains operational control of emergency response until a Chief of Field Operations assumes control at either a staging area or an emergency operating site at the affected locality. [ The BRC Austin office was advised, by telephone, at 0800, followed by a telex message, of an Unusual Event at the STPEGS plant. At 0842, telephone and telex messages were received upgrading the event to Alert status. At 0945, the Site Area Emergency message was received by telephone. At 1030 the Chief of Field Operations i I ~ advised BRC Austin that he was in the STPEGS EOC and was assuming control of BRC A operations. in the Austin office, following the Unusual Event declaration, BRC personnel 3 moved a COMPAQ computer into the conference room, the emergency operations area, ,I and began developing potential scenarlos and inputting data for preliminary plume projections and dose projections. The IRDAM computer program, specifically modified gun for STP, uses data on classification levels, wind speeds and directions, anticipated U . release rates, precipitation, and other factors to produce graphic depletions of potential f plume pathways, dose projections, and other factors that can be used in early } considerations of possible protective actions that could be recommended to local j f response organizations. I 1 i I u
y.. All BRC communications systems used in the exercises telephone, telex, and hard-copy, functioned well throughout, and the operators and their procedures were entirely adegante. The staff was frequently briefed and a chalkboard was used for status display. A BRC llatson team was dispatched to the State EOC following the assumption of control by the Chief of. Field Operations, and after the declaration of-a General Emergency at STPEGS. While no speelfic FEMA' objectives were assigned to this site in this exercise, it 1, 3, 4,5,6 36,37 and 38 were met. is felt that objectives 3 ' DEFICIENCIES: NONE i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE t 1.1.2 Division of Emergency Management (DEM)/ State EOC The DEM received nollfication of the declaration of an Unusual Event at the ~ I ,STPEGS plant at 0751. Initial activation of the State EOC was ordered at 0825, upon receipt of the Alert. Mobilization of additional staff was demonstrated as the energency classification situation changed during the exercise. Three-shift operational capability was demonstrated by execution of shift changes. The State EOC serves as a back-up to the Disaster District EOC (in Pierce, Texas) where primary State response m} management authority is assigned in the event of an STPEGS emergency. If a situation grows beyond the control of the Disaster District, the State EOC would call on resources 'outside the District for support. The State EOC, located underground in the Department of Public Safety complex in Austin, is more than adequate to support all anticipated emergency operations, with appropriate space, power, lighting, furniture and equipment. Maps and displays in the U EOC are excellent and, when augmented by the display materials brought by the BRC "I liaison group, provide a comprehensive array of aids for executive decision making. L. State EOC communications equipment, systems and procedures are very good. Telephone', telex, hard-copy and/or radio systems connect the EOC with all appropriate 7!; locations, with multiple redundancies and back-ups in case of failure of one or more' systems. All incoming and outgoing communications are appropriately logged, duplicated and passed to EOC staff for action or information. Frequent reviews of action status f I were held to insure that no required actions or responses were overlooked. The EOC staff, led by the DEM, demonstrated a thorough grasp of emergency f operations requirements and participated actively in discussions leading to required decisions from the EOC. Coordination with other participating organizations and locations was maintained, and requests for Federal or other outside assistance were well managed. o L j
a: 22 All. exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 24, 25, 32, 36, 37 and 38) assigned to the State EOC were adequately met.' DEFICIENCIES NONE (f ~ AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE l 4 .J AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE .v. %I 2.1.3 STPEGS EOC (BRC Operations) y The Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control EOC team, pre-i staged at the Bay City Service Center, was notified of the Site Area Emergency, and the need to staff the STPEGS EOC at 0908. They immediately initiated pre-deployment 1 u-activities and when ready, departed for the EOC facility. An actual deployment, from normal offices in Austin, Hoviston or other BRC locations, would have required more time than was available in the exercise scenario. Therefore, although a mobilization from p day-to-day offices was not de.monstrated, the pre-staging was appropriate in this case.. k y M The State liaison officer to the utility arrived at the EOC at 1003, and was followed i shortly after by the remaining BRC EOC staff. BRC functions at the STPEGS EOC include; dose assessment, development of protective action recommendations and direction of.BRC radiological field teams. A General Emergency was declared, f concurrent with the arrival of the BR.C team and the team immediately initiated + emergency response activities in accordance with their plans and procedures. [ While no shift change or around-the-clock activities were demonstrated during 3 the exercise, rosters of second-shift personnel, including names and assignments were L U presented to illustrate the State's capability to maintain 24-hour operation of an EOC team. g. The BRC EOC team adequately demonstrated their abilities to nake needed decisions and coordinate activities with other emergency response locations. However, - the recommendation to Wharton County, from the Stat 6 EOC, to take shelter was not speelfically coordinated with the BRC Chief of Field Operations or his STPEGS EOC -~ staff prior to being issued. This recommendation was based on dose projections available at the time. ] The STPEGS EOC is located adjacent to to the plant in the utility's Training Center. The State's main operating area within the EOC is in a room next to the main f EOC. The entire EOC is dedicated to that purpose and therefore remains set up and L ready for emergency response activities at all times. The State operations room is f' limited in size, resulting in cramped and crowded conditions. Partly because of the { crowding, excessive noise in the room was a problem. The State communications L equipment, and its operators are also located in the State operations room. It is useful to l l f the overall operations that these activities are co-located, but these communications l .i. t:
) 23 activities add to the noise levelin the room. It is recommended that the communications operators be, equipped with headsets in an attempt to limit the noise in the room. The . State operations room is equipped with adequate furniture, telephones, supplies and other material _to perform its designated functions. Emergency power _and other back-up systems are available if required. Utility support to the State operations includes clerical assistance, security, copying, message distribution, etc. Maps, status boards and activity displays are mounted in the State operations room and were used appropriately i by the EOC staff. A problem that developed when entries on the displays could not be erased, when new entries were to be substituted should be resolved so that the displays can be updated as necessary._ Communications systems used by titate BRC personnel in the EOC included: BRC radio, the primary link to State field teams; Department of Publ'ic Safety (DPS) radio, the back-up link to the State field teams, and the link with the Disaster District ~~ EOC. at Pierce. Commercial telephones, supplemented by a telefax, provided the primary link to other State and locallocations outside the EOC. HL&P communications ~ support operations at the telefax were delayed initially due to telephone problems. Once the telephone problems were resolved, rapid and timely'hard-copy transmissions were observed. The BRC radio system didn't work very well during the exercise. The field teams (monitoring and contamination control) were able to receive transmissions from the EOC, probably due to the fixed, high antenna, but the mobile units that were located more than' about eight (8) miles from the EOC site, or in a few terrain features such as underpasses, were received only intermittently by the EOC. The back-up system, the DPS radio in the fleid monitoring team vehicles, functioned effectively and communications were maintained. The decontamination and contamination control teams, which did not have the benefit of the DPS radio back-up, were never able to establish communications with the BRC system. The contamination control team was q not aware that they could have communicated with the EOC through the inter-city ] 'j frequency on the radio in the Sheriff's vehicle radio. When all DPS vehicles are equipped with radios now in the acquisition process, BRC frequencies will be available on these k units and will resolve the range and coverage problems experienced by the BRC hand-held units. BRC teams not paired with DPS vehicles should be provided with more _ capable radios or additional repeaters should be installed around the EPZ for full area -] coverage. Projected dose rates, provided to the State STPEGS EOC Staff by the utility, were far in excess, by a factor of almost 100,000, of the results produced by the State field monitoring teams. This discrepancy appears to have been due to errors made by the '( - utility. The BRC Chief of Field Operations recognized the problem and made an attempt h. to determine what was wrong before taking action. As it turned out, his decision to wait was a correct one. However, the discrepancy was never satisfactorily resolved. The l decision to recommend evacuation of all sectors out to five miles was prudent, based on the projected time required to stop the release and expectation of a wind shift later in I the evening. Inquiries about safety of water supplies were properly handled. At 1158 the BRC Chief of Field Operations querled the State EOC about the I advisability of KI use by Field Teams. Pelor to receipt of a response, the Field Monitoring Team Leader advised the monitoring teams to take Kl. While the Chief of
