ML20235L878

Insp Rept 50-458/87-20 on 870801-0915.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Licensee Action on NRC Info Notice & Licensed Operator Requalification Program

ML20235L878
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	09/26/1987
From:	Chamberlain D, Jaudon J, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235L848	List: ML20235L845 ML20235L869 ML20235L878
References
50-458-87-20, IEIN-87-021, IEIN-87-21, NUDOCS 8710050629
Download: ML20235L878 (15)

See also: IR 05000458/1987020

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Repor:: 50-458/87-20 l

Docket: 50-458

Licensee: Culf States Utilities Company (GSUN

P. O. Box 220

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: August I through September 15, 1987

Inspectors: l' , 8[

D. D. (f'hamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector 'Date

Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

+ ~ mt o Ri'IF/87

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W. B. . Tones, Residen Inspector Date

Prcj.mt Section A, Reactor P ' cts Branch

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Approved: M 4:f' [

.. P/ Jaud , Chief, Protect Section A

1, D e L

R{ actor Projects Branch

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8710050629 870930

PDR ADDCK 05000458

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection Conducted August I through September 15, 1987 (Report 50-458/87-20)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on

l previous inspection findings, licensee action.on a NRC Information Notice, l

I. licensed operator requalification program, non-licensed staf' training, '

1: maintenance witnessing, safety system walkdown, surveillance J.est witnessing,

operational safety verification and preparation for refueline.

Results: Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified'(failure

to verify diesel fuel oil properties within 31 days and failure to include

QA program controls in a procurement document).

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DETAILS-

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,' . 1. Persons' Contacted

~*D. L. Andrews,LDirector,. Nuclear Training.

W.-J. Beck,; Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

• J. E. Booker..' Manager,. 0versight

J. L. Burton, Supervisor .. Independent Safety' Engineering Group _

> W. Bushall, Nuclear Training Coordinator

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. *E. M. Cargil1~,. Supervisor, Radiation Programs.

• J. W.. Cook . Lead Environmental Analyst,-Nuclear Licensing-

• J..C. Deddens,, Senior..Vice-President, River Bend Nuclear Group

D. R. Derbonne, Assistant: Plant Manager, Maintenance

.D. Dietzel,LNuclear Training Coordinator

C. L. Fantacci... Supervisor, Radiological Engineering

• R. W. Frayer, Director, Projects-

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• P. E.-Freehill, Outage' Manager

• C. E. Foster, Assistant Supervisor, Plant ' Security

A. O. Fredieu, Assistant' Supervisor, Operations

• D. R. Gipson, Director, Quality Services

• P. D. Graham, Assistant-Plant Manager, Operations

• E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing _

J. R. Hamilton, Director, Des _ign Engineering <

R..W.~~Helmick, Director, Projects _. )

K. C. Hodges, Supervisor,' Chemistry

R. Horn, Nuclear Training Coordinator

• R. N. Jackson, Nuclear Training Coordinator

L. G.-Johnson, Site Representative,. Cajun

G. R. Kimmell, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance (QA)

• R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing

• A. D. Kowalczuk, Director, Oversight

I. ' M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems

V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services j

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• W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager  :

C. A. Rohrmann, Training Systems Coordinator  !

M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering

R. R.' Smith, Engineer, Nuclear Licensing

• A. Soni, Supervisor, Environmental Qualifications and Specifications

J. E. Spivey, Engineer, QA  !

-*R. B. Stafford, Director, Operations QA

• K.- E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management

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• R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance Analyst 1

R. G. West, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls

D. W. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations

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L .The NRC re'sident inspectors also interviewed additional licensee' personnel

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during theLinspection period.

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' * Denotes those persons that attended the exit' interview conducted on - i

T September 16, 1987. a

P. . Lic'ensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings. I

a. (Closed) Violation (458/8577-01): Failure of design control program

with the use of'a field change notice (FCN) which was not appropriate

to the circumstances.

