ML20235N622
| ML20235N622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1987 |
| From: | Conklin L, Scott D, Williams J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235N576 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707200155 | |
| Download: ML20235N622 (85) | |
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i ATTACHMENT 2 HUMAN FACTORS REPORT FOR PROBLEMS 4 AND 5 8707200155 87070D PDR ADDCK 05000312 PDR P
MCRSIR0(L4.9) i - . - . - _ - _ _ - _ - - . _ - _
ATTACHMENT #2 TZTLE: HUMAN FACTORS TEAM REPORT FOR 1987 CONTROL ROOM CONFIGURATION
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Dallas T. Scott DATE
... P. F...........[ M..
Deborah A. Mrazek DATE
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Bill Moon. DATE "1.. ...... O d[...
Bill Spencer DATE
......... .. .............. .3 $l-Dimitt u DATE
..i.$d2 ..YL. ., 6. ......& W l Linda T. Conklin DATE
... .b.Y.l.f.7.~.............}f!.I.N'........
Jedy W. Williams DATE
I'. INTRODUCTION Following the December 26, 1985 overcooling incident, the District initiated an Action Plan for Performance Improvement. The-evaluations. perfomed as part of the Action Plan identified modifications to the Control Room. A summary of the modifications to the Control Room was sent to the NRC on January 12, 1987 in Attachment #7 to the Districts' letter (JEW 86-1108). Attachment #7 is duplicated in this report as Table 1. The majority of modifications are related to Integrated Contro1~ System (ICS) and Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) improvements. Additional changes were results of TMI-II. modification implementation _(EFIC and RG 1.97).
Because these modifications were identified after completion of the District's Control Room Design Review (CRDR) Summary Report and had limited human factors involvement, the District decided to perform the. analyses of the CRDR a.second time including the latest revision to the Emergency 0perating Procedures (EOPs). The analyses.were to insure that no safety significant (Category A) human engineering observations (HEOs) had been introduced into the Control Room. The analyses were performed by members of the original Design Review Team
.(hereafter referred to as " Team") to assure continuity of the process _-
and qualifications of the participants.
The methodology defined for the CRDR Program Plan was followed for these analyses. Minor deviations to that methodology were necessitated. An example of.a deviation is that operator interviews were not conducted to a pre-established percentage of the Control Room operating crews. Instead indiv"1 dual interview comments were recorded from conversations with the operators during visits to the Control Room by the team. -
The Human Factors Team performed reviews for Engineering Change Notices (ECNs), Design Basis Reports (DBRs), and Field-Problem Reports (FPRs) for human factors implications in accordance with NEP 4109. Human factors principles as defined in the CRDR Criterie Report and NUREG-0700 were imposed on these designs to improve man-machine interface. The team conducted reviews of the draft E0Ps?
following the guidelines of AP.2.05, Verification of Emergency Operating Procedure, and AP.2.06, Validation of Emergency Operating Procedures. The team perfomed task analysis, verification of task perfomance capabilities and- validation of Control Room function on the revised E0Ps< and modified Control Room layout.
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' The CRDR' Task' Analysis parformed in 1984 serv 2d as a starting point
/
for tha HFT Task Analysis in 1987. A comparison of the 1984 E0Ps to D 1987 E0Ps to 1987 E0Ps was performed to discover differences and similarities. ' A composite Task Analysis was assembled using original data (where-appropriate) and new data for new tasks as defined by the comparison. This approach saved time and duplication of effort in identifying the control and display requirements of the E0Ps.
The Verification of Task Performance Capabilities consisted of a comparison of the control and display requirements of the Task Analysis to the updated Control Room Inventory. The availability of the equipmant and an evaluation of the suitability of the equipment to satisfy the HFE and operational requirements was performed on new items. Where applicable, the original verification documentation was utilized.
The Validation of Control Room Functions task was performed in the static mockup.which had been revised to reflect the modifications for startup. Two scenarios were run using different ifcensed Control Room operators. The scenarios were inadequate core cooling and a steam generator tube rupture. E.01, E.02, E.06, E.07 and part of -
E.03 were walked-through. These scenarios exercised the '"
modifications to the Control Room to allow an assessment of the adequacy of the equipment, procedure revisions and operator training.
A static survey of the additions / modifications to the Control Room was performed against the human factors criteria contained in the Rancho Sect Criteria Report. . Checklists were prepared for each of the equipment changes to document th'e compliance to or deviation from the criteria. At tha writing of this report, all of the Control Room modifications were not complete. Procedure changes and operator training had been performed on the engineering concepts but physical changes were not complete. The survey checklists for those items can not be finished until after installation turnover to operations.
This is an open item. Each of the above defined tasks lead to the identification of Human Engineering Observations (HEOs) for .
deviations from human factors principles. The HE0 guidelines used for the CRDR process were folicwed for the generation and assessment
- of HEOs.
The analyses led to the generation of significant amounts of documentation. Most of the documentation is completed forms with -
dates of completion and initials for preparer and reviewer. The modification reviews were documented on an HFE Review Log Sheet. A sample of this log sheet is included as Enclosure #1. The documentation of the HFT Analyses is maintained with the CRDR files.
i Page 3
- ' Document'ation includes tha following:
- Operator Interview Sheets
- Task Analysis Forms Verification' Forms Validation Comment Sheets
- HFT Log Sheets
- Control Room Inventory Revision E0P Review Comments
- Survey Checklist
- Human Engineering Observations II. RESULTS The results of the HFT analyses are recorded as~HEOs. The complete
-list of HEOs identified for the HFT 1987 analyses is included in Enclosure #2. A short summary of the HEOs follows: Twenty-four (24)
HEOs were written. None,were Category A (Safety Significant -
unrecoverable error). Eleven (11) were Category B (Safety-Significant - recoverable error). Two (2) were Category C (Non-Safety Significant - Availability / Reliability). Eleven (11) were Category D' (Minor /Non-significant considerations). -
Each of the HEOs was assigned to the most appropriate member of the HFT to perfom a technical review of the concern. The validity of-the concern was determined. The proposed resolution was investigated and the recommended category was determined. The HFT evaluated and assessed each HE0 individually at round table discussions.
~
The results of the discussions are presented in Enclosure #2.-
Integration of procedure revisions, control room modifications, operator training, and operator perceptions was a major concern of the HFT (se~e HE0 # MCR-W-0014). To investigate the validity of this concern, three members of the HFT travelled to Lynchburg, VA to observe the operators performing the E0Ps on the simulator. This trip resulted in lowering the category of an identified HE0 and the identification of four new HEOs. ,
The construction of modifications'in the control room is not complete, therefore, the control room static survey is an open item until these additions can be reviewed / observed. This task may identify new HEOs. This open item is in keeping with the District's commitment to-maintain a continuing Human Factors Engineering program. The NRC has requested and the District has agreed to '
maintain at least one member of the HFT as a human factors professional. A human factors professional is defined as someone with appropriate human- factors training and experience to interpret '
the correct man-machine interface / relation in existing and new designs.
In summary twenty-four (24) new HEOs were identified by the HFT I- 1987. Of the twenty-four, fourteen HEOs were related to the EFIC installation. Three (3) HEOs were related to the Auxiliary Steam Pressure Reducing Station. Two (2) HEOs were related to the Yokagawa multi-point recorders. Two (2) were related to the IDADS computer.
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- i- - ThQ most significant HE0 was related to the integration of procedure
- revisions, control' room modifications, operator training and operator
-perceptions. This HEO.had.the potential to impact restart of the
. plant; After investigation ~and _ technical review, the HFT decided-
' that this1HEO~was' of' safety importance but was~ being effectively treated by training and operations to lower the priority determination.
- The changes that have been made in the Control Room, E0P-revisions, training . and operator' perceptions have not invalidated the results
- of.the CRDR Summary Report, dated 12/24/85, which was previously sent to:the NRC.
- III. TABLE 1 - SUMARY OF CONTROL ROOM MODIFICATIONS IV. ENCLOSURES
.1. . Log of ECN/DBR/DVR's Reviewed for Human Factors
~
. 2. Human Engineering Observations from HFT 1987 M
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g , 4 ATTACHMENT #7 III. Table 1
' Summary of Control Room Modifications
- 1. Installation of EFIC controls and' indication on HlSS.
- 2. .TBV controllers . independent of ICS which provide manual control upon l failure of ICS power to the normal controller added to H1RI.
- 3. Annunciator Changes Include:
m a. ICS. andLNNI Trouble and Failure Alarms
- b. EMOV Actuation Alarm c.. IDADS Trouble Alarm-
-4. ICS and NNI labels have been added for all indicators and recorders ~~
which receive signal or power from ICS or NNI.
6.. OTSG A and B labels and color padding for OTSG isolation switches-have been added to H2PS.
- 7. A recorder has been added to H1CO'which wf11 trend parameters usually used to take the plant from hot shutdown to cold shutdown. . All trended parameters are independent of ICS/NNI signals and power.
- 8. The five recorders on H1CO driven by the Bailey'or Modcomp computers have been replaced with a single 30 pen 6 color programmable recorder.
9.- The Auxiliary Steam Reducing Station on H2X has been modified to make the setpoint demand control independent of ICS power.
- 10. The SPDS control panels on H1SS will be replaced with better human engineered control panels.
- 11. The. nuclear service bus loading sequence indicators have been removed from H2SF.
- 12. Controls for motor operators added to MFW isolation valves will be installed on H1RI
- 13. The SPDS is being upgraded to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 1 requirements, NUREG 0696 requirements for radiation monitoring and independence from NNI for hot shutdown parameters.
- 14. The HPI flow indication on H2SF has been made independent of NNI.
Page 6
, . . . . . . . ~ a P1;e No. 23
, . SAMPLE OF LOG 2r ECNIDBUOVR'S REV5D FCn -t.Mn FACTGR$
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T. DMLEY 02/;0/87 02/10/87 mute: Bt 5.h TO .tSO CAN6e . r. . F.
R-12Fi revi DECAY MEAT SYSTEM UPGRADE APPaCPR:A*E: :PE?.ATING PRC230PIS. no OTHER dei !?vtICATICNS.
P. GAZDA 11/10/e611/11/M N0 HFE IPCCATIONS . F. . F.
R-!E 3 revo PIPE SUPPCRT TO CLEAR INTERFERt s/
VLV MTR R-1260 rev0 ESSENT AIR MANDLR 1 BANSAL- 11/17/86 11/18/86 NQ HFE I#.ICATICd .r. .r.
CONDNST DAN LINE LIQUID TRAP -
R-1251 rev0 INSTALL SECURITf R. Dr.SUCHI 12/10/8612/11/E NQ WE IPt.ICATIONS . F. . r.
BARRIERS R-1272 rev0 HPI FLCW INDICATICN T. BEEVES 11/14/8611/14/86 4E CCORDINaiION RtGUIRtD. HR CK . F. . i.
INDEPENDENT OF NNI R-1272 rev0 MPI FLCJ INDEPENDENT' T. BtIVES / / // HFE RtVILW TED D Cs DLYS .r. .r.
CF NNI R-1280 rev0 RESET RB PUEGE V. A @RA 11/18/86 11/19/86 NU HFE IMPLICATIONS . F. . r.
VALVES R-1295 revo REWORK RACEWAYS R. WHITE 11/19/86 11/19/86 NU HFE IMPLICATIONS .F. .r. i AFFECTING CKT i
PT21092
& BASU 12/17/86 12/18/86 PRELIMINARY HFE C4 .r. .r.