14 Field OperatJons has been delegated the authority t6 e Nem%d the use of El by the l field teams, ha did not make the ree' commendation VMW r %tNys was received from the State EOC at 1314. In the future, either the Chid nf Wht operations or the State EOC should issue an approval prior to K! use being recommended The State PIO liaison at the STPEGS EOC was fuq htvolved in coordination of l ) Information intended for release to the publh. Following rev%w of the material with the l Media Center, the material was includrc] In the SRC news releases. Cooperatim between the EOC an6 the Media Center was rapid rnd comprehensive. un Estimation cf total populatitu exposure was not done until an evalustar questioned the State STPEGS EOC staff about it. The staff then demonstrated 'he ability to carry out the required activities. Recovery and reentry activitics were table-topped due to the brief time frames in the exercise. The staff demonstrated that tney understood the important factors that need to be considered. ig Internal and external communic 6ttom to the State STPEGS EOC staff were L logged, recorded, copied and distelbuted (a appropriate. A problem was observed regarding the exchange of verbal information octween the utility and the State staff. 7b The Utility Emergency Director provided periodic briefings to ESC personnel, including a liaison officer from the State who would later present the information to the State staff. During the exercise, one of the utility briefings included some information that [ was not intended for general release, but was not identified as being confidential or for 6. Informational purposes only. The State liaison made this Information known to the State staff which took action as though the information was intended for public release. This 7 resulted in some confusion and disaffection with the utility. It is recommended that the utility insure that briefings include a clear delineation of information that is to be released, and information that is for internal use only. { All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 14, 20, 25, 33, 34, 36, 37 m and 38) assigned to the STPEGS EOC were met, with the following Areas Requiring Corrective Action and Areas Recommended for Improvement. d i 7 DEFICIENCIES: NONE i AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 87-1
== Description:== The State Department of Health (BRC) radio at the STPEGS EOC was unable to provide continuous communications with the State Field Teams due to limited range and/or power of the hand-held mobile units. (NUREG 0654, F.1.d) Recommendation: The BRC radio system should be improved to provide for continuous communications with field units. Possible { improvements might include increasing the power of the port-RJ able units, installing additional repeaters arcund the EPZ or, I
li. 25 t ll using the DPS radio system (now used as a back-up to the BRC system) as the primar' channel to the field teams. y !i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l
== Description:== The room designated for use by the State EOC team l's somewhat small, resulting in crowding and high noise levels. !l !( Recommendation: A larger room should be secured for use by the State emergency response team at the STPEGS EOC. . m
== Description:== Open-speaker communications equipment in the State u operating area contributed to the high noise levels. l i Recommendation: Radio operators be provided with headsets to l reduce the noise levels and remove the staff distractions of open lro communications. l(
== Description:== Entries on the status boards used by the State staff could not be erased. Recommendation: The status boards should be altered so that they q can be erased and information revised, as required. M 2.1.4 Disaster District EOC - Pierce, Texas t The Pierce Disaster District EOC, the initial line of State response to any disaster, was activated promptly upon notification of the Unusual Event at STPEGS, and 3 y an appropriate staff was quickly mobilized. The EOC's capability of 24-hour operation was demonstrated by presentation qf rosters of back-up personnel for all but the DEM Regional Liaison Officer (RLO). No formal designation has been made to back-up this ' f" position. DEM indicated that they would designate, as required, an RLO from another disaster district to serve as relief for the Pierce RLO. It is recommended Ost this procedure be formalized, and specific back-up personnel be designated so that they can i familiarize themselves with the locations and procedures in the Pierce area prior to a requirement for their activation. The EOC facility, located in the Department of Public Safety Sub-District ^ office, is adequate to support all disaster response operations and has the appropriate maps, status boards and displays'to support such operations. Emergency power, food, L water and other essential supplies are available. The EOC is supported by communications capable of maintaining contact with all appropriate organizations, locations and field forces. Equipment in place includes: j dedicated and commercial telephone lines, data terminals, telex, Datafax, NAWAS, TELETS teletype and DPS radio systems. A noisy line, during the early part of the
v. .g exercise, on the' dedicated line,to the utility, was the only communications problem experienced at Pierce. DPS comm'unications operators are highly trained and capable, q and operating procedures were, for the most part, adequate. It is recommended that ~ more detailed logs, of both incoming and outgoing messages be maintained and that j operator Initials and EOC receipt times be entered on incoming messages for later retrieval or review of specific. message data. The DPS communicator dispatched to p, activate a DPS radio at the STPEGS_EOC to serve as a back-up to the BRC field team L radios proved to be extremely valuable and maintained continuous contact when the BRC hand-held units failed to provide adequate coverage. - The Pierce EOC staff, under the direction of the Disaster District Committee Chairman, demonstrated a thorough knowledge of plans and procedures for emergency response.. The staff was continuously aware of emergency classification levels and was fully involved in discussions of appropriate actions. A problem that surfaced during the exercise involved the development and issuance, by the Pierce EOC, (simulated) of three g I news releases to radio stations in.Wharton County. These releases were not coordinated with the State EOC 'or the Media Information Center prior to issue and could have resulted in confileting or confusing information reaching the public. It is recommended that procedures be reviewed to insure that all messages directed to the public be jb coordinated through the Media Information Center, prior to issue, to insure commonality and consistency. All FEMA exercise ob]ectives (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 36, 37 and 38) assigned to the Pierce Disaster District EOC were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE bIi AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: .i W 87-2 Descriptions The Pierce EOC simulated issuing three news releases to radio stations in Wharton County without coor-dinating the releases with the Media Information Center. (NUREG 0654, G.4.b) Recommendation: Review procedures to insure that all releases intended for the public are coordinated through the MIC. ' AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
== Description:== Communications operators did not initial or enter time l of receipt on all incoming messages as required by procedures. I i< Recommendation: Operators should follow all procedures and complete message forms for later retrieval or response if required. l e
x) 1 .'w y j y s-o
Description:
. Logs of outgoing messages were not maintained.-The l message clipboard was fairly effective,in maintaining messages in sequence, but would be less than effective if quick reference to a' B-j message was required. - Recommendattom Maintain message logs for outgoing and incoming messa;;es. (
- Descriptions The DPS/DEM Regional Liaison Officer (RLO) has no
' dentified back-up or relief. The State DEM EOC indicates that i another RLO would be, as needed, sent to relieve the Pierce RLO. 9 Recommendattom Specific alternates to the Pierce RLO should be r designated, in advance. o 1.1.5 Bureau of Radiation Control Staging Area g The BRC. Staging Area, located at the Day City Service Center, was activated on ~ the arrival of BRC team personnel following the receipt of the Alert Notification. All BRC teams and personnel were prestaged, to meet exercise time frames, at the Staging F Area. Therefore, actual mobilization and activation times were not observed.. However, mobilization and activation procedures, described in State plans, appear to be adequate. ~ 1 The Staging Area facility.is adequate in space and equipment and it has } appropriate maps, status boards and displays to support-its role in BRC ' deployment j Communications equipment at the Staging Area consists of telephones and a BRC radio ) base station.' The equipment provided adequate links with all organizations and locations j except for deployed field. teams. : The hand-held radios used by the fleid teams are limited in range'and frequently unable to contact either the Staging Area or the Field ' Monitoring Team Leader at the STPEGS EOC. DPS back-up units, in the field team cars, { would have been able to maintain communications had there been a compatible unit at the Staging Area as there was at'the STPEGS EOC. If some management of field teams L is to be maintained at the Staging Area, improved communications to and from the teams i must be provided. The BRC STPEGS EOC staff, including the Chief of Field Operations, was ) deployed from the Staging Area as per written procedures. On arrival at the plant gate, j they were denied entrance by a plant guard who told them that "there is an emergency l - drill and the plant site is sealed". The team indicated to the guard that they were part of] ' the emergency response and had assignments in the EOC, but he still denici them i Area by . entrance "until someone at the EOC authorized it." The team called the Stag ng radio requesting assistance, whereupon the Staging Area called the plant by telephone t request that they direct the guard to admit the State team. These events resulted in a 15-to 20-minute delay in the State team reaching their assigned working area at the Personnel that should, or should not, be admitted to the plant site during an EOC. emergency la a utility issue that should be resolved prior to the emergency. L ~ 't ]l I
M8 28 .c All' BRC.' teams _. received briefings on current and projected plant ~and. p* meteorological conditions prior to their deployment from the Staging Area. Control of { ' the field monitoring teams was shifted to the Field Monitoring Team Leader at the EOC.- J -as they were deployed from the Staging Area. Once the teams were deployed, the - 0 - Staging Area stood by to provide support as needed. f:} All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 36 and 37) assigned to the Staging Area were met. j ) 'I DEFICIENCIES: NONE ~ I ~ AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-1. } AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE m ' ' 2.1.8 Bureau of Radiation Control Mobile Lab -s The SRC Mobile Lab, consisting of two units, a 45-foot semitrailer and an18-T A foot self-powered van, were pre-positioned at the STPEGS EOC for this exercise. The units are not hardened and the trailer would be difficult tb move rapidly out of locations in an area that could be at risk of contamination in an accident. A new site outside the M EPZ, adjacent to the Media Information Center in Bay City, has been selected for future use,. but communications and 'other ;In-place support to the. unit (s) are not yet completed. ' It is recommended that the Bay City site be completed as soon as possible and all requirkd communications links, including a computer link to the STPEGS EOC, be - pre-installed for use as required. ,p The Mobile Lab was activated at the appropriate time and adequate staff wss 4 available to perform required analysis functions. The staff was well trained and directed P' by an experienced radio-chemist. Their ability to calibrate their equipment, using calibration ' samples was ably demonstrated. Germanium and. NaI detectors were
- m..
