ML20236H142

Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Refueling Water Boron Concentration & Corresponding Concentrations in Refueling Water Tank & Safety Injection Tanks

ML20236H142
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	10/28/1987
From:	ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236H125	List: 2CAN108705, Application for Amend to License NPF-6,changing Tech Specs to Increase Refueling Water Boron Concentration & Corresponding Concentrations in Refueling Water Tank & Safety Injection Tank.Fee Paid ML20236H142
References
NUDOCS 8711030460
Download: ML20236H142 (18)

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1 ATTACHMENT 1 yy l4 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION l REVISIONS!

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- 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 80 RATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - Tava>200 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be B 5.5% Ak/k.

- APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2*, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN (5.5% Ak/k, immediately initiate.and continue

- boration at 240 gpm of 2500 ppm boric acid solution or equivalent until the l

required SHUTOOWN MARGIN is restored.

1 SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall b'e determined to be 25.5% ak/k.

a.

Within one hour after detection of.an inoperable CEA(s) and at I

l least.once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the CEA(s) is. inoperable.

If the inoperable' CEA is immovable or untrippable,~ the above required SHUTDOWN. MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable

.CEA(s).

b.

When in MODES 1 or 2, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6. critical CEA' position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

c.

When in MODE 2

, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1~3.6.

I d.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each

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l fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e below, with the l

CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

See Special Test Exception 3.10.1.

With Keff > 1.0.

With Kef f < 1. 0.

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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-1 Amendment No.181 l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL ~ SYSTEMS Jl d

SHUTDOWNMARGIN.;T,y[$200FL

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR'OPER TION' l

3.1.1.2: 'The SHUTDOWN' MARGIN shall be h5.0 Ak/k.

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APPLICABILITY

MODE ' 5 .

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. ACTION:

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With the SHUTDOWN < MARGIN (5.0% Ak/k, L.immediately-initiate and continue:.

l boration'at 240 gpm of 2500. ppm boric acid solution or. equivalent-until the l.

required SHUTDOWN. MARGIN'is restored.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS Li 4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to beiRS.0% Ak/k:

1 1

a.

Within one hour after detection of an i'noperable'CEA(s) and ati.

l least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while.the,CEA(s)'is inoperable.

sj If the inoperable CEA is immovable or..untrippable,..the above:

required' SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be i.ncreased by'an amount at.leastl

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equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or.untrippable' CEA(s).

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of at'least'.thei following factors:

1.

Reactor coolant' system boron concentration,

'a 2.

CEA position, 3.

Reactor coolant system average temperature, 4.

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal' energy.

'E generation, 5.

Xenon concentration, and 6.

Samarium concentration.

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-i ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-3 Amendment:No;: 24 l

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REACTIVITY. CONTROL SYSTEMS ~

B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-1 3.1.2.7 As a minimum, one of the'fo.llowing borated water sources _shall.be OPERABLE:

a.

One boric acid makeup tank with:

1.

A minimum contained borated water volume'of-3,400 gallons (equivalent to 31% of indicated tank level),

2.

A boric acid concentration between 2.5 WT%'and 3.5 WT%, and 3.

A minimum solution temperatureJof 55 F.

b.

The refueling water tank with:

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A minimum contained borated water' volume of 61,370. gallons

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(equivalent to 7.5% of indicated tank level),

2.

A minimum boron concentration of 2500 ppm, and l

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A minimum solution temperature of 40 F.

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APPLICABILITY:

MODES 5 and 6 ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving.

CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

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EljRVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS l

4.1.2.7 The above required borated water sources shall be demons'trated i

OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the boron concentration of.the water, 2.

Verifying the contained borated water volume'of the tank, and 3.

Verifying the boric acid makeup tank solution temperature is greater than 55 F.

I b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by. verifying the RWT temperature d en it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is < 40 F.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-13 i

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~ LIMITING CONDITION FORJ0PERATION-l i

3.1.2.8 CEach of-the1following: borated waterisources?shall;be OPERABLE!

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1 At lea' t: one ~of the : following' sources with'.a' minimum' solution; a.

s temperature'of. 55 F:

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11.

