ML20236A337

Proposed Changes to Nuclear Svc Water (Rn) Sys Tech Specs to Show That Sys Contains Components Shared Between Units & to Allow Placing Sys in ESF Alignment When Number of Operable ESF Channels Less than Required

ML20236A337
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	10/16/1987
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236A286	List: ML20236A283 ML20236A337
References
TAC-66403, TAC-66404, NUDOCS 8710220199
Download: ML20236A337 (40)

Text

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q TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued) ACTION 20 - With.less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour 1 determine by observation of the associated permissive status light (s) that the interlock is in its. required state for the { existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3. j i ACTION 21 - With the number.of OPERABLE channels one-less than the Minimum . Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in' at least HOT STANDBY: ~ within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; howevor, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the' i other channel is OPERABLE. l ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one.less than the-Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANOBY within e - 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN vithin the following l 6 hours. ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total l Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE i status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.1.4. I ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum i Channels OPERABLE, restore the inoperable' channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours,-or initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Area Ventilation System with flow through the. HEPA filters ard carbon adsorbers. 4 ACTION 25 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum l Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANOBY within 6 hours. ACTION 26 - With the number.of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANOBY within .i I 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. ACTION 27 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STAN0BY within l 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1'provided the other channel is OPERABLE. A c -( g 4 z.8, M5EET Ff2rA MF.X-T fA% CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 3-26 g

i 1 l ACTION 28 - a. With the number of:0PERABLE channels one less than the. Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable' channel to OPERABLE j status within 7 days or align the Nuclear Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond recirculation, or be in HOT STANDBY within'the next 6' hours and in at least COLD SHUTDOWN, within the following 30 hours. I -l b. With the number of OPERABLE' channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour align the Nuclear l Service Water System for Standby Nuclear Service Water Fond -l recirculation, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and i in at,1 cast' COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. l l 1 1 1 l r l l l 1 i l I t

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TABLE NOTATIONS'(CONT.) (5) Surveillance Requirements must be met on common (shared) portions of the Nuclear Service Water System when either unit is.in MODE 1,., 3 or 4. 1 2 Surveillance Requirements must be met on unit-specific portions of the Nuclear Service Water System only when that unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or.4. i

45EET A*M PLANT SYSTEMS % 6-gexi 3/4.7.4 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ) r / ~ 3. 4 At east t independe t nuclear servico wa 4r loops, atl,be OP ABLE. Y 1 A PLICA ILITY: DES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ) lACTIO Wit!onlyon nuclear tvice w ter loop 0 ERABLE, re tore at st.two ao l to/0PERABLE. status wit, in 72 h rs or be n at least OT STANO withi th ( next 6 hou and in COLD SHUTO N within he followi 'g 30 hou ( SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4 At least two nuclear service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERAB i a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual', power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked,-sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown,** by verifying that: 1) Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection, or Phase "B" Isolation test signal, and 2) Each Nuclear Service Water System pump starts automatically on a Safety Injection, or Loss-of-Offsite Power test signal. k SNeNance. ktdrerneds mv.dk k Ynd on ecmrnon (Sharedh pothos oh4hc R$ 3 sb taken cibec unit a in M ote I,2,3 ee 4. Lat(lance 12eptre,neds 3 osu5h b wd on unih-s c porNons o[ 4hc Rd 5 s4% onl3 LJhen-3 i M und to in A4obs I,7_,3oc4. ""This surveillance need not be performed until prior to entering HOT SHUT 00WN following the Unit 1 first refueling. CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-12

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~At'least two' independent Nuclear S'rvice Watir (RN)tloops;shall be e OPERABLE.. l E a. With'both unitsLin MODE 12-2, 3 or 4i_each looptshall contain two; ~ . 0PERABLE nuclear service' water. pumps andiassociated emergency' 1 diesel generators,Ltwo essential;equipmentLsupply and return j headers,'and,a supply and: discharge. flow: path capable of being n . aligned to the Standby Nuclear Service WaterjPond (SNSWP). (j if With'only one unit 1 n MODE 1, 2,.3 Eor-4,feach loopishall contain at-j 1 b. least one OPERABLE nuclear service' water pump, associatediemergency diesel' generator, Land the essential equipment supply.and return. j header' associated with the unit.in MODE;1, 2,;3.or 4,'and a supply ] and discharge flow path capable'of being aligned to the SNSWP. U APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2,-3 and 4 ACTION: (Units 1.and 2) Both units in MODE 3 1,.2, 3 or 4 With.only'two or three RN pumps and their associated emergency diesel generators j OPERABLE,. restore four RN pumps and their associated emergency-diesel generatorsi to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or place-at least one unit in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SRUTDOWN within.the following 30 hours, in order to restore two loops to OPERABLELstatus for any unit which ) remains in MODES 1, 2, 3 or.4. l One unit in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4 With only one RN pump and its emergency diesel generator OPERABLE, restore two loops to OPERAELE status within 72 hov.rs or be,in at least HOT STANDBY in the 1 next 6 hours and COLD SKUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. One or Both units in MODES 1, 2, 3'or 4 a. With RN unavailable to any essential equipment declare-the affected equipment inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION Statement. The provisions of. Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. b. With only one RN loop'0PERABLE due to the inoperability of a shared valve, flow path or component (other than an RN pump or its uniquely associated equipment) return'two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or place both units in HOT STANDBY vithin the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. 1 ) I \\ i .t