available and computer and multi-channel analyzer equipment were used for calculations { of radionuclides concentrations and measurements of levels as low as about 3.6 E-08 pC1/cc of Iodine 131, using a 500 second sample measurement time.' w Field samples were received and prepared for analysis in the 18-ft. van and then a j transferred to'the 45-ft. lab trailer where the detectors and analyzers were located. The i radionuclides-impregnated bench samples used for calibration of the detector systems for air sample cartridges, soll, water, milk and vegetation samples were adequate. Proper p4 procedures were used to label, record, handle and dispose of field samples.
- Also, Ej procedures to avoid cross-contamination of samples and contamination of equipment were excellent.
pI L i The Mobile Lab is equipped with BRC radio, phone lines, and, for this exercise, a runner system to deliver analysis results to the EOC. At its future Bay City location, the 4 e r _______._m.
u o 29
- lab will be linked to the EOC by computer line. All communications worked well and provided information needed by ~ the lab, including advance notice of incoming field samples.
All FEMA exercise objectives (EA. 1, 5, 8, 9, 36 and 37) assigned to the Mobile
- Lab were met.
DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
== Description:== The Mobile Lab was located at the STPEGS EOC, in an area at risk of contamination. The lab is not hardened and can not be readily moved. A site outside the EPZ, in Bay City, has been selected for future operations but is not yet ready for use. Recommendation: _ Complete the Bay City site as soon as possible and evaluate the operations there at a future exercise. 1 2.1.7 BRC Field Monitoring Team #1 b Field Monitoring Teams were mobilized at and deployed from the BRC Staging Area located at' Highway 35 and Avenue "M" in Bay City. These teams were made up of i personnel from various Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control offices throughout the state, and License and Weight Service Troopers of the Texas DPS. These team members were repositioned, in agreement with FEMA, in the Bay City area. The demonstrations of the operability and effective use of routine and [ emergency communication equipment.and the adequacy of procedures and methods to communicate with field personnel were met, but with difficulty. The Team #1 Health ? Physicist (HP) could hear Instructions from the Team Controller, but efforts to respond were futile because of the low power of the hand-held radios. The team spontaneously i solved this problem by having the Team #1 Department of Public Safety (DPS) Trooper handle communications via the DPS back-up radio. This technique was somewhat cumbersome, but effective. Prior to departure from the Staging Area, Team #1 ran through a thorough check of equipment using a written checklist. At field locations, ambient radiation levels were adequately determined (simulated). Care was taken to prevent the possible spread of 1 contamination to equipment, vehicle and personnel. Team #1 was able to locate and navigate in the field to find all preselected monitoring points. Maps were followed and team members were familiar with the geographic area. 1 k.- f ~ l
[_ + 1 i E 30 Team' #1 was required to take one air sample during the exercise. Appropriate procedures and equipment were used to determine airboric radiolodine concentrations as low as E-07 pCl/cc in the presence of noble gases. ' An air pump was used to draw a y measured sample of air through a HEPA filter and a charcoal cartridge (silver zeolite L, l-cartridges were available in the kits' but were not used). The air pump was properly l - calibrated for the appropriate flow rate. ' Sample cartridges were quickly screened with - f ~ the G-M to determine if shielding was required during transport to the lab. Sample L cartridges and filters were then labeled and double-bagpc pr'or to delivery.
== Exercise activities did not require Team #1 te collect, transport, or analyze samples of soll, vegetation and water. - However, during a lull in exercise action, Team #1 was requested by the FEMA evaluator to collect a soll sample. Team #1 did
== have all appropriate equipment and did demonstrate proper technique for all sample collection activities. Team #1 adequately demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure through the proper use of dosimetry equipment and procedures.. Each team member was provided with a dosimetry kit and record keeping q cards. Team members read their dosimeters approximately every half hour and properly l recorded dose readings. The maximum allowable dose without authorization was known by the team members. The team was aware that they should leave the area if that exposure dose was reached, and report to the Field Monitoring Team Leader for ,Iy U instructions. The team 'was equipped with full anticontamination suits and protective equipment (i.e., coveralls, boots, gloves, respirators, etc.). J f Team #1 demonstrated the. ability to monitor Emergency Classification levels continuously and implement appropriate procedures, q Since this was an initial exercise, there were no corrective actions verified b during this exercise. J ll FEMA objectives met by Team #1 were 1,5,6,7,8,9,20,36 and 37. y I DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-1. E AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE l 2.1.8 BRC Field Monitoring Team #2 Field Monitoring Team #2 was, like all BRC teams, pre-staged at the Staging 3 Area for the exercise. Activation and mobilization (an exercise simulation) were carried out at that location and teams were dispatched, by the Field Monitoring Team Leader at the STPEGS EOC, to locations in the EPZ for monitoring or sample collection I a, i ______-.m_.-___
31 o o assignments. Pre-deployment equipment checks, calibrations and inventories were accomplished using a set of check lists and SOPS included in the team equipment kits. BRC hand-held radios were issued to the team by staging area personnel for use in communicating with the Field Monitoring Team Leader. These radios proved to be inadequate as the team could receive transmissions but didn't have the range to reach the Team Leader, the Staging Area or other locations beyond about six miles from the STPEGS EOC. The back-up DPS vehicle radio was used successfully to maintain two-way communications with the Field Monitoring Team Leader at the EOC. Team equipment and procedures for radiation survey and collection, transportation and analysis of air, water, soll and vegetation samples were demonstrated. Team members were well trained and capable of executing all required operations. Milk and snow samples were not collected in this exercise. Team member exposure control procedures were in accordance with the written guidance included in their equipment kit. Each member was equipped with 0-200 mR and 0-20 R direct-reading dosimeters and a TLD. Protective clothing and respirators were available in the team kit. Maximum allowable doses were known and dosimeter readings were monitored to insure dose was not exceeded. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 36 and 37) assigned to this team were met. DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-1. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE i 2.1.9 BRC Field Monitoring Team #3 Team #3, along with all of the other BRC response teams, was prestaged at the 7 BRC Staging Area. Therefore, team mobilization, as would be carried out in an actual emergency, was not observed. However, the State plan and procedures for mobilization activities appeared to be entirely adequate. At the Staging Area, all appropriate equipment inventory and preparation activities were carried out by the team. They discovered broken cable connections for the inverter which powers their air sampler. They took immediate steps to improvise other cabling using jumper-cables from the team vehicle. Their reactions demc,nstrated excellent initiative and response by the team members. Team briefings prior to deployment were clear and concise and the teams were kept current on conditions during the course of the exercise via radio systems.
