ML20235F490

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Insp Repts 50-348/87-13 & 50-364/87-13 on 870518-0612.Major Areas Inspected:Monthly Surveillance Observation,Monthly Maint Observation,Operational Safety Verification & Engineered Safety Sys Insp
ML20235F490
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 07/01/1987
From: Bradford W, Dance H
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235F455 List:
References
50-348-87-13, 50-364-87-13, NUDOCS 8707130413
Download: ML20235F490 (6)


See also: IR 05000348/1987013

Text

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11

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101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.

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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-348/87-13 and 50-364/87-13

Licensee: Alabama Power Company

600 North 18th Street

Birmingham, AL 35291

Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364

License Nos.:

NPF-2 and NPF-8

Facility name: Farley 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: May 18 - June 12, 1987

Inspection at

riey s'te near Doth n, Alabama

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Inspector:

SW

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W. H. Bradford

Oatt Si ed

Approved by:

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7 [ d' 7

41. C. Dance, Section Chief

Ddte Signe'd

Division of Reactor Projects

'

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, onsite inspection entailed: monthly surveillance

observation, monthly maintenance observation, operational safety verification,

and engineered safety system inspection.

Results:

One violation was identified with two examples: a procedure had not

been established for control of testing equipment and material and, failure to

perform post maintenance testing.

8707130413 870702

PDR

ADOCK 05000348

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REPORT DETAILS

1.

Licensee Employees Contacted

J. D. Woodard, General Plant Manager

D. N. Morey, Assistant General Plant Manager.

W. D. Shipman, Assistant General Plant Manager

R. D. Hill, Operations Manager

C. D. Nesbitt, Technical Manager

R. G. Berryhill, Systems Performance and Planning Manager

L. A. Ward, Maintenance Manager

L. W. Enfinger, Administrative Manager

B. Moore, Operations Supervisor

J. E. Odom,' Operations Unit Supervisor

B. W. Vanlandingham, Operations Unit Supervisor

T. H. Esteve, Planning Supervisor

J. B. Hudspeth, Document Control Supervisor

L. K. Jones, Material Supervisor

R. H. Marlow, Technical Supervisor

L. M. Stinson, Plant Modification Manager

J. K. Osterholtz, Supervisor, Safety Audit Engineering Review

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operations

personnel, maintenance and I&C personnel, security . force members, and

'

office personnel.

2.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management

interviews throughout the report period and on June 10, 1987, with the

general plant manager and selected members of his staff. The licensee

acknowledged the violation identified in Paragraph 7.

The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any material reviewed by the inspector during this

inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

This was not inspected.

4.

Unresolved Item *

See paragraph 7.

  • An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

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5.

Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed and reviewed Technical Specification required

surveillance testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance

with adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that

limiting conditions were met; that test results met acceptance criteria

and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the

test; that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly

reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel; and that

personnel

conducting the tests were qualified. The inspector

witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

Containment Integrity Verification Test

STP-14.0

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2B Diesel Generator Operability Test

STP-80.1

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2C Diesel Generator Operability Test

STP-80.2

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STP-22.19

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Flow Path Verification

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Auxiliary Feed Automatic Valve Position Verification

STP-22.18

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Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Annual Inservice

STP-22.17

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Test

Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio Calculation

STP-7.0

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Operations Daily Shift Surveillance Requirement

STP-1.0

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STP-71.0

Main Control Room Remote Valve Verification

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No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Mont,ly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components

were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance

with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards,

and were in conformance with Technical Specifications.

The following items were considered during the review:

limiting

conditions for operations were met while components or systems were

removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were

inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified

personnel; parts and materials were properly certified; radiological

controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs to

assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may affect system performance. The following maintenance activities

were observed / reviewed:

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D/G 1-2A starting air compressor PM's

Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump thrust bearing

balancing and lube oil classification change

,

Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feed pump steam supply valve

HV-3226 1B service water pump overhaul

1B auxiliary buildir.g 125V DC battery (3 cells replaced)

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Op'

tional Safety Verification (71707)

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the report

period.

The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency

systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of

affected components.

Tours of the auxiliary building, diesel building,

turbi~ building and service water structure were conducted to observe

pl a n'.

equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive

vibrations. The inspector verified compliance with selected Limiting

Conditions for Operations (LCO) and results of selected surveillance

tests.