1 PLANT-SYSTEMS. 3/4.7.5 STANDBY' NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER PONO LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION r 3.7.5 The standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP) shall be 0PERABLE with: a. A minimum water level'at or above elevation 570 feet Mean Sea Level, j USGS datum, and b. An average water temperature of less than or equal to 86.5 F at elevation 540 feet in the SNSWP intake structure. l 1 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. l ACTIONi (Units 1 and 2) With the requirements of the above spe'cification not satisfied, be in at lea'st HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTOOWN within the following 30 hours, i I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l h 4.7.5 The SNSWP shall be determined OPERABLE: a. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the water level to be within its limit, j l b. At least once per 24 hours during the months of July, August, and ] September by verifying the water temperature to be within its limit, <g) ] c. At least once per 12 months by visually inspecting the SNSWP sin an'dx verifying no abnormal degradation, erosion, or excessive se agegnd j l cl /4 \\ead emce_ y 24 hours durinj 4ke. yrienths of Ll duyusk y y g Q 6 bes Ale. A A)u. lear SeMer Wahr hs4tm is j Lake. bl be by re.coelin3 Oc udor te.mperdre-6 yut to y of 66 Wyh, ms mensarul in b bby ean d an opeect4m1 tju.ciac L.c m e L k +ce pm g. l [ CATAWBA - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 7-13 l

1 PLANT SYSTEMS ) BASES 1 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM g b The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that suf-l LJ k ficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related j equipment during normal and accident conditions. fhe redundant cooling s b capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the l assumptions used in the safety analyses. l l W 1 w e 3/4.7.4 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM he ORERAB LITY f th Nuc ar ervi e Wa r5 tem nsu es th t suf icie t oli. cap city is av ilab fa con inue ope atio of cret -rela ed eq ip-j me t d ring orma and ccid nt c ndi ions. The redu dant cool ng c acit of ) th sy tem, ssu ng a singl fai ure is onsi tent ith he sump fons s used in(v e s fety naly is. 4 a 1 l 3/4.7.5 STANOBY NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER POND $ W P') N The limitations on the standby nuclear service water pondslevel and & temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available to either: b (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility, or (2) mitigate the effects of j d accident conditions within acceptable limits. g 'R The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based j on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without g exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommend-k ations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," March 1974. g% N H 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Area Ventilation System ensures that: (1) the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous-duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system, and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating to maintain low humidity using automatic control for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control l room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is con-i l sister t with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveil-lance testing. l l CATAWBA - UNITS 1 AND 2 8 3/4 7-3

y J INSERT A: The Nuclear Service Water (RN) System consists of two independent loops (A and B) of essential equipment, each of which is shared between units 1 and 2. Each loop contains two RN pumps, each of which is supplied from a separate emergency diesel generator. Each set of two pumps supplies two trains (1A and 2A, or 1B and 2B) of essential equipment through common discharge piping. While the pumps are unit designated, i.e., 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, all pumps receive auto-start signals from a safety signal on either unit. Therefore, a pump designated to one unit will supply post accident cooling to equipment in that loop on both units, provided its associated emergency diesel generator is available. For example 2A RN pump (supplied by emergency diesel generator 2A) will supply post-accident cooling to RN trains 1A and 2A. Two RN pumps have sufficient capacity to supply post-LOCA loads on one unit and shutdown and cooldown loads on the other unit. Thus the operability of four RN pumps and their associated emergency diesel generators assures that no single failure will keep the system from performing this safety function. Additionally, one RN pump has sufficient capacity to maintain a unit indefinitely in COLD SHUTDOWN (commencing 36 hours following a trip from full power) while supplying the post-LOCA loads on the other unit. Thus, after a unit has been placed in COLD SHUTDOWN only one RN pump and its associated emergency diesel generator are required to be operable on each loop in order for the system to be capable of performing its safety function, including single failure considerations. l The requirement that two independent RN loops (each consisting of an OPERABLE RN l pump and its associated emergency diesel generator for each unit in MODE 1-4) ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. If both units are in MODES 1-4, and less than four, but at least two, RN pumps and/or their associated emergency diesel generators are OPERABLE, or if only one unit is in i MODE 1-4 and only one RN pump and its associated emergency diesel geners. Lor is l OPERABLE, the ACTION Statement provides time to return the affected equipment to i dn c o rt u he tds g e fa u ab y requirements for a single unit in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4 are sufficient to assure i that the assumptions in the safety analysis for the unit in MODE 5 or 6 are met. l INSERT B: i l The peak containment pressure analysis assumes that the Nuclear Service Water (RN) flow to the Containment Spray and Component Cooling heat exchangers has a temperature of 86.5'F. This temperature is important in that it, in part, determines the capacity for energy removal from containment. The peak l l containment pressure occurs when energy addition to containment (core decay heat) is balanced by energy removal from these heat exchangers. This balance is j reached far out in time, af ter the transition from injection to cold leg recirculation and after ice melt. Because of the effectiveness of the' ice bed in condensing the steam which passes through it, containment pressure is insensitive i to small variations in containment spray temperature prior to ice meltout. l To ensure that the RN temperature assumptions are met, Lake Wylie temperature is ] monitored. During periods of time while Lake Wylie temperature is greater than 86.5 F, the emergency procedure for transfer of ECCS flow paths to cold leg recirculation directs the operator to align at least one train of containment spray to be cooled by a loop of Nuclear Service Water which is aligned to the ) i SNSWP. l i I ]

ATTAClefENT 2 JUSTIFICATION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS l