I 3 32 Primary field team communications (BRC -hand-held radios with - magnetic antennas on vehicle roofs) were an annoying problem throughout the exercise. The Staging Area in Bay City appeared to be at the extreme range of the radio units to the EOC at the_ plant site. While transmissions from the plant could be copied on the mobile ~ units' staging there, return transmissions could not be copied at the EOC. Additionally, there were some landscape features (underpasses, etc.) in the plume EPZ that appeared - i to. block transmissions from the mobile units. In contrast, the DPS back-up system was functional at all times and appeared to have the range and coverage that the BRC hand- ' held units appeared lacked. ~ ) During the exercise, the team executed a representative display of monitoring and sample collection techniques and procedures. They demonstrated a high degree of - training and skill in areas such as communication, map reading, closed and open window monitoring, collection of air, water, soll and vegetation samples and handling of materials to be transported to the BRC mobile lab for analysis. By prior agreement with FEMA, the team did not dress-out in Anti "C" clothing, gloves, boots, respirators, etc. L 1 However the appropriate equipment was available and the team demonstrated that they could and would use the appropelate protective clothing if required. The team adequately demonstrated all objectives established for this exercise b (Nos.1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 36 and 37). 7 L DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-1. b AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR' IMPROVEMENT: Description Team efforts to obtain water samples, as directed from the EOC, at a steep, muddy, weed-choked stream bank resulted in personnel placing themselves in a precarious and If 1 l potentially hazardous position, which would have been further complicated had they been wearing Anti 'C' gear. Recommendation: Provide each team with a water scoop with a telescoping handle so that samples can be obtained from safer positions on stream banks. 9 2.1.10 BRC Field Monitoring Team #4 Team #4 was, as were all BRC teams, pre-staged at the BRC Staging Area. At this location, the team inventoried and prepared all team kit equipment and supplies for p field operations. Excellent pre-deployment briefings on plant conditions, meteorological U data and team readiness were given by Staging Area personnel. Following the I h
33 declaration of General Emergency, the team was dispatched to its first assigned area for monitoring operations. The BRC hand-held radio issued to the team proved to be unreliable as it could usually receive transmissions from the Field Monitoring Team Leader, but its range was so limited that, beyond about six miles from the EOC, it could not be used-to respond. The back-up radio in the DPS vehicle was successfully used to maintain two-way communications with the EOC. l \\ The team successfully demonstrated equipment and procedures for radiological i monitoring and for obtaining air, water, soll and vegetation samples with consistent skill and ability. Team knowledge of the area and navigation by map reading was excellent. The team members believed that separate approvals were required, from both BRC and DPS, to cross the plume centerline. In fact, procedures only require that the action be coordinated with either the BRC Field Monitoring Team Coordinator or the DPS communicator who are co-located at the STPEGS EOC. The team was not kept fully advised of other possibly significant activities occurring in the EPZ. Information such as evacuation recommendations (including sectors and areas involved, etc.), access control point locations, significant public actions, etc. could be important to the team. It is recommended that the Field Monitoring Team Leader provide, at appropriate intervals, brief status reports of significant EPZ activities to the field teams. Advice to the field team to take the radio-protective drug (KI)in their equipment kit was, based on readings being obtained by the team,' not appropriate. This resulted in some confusion and concern. Procedures for determining requirements for KI for the field team should be reviewed and training provided as necessary. The FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, 36 and 37) assigned to i this team were met. o DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-1. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
== Description:== Field teams were not kept advised of other significant activities 1 underway in the EPZ. Recommendation: The BRC Field Monitoring Team Leader should periodically provide brief status reports of activities in the EPZ. 2.1.11 BRC Contamination Control Team The BRC Contamination Control (CC) Team was deployed, as were all BRC teams, from the Bay City Service Center Staging Area, to accompany a Matagorda q l
34 County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) Access Control team. In the pre-deployment period, the CC team performed aU required checks on equipment and supplies, and were briefed on plant conditions and weather data. On station at the designated access control point, the CC team demonstrated a thorough knowledge of appropriate procedures and considerable skill in performance of required operations. Exercise " players" entering or leaving the access controlled area were monitored and if required, directed to decontamination facilities. The team . members demonstrated good decisionmaking and judgment during their operations. r I The BRC hand-held radio issued to the team was inadequate to establish two-way communications with the Field Monitoring Team Leader. The MCSO Deputy, manning i the access control point, communicated with his dispatcher who then relayed messages to i the EOC by telephone. This alternate system proved cumbersome, subject to delays, and at considerable risk of message misinterpretation or error. The CC team was not aware 7'.y that the MCSO deputy could have communicated directly to the EOC on the inter-city frequency on his vehicle radio. It is recommended that the BRC radio system be improved to insure two-way communications coverage throughout the potential operating area of BRC teams. ,b w The designated Access Control Point was well outside the 10-mile EPZ, with little risk of exposure to the BRC or MCSO personnel operating there. However, the CC j dq team continuously monitored their survey instruments and dosimeters to insure appropriate exposure control. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 5, 17, 20 and 36) assigned to the Contamination Control Team were met. y' 4 DEFICIENCIES: NONE n LA AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-1. 1 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE en. w 2.1.12 BRC Decontamination Assistance Team m See Sees. 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 of this report for operations of State and Local government personnel at the Decontamination Area of the Reception / Care Center. 2.1.13 Media Information Center The Media Information Center (MIC) for STP is located in the Holiday Inn on Highway 35 in Bay City. Spokespersons for the State Bureau of Radiation Control, Matagorda County and Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) participated in this exercise. l
35 s. The MIC was activated at 0944. Matagorda County's PIOS were in place at about i 0950. The State BRC's PIOS arrived at about 0955. This was not a complete demonstration of the state's mobilization and activation procedures since BRC participants began the exercise in Bay City. However, the BRC did follow its general i plan for notifying people and activating its response teams. Coordination among spokespersons for different organizations and with other locations was good. Although state and county PIOS are not often in a decision-making role, they do play a key role in keeping emergency managers aware of information needs. The BRC's spokesperson, for example, recognized the net.d for and eventually got i assistance, later in the exercise in describing actual radiological conditions and their Implication for public health. This type of support, however, is crucial even in the early stages of a nuclear plant emergency and might have been requested much earlier. HL&P assumes the responsibility for the facility, maps and displays. Although the MIC arrangements were adequate, performance could be enhanced if state and county PIOS who remain in their work arcas during briefings could hear what is being said at briefings. This would aid and expedite the process of advising emergency managers of information needs at the MIC and enable those in the work area to play a stronger supporting role to the spokespersons. In The physical arrangements of the press briefing room were less than ideal during this exercise. The presence of TV cameras in the front of the room made it more difficult for other reporters to see who was talking or to see the displays being used. h Communications with other emergency facilities took place without any problems. This was also true for information transmitted by telecopier. =,]- Although public instructions (EBS messages) were not drafted at the MIC, the county PIOS did receive copies of all EBS announcements, which were also disseminated to all organizations and the media. This occurred throughout the exercise in a very g h timely fashion. For the most part, brieflags here clear, accurate and timely. The only exception J to this dealt with information related to the bases for protective actions and to actual or ) L projected radiation levels in the off-site environment. This type of information should be explained thoroughly and put in proper perspective. To accomplish this, either the {f State BRC or the utility (or both) s,hould arrange for spokespersons who have access to this information and who have the ability to explain it. To the BRC's credit, a technically competent spokesperson appeared at the final exercise briefing and provided 7 authoritative information on environmental radiation levels. The BRC also provided useful information to the media In radiological emergency response and other relevant features of response to radiologicalincidents. There were both frequent and effective exchanges of information among spokespersons for the various organizations. This was especially true for all written news ] 1 announcements which were processed rapidly and provided to all organizations. 1
-36 Y HL&P operated the " rumor control" system at MIC. In conjunction with the y , utility's monitoring of television and radio broadcasts, it served as an effective means of providing information in response to inquiries and checking information being broadcast j to the public. The employees conducting these activities were furnished copies of all l state and county news releases, enabling them to answer questions about activities related to those organizations. The " rumor control" operatives were put to a challenging test answering call-in questions from more than 260 concerned citizens. Changes in emergency classification levels were provided promptly to and understood by the MIC. All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1,3,4,5,14,24,25,26,36 and 37) assigned to the Media Information Center were met. 3 DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE D( AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
== Description:== It is.Important to provide the affected public with information on the bases for protective actions, on projected dose rates and actual radiation levels in the off-site environment. D Recommendation: Either the State BRC or the utility (or both) should arrange for the appearance of spokespersons who have access to this technical information and who have the ability to explain it in laymen's terms.
