ML20235L878
| ML20235L878 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1987 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Jaudon J, William Jones NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235L848 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-87-20, IEIN-87-021, IEIN-87-21, NUDOCS 8710050629 | |
| Download: ML20235L878 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1987020
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Repor::
50-458/87-20
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Docket: 50-458
Licensee: Culf States Utilities Company (GSUN
P. O. Box 220
St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775
Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: August I through September 15, 1987
Inspectors:
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D. D. (f'hamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector
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Project Section A, Reactor Projects Branch
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W. B. . Tones, Residen Inspector
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Prcj.mt Section A, Reactor P
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Approved:
, Chief, Protect Section A
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.. P/ Jaud
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R{ actor Projects Branch
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8710050629 870930
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted August I through September 15, 1987 (Report 50-458/87-20)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on
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previous inspection findings, licensee action.on a NRC Information Notice,
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licensed operator requalification program, non-licensed staf' training,
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maintenance witnessing, safety system walkdown, surveillance J.est witnessing,
operational safety verification and preparation for refueline.
Results: Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified'(failure
to verify diesel fuel oil properties within 31 days and failure to include
QA program controls in a procurement document).
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DETAILS-
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Persons' Contacted
~*D. L. Andrews,LDirector,. Nuclear Training.
W.-J. Beck,; Supervisor, Reactor Engineering
- J. E. Booker..' Manager,. 0versight
J. L. Burton, Supervisor .. Independent Safety' Engineering Group _
> W. Bushall, Nuclear Training Coordinator
. E. M. Cargil1~,. Supervisor, Radiation Programs.
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- J. W.. Cook . Lead Environmental Analyst,-Nuclear Licensing-
- J..C. Deddens,, Senior..Vice-President, River Bend Nuclear Group
D. R. Derbonne, Assistant: Plant Manager, Maintenance
.D. Dietzel,LNuclear Training Coordinator
C. L. Fantacci... Supervisor, Radiological Engineering
- R. W. Frayer, Director, Projects-
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- P. E.-Freehill, Outage' Manager
- C. E. Foster, Assistant Supervisor, Plant ' Security
A. O. Fredieu, Assistant' Supervisor, Operations
- D. R. Gipson, Director, Quality Services
- P. D. Graham, Assistant-Plant Manager, Operations
- E. R. Grant, Director, Nuclear Licensing _
J. R. Hamilton, Director, Des _ign Engineering
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R..W.~~Helmick, Director, Projects _.
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K. C. Hodges, Supervisor,' Chemistry
R. Horn, Nuclear Training Coordinator
- R. N. Jackson, Nuclear Training Coordinator
L. G.-Johnson, Site Representative,. Cajun
G. R. Kimmell, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance (QA)
- R. J. King, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- A. D. Kowalczuk, Director, Oversight
I. ' M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Systems
V. J. Normand, Supervisor, Administrative Services
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- W. H. Odell, Manager, Administration
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- T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager
C. A. Rohrmann, Training Systems Coordinator
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M. F. Sankovich, Manager, Engineering
R. R.' Smith, Engineer, Nuclear Licensing
- A. Soni, Supervisor, Environmental Qualifications and Specifications
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J. E. Spivey, Engineer, QA
-*R. B. Stafford, Director, Operations QA
- K.- E. Suhrke, Manager, Project Management
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- R. J. Vachon, Senior Compliance Analyst
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R. G. West, Supervisor, Instrumentation and Controls
D. W. Williamson, Supervisor, Operations
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.The NRC re'sident inspectors also interviewed additional licensee' personnel
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during theLinspection period.
' * Denotes those persons that attended the exit' interview conducted on -
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September 16, 1987.
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Lic'ensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings.
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a.
(Closed) Violation (458/8577-01):
Failure of design control program
with the use of'a field change notice (FCN) which was not appropriate
to the circumstances.
This' violation involved the use of an FCN which was misleading and
' difficult .to follow'.' Also, several pages of.the FCN were illegible
because of. poor. reproduction quality.1: This' occurred during the early
developmental' stage ~of the licensee design control program.