!l 1 l I Discussion and Analysis of No Significant Hazards Consideration j i i ) These changes are proposed, in part, in response to commitments made during an August 27, 1987 meeting between Duke Power Company personnel and members of the l KRC Staff. a Although the current Catawba Nuclear Service Water (RN) Technical Specification (3/4.7.4) is based on the NRC's Standard Technical Specification, it does not explicitly convey the shared arrangement of the Catawba RN System. As discussed at the August 27, 1987 meeting, Duke Power has conservatively interpreted Specification 3/4.7.4 as being applicable as shown in these proposed changes. That is, both units would be placed in the Action Statement if a shared portion I of the RN System were declared inoperable. This conservative interpretation ' rill be administratively maintained until the Specifications are amended. The proposed amendment to Technical Specification Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2 and Specification 3/4.7.4 are intended to: (1) Show that the RN System contains shared components between Unit 1 l and Unit 2; and (2) Allow placing the RN System in its Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) l alignment when the number of operable ESF channels is less than required. In particular, the changes to Item 14.g in Table 3.3-3 show that the RN Suction Transfer - Low Pit Level ESF instrumentation is associated with the RN pits, l There are two RN pits each with two associated channels. Any one channel will cause realignment of the RN System and all four RN pumps will start. The addition of ACTION 28 to Table 3.3-3 will allow placing the RN System in its q ESF alignment if the number of operable RN low pit level channels is less than l required. This is consistent with other Ar7 ION statements for shared systems such as ACTION 24 for the Control Room Ventilation System instrumentation. The change to Table 4.3-2 would add a Noto (5) to the Table Notations. Note (5) clarifies the need for performing surveillance on the shared portions of the RN System as well as those portions which are unit specific, and would add Mode 4 applicability for item 14.g to make this consistent with Table 3.3-3. The change to Technical Specification 3/4.7.4 shows that the RN System is shared between units and that with the Limiting Condition for Operation not met, both units may be in the Action Statement. Clarification as to the conditions where both units would be considered to be in the Action Statement are identified in the additions to the RN System Bases. f The change to Technical Specification 3/4.7.5 is to ensure that the temperature of the RN water drawn from Lake Wylie is monitored. Initial temperature of the RN water is an assumption in the accident analysis. In addition to the changes proposed to the Technical Specifications, a change l will be made to the Catawba Emergency Procedures. l

1 l l l Discussion and Analysis of No Significant Hazards Consideration (Cont.) The peak containment pressure analysis assumes that the RN flow to the Containment Spray and Component Cooling heat exchangers has a temperature of 86.5*F. This temperature is important in that it, in part, determines the capacity for energy removal from containment. The peak containment pressure occurs when energy addition to containment (core decay heat) is balanced by energy removal from these heat exchangers. This balance is reached far out in time, after the transiticn from injection to cold leg recirculation and after ice melt (FSAR Figure 6.2.1-5). Because of the effectiveness of the ice bed in condensing the steam which passes through it, containment pressure is insensitive l to small variations in containment spray temperature prior to ice moltout. If the lake temperature is less than 86.5*F, the analysis assumption is satisfied l while RN suction continues from the lake. In order to ensure that the RN temperature assumptions discussed above are met, specific instructions are placed in the emergency procedure for transfer to cold leg recirculation during periods 1 where Lake Wylie temperature is greater than 86.5*F. These instructions would bo placed near the end of the procedure so as not to affect the time sequence analysis of operator actions to complete the transition to cold leg recirculation. As discussed above, the containment pressure is insensitive to small variations in containment spray temperature, e.g., the reduction in spray subcooling caused by use of up to 92*F RN water for a short time while the realignment is accomplished. l l 10 CFR 50.92 states that a proposed amendment involves no significant hazards j considerations if operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: I (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed amendment does not involve an increase in the probt.bility or consequences of any previously evaluated accident. The probability of an accident is not increased because these changes involve the addition of clarifying statements to the Specifications. These changes more accurately describe the as-built RN System and thus would improve the current Specifications. Placing the RN System into its ESF alignment ensure, that this System will be in the required mode of operation if an accident should occur while ESF channels are inoperable. This Technical Specification amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since these changes do not affect the design or normal operation of the RN System. Additional restrictions will be placed on the operation of the system if a shared portion is inoperable. Placing the RN System into its ESF alignment will ensure i that the safety function of the System will be satisfied. i

Discussion and Analysis of No Significant Hazards Consideration (Cont.) These changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed amendment adds clarification to the Specifications and will ensure that the safety function of the RN System is guaranteed. For the reasons stated above, it is concluded that the proposed amendment does not involve significant hazards consideration.

l .} -l .i ATTACle[ENT 3 FSAR CHANGES i i I i l j i i I i 1

s t 'CNS1 1 10. The initial conditions in the' Containment are a t'emperature.of:100 F in h the' lower and dead-ended volumes and a temperature of 75 E in the~ upper ~ ~ volume. All volumes are at a pressure of 0.3 psig. q 11. Pump flow rates.versus. time given in Table 6.2.1-3 were usedc 12. Containment structural heat sinks are assumed'with conservatively low heatL 1 transfer rates. (See Table'6.2.1-4).

13. 'The. operation ~of-one Containment' spray heat exchanger '(UA;= 1.18 10 '

l. 6 Btu /hr-F) for containment c'ooling and the operation.of.'one RHR heat-exchanger (UA = 1.84 x:106 Btu /hr-F) for core cooling'. The RHR.flowlis cooled by' component cooling flow which~is. cooled, in. turn, by:its own heat- ~ .l.' 6 ) . exchanger (UA = 3.42 x 10.8tu/hr-F.