This' violation involved the use of an FCN which was misleading and

' difficult .to follow'.' Also, several pages of.the FCN were illegible

because of. poor. reproduction quality.1: This' occurred during the early

developmental' stage ~of the licensee design control program.

Immediate action taken,by the licensee included correcting;the

specific problems' identified in;the violation and conducting a review

-of.previously issued FCNs for similar problems. All. identified ',

problems 1from this review were documented and corrected.' The '

licensee quality assurance department also conducted an-audit of the-

' design control' program after the review and no other problems with

FCNs were identified. The present licensee design control procedures-

provide strict control on use and approval of FCNs, and a preprinted

form is used for legibility.

This violation is closed.  !

b. (Closed) Violation ^(458/8714-01); Failure to follow surveillance

test procedures.

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This violation involved the failure of instrumentation and

control (I&C) technicians involved in the' performance of a

surveillance test ~to. sign a prerequisite step indicating that each

had read and understood the procedure prior to test performance. The

principal technicians performing the test had signed, but not all

assisting technicians had done so. The licensee issued a memorandum

on June 22, 1987, which reiterated the importance of signing the

required steps by all technicians involved with test performance.

Also, all I&C technicians were given training which directs the

technicians regarding th'e requirement to indicate that they have read 1

and understand the test procedure regardless of what percentage of j

completion of the test in which they become involved.

This violation is closed.

3. Licensee Action on a NRC Information Notice

This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions relative

to NRC Information Notice No. 87-21, " Shutdown Order Issued Because

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Licensed Operators Asleep While on Duty." The stated purpose of this

notice was to reaffirm the principle of high standards of control room

professionalism and operator attentiveness that are essential to ensure a

nuclear power reactor facility is. operated safely and in a manner'which-

will protect the health and safety.of the public. The licensee roviewed

their policies and practices for conduct of operations and determined that

the necessary elements for maintenance of a professional atmosphere in the

control room and throughout the facility are included. In' addition, '

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management personnel periodically conduct unannounced inspections of work

areas at various hours to assure alertness of all personnel. To date, no

instances of inattention of licensed or non-licensed operators has been

identified. The licensee quality assurance organization conducted-

periodic surveillance of control room watchstanding activities with j

results similar to those of the management inspections. '

The NRC resident inspectors monitor control room professionalism and -

operator attentiveness on a continuous basis during routine and reactive l

inspections. Control room professionalism and operator attentiveness has,

in general, been observed to be very good with some intermittent problems

with control room congestion during peak work load periods. . The control

room design at River Bend has not been ideal for flow of traffic to handle

administrative duties of the shift supervision. The licensee has been

aggressive in handling congestion in the control room and consequently no

major problems with congestion have occurred. The licensee is making some

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modifications to' the control room access area during this refueling outage

which should further alleviate problems with control room congestion. The

resident inspectors will monitor the control room modifications and

evaluate control room access improvements as an open item (458/8720-01).

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

This information notice is closed.

4. Licensed Operator Requalification Program

The resident inspectors reviewed the licensed operator requalification

program to verify that the program being implemented by the licensee

complied with the licensee's NRC approved training prograa and 10 CFR

Part 55. During the performance of this review, the resident inspectors

verified that the following program elements were implemented by the

licensee:

Preplanned lectures required by the licensee's NRC-approved training

program have been given to the operating staff and are scheduled

throughout the remainder of the 2 year requalification program.

Training lectures included review of station systems and technical

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All licensed personnel reviewed emergency and abnormal operating

procedures annually.

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Documentation was.available to indicate that operations and staff

supervision personnel (licensed individuals not assigned to an

operations crew) reviewed facility design changes, proceduto changes,

facility license changes, and abnormal and emergency operating

procedures.

All licensed individuals who failed the annual requalification exam

were placed in an accelerated requalification program.

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All licensed individuals who scored low in any particular category

were required to attend appropriate lectures. (Each licensed

individual attends all lectures given during the requalification

module.)

All licensed individuals received on-the-job training.