R-1300 rev0 EMTE.NCY CCmuNICATICNS ALTERNATIVE R-1300A rev0 PLANT TELEPHONE A BASU 12/17/86 12/18/85 PRELIMINARY WE Cn. PJKLbT Cn NT .F. .r.
SYSTEM EVENTUALLY SHOULD IE PUT Alk A SAFETY SHUTDOWN WORKSTATION R-1300B rev0 PLANT UHF RADIO M. BAST! 12/17/86 12/18/86 PRELIMINARY HFE CK PLACE S T OK BUT . F. . F.
SYSTEM EVENTUALLV S 4 ETY SHuTDUWN PANEL SHoll.D HAVE A COMNJNICATI0hs WORKSTATION.
R-1300C revo MISCELLAMOUS M. BASU 12/17/86 12/18/85 PRELIMINARY HFE OK . F. . F.
CCr.MUNICATION P:0 DEIFICATIONS R-1315 revo DISCCwECT R;B Us P. 50R/I :2/10/!6 12/11/E5 PkELIr.IrN Y riE C4 . F. . T.
DC$E AIR CIP.C FA4 Page 7
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1 ENCLOSURE 2 HUMAN ENGINEERING OBSERVATIONS f..)M HFT 1987 (27 Pages)
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Page 8
- age No. , 1 Human Factors Team 1987 HE0's Sorted oy HE0 s -
Criteria Control Roos {0 su 40 HED Report Disolay Descr20 tion Description Cat.
Nusper NumDer (cont.)
===---========================--============-- - -
MCR-M-0001. 4.8.1.1.a STEAM ISOL VLVS VERY DIFFICtLT TO DETERMINE IF D ALL STEAM ISOLATION VALVES ARE ISOLA'ED IN Ah EMERGENCY BECAUSE THEY ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE CONTROL ROOM.
ASC-w-0002 4.4.1.1.a- PIC-36014A CAN ONLY CONTROL SET POINT, C .
HAVE TO 60 LOCAU.Y TO MMUALLY CONTROL THE CONTR0u.ER.
CR-W-0003 4.8.1.1 EFIC LOCATION OF EFIC CONTROLS NOT B IN DESIRED PLACE IN THE CONTROL ROOM.
ASC-S-0004 4.4.1.184.9.3.2 HS-360144 DIFFICtLT TO PRECISELY SET D USING THIS TYPE OF CONTORL, MAY CDAUSE OSCILLATING
~
SET POINT TO Gdi PRECISE VAltjE.
AFW-S-0005 2.6.1 FI-31850 Il@! CATION TYPE DOESN1T D CONFORN TO EXPECTATIONS FOR TY M 0F PARAMETER.
AFW-S-0006 4.5.1.4 FI-31850 MISCELLAIEDUS VENDER D TRAIEMRRKS 8 EXCESSIVELY LARGE E .
AFW-S-0007 4.5.2.2 FI-31850 WHEN VARIABLE iS DUT OF RANGE, D DISPLAY SHOWS LIMIT OF TRmSMITTER W/WO INDICATION THAT IT'S BEYOND RANGE.
AFW-S-0008< 4.4.4.2 - HS-318104: LOCK IS NOT ORIENTED SD TkAT D
' SAFE' (LOCK-0UT) POSITION HAS Tif KEY VERTICAL.
D AFW-S-0009 2.3.6.2 HS-EFICMB/A COLOR CODE OF BLPB DO NOT CSFORM TO CONTROL ROOM COLOR CODE.
B
- MCR-S4010 4.4.1.1 T-STATIONS THESE ARE USED 8 SHOW DEMAND &
FEEDBACK DIFFERENTLY THAN ANYTHING PREVIOUS IN ThE CONTROL ROOM.
4.4.2.2 T-STAT!DN COLOR CC*i DOES h0T C0tFORM-TO B MCR-S-0011 COLOR CODINS IN REST OF CONTROL ROOM.
.,P age ho, .
2 numan Factors Team 1987 HED's Sorted oy HED e I
Criteria Control Roou nED riE0 rio HED Reoort Disolay Description Description Cat.
Nunoer Nunner (cont.)
======================:===========================sss======esss=======ses.
AFW-S-0012 4. 8. 2.1 P-318 CONTROLS THE ' NORMAL' COTNROL SiED BE D f I
TO THE LEFT & ThE 'LESS USED'-
OR 'LATER USED' CONTROL TO THE RISHT TO PROMOTE LEFT TO RISHT FLCW OF MOVEENT. 1 I
AFW-S-0013 4.8.2.3' EFIC ACTUAL CCNTROL LAYOUT IS D f CORRECT BUT PLACEMENT ON PANEL APPEARS AS A MIRROR.
MCR-W-0014 2.1.1 OPEilATORS 'SbCESSFUL PLANT CONTROL BELIEF IN EACH OTHERS B .
REElIES THAT ALL (ABOVE AhD THIER Cl.N LIST D) ITEMS PERFDRM ABILITIES TO HMDLE ABERIATELY AND IN CONCERT.' VERY HIGH STRESS THERE D(ESN'T APPEAR TO BE SITUATIONS SUFFICIENT INTEGRATION OF ALL EFFECTIVELY. ,
COMPONENTS OF M 04HATINS C(BITROL ROOM' THE CREWS LACK THE TEAMWONK, C00RDINATION +
2.2.1- IDADS T)E LOCATION OF THE IDADS C MCR-S-0015 4.1.1 dEYBOARD ON TE SIDE OF H1DRRS DISTRICTS OR IMPEDES THE Oe1ERATOR ACCESS TO THE BACK PANEL. l MCR-0-0016 4.5.1.1.c UJR-10104 THE Y 2 RECORDER USED FOR D IO Het! VARIABLES IS FED BY 22 HARD WIRED PONTS. TESE POINTS AIE INT 91DED TD BE USED TO '
- PROVIDE HISTORY TRACE UPON LDSS OF NNI POWER.
ASC-9-001T PI-36014A, PI-36015 TESE ARE POWERED BY ICS AND B SHDLLD BE LABELLED AS SUCH.
MCR-V-0018 4.5.1.1 NONE NO EASY WAY TO SET RCS Tsat, B MUST HAhD CALCULATE AND PLDT MCR-V-0019 4.5.1.1 11-20003 UNDER VARIOUS PLANT B C0f01TIOhS, DIFFEREhT TEMPS SHOULD BE USED TO CALCULATE THE RATE, CURRENTLY ONLY Tc IS USED.
MCR-0-0020 4.5.1.1 UJR-10105- IT IS NOT SUITABLE TO TFE B FUNCTION Or TRENDING SPECIFIC ,
COMPUTER POINTS OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST.Io t i
Page No. 3 .
Human Factors Tecm 1987 HED's Sorted oy HED e Criteria Control Roon HE0 nEO nED HED Report Disolay Descrint1on Deser1at1en Cat.
Nuaner Nunner (cont.)
r--.---sessa============================ss================s=== mss ===ss================================
GR-V-0021 4.5.1.1 LI-20505A/B 16A/B THE LOW RANGE INDICATORS DID B NOT SHOW DERRAhBE WHEN LEVEL EXCEEDED THE UPPER LOW-RANGE TAP.
MCR-V-0022 4.5.1.1 LI-20505.6,7,8 AAB's DUE TO DENSITY COMPENSATION BY B MEANS OF PRESSuftE COMPENSATION, THE LEVELS OSCILLATE DRAMATICALLY WHEN THE ADV'S OR TBV'S 4.RE l OPEhED. I MCR-V-0023 4.5.1 HS-EFICLA.HS-EFIllB TE NAT CIRC / LOW FLOW BACKLIT D IhDICATOR IS A SPLIT LEKS WITH BOTH HALVES ILLUMINATED CYAN.
FROM ThE ' NORMAL' POSIT 0N OF THE SECONDARY OPERATOR IT IS DIFFICULT 10* DETERMINE WHETFER THE TOP OR BOTTOM HALF IS LIT. i l
MCR-V-0024 IDADS- CURRENTLY'IDADS IS NOT B AVAILABLE'AT THE SINJLATOR SD GPERATORS ARE TRAINED TO MITIGATE TRANSIENTS WITHOUT IDADS, EVEN THOUGH IN ACTUALITY VALUABLE INFORMATIN 13 SOMETIMES Oft.Y AVIALABLE THROUGH IDADS.
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[$.[' Panel Layout - Grouping by Function f 0 nica -M -o001 FM E Mis. Control aoom E *:
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00MROL ROOM OISR.AY x Steam isolation valves as an integral set.
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.Very difficult to determine if All steam isolation valves are isolated in an emergency because they are scattered throughout the' Control Room. -
I M ENTA_ C0hC 8 N; Valves not isolated like should be i
RIC0 WDJ D kO F CA" LOA No change recommerided at this time. Under MOD 142 " Control Room Modifications" the H2YS panel will be modified to group the steam isolation valves per steam line.
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J Presently in the Control Room the steam isolation valves on the H2YS panel have been identified for Steam line A or B and the ones called out in the Emergency Procedures. The original CRDR Summary report'that was submitted to NRC identified the necessity to better organize the steam isolation. Control Room modification Mod 142 is scheduled to identify the H2YS panel during the Cycle 9 refueling outage. No change is recomended at this time.
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Can only control set point,'have to go locally to manually control controller.
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1 RECOMMDOED WOO RCAEON 1
Place auxiliary steam transfer station at the boiler !
1.
- 2. Place 4th point auxiliary steam FM heating controls at the boiler
- 3. Have a certified boiler operator
- 4. Upgrade C-40 on how to isolate main si,eam from auxiliary steam.
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' Without a full-time boiler operator, it is necessary to have the capat,ility to control the auxiliary steam header pressure from the control room. This ability was finally achieved a few years ago. However its power supply being placed within the ICS proved to have problems. The benefit, however was to be able to observe plant conditions .during the transfer from main steam to auxiliary steam and vice versa. The previous station was only on the mezzanine deck of the turbine building. This left the operator blind and couldn't hear pages. A phone was there but you had to leave the controls to talk on it. This along with an inexperienced operator caused innumerable boiler trips, aggravating plant cool downs, and .
feedwater temperature control. Boilers have consistently been hard to restart. It caused diversion of other operators to support restart.
pr
- 1. Place auxiliary steam transfer station at the boiler.
- 2. Place 4th point auxiliary steam FW heating controls at the boiler.
- 3. Have a certified boiler operator.
- 4. Upgrade C-40 on how to isolate main steam from auxiliary steam.
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I H{Q g MCR ',1 0003 @ @ lSS(E) . jEQ f; Complete Console HE0 SOURCE SOURCE 4:
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WEG. MECR F'iOy Location of EFIC Controls not in desired place in the Control Room
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FOTEFA_ C0hCE E _
When EFIC actuated operator is gway from main operating area.
TEC0kMENDO 90] R CATLON Install Integrated Console 118 h
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_i(::NsN! C ,l) il I.I Agree with observation integrated console will reduce the concerns and provide operators with a workable station.
EF1C system review identified and solved the problem by providing Ehe integrated console. '
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RECOMME)DED WOECATL0b
- 1. Place auxiliary steam transfer station at the boiler. ,
- 2. Place 4th point auxiliary steam FW Heating controls at the boiler. i
- 3. Have a certified boiler operator l
- 4. Upgrade C-40 on how to isolate main steam from auxiliary steam. j S. Replace Ituxiliary steam contro1' station with a auto / manual controller.