OneLboric acid: makeup tank,:with'the. tank contents!in acco.rdance withLFigure 3.1-1,lor.

2.

Two~boricmakeuptanks,withithecombinedcontents.~ofthe'.

tanksiin'accordance:.with. Figure 3.1-1, and"

.b.

'The. refueling waterLtank with:

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a 1.

A contained borated. water v'olumeiof between 4609'0'0'ans O

500,500 gallons (equivalent to an' indicated tank level:of l

between 91.7% and'100%, respectively),

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Between2500"and.3000ppmofboronL U

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.Aminimum.. solution ~ temperature 1of;40F,fand-4.

.A maximum. solution temper'ature of 110 F.

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APPLICABILITY:

MODES.1, 2, 3 an'd 4.

a ACTION:

i a.

With the above required boric-acid makeup tank (s) inoperabie, restore the make up tank (s).to 0PERABLE~ status.within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or' H

l be-in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> a'nd. borated"to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent ltolat'least 5.0% Ak/k at 200 F;.

restore the above required.boriciacid makeup; tank (s)-to"0PERABLE:

l status within the next 7 days:or.be'in COLD SHUTDOWN.within1the l

next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

1 b.

With the refueling water tank inoperable, restore thel tank to.

OPERABLE status within' one hour.or' be -in at least HOT STANDBY:

a within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and.in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following' 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS l-4.1.2.8 Each of the above required borated water source'sishril'bel demonstrated OPERABLE:

l ARKANSAS --UNIT-2 3/4 1-15' jAmendmtnt No. 8,L81-

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1 i SURVEILLANCE-RE0UIREMENTS (ContinuedP t

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At ;leastio~ne

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_' Verifying (ths boron concentration in:eacWwaterf source '

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. 2. > Verifying!the c'ontainsd borated waterivolunieLinLeachswatira "m

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Verifying the boric; acid makiup tarik(s)Ssolution temperature ~

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-is greater.than 55 F.

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At leastt once per124'. hours.iby. verifying the RWTJ temperature.' J,. ',,

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3/4:5 " EMERGENCY' CORE C00 LING' SYSTEMS (ECCS).

SAFETY. INJECTION TANKS-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ~

3.5.1-'.Eachreactor.coolantsystemsafetyinjectiontank'shallbe' OPERABLE

with:

a.

The isolation valve open,1 y

b.

A contained borated water volume:of'between-1413 and-1539 cubic.

O feet.(equivalent to an? indicated level between,80.1% and 87.9%,L respectively),

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Between 2500 and 3000 ppm of boron, Land' l

d.

A ni.trogen cover pressure of:between 600 and 624lpsig._

- APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2'and'3.*L

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ACTION:

a.

With one safety injection.tankLinoperable, except as a result of a.

d closed isolation valve, restore _the inoperable' tank to OPERABLE i

status within.one hour or be.in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12-t

. hours.

b.

With one safety injection tank' inoperable due:to' the-isolation:

-t valve being closed,<either'immediately open the isolation valve'or.

U be in H0T STANDBY within one hour'and be in H0T' SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

1 1

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 1

4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be. demonstrated OPERABLE:

1.

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volum'e and nitrogen.

cover pressure in the tanks,.and 2.

Verifying that each safety injection ' tank isolation valve (2CV-5003, 2CV-5023, 2CV-5043 and 2CV-5063)1is_'open.

"With pressurizer pressure h 700 psia.

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ARKANSAS - V' NIT 2 3/4 5-1

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i EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS REFUELING WATER TANK-LIMITING CONDITION FOR~0PERATION' 3.5'4 The refueling water tank'shall be-0PERABLE with:

a.

'A contained bor'ated water volume of between_464,900 and,500,500 gallons (equivalent'to an indicated. level between 91.7% 'and 100%,

respectively),

b.

Between 2500 and 3000 ppm of boron, l

c.

A minimum solution' temperature;of.40 F, and I

d.

