ML20236C649

Insp Rept 50-424/87-56 on 870905-1007.Two Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint,Surveillance,Fire Protection,Security & Quality Programs & Administrative Controls

ML20236C649
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/16/1987
From:	Burger W, Rogger F, Schepens R, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236C608	List: ML20236C605 ML20236C649
References
50-424-87-56, NUDOCS 8710270281
Download: ML20236C649 (12)

See also: IR 05000424/1987056

Text

- _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ . ._ -

_

• ,

UNITED STATES

/pn AtogDo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

g" .-

n REGION 11

y j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• I

e ATLANT A, GEORGI A 30323

o

'+4 * * * . * s

Report No.: 50-424/87-56

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302 ,

Docket No.: 50-424 License No.: NPF-68

Facility Name: Vogtle 1

Inspection Conducted: September 5 - October 7, 1987

Inspecto - 4; A N /0 N6

. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

W4 A hal4

b M . J. Schepens, Resident Inspector

to/16 /27

Date Signed

f.edre: A8&

% W. Burg r, Repident Inspector

lO//6 /2 7

Date Signed

Approved by: 7 2 u- a/C-

M. V; Sinkule, Section Chief

/c e-

Date' Sighed

7

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed resident inspection in

the following areas: plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance,

surveillance, fire protection, security, quality programs and administrative

controls affecting quality, and follow-up on previous inspector identified

items.

Results: Two violations were identified - failure to maintain the residual

heat removal system operable and failure to adequately report the event.

8710270281

DR

871016

ADOCK 05000424

PDR

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ ._. -. _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _

( j  !

I

,

!

c

REPORT DETAILS

1.- Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• G. Bockhold,- Jr., General Manager, Nuclear Operations

• E. M. Dannemiller, Technical Assistant to General Manager

• T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager 4

'

• R. M. Bellamy, Plant Manager

• W. F. Kitchens, Manager Operations

J. E. Swartzwelder, Deputy Manager - Operations

• R. E. Lide, Engineering Support Supervisor

C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager

G. R. Frederick, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations ,

C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Assessment Manager i

-W. E. Mundy, Quality Assurance Audit Supervisor

M. A. Griffis, Maintenance Superintendent

• J. F. D'Amico, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager

R. M. Odom, Plant Engineering Supervisor

• C. L. Cross, Senior Regulatory Specialist

W. C. Gabbard, Regulatory Specialist ,

S. F. Goff, Regulatory Specialist  !

• A. L. Mosbaugh, Assistant Plant Support Manager

H. M. Handfinger, Assistant Plant Support Manager

M. P. Craven, Nuclear Security Manager

R. E. Spinnatu, ISEG Supervisor

• C. C. Echert, Technical Assistant to Plant Manager

• P. A. Herrmann, Senior Nuclear Engineer, Corporate

Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,

supervision, engineers, operations, maintenance, chemistry, inspectors,

and office personnel.

• Attended Exit Interview

1

2. Exit Interviews (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 7, 1987, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. No  ;

dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not  !

identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by

the inspector during this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews

- _ --_

__

- _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. , ,

,

!

!

were-attended during the inspection period by a resident inspector. The

inspection closed one unresolved item. The items identified during this

inspection were:

Violation 50-424/87-56-01, " Failure To Maintain The Residual Heat

Removal System Operable per TS 3.5.2" - Paragraph 6.b.(1)

Violation 50-424/87-56-02, " Failure To Adequately Report the Residual

Heat Removal System Inoperable Event" - Paragraph 6.b.(2)

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

This area was not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items (92701)

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or ,

deviations. No new unresolved items we*e identified. One previous item

is discussed in Paragraph 6.b.(1).

5, Operational Safety Verification (71707) (93702)

The plant began this inspection period in Power Operation (Mode 1) at 100%

power until October 2 when power was reduced to 75% due to secondary ,

chemistry problems. The unit returned to 100% power the same day following i

repairs to a leaking condenser tube. The plant experienced one ESF

actuation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System on

September 21, 1987.

a. Control Room Activities ]

Control Room tours and observations were performed to verify that

facility operations were being safely conducted within regulatory l

requirements. These inspections consisted of one or more of the

'

following attributes as appropriate at the time'of the inspection.