. 3 ,;^ 6. ,
Place auxil,iary . steam controller .on the boiler shack c.ontrol panel .
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For the set point controller being precise is unnecessary. Beina 5-10 #
around the:250 # point is close enough. None of our equipment that.is requirina l Auxiliary steam has a precise close tolerancel The Toggle switch that is used for set point setting does protrude and can I accidentally be moved changing the set point, maybe to where the relief valves lift or cause reduction in steam flow for hoggers, air ejectors and cause vacuum loss. The control Station should have auto manual controls.
It is also recommended that this station would better serve the plant if l these controls were placed on the boiler shack contr61 oanel. g Also the same recommendations as HE0 ASC-W-0002 l
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[lII,[ Device Selection {
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CE}GijIAICE: D. Mrazek DA E 3-18-87 00hTA0E -
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AFW Test Flow Indication KEO.OESCR PTiObi
. Indication type doesn't conform to expectations for type of parameter .
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REC 0WD0D MOF CATLOA No Change Recommended
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O AE Cl$F3 ih Ei flow is displayed on an edgewise indicator in the Control-Typically,f.thestartofthisoutageihi Room. As o the edgewise indicators will have a vertical bar and'a digital display. s test flow indicator is a digital display. Tne onlp. time this indicator is used is during .
system / component testing at which time the value needs to be accurately recorded. This digital . indicator adequately serves this function.
i Therefore no change is recommended,
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'HE0 SCURCE Survey SOURCEe Digital Display
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i F1-318so AFW Test Flow Indicator HEG NRCR FTICS Miscellaneous Vendor Trademarks and Excessively large Bezel
?O n~s,v_iA. . .a C0huRb Distraction , , .
RECO WBOD k O } r CATLOS Eventually Replace with a more acceptable indicatorr m
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As part of cycle 8 ingementation of the CRDR Control Room MODS, the EFIC layout will'be redone. For this modification a study should be performed to evaluate available indicators to try to' find a better one, with less distraction.
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- oioita, oisp,ay CE!$.I{kICE; D. Mrazek DAE.3-18-87 CONTACT: EXTENS10tt
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When variable is out of range, display shows limit of transmitter w/no indication that -
its beyond range. {
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Misinterpretation of System Status l 2 REC 0kMD JD k0) rCF0A No change recommended - .
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Duringnon-auto-EIICuseofthisvalve,theflowwillnot circumstances.
exceed 1300 which-is the limit of the transmitter. Therefore there is no real problem with the range being exceeded.
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HE0 SOURCE Survey SOURCEr. xey Switch CE}Ci}JAICE* D. Mrazek gjy{ 3-18-87 00 TEA 0T: C(T9isiCit
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P-318 Key Lock Permit .
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Lock is not oriented so that " Safe" (Lock-out) position has the key vertical
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RIC09 MENDED k001RCATLON Recommend no change be made at this time. - -
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L The concern is warranted. The switch does not conform to criteria guideline, also other switches in the Control Room do not meet criteria.
l So for the sake of consistency, recommend no change.
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HE0 SOURCE: Survey $0VRCE4: steB CE}0i!@ ICE.; D. Mrazek DAE 3-1s-a7
! 00EA0T: EXTDiSICit TEM DESCRPTION 00ER0L R00W DISR.AY 1:
Initiate Test Matrices ,
- E0 MSCUTI0t Color Code of BLPS do not conform to Control Room Color Code.
30"E F A _ C06 CEB Misinterpretation of information & status REC 0bME s )ED0J FCAn0A Reverse the color of the test and manual poshbuttons so that manual is amber and test is white.
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TECHNICAL REV EW ,
OSYS E 31 RH EURED I X . .I . . .
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HE0 CATEGORY: D l TECHNICAL REVIEW:
The. colors used on the initiate test matrices are those provided by the manufacturer. The colors were reviewed in an EFIC report (attachment 1) prepared by R.L. Starkey, a member of the Design Review Team for CRDR.
The following colors are used on the matrices: I RED = Half-Channel Trip Buttons AMBER = Test Results/ Reset Buttons #;
White = Manual Permissive
' Table 2.6-1, Color code Conventions, provides the CRDR color code for controls. Red is used for start / trip.' The matrices usage seems correct. Amber is used for manual. White has no specified usage. The Amber and White button on the matrices do not conform to the convention.
The color of the lens is easily changed and should be in accordance with the recommended modifications.
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ggmr.Ler, so thera is a.s rong poss S ility of inadvertently depressing---
=s1*4919 h:ttons with ena fingar; Ecamining tha various possibilities, thera aro no ot:wious scenarica wh2ra depressing two adjrcent buttons
. would lead to irreversibic consegaences or not be 4*4=cely ot:wia.ts.
to the osmrator.
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2e EFIC system w"' require 10 sets of four-cut on, horizontal arrays of. mmentary ac ion m=W .ons for the hi ia ion, testing, and ma:::a1 permission func:icns for each of the following rfstam bznc ions in both channels: AEW in4*d= tion, main steam isolation of Steam Generator-A, main steam isolation of Steam Generator-B, main-feedwater isciation of Steam Generator-A, and main feedwater isolation of Steam Generator-B.
Within each array are (left to right) a red half-@.annel TRI? button, L an amper TEST RESCLTS/RESC b_m, a white MANDAL PERMISSIVE bm:::en, L and anotner red half-channel TRI? button. Nothing prevents inadvertent l
ac=sation of multiple tw v.m but there are- no obvicus ;e. irs of buc ms whose sim21:aneous depression could cause imediate syL_ams' problems.-
These would be- the ~ only major =pnif aa@.s in the cont:ci roem wnere two idan+ic=1 buttons m2st be depressed to acnieve a single 22nc ion. -
21s ent spe is not expected to cause operator error. The two l halfa-n =1= do not have to be deprammarl s4='1*=a ='*17 to achieve 4n4*4*4an; ir.-4,. it is an*4edr=ted that many operators would attempt: to do so by using the thumb or inder and little fingers of one haiM. From an -J' 4 --uic' F-=4-31nt,. those two and butten= v4 be i close -h that even a 5th.pm.c.edle female operator's fingers.would L make the required span (i.e., all expected male operators and 954:cf all - ., _ ^ ' female operators could ranannanly be expec:ed to b4* both buttons s-mitanarmely) . Although no measuranents were taken An-ing,.
this study, the ferra needed to depress the teso' 6 ms =M'7r' not exceed the capacilitf of a little f6ger held rigide being driven f:=m:
the elbow.
.. - 2ese butt =ns are all 5-=<+"P=" and color coded. Finalchoi$ eof miamr will be deferred urr" the C=ntrol Room Design Review -'
esenh1'a= preferred color usage c=itaria. Se fol. lowing discussion is based upon the colors provided on the bm . css by vitro.
S e h=1 % mel trip lig5: are red, and energi=e when the half-trip bus energi=es. mis is consistant with present use of red for;the' reactor trip button.
Se amber hatton is normally & ca rgized. Wben a half hmal int *4=*ian is depressed (red buttons), the ammer light will flamh if the signal reaches at least ene component and will go solid when all angenents receive the in4*d=te signals. Depressing this ammer bu= ton resets the channel and, if successful, de-energizes the red and amber
' lights. The white hatton permits taking nanual cont:cl of an individual ecmponent. This is only a p= "4=sive function - no
,-- #.6 changes state with this button; it. merely allows the centrols for individ=al ;-ments to be changed rar"*1'y. Exact engineering Page 1 of 2 I raa mamm'm .i i s di ni
%. N Rev. 0 7/6/84
_ , , _ m-_ -______
4
, details of' implementation of overrid2 ftnetions rurain to be resc1ved, but are presently = r,;ed to conform to the previous discussien.
':'be buttons for the AEW system are located en the lower hori=cntal portion of the panel at a location readily visible:tc a person standing as far back f:cm the panel as the layout pe=its. S ey are located in-a pt =4"a e location within the array where they can be easily located.
may are placed far enough f:cm the front edge of the panel to preclude inadvertent ac -*=*dm by persennel brasning past the panel.
r, m1 e 1 edm 9,w r ns Se E2'IC level control logic makes a' two-step decisien process to determine the level it wd7' am&rtain. If at least one RC pump is .
r=nning, it will feed to a ncminal 30 incoes (en the ' star .tp range) steam generator level. If no RC pumps are r::nning, it then checks dis
- nnnually operated swit=h. Se d=#=n't ner:nal natural circulation position w"' select wuuenately 26 feet acove the tuce support (about half way up the s+x M side). If the operator e-mma=a, and if the RC pumps are not running, the ICC level can be ==11y selected (m is would place the setpoint at about 60% up the ser m d= f-
. side.) tis d -iaica is addressed irt emergency procedures and is hssed on r-4em ICCA symptoms, such as loss of succooling margin., mese three setpoints are aristing operating concepts with which all operators are *==47 4=e.
Bis D -nim will be =-- = 114*hd by a set of two M*i 4d+ed Master en 4 =1 ties' p d : - - - and a Mester ar -d=1 ties' split lens indicator in each n ul ehannel- Che ?=N n will be marked "AUTC" and will let the logic system choose either the low levellimit or natural 6 1=W = serpoine S e split lens indicator shows which of these ~
two 'd=4*
- is in effect Se other y=M _ presently lameled "r::
- h p q C=ra & 7d7), will, permit the operze=r to selec: the hign level setpoint (provided no RCP's are energi=edD w d -., - Aee w <- .
Bigewise vertical meters have been used in preference to other types
. (e.g., circular dial, digital readout, gas disc =arge) in. de centrol room for most non-elect:ical parameter applications. Bailey Rr meters are the most g '--J"me unters used, but were avoided in this * -
app 14 meien SIGUL mumm'".T. NPJ 1100/1200 series meters w"' be used-for EFIC 4M4mtors. Sese meters are ww&tely the same si=e as most existing meters presently installed, but are easier to remd and are more readable from a side angle than R!"s. mis was an important consideratica considering that generally the operator w"' not be in front of the EPIC panel but rather se=Mdng down in front of ElRI/E13C when APW is in use.
Pushbuttons Master Specialties 2000 series rectangular backlighted p2shbuttons are used througbout the control roem for alrest every switch / control
=pn1in tion not regairing a hand / auto control statien. S ey will, therefore, be uM14-=d for all new controls provi6ed in EPIC'not Page 2 of 2
-14 -
Rev. 0 7/6/84
.y CONTROL ROOM
[*
DESIGN REVIEW V .,
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Control Room.
Foisif Ai CONCERi% .
Difficulties Controlling Equipment REC 0WEDD M00 ECATLON 1 Training to stress the differences between the Bailey T-Station and existing controllers i>
the Control Room to reduce the, possibility of misinterpretation and misuse.
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ATTACHMENT TO HE0 MCR-S-0010 l cmtrol' Enabled" butten has been pushed; at which ti:ne tha EPIC c:ntr:1 circuits will revert to deir' der:nant stata.
ee.==r:eer=mr ==1.-e. T-a % - %
While diagnosing casualties er detecting :nalf=nctienhg ecci;rnent, direct emmrisons of various parameters are reg ired. Se instrumentation has been selected and positiened to pe=it such ccagerisons. . During ::st nc :nal cire== stances, the two pter i levels ahmid be appr:zi:nately the same. A key inder cf system o=eration is a direct ecugarison of the levels of the 'two ptors. .-
Cerr-9 1ng4 level indications for the two steam generators are on opposite sides of the panel at the,same hori=cntal height. mese
, ccusarisons will be semswnat difficult to make due to the hori= ental l ===r=@ and the need to pick like parameters from =4m4'ar vu+ of j four dd T 1=ys. . I 7+=1=nce of flew into the generaters is a keI' diagnostic cue for .
l id**ying leaks in the licuid inventory Lamd=7 of the sw hy l
side of the steam p ters and APW system. It also requires l 7 eing values frem two widely segerated meters of the same i bordwme=1 baigne.