Immediate action taken,by the licensee included correcting;the
specific problems' identified in;the violation and conducting a review
-of.previously issued FCNs for similar problems.
All. identified
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problems 1from this review were documented and corrected.' The
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licensee quality assurance department also conducted an-audit of the-
' design control' program after the review and no other problems with
FCNs were identified. The present licensee design control procedures-
provide strict control on use and approval of FCNs, and a preprinted
form is used for legibility.
This violation is closed.
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b.
(Closed) Violation ^(458/8714-01);
Failure to follow surveillance
test procedures.
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This violation involved the failure of instrumentation and
control (I&C) technicians involved in the' performance of a
surveillance test ~to. sign a prerequisite step indicating that each
had read and understood the procedure prior to test performance.
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principal technicians performing the test had signed, but not all
assisting technicians had done so.
The licensee issued a memorandum
on June 22, 1987, which reiterated the importance of signing the
required steps by all technicians involved with test performance.
Also, all I&C technicians were given training which directs the
technicians regarding th'e requirement to indicate that they have read
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and understand the test procedure regardless of what percentage of
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completion of the test in which they become involved.
This violation is closed.
3.
Licensee Action on a NRC Information Notice
This area of inspection was conducted to review licensee actions relative
to NRC Information Notice No. 87-21, " Shutdown Order Issued Because
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Licensed Operators Asleep While on Duty." The stated purpose of this
notice was to reaffirm the principle of high standards of control room
professionalism and operator attentiveness that are essential to ensure a
nuclear power reactor facility is. operated safely and in a manner'which-
will protect the health and safety.of the public.
The licensee roviewed
their policies and practices for conduct of operations and determined that
the necessary elements for maintenance of a professional atmosphere in the
control room and throughout the facility are included.
In' addition,
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management personnel periodically conduct unannounced inspections of work
areas at various hours to assure alertness of all personnel.
To date, no
instances of inattention of licensed or non-licensed operators has been
identified.
The licensee quality assurance organization conducted-
periodic surveillance of control room watchstanding activities with
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results similar to those of the management inspections.
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The NRC resident inspectors monitor control room professionalism and
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operator attentiveness on a continuous basis during routine and reactive
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inspections.
Control room professionalism and operator attentiveness has,
in general, been observed to be very good with some intermittent problems
with control room congestion during peak work load periods. . The control
room design at River Bend has not been ideal for flow of traffic to handle
administrative duties of the shift supervision.
The licensee has been
aggressive in handling congestion in the control room and consequently no
major problems with congestion have occurred.
The licensee is making some
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modifications to' the control room access area during this refueling outage
which should further alleviate problems with control room congestion.
The
resident inspectors will monitor the control room modifications and
evaluate control room access improvements as an open item (458/8720-01).
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
This information notice is closed.
4.
Licensed Operator Requalification Program
The resident inspectors reviewed the licensed operator requalification
program to verify that the program being implemented by the licensee
complied with the licensee's NRC approved training prograa and 10 CFR Part 55.
During the performance of this review, the resident inspectors
verified that the following program elements were implemented by the
licensee:
Preplanned lectures required by the licensee's NRC-approved training
program have been given to the operating staff and are scheduled
throughout the remainder of the 2 year requalification program.
Training lectures included review of station systems and technical
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specifications.
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All licensed personnel reviewed emergency and abnormal operating
procedures annually.
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Documentation was.available to indicate that operations and staff
supervision personnel (licensed individuals not assigned to an
operations crew) reviewed facility design changes, proceduto changes,
facility license changes, and abnormal and emergency operating
procedures.
All licensed individuals who failed the annual requalification exam
were placed in an accelerated requalification program.
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All licensed individuals who scored low in any particular category
were required to attend appropriate lectures.
(Each licensed
individual attends all lectures given during the requalification
module.)
All licensed individuals received on-the-job training.
Each licensed operator completed an annual requalification
examination prepared by the licensee or NRC staff.