Each licensed operator completed an annual requalification

examination prepared by the licensee or NRC staff.

The required control manipulations were performed within the annual

and biennial cycles.

Records were maintained by the training department to document

participation by each licensed operator in the above activities.

The licensee has established a lesson schedule for the remainder of the

licensed operator requalification cycle. This scheduled training is to be

supplemented by additional training in preparation for the refueling

outage. The lesson plans necessary to perform this training have been

completed. In addition, a training representative has been working with

GE to determine what additional training may be necessary for the outage.

The resident inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for incorporation  ;

of significant operating event reports (SOERs), licensee event '

reports (LERs), NRC Information Notices and other event-related reports

into the training program. This program was established in Training

Administrative Procedure (TAP) TAP-5-005," Configuration Management of

Training Systems." This procedure implements the training management

review (TMR) program. A TMR is assigned to each LER, SOER, I&E Notice and

other event reports for review of applicability to the training program.

If it is determined that the TMR may affect the training program, a

training material discrepancy report (TMDR) is initiated to review the

training material and determine if the lesson plans are adequate or if an

additional revision is needed. Review of the TMR and TMDR logs revealed

that there were open TMRs and TMDRs dating back to June 1986 and

September 1986, respectively. This was discussed with licensee

management. During the discussion, the licensee was able to show that the

effort to reduce the backlog of IMRs and TMDRs had been accelerated. The

reduction of the TMR and TMDR backlog is an open item pending additional

review by the NRC inspector (458/8720-02).

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Eleven TMDRs were then selected which required changes to the lesson

plans. Nine of the eleven TMDRs had been incorporated into the lesson

plans; however, the remaining two had been filed with the applicable

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lesson plan after the lesson had been removed for revision. The licensee

was able.to demonstrate that the open TMDRs would be included in the final

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approved lesson plan, because of the subsequent review process. The

licensee is, however, examining possible controls that.can be implemented

to assure timely incorporation of the TMDR into lesson plans.

The licensee's annual requalification examination was reviewed for the

type and difficulty of the questions given. The questions were found to

be consistent with the questions used in the NRC administered

examinations. Grading practices were also reviewed and found to be

consistent throughout the examinations reviewed. The pass rates for the

requalification examinations administered by the licensee were 6 out of 7

for the reactor operators and 15 out of 16 for the senior reactor l

operators. The NRC examination pass rate was similar with 2 out of 3 for

the reactor operators and 6 out of 6 for the senior reactor operators.

Each of the individuals that failed the requalification examination was  ;

placed in an accelerated training program and subsequently passed a

re-examination. The licensee is presently considering a program to

evaluate individuals who score between 70 and 80 percent in the same

category during successive years to determine if additional training may

be necessary. At the present time, however, a sufficient history of each

individual's performance does not exist to implement such a program.

During the review of the emergency and abnormal operating procedure

signoff sheets, which acknowledge that these procedures have been

reviewed, the resident inspectors noted that several individuals were

reviewing the procedures 3 to 4 months after the assigned due date.

Although this practice did not result in any licensed personnel exceeding

the annual review cycle for emergency and abnormal operating procedures,

this could have resulted in problems during subsequent requalification

cycles. Review of the licensee's action to assure that the review of

abnormal and emergency operations procedures is conducted in a timely

manner is an open item (458/8720-03).

It was noted that the training department utilizes a fully functional

reactor plant simulator specifically designed to simulate operations at

River Bend Station. The licensee has developed programs similar to the

TMR/TMOR programs in order to maintain the simulator design and operation

consistent with the plant. These programs are identified as the simulator

work order (SW0) and simulator problem report (SPR). The SW0 is used to

make modifications to the simulator, and the SPR serves to identify either

an operational change to the plant or an operational problem with the

simulator. The SW0s are approximately 3 months behind the actual status

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of the plant, and all the Priority 1 SPRs have been resolved. The

remaining SW0s and SPRs are scheduled to be addressed during the next

simulator outage.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the

inspection.