Should a; channel or an individsa.1 control valve fail, the opposite channel would tend to empmante for it. Se present layout of the ;
I controls for the control valves hed14tates re v de4m; the faulted '
7- --- L 2e controls, Bailey iT-20 hand / auto stations, 4n_ e 1"da borizontal meters that will be wired to ind4 m te a demand signal. Se cxurtrn'_larm have been r1=' =d so tfat the controls for CESG A are to the Iset and those for CC5G B are to the right. '".is pe==its rapid .
r <mmrmedams of the demand seen. by both valver in:.c the same samm ,
a==rar r. E - ,- 'm 2.is with. level d - % Men pe=its easy 4d"*de* tion of the valve that is either overfeeding or underfeeding.
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2e fc11owing are observations en the edirme teristics and suitabib.itf of varicus EPIC mmmnants and the layout frem ,a stric ly static human -
engineering viewscint and. in the- centext of u rdhi'3tf.with existing .-
control. room convention and usage. ,'
nn47 m No mana> Auto cme-ei semehs mese band / auto centrols will be new ctznpanents not previously used in the control room. Functionally, they are very s4m4'=~ to an older Bailey nedal contrc11er used in several applications elsewhere in this control roan. Se '1T-20's are ecmparatively small (roughly 3 4m+a= ,
scpare) and have an integrated borizontal meter and square mh ons !
for EMCr ADTO, RAISE, and IO7ER. Se older units are noch larger
(.wsw'.nately 8 by 2-1/2 4m-h==), have a vertical meter, and use round r =->ttens. Since they are functionally similar to the existing enntrels, and since no gress M =- , -tibilities in control ncvement conventions are present in either unit, there should be negligible problems training operators en their.uses. Bailey TA20's u*d'i:e 9
35"
}E Bev. 0 7/6/84
.. . existing ccaventieni used in th2 c=ntrol"rocm. Greefand y=11cw are used to signify aut=matic and manual operation, respec ively. "'tn sy m ols ara also unconventional and
- 1eading to thn naive.* MANCE is 4~84 s ted by a solid figura of a raised hand,-fing rs straight but.
41sr. Naive: observers
- frecuently associate this with "stop" since it brings to mind the universal "balt" signal of'a traffic policeman.
Se AUTCt9CIC butten is green and has two- black ar:cus, head to **",
in a circle. Naive ecservers fragen 17 D:cerpret cis as "G0". Cnce the synoclogy has been exp1m%=d, however, it is not apt to Pr forget.an. The IMISUIOTER buttons are scuare yellow bu i.:: with black arrows. The buttons are h=
- 4 W ad woenever depressed and the TT-20 is sie=1745 the valve to move. S e units come f:=m the fact:ry with the ICNER Li n en the left, pointing left, and the RAISE but.:n on the right, pointing right, which is scmewnat ammiguous. Previous models were keyed so the orientation could not be changed. A recen:
9488mim permits the butt =ns to be reoriented so the RAISE arrow can be p1=md ' pointing up and the ICNER dowrt - this, of course, is a ms. zed hiessing since they could also inadvertently be oriented in.the opposite directions and lead directly to operator error.
J 2ese standard units arrive with an ins *=T'ad meter with a=:ar:.1 l connmons and a Mia swit=h that permits the- meter to be connected -
across any two signals of the insta11er's choosing. S e unit comes with the toggle switch pnsitions engraved POS and DE7 (for' " position" and "devi=*im_", the most fr-gMy used f&) . It is important that the operators m"-----4 bow these meters were installed and the true 14 s.t.ica of the r==d4=r in the two switch positices.
Tradi+4 m=1 usage is to have t S .POS r 847 to be the w p demand
=ie=1 being sent to tbn -ulled slen=ne (in this case the flow
. cunn=ol valves) .
In its standard equit: ment, vitro (system sum-vender) provided a
-dd 'd ' 55-20 with only one mster. c=ch and the toggle swit=h
- d 71 w i-=~'
- 2n= cibly sys=en w# deonnd be displayed en l the enm=oller. SPE:D i=ceds t= repes: da: = - "3"ied "'5-20's.be I
, provided for use with the APW control valves,. and that the meters be wired to additie=177 pcevide ac= sal valve position is, dt.ad: if '
selected.
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- " Naive
- and " naive observer
- bare are in the usage of experbental !
y.ya ,lagy. In the contart it does not mean a credulous or g__;_H.ne=a person, merely one m 'ai4=" with the specific apparatus or =~45 Specifically, in this case we refer to experienced control room operators who have never seen the Bailey TT-20 controller.
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3co g Pav. 0 7/6/84 c _ .___________ _ --_ - _ . \
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another, so thera is a' strong possibility cf inadvertently depresting.
mitipla buttons with one fingrr. erami:ing tha various persibilities, thera aro no obvious scanarios whera deperssing two adjacent buttons
.-would lead to irreversible consequences or not be 4= =84=taly covious tu the operater, m4*in- w wme-de== -
Se Er!C systen will recaire 10 sets of four-but on, horizcntal arrays of ==ar:cary acticn ;ushh ons for the initiatien, testing, and manual p=Ma= ion tsncticns for each of the following system i:nctions in both channels: AN 4n4*d= tion, main steam isolatien of Steam Generator-A, main'steem isolation of Steam Generator-B, main feedwater isolation cf Steam Generator-A, and main feedwater isolation of Steam Generator-B.
Within each array are -(left to right) a red half-channel TRIP butten, an amper TEST RESCL':5/Rr.s. button, a white MANCAL PERMISSIVE but m, and another red halfcannel TRIP but on.. . Ncthing prevents inadvertent ac::=ation cf multiple buttons but there are no corious pairs of Nws whose simitaneous depression could cause. %=d4=ce systems' problems.
These would be the only major applications in de centrol room wnere two identical buttons :s:st be depressed to achieve a single 1:nction. '.
21s .;.r is not .- ;- =d to cause operator error. S e two-balfa-. 1= do not have to be depressed s4=1*=n===1y to achieve in4*4=' *4=r bowever, it is an*4ed=ted that many operators would attempt to do so by using the thumb or inder and little *d==-s of one hand- From an anh ---- 4 F---( _ int, those two end bLe*ms will be close =-93 that even a 5th 7e female operator's "dng= = would make the required span (i.e..,W all =--g=d male q- = Ors and 95% of all - ,--r " female operators could r==am=My be expected to hit both l m m 4 - 7 u..== ='y). Althcugh no measurements were taken during, this studyr the force needed to depress the two 1.u w h 1d not ascoed the capamility of a'- lip.le ngar held rigid,. being driven f:=m the. elbow. -
2ese tu = are =" %+"h and color coded Fi al =b:i=a of colcrz v477 be deferred untii the Control Room Design Review /
esenh"shes preferred colcr usage criteria. Se follow:.ng discussien is based upon the colces prov:.ded on the 1.uL.~us by vitre.
S e half-channel trip lights'ars red, and energi=e when the half-trip bus energi=es. 21s is consistant with present use cf red for the reactor trip button.
S e amber butten is normally de rergized. When a half-channel in4*4=* ion is depressed (red buttons), the ancer light wi77 flash if the signal reaches at least one component and wi7' go solid when all congenents receive the in4*date signals. Depressing this ancer bucten resets the channel and, if successful, de-energizes the red and amber lights. So white AL,.cu per: nits taking manual cont:ci of an individual , ;2nent. *4= is only a pe 4=sive 2:nc ion - no
>r w t changes state with this button; it merely allows the centrols for individual components to be changed manually. Exact engineering 37 13 Rev. 0 7/6/84
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Color code does not conform to color coding in rest of Control Room. -
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Misinterpret status, misuse O
REC 0WED D M00lTICATLOA Training to stress the differences between the Bailey T-stations and existing controllers in the Control Room to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation and misuse.
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.i. _ \_'"l? ?f?;$ .h$ \h I L.kk 5ibfh, Attached are performed by exceots fromfor Bob 5tarkey anthe evaluation of the HISS Human Factor (E) EFIC console Review. .
It is recommended that training stresses the differences of controllers in the Control Room and their use to significantly reduce misinterpretation of the status and misuse of the controllers.
The possibility of changing.the Manual Switch color and the Auto Switch color should be investigated. -# '~
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. I Centrol Enacled" butten has been p:shed; at which ti:ne ths EFIC c=nt:cl
- circuits will revert to thair der:: ant state.
m ==- < -*=-e * =m 1 =-= rna4m -4en -
14 bile diagnosing casualties or detecting =alfunctiening eqdanent, direct 7risons of various parameters are recuiritd. Se )
instr:anentation has been selec ed and ;csitiened to pe=it such ecmparisons. During nest ner:nal circ.=: stances, the two generator ,
levels snould be apprezimately de sa:ne. A key inder cf system '
ope:ation is a direct c=mcarisen of de levels cf the be generaters. -
Carr r41ng level indications for the two steam generaters 'are en l opposite sides of the panel at the same hori=cntal height. Sese l comparisons will br, semeuhat d4**icult to ::ake due to de beri= ental
- ,--m inn and the. need to pick like ;arameters f
- cm =4=4'a" groups of four d4=n1=ys. .
N=1-= cf ficw into the generators is a key diagnostic cue for .
4d=aeddying leaks in the li?df inventory 5-dary of the hiiu:y side of the steam generaters and APW systam. It also requires medng values f:cm two widely separated meters of the same bordma*=1 height Should a' C =1 or an individual control valve **d7, the opposite channel would tend to e m pan ==te for it. S e present layout of the controls for the control valves M7 4tates re d*dng the faulted r - -- - - 2 e centrols,. BaileT T S20 hand / auto stations, be'"da horizontal nurters that will be viged to indde*= a demand signal. Se )
11ers have been rt=M so.that the -uls for CSSG A are to the' j left and those for Ctts; 3 are to the r4eh% Sis pe=its rapid ,
j
. - , r'- of the dammd seen, by betit valves i==c the same sceam ,
cana-at=r. E -,- '=r this with level d' Ed en pe==i:s easy j
4daa*d'ication of the valve that is either overfeeding or underf==ddne. -
s; i
e, N _._LNP" T/P i i ! A The folicwing are observations en the charac a-9 ics and suitability of various EFIC components and the layout f:cm ,a stric ly static bu:: art -
-- angiraering viewpoint and. in the c6ntext of - ;.J'hi'dty.with existing .
cont:el. room ccavention and usage. f nad7 w am-?o wan?> ante sm-ei m-=* dens These band / auto controls will be new components not prev.dously used in the control room. Functionally, they are very s4=47me to an cider Bailey acdel cont:cIler used in several applications elsewhere in this control room. Se TT-20's are comparatively small (rocghly 3 heha=
sqcare) and have an integrated bori=antal meter and sq.sare pn=hhnetens for BMC, ADTO, RAISE, and IDfER. The older units are much larger
(.we ==*=17 8 by 2-1/2 inches), have a vertical meter, and use round r=hNttons. Since they are functionally similar to the existing controls, and since no gross irt w =*dh4'dties in centrol ncvement conventions are present in either unit, there snocid be negligible preolems: training operators on-their uses. Bailey TT-20's utili::e 40 ,
31 B*v 0 7/6/84 ____ _
. - existing wunations used in tha centrol"rocn. Green and yellow ara used to signify automatic and m=m=' cperation, respectively. 22 syr:cols ara also unconventional and +'ending to da naive.* MAIEAL is im'.icated by a solid figura of a raised hand, fingars straigne but togeder. Naive ecservers' fregaently associate this with "st=p" since-
-it brings to mind the universal " halt" sig:.a1 ef a traffic policeman.
