ML20236C526
| ML20236C526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1987 |
| From: | Adensam E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236C528 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707300096 | |
| Download: ML20236C526 (8) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
[
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
- l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655
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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-395 i
VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 67 License No. NPF-12 1.-
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company and South Carolina'Public Service Authority (the licensees),
dated December 12, 1986, as supplemented April 9, 1987, complies with the standards and req)uirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act, and the Comissior.'s rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of t1e Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety cf the public.'and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the. Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license an,9ndment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-12 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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.(2)~: Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The: Technical Specifications contained in' Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.
67. and the Environmental Protection Plan-contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and'the Environmental-Protection Plan.
3.
- This amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
i FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
&,C.m\\ M - R)
Elinor G. Adensam,_ Director Project Directorate II-1 Division of Reactor Projects-'I/II
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications i
bateofIssuance: July 22. 1987-
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. ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT' AMENDMENT NO. 67 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12' DOCKET NO. 50-395 L
-Replace the following pages.of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the. enclosed pages. -The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. -Corresponding overleaf pages are also provided.to maintain document completeness.
Remove Pages Insert Pages
.3/4-3-30 3/4 3-30 3/4 3-31 3/4 3-31 B 3/4 3-lb B 3/4 3-lb' B 3/4 3-Ic B 3/4 6-4 B 3/4 6-4 i
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....o.;o.,.
INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS e.
Reactor Building Purge and Exhaust Isolation Not Applicable f.
Emergency Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable g.
Service Water System 71.5(4)/81.5(5) i h.
Reactor Building Cooling Units 76.5(4)/86.5(5) 1.
Control Room Isolation Not Applicable 3.
Pressurizer Pressure-Low a.
Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 12.0(2)/27.0(1) b.
Reactor Trip (from SI) 5 3.0 c.
Feedwater Isolation
< 10.0 d.
Containment Isolation-Phase "A" h45.0(4)/55.0(5) e.
Reactor Building Purge and
,.k.
Exhaust Isolation Not Applicable f.
Emergency Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable g.
Service Water System
< 71.5(4)/81.5(5) h.
Reactor Building Cooling Units
[76.5(4)/86.5(5) i.
Control Room Isolation Not Applicable 4.
Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-High a.
Safety Injection (ECCS) 5 12.0(2)/22.0(3) b.
Reactor Trip (from SI)
$ 3. 0 c.
Feedwater Isolation
< 10.0 d.
. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" k45.0(4)/55.0(5)
SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 3-30 Amendment No. 67
., INSTRUMENTAL 10N TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS e.
Reactor Building Purge and Exhaust Isolation Not Applicable f.
Emergency Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable g.
Service Water System
< 71.5(4)/81.5(5) h.
Reactor Building Cooling Units h76.5(4)/86.5(5) 1.
Control Room Isolation Not Applicable 5.
, Steam Line Pressure-Low a.
Safety Injection - ECCS 5 12.0(2)/22.0(3) b.
Reactor Trip (from SI)
$ 3. 0 c.
Feedwater Isolation
< 10.0 h45.0(4)/55.0(5) d.
Containment Isolation - Phase "A" e.
Reactor Building and Purge and i
Exhaust Isolation
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Not Applicable f.
Emergency Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable g.
Service Water System
< 71.5(4)/81.5(5) h.
Reactor Building Cooling Units k76.5(4)/86.5(5) 1.
Steam Line Isolation 5 10.0 l
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Control Room Isolation Not Applicable
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6.
Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines - High Coincident with j
Tavg'~l *'l0*
4 a.
Steam Line Isolation 5 12.0 l
7.
Reactor Building Pressure-High-2 a.
Steam Line Isolation 5 9.0 SUMMER - UNIT 1 3/4 3-31 Amendment No.67
1 INSTRUMENTATION BASES l
l REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM
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INSTRUMENTATION (continued) l I
Several automatic logic functions included in this s) edification are not
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necessary for Engineered Safety Feature System actuation aut their functional j
capability at the specified setpoints enhances the overall. reliability of the Engineered Safety Features functions.
These automatic actuation systems are-purge and exhaust. isolation from high containment radioactivity, turbine trip and feedwater isolation from steam generator high-high watar level, initiation of emergency.feedwater on a trip of the main feedwater pumps,. automatic transfer of the' suctions of the emergency feedwater pumps to service water on low suction pressure, and automatic opening of the containment recirculation sump suction valves for the RHR and spray pumps on low-low refueling water storage tank level.
The service water response time includes:
- 1) the start of the service water pumps and, 2) the service water pumps discharge valves (3116A,B,C-SW) stroking to the fully opened position.
This condition of the valves assures that flow will become established.through the component cooling water heat exchanger, diesel generator coolers, HVAC chiller, and to the suction of the service water booster pumps when these components are placed in-service.