- Proper Control Room staffing

- Control Room access and operator behavior

-

Adherence to approved procedures for activities in progress

!

- Adherence to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions

for Operations (LCO)

- Observance of instruments and recorder traces of safety related

and important to safety systems for abnormalities

- Review of annunciators alarmed and action in progress to correct f

,

.

_

... .

I

3

- Control Board walkdowns

,

- Safety parameter display and the plant safety monitoring system l '

-operability status

- Discu',sions and interviews with the On-Shift Operations

Supervisor, Shif t Supervisor, Reactor Operators, and the Shift

Technical Advisor to determine the plant status, plans and

assess operator knowledge  !

- Review of the operator logs, unit log and shift turnover sheets

!

No violations or deviations were identified,

b.- Facility Activities

4

Facility tours and observations were performed to assess the ,

effectiveness of the administrative controls established by direct l

observation of plant activities, interviews and discussions with

licensee personnel, independent verification of safety systems status

>

and LCOs, licensee meetings and facility records. During these l

inspections.the following objectives are achieved: $

(1) Safety System Status (71710)- Confirmation of system

operability was obtained by verification that flowpath valve  !

alignment, control and power supply alignments, component

conditions, and support systems for the accessible portions of

the ESF trains were proper. The inaccessible portions are

confirmed as availability permits. Additional indepth

inspection of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) was performed

to review the system lineup procedure with the plant drawings

and as-built configurations, compare valve remote and local

indications, and walkdown of hangers, supports, snubbers and  !

electrical equipment interiors. The inspector verified that the

lineup was in accordance with license requirements for system

operability. The AFW system received additional inspection when ,

one pump could not pass the flow requirements during l

surveillance and again when the building sump overflowed and

backed up into all three pump rooms. Corrective action for the

first event involved replacing the orifice in the pump miniflow

line and conducting the surveillance with a portion of the flow l

into the Steam Generators. The second event required the

cleaning of all three floor drain lines and the removal of

foreign debris from the check valves.

(2) Plant Housekeeping Conditions - Storage of material and

components and cleanliness conditions of various areas

throughout the facility were observed to determine whether

safety and/or fire hazards existed.

,

I

t

_ ___- _ - _ - ___-

y 5

,,

4

1

!

(3) Fire Protection - Fire protection activities, staffing and

equipment were observed to verify that fire, brigade staffing was

appropriate ' and that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment,

-

actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency

-equipment, and fire barriers were operable.

(4) Radiation Protection (71709) - Radiation' protection activities,

staffing and equipment .wert. observed = to verify proper program

implementation.- The inspection included review of the plant .

program effectiveness. Radiation work permits and personnel l

cunpliance were reviewed during' the daily tours. l

Observations of Radiation Control Areas (RCAs) wereplant

conducted to.  !

verify proper identification and implementation. The inspector ,

. discussed with the licensee previous issues which have resulted  !

in an NRC view that this programmatic- area needs additional

management at'tention (staffing, experience, high rad area

control,etc.).

(5) Security (71881) - Security controls -were observed to verify

that security barriers were intact, guard forces were on duty,

and access to the Protected Area (PA) was controlled in

accordance with the facility security plan. Personnel within

the PA were observed to verify that badges were properly

displayed and that personnel requiring escort were properly

'

escorted. Personnel within vital areas were observed to ensure

proper authorization for the area. Equipment operability and

proper compensatory activities were verified on a periodic

basis.

(6) Surveillance (61726) (61700) - Surveillance tests were observed

to verify that approved procedures were being used; qualified

personnel were conducting the tests; tests were adequate to

verify equipment operability; calibrated equipment was utilized;

and TS requirements were followed. The inspectors observed

portions of the surveillance and reviewed completed data

against acceptarce criteria.

(7) Maintenance Activities (62703) - The inspector observed

maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment

clearances were in effect; work requests and fire prevention

work permits, as required, were issued and being followed;

quality control personnel were available for inspection 1

activities as required; retesting and return of systems to j

service was prompt and correct; and TS requirements were being l

followed. Maintenance backlog was reviewed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Licensee Reports (90712) (90713) (92700) l

'

a. In-Office Review of Periodic and Special Reports

j

t

__

,. .