Se AD"DUCIC button is green and has two blacx arrows, head to tail, in a circle. Naive observers frecuently inte.pret dis as T ". Cnce the syncciogy has been e:Lplained, however, it is net apt to be forgotren. Se RA ST.A::WER but :ns are sqaare y="cw bute=ns with blacic arrows. S e L gs are bacxlig=ced whenever depressed and d e :
5-20 is sie="%g the valve to move. Se units c=me fr=m de fac: ry l with the IOrER butten en the left, ;cinting left, and de PAISE b."::=n ,
l en the right, pointing right, which is scmewhat amcigucx s. Perrious W a1= were keyed so the orientation could nce be changed. A rece::=
- cdificarica pe-4ts the butt =ns to be reoriented so the RAISE arr:w can ce placed pointing up and- de IGiER down - dis, of course, is a j mixed blessing since they could also inadverter:tly be orien?.ed in the l opposite direc icns and lead direc ly to operator error. '
2ese smM units arrive with an installed meter wit. e=ta:==1 i connec-dme and a toggle swi++ that permi"s the- meter to be con: meted i
across any- two signals of the fastaller's choosing. S e unit c=mes I with the toggle switch positions engraved PCS and DE7 (for' ";esition" and "dee.dation", the nest frequently used inpsts). It is important that the operators undeu.e s ai bow these meters were installed and the true int wu im of the r==d4 = in the two swit=h positions.. ,
Tr=d 44 - 1 usage is to have tG 4CS reading to be the wwdemand J
=i==1 being sent .to the m 17ad element (in *d= case the flow
. control valves). .
In its standard equigment, vitro (sys:em sco-vender) provided a
='d"#~8 ">20 with cely cne ::: star ch and the toggle swit=h runsved F o i:-W :=as chly sys=en w_, deme =d be dis =I.ayed en ;
the c:xr: roller. SCD 4 = ee t= reemest t. a: - rW"ied "520'r be
, provided for use with the APW centrol valves, and dat the meters be wired to additionally prenride ar-"=' valve positien feedhack if
- selec:ed ,
4
- " Naive
- and " naive observer"' bere are in the usage of experi metal y-re logy. In the context it does not mean a credulous or k --l-rienced pa m , merely one unfamiliar with the specific apparat =s or equignant. Specifically, in this case we refer to experienced control room operators who have never seen the Bailey 5-20 c::ntroller.
41
,12' Rev. 0 7/6/84
ancther; so.th ro is a strong pessibn4ty of inac .vertently depressing
' mitiple buttons with ena fingar. n ram ming tha various pezeibilitics, '
thera ara no obvious scenarica whera d:prgssing two adjccent but cns
. would lead to irreversible consequences er not be immediacaly envicus to the operator, ]
j Tnitdarden un- W ee i
se EPIC system wd" recuire 10 sets of fcur 'uteen, e horizontal arrays
)
of enantary action .m=Wetens for de ini-datien, testing, and m:m' '
pensien fune ices for each of the follering system Sncticns in both channels: AEW in4*dation, main steam isciation of Steam Generator-A, main steem isolation of Steam Generator-B, min feedwater isolation of Steam Generator-A, and main feedwater isolation of Steam Generater-S.
Within each array are (left to right) a red half <.hannel TRIP button, an ascer TEST R*"'"%r.;;; button, a white MANCAL erha.vr.; butt:n, and ancther red half-channel TRIP button. Ncthing prevents inadvertent actuation of mitiple bute=ns but there are no ~ obvious pairs of buttens wnese'simitsecus depression could causa d-==d4=ce systems' problems.
2ese would be the only major applications in the control room wnere two identical buttons must be depressed to achieve a single func= ion 2 1s concept is not expected to cause oserator er:ce. S e two halfa- =1= do not have to be depressed simitanecusly to achieve 4n4H=Mmr however, it. is an*4e4 t=ted that many operators would attempt to do so by usdag the thumb or inder and little fingers of ene-hand- From an .LC.u.emule F--Dint, those two and buttons will be close enough that even a 5th.;i;r.p +T fie female operator's fingers would make the required span (i.e., allm-rad male cT="**ers and 95% of all - ,-7+i female cpes u could reasonacly be expected to kd* both i ms si m 1* = m =1y) Althcogh no measurements were takam d- 'n_ g.
dis sesdyr the fer=a needed to depress. the two 1:ct ons ehmid net exceed _Se capacility of a lit la finger bald rigid,. being driven f:cm tbe . ey,.hu %
2ese N = are all $*+"@ted and cele = ceded. Fi=al ebei:n cf celers wm be deferred until de Cont:cl Room Design Review '
esa hld*ha= preferred celer usage criteria. Se fclicwing discussion is based upon the colces provided on the buctens by vitre.
Se half .6mel trip lighte are red, and energize when the half-crip bus energi=es. *.is is censistant with present'use cf red for de reac::or trip button.
The amber button is nm=T1 7 e-energized. d When a half-channel R ini&4= Mon is depressed (red b. cns), the amoer light will flash if the signal reaches at least one w ient and will go solid when all ccagenents receive the initiate signals. Depressing this ameer bucten resets the d - 1 and, if successful, de-energ.d=es the red and ameer .
lights. Se white butten permits taking manual control of an j individual component. m is is only a p= * =sive function - no l
On- + t changes s:ste with this but.cn; it merely allows the cent:cis j for individ=al tvv mnents to be changed manually. Exact engineering 3 I
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HEO.J)ESCRPTiQt Th r.; Normal" control should be to the left and the "less used" or "later used" control' to the riaht.to promote L -p R flow of movement.
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l IICOMMIND D M00lFCAil0h Recommend no change be made a't-this time. -
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! . f I l U AIIAClifIS f RE This is a valid concern and to comoly with criteria guideline it is recommended that controls be relocated,and key switch be moved above controls. This has been identified as part of the " Control Room Modifications" Mod 142 which will be implemented at next refueling outage. No changes recommended at this time.
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I Layout of EFIC System-i lEO OfSCR FTION J
Actual control layout is correct but placement on, panel appears as a mirror. 3 F0...E?it1 A _ CuhCtxN _
Misinterpret correct control or display l
2 REC 0bMENDO M00F1CATL06 When installing integrated console ensure' layout is correct
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As part of cycle 8 implementation of the CRDR Control Room MODS, the EFIC layout will b'e redone. At this time thelaiout should be modified slightly to alleviate this problem.
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U?.O'M!f 1 iV1m,---e e s q 00NTROL ROOM DI$R.AY E Integration of people procedures, training and Control Room 40 QESCR FT10S
" Successful plant control requires that all (above listed) items perform adequately and in. concert." There doesn't appear to be sufficient integration of all components of an operating Control Room. The crews lack the teamwork, coordination, belief in each others and their own abilities to handle very high stress situations effectively.
FDTENTAL CONCERN . Minor transients / events escalating into major transients with damaged equipment. REC 0bMIN]ID M00FCATL0b Implement the recommendations of the HFT observations. Continue work in the area of integration of people, procedures, training and Control Room. i
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_X,_ Aj !;$j];yt. . +.i ; u h'J~;-j ;!\ l~'ff, ; HE0 CATEGORY: B TECHNICAL REVIEW: To complete the technical review of this concern, three members.of the Human Factors Team travelled to Lynchburg, VA to observe two operating and two staff crews on the simulator. A copy of their observations is attached. The team discovered that.the integration was being addressed by the Training department and Nuclear Operations. The recommendations included in the trip report are encouraged to be accomplished. Teamwork, coordination and confidence are being improved. Therefore the second part of this HE0 description.is not valid. _.... Continued work in the area of integration of people, procedures, training and Control Room changes is recommended. This work could include back shift drills using walk-through/ talk-through techniques on normal operating procedures and plant equipment operations. The addition of maintenance personnel (mechanical, electrical, I&C) to the shift concept would provide a pool of assistance to tKe shift operators to correct l equipment failures in a timely manner. These personnel could perform i routine planned maintenance activities when not required to perform emergency repairs. 1 e f*CR-if-0C
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ATTACHMENT #1 TO HE0 MCR-W-0014 l-SACRAMENTO MUNIC! PAL UTILITY DISTRICT OMC2 MEMCRANCUM
~0: Je rry f,lilli ams cATE: Aoril 22,1987
. Y FROM:0, .T, ~ Scott,- (thru L. Conklin)
SUBJECT:
HFT TRIP REPORT E
REFERENCE:
JWW to 'GVC, Human Factors Team Travel, Dated April 6,1987 I. Introduction The Human Factors Team (HFT) travelled to Lynchburg, VA to observe the ' operators performing the operating procedures in 'real time' on ' the simulator. . The focus of the observations was new equipment -from L. modifications, revised procedures and the extent- of team coordination training- . The: Team members traveling :to;Lynchburg' included:
-Dallas T. Scott - Team Leader, Nuclear Systems Specialist.:
l Debbie Mrazek Human Factors Engineer. Bill Spencer - Nuclear Operations Specialist The team travelled on Wednesday, April' 8th, viewing crew trainin'g on Thursday, Friday, Monday and Tuesday. The team observed the , staff operators on the simulator from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 Noon and the shif t operators from '4:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. Portions of the classroom training from 12:00 Noon to 4:00 P.M. were also observed. , II. Observations During the course of four days, many observations were made which related to the concern of operator / procedure / Control Room / training integration. Additionally observations were made on the adequacy of plant equipment / procedures, training practices, teamwork and crew confidence-levels. The following are the major observations of the team:
'A. Operator / Procedure / Control Room / Training Integration After the first day'of observation, it became apparent that the integration of the operator practices with procedural guidance, the physical Control Room and instrumentation layout and training was being accomplished more effectively than previously understood. -Teamwork was being stressed by the trainers and practiced by the crew (staff and shift).
.M e.
LJerry WilliamsJ ., . '- 2^- ' April 22,'1987'.
' Communications:betwaen tne: assistant.snift supervisor, pr Mary operator,; secondary operator and backcanel operator were being '
practiced. Different levels of skill were observed but' all crews were concerned with the effectiveness of-communications during'. the Ldrill . Typical communications. problems observed include:
. Not speaking loudly'enough. .
- Not enough talking between primary and' secondary operators.
Not' acknowledging communications (improper feedback of messages) directed to an' operator. Jypical communications, improvements . observed include:-
'* The. assistant shift supervisor was being instructed to stand-back from the console operators forcing him.to speak up.
This also promotes keeping an overview cf the situation , rather'than focusing on one problem.
* .Tne crews have' recognized the importance of communicating properly and.are practicing to achieveLthis' skill.