5. Non-Licensed Staff Trainir.g

The NRC resident inspectors reviewed the non-licensed staff training

program to verify the program was being implemented in accordance with the

requirements of Technical Specification 6.4.1 and Section 13.2 of the

Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The review included examination of

training records, discussions with personnel, and review of selected

training material used in the classroom. Specific material reviewed

included training material on 10 CFR 50.59 reviews for the engineering

staff and the presently developed training material for the shift

technical advisors (STAS).

The licensee is presently developing lesson plans for the non-licensed

staff and modifying the existing lesson plans to strengthen training

programs. Changes to the existing lesson plans are accomplished using the

same TMR/TMDR program described in paragraph 4 of this report. Similar

backlogs of TMRs & TMDRs were noted for the nonlicensed staff training

program and monitoring the reduction of this backlog is considered to be

an open item (458/8720-02).

INPO accreditation has been received for all areas of the licensed

operator requalification training programs and all areas of the

non-licensed staff training programs with the exception of chemistry,

radiation protection, and ter.hnical staff training. The licensee expects

to receive full INP0 accreditation during the summer of 1988. ,

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the

inspection.

6. Maintenance Observation

During this inspection period, the resident inspectors observed

maintenance activities conducted under Prompt Maintenar.;e Work

Order (PMWO) 55343 and reviewed PMW0 Package 55352. The resident

inspector verified through observation and/or the review of records that:

The activities did not violate limiting condition for

operation (LCOs);

the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained

before initiating work;

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the procedures used were adequate to control the work;

the equipment was tested before being returned to service, and

adequate quality control coverage was provided as required for work

performed under PMW0s.

The following observations were made for each of the above maintenance

activities:

PMWO-55343 - This PMW0 was initiated on August 14, 1987, to repair Flow

Switch 1RMS*FS11B for the reactor building annulus exhaust ventilation

Radiation Monitor 1RMS&RE118. The inoperable flow switch prevented the

process flow sample pump from operating. This radiation monitor is

required by Technical Specifications (TSs), to be operable in Operating

Conditions 1, 2, and 3. LC0 87-425 was initiated at the same time as the

PMW0 as required by TS with the reactor in Operational Condition 1. The

flow switch was replaced and calibrated in accordance with the approved

procedure. The reactor building annulus Radiation Monitor 1RMS*RE11B, was

functionally 15, 1987, using Surveillance Test

. Procedure (y tested on AugustSTP) 511-4556, "RMS/SCIS reactor building annulu

ventilation radiation high-high monthly CHFUNCT 1RMS*RE11B," and

subsequently returned to service.

PMWO-55352 - This PMW0 was initiated on August 18, 1987, with the reactor

in Operational Condition 3 following the manual reactor scram at

6:22 a.m. (CDT). This PMWO identified that Control Rod 16-53 scrammed

at a rate that would be expected by drive water pressure and not the

accumulator discharging. The licensee identified that the scram inlet {

Solenoid Operated Valve (S0V) 139 did not change position despite being {

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deenergized. This failure will not prevent a control rod from scramming

as was noted, because the air pressure used to maintain the inlet and

outlet scram valves closed will bleed back through the air header eventually j

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allowing the scram valves to open when the air pressure decreases. The

S0V was subsequently replaced and the failed SOV sent to GE for a determination

of the failure mode. The control rod was functionally tested on August 20, j

1987, with the reactor in Operational Condition 2 as allowed by TS using ]

STP-052-3701. Following the satisfactory completion of the STP, the i

licensee resumed full-power operations. See paragraph 9 for a j

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description of the event.

No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.