The required control manipulations were performed within the annual
and biennial cycles.
Records were maintained by the training department to document
participation by each licensed operator in the above activities.
The licensee has established a lesson schedule for the remainder of the
licensed operator requalification cycle.
This scheduled training is to be
supplemented by additional training in preparation for the refueling
outage.
The lesson plans necessary to perform this training have been
completed.
In addition, a training representative has been working with
GE to determine what additional training may be necessary for the outage.
The resident inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for incorporation
of significant operating event reports (SOERs), licensee event
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reports (LERs), NRC Information Notices and other event-related reports
into the training program.
This program was established in Training
Administrative Procedure (TAP) TAP-5-005," Configuration Management of
Training Systems." This procedure implements the training management
review (TMR) program.
A TMR is assigned to each LER, SOER, I&E Notice and
other event reports for review of applicability to the training program.
If it is determined that the TMR may affect the training program, a
training material discrepancy report (TMDR) is initiated to review the
training material and determine if the lesson plans are adequate or if an
additional revision is needed.
Review of the TMR and TMDR logs revealed
that there were open TMRs and TMDRs dating back to June 1986 and
September 1986, respectively.
This was discussed with licensee
management.
During the discussion, the licensee was able to show that the
effort to reduce the backlog of IMRs and TMDRs had been accelerated.
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reduction of the TMR and TMDR backlog is an open item pending additional
review by the NRC inspector (458/8720-02).
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Eleven TMDRs were then selected which required changes to the lesson
plans. Nine of the eleven TMDRs had been incorporated into the lesson
plans; however, the remaining two had been filed with the applicable
lesson plan after the lesson had been removed for revision. The licensee
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was able.to demonstrate that the open TMDRs would be included in the final
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approved lesson plan, because of the subsequent review process. The
licensee is, however, examining possible controls that.can be implemented
to assure timely incorporation of the TMDR into lesson plans.
The licensee's annual requalification examination was reviewed for the
type and difficulty of the questions given. The questions were found to
be consistent with the questions used in the NRC administered
examinations. Grading practices were also reviewed and found to be
consistent throughout the examinations reviewed. The pass rates for the
requalification examinations administered by the licensee were 6 out of 7
for the reactor operators and 15 out of 16 for the senior reactor
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operators. The NRC examination pass rate was similar with 2 out of 3 for
the reactor operators and 6 out of 6 for the senior reactor operators.
Each of the individuals that failed the requalification examination was
placed in an accelerated training program and subsequently passed a
re-examination. The licensee is presently considering a program to
evaluate individuals who score between 70 and 80 percent in the same
category during successive years to determine if additional training may
be necessary. At the present time, however, a sufficient history of each
individual's performance does not exist to implement such a program.
During the review of the emergency and abnormal operating procedure
signoff sheets, which acknowledge that these procedures have been
reviewed, the resident inspectors noted that several individuals were
reviewing the procedures 3 to 4 months after the assigned due date.
Although this practice did not result in any licensed personnel exceeding
the annual review cycle for emergency and abnormal operating procedures,
this could have resulted in problems during subsequent requalification
cycles. Review of the licensee's action to assure that the review of
abnormal and emergency operations procedures is conducted in a timely
manner is an open item (458/8720-03).
It was noted that the training department utilizes a fully functional
reactor plant simulator specifically designed to simulate operations at
River Bend Station. The licensee has developed programs similar to the
TMR/TMOR programs in order to maintain the simulator design and operation
consistent with the plant. These programs are identified as the simulator
work order (SW0) and simulator problem report (SPR). The SW0 is used to
make modifications to the simulator, and the SPR serves to identify either
an operational change to the plant or an operational problem with the
simulator.
The SW0s are approximately 3 months behind the actual status
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of the plant, and all the Priority 1 SPRs have been resolved. The
remaining SW0s and SPRs are scheduled to be addressed during the next
simulator outage.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
5.