*' The shift supervisor'or assistant announced'to all crew members when any evolution *was started. i Procedure utilization was one. training aspect the instructors had been directed by the Operations staff'to stress.
Utilization of procedures-varied from crew to crew but appeared to improve over the course of the week. Typical procedure utilization problems observed include:
- An assistant shift supervisor was not aware that a new .
. procedure existed for a normal operation and therefore did not use the procedure. Communications were stressed by the instructors so that crew members could help the assistant find the correct procedure.- ,
- One assistant shift supervisor was observed to not use the-E0P in a sequential manner rather chosen parts were utilized. The correct utilization of the E0Ps was stressed by the instructors.
l l 50 . __ - _ . - .__-.___._w.-u.___--
l f 1 Jerry Williams Acril 22, 1987 l
' Differences Of ?r0cedure duerpretati:n 'ed r s': ^ g operator response. Procejure chilosophy should De evie.ted i
l in E.03 step 7 to step 12 to direct individual l l interpretations.
- Entrance into the Emergency Plan was not always noticed by the Shift Supervisor. The instructors suggested frequent i
plant status updates by the Assistant to jog all crew members memories about entry conditions of the Emergency Plan. This observation may be a function of revisions to the Emergency , Plan and recent management requirements for entry into the Emergency Plan. Typical procedure utilization improvements. include: One crew discovered a problem in a procedure step. They noted the problem and revised their actions to comolete the procedures. ,.,i
- The use of procedures to provide guidance was more evident in the crews who had completed the week. This leads to the conclusion that t.aining is teaching and that the Operations staff is dictating the use of procedures for all evolutions / situations where,a procedure is available/ appropriate.
The Control Room is sized to allow 6 operators to be present and useful without running into one another. Through continued emphasis in training the operators are becoming more proficient and comfortable with the new AP 23.00 roles. Training has developed a lesson plan and lecture on teamwork. This has helped to reduce the concern about operator / procedure / Control Room / Training integration. B. Crew Confidence Levels Confidence levels vary with qualification level and time of . qualification. The more experienced the operator the more confidence exhibited. Hesitations were observed but seemed to be caused by procedure philosophy problems rather than a lack of confidence. Subtle component losses were observed by the team. The crews all found the component f ailures but the ease of their response was a function of er.perience and confidence. 51
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L, j j Jerry '.filliams April 22, 1987 L C. Trai W C Practicas Training emphasis _ was on coordination, teamwork, component
-failure recognition and normal operations. The instructors stressed communicating between crew members, frequent status updates and using the entire crew to diagnose problems. After each training exercise, the opera. tors were allowed to critique themselves and to write their strengths and weaknesses on a bulletin board. The instructors, after caucusing, conduct 2d a formal critique of the exercise. The strengths and weaknesses ~
written by the crews were discussed by the instructors and improvements were suggested by all. This process was very effective in getting the operators involved and lead to productive training sessions. . The training scenarios were realistic and the operator response ' was correct. Frequently.the scenarios were started with each operator at his assigned-station. During normal operations in the plant, seldom are the operators.at their assigned stations when a transient starts. Therefore, the speed of recognizing L transient initiation was probably skewed at the simulator. l Several' times the operators were instructed to perform normal l operation and at some point within the normal evolution the l transient was started. One transient was initiated with 3 people in the Control Room. This was a more realistic situation.. With a limited number of operators in the' Control-Room, the emergency plan was ignored. When the Shift Supervisor l' returned- (was allowed in) to the Control Room, he determined plant status;with turn-over from the Assistant Shift Supervisor then evaluated for entry conditions into the- Emergency Plan. The transition from few operators to the full crew was awkward. More frequent plant status updates were suggested by the instructors to reduce confusion. . D. Plant Eouioment/ Procedure Adeouacy The Yokogawa recorder appears to be confusing to use. The operators complained about this new piece of equipment. Nuclear Engineering is taking the lead in attempting to make this equipment more useful for the operators. The System Design Engineer.is aware of the operator concerns and is attempting to resolve them. 32 .
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4 Jerry '.lilliams . April 22, 1987 a #ailure of one segment of the digital por. ion o' the Dixson
~ indicators was observed. This was discovered by a mismatch in the digital-indicators with a match in the.bar graphs. Since - these are new indicators, it leads to questions about the validity of claimed mean-time-between-failures. For indicators which will be in the Control Room that are only single indicators, a failure would be very difficult to discover.
The EFIC OTSG level indicators displayed some anomalies. The-low range indicators did not show over-ranged when level exceeded the upper tap. According to the system design engineer, this phenomenon is caused by flow in the OTSG tube bundle region. . The curves indicate that the low range level should plateau. The simulator indicators are peaking at approximately 147 inches but as level continues to rise low range level begins to lower. With 370" on the high range level, 67" was observed on the low range level. It is unknown whether this is caused by the simulator programming or typical of the EFIC level transmitters. EFIC OTSG level (both low range and high range) are density compensated by means of . pressure compensation. The levels were observed to oscillate when the ADV's or TBV's were opened. This oscillation is amplified by the density compensation method. Major differences between the'B&W Simulator and Rancho Seco Control Room were explained by the instructors to the operators. However some subtle differences were observed that were not explained. The Containment Isolation Alert on the simulator SPDS activates on.SFAS.lA or 1B. The Contair. ment Isolation Alert on the Rancho Seco SPDS activates on a SFAS 1A or 18 and one or more of the valves failing to close. The labels on the simulator HlSS extension do not match the Control Room HISS extension'. This will lead to confusion by the operators in the Control Room. The IDADS is not simulated and" is therefore not utilized in training on the simulator. This does not help the operators practice using IDADS in transient conditions and teaches the operators how to "make do" without the plant computer. The location of EFIC is not optimum. Manual operations of the l EFIC controls require close coordination between the primary and secondary operators to prevent an over/under cooling event. The closer the EFIC is to H1RI the easier the communication / cooperation will be for these operators. With EFIC on the HlSS extension, excessive movement was observed from HlRI to the EFIC controls by the secondary operator in time-critical situations. 53 i
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,9 w Jerry Williams April 22, .1987 -
- L Recommendations The observations of tne HFT have resulted in the following recommendations. , ,
A. Increase the realism in the simulator by initiating scenarios with a reduced number of operators in the Control Room. ' Add operators.at intervals to help practice control station , turnover and plant statusing. Expand training in. transient
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turn over/statusing area.
- 3. The individual scenario critique by crew-and instructor.is a great improvement in simulator teaching techniques. This L
program is encouraged to continue and expand to improve l student / instr.uctor relationships. , 1 C. Management involvement in crew training has helped improve the operator's attitude toward simulator training. It appeared to be difficult on occasions for Training Department management to defend / interpret Nuclear Operations management philosophies. Philosophy defense was observed to be smoother when Nuclear Operations Management was present for the simulator training. I Both training and Nuclear Operations Management should be present at the simulator. Training Management to ensure the quality of instruction and Nuclear Operations. Management to interpret departmental policy. l D. The increased emphasis by training on communications skills is effective and should continue. Message feedback needs to be stressed and practiced, i E. Nuclear Engineering should continue to work with the operators in revising the setup of the Yokogawa recorder. This recorder. needs to satisfy operator expectations of performance. Training should become involved in this work, also. F. EFIC level instrumentation appears to have an anomally between the high range.and low rarige. These level instruments both measure OTSG level in inches ofiwater. OTSG startup level and i I full range level also measure OTSG level in inches of water. However, because of different tap locations, different density compensation methods and different level instruments; none of these indicators read the same. This is very confusing during operations and difficult to train upon. Nuclear Engineering is encouraged to investigate creative solutions to this challenging problem. The goal should be to have the entire range of OTSG 1evel displayed with all indicators reading within 10%. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _^
Jerry Williams - April 22,1987 G..Backshiftcrewtrainingonoossiblescensriosit] lowing equioment fai wres, normal coerating procecures, ,uai:s and precautions should be encour' aged by Nuclear Operations for al1 ~ Crews. H. Procedure cross referencing needs to be increased and more j complete to remove the mental strain from the operators on i where and when to exit or enter a new procedure. Special 1 attention should be given to tech. spec. and Emergency plan entry conditions within the E0Ps. I. The District should continue with plans to provide an integrated HlSS panel with EFIC controls located more closely to HlRI. - J. The District should continue and expedite the construction of a Rancho Seco specific simulator to improve the quality and frequency of simulator instructions. ? K. Changes have been made in the IDADS such that some safety-significant items are now only shown on IDADS. These changes need to be stressed in training. L. . IDADS needs to be added to the simulator. One of the
. contributing factors to the 12-26-85 incident was the operator mistrust and lack of understanding of the IDADS. The IDADS is .
not an ideal system but needs to be effectively used by the operators. Training on IDADS use at the simulator for transient diagnosis and instrument reading verification is essential for operator confidence in this equipment. l M. Modifications to the plant require 'a revision to the training department lesson plans.to teach the operators how the plant has been changed. Interaction between Nuclear Engineering and, the Training Department has not always been sufficient to ensure the operators are receiving the correct information. The Training Department is encouraged to have the Nuclear Engineering system design engineer review / comment on the lesson plans. N. Nuclear Engineering should as part of the Human Factors Program l initiate an annual observation of the training at the simulator l to ensure the integration of the Control Room changes, E0P L revision, lesson Plan update and operator understanding. This observation should be made more frequently if major changes are being performed in any of the integrated components. 1
Jerry Willivns April 22, 1987 i
)
- '! . S u=n ty The operator / procedure / Control Roon/ training integration is being .
accomplished for the new E0P's, Control Room components, and operator assignments. This trip to Lynchburg allowed tne Human Factors Team to assess the plant in a real-time atmosphere. The improvements in the " team" concept by training will allow the Human 1 Factors Team to lower the priority of a human engineering ! observations. The simulator is being effectively used and the I instituting of self critique has been well received. The observers felt encouraged that the instructors were teaching instead of .l testing. l The observers did notice problems with a simulator that does not . exactly'model'this plant. It is reconnended that the Rancho Seco simulator project continue as a District priority. Training will be improved and the transient readiness of the operators will be much better with a plant specific simulator where all equipment is modeled. In conclusion, this trip allowed the Human Factors Team to see the improvements in integration by the operations staff and to understand the inpact of changes in the Control Room and procedure revisions upon operator responses, cc: G. Cranston T. Tucker P. Turner B. Beebe M. Rojas B. Pate RIC Files Trailer 8 Files Design City Files - u____________ _
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HE0 SCURCE Operator Interviews SOURCEr. CEh@AiC$ D.T. Scott CA5'3-24-87 am,m n, re t-iemu. waimi.- D.T. Scott W C N .3966
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oee u -m .mr whi 00ECLROCWOl5P_AY5: IDADS Keyboard located at H1DRMS HEC 33CR FTION The location of the IDADS keyboard on the side of HIDRMS obstructs the operators access to the back panel. FuiENiML CONCERiv With one operator using the IDADS keyboard to answer alarms or observe the Critical Alarms display, a second operator is unable to pass from the console area to the back panel area between HISS (F) and the 1st operator. REC 0WEbOED WOOFCATION Remove the Cabinet, Relocate IDADs keyboard elsewhere in the control room. Long term solution is to install the operator workstation, relocate the IDADS CRT, keyboard and alarm printer as. planned.. However to prevent placing the -Critical Alarms CRT behind the operator, the Critical Alarms CRT must be placed on top of the console as planned in MOD 142. f7 c _
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- .Tc.chincal Review .