7. Safety System Walkdown

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On September 10, 1987, the senior resident inspector and resident

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inspector performed a walkdown of the fuel building ventilation system and  !

the spent fuel cooling system. I

The fuel building ventilation system normally provides supply air and area l

cooling for the fuel building. The exhaust air system is normally aligned j

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around the charcoal filtration units. In the' event of a loss of coolant

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accident or a.high-high radiation alarm iri the fuel building, the supply.

air system will-isolate, and the exhaust air system will realign through

.the charcoal = filters. .This provides a'slightly negative pressure in.the

fuel: building and assures that all the exhaust air is filtered prior to

release. The two independent fuel building ventilation charcoal

filtration subsystems are: required to be operable in Operational

. Conditions 1, 2, and 3_ and when handling irradiated fuel. in the fuel

' building. Radiation monitoring of the exhaust air is provided in both the

normal and filtration modes. The walkdown of this system did not reveal

any conditions ~that would prevent the system from operating as required in

either the normal or filtration mode. The required. instrumentation was

properly ' aligned and the control board alignments and. instruments did not

indicate any abnormal' conditions.

The spent fuel pool cooling' system is- provided.to remove decay' heat from

inactivated fuel assemblies and to maintain the required water level in

the spent fuel. pool. During the walkdown of this system, the NRC

inspectors noted what appeared to be a slight, recurring, water hammer

e in the "B" spent fuel pool cooling suction line with the "B" pump in

operation. This condition was identified to the. licensee, who initiated

Condition Report (CR) 87-1068 to evaluate this condition prior to movement

of irradiated fuel. The NRC inspectors are monitoring licensee corrective

actions.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the

inspection.

8. Surveillance Test Witness

During this inspection period, the resident-inspectors observed the

performance of Surveillance Test Procedures (STP) STP-505-4504, ,

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"RPS/ Control R00 Block-APRM WEEKLY CHFUNCT, WEEKLY CHCAL (51*K605 D) and

18 month LSFT" STP-000-0001, " Daily Operating Log" and STP-309-0202,

" Diesel Generator Division II OPERABILITY TEST."

STP-505-4504: This STP was performed on August 15, 1987, to meet the

channel functional test and calibrate the RPS-APRM flow biased

channel and control rod block-APRM for average power range monitor

(APRM) D Os required by the Technical Specifications (TSs). The

resident inspectors noted that the technicians performing the

surveillance were cognizant of the surveillance requirements and that

communications were maintained between the operator's console and the

back panel where the second technician was located. Review of the

final STP package indicated the procedure had received the required

operations review and that the acceptance criteria had been met.

STP-000-0001: This STP was performed on Auoust 15, 1987, by the back  ;

shift operations crew to meet the TS surveillance requirements for

channel functional tests with a frequency of less than or equal to

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The resident inspectors observed that all steps on the

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data sheet were completed and that the abnormal readings were circled'

in red ink and reported to the shift supervisor / control operating

foreman.

STP-309-0202: This STP was performed on August 28, 1987, to verify

the operability of the Division II Diesel Generator after the

o Division' I Diesel Generator was declared inoperable, as required by

TS Action Statement 3.8.1.1.b. The resident inspectors observed that

the Division II Diesel Generator met the operability requirements

. established in TS Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and

4.8.1.1.2.a.5.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the l

inspection.

9. Operational Safety Verification

The resident inspectors observed operational activities throughout the  !'

inspection period and closely monitored operational events. Control room

activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled. Proper

control room staffing was maintained, and access to the control room

operational areas was controlled. Operators were questioned regarding lit

annunciators, and they understood why the annunciators were lit in all

cases. Selected shift turnover meetings were observed, and it was found

that information concerning plant status was being covered in each of

these meetings. System walkdowns of the "C" low pressure coolant

injection system and the high pressure core spray system were conducted to L

verify major flow path alignments for operability. Also, detailed system ]

walkdowns of the fuel building ventilation system and the fuel pool

cooling system were conducted, and the results are documented in

paragraph 7 of this report. Plant tours were conducted, and overall plant ]

cleanliness was good. j

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General radiation protection practices were observed, and no problems were  !

noted. Personnel exiting the ra.iiation control area (RCA) were observed;

radiation monitors were being properly utilized to check for

contamination. Also, ingress and egress points for contaminated areas

within the RCA were controlled with contaminated materials being properly

stored. The ALARA program involvement with the scheduled refueling outage ,

was reviewed, and the results are documented in paragraph 10 of this J

report. j

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The resioent inspectors interviewed security personnel in the central l

alarm station, secondary alarm station, and in the plant and verified that

compensatory posts had been established when required and that each

individual interviewed was cognizant of assigned duties. The resident )

inspectors reviewed the security maintenance log and noted that there were i

no extended outages of security equipment. Personnel entry and exit from

the protected area were observed, and no problems were noted.