14. The air return fan returns air at a rate of '40,000 'cfm from the upper toi lower compartment.

15. 'An active sump volume of 80,610 ft3 is'used.

D

16..102% of rated thermal power is used.in the calculations.

17. Subcooling of ECC water from RHR heat exchanger.is assumed,

18. The nuclear service water flow rates assumed are 3800'gpm to the contain-ment spray heat exchanger and 5200 gpm to-the. component cooling heat.

exchanger. l u 19. The component cooling water flow rate in-the RHR heat exchanger and the

I component cooling heat exchanger is 5000 gpm.

20. The minimum time at which flow from the RHR pump can be diverted to the I auxiliary containment spray header is specified in the plant operating .l procedures as 50 minutes'after reactor trip. A discussion of the core i cooling capability for this mode of operation oflthe ECCS is given in'- ) Section 6.3.1. ) With these assumptions, the heat removal capability of the containment is 4 sufficient to absorb the energy releases and still keep the' maximum' calculated pressure below the acceptance criteria of 14.38 psig, as discussed in Section 6.2.1.3.1.2. The following plots are provided for the limiting case, the DEPSG break: Figure 6.2.1-5, Containment pressure transiont o Figure 6.2.1-6a, Upper compartment temperature transient Figure 6.2.1-6b, Lower compartment temperature transient Figure 6.2.1-7, Active and inactive sump temperature transi.ents Figure 6.2.1-8, Ice melt vs. time Table 6.2.1-5 gives energy accountings at various points in the transient. y .f s 6.2-14 'I

yc. e 4 s e - i TABLE 6.2.2-2 ) Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Operating Design Parameters 7;, \\' Characteristic y-Data j l 1 Quantity Per Unit

f. 2 Type Shell an,d U Tube Heat Transfer Per Unit, ETU Per Hour 72.6 x 106 Flow Shell Side, lb/hr 1.9 x 106 Flow Tube Side, lb/hr 1.6 x 106

'l 1 Tube Side Inlet Temperature, F 130 ) 1 Shell Side Inlet Temperature, F 86.5 j l Tube Side Outlet Temperature, F .) 143.5 Shell Side Outlet Temperature, F '125 Design Pressure Shell/ Tube, psig 150/250 Design Temperature Shall/ Tube, F 200/200 l / \\ 'g / ~, e s 'N / i (; F \\ i, E r \\

&}[' Q:f CNS' 4 7.4.1'.3.18 Identification of. Protective Action ,y The safety"re hted instrume'ntation and: controls of the Auxiliary Feedwater Sys-et t k >(/ tem are train related and do not include protection channels as, defined in IEEE. 279-1971; The protection.. channels'that actuate the Auxiliary Feedwater System are part of the ESFAS and are described in Section 7.3. 7.4.1.3.19 In' formation Rsaci-Out Information read-outs pett'inent to4the correct operation of the Auxiliary Feed-i water System are provided in'the control room'and at the. local control panels. 7.4.1.3.20 System Repair / The Auxiliary Feedwater System is designed to facilitate the replacement, re-pair, or adjustment of malfunctioning instruments and controls. 7.4.1.3.21 Identification 'l The Auxiliary Feedwater System safety-related instrumentation and control eq'uip-ment is physically identified as described in Section 7.1.2.3. 7, 7.4.2 NUCLEAR SERVICE WAIM SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 7.4.2.1 Description ) The Nuclear Service Water (NSW) System supplies cooling water to safety and non-- safety loads in both units. Cooling water taken from either Lake Wylie or the Standby Nuclear Seryice Waterz, Pond (SNSWP) is pumped through heat exchangers in both units and returned to.its s ucce. The NSW System is~ discussed'inl detail in, Section 9. 2.1. i One NSW train Thg NSW System is controlled niantially under normal conditions. p p anit is normally in operation with pump suctions and discharges shared l bpeenunitstoprovide.coolingwaterfromLakeWylie. h On receipt of a safety injection signal, all four.NSW pumps (both~ pumps on each unit) are started. On the affected unit, NSW isolation valves on the essential supply headers, component cooling heat exchangers, and diesel generator engine jacket water heat exchangers receive a signal to ~open;'and the NSW isolation valves on the NSW pump lube. injection strainer supply cross-l over line and non-essential HVAC leads in the Auxiliary Building receive a. i signal to close. Upon receipt ofia Phase B containment isolation signal, the s l isolation valves to the non-essential loads in the Reactor Building and all l remaining non-essential loads are automatically closed. q A lowilcw !evel in either NSW pump pit initiates. automatic realignment of the I system (both channels) from the lake to the SNSWP. 4 i i \\ S, l 7.4-7 I. ] l t A q q l \\ l N4 Ta -i 1 g