== Description:== The state end county PIOS who remain in their work areas during news briefings have no way of monitoring the briefings. Recommendation: The addition of the capability to monitor briefings from the PIO work areas should be considered. 1 2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS i 2.2.1 Matagorda County EOC { { The Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was received by the Matagorda County Sheriff's office dispatch center at 0737 via the dedicated phone line. Based upon receipt of this Emergency Classification Level (ECL) the dispatcher notified the County Sheriff who is also designated as the County emergency coordinator. Subsequently, a hard copy message was received over the teletype at 0750. The hard copy received was not readable primarily because the copy was reduced in size and the handwriting was not J! .J
~ ~ ~ \\ l I i distinct. : The emergency coordinator' immediately contacted the Pierce DPS district office for verification of the message. Hard copy messages received later in the EOC 'over the telefax were readcble. Based on receipt of the NOUE the County Judge, County . Sheriff and the Public Information Officer were notified. At 0822 the Alert was received and the appropriate staff was notified. The. County Sheriff chose to partially activate ( the EOC at the Alert notification rather than at the Site Area Emergency notification, l which was appropriate. ' An excellent job was demonstrated in setting up the EOC operations room. ' The room.wes organized and operational in a short period of time. Everyone arriving at the EOC knew their duties and responsibilities in activating the j EOC.. The. General Emergency was received at approximately 1030. Based on these observations, mobilization of the staff and timely activation of the EOC was adequately demonstrated.- ] The ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing for 24 hours was ) J-demonstrated. All EOC staff.were promptly activated and were present in accordance j with the plan and procedures. A roster was used to demonstrate 24-hour staffing; this { ~ was agreed to prior to the exercise as the means to demonstrate that portion of the _] ~ objective. 1 Access to the EOC operations room was adequately controllect and persons were
- required to sign in and out. Even though the EOC is outside the 10-mile EPZ, it is recommended that once a radiation release has been confirmed, persons entering the Matagorda County Sheriff's facility be questioned as to whether they had been in the affected 10-mile EPZ.
Appropriate measures could then be taken for controlling exposure. - The Matagorda County EOC is located in the County Sheriff's Department multi-j purpose room in Bay City, Texas. The facility was completely adequate to support the j 4h emergency response activities..' As mentioned previously, the facility is located outside the 10-mile EPZ. Maps, status boards, and displays were excellent and were effectively 7 used throughout the exercise. The " County Emergency Response Procedures" board was j very useful for all EOC staff members. This display board listed certain procedures that j should be implemented for each of }he four Emergency Classification Levels. Overall,it was particularly noteworthy how quickly information was posted on status boards and how effectively this information was used in briefings and in carrying out staff responsibilities. The EOC staff demonstrated the capability to communicate with all appropriate personnel and organizations by effective use of equipment and procedures. During the initial notification, activation and subsequent activities, communications within the 7 F county, and to other contact polys, functioned well and procedures were followed. One noticeable equipment problem was the telephone hotline. Throughout the exercise, the emergency coordinator indicated'that, at times, noise could be heard over the phone that negatively affected communications. However, the emergency coordinator effectively utilized the backup communication systcms when necessary. All telephones available for the EOC staff functioned well. There did not appear to be any problems with the telefax machine located in the EOC. All staff were well-trained in the use of communications equipment and performed professionally in following procedures. I
3g The Matagorda County emergency coordinator was effectively in charge of the EOC operations. The County Judge was also present throughout the exercise and provided excellent input into the decision making process. The County Sheriff, acting as y the county coordinator, demonstrated outstanding management capabilities and kept his g, staff up-to-date with frequent briefings. He continued to utilize his management skills and abilities by anticipating the actions that he might need to take prior to actual p events. The briefings provided input from all EOC staff members on the status of their [, retivities. EOC staff members were updated on changes in the emergency situation including Emergency Classification Levels as they occurred. There was good use of the liaison representatives who were assigned to the county EOC. Those representatives y l were from the Bureau of Radiation Control and Houston Lighting and Power Company. l The utility representatives assisted in two areas of expertise: (1) technical aspects (as I did the BRC official), and (2) drafting and preparation of EBS messages and press u releases. Coordination efforts were outstanding between the EOC staff and the assigned liaison persons. These individuals were utilized adequately by the county emergency p-coordinator to explain or clarify what was going on at the plant and the status of other [ off-site activities. The EOC staff did an outstanding job in monitoring Emergency Classification g~ Levels and implementing procedures in a timely manner. In addition, not only were procedures followed, but as previously mentioned, the county coordinator demonstrated an ability to effectively anticipate actions and prepare to implement the appropriate 4 procedures. There was an excellent demonstration of processing incoming information and rapid documentation on status ooards. The status board information was updated continuously and was effectively used during briefing sessions to monitor the actions being implemented. Hard copy messages and status board summaries were developed, '[~ copied, and distributed to all emergency response personnel within the EOC. Alerting of the public, within the 10-mile EPZ, and dissemination of an initial instructional message within 15 minutes was handled effectively and efficiently by the County Judge and ' utility liaison representatives. On two occasions, decisions were made by the County Judge to implement evacuation measures. On both occasions the strens were activated and an EBS message was developed and disseminated within eight minutes. The Media Information Center was immediately provided telefax copies of all press releases and EBS messages. The f.taff demonstrated an exceptional job of coordination and team work and those involved are to be commended. 'During the evacuation phase of the exercise, EOC staff (particularly the transportation officer) successfully demonstrated (simulated) effective and timely 7 capability for arranging transportation for evacuees, including schoci children. Also, a file was checked to see if there were any special need.9 people in the evacuated area. The transportation officer and Palacios Mayor handled their responsibilities well by putting bus drivers on standby and anticipating certain actions that might need to be implemented. Also properly demonstrated was the organizational ability ani resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation. Access control points were promptly activated as protective actions were ordered. There was discussion following the exercise that illustrated some additional work was needed in the following areas:
____7-39 -(1) evacuation time estimates by evacuatien zones, and, (2) other traffic control points that needed to be established. The McAllister Reception Center was promptly activated as called for by the county plan. 'Estimaw of the number of people expected were also discussed. - The I county coordinator. initiated a second call to insure that the reception center was activated and ready to receive evacuees from Matagorda County. A second reception center was also activated (simulated). l f According' to the.' County plan and procedures, the radiological officer is responsible for radiologleal protection of emergency workers it is the responsibility of-this individual to inventory dosimetry equipment, check operability of equipment and zero dosimeters for use at the reception centers and the road blocks. Dosimetry kits, have been put together for county personnel who are assigned to field activities. It is also the responsibility of the radiological officer to insure that emergency workers read and log exposure and do not exceed specified exposure levels. Radiological exposure control measures were implemented at vr.rious locations in the field; none were observed l a at the County EOC. =9 d During the exercise, the emergency coordinator demonstrated the ability to effectively call upon and utilize outside support agencies. Support was requested from the Bay City Police Department and from the State of Texas through the Department of s Public Safety Sub-District Office in Pierce, Texas. A discussion took place on recovery and reentry issues at the Matagorda County EOC. This session was directed by the County Sheriff. It was evident that the county plan procedures did not fully address actions that need to be taken during recovery and reentry phases 'of exercises or actual events. Based on procedure inadequacy, the b oisjective to demonstrate implementation of appropriate measures for controlled. recovery and reentry was not fully met. A checklist is to be added to the county plan . procedures concerning recovery / reentry measures to be implemented. J p Overall, all EOC staff ' members assigned to the Matagorda County EOC demonstrated their capabilities in an exceptional manner. One outstanding highlight was i ( the excellent coordination demonstrated between the County Judge and County Sheriff l (county emergency coordinator) in carrying out the responsibilities and functions of 1 operating the EOC. Also the Palacios Mayor was highly involved in the EOC activities being implemented. All of the following FEMA exercise objectives were fully and successfully [ demonstrated: Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 5,13,14,15,16,17,19, 25, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39. L Although not listed as an exercise objective, #18 was also demonstrated. The only exercise objective not met was #34 relating to reentry / recovery. Objective #20 was not , fully observed and will be evaluated during the next scheduled exercise. DEFICIENCIES NONE i
e 40 l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION n 87-3 Description Evacuation time estimates by evacuation zones p were no_t available. (NUREG 0654, J.10.L.). L Recommendattom Evacuation time estimates by zones should be p available and included in the local plans / procedures. L 87-4 Description ' Additional traffic control points were not established during the evacuation phase of the exercise. I (NUREG 0654, J.10.j). Recommendation Reevaluate all possible intersections and m other possible roads that will need traffic control points established for control of access to evacuated areas. ~ 87-5 Description _ The county procedures did not inclLde specific actions to be taken to implement controlled recovery and 7" reentry operations. (NUREG 0654, M.1.). i, Recommendattom Develop and test procedures to use in P implementing recovery and reentry operations. i AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Description Even though the county EOC is located outside the q" 10-mile EPZ, persons entering the EOC facility were not questioned k. as a precautionary measure as to whether they had been in the 10-mile EPZ. 7 Recommendation As a precautionary measure, once a release has been confirmed, persons entering the county EOC facility should be '~ questioned and appropriate measures taken if necessary to control m exposure or contamination. em 2.2.2 Reception Center (Monitoring / Decontamination Fun 3 tion) i The function of monitoring and decontaminating evacuees and their venicles was performed at the Reception Center at McAllister Junior High Schoolin Bay City. Mobilization of the Monitoring / Decontamination staff and activation of the fecility were in accordance with local plans and procedures, and were adequately demonstrated. BRC personnel, and personnel from the Texas Department of Health, Public Health Region 11 office in Rosenberg were on hand to advise and assist local personnel. Appropriate supplies and equipment were available and properly used by Center personnel. i!