Non-Licensed Staff Trainir.g
The NRC resident inspectors reviewed the non-licensed staff training
program to verify the program was being implemented in accordance with the
requirements of Technical Specification 6.4.1 and Section 13.2 of the
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The review included examination of
training records, discussions with personnel, and review of selected
training material used in the classroom.
Specific material reviewed
included training material on 10 CFR 50.59 reviews for the engineering
staff and the presently developed training material for the shift
technical advisors (STAS).
The licensee is presently developing lesson plans for the non-licensed
staff and modifying the existing lesson plans to strengthen training
programs.
Changes to the existing lesson plans are accomplished using the
same TMR/TMDR program described in paragraph 4 of this report. Similar
backlogs of TMRs & TMDRs were noted for the nonlicensed staff training
program and monitoring the reduction of this backlog is considered to be
an open item (458/8720-02).
INPO accreditation has been received for all areas of the licensed
operator requalification training programs and all areas of the
non-licensed staff training programs with the exception of chemistry,
radiation protection, and ter.hnical staff training. The licensee expects
to receive full INP0 accreditation during the summer of 1988.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
6.
Maintenance Observation
During this inspection period, the resident inspectors observed
maintenance activities conducted under Prompt Maintenar.;e Work
Order (PMWO) 55343 and reviewed PMW0 Package 55352. The resident
inspector verified through observation and/or the review of records that:
The activities did not violate limiting condition for
operation (LCOs);
the required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained
before initiating work;
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the procedures used were adequate to control the work;
the equipment was tested before being returned to service, and
adequate quality control coverage was provided as required for work
performed under PMW0s.
The following observations were made for each of the above maintenance
activities:
PMWO-55343 - This PMW0 was initiated on August 14, 1987, to repair Flow
Switch 1RMS*FS11B for the reactor building annulus exhaust ventilation
Radiation Monitor 1RMS&RE118.
The inoperable flow switch prevented the
process flow sample pump from operating.
This radiation monitor is
required by Technical Specifications (TSs), to be operable in Operating
Conditions 1, 2, and 3.
LC0 87-425 was initiated at the same time as the
PMW0 as required by TS with the reactor in Operational Condition 1.
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flow switch was replaced and calibrated in accordance with the approved
procedure. The reactor building annulus Radiation Monitor 1RMS*RE11B, was
functionally
15, 1987, using Surveillance Test
. Procedure (y tested on AugustSTP) 511-4556, "RMS/SCIS reactor building annulu
ventilation radiation high-high monthly CHFUNCT 1RMS*RE11B," and
subsequently returned to service.
PMWO-55352 - This PMW0 was initiated on August 18, 1987, with the reactor
in Operational Condition 3 following the manual reactor scram at
6:22 a.m. (CDT). This PMWO identified that Control Rod 16-53 scrammed
at a rate that would be expected by drive water pressure and not the
accumulator discharging. The licensee identified that the scram inlet
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Solenoid Operated Valve (S0V) 139 did not change position despite being
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deenergized. This failure will not prevent a control rod from scramming
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as was noted, because the air pressure used to maintain the inlet and
outlet scram valves closed will bleed back through the air header eventually
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allowing the scram valves to open when the air pressure decreases.
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S0V was subsequently replaced and the failed SOV sent to GE for a determination
of the failure mode. The control rod was functionally tested on August 20,
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1987, with the reactor in Operational Condition 2 as allowed by TS using
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STP-052-3701.
Following the satisfactory completion of the STP, the
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licensee resumed full-power operations. See paragraph 9 for a
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description of the event.
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No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.
7.
Safety System Walkdown
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On September 10, 1987, the senior resident inspector and resident
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inspector performed a walkdown of the fuel building ventilation system and
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the spent fuel cooling system.
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The fuel building ventilation system normally provides supply air and area
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cooling for the fuel building. The exhaust air system is normally aligned
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around the charcoal filtration units.
In the' event of a loss of coolant
accident or a.high-high radiation alarm iri the fuel building, the supply.