1

5

l

This inspection consists of reviewing the below listed reports to

determine whether the information reported by the licensee is

technically adequate and consistent with the inspector knowledge of

the material contained within the report. Selected material within

the report is questioned randomly to verify accuracy to provide a

'

reasonable assurance that NRC personnel and/or other users have an  ;

appropriate document for their activities. J

Monthly Operating Reports - The report dated September 11, 1987, was )

reviewed. The' inspector had no significant comments regarding these j

reports. 1

b. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Deficiency Cards (DCs)

Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Deficiency Cards (DCs) were

reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to

determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events

which were reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72, were reviewed as they

occurred to determine if the technical specifications and other i

regulatory requirements were satisfied. In-office review of LERs may i

result in further followup to verify that the stated corrective

actions have been completed, or to identify violations in addition to

those described in the LER. Each LER is reviewed for enforcement

action in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. Review of DCs ,

was performed to maintain a realtime status of deficiencies, j

determine regulatory compliance, follow the licensee corrective {

actions, and assist as a basis for closure of the LER when reviewed. j

Due to the numerous DCs processed only those DCs which result in

enforcement action or further inspector followup with the licensee at l

the end of the inspection are discussed as listed below. The items i

marked with an asterisk indicated that a reactive inspection occ'urred i

at the time of the event prior to receipt of the written report.

(1) Deficiency Card reviews: 1

DC 1-87-2018,1-87-2057 and 1-87-2241 - These deficiency cards j

documented a problem where the plant was placed in an unanalyzed j

condition outside the established design basis when the RHR j

crossover isolation valves (1HV-8716 A & B) were closed on i

several occasions for surveillance testing. With either of j

these valves closed the RHR subsystems are not capable of i

injection into all four RCS loops per the ECCS analysis. This l

condition was described in NRC IE Intermation Notice 87-01 a'ated

January 6,1987, which the licensee had received on site on l

January 12, 1987. The licensee formed an event critique task '

force on August 31, 1987, per their administrative procedures to

conduct a root cause determination of why this information was

not effectively processed to prevent the condition. The task i

force reviewed plant procedures to determine a complete account ]

of when and for how long the plant was in an unanalyzed <

condition. The task force identified six (6) times when the RHR f

a

l

_ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

,

'

6-

!-

l. crossover isolation valves were closed. Three times were for.

L valve stroking on 4/3/87, 7/3/87, and 8/8/87 per the quarterly

inservice valve test surveillance. procedure 14825-l' and the

other three times were for RHR pump testing on'2/24/87, 4/16/87,

and. 7/20/87_ per the RHR pump and check valve inservice test

surveillance procedure 14805-1. The licensee estimates that the

valves were closed for a maximum time of 3 minutes during the

performance of the valve stroking surveillance and review of the

maximum ~ time which they were closed during the RHR -pump

inservice testing surveillance indicates that one surveillance

on'7/20/87 degraded the RHR system 72 minutes. The task force

also identified that the RHR cold leg isolation valves

(1HV-8809A & B) were closed on 3/18/87 during the performance of

the RCS pressure isolation valve leak test surveillance

procedure 14450-1 which was performed in Mode 3 for a 12 minute-

duration. The licensee's task force has completed the review of

these events to determine the duration for which these valves

were closed. The task force also conducted a complete review of-

all maintenance work orders and clearances since initial fuel

which did not identify any other instances were these valves

were closed. The licensee's immediate corrective action has

consisted of but was not limited to the following:

1) surveillance procedures 14805-1 and 14825-1 have been revised

to no longer require closing of the RHR crossover isolation

valves in Modes 1, 2, or 3; 2) a night order has been issued to

the shifts describing the concern with closing either the RHR

crossover or cold leg isolation valves and a copy of NRC IE

Information Notice 87-01 has been placed in the . operations

required reading book; and 3) Administrative' Controls have been

placed on the RHR crossover and cold leg isolation valves by

hanging a "for information" tag on the handswitches on the main

control board -instructing operators not to close these valves

when in Modes 1, 2, or 3 and that if any of these valves are

found to be closed then they should be opened immediately or if

they can not be opened then comply with Technical Specification 3.0.3. The inspection included the attendance at the PRB

Meeting where the event critique team presented the event review

report and root cause determination. The inspection determined

that the two most-important corrective actions are improvements

to the Operating Experience Program (0EP) and to the Inservice

Test program (IST). The OEP program will be revised to include

an operational impact review and immediate compensatory action j

prior to normal program changes and the IST program changes will

include procedures for making 10 CFR 50.59 changes.