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I f,'- 1 41 j l j ' Entry to the Reception Center for evacuees was through one designated door. As evacuees. entered, they - were given 'a preliminary. screening for ~ radiological-contamination. If.no contamination was found, the evacuee was directed to the Red Cross registration desk for entry processing. (See Sec. 2.2.3, Reception Function.) d Evacuees found to be contaminated were routed to a second monitoring station, q -vla a paper covered walkway, which was roped off from the main gym floor. - At.the second monitoring station more detailed monitoring.was performed. If contamination j > levels.in excess of 0.1 mR/hr were observed, a ' PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION j RECORD' was filled out,to document survey fladings and subsequent decontamination l efforts..In either. case, after being monitored, all individuals were directed to the j decontamination area and assisted. In decontamination in accordance with written I procedures. After decontamination, evacuees were again monitored and, if clear, issued clean clothing and directed to ARC registration. ~- T Vehicles of arriving evacuees were also monitored, but, with the concurrence of a the evaluators,' vehicle decontamination was described rather than demonstrated during the exercise. Procedures require all vehicles with contamination levels above 0.1 mR/hr j) ] to ' be held in a designated area near the. Reception Center until they can be d) decontaminated. Vehicles with contaminated levels less than 0.1 mR/hr may be released < to their drivers to be decontaminated as opportunity permits.' t Communications for the Monitoring / Decontamination function consisted cf a specially installed commercial telephone line, as well as the normal telephone lines in the y school.- A BRC hand-held radio was also available,,but this unit was only able to receive messages. Probably due to its limited range, the hand-held unit was not able to transmit .to other BRC operating locations.. It is recommended that the BRC take action to yf P resolve the radio problem so that the Monitoring / Decontamination assistance personnel y . at the Reception Center can have direct, two-way, communications with other BRC operating locations (fixed and field) throughout the 10-mile EPZ. 1 Monitoring / Decontamination' personnel adequately demonstrated knowledge of required techniques and procedures with the following minor exceptions: 1. A television cameraman was hilowed to cross into the controlled access area, and onto the paper walkway, to film an evacuee being monitored. He spent several minutes in the aree before being 9 asked to leave. On exiting the controlled area, he was not checked for contamination. 7 It is recommended that security procedures be reviewed to ensure that unauthorized persons are denied access to controlled kreas, and that anyone leaving those areas be monitored. l 1 2. Evacuees found to have contamination on their shoes during the initia! acreenin'g were directed down the paper walkway to the second monitoring station without being issued paper shoe covers. It is recommended that shoe covers be issued to any evacuee with shoe contamination. This would reduce the possit,ility of spreading l l l
l y j -42 i [; contamination to the floor In other parts of the ' Monitoring /. j l- . Decontamination area. .j 1 3. The personal belongings of one evacuee (a purse) were found to be contaminated. The purse was passed to the decontamination area, placed in"a plastic bag and returned to the evacuee for home p! ' decontamination The level of contamination was not recorded. O j ? Therefore, the decision to release the item could not be based on j i recorded levels.. If the observed level is less than 0.1 mR/hr, the { ^ decision to release the item for later home decontamination is in accord.tnce with written procedures. It is recommended that contamination levels; of belongings ' returned to evacuees be recorded for file purposes. b}n j 4. A' few of the monitors appeared to lack knowledge of proper. evacuee contamination control procedures as they asked already monitored. and cleared drivers to open ' doors of possibly e contaminated ' vehicles, with ' the resultant ' possibility of-w 2 contaminating the drivers. Also, monitors displayed varying j i levels of understanding of techniques to be employed in vehicle p decontamination. - L' It is recommended that monitors be provided additional training on procedures and techniques for evacuee contamination control, vehicle monitoring, and vehicle' decontamination. T Monitoring / Decontamination personnel knew and understood emergency worker-1 exposure-control procedures and were equipped with direct reading dosimeters and TLDs. The dosimeters were periodically read and exposures recorded. "} All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 20, 27, 29, 36, and 37) assigned to the Monitoring / Decontamination function at the Reception Center were met. 7L DEFICIENCIES: NONE c-1 1 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: See ARCA 87-2. 1 87-6 Description Monitoring / Decontamination personnel did not understand, or did not follow, written procedures for vehicle . monitoring, vehicle decontamination or evacuee contamination control. (NUREG 0654, K.5.a, K.S.b) 9 Recommendation Additional training should be provided to l Monitoring / Decontamination personnel to ensure that written procedures are understood and followed. q l a
43 .c AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: o
== Description:== Unauthorized persons were allowed access to the controlled area. - Recommendation: Security procedures should be reviewed to ensure i ' control or access to potentially contaminated areas. 2.2.3 Reception Center (Reception and Care function) McAllister Junior High School, in' Bay City, serves as the primary reception . center for evacuees from the 10-mile EPZ, and approximately 1100 evacuees could be n housed there.. The Center is staffed by American Red Cross personnel. Security 'Is 7 _provided by the Bay City Police Department. The Bay City Red Cross office was
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notified by the Matagorda County EOC at 1054 of the requirement for activation of the Reception Center. Prior.to this time, some preliminary set-up of the Center by ARC personnel was observed. Following the activation request, personnel from the ARC, the d. County Health Department and the.BRC arrived at the Center and full preparations to receive evacuees began. All of the Center staff appeared knowledgeable of their duties and contributed to the orderly and efficient set-up of the Center. By 1130, the Center E was fully activated and ready-to receive evacuees. Appropriate equipment and supplies were available and used by Center personnel. Following initial screening for contamination by Monitoring / Decontamination personnel, and additional monitoring and decontamination if necessary, evacuees were directed to the ARC registration station where full details were recorded on ARC - pl. - forms. The evacuees were then directed to the school cafeteria where they were alther assigned to a classroom area for housing or allowed. to leave the center if other accommodations were available to them. p Communications with other locations was via a specially Installed telephone line fe ARC use or by normal commerhlal telephone lines in the school. The Reception r [# Center supervisor could also be contacted by a pocket pager, alerting her to call the Matagorda County EOC for Information. Ia t All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 27, 28, 36, 37, and 39) assigned to the Reception and Care function were met. I* DEFICIENCIES: NONE i 3j i l I AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE I \\ l' AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE j ) I i J
44 { l l 2.2.4 Taylor Brothers Ambulance Service j ] The Matagorda County Sheriff's office called the ambulance service with a request for transportation of an accident victim from the STPEGS plant to the hospital. ~ The ambulance crew responded within one minute and acted realistically and promptly, as though it was a real emergency. The ambulance used for the response appears fully equipped to respond to an emergency and carries a radio capable of communicating with ,j the hospital, the Sheriff's dispatcher and other emergency services. All equipment functioned adequately. l l Ambulance crew procedures were followed for handling the contaminated patient. The contaminated patient and the entire stretcher were wrapped in cloth sheets to prevent contamination spread and the floor and seats of the ambulance were draped. Crew members used disposable gloves to handle the patient and all potentially contaminated material. On arrival at the STPEGS plant, a plant employee boarded the ambulance with a "Off-site Assistance Elt" containing additional protective gear such as k,l plastic sheets, gloves and bootles. However, provision of this " kit" was apparently a change in procedure from previous drills. Thus, the ambulance crew did not know the contents of the " kit" until after the patient had already been loaded using the cloth sheets. Nonetheless, appropriate care was used in handling the patient and stretcher to avoid spreading contamination. 7 L At the hospital, patieht transfer to the protected part of the emergency room was equally careful. Ambulance personnel were monitored for contamination before { being allowed to move to a clean area. The vehicle was monitored and found to be (simulated) contaminated inside. Procedures were described for placarding the vehicle and returning it to STPEGs for decontamination, along with any affected equipment. 7 The ambulance crew used the on-board radio to communicate with the hospital iL enroute so that they were aware of the patient's condition prior to his arrival. There were some communications / coordination problems that originated at STPEGS. When the J ambulance arrived at the plant gate, it was directed to another gate, then mistakenly a escorted to the STPEGS EOC, and only then escorted to the accident site, ten minutes after arrival at the first gate. Then, when the ambulance was ready to depart, the crew f was instructed to wa!t for the arrival of another technical person from the plant, which A incurred an additional six-minute delay. These events indicate a failure of internal communications or coordination at the plant. l The ambulance service was never informed, before, during, or after its response, of conditions at the plant, the Emergency Classification Level, or other factors, beyond the condition of the patient, that might influence their response or the way to approach the incident site. As emergency response parsonnel, they should be considered to have an Interest in the information, and should be advised of conditions at the plant. un {1 The ambulance crew was provided with dosimetry only upon arrival at the plant, and the instruments were collected again when they departed. As emergency workers, 3 they should be provided with instruments for the entire run into and out of the EPZ.