Problem #3 (Attached) in the Main Control Room (MCR) System Investigation Report (SIR) identified IDADS keyboard interference ( QTS #26.0709) as a concern. Problem #3 was reviewed by the PAG and approved as a priority 2 in PAG-86-088 (December 4,1986). The resolution on Problem #3.is to " remove the cabinet that holds the IDADS keyboard and remount the keyboard elsewhere". Tha CRDR documented in HE0 GN-0-0328 that the present location of the IDADS CRT is not ,.. . optimum. However because of a general lack of available space for relocating the CRT no change was recommended. Following the installation of an operator work station (planned for Cycle 9 in Modification 142) GN-10 to replace the desk, the CRT (atop H1DRMS) and keyboard (on the cabinet) will be located in the workstation. The alarm prjnter currently located between H1DRMS and H2ES will be relocated next to the workstation. With the incorporation of the Critical Alams Display on IDADS, it is important that the CRT be visible from the console. c
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Ik 5-4-87 0
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, ATTACHMENT TO HE0 MCR-0-0015 I MCR SYSTEM FROBLEMS j Problem 3: IDADS Keyboard Interference Tra:'<ing 'iumber: 25.0709 Priority: 2 - . Source: SYSTEM ENGINEER
Description:
With the addition of the EFIC extension at the end of tne HlSS console tnere is not sufficient rocm fcr an operator to walk tnrough the passageway (:ne etner side of the passage way is a cabinet with the ! DADS keyboard on it). Investigation:
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Addition of the EFIC extension in the Control Rcm., mock-up verifies this probl~em. Resolution: Remove the cabinet that holds the IDACS keyboard and remount the keyboard elsewhere. Testing: Later 4 i 3-6 Rev. 1 MCR5!Rl(L4.9) -
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.T. scott CONTACT: EUD4SiCN: 3966 III.k DE3CRFTiON Yokagawa (YEW) Recorder 00tE01. ROOM 015P_AY 4: uaa-toto 4
*EO DESCR FTIOT The YEW recorder used for Non-NNI variables is fed by 22 hard wired
. points. These points are intended to be used to provide history trace upon loss of NNI power.
70T6h7Mi CONCERN . The YEW recorder used for Non-NNI variables will not be used during normal operations, therefore able to use this recorder fo r loss in all of likelihood, NNI. the operators will not be RIC0kMINDED MOXFCATICA Remove the hard-wired points from this recorder. Make all points into this recorder operator selectable with-a standard set to be put on the recorder upon loss of NNI.
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__ it . :;/b%b);gq l av :t i ] :. .. l It was identified during the deterministic failure analysis that failure _ or loss of power of the NNIs would put the operators in a position of not being able to cool the plant down in a safe and controlled manor. Hence the 22 point recorder with separated power from NNI & ICS-influence and placed on a recorder for operator use. The information whether on a recorder or edge wise indicators was the minimum for the operators to cool down the plant in a controlled manner. It was not just for history. The recorder was for observable memory due partly to its location from the controls . The recorder has not been fn service in the plant. It has been observed at the Simulator only and I believe at the time of these comments it wasn't setup properly. Therefore, initial contact with it was ungood. They attempted to use it during the transients and it is only good after the plant is in a stable condition. It is recommended.that training department recognize the proper use of this instrument and emphasize this at the simulator training time. The operators feel they should be able to use this recorder during the
~ transient, this is not what it was set up for. It is only usable after the plant has been brought to a stable condition and a decision has been made to begin to cool the plant down with out the NNIs & ICE.
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i TEM OESCRIPiiO4 00t4TR01. ROOM DISR.AY 1: Auxiliary Steam Reducing Station Indicator labels. E0 JESCt FTi0s These are powered by ICS and should be labeled as such. 20 Th A _ C0bCERS Relying on an instrument that actually has no power. (E.06) REC 0v MEN}D WOJ rCAT: 0N Add purple lamacoid labels with White letters (ICS) to the botton be:el for PI-36014A, PI-36015. 1
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HE0' CATEGORY: B TECHNICAL REVIEW: l
' Loss of ICS Power during the December 26, 1985 event opened the auxiliary steam pressure control valve (PIC-36014A) to mid-position, causing overpressure in the auxiliary steam header and lifting of one of the headers two relief valves. Action Plan item #3.b developed and implemented ECN R-0878, Rev. 1 (attached) to the auxiliary steam controls to assure valve control on loss of ICS control. This ECN removed PIC-36014A from Control Room panel H2X; installed a new face plate on
'1 panel H2X containing PI-36015 (Auxiliary Steam Header Pressure) and PI-3604A (Auxiliary Steam Header Setpoint Demand Pressure), HS-36014A (raise / lower control toggle switch), which controls HC-36014A and FI-20585 (Mainsteam to Auxiliary Steam Hender Flow). Upon loss of ICS power this control now fails as-is and the valve. position can be manipulated locally via pneumatic controls. However, no Control Room manipulation is possible upon loss of ICS power.
ICS indicators in the Control Room have purple lamacoid lables with white letters (ICS) on the bottom bezel to remind the operators that they are ICS related.. PI-36015, PI-36014A, HS-36014A and HC-36014A are powered by ICS. Since controls are not labelled with their power source HS-36014A should not be labelled. Indicators PI-36015 and PI-36014A should be labelled with ICS labels. - 9 l D. Scott l
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ECN NO. R-0879 Rev. 1 Sheet 2 of 7 l R?ASON FOR CHANGE To provide continuous modulation af Auxiliary steam header pressure control valve P7-36014A wiM loss of ICL ;"wer and to improve operability. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE
- This design change involves removing the e risting electronic pressure control components powered by the ICS, and installing local pneumatic pressure controller with remote (control room) electrical setpoint adjustment as a replacement. The addition of a local motor operated setpoint pressure regulator will assure continued valve modulation by failing as is on loss of electric power. Indication of the setpoint regulator, indication of auxiliary steam header pressure and a toggle switch regulator setpoint control station will be located on the H2X panel.
- Remove auxiliary steam flow indicator FI-20585 from panel HISS and This modification is required to comply !
install it in panel H2X. with Human Factor Engineering requirements and shall be installed (_: next to PI-36015/PI-36014A. This design modification requires the following: (Refer to attached sketches)
- 1. Disconnect and remove PC-36014A and associated devices labeled '83* '
and "M" f rom ICS panel E4ICOS.
- 2. Disconnect and remove PIC-36014A located on panel H2X.
- 3. Disconnect and remove existing E/P converter PY-36014A located near the control valve PV-36014A in the turbine building.
- 4. Disconnect and remove PI-36015 located on the panel HISS.
- 5. Fabricate a new face plate for panel H2X for the mounting of a Bailey Type RY dual electrical edge wise indicator and a duel switch control station. The type RY indicator will require 120V +10% ac, 60 Hz power.
Note: The Bailey Type RY dual indicator will be designated as Tag No. PI-36015/PI-36014A. l u.
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4 ECN NO. R-0878 Rev. 1 Sheet 3 of
- 6. Install-a new Fisher Pneumatic Pressure Controller PC-26014A Type l 4195 BFME with 0-300 psi stainless steel Bourdon tube and remote set point features, at the control valve area. Provide existing air supply for the controller. Provide existing air supply for the controller. Provide a new sensing line to the controller by tapping of.f the existing pressure transmitter PT-36015 sensing line.
. Reconnect the control valve pneumatic supply line to this controller.
- 7. Install new Belloframe Type "10" electric mo":or driven' pressure regulator,- HC-36014A in an enclosure. the field-is to provide this enclosure with te,rminal. block. Provide existing air supply to the.
regulator and a pneumatic sensing line. to connect to the new pressure controller PC-36014A remote set-point port. Utilize the existing 120 VAC through TB2-46 ' and TB2-47 of 1-1-4 (See N21.01-32 sh. 1).
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B. Install a new P/I converter PY-36014A near the control valve. Utilize the existing 120 VAC power supply used for the E/P converter. Connecting wiring from this P/I to the right indicater on panel H2X designated PI-36014A through points 10, 11 and 12 of 1-4-2 (See N21.01-32, sh. 1). Tee off the pneumatic line between the pressure controller and the pressure regulator, and connect to this
'P/E. converter. -
D.
- 9. Route the output of PT-36015 to Lndicator PI-36015 located on the H2X panel.
- 10. Disconnect and remove FI-205ES~1ocated on the: panel HISS. Do not close the opening left by removed indicator as it will be used by heat up cool down rate recordde per ECN4 R-1028.
- 11. Install FI-20585 on the new f ace place for panel H2X f abricated for
- PI-36015/PI-36014A.
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ECN NO. R-0878 ~ Rev. 1 Sheet: 4 of. 7 New Added equip' ment-are as.follows: QA Equipment Description Quantity Classification Location l' 1. Fisher pneumatic 1 2 Turbine. Bldg.
. Pressure Controller near Control
- - Model 4195bFME. Tag Valve PV-36014A*
No. PC-36014A, 0-300 psig range 3-15 psig output.w/dirwet action, peraportional-plus-reset control mode w/ remote set and internal auto .. manual station.
- 2. Belloframe motorized 1 2 Same as 1 pressure regulator Type 10, Tag .;
No. HC-36014A, , f"i 2-25 psig control-
' b ' cange, motor speed 2 RPM.
- 3. Moore Industries- 1 2 Same as 1 P/I Converter l Model PIT /3-15 psig/10-50 mA/
1177ac (WT) pneumatic input signal . 3-15 psig electric j output signal 10-50 mADC j 120 VAC electric power supply, Tag No. PY-36014A
- 4. Bailey electrical 1 2 H2X Panel edgewise dual-indicator Type RY-2331, 120 VAC power .
supply, Tag No. PI-36015/PI-36014A
- 5. Cutler-Hammer 1 2 H2X Panel toggle switch l S.P.D.T. spring loaded center
^- position off.
, Ratt No. 7560k73D Tag No. HS-36014A
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. Item provided'by. field are as.follows:
- 1.- P.nclosure with terminal block for ac-36014A
- 2. _ Interconnecting wiring and pneumatic tubing as . required
- 3. . : Provide tags for HS-36014A on H2X PANEL .
Tags' required ~includea" RAISE *
- " LOWER"
' SET POINT"
- 4. Provide new sub-panel for H2X panel.
Type of drawings affected are as follows: PEID Loop & Schematic Diagrams.
. Data Sheets .
ISO Drawings Estimated Cost: 875,000 JCj j
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w c". *.5.1.1 [}ii.bInformationtobedisplay E0 -:: MCR- V -0018 fd j b f: ) E o7 R4 Step 3.1 E0 SOURCE: wa k-Thru $0K e ORGi!(AICE: DATE 3-30-87 Ca#ACT: ecd 4siot ! TDA DESCRi? TION casot. Rec 9 DisaAy e HOME FE0 MSCRFTION No easy way to get RCS Tsat, must hand calculate and plot T 50TEhiA_ C0hCERN . Waste of valuable time during time critical ICC cooldown 2 R COMM90E0 900lFCATL06 Provide RCS Tsat on SPDS as a call-up overlay and add OTSG Tsat to ICC Page 1 and Low Rance PT as a permanent curve. . 7/ = .