Prior to this time, the flow is rapidly approaching required flow and a
sufficient pressure is developed as valves finish their stroke.
Each of the l-
~above-listed components will be starting to perform their accident mitigation function, either directly or indirectly depending upon the use of the compo-nent, and will be operational within the service water response time of
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71.5/81.5 secondsM.
Only the service water booster pumps have a direct impact on the accident analysis via the RBCUs' heat removal capability as discussed below.
l The RBCU response time includes:
- 1) the start of the RBCU fan and the service water booster pumps and, 2) all the service water valves which must be driven to the fully opened or fully closed position.
This condition of the valves allows the flow to become fully established through the RBCU.
Prior to this time, the flow is rapidly approaching required flow as the 1/ Total time is 1.5 second instrument response after setpoint is reached, plus 10 seconds diesel generator start, plus 10 seconds to reach service water pump start and begin 3116-SW opening via Engineered Safety Features Loading i
l Sequencer, plus 60 seconds stroke time for 3116-SW.
During this total time, the service water pumps start and the service water pump discharge valve begins to open at 11.5 seconds and the pump discharge valve is fully open at l
71.5 seconds without a diesel generator start required and 21.5 seconds and 81.5' seconds including a diesel generator start.
i SUMMER - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-lb Amendment No. 67 i
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" INSTRUMENTATION BASES
' valves finish their stroke.
Although the RBCU would be removing heat through-out the Engineered Safety Features response time, the accident analysis does not assume heat removal' capability from 0 to 71.5 secondslE/ ecause the.
b industrial! cooling water system is not completely isolated until 71.5' seconds.
A linear ramp increase from 95% full heat removal capability'to 100% full heat.
removal' capability is assumed by the accident analysis.to start at'71.5 seconds l -
and end at?86.5 seconds /
. Full heat removal capability is assumed at 86.5 3
seconds' based on the position of the valve 3107-SW.
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2/ Total time is 1.5 second instrument response after setpoint is reached, plus
~ 10~second diesel start plus 60 seconds
- for valves to isolate industrial cooling water system.
3/ Total time ~is 1.5 second instrument response after setpoint is reached, plus 10.second diesel generator start plus 75 seconds to stroke valves 3107A,B-SW.
- During this time period, the Engineered Safety Features Loading Sequencer starts the RBCU fans at 25 seconds and service water.
booster pumps at 30 seconds after the valves begin to stroke.
SUMMER - UNIT 1-B 3/4 3-1c Amendment No. 67
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llCONTAINMENTSYSTEMS:
,' BASES-i 3/4i6.2.2 SPRAY' ADDITIVE < SYSTEM L
1 The OPERABILITY'of.the spray additive' system ensures.that: sufficient Na0H is addedLto the reactor building spray.
4 lNaOH' volume and concentration ensure a..in the event of.a LOCA. '.The limi pH value of between 7.8 and 11.0 for the a
' solution recirculated within containment after a'LOCA.
This pH band' minimizes the evolution'-of iodine'and minimizes the effect of chloride:and caustic stress-
' corrosion on mechanical. systems'and components., The contained' solution volume; limit' includes-an allowance'for solution not' usable because4of: tank. discharge line.locationLor other physical characteristics..These assumptions are con '
l sistent.with the' iodine removal efficiencyLassumed in'the accident analyses.
'3/4.6.2.3 REACTOR BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM-The OPERABILITY of the reactor building' cooling' system ensures that H
- 1) the reactor building air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate. heat removal capacity is available when operated'in conjunction with the reactor _ building' spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.
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..The_ reactor building cooling system and.the reactor building spray _ system are redundant' to each other in providing post accident cooling of the. reactor building atmosphere.
As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, theta 11owable.out of, service time requirements-for the reactor building cooling systemhavebeenappropriately. adjusted.
However, the allowable out of. service time requirements:for the reactor building: spray system have been^ maintained-consistent with'that assigned other inoperable-ESF equipment since the reactor building spray: system also provides a mechanism for removing; iodine from the reactor building, atmosphere.
,The accident analysis requires the ' service water booster' pump to be pass-
.ing 4,000 gpm to both RBCU's within 86.5 seconds.
This time encompasses the driving of. all.necessary service water valves to the correct positions, i.e.,
fully opened.or fully closed.
Reference Technical Specification Bases B3/4.'3.1' y
and B3/4.3.2 for additional details.
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'3/4.6.3' PARTICULATE-IODINE' CLEANUP SYSTEM 1
The OPERABILITY of the containment filter trains ensures that' sufficient' a
' iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.
The:
' reduction in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radiation doses associated with containment _ leakage.
The operation of this
- system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses.
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SUMMER UNIT 1 8 3/4 6-4 Amendment No.57 67
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