45 ) All FEMA exercise objectives (Nos. 1, 5, 39, 36, and 37) assigned to the ] ambulance service were met. ] I DEFICIENCIES: NONE AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 87-7 Description Ambulance personnel responding to the call, from STPEGS, to transport an injured, contaminated patient, were issued dosimeters while at the plant, but not while enroute into or out of the EPZ. If they had been required to enter the plume to reach their response location, there would have been no record of their exposure. (NUREG 0654, K.3.a). Recommendatlom Personnel manning any ambulance that might be called to respond to an incident at ine STPEGS plant should I be issued appropriate dosimeters prior to entering the '3PZ. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR-IMPROVEMENT I Descript!om Contents of the "Off-site Assistance Kit," provided at the plant, were not known to the ambulance crew in advanco. Provision of this " kit" was apparently a change from previous drills. 1 I Recommendattom Changes in procedures between the plant and the ambulance service should be communicated in advance. l Description The ambular,ce service was not informed of the status I of the emergency beyond the patient's condition. Recommendattom Communications to the ambulance service should i include basic informe.tlon on the status of the emergency. l 1 2.2.5 Matagorda General Hospital Upon notification, from STPEGS, that a contaminated injured patient was being sent to the hospital, mobilization efforts were started immediately. A large number of hospital staff, representing various departments, participated in the mobilization effort. A hot area was quickly established and appropriate emergency room staff dressed in protective clothing ready for receiving the patient. Two STPEGS plant HPs arrived ahead of the patient to provide technical assistance as needed. Two-way radio communication was established with the in-bound ambulance and the hospital was advised of the patient's vital signs, level and location of contamination, f and the estimated time of arrival at the hospital. I e __------____.______m___
t 46 . Emergency room staff demonstrated appropriate equipment and techniques for ,1 decontamination of an injured,' contaminated patient. ' Proper precautionary measures {- .were taken to prevent t e spread of ' contamination by sealing ' air intakes, bagging h specimens and changing gloves when appropriate. Laboratory analysis of contamination - would be accomplished at the plant or at the BRC mobile lab. The two plant HPs were very knowledgeable and provided technical assistance to the hospital staff as needed. fi-i 1 They were particularly helpful in monitoring the patient's contamination level and in assisting the hospital staff in correct exit procedures from the hot area. Two HPs from-the State BRC were also at the hospital to act as technical advisors. w-4 Thelpresent hospital emergency room'is limited as a treatment area due to ~ restricted access through a single entrance, used for all patients, and due to its small size. This problem will be alleviated in approximately 18 months when a.new emergency w room is completed.. The new facility will include a separate entrance and a specialized treatment area for contaminated patients. 6. In summary, the hospital staff demonstrated excellent knowledge of mobilization procedures and proper technique for handling and treatment of a contaminated patient. [L. The' staff demonstrated this capability in a limited physical environment and responded to three actual emergencies during the course of the exercise. E r . All FEMA'exerelse objectives (Nos.1, 5, 31, and 36) assigned to the Matagorda [. General Hospital were met. 1
- DEFICIENCIEik NONE q,.
AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE h AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: NONE "p ik ' 2.3 UTILITY ISSUES 1 The following is a summary of Houston Lighting and Power issues which relate to, or impact upon, off-site activities of other participating agencies. FEMA acknowledges that its responsibility is not to cite utility Defielencies, Areas Requiring q Corrective Actions, or Areas Recommended for Improvement. However, the issues that follow should be addressed by the NRC and/or the utility to prevent their recurrence during future exercises, or in a real emergency, at the STPEGS plant. Description There was a significant difference, by a factor of almost 100,000, between the dose rate projections provided by the utility and the readings being observed by the State Field Monitoring Teams, and the dose data produced therefrom. l i i
=. .t" 47 Recommendation The utility and the NRC should determine the cause of this discrepancy and take appropriate action to correct this potentially serious problem. Description Utility briefings of EOC. staff at the STPEGS EOC, q including State liaison officers, included information not intended for. general release. The information was - not identified as confidential or for internal informational purposes only. The State L11alson relayed the information to the State staff who took what appeared to be appropriate action and released some of the information to the public. -Recommendattom The utility should clearly identify, during briefings, any information that is not intended for release or is for L Internal use only. Description ' The State STPEGS EOC team, on arrival at the plant L gate, was denied access by a plant guard until after a radio message l' was passed to the BRC Staging Area, where a telephone request for teart. access was passed to the plant, which then advised the guard to admit the team.. A 10- to 15-minute delay in the State team reaching their work area at the EOC resulted from the actions of the plant guard. Recommendation Utility procedures should include clear instructions to plant security on who should be admitted to the site during an emergency. - i Description Communications on the utility " hot-line" at the e Matagorda County EOC were made difficult due to excessive ' noise' L l on the line. 1 l i Recommendation The sorree of the ' noise'should be located and - appropriate line repairs made. Description Apparent failure of internal communication and
- coordination at the plant caused excessive delay in directing the ambulance called to provide care for the injured, contaminated l
patient and further delay in moving the patient to the hospital. l Recommendattom Review. internal plant communications / coordination procedu-es to facilitate prompt direction of an ambulance to an incident location within the plant-site, and to facilitate prompt departure from the plant area. 1 1 .m ____2 _m_ &_a_..-.____mi___.A._._._._
48 y - 3 TRACKING SCHEDULE FOit STATE / LOCAL ACTIONS TO CORRECT 1 DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i l In' ividual exercise site narratives,. in Section 2 of this repcrt, have provided d listings >of Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Corrective Action, ' with recommendations, noted by the Federal evaluators during the April 8,1987 exercise. The evaluations developed by the Federal evaluators were ' based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev 1 (November 1980), and pre-approved exercise objectives. g The FEMA. Region VI Director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local' Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any .U']1 Deficiendes and/or Corrective Actions noted in the exercise will be corrected, and that such corrections will be incorporated into emergency response plans as appropriate. ~. FEMA' Region VI may request that the State of Texas, and Matagorda County, b-i submit measures that they will or intend to take to correct those problems noted by the Federal evaluators.. If corrective actions are necessary, FEMA Region VI will request that m' detailed plan, Including dates for scheduling and implementing the corrective actions, be provided if such actions cannot be instituted immediately. I 1 Table 1 provides, by exercise operating location or activity group, a consolidated L. 1 summary of all Deficiencies and/or Areas Requiring Corrective Action. As noted previously in this report, there were no Deficiencies identified in. the April 8,1987 ~ exercise'. The table is designed so that space has been allowed to adds (1) the proposed b corrective actions that will be undertaken by the State or local jurisdiction, and (2) the projected and actual dates of completion.- u]u's A J P tt f 46 pm w c' E i I ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ^ ~ ^ ' ~ ~ ~ ~'~' ~ ' - ~ -