= z fff s x' ,t l i ,.), /< I s- 't d <4 CNS s-- The NSW pump outlet valves and motor cooler inlet valves are interlocked to open when their associated pump starts. Additionally, the heat exchanger inlet valves for the diesel' generators are,i_nterlocked to open when their~ associated diesel S ' generator starts. c,1 There are no aut'oratic by' passes capable of. preventing the NSW System'from l s performing its safety function; however, fin the event system control'must be 't transferred to the Auxiliary' Shutdown Complex, all automatic signals are '// h defeated (refer to Section 7.4.7). Automatic closure of non-essential equip-( h ment isolation valves is blocked during system testing. NSW Systemis Megy-related instrumentation and controls are powered from the same '{ train of essentfe.1 auxiliary power a' L their assoc;ated train of NSW equipment. q s '/g y J" 7.4.2.2 Des'ign Bases - f#b \\ The Nuclear Service Water. System instrumentation and. controls are designed to 1 provide reliable monitoring and control of the NSW System so'that a continuous flow of cooling water is. supplied to thel systems and components. required for: safety under normal and accident conditions. 3 i ~ 7.4.2.3 Analysis q i TherequirementsofIEEE279-N71arewrittenforprotectionsystemsasdefined k in Section 1 of.that standaro, therefore, these requirements are not directly-applicable to these controls'. However, a discussion of the extent to which the design of this system meets the appropriate portions of IEEE 279, Section 4, is provided below: j i / 7.4.2.3.1 General Functi?tial Requirements TheNuclearServiceWatekSyst4 min'.:rumentationand'controlsmonitorandcontrol the operation of the NSW System to assure a continuous supply of cooling water to 1 essential systems and components under normal and accident conditions. - j 7.4.2.3.2 Single Failure Criterion No single failube in the NSW System instrumentation and w trols can affect the operation of more than one train of NSW. 7.4.2.3.3; Quality of Components and Modules ( The quality esurarsta program under which the cor ponents 'of tiiis system are qualified fs' der:ribel in Chapter 17.0. This program includes appropriate requirements for dedgr. review, procurewnt, inspection, and testing to ensure that system components are of a quality consistent with minimum maintenance requirements and low -failure rates. 7.4.2.3.4 Equipment Qualification Qualification of electrical equipment is discussed in. Sections 3.10 and 3.11. 7.4-8 _i 1 l

CNS 9.2 WATER SYSTEMS 1 9.2.1 NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 9.2.1.1-Design Bases The Nuclear Service Water System (RN) provides essential auxiliary support 1 functions to Engineered Safety Features of the station. The system is designed-to supply' cooling water to various heat loads.'in both the safety and non-safety ' i portions of each unit. Provisions are made to ensure a continuous. flow of-1 cooling water to those systems and components necessary for plant safety during normal operation and under accident conditions. Sufficient redundancy of piping i and components is provided to ensure that cooling is maintained to-essential loads at all times. See Table 3.2.2-2:for a listing of_RN' System component design codes, locations, missile protection and seismic consideration. 9.2.1.2

System Description

The Nuclear Service Water System is shown diagrammatically on Figures 9.2.1-L through 9.2.1-12. The piping and components _shown on Figures 9.2.1-1 through 4-are shared between units, while the piping and. components shown on Figures 9.2.1-5 through 12 are duplicated for each unit unless otherwise stated in the following text. Functionally the system consists of four sections which, when put together in series, serve to assure a supply of river water to various station heat loads and return the heated effluent back to its proper _ heat sink. In order of flow, these are: a. Source and intake section b. RN Pumphouse section c. Station heat exchanger section d. Main discharge section 9.2.1.2.1 Source and Ir.take Section Two bodies of water serve as the ultimate heat sink for the components cooled by the RN System. Lake Wylie is the normal source of nuclear service water..A single transport line conveys water from a Class 1 seismical_1y designed intake structure at the bottom of the lake to both the A and 8 pits of the Nuclear Service Water Pumphouse serving the RN pumps in operation... Isolation of each line is assured by two valves in series and fitted with electric motor opera-tors powered from separate power supplies. Should Lake Wylie be lost due to a seismic event in excess of..the design of' Wylie Dam; the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP), formed by the Class 1 seismically. designed SNSWP Dam, contains sufficient water to bring the station safely to a cold shutdown condition. The SNSWP has an intake l structure designed to Class 1 seismic requirements, with two Class 1 seismic, redundant lines.to transport water independently to each pit in the RN Pump-house. Each line is secured by'a single' motor operated valve. Automatically upon loss of Lake Wylie (as detected by RN pit level instrumentation), l 9.2-1 t _ _ - - _ ~. _

I CNS Lake Wylie double isolation val'ves are closed and the.SNSWP' valves are opened l_ to both pit A and pit B. The Nuclear Service Water-lines cross over the condenser cooling water lines. These CCW lines are low pressure lines and could only affect the NSW lines by undermining the surrounding soil-due to a possible loss of cooling water. Detection of this loss and system shutdown would occur prior.to any detrimental effects to the NSW lines; further, the NSW lines are self-supporting over a considerable distance should'any. undermining occur. j -{ Ultimate heat sink adequacy is discussed and analyzed in Section 9.2.5. 9.2.1.2.2 RN Pumphouse Section .] .) The RN Pumphouse is a Class 1 seismically designed structure that contains two-j separate pits from which two independent and redundant channels of.RN pumps J take suction. Each pit can be supplied from-both the normal source and also l the assured source of water. Either pit is capable of passing the flow needed ] for a simultaneous unit LOCA and unit cooldown.. Flow spreaders in front of all 2 the intake pipe entrances prevent vortices and flow irregularities while. removable lattice screens protect the RN pumps from solid objects. Pumps 1A and 2A take suction from pit A and discharge through RN. strainers 1A-and 2A respectively. The outlet piping of the 1A and 2A RN strainers then' join back together to form the channel A Supply-line to channel A components in both units. RN pumps 18 and 28 are physically separated from RN pumps 1A and 2A by a j concrete wall, and take suction from pit B, discharging through RN strainers 1B J and 2B respectively. 'The outlet piping of strainers 18 and 28 join together to form the channel B supply line to channel B comp'onents in both units. See Table 9.2.1-1 for a listing of RN System component design parameters. ] Outside the Auxiliary Building wall, the channel A supply line splits, with 1A l supply header entering on the Unit 1 side, isolated by an'EM0 valve powered by the 1A normal and assured power supplies, and the 2A supply header entering the building on the Unit 2 side, isolated by an EMO valve powered by the 2A normal and assured power supplies. Likewise, the channel B supply line splits with the 1B supply header entering on the Unit 1 side of.the Auxiliary Building and the 28 supply header-entering on the Unit 2 side, each isolats e by EMO valves powered by corresponding normal and assured power supplies. Thr supply and return headers are arranged and fitted with isolation valves sucn that.a critical crack in either header cal be isolated and will not jeopardize the safety functions of this system or flood out other safety. related equipment. The operation of any two pumps on'either or both supply lines is sufficient to supply all cooling water requirements'for the two unit plant for unit startup, cooldown, and refueling. However additional pumps are normally started for unit startup and cooldown and refueling. 9.2-2.