The verifications were accomplished by direct observation of

monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, accessible

hydraulic snubbers, and review of completed logs, records, and chemistry

results.

The licensee's compliance with LC0 action statements were

reviewed as events occurred.

,

The inspector routinely attended meetings with certain licensee

management and observed various shift turnovers between shift supervisors,

shift foremen and licensed operators.

These meetings and discussions

provided a daily status of plant operations, maintenance, and testing

activities in progress, as well as discussions of significant problems.

The inspector verified by observation and interviews with security force

members that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the

facility met current requirements.

Areas inspected included the

organization of the security force; the establishment and maintenance of

gates, doors, and isolation zones; that access control and badging were

proper; and procedures were followed.

The inspector found that the licensee had not established and implemented

procedures establishing requirements for control of test equipment and

material storage following maintenance activities in safety related areas.

Certain safety related areas contained testing equipment for electrical

breaker testing, lifting devices for rod control MG set and ladders. None

of the equipment was secured to prevent potential movement and damage to

adjacent safety related equipment in case of a seismic event. Absence of

precedures to cover storage precautions of mobile equipment is the first

example of a violation of TS 6.8.1.a (348,364/87-13-01).

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On May 10, 1987 at 11:05 p.m. the licensee found 1B RHR pump room cooler

inlet and outlet valves (V021B and V0178) closed during the performance of

STP 24.5, Service Water Flow Path Verification.

The valves were

immediately opened and an investigation was initiated.

(See Unresolved

Item 364/87-10-02) . The licensee had completed changing service water

carbon steel piping to stainless steel piping on the room cooler.

A

hydrostatic test was performed and maintenance work requests 138205 and

157474 were released and signed off as functionally accepted on May 8,

1987 at 12:30 p.m.

At that time IB RHR pump room cooler was improperly

returned to service.

This was in violation of Administrative Procedure

(AP) 52, Equir at Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, Section

7.5.9 which

wra that proper test and restoration be completed prior

to functionu

Wante of the work request.

It further states that

those systems '

o Appendix III of AP-52 require that verification of

line up be per

prior to return to service. The service water system

is among thosa

.s listed in Appendix III.

modification was planned to be completed within

The service water i i ,,

the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LC0 peried .llowed by TS 3.5.2 Action statement a.

However,

the room cooler was out of service in excess of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> befote actual

valve verification by STP 24.5 found the mispositioned valves.

It was

recognized that the lack of room cooling could reduce the service life of

)

the 1B RHR pump motor if it had been required to operate.

It was not

required to operate.

1A RHR pump room cooler was operable during this

period. This event is described in Licensee Event Report 348/87-09.

Failure to properly restore the Unit 1B RHR pump room cooler to service

following maintenance as required by AP 52 is a second example of a

violation of TS 6.8.1.a and also resulted in exceeding the Action

statement a of TS 3 3.2 (348,364/87-14-01).

On June 9,1987, at approximately 10:30 a.m. the licensee attempted to

perform FNP-0-PMP 1087, Test For Isolation For Fires Dampers In The

)

Control Room Air Conditioning System.

The NRC Resident Inspector was

present to observe the test. The test could not be performed because both

trcin "A"

and "B" fire dampers were found to be inoperable.

Links were

found open in field terminal boxes on both trains; A wiring disorder was

found in a "A" train terminal box.

The licensee is investigating this

incident.

The inoperability of the control room fire dampers is

unresolved pending further evaluation (348,364/87-13-02).

8.

Engineered Safety Systems Inspection (71710)

The inspectors performed various system inspections during the inspection

period.

Overall plant conditions were assessed with particular attention

to equipment condition, radiological controls, security, safety, adherence

to technical specification requirements, systems valve alignment, and

locked valve verification.

Major components were checked for leakage and

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any general conditions that would degrade performance or prevent

fulfillment of functional requirements.

The inspectors verified that

approved procedures and up-to-date drawings were used.

Portions of the following systems were observed for proper operation,

valve alignment and valve verification:

Auxiliary Feedwater Systems

Chemical Volume Control Systems

Service Water Systems

Boric Acid Transfer System

Containment Spray System Including Chemical Additive System

Residual Heat Removal System

The systems were assessed to be operable in accordance with the Technical

Specifications, appropriate drawings, procedures, and the Final Safety

Analysis Report.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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