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L During this inspection period, the plant began a power coastdown for the i'

first refueling outage. A planned reactor shutdown was completed at

7:57.a.m. (CDT) on September 14, 1987. A refueling outage of 60 days is i

scheduled. The licensee preparations for refueling are discussed in

paragraph 10 of this report.

The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational i

events and potential problems. The results of reviews of selected items

are described below:

Drywell Leakage: During this inspection period the licensee

experienced a problem with increasing drywell leakage which resulted

in a controlled plant shutdown on August 18, 1987. The unidentified

leakage peaked at approximately 4.9 gallons per minute (GPM), which ,

is below the TS limit of 5.0 GPM. After the plant shutdown, the i

licensee found a valve packing leak in the drywell. The valve '

packing was replaced, and the plant was restarted on August 20, 1987.

Single Control Rod Slow Scram Time: During the plant shutdown on

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August 18, 1987, the licensee initiated a manual reactor scram at a

low power level. During this manual scram the reactor operator noted

that one control rod (16-53) was slow in reaching the full in

position. The rod appeared to drift in at normal drive speed rather

than the required scram speed. The licensee investigated the problem

and found that Solenoid Operated Valve (S0V) 139, for Control

Rod 16-53 was acting erratically. This 50V was apparently not

allowing the air to vent off of the scram valves. The licensee

replaced this 50V and verified proper operation of Control Rod 16-53

prior to restart and subsequently verified required TS scram times

for the control rod. The licensee has returned the S0V to General

Electric for a failure analysis. The senior resident inspector will

monitor the licensee actions to determine the failure mechanism of

this S0V as an open item (458/8720-04). See paragraph 6 for

description of the corrective action.

Diesel Fuel Oil Analysis: On September 1,1987, the licensee's

chemistry department issued CR 87-1038 to document a failure of a

diesel fuel oil sample analysis to meet TS limits for ash content and

distillation temperature. Initial indications were that the suspect

oil had been added to all three diesel generators. The licensee

operations staff immediately declared Divisions I, II, and III

emergency diesel generators inoperable and began a plant shutdown in

accordance with TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3.

Prior to completion of the shutdown, the licensee was able to confirm

that the suspect oil had not been added to the Division I diesel

generator. The licensee then declared only the Division II and III

diesel generators inoperable and entered a 72-hour LC0 action

statement before a plant shutdown would be required. Samples of all

three diesel generator storage tanks were reanalyzed on September 2,

1987, and all were found to be well within TS limits. This allowed

the licensee to declare the Division 11 and III diesel generators

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operable and the 72-hour LC0 was cancelled. The licensee is

continuing the investigation of this problem, but it appears as if

improvements in the control of chemistry-related TS surveillance are

needed.

The senior resident inspector noted from the review of this problem

that the initial sample had been taken on June 25, 1987, and although

all TS required initial analysis had been completed on site by the

licensee, the TS required detailed analysis performed by a vendor off

site, which had to be verified within 31 days, was not received on

site by the chemistry department until August 27, 1987. The results

of the analysis were then found to be out of tolerance on

September 1, 1987. This failure to verify within 31 days of

obtaining the sample that other properties specified in Table 1 of

ASTM D975-81 are met as required by TS Section 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 was 1

identified by the senior resident inspector as an apparent violation

(458/8720-05). In addition, during subsequent discussions with the

licensee QA organization, it was found that the procurement document

fcr Petro-Check, Incorporated, which is the lab that performs the

detailed analysis, had been revised on May 5, 1986, to remove any QA

program requirements. This was done as a result of the disposition

of CR 86-0692, which documented problems with QA program controls at  !