A maximum solution temperature of 110 F-APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water tank' inoperable, restore tank to'0PERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD.

. SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4 The RWT shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the contained. borated water volume in the tank,-and 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWT temperature.

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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 81 s'

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS l

BORON CONCENTRATION i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 With the reactor vessel head unbolted or removed, the. boron concentration of the reactor coolant and the refueling' canal shall be-maintained' uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of following reactivity conditions is met:

a.

Either a K of 0.95 or less, which includes a 1% Ak/k conservatiNIallowance for uncertainties, or b.

A boron concentration of.2 2500 ppm, which includes a 50 ppm l

conservative allowance for uncertainties.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 6*.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS-or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at-B 40.gpm until K is reducedto50.95ortheboronconcentrationisrestoredtoB.28bbppm, whichever is the more restrictive'.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

EVR EILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a.

Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and b.

Withdrawal of any full length CEA in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor pressure vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the reactor coolant and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

• The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 when the reactor vessel head is l

unbolted or removed.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4.9-1 l

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3/4.'10

-SPEC'IAL TEST EXCEPTIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of CEA-worth and shutdown margin provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth is available for. trip insertion from OPERABLE CEA(s).

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 2.

ACTION:

a.

With any full length.CEA not fully inserted and-with less than the above reactivity equivalent ~available for trip'.inser. tion',

immediately initiate and continue boration.at R 40 gpa. of 2500 ppm l

boric acid solution or its equivalent until the SHUTOOWN MARGIN required by Specification:3.1.1.1 is restored, b.

With all full length CEAs inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at 2 40 gpm of 2500 ppm boric acid solution l

or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.10.1.1 The position of each full length CEA required either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

1 4.10.1.2 Each CEA not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped-from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 7 l

days prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

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. ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 10-1 Amendment No. 76 17

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j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS' l]

BASES

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,3/4'.1.1.5: MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR' CRITICALITY,

4

.This: specification. ensures that the reactor will=not.be made critical'

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with'the Reactor.CoolantLSystem; average temperature ^1ess:than 525 F.. This limitation.is required to' ensure ~1) the' moderator temperature coeff.icient...is within its; analyzed. temperature; range,-2) the..prote'ctive; instrumentation,is within its normal ~ operating range, 3).the pressurizer is capable of.being in

)

an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and 4) the' reactor pressure' vessel

'2 is above:its minimum RTNDT temperature.

3/4.1.2.BORATION SYSTEMS l

The. boron injection' system ensures that negative reactivity'c'ontrol'is available during each mode of facility. operations.

The. components required to perform this function include 1)-borated water sources, 2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths', 4) boric acid makeup pumps, and 5)'an.

emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.'

With the RCS average. temperature above 200 F,-a' minimum.of:two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided-to ensure single i

functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the 1

systems inoperable,. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor-component repair or corrective action may be-completed without undue' risk to overall facility safety from-injection system failures during the repair?

period.

The boration capability of these systems is sufficient to' provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 5.0% Ak/k-after xenon-

- t decay and cooldown to 200 F.

The' maximum expected boration capability.

requirement occurs at E0L from full power equilibrium xenon. conditions and 9

requires boric acid solution from the boric acid makeup' tanks in-the allowable concentrations and. volumes of: Specification 3.1.2.-8 andia small

' fraction of the borated water from the refueling; water tank required in Specification 3.1.'2.8.

The requirement in Technical Specification 3.1.2.8 for a minimum contained volume of 464,900 gallons of 2500-3000 ppm borated' water in the refueling water tank ensures the capabili.ty for borating the RCS to the desired concentration.

The value listed is consistent with the plant ECCS requirements.