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.HE0 CATEGORY:B TECHNICAL REVIEW:
In E.07, Inadequate Core Cooling,(ICC) Step 3.1, the operator is required to lower OTSG pressure to decrease OTSG Tsat 90-110 F below RCS Tsat for existing.RCS pressure. The SPDS provides the easiest method of presenting this information to the operator. Currently 0TSG Tsat is shown on the SPDS as a' green vertical line on the post trip PT only. . When the plant gets into an ICC condition, the operator will most likely place the SPDS on ICC page 1 (one CRT) and ICC Page 2 (the other CRT). .... With these pages selected, OTSG Tsat cannot be seen. Therefore it is recommended to add the OTSG Tsat line to ICC Page 1 to allow the operator to perform E.07 and to add the OTSG Tsat line to the Low Range PT to ensure Primary to Secondary coupling during heatup/cooldown procedures. RCS Tsat is not displayed in the Control Room. The operator is required to hand-calculate this value;from the steam tables or plot it from a 1 figure provided in the E0P. If.a yellow line were'added to the SPDS as a ! callup overlay, the operator could visually check for 90-110 F between ! the yellow (RCST sat)and green. (OTSG Tsat) lines. RCS Tsat should be I able to be added to the Low Range PT, Post-Trip PT and ICC Page 1 l displays. .j 0 Oh iI
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$0WCf t, e.07 a4 HE0SCECf.: weia-thru ORiGiRATCR: o. neazeg DAI: 3-30-87 00tFACT: Dit.N51Ctt
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Heat-pp/ Cool-down meter 4EO. Q#RCR FTI@ Under various plant conditions, different temps should be used to calculate the rate, currently only Tc is used. POTENTE C0hCERh - l Vi61 ate tech spec or over cool based on misleading information. ! REC 0bMEN00 M0FICATf0b 1 I short Term: label Tc as input . Long Term: Allow IDADs or comparable system to choose input based on other plant-parameters. g . 73 ^
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t'"~ :;~:ig 7; g,! q O. 1N.T y' i ..." 'L[ v it The Heatup/Cooldown Rate monitor utilizes Tc inputs for the calculation of-the Rate. This implies a certain mode of operation in the plant. This information will be of value to the operator when he is op,erating the plant from the Enurgency Procedure, a label should be placed by the indicator identifying the.Tc inputs. Long-term solution to the above problem will be to provide a system that will utilize the appropriate parameter.for.the rate calculation depending on the plant's mode of operation, i.e. T-incore temperatures, DHR nozzletemperature in addition to the Tc temperature. ,- This can be accomplished either through the IDADS system or a dedicated computer based system.
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Ckl0l!N hk! D. firazek DATE 4_14-87 CC[dAC5; Curtis Krumpler - Walt florris EXTEliS10ti: TDi OESCRPiiON 00t#R01. ROOM Di$R.AY 1: Tne new computer trend YEW recorder. n v l WE0 DISCR Pil0s 1 It is not suitable to the function of trending specific computer points of immediate interest. 30"EFA_ 00bCERb Loss of valuable trending information that is currently available. REC 0 WME s )E] v0)FCATLOA
- 1) Replace with 5 or 6 3-pen multi-color trend recorders; 2 from the Bailey and 4 from
. .IDADS . . ~2) liodify the YEW such that only 10-15 points are available a the points impact the recorder more often. Also allow control of chart speed.
75
T TECHN CAL REV!EW _ 0E3 BB. RES EVE O ATTACH &M El
'The multi-point recorder (yokagowa), that has replaced the two 3 point pen recorders, is unsuitable for the task that it has been given for the following reasons:
- 1. it is difficult to identify, assess and control a parameter at a glance. Points are splattered all over the chart.
a) You have to discover which point it is among many. - b) Difficult to know value of points with out time.
- 2. The point moves due to threshold requirements of computer (step changes) a) Pen recorders show the movement and scales are more easily identified.
b) Multi-point recorders are difficult to use. c) Need ability to set scales for user applications. _...- Recommend: In addition to the recommended modification, it is suggested to change out this recorder with 5 or 6 3 pen recorders that operators can use similar to the 2 that wer.e removed. They should have the capability to use Bailey and or IDADS points. This recorder can be used to replace other recorders such as the multi-point westronics recorders. ~
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0652RVATCN 1 CRDE ORiTE.T.A RE.?:RT 1: 45 . Illi.E: information to be displayed HE0!: nca- v 0021 FANE. s1SS (e> iTEMi: HE0 SOURCE: Simulator observation $00RCE 4: -- CEb!!I.k CE: D. firazek hAi[.*4-29-87 00t#ACT: EXTD4Sl0tt TEM OESCRPiiO' 00tRR01. ROOM DimY #: Low & High range EFIC OTSG level indicators. O. m EO OESC:s F~iOs The low range indicator did not show over-range when level exceeded the upper low-range tap. 1 l l 30W A_ 00h CE Rh Misinterpret OTSG Level. REC 09 M ENDE] WOD FCATLON Long Term: Blank low range indicator when level goes beyond indicator accuracy range. ( Short Terni: Stress anomaly in training.
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OltiiACHES S E HE0 CATEGORY: B TECHNICAL REVIEW: The low range OTSG 1evel is not capable of indicating full scale for the instrument. This is caused by the weight and flow of steam. According to the system design engineer, the low range level should only be used to verify a low level actuation not to compare the operation of high range transmitters. When four level indicators are provided, the operator will compare the two high range level indicators tc each other and the two, low range level indicators to each other. The operator will also compare the low range to the high range level - indicators. Because over-range flash indicators are provided, common sense dictates that when OTSG level is above 7"~ inches, the EFIC HR OTSG 1evel indicators will show 156 inches with a fiushing bar at the top of the bar graph to indicate over-range. However on the simulator, as EFIC HR OTSG 1evel approaches 156 inches, EFIC LR 0TSG Level peaks at approximately 147 inches (well below the over-range bar) and then indicated LR level decrease as real OT5G 1evel continues to rise. This ~ situation seems to be misleading and confusing for the operator. ., The recommended modifications are good options. However in addition, Nuclear Engineering is encouraged to investigate other alternatives. One-area of concern that should be investigated as a part of this HE0 is the reduction of the methods and presentation formats of OTSG 1evel indication. Currently OTSG 1evel is presented in the following manner: DISPLAY DISPLAY DISPLAY CONTROL COMPUTER COMPENSATION INDICATOR RANGE UNITS SYSTEM POINTS METHODS Startup Range 0-250 Inches ICS Yes None . Operate Range 0-100 % ICS Yes Temperature .I Full Range- 0-600 Inches None Yes None i Shutdown Panel 0-600 Inches SDP Yes None 1 Low Range 0-156 Inches EFIC Yes Pressure 1 High Range 6-619 Inches EFIC Yes Pressure There seems to be insufficient justification for the number of methods used to represent OTSG water level. Reducing this list to one or two comparable methods would simplify the operators conceptions / understanding of OTSG 1evel. I . 75 pbv. MCR -V-0021j ( Dallas Scott )f 5-5-87 o
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[@d; Information to be displayed HE04: MCa- v -o022 FANE.: siss (E) ITE4 #: HE0 SCURCE: simulator observation $0VRCE 4: CElhi! MICK; D. Mrazek hAi[.: 4-29-87 cct#Aci: catNsictt TEM OESCRPiiO4 00t#ROL ROCM OISPLAY f: All EFIC OTSG Level indicators m lY l E0 )ESCtFT10b ) Due to density compensation by means of pressure compensation, the levels oscillate dramatically when the ADV's or TBV's were opened. I i l 1 DOSD A _ C0hCERb . Misinterpret OTsG level. TECOS MEA )E] WOJF CATI 0A l smooth / Dampen displayed oscillations. I 7'1
TECHNlCAL REV!EW _ _ h. . ...J..5 '! . l U AiTACKS lh fl HE0 Category: B Technical review: EFIC OTSG level indicators are compensated for changes in density by a pressure compensation tecanique. Therefore when the main steam system pressure is pertubated (eg: code safties, TBV's, or ADV's are opened), the. indicated EFIC OTSG level is changed. Pressure is an OTSG parameter that is easily changed by operator or automatic action. This method of density compensation is, therefore, subjected to dramatic changes resulting in corresponding oscillations in OTSG level. During pressure change events, the operator is therefore forced to observe EFIC OTSG levels for longer periods of time (than for stable pressure conditions) to determind a value fcr OTSG level. Temperature compensation is used on the operate range levels. This _ . . - method has proven to be less volitale. The temperature of the OTSG downcomer outlet is used to compensate the operate range level. Saturation temperature of the OTSG does change with a change is pressure. However, the OTSG downcomer outlet temperature does not indicate OTSG saturation temperature. The OTSG downcomer outlet temperature is enfluenced by the feedwater temperature, the OTSG metal shell temperature, the RCS T-cold and the pre-heating of the MFW via the aspirating port. , m Nuclear Engineering should investigate methods to smooth or dampen the displayed EFIC OTSG ... level oscillations. An analysis of the desirability of temperature versus pressure compensation should be performed and all OTSG levels converted to that method. This HE0 should be resolved in concert wi'th HE0 #MCR-V-0021. , o,s n IIw w e I
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065ERvATiON CEU$ Ck!I3[k 5((CEi :: 4.5.1.G [lI!.b Color Coding ITEM #: 58,60 E0 : MCR- v -o023 FA% E0 SCURCE: simulator 08servation SOURCf f: 1 CEblNkICE' D. Mrazek DATE4-29-87 EUENS10tt i 00NTACT: TEM DESCRPiiO< CONTROL ROOM DISR.AY 1: Set point selector controls. { . E0 MSCRF"iO* The NAT CIRC / Low Flow back lit indicator is a split lens with both halves illuminated cyan. From the " normal" position of the secondary operator it is difficult to determine whether the top or bottom half is lit. 307'EC A_ CONCtB Inaccurate plant status TEC0v MEN)E] WO ) riCA"!0A Change half lens to illuminate yellow for better differentiation. Use yellow since it's the only available color that doesn't have a specific color code. A. 8/ o
TECHNICAL REV!EW - - 0SYSia LEyB. RDE EM O AIIACH&S ih fl.E - . Tha observation is correct. The color is produced by Bulb Caps. The only available color that is not currently used for a specific meaning is yellow.
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CV i i_ 06SERYAT10N CRDE ort!MA. EE?:Ei :: IITLE: HE0 4: nCa- v -0024 FMEL: ffEW #: HE0 SCVRCE: simulator observation $0VRCE f: ORiGi!RIOR: D. rirazek DATT.: 4-29-87 00i#ACT: EXTENSION: TEM OESCRPiiO5 CONTR01. ROCW DISR.Al' f: i Use of IDADS n v E0 ) ESC:R PTIOs Currently IDADS is not available at the simul'ator so operators are trained to mitiaate transients without IDADS - even though in actuality valuable infomation is sometimes only available through IDADS 80"EFA_ CdACERb tiisunderstand plant status - ignore IDADS in a transient and miss valuable infomation. REC 0 iME s JE0 WOJ FCA" OA Long tem: Stress IDADS use on new plant specific simulator. .. Short tem: Improve operator accessability in CR during standard ops and provide additional training. 83 i
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Th3 HE0 is correct as written With IDADS unavailable at the simulator, operators can easily fall into a pattern of ignorina or not utilizing the information that is available on IDADS. Sin .e Rancho Seco is in the ;sucess of building a simulator, it would not be feasible for IDADS to be installed at Ly.<caburg. It is recommended that the instructor when scenorio's are in progress, stress IDADS information is available for assessment and control of the plant. ,,
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