Petro-Check. This CR was issued by QA as a result of an audit at

Petro-Check. The engineering disposition of this CR was to remove

any 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, QA program requirements from the l

purchase order. Since the diesel fuel oil is purchased from Exxon

with no QA program requirements imposed and the Petro-Check analysis

is required by TS for diesel generator operability, the senior l

resident inspector identified the failure to include necessary QA l

program controls in the Petro-Check purchase order as an apparent I

violation (458/8720-06).

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Misaligned Instrument Valves: During this inspection period, two

instances of misaligned instrument valves were identified by the

licensee. The first instance was discovered on August 11, 1987, and

was documented on CR 87-0953. An isolation valve to a reactor core

isolation cooling (RCIC) system transmitter was found shut. This

shut valve caused the turbine exhaust diaphragm portion of the

Division I isolation logic to be inoperable. The Division 11 logic

was not affected and several other instruments existed to provide

RCIC isolation. The RCIC system operability was not affected by the

shut valve. The licensee investigation of this problem identified

that the last verification of this valve position was October 1985

and no subsequent tests or maintenance work was identified which

would have repositioned the valve.

The second instance was discovered on September 14, 1987, during the

investigation of the inability to reset a half scram condition. This

was documented on CR 87-1087. An instrument valve to a scram

discharge volume level instrument was found locked closed instead of

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locked open as required. This closed valve would nnt allow water to

drain from the instrument to allow resetting of the manual scram that

had been initiated. This did not block any safety function

performance. Initial investigation by the licensee revealed that a i

surveillance test of this instrument had been performed on l

September 11, 1987, which required repositioning of this valve.

However, documentation indicated that the valve had been returned to

the locked open position. The licensee is continuing the 1

investigation of this event. This issue will remain an unresolved "

item pending completion of the licensee investigation and review of i

any resultant licensee actions (458/8720-07).

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10. Preparation for Refueling i

During this inspection period, the resident inspectors reviewed licensee j

actions to prepare for the first refueling outage at River Bend. This

outage began on September 14, 1987, and is scheduled to last for 60 days. 4

Procedures and administrative controls were reviewed, and no problems were ,

noted. Procedure areas included, receipt inspection of new fuel, outage i

planning and management, alternate decay heat removal verification,  ;

control of refueling operations, fuel transfer tube operations, i

criticality rules, and fuel handling mishaps.

Prior to initial receipt of the new fuel shipment which began on August 8,

1987, the resident inspectors toured the fuel handling building to verify

that activities necessary for receipt of new fuel had been completed.

Reactor engineering procedure requirements for " Criticality Rules" were

also observed to have been implemented prior to storage of the new fuel 1

bundles. During the receipt of new fuel, the resident inspectors observed i

selected activities for the off load, inspection, channeling and storage

of the new fuel bundles. Radiological protection controls and handling

and inspection of new fuel bundles and channels were observed to be well

controlled.

The ALARA programs coordinator was interviewed, and it was apparent that

efforts to maintain radiation exposure "As Low As Reasonably Achievable"

during the outage were being factored into outage planning and scheduling.

The ALARA program will also be implemented on a day-to-day basis during

the outage.

The licensee has assembled a dedicated outage schedule management team to

coordinate activities with operations and maintenance departments during

the outage. The resident inspectors will continue to monitor outage

activities throughout the outage.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.

11. Unresolved Item

An unresolved item is one about which additional information is required

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in ordd7? to catermine if it is acceptable, a deviation, or a violation.

~fhere s is#que chresolved item in this report,

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,,a,ragr pah, item No. Subiec__t

Misaligned Instrument Valves

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9 458/E720-07

12. Exit and Ippection Interview

AnexibinterviewwasconductedonSeptember 16, 1987, with licensee

reprecentitives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the ,

<senice' resident inspector and resident inspector reviewed the scope and i

findings of thi inspectior.. j

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