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air system will-isolate, and the exhaust air system will realign through
.the charcoal = filters. .This provides a'slightly negative pressure in.the
fuel: building and assures that all the exhaust air is filtered prior to
release. The two independent fuel building ventilation charcoal
filtration subsystems are: required to be operable in Operational
. Conditions 1, 2, and 3_ and when handling irradiated fuel. in the fuel
' building.
Radiation monitoring of the exhaust air is provided in both the
normal and filtration modes. The walkdown of this system did not reveal
any conditions ~that would prevent the system from operating as required in
either the normal or filtration mode. The required. instrumentation was
properly ' aligned and the control board alignments and. instruments did not
indicate any abnormal' conditions.
The spent fuel pool cooling' system is- provided.to remove decay' heat from
inactivated fuel assemblies and to maintain the required water level in
the spent fuel. pool. During the walkdown of this system, the NRC
inspectors noted what appeared to be a slight, recurring, water hammer
in the "B" spent fuel pool cooling suction line with the "B" pump in
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operation. This condition was identified to the. licensee, who initiated
Condition Report (CR) 87-1068 to evaluate this condition prior to movement
of irradiated fuel.
The NRC inspectors are monitoring licensee corrective
actions.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
inspection.
8.
Surveillance Test Witness
During this inspection period, the resident-inspectors observed the
performance of Surveillance Test Procedures (STP) STP-505-4504,
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"RPS/ Control R00 Block-APRM WEEKLY CHFUNCT, WEEKLY CHCAL (51*K605 D) and
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18 month LSFT" STP-000-0001, " Daily Operating Log" and STP-309-0202,
" Diesel Generator Division II OPERABILITY TEST."
STP-505-4504:
This STP was performed on August 15, 1987, to meet the
channel functional test and calibrate the RPS-APRM flow biased
channel and control rod block-APRM for average power range monitor
(APRM) D Os required by the Technical Specifications (TSs). The
resident inspectors noted that the technicians performing the
surveillance were cognizant of the surveillance requirements and that
communications were maintained between the operator's console and the
back panel where the second technician was located.
Review of the
final STP package indicated the procedure had received the required
operations review and that the acceptance criteria had been met.
STP-000-0001:
This STP was performed on Auoust 15, 1987, by the back
shift operations crew to meet the TS surveillance requirements for
channel functional tests with a frequency of less than or equal to
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The resident inspectors observed that all steps on the
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data sheet were completed and that the abnormal readings were circled'
in red ink and reported to the shift supervisor / control operating
foreman.
STP-309-0202:
This STP was performed on August 28, 1987, to verify
the operability of the Division II Diesel Generator after the
Division' I Diesel Generator was declared inoperable, as required by
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TS Action Statement 3.8.1.1.b.
The resident inspectors observed that
the Division II Diesel Generator met the operability requirements
. established in TS Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and
4.8.1.1.2.a.5.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of the
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inspection.
9.
Operational Safety Verification
The resident inspectors observed operational activities throughout the
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inspection period and closely monitored operational events.
Control room
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activities and conduct were observed to be well controlled.
Proper
control room staffing was maintained, and access to the control room
operational areas was controlled.
Operators were questioned regarding lit
annunciators, and they understood why the annunciators were lit in all
cases.
Selected shift turnover meetings were observed, and it was found
that information concerning plant status was being covered in each of
these meetings.
System walkdowns of the "C" low pressure coolant
injection system and the high pressure core spray system were conducted to
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verify major flow path alignments for operability.
Also, detailed system
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walkdowns of the fuel building ventilation system and the fuel pool
cooling system were conducted, and the results are documented in
paragraph 7 of this report.
Plant tours were conducted, and overall plant
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cleanliness was good.
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General radiation protection practices were observed, and no problems were
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noted.
Personnel exiting the ra.iiation control area (RCA) were observed;
radiation monitors were being properly utilized to check for
contamination.
Also, ingress and egress points for contaminated areas
within the RCA were controlled with contaminated materials being properly
stored.
The ALARA program involvement with the scheduled refueling outage
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was reviewed, and the results are documented in paragraph 10 of this
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report.