The method utilized for testing the RHR pumps and check valves

as specified in Revision 1 of surveillance procedure 14805-1

requires the closure of the RHR crossover isolation valve for

the opposite train being tested as well as the closure of the

RHR heat exchanger outlet valve for the train being tested. The

RHR pump and check valve performance is then demonstrated by

l

I

- --- __ - -

, -. --

'

Ii

opening 'the- RHR heat exchanger bypass valve and recirculating

flow ba'ck to the RWST via two no.rmally locked closed manual  ;

"

isolation valves ~(1-1205-U4-027 - and 1-1205-U4-226). . The

inspector' determined that this test method-in effect renders the.  !

low head safety injection flow path inoperable as defined in TS l

3.5.2 in that the train being . tested would have its flow

diverted to the RWST and the other train would only be. capable

of-injecting into two of the four loops. This test method was

conducted during the following times. 1

1

Date' RHR-Pump Mode Power Duration j

02/24/87* A 3 0 53 Minutes

02/24/87* B 3 0 29 Minutes

04/16/87** A 1 48% 46 Minutes

04/16/87** B' 1 48% 39 Minutes

07/20/87 A 1 100% 72 Minutes

07/20/87 A 1 100% 34 Minutes

• Initial Criticality Achieved on 3/9/87

• • The NRC I'nspection determined that the worst case f(r RHR System

unavailability was 85 Minutes since the RWST manual isolation

valves were not closed between pump tests.

During the' inspection the inspector also noted that Westinghouse

letter No. GAE-4704 dated' February 27, 1987, communicated

Westinghouse's position regar#ng IE Information Notice 87-01 -

RHR Valve Misalignment Causes Degradation of ECCS in PWRs. This ,

letter informed the licensee that every Westinghouse plant ECCS i

Analysis assumes low head safety injection. into all cold legs.

Therefore, the isolation of RHR flow to any of the reactor

coolant system cold legs to allow surveillance testing wil.1

place a plant in an unanalyzed condition outside its established

design basis. Furthermore, the inspector noted that FSAR

paragraph 6.3.2.2.4 describes the RHR pumps and states that the

minimum flow bypass. lines prevent deadheading of the pumps an_d

permit pump testing during normal operation. FSAR paragraph

6.3.2.7 describes the provisions for performance testing and

states that all pumps have miniflow lines for us.e in testing

operability. FSAR 6.3,4.2 describes reliability tests and

inspections and states: 1) that the design measures ensure that

active components may be tested periodically for operability

(e.g., pumps on miniflow); and 2) that the design features which

ensure this test capability are met. Specifically, RHR pumps

can also be tested periodically when the plant is at power using

the miniflow recirculation lines. FSAR figure 6.3.2-2 sheet 4

of '21 provides a valve alignment chart for the three modes of

l

ECCS and in part shows the following valve positions.

__-__a

V y y

p

4

u

'

,

,' ;b;I- ,

.j

8

.

V

h . Cold Leg- Hot Leg I

! . Valve Injection _ Recirculation Recirculation

HV-8809A- Open Open ' Closed

HV-8809B Open Open Closed

D HV-8716A Open . Closed. Open

HV-87168- .0 pen Closed Closed

t: HV-0606 'Open .0 pen Open

'~

, HV-0607' 0 pen 'Open Open

. Contrary to. the above information, the RHR. system was rendered

'

inoperable by the surveillance procedure 14805-1 in that both

. trains of RHR were impacted due -to the valve lineup and test .,

. method which resulted in eliminating the four loop injection 'I

that each RHR subsystem must have to be considered operable. i

This surveillance was performed on several occasions subsequent i

to:the licensee receiving the IE Information Notice and the L

Westinghouse letter which serves as notification of the

potential problem and that the plant would be placed outside the

design-basis. l

The NRC inspection determined that the licensee's task force did  !

not -identify the significance of the inadequate test method

utilized in the abnve pump test events which recirculated RHR

flow back to the RWST in lieu of recirculating the' flow thru'the

miniflow line as specified in the FSAR. In addition, plant j

personne1' utilized a surveillance procedure from another utility

as the basis during their procedure development.  !

l

The quarterly inservice valve test procedure No. 14825-1 j

requires the stroking of the :RHR crossover isolation valves I

(1-HV-8716A & B) to demonstrate operability in Modes 1, 2, 3 and )

4. This surveillance was conducted on the following times.

Date Mode Power Duration .