CNS However, additional pumps are normally started for unit startup and cooldown providing added reliability. All pumps (two per unit) are started during the hypothetical combined accident and loss of normal power if all diesel gen-erators are in operation. If a diesel generator is out-of-service for an extended period of time (then, its associated unit is in cold shutdown), one i pump is sufficient to provide adequate cooling water requirements for the hypothetical combined accident and loss of normal power to the accident unit 4 and the shutdown unit. In an accident the safety injection signal auto-matically starts both RN pumps in each unit, thus providing full redundancy. The Nuclear Service Water System design basis is for operation under the worst l initial conditions of operation. This condition is assumed to be the low probability combination of a loss of coolant accident in one unit, shutdown of l the other unit, loss of the downstream dam, and a prolonged drought and hot weather and its effect on the Standby Nuclear Service Water' Pond. In addi-I tion, the RN Pumphouse is designed to keep all valve and pump motors and other essential electrical equipment above water during the probable maximum flood (PMF) due to sudden cccurrence of a rain induced failure of the upstream dam. The RN pumps can take suction from Lake Wylie throughout the entire range of lake levels from 592.4 f t above MSL (maximum calculated flood elevation corre-sponding to a seismic failure of Cowans Ford Dam coincident with a Standard Project Flood) down to the maximum lake drawdown of 559.4 ft above MSL. The SNSWP is normally overflowing at 571 ft above MSL and has a minimum allowable water level of 570 ft as described in Section 9.2.5. 9.2.1.2.3 Heat Exchanger Section Nuclear Service Water supplied by the RN pumps is used in both units to supply essential and non-essential cooling water needs or as an assured source of water for another safety-related system. Essential components are those necessary for safe shutdown of the unit, and must be redundant to meet single failure criteria. Nonessential components, are not necessary for safe shutdown of the unit, and are not redundant. Each unit has two trains of essential heat exchangers designated A and B, and one 1 train of nonessential heat exchangers supplied from either A or B and isolated i on Engineered Safety Features actuation. The following components or services are supplied by each essential header of the RN System. Some components are normally in operation, some are automati-cally supplied upon ESF actuation, and others are used when needed, a. RN Pump Motor Cooler 1' b. RN Strainer Backflush c. RN Pump Bearing Lube Injection Water I i d. RN Pump Motor Upper Bearing Oil Cooler e. Diesel Generator Engine Jacket Water Cooler i f. Diesel Generator Buildinc Essential Fire Water l a g. Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air Aftercooler h. Component Cooling Heat Exchanger j 9.2-3 j l l l

CNS i. Assured Auxiliary Feedwater Supply j. Assured Fuel Pool Makeup k. Assured KC System Makeup 1. Containment Spray Heat Exchanger q i 1 i ~ i { 9.2-3a

l q CNS ) System flow demands outside of the RN pumphouse. Nominal Nuclear Service Water Flow System flow demands inside of the RN pumphouse are listed separately in Table 9.2.1-5. Essential components receiving Nuclear Service Water flow are described below: The RN pump motors are of the totally enclosed, water cooled type which have internal water-to-air heat exchangers. Cooling water is provided to the RN pump motor coolers only when the motor is in operation. This prevents the l formation of condensate in the motor internals by the passage of celd water through an idle motor. The control ~ valves for the RN pump motor coolers are manually set. The RN pump motor upper bearing oil coolers are supplied cooling flow only when their respective RN pumps are in operation to prevent hannful condensation from forming in the oil. The RN pump motor coolers and RN pump motor upper bearing oil cooler on each pump are located downstream. A motor operated isolation valve is interlocked to open when the pump motor starts and close when the pump motor stops. Bearing lube injection flow is maintained to all RN pumps at all times, even though only one pump is required to meet all the normal and accident flow l requirements of both units. This water is supplicd through redundant self-cleaning strainers. One strainer is supplied per train. A crossover allows a single operating RN pump to supply its own bearing lube injection flow plus that of the redundant channel RN pumps. Upon Engineered Safety Features actuation, all four pumps start and the crossover valves close, allowing each channel to supply the bearing lube requirements of its corresponding channel RN pumps. . The nuclear service water strainers backflush automatically on a time cycle unless overridden by a pre-set high pressure drop. Internal water pressure is the motive force for dislodging strained particles as a backflush drive motor turns a backwash arm past the various strainer assemblies. The discharge is released to atmospheric pressure and dumps into a trash basket outside the RN i Pumphouse. Entrained trash is collected and the water is returned to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond, which overflows to Lake Wylie. Diesel generator engine starting air compressor aftercooler is supplied con-stantly as the compressor operates periodically to maintain starting air tank pressure. Flow is set by a manual throttling valve. Cooling water is supplied to the diesel generator engine jacket water cooler only when the diesel is in operation. This is accomplished by an electric motor operated valve inter-locked to open when the diesel starts, close when the diesel stops. Flow is assured to all diesel generators no matter which RN pumps are in operation by the normal valve positions identified on Figure 9.2.1-2. Those heat exchangers in which a tube leak could allow radioactive fluid to enter the cooling water are cooled indirectly through the closed loop Component Cooling System (KC). Heat is then transferred to the RN System via the compo-nent cooling heat exchanger. The heat load provided by the RN normal loads will probably provide RN pump minimum flow requirements, but should this not be 9.2-5 l