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The resioent inspectors interviewed security personnel in the central
alarm station, secondary alarm station, and in the plant and verified that
compensatory posts had been established when required and that each
individual interviewed was cognizant of assigned duties.
The resident
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inspectors reviewed the security maintenance log and noted that there were
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no extended outages of security equipment.
Personnel entry and exit from
the protected area were observed, and no problems were noted.
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During this inspection period, the plant began a power coastdown for the
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first refueling outage. A planned reactor shutdown was completed at
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7:57.a.m. (CDT) on September 14, 1987. A refueling outage of 60 days is
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scheduled. The licensee preparations for refueling are discussed in
paragraph 10 of this report.
The resident inspectors also reviewed licensee actions on operational
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events and potential problems. The results of reviews of selected items
are described below:
Drywell Leakage:
During this inspection period the licensee
experienced a problem with increasing drywell leakage which resulted
in a controlled plant shutdown on August 18, 1987. The unidentified
leakage peaked at approximately 4.9 gallons per minute (GPM), which
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is below the TS limit of 5.0 GPM. After the plant shutdown, the
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licensee found a valve packing leak in the drywell. The valve
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packing was replaced, and the plant was restarted on August 20, 1987.
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Single Control Rod Slow Scram Time: During the plant shutdown on
August 18, 1987, the licensee initiated a manual reactor scram at a
low power level.
During this manual scram the reactor operator noted
that one control rod (16-53) was slow in reaching the full in
position. The rod appeared to drift in at normal drive speed rather
than the required scram speed. The licensee investigated the problem
and found that Solenoid Operated Valve (S0V) 139, for Control Rod 16-53 was acting erratically. This 50V was apparently not
allowing the air to vent off of the scram valves. The licensee
replaced this 50V and verified proper operation of Control Rod 16-53
prior to restart and subsequently verified required TS scram times
for the control rod. The licensee has returned the S0V to General
Electric for a failure analysis. The senior resident inspector will
monitor the licensee actions to determine the failure mechanism of
this S0V as an open item (458/8720-04).
See paragraph 6 for
description of the corrective action.
Diesel Fuel Oil Analysis:
On September 1,1987, the licensee's
chemistry department issued CR 87-1038 to document a failure of a
diesel fuel oil sample analysis to meet TS limits for ash content and
distillation temperature.
Initial indications were that the suspect
oil had been added to all three diesel generators. The licensee
operations staff immediately declared Divisions I, II, and III
emergency diesel generators inoperable and began a plant shutdown in
accordance with TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3.
Prior to completion of the shutdown, the licensee was able to confirm
that the suspect oil had not been added to the Division I diesel
generator. The licensee then declared only the Division II and III
diesel generators inoperable and entered a 72-hour LC0 action
statement before a plant shutdown would be required. Samples of all
three diesel generator storage tanks were reanalyzed on September 2,
1987, and all were found to be well within TS limits. This allowed
the licensee to declare the Division 11 and III diesel generators
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operable and the 72-hour LC0 was cancelled. The licensee is
continuing the investigation of this problem, but it appears as if
improvements in the control of chemistry-related TS surveillance are
needed.
The senior resident inspector noted from the review of this problem
that the initial sample had been taken on June 25, 1987, and although
all TS required initial analysis had been completed on site by the
licensee, the TS required detailed analysis performed by a vendor off
site, which had to be verified within 31 days, was not received on
site by the chemistry department until August 27, 1987.
The results
of the analysis were then found to be out of tolerance on
September 1, 1987. This failure to verify within 31 days of
obtaining the sample that other properties specified in Table 1 of
ASTM D975-81 are met as required by TS Section 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 was
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identified by the senior resident inspector as an apparent violation
(458/8720-05).
In addition, during subsequent discussions with the
licensee QA organization, it was found that the procurement document
fcr Petro-Check, Incorporated, which is the lab that performs the
detailed analysis, had been revised on May 5, 1986, to remove any QA
program requirements. This was done as a result of the disposition
of CR 86-0692, which documented problems with QA program controls at
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Petro-Check. This CR was issued by QA as a result of an audit at
Petro-Check. The engineering disposition of this CR was to remove
any 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, QA program requirements from the
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purchase order.