With the RCS temperature below 200 F. one injection system is

. acceptable without single failure' consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the~ reactor and the ~additiona1' restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive' reactivity change in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-2

. AMENDMENT N0. 24 i

18-

= _ _

' REACTIVITY' CONTROL SYSTEMSl

' BASES 4

LThe boron capability required:below1200 F:is'basedLupon providing av 5% AK/K' SHUTDOWN MARGIN after' xenon : decay and cooldown from 200 F to~ 140 FJ

'This' condition requires.either borated water from;the' refueling water. tank or boric acid solution from the boricsacid makeupjtank(s) in accordance with the; requirements'of Specification 3.1.2.7.

The contained water volume limits includes allowance for water notl available because of discharge line location and other physical; characteristics. - The 61,370-gallon limit.for!the refueling water tank 'is,

based.upon having an indicatedelevel in the. tank of at least 7.5L The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING. ensures that this system is available for reactivity (control while'in. MODE l6.

The limits on contained water volume and boron' concentration of'the:RWT-also ensure a'pH value of.between-8.8 and 11.0 for:the solution recirculated

] ~'

within. containment-after a LOCA. ~This pH band minimizes:the evolution of' iodine and minimizes the'effect of' chloride.and caustic stress corrosion'on mechanical systems and components.

3/4. 1. 3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that-(1) acceptable power distribution limits are' maintained, (2) the minimum-SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects'of-CEA misalignments are limited-to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional ~ restrictions which ensure.that' the original design criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable to a stuck or untripable CEA,' to two or-more inoperable CEAs, and to a large misalignment (g 19 inches) of two'or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since any-of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical' functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of a stuck _or'untripable CEA, the loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

1 For small misalignments (< 19 inches) of the CEAs, there.is-1) a small-effect on the time dependent long term power' distributions relative.to-those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints, 2) a small effectLon the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and 3) a small"effect.on!the ejected CEA worth:

used in the safety' analysis. Therefore, the ACTION

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ARKANSAS.- UNIT 2 B'3/4 1-3 AMENDMENT N0/ 24 I-l-

19

l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

BASES 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS I

The OPERABILITY of each of the RCS safety injection tanks ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the'RCS pressure i

falls below the pressure of the safety injection tanks.

This initial sure of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on safety injection tank volume, and pressure' ensure that

]

the assumptions used for safety injection tank injection.in the accident i

analysis are met.

l l

The limits on safety injection tank boron concentration are conservatively set to be consistent with the refueling water tank (RWT) concentration.

The upper limit supports-the analysis for boron precipitation and minimum pH of t_he post LOCA containment solution.

The lower limit is consistent with the RWT value for operational convenience.

The accident analysis assumes a lower value of 2000 ppm boron.

t The safety injection tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be " operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met.

In addition, as i

these safety injection tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure j

criteria, removal of power to the valves:is required.

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The limits for operation with a. safety injection tank inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of.

the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional safety injection tank which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one safety injection tank is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is l

not required.

3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS l

i The'0PERABLILTY of two separate and independent ECCS subsystems ensures j

that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the J

event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration.

Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the safety injection tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to j.

limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits'for all l

postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest

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l RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long

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term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident:

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recovery period.

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l ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 J

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- EMERGENCY CORE C0OLING SYSTEMS BASES The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure -0PERABILITY of each component ensur'es that at a minimum, the assumptions'used in the accident' analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

Surveillance

.requ remen s of throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing i

t provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained._in the event of

- a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:-(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions'when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points. in accordance with. the assumptions'used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an~ acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK-(RWT)

The 0PERABILITY of the RWT as part'of the ECCS ensures that a-sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS l

and CSS in the event of a LOCA.

The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron I

concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for l

the most reactive control assembly.

These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

i The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

l The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWT also ensure a pH value of between 8.8 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated l

within containment after a LOCA.

This pH band minimizes the evolution off iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion-on mechanical systems and components.

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ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 1

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1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS.

BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM J

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that j

containment'depressurization and cooling l capability will be available in the_

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event'of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant-lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident.

l analyses.

'The containment spray system and the containment cooling system are-redundant to each other in providing post accident-cooling of.the

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containment atmosphere.