i CNS the case, one of the non-operating KC heat exchangers may be used to provide a minimum' flow path. The KC heat exchanger control valve on the non-operating KC train'will receive a signal to modulate on RN pump flow. It will open upon low-flow (minimum flow) conditions, allowing the minimum flow to pass through the redundant KC heat exchanger. The only heat exchanger which could allow radioactive liquid to'be discharged l to the environment in the event of a tube leak is the containment spray heat A l exchanger, which is only in service after a loss of coolant accident., Should a radiation monitor is installed at the outlet of this heat exchanger. leak' occur, that channel would be shut down, isolated, and repaired while the redundant channel provides the required-cooling. Both control room area chiller condensers, which are located on the Unit 1 essential headers, are normally in operation sharing the load equally. In the j event of a single failure, the other. chiller is sized to pick up the entire load due to a one unit LOCA and one unit cooldown simultaneously. The automatic control valves for these components are electro-hydraulically actuated and powered from the Class 1E emergency-diesels..These control valves can be aligned to the Class 1E emergency diesels from either unit and 'are designed to continue operation, maintaining control room area habitability by controlling condenser head pressure after loss of offsite power, LOCA, and earthquake. A seperate auxiliary shutdown panel air conditioning unit condenser is located on each of the four RN essential headers. Each of the four air conditioning-units is independently controlled to maintain a controlled environment for functioning electrical equipment and to assure habitability.for personnel'in the event of a control room evacuation and simultaneous loss of offsite power. l I Their automatic control valves are self-contained and control off of condensor head pressure, making this function independent of air supply. Unless otherwise stated in the preceding description, all automatic control valves fail open on loss of air or signal, and have travel stops to limit the l maximum flow through the corresponding heat exchanger. l l 9.2.1.2.4 Main Discharge Section l There are two main discharge headers, extending the width.of the Auxiliary Building with channel 1A and 2A components returning flow to the A header, and channel 18 and 28 components returning flow to the 8 header. During normal station operation when RN pumps are taking suction from Lake Wylie, discharge crossover valves are open, and all heat exchangers in operation discharge through the channel A return to Lake Wylie.via the 1.ow Pressure Service Water discharge. Automatically upon low-low pumphouse pit level (as in loss of Lake Wylie), double isolation valves close on the channel A return to Lake Wylie, -{ double isolation valves close on the discharge header' crossover, and single isolation valves open on each channel return to the SNSWP. This sequence, l along with isolation of the non-essential header and supply header crossover valves ensures two independent, redundant supplies and returns, satisfying the 9.2-6 l

1 i ? ELS single failure criteria. The non-essential header will only isolate on P-signal, not low-low pumphouse pit level due to a possible s-signal resulting from the containment vent units not in operation. If damage is visually assessed, the non-essential header will be manually isolated. RN piping in each Diesel Generator Building also has discharge isolation valves that are aligned from lake discharge to SNSWP discharge on the same signals which cause the Auxiliary Building headers to align to the SNSWP. The discharge lines to the SNSWP split and discharge flow to each " finger" of the SNSWP to assur.e that surface cooling will occur in all areas of the pond. An orifice is installed to create a pressure drop in the shorter of the two discharge lines to assure equal flow at both discharge points (during a simul-taneous safe shutdown of both units). 9.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation The Nuclear Service Water System is designed to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake and to prevent any single failure from limiting the ability of the engineered safety features to perform their safety functions. Sufficient pump capacity is included to provide the cooling water to shutdown each unit, and the valves are arranged in such a way that loss of one train does not jeopar-dize the entire system. Sufficient pump capacity is included to provide design cooling water flow under all conditions, and the headers are arranged in such a way that loss of a header does not jeopardize unit safety. Radiation monitors are located in the systems for detection of potentially radioactive leaks. The system is designed to operate at either maximum drawdown of the lake or Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond and also at a maximum water elevation in each body. l As described in Section 9.2.1.2.2, the Nuclear Service Water System is designed to withstand both probable maximum flood and the effects of a prolonged drought. Sufficient margin is provided in the aquipment design to accommodate anticipated corrosion and fouling without degradation of system performance. The RN System is designed to supply the cooling water requirements of a simul-taneous LOCA on one unit and cooldown on the other unit assuming a single failure anywhere on the system and loss of offsite power. Upon complete i channel separation, both units are assured of having a source of water, at least one pump capable of supplying required flow on its associated channel, and at least one essential header to provide cooling water to components served by RN. Channels A and 8 are connected together only at six places: five between the RN supply headers and one between the RN discharge headers. Redundant motor operated isolation valves are provided on the normally open crossover lines, and manual isolation valves are used on normally closed, rarely used crossover lines. Three crossover between supply headers are in the RN Pumphouse. The RN pump lube injection strainer inlet crossover line is normally open to keep the inactive channel pressurized, to provide lobe injection flow for inactive pumps, and to provide flow to backflush the RN strainers on the inactive channel. The redundant crossover valves on this line are' automatically closed by a safety injection signal from either unit. Two RN pump lube injection 9.2-7