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tl a 2 cpD A m' H o' 5 C ne ye eb l b t e tl t l cl al s ai. ui. n we qwe eo s e s ti y si d si atf c st c at c t coa i r l r SA u h lue u e nq t s s s s l f eoe - Ree e e ovid l R 't i i t a ocni a. t nt an t w n s iei h .e e A n .n A rmr t C t nC ar ro R e oR e } la ec uoe Ah h Ct y iA t s t t E t s c S vl D a pi t a st I E a u eh a i a h [ C cd q ct A A one c d t d E I L ad se d e E D A
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c pD A mo C yl ye l b ~ l l ei e t w tl a al s u ui. n qs e qwe eo et s e s d si t i y dl i atf c auc at c t coa s r l r SA u ee u e nq R s l s x e e e f eoe l l ovid l R i t i i t a w.t w x nt an xe e oc nI A .n i ei t r mr C n A nR nC e ar r o uoe oA e oR h h iA i l Ct y t t t t t a ec cs c st s vl D a ait a i a l E a u h a e cd q h t t d m Aone d 1 D"ad d e d e e I r A eet eet m Fd s va s va n ol u ol u T a pol pol C os a os a E rev r ev J P re P re 0 ^ e P A n S I d o 8 8 E ei 8 8 T st e oet 8 8 pl a 2 2 lm opD t r m 2 2 0 P o 7 9 C 89 1 yd nd d e rnae nb t al t a 8 n ps e' e d L e t d I e el R rpe i l P o r e fi ub e i w A d l d s et l e s R en v uli p l E s o efl m l c d T d oi i r a o npt r we k R aoc t e s n a O rA nb se ei F ) P o e b n 5 e cl rd i 5 () v W Li l nu e a iidd l r O e( t r I t c w e a l t o c r i T al e f og w C t ar yd r A S cr r ePt oo s et a sl L LC v a e ea. e A r o r n r nd I u c o. uoe D d epeg did E e r rt n eti c oai civ D od cd r od o R rnnpu rd r P aiud P ap 1 E ) ed. t y R d rrn. l os L d ves sr E s i oool at e al n et T d fi o n r B 't hl o t n N d t r o u A at idd T n oi e E l n o t rt e C ea nn t e e d geC C ot a r nt si o id c n A ( nnr N ns emc di o. a or ra d vrd iR n oe O s d ut A ope I M s e r/o N s cp i Ai O e o pe T O rd d n n r w en eo o pe o ol A I uMt I ot l i l N T pu c c - u l qE c ) T t r d n o I C oe l eF e d C ey e a o r r v M A r rd n )b, R r A ym et A e s ,i es , p f hr t e e b n st o n E v D n TL E t e gm t i nl o W0 V n d a. aiC o V upo c s a n omc) D0 e n I eW C I t d oa N T C ani r EC C cer n S. r r ( T Cie1 ( l t t A s o C r nf E M n o DS E t o oK n u d o c e o o d o C R of. / R et t hf o t d, i y CN E R s mii sf , i nis O R at n E O n n4 t r NC M O no r n e4 t t a co C os a5 a s e I I O C oswo e5 a s t m u6 d r sAi Y ie 6 d e v RN N i s e t T C t r 0 nr o O C t c0 ng e ps e a en d i ea N N puy e uc T. N i iwl vC mirn c vd U I id rC md e I R I E mneu nin O R ret E mer NJ S R r oc e et e C I c c nR oc O E I c ,l i R oit cm U s oeU c od MR I U s tl h U c ane ic em A Q e r eN er n E C Q eo oe rN e r er i ro D E D pr( R pa YT N E D nf vo( R t c a f rc R R TS E R eoe B I I I DCR ( S CL C S A A 5 L I A 6 T E YA F E A R 7 A c E R 7 M A 8 RM D A 8
6 no l i at e uet t l a u c pD A mo C mf ye l b e tl al s ui. n qwe eo e s ti f d si at f r at c t c oa r l SA u u e oc nI e nq s x eoe l e e ovid l R it a i t nt an w x mb i ei n t r mr A arr o nC e uoe oR h i l C t y A t t t a ec c S vl Da st t E a u a i a h r cd q h A o. a d ne t d a d e IDI A eet m 5 Fd s va = n ol u T a pol = C ose E rev J P re O RF MS A n I d o 8 E ei. 8 l T s t e oet 8 1 pl a t 2 f opD t lM7 f r m 2 0 P o 4 3 C i 99 1 l d rr eeo M8 utf se s me L i il i sb t oa P e A b dl i d s lMT a E en 1 v H s o 1 d a d oi 1 n npt vae R aoc b O rA F ) P l l S e e sl B () v n NT ri M Li n ew. O e( t o t e I t c s eh m al e r mci C t ar e iit A S cr p sh oo owy L LC ed n A lMt c sa n r s a et E l ,ga M usr s bDae a mLh s ATcu d 1 s l e ,dtf gd ed e t ehd euo neh eh s nt eub il t ut A n r s nl s T o us ,t na s s mji u t ig ac t a n o) m 1 gC ron n i nA eri a a. e l b t r pf el r it n s rl o E W rpo3 e n ee bt iai C O ne nt e el K nh d n aw eo uht I I i e qEc V T cl eF e R C na h t og si cd R r E A ac t n 4 r m nl o t l t i st o E u u n 5 e i u h r S t et 6 P t o b eo a e0 h aiC E V mhb an i t t s r eW C I aeuC h a r r N T A t a o t A s o A C pl oE i nf L E o irR n o r t t d o U R t h, nU o et np nd e eN i c nis B E R s at n M M O n a s ( t n a adl s co A O C o gl t s a npar e np dl r sAi N i l o e t S C ti re nu e p i Z eb t i ea R N pd i t ins me h s P mm S e c vd E I nin 8 S R r oC a m wE ma eC m. 1 r et e 7 E I c pE ti o Ei i c m 0 I U s sP ns t e c y P sZ a c es 9 C Q eeT oo oh e noT oP i ro 3 N E D rS cd nt R at SdE f rc E R e oe R I DCR O C S L I A 7 Y F E A E R 7 T D A 8 I ll l
I 54 4 EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES 1 f4 4.1
SUMMARY
OF FEMA OBJECTIVES REMAINING TO BE MET Table 2.provides a consolidated listing of those FEMA objectives which, . f' j according to the FEMA RAC Chairman, have not been satisfactorily met or tested, and which should be incorporated into exercise objectives on or by the sixth year of the six-year exercise cycle in which all objectives must be tested and met. These objectives should.be considered in the development of future exercise objective lists; as well as those FEMA objectives which, although previously tested, and satisfactorily j demonstrated, must be tested and evaluated during any full-participation exercise of off-site State and local response capabilities. s l r 4.2 FEMA OBJECTIVES TRACKING - SOUTil TEXAS l'ROJECT { Table 3 provides a comprehensive tracking system of all FEMA exercise objectives, NUREG 0654 Reference Elements, latest exercise objectives, jurisdictional responsibilities, exercise dates, identified deficiencies and/or required corrective actions, and the date that specific FEMA objectives were met by State and local agencies. This system will track the progress and status of this data through the six-year T L j exercise cycle in which all FElWA objectives must be tested and met. e 4 s r x i w. b 0l l
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, j [. k b. TAiEE 1 G:Aniary of FEMA Objectives Remaining to be Met 3:
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7 ) Jurisdiction I FEMAObj$;ctiveandNUREGReference
- 11. Demonstra\\,eabilitytoprojectdosage.
A State: Not tested 4/8/87 to the ptt.lke via ingestion pathway l r exposured based on field datal and to I determina}Appropriateivrotective Q. , mu.sures !hsed on PAGs and other s " relevant factors. t_. L-12.- Demonstrate ability to implement pro-State and local: Not tested m te'etive actions for ingestion path-4/8/87 $i way hazer (s (J.9, J.10.a/g).
- 18. Demonstrate organizational ability Matagorda County: Demonstrated q
y and resources necessary to effect an but not an objective of the J j orderly evacuation of mobility-exercise 4/8/87 .,g impaired individuals within the plume w EPZ (J.10.di. } ~1 .Demonstrar.E sbility to' continuously Matagorda County: Partially i 2 203 monitor and control emergency worker met 4/8/87 ~ ' M. exposure.'TK.3.a, K.3.b) ' ~
- 21. Demonst' rate ability to make the State and Local: Not tested decision, based on predetermined 4/8/87'
) criteria, whether to issue KI to ] emergency workers and/or to the public (J.10.f). ,,b' 22. Demonstrate the ability to supply and State and local: Not tested administer KI, once the decision har 4/8/87' f*' been rade to do so (J.10.e). L"
- 23. ' Demonstrate.the ability to support Hatagorda county: Not tested an orderly evacuation of on-site 4/8/87 y
lt personnel (J.2). G
- 34. Isemonstrate ability to determine and State: Het 4/8/87 f
imp u :*nt appropriate measures for Mat. ;orda County: Partially cont-o11.9 reentry and recovery met 4/8/87 (M.1) l
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