4/3/87 1 35% 3 Minutes

7/3/87 1 100% 3 Minutes

8/8/87 1 90% 3 Minutes

The inspector determined that valve stroking would not be

allowable by the technical specification because they cause each l

RHR subsystem to be, incapable of injection into all four cold

'

legs. The inspector notes that as lon

were to occur (failure of an RHR pump)g as would

that this no active

havefailures

no

affect on the ability to perform the safety function. In fact,

this stroke test is a desirable test since this valve is

required to be repositioned during the course of an accident and

quarterly stroking would provide reasonable assurance of I

operability. .

1

i

l

l

l

_ _ _

_

(?  ;* ; 4

4

1

~'

9

The ' RCS pressure isolation valve leak test surveillance ]

procedure 14450-1 Rev. O required the closing of the RHR cold a

' leg- isolation valves (1-HV-8809A & B). to . demonstrate that

~

leakage of the RCS pressure isolation valves is within limits of {

TS - 4.4.6.2.2. The. licensee estimated 'that. these valves were 1

closed for _ approximately 12 minutes each during the performance -  !

of the . surveillance test on March 18, 1987. The inspector )

. determined that this test placed the plant _ outside the design l

basis in that it' prevented either RHR pump from being able to -l

inject into all four loops. l

The inspector ' determined that' the failure to implement prompt

corrective . action. following notification by the NRC resulted in

-three situations of inoperability of the Residual Heat Removal'

System. (TS 3.5.2) for various periods of time ranging from 3

minutes to as long as 85 minutes. Each occurrence places the

plant in the condition whereby TS 3.0.3 is applicable. TS 3.0.3 I

cannot be voluntarily utilized for maintenance or testing l

purposes and had it .been entered it would- have necessitated I

'

action within one hour to place the unit in hot standby within

six. hours. - The licensee did not take any' action for the two

events on .4/16/87 and 7/20/87 which exceed the one hour time i

frame. This violation is identified as 50-424/87-56-01 " Failure

To Maintain The Residual Heat Removal System Operable per TS 3.5.2". .t j

'

(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-424/87-49-01, " Review Licensee

Evaluation.and Corrective Action Regarding the Closure of either

the RHR Cold Leg Isolation (1HV-8809A & B) or Crossover

Isolation (1HV-8716A & B) Valves which Renders the System ,

Inoperable". This item is closed based on the above I

identification of a violation.

(2) The following LERs were reviewed and are ready for closure .

pending'. verification that the licensee's stated corrective l

actions have been completed.

• 50-424/87-44, Rev.1, " Control Room HVAC Design Violates Single

Failure Criteria". This event involves two conditions which

could have potentially prevented the control room pressure from

. reaching the emergency mode design value since the introduction

rate of outside air would have been lower than postulated in the l

analysis. Backdraft dampers were installed to correct one

condition and the inlet dampers were deenergized to prevent the

second condition. Final corrective action is under review and

~

will be the subject of a supplemental LER. No enforcement i

action is warranted since Region II granted discretionary '

enforcement action.

• 50-424/87-50, Rev. O, " Reactor Trip Caused By Instrument

.

Technician's Error". This event involves a reactor trip from

l

i

l 1

[ .~ j

_-

. . .

)

i

10 i

-

100% power on a turbine trip signal which was a result of a low

hydraulic fluid pressure. The low pressure resulted when a l

technician improperly connected the test equipment across the j

generator current transformer and produced a false momentary j

'

power load unbalance signal, which initiated closure of the

turbine control and intermediate stop valves. The licensee

corrective action was to counsel technicians and engineers

regarding the need to accurately assess the potential impact of

maintenance activities that are performed on their system. No

violations were identified during or as a result of this event.

• 50-424/87-48, Rev. O, " Local Leak Rate Test Not Performed Within

TS Time Limit". This event regards the failure to perform the

appropriate surveillance after maintenance to demonstrate

containment integrity. The licensee discovered the June 18,

1987 event on July 14, 1987, during a review of work orders.