However, the containment spray system also provides

~i a mechanism for removing iodine from the' containment atmosphere and j

therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system.to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 SODIUM HYDROXIDE ADDITION SYSTEM The 0PERABILITY of the sodium hydroxide addition system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the-event of a LOCA.

The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between 8.8 I

and 11.0 for the' solution recirculated within'. containment after a LOCA.

5 This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of I

chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The contained water volume limit includes an allawance.for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

These assumptions are con.sistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the. accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will.be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3

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'I ATTACHMENT 2 1

DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES I

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b

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? DESCRIPTION' 0F TECHNICALcSPECIFICATION CHANGES--

l Page'3/451 '; TECHNICAL' SPECIFICATION.3.1.1.1'

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The minimum ' concentration of the boric,acidisolution requi. red'for boration--

in the Action statement is increased:to corresp'ond_to'the new minimum for

RWT' concentration.-

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.1.2.

- Page 3/4-l-3 l

The minimum conce'ntration of the boric acid solution required for boration in-the Action ~ statement is increased to correspond-to'the~new.~ minimum for Ji RWT concentration.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.1.2.'7 Page 3/411-13.

l The changes to specification 3.1.2.7 a and to thelsurveillance r'equirement i

x are. propose:I in the, concurrently submitted, amendment request for the. boric' acid makeup tank boron concentration-reduction. :The. change to specification' i

i 3.1.2.7 b refkets the increase in> the minimum RWT' boron concentration and a; more conservative evaluation of the corresponding minimum. volume.

1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.1.2.8 Pages 3/4 1-15,.16 The changes to specification 3.1.2.8:a,: the change-of the word " tank" to

" tank (s)" in Action statement a, and the change'to. surveillance requirements are proposed in the concurrently submitted amendment. request.on the boric acid makeup tank boron concentration reduction. 4The change 1to specification i

3.1.2.8 b 2 reflects the increase in minimum ~ and maximum,RWT' boron -

concentration.

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.1 Page 3/4.5-1, The change in the specification' reflects the increase in minimum.and maximum ~

safety injection tank concentration.

i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.5.4 Page 3/4.5-7 The change in the specification reflects the. increase in' minimum and maximum refueling water tank boron concentration..

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i TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI0N'3.9.1.

Page 3/4.9-1.

The change in the specification and the action statement Nalue of-minimum concentration reflects the increased minimum in the'refue;ing water concentration.. The elimination of' the phrase' "of 1731 ppm boric acid.

solution or its'equivalenc",' corrects a point of potential confusion.

Even.

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if changed to 2500 ppm, boration at this. concentration:may not be sufficient.

to reach a K f 50.95 if it is the' more restrictive requirement.

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Technical Specification 3.10.1 Page 3/4 10-1 l

The minimum concentration of the boric acid solution required for'boration in the Action Statement.is increased to correspond to the new minimum for-a RWT concentration.

j Bases 3/4.1.2 Page B 3/4 1-2, 3' l

Tne changes in volume requirements of the RWT reflects the corresponding concentration increase.

The change in the minimum post LOCA containment pH corresponds to the newly calculated value reflecting changes to the RWT,' SIT q

and BAMT concentrations.

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The other changes to these Bases are the results of the concurrently submitted amendment request on the boric acid makeup tank boron concentration reduction.

i Bases 3/4.5.1 Page B 3/4 5-1 I

l The added paragraph explains the bases of the safety injection tank' boron j

concentration requirements.

This was added since the new minimum l

concentration of 2500 ppm boron was set to match that of the RWT-as an l

operational convenience.

The actual. minimum value used in the appropriate l

l analyses was 2000 ppm boron.

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Bases 3/4.5.4 Page B 3/4 5-2 i

The change in the minimum post'LOCA containment pH corresponds to the newly I

calculated value reflecting changes to the RWT, SIT, and BAMT:

concentrations.

l Bases 3/4.6.2.2 Pgae B 3/4 6-3 1

The change in the minimum post LOCA containment pH corresponds to the newly calculated value reflecting changes to the RWT, SIT and BAMT. concentrations.

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