Since the diesel fuel oil is purchased from Exxon
with no QA program requirements imposed and the Petro-Check analysis
is required by TS for diesel generator operability, the senior
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resident inspector identified the failure to include necessary QA
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program controls in the Petro-Check purchase order as an apparent
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violation (458/8720-06).
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Misaligned Instrument Valves:
During this inspection period, two
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instances of misaligned instrument valves were identified by the
licensee. The first instance was discovered on August 11, 1987, and
was documented on CR 87-0953. An isolation valve to a reactor core
isolation cooling (RCIC) system transmitter was found shut. This
shut valve caused the turbine exhaust diaphragm portion of the
Division I isolation logic to be inoperable.
The Division 11 logic
was not affected and several other instruments existed to provide
RCIC isolation. The RCIC system operability was not affected by the
shut valve.
The licensee investigation of this problem identified
that the last verification of this valve position was October 1985
and no subsequent tests or maintenance work was identified which
would have repositioned the valve.
The second instance was discovered on September 14, 1987, during the
investigation of the inability to reset a half scram condition.
This
was documented on CR 87-1087. An instrument valve to a scram
discharge volume level instrument was found locked closed instead of
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locked open as required.
This closed valve would nnt allow water to
drain from the instrument to allow resetting of the manual scram that
had been initiated.
This did not block any safety function
performance.
Initial investigation by the licensee revealed that a
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surveillance test of this instrument had been performed on
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September 11, 1987, which required repositioning of this valve.
However, documentation indicated that the valve had been returned to
the locked open position.
The licensee is continuing the
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investigation of this event.
This issue will remain an unresolved
"
item pending completion of the licensee investigation and review of
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any resultant licensee actions (458/8720-07).
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10.
Preparation for Refueling
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During this inspection period, the resident inspectors reviewed licensee
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actions to prepare for the first refueling outage at River Bend.
This
outage began on September 14, 1987, and is scheduled to last for 60 days.
4
Procedures and administrative controls were reviewed, and no problems were
,
noted.
Procedure areas included, receipt inspection of new fuel, outage
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planning and management, alternate decay heat removal verification,
control of refueling operations, fuel transfer tube operations,
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criticality rules, and fuel handling mishaps.
Prior to initial receipt of the new fuel shipment which began on August 8,
1987, the resident inspectors toured the fuel handling building to verify
that activities necessary for receipt of new fuel had been completed.
Reactor engineering procedure requirements for " Criticality Rules" were
also observed to have been implemented prior to storage of the new fuel
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bundles.
During the receipt of new fuel, the resident inspectors observed
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selected activities for the off load, inspection, channeling and storage
of the new fuel bundles.
Radiological protection controls and handling
and inspection of new fuel bundles and channels were observed to be well
controlled.
The ALARA programs coordinator was interviewed, and it was apparent that
efforts to maintain radiation exposure "As Low As Reasonably Achievable"
during the outage were being factored into outage planning and scheduling.
The ALARA program will also be implemented on a day-to-day basis during
the outage.
The licensee has assembled a dedicated outage schedule management team to
coordinate activities with operations and maintenance departments during
the outage.
The resident inspectors will continue to monitor outage
activities throughout the outage.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
11.
Unresolved Item
An unresolved item is one about which additional information is required
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in ordd7? to catermine if it is acceptable, a deviation, or a violation.
~fhere s is#que chresolved item in this report,
,,a,ragr pah,
item No.
Subiec__t
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458/E720-07
Misaligned Instrument Valves
12.
Exit and Ippection Interview
AnexibinterviewwasconductedonSeptember 16, 1987, with licensee
reprecentitives (identified in paragraph 1).
During this interview, the
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<senice' resident inspector and resident inspector reviewed the scope and
findings of thi inspectior..
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