y ]- I

CNS, j

f strainer outlet crossover lines are also provided. Upon low-low pumphouse pit .1 J level, these two valves close, the lake discharge isolation valves close, and redundant valves open for each channel discharge to the SNSWP. A ' separate crossover line is provided for each unit in the auxiliary building. These lines are normally open to provide cooling flow to components on the RN ) nonessential headers and to-provide flexibility in system operation. The' 1 supply header crossover valves and the nonessential header isolation valves ] close on the LOCA unit on the phase B isolation signal. This-assures adequate-i flow-for.the containment spray heat exchangers.during sump recirculation J operation. The supply header crossover valves on the non-LOCA unit remain open J so that cooling can be maintained on.the non-LOCA nonessential header. With -this supply crossover valve open, there could be flow between the redundant channels. The system is protected against single active failure by interlocks and operator action. Upon a safety injection signal, the non-LOCA operator checks for the operation of the RN pumps. If a single RN pump is not operat-ing,-the crossover is left open and unnecessary components on the non-LOCA~ unit y are secured to assure sufficient flow to the remainder of the system. If an - entire channel is inoperable, steps are'taken to isolate the. faulted channel. i Upon low-low level in either RN pit coincident with a phase 8 isolation signal-on either unit, interlocks automati.cally isolate the faulted channel. Credi b.l e. passive failures result in leakage rates that are not significant from the point of view of cooling water supply..Thus a passive. failure (leakage)'on train A may result in slightly smaller flowrates on train A and train 8 (unless the non-LOCA unit crossover valves are isolated). However, since no active i failures need be considered, cooling water supply to all train A and 8 compo-nents will still be an excess of minimum requirements. Note that depending on location of the passive failure, flooding considerations may. require isolation 4 and shutdown of the failed train. The discharge header crossover line is normally open to allow water returning from all RN headers to be discharged through the Low Pressure Service Water System (RL). The discharge header crossover valves close upon a phase B isolation signal from either unit or upon low-low RN pumphouse pit-level in ) either pit. These signals also align both discharge channels to the Standby Nuclear Service 'later Pond. All valves whose functions are shared between units and therefore whose opera-tion is related to the safety of both units are provided with normal and emergency diesel power from Unit 1. These valves are listed in Table 9.2.1-3.- If a Unit 1 diesel is out of service or down for-maintenance, then the shared valves normally powered from that channel are provided with manual-switchover to the Unit 2 diesel of corresponding channel. In this manner, any one diesel generator can be down for maintenance and the RN System can still shut the plant down safely assuming a LOCA, station blackout, and single failure. l A complete RN System single failure analysis is presented in Table 9.2.1-4. 9.2-8 H 1____

r r i CQ ' indication, both local ard main control board, is provided on the containment i l spray heat exchanger outlets, the. component cooling heat exchanger. outlets, and the diesel generator engine tjacket water cooler outlets. These' alarm on both. 1 high and low setpoints., Local flow indication is provided on all' heat exchang-ers whose flowfis controlled by a' manual throttling valve'to' aid in setting'the -. design flow and also on all vent' 'rion cooling coil ' lines to mon.itor their - performance. There is a portable flow measuring probe provided for testing-to assure equal 1 5 flow at both discharge points into the SNSW?. This-test verifies the perfor-mance of 'the "short leg" pressure drop orifice described in Section 9.2.1.2.4. 9.2.1.5.4-Temperature Instrumentation ~ RN pump motor internal air temperature is indicated both. locally (to aid in I I setting motor cooler' outlet throttling' valve) and.on the main control board to alarm on'high temperature. RN pump motor bearing and stator temperatures are. also mo.nitored on the plant computer. Temperature indication is provided for-each channel' main supply header in the main control room, and temperature test' Temperature test points are provided at both the inlet and' outlet of the j points provided at the outlet of each heat evchanger to check performance. ventilation cooling coils.- Outlet temperature of. the SNSWP is monitored and alarmed on high temperature. By technical specification the station must be j shut down if SNSWP temperature exceeds a given'value. l l All air actuated control valves have travel stops. set to provide design flow for safe shutdown heat loads upon loss of, instrument air due to station black-out with or without simultaneous LOCA. Instrument air can be' restored follow-ing a blackout by manually aligning emergency supply of RN to and from the instrument air compressors and manually loading'the compressors on the diesel " blackout bus". This restores air supply for RN as well as all other air actuated control valves. 9.2.1.5.5 Level Instrumentation Two sets of level instrumentation per unit, one on each power train, are installed in the RN Pumphouse pit behind the lattice screens where the RN pumps take suction. It is this instrumentation which alarms in'the control room on l: t low level and on low-low level realigns suction from Lake Wylie to the SNSWP. l This will provide qualified indication of the occurrence of. loss of the down-stream dam. Level instrumentation provides indication in the the control room the levels of Lake Wylie and the $NSWP, which also has positive level markings painted on a L pier for visual verification of gage reading. 9.2.1.6 Corrosion, Organic Fouling, and Environmental Qualification No provision _is made for prevention of long-term corrosion in the RN System. Allowances for such corrosion were made by increasing the wall thickness of the 9.2-10 l .__-__2______

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