The test was performed and successfully completed. Following

the maintenance a seal leakage test was performed; however, the

TS requires an overall air lock test at 45 psig. The licensee

counseled the supervisors and is revising the work order process

to ensure early identification of maintenance work orders which

effect TS surveillance requirements. This item is identified as

a licensee identified violation (LIV) which meets the criteria

for not issuing a Notice of Violation and will be identified as:

50-424/ LIV 8756-01, "LER-87-48 - Failure to Perform TS 4.6.1.3b  !

Surveillance on the Containment Air Lock Following Maintenance".

• 50-424/87-51, Rev. 0, "AFW Flow Transmitters Inoperable Due To

Inadequate Instructions and Personnel Errors". This issue was

reviewed in NRC report 50-424/87-49 and resulted in identifying

a Licensee Identified Violation. The LER was reviewed and found

to be consistent with the finding in the previous inspection. ,

Implementation of the corrective actions remains to be

completed. This item will receive further followup.

• 50-424/87-55, Rev. O, " Closure of RHR System Valves Causes Loss

of Availability of One RHR Pump". This LER was submitted to the

NRC on 10/5/87 entitled " Closure of RHR System Valves Causes

Plant to Operate Outside its Design Bases". The LER states the

report to be voluntary and only discusses the closure of

1-HV-8809A & B events of March 18, 1987. The inspector

questioned why the event was not submitted pursuant to

50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) or (B) criteria which requires a report for

any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant I

i being: (a) in an unanalyzed condition that significantly )

compromised plant safety; or (b) in a condition that was outside l

the design basis of the plant. The licensee response was that  !

they had spent many hours on this issue and felt that it did not

fit the criteria. The other events were not included because l

they were not as significant or interesting. Based on the  !

conclusions as stated in arriving at Violation 50-424/87-56-01

'

.

)'

l

i .

_. _ _ _ _

o

,, i.

.

9

i

,

11

above the inspector has concluded that a failure to report all

the. events;where the plant was in a unanalyzed condition

constituted..a separate violation. This violation is identified

as 50-424/r -56-02, " Failure To Adequately Report the Residual

Heat Removal = System Inoperable Event".

1

1. 7. Management Meetirs (303028)

On September 10,_1987, a meeting was conducted at the site-.to discuss the .i

plant status and served as a followup meeting to previous meetings. The l

focus of the . meeting was directed at the licensee's progress regarding

reactor . trip reduction, security improvements, and other areas regarding  !

operational performance. The meeting included a tour of the security

~

i

barriers that had recently been found deficient. The NRC requested that 'l

another meeting be planned for November. j

On September 15, 1987, a meeting was conducted at the GPC Corporate office

-in Atlanta, GA to discuss .the status of licensing and inspection items on

the'Vogtle and Hatch facilities.

8. IE Bulletin Followup _ (92703)

~(Closed) 50-424 & 50-425/86-BU-03, " Potential Failure of Multiple -

Emergency Core ~ Cooling System (ECCS) Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air

Operated ' Valve in Minimum Flow' Recirculation Line". The licensee .

responded to this bulletin in a letter dated November 11, 1986, and stated i

that they had evaluated the bulletin to determine whether a single-failure

vulnerability exists in the minimum flow recirculation line of any ECCS

pump that could cause a failure of more than one ECCS train. Their

evaluation has concluded that the concerns-'of the bulletin are not

applicable to this facility. The only ECCS components that share common

minimum flow recirculation lines and/or valves are the Safety Injection

System (SIS) and the Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS). The SIS

has miniflow return lines to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). The .

lines become common after the pressure breakdown orifices for each pump. .l;

The individual portions of the miniflow lines contain an isolation valve

each, and the common portion contains a single valve. All of these valves  !

are motor operated and as such are fail-as-is upon loss of control I

circuitry or power. The CVCS minimum recirculation normal flow paths (

connect to a common line that contains a single motor operated isolation j

valve that is also-fail-as-is upon loss of power. On a safety injection  ;

signal, the CVCS pump miniflow paths automatically align to alternate j

miniflow paths which have no common valves. R

Based on an in-office review by the Region II inspectors, this item is  !

closed. Closure for Unit 2 is via report 50-424/87-39. l

l

< l

L I

L-

,

!

L

l j

1 \

L I