ML20235A302
| ML20235A302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
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| FOIA-87-737 NUDOCS 8801120186 | |
| Download: ML20235A302 (32) | |
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PREPARED TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY l
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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TO l
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS l
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1
I CONCERNING NRC LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, THE NUCLEAR POWER EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM ACT OF I
1987, AND THE WESTERN LOW-LEVEL RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL COMPACT I
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l PRESENTED BY LANDO W.
ZECH, JR.
l CHAIRMAN l
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SUBMITTED:
MAY 7, 1987 l
8801120186 880107 h,
SHOLLYB7-737 PDR
e tir. Chairman, Merrbers of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before ycu today to discuss four legislative proposals that the hRC submitted to Congress this year, the " Nuclear Power Emergency Response Data System Act of 1987." as well as the pecposed Western Low-leve.1 Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact.
The Commission is grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for introducing our legislative proposals, and we are most appreciative of the Committee's interest in cur legislative recommendations. Our testimony will begin with a discussicn of the 1
NRC legislative proposals.
NRC Legislative Proposals 1.
H.R. 1316--Unauthorized Possession of Firearms Three of the proposed bills seek to enhance our ability to prevent or deter theft or sabotage of nucle'ar equipment and materials.
H.R. 1316 would authorize the Commission to promulgate regulations which would prohibit a person who has not obtained prior authorization to carry, transport, or otherwise introduce or cause to be introduced any dangerous weapon, explosive, or other dangerous instrument into any facility, installation, or real property regulated by the Commission. Violation of the regulation would constitute a I
l federal crime punishable by a $5000 fine, imprisonment for not trore than one year, or both.
The Comission in promulgating implementing regulations would
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be authorized to determine the scope of the prohibition.
The Commission's intent would be to limit the applicability of those regulations to those i
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licensed nuclear facilities and materials which must be protected against theft or radiological sabotage.
This legislation is needed because there have been an increasing number of reported incidents where persons without authorization have brought firearms into protected areas of NRC regulated sites.
There were, for example, eleven such incidents in 1985 and twelve in 1986. While, the Consnission currently can and does impose sanctions against licensees for permitting unauthorized weapons or other dangercus instruments to enter the site, there is no federal law l
permitting the imposition of criminal sanctions against the person responsible for bringing the weapon or other dangerous instrument to the site.
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We believe enactment of H.R.1316 would assist our licensees in their efforts to safeguard those licensed nuclear facilities and materials which must be protected against nuclear theft or sabotage.
In addition, enactment of this legislation would promote the national policy of maintaining comparable safeguards for similar nuclear materials and facilities in the public.and private sectors. Under section 229a. of the Atomic Energy Act, unauthorized introduction of weapons or other dangerous instruments at nuclear facilities owned by the Department of Energy would constitute a federal crime.
Enactment of H.R.1316 would permit similar safeguards with respect to unauthorized introduction of weapons at non-CCE nuclear facilities.
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H.R. 1318--Sabotage During Construction of a Facility l
The second legislative prcposal, H.R.1318, would amend section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act to rake it a crime to sabotane or attempt to sabotage a nuclear production or utilization facility during its construction where the action, if it went undetected, could affect public health and safety.
Currently, section 236 covers acts of sabotage to a utilization facility only after it has received its operating license from the Commission.
Sabotage.
during the later stages of construction, particularly during pre-operational testing, can be equally serious.
For example, in 1984 a bag containing some-parts was found inside a oice which had been welded closed after it had undergone several pre-welding checks at a plant under construction.
While this incident was determined to be negligence rather than sabotage, it demonstrated that an act of sabotage during construction could potentially have an adverse effect on public health and safety.
Sabotage during the late stages of construction is of special concern since most inspections which would have discovered the sabotage would have already occurred.
Therefore there is the possibility that the sabotage might not be
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discovered prior to operation.
In drafting this legislation we have narrowly i
defined the type of sabotage which would constitute a federal offense.
1 The sabotage or attempted sabotage must be serious enough to have a possible effect on public health and safety if not discovered prior to operation.
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4 We therefore believe that enactment of H.P.1318 is warranted to provide greater protection for the public health and safety by ecacting criminal sanctions to deter such sabotage.
3.
H.R. 1319--Protection of Sensitive Generic Safeguards Information l
The third safeguards-related bill is H.R.1319.
This legislation would amend section 147 of the Atomic Energy to provide that the Consnission is authorized to protect frore public disclosure certain categories of sensitive generic safeguards information when disclosure could compromise or negate site-specific security measures required by the Commission to protect nuclear materials and facilities against theft, diversion or sabotage.
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I In 1980 Congress added section 147 to the Atomic Energy Act.
In that section Concress provided important projections against unauthorized disclosure of a licensee's or applicant's sensitive information related to the security of specific nuclear facilities and special nuclear materials. However, Congress did not enact a broadly written provision for withholding generic information l
l on safeguards matters from public disclosure.
1 As a result of its experience in implementing section 147, the Commission is aware of an ambiguity in that secticn relating to the Commission's authority to L- -
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prctect from public disclosure generic information that would be likely to endanger specific safeguards measures implen'ented by NP.C licensees.
In its Diablo Canyon operating license proceeding, the Commissio'n concluded that certain generic information regarding the design basis threat, specifically, that part of the design basis threat relating to the number of armed adversaries against which security plan characteristics are developed was an integral party of the licensee's security plan. The Commission determined that release of that information could reasonably be expected to provide substantial assistance to a potential saboteur of the Diablo Canyon facility.
The Commission further determined, that the information, although nominally generic, was properly considered e detailed portion of the appliant's plan and that the Commission was authorized under section 147 to protect that information from public disclosure.
The Commission believes that its interpretation of section 147 is correct. An interpretation contrary to the Commission's could negate the important projections provided by Congress for sensitive safeguards information.
Accordingly, the Commission believes it would be useful for Congress to codify its authority to withhold and protect generic information of the nature discussed.
f, The Commission's concern is not lirrited to the Diablo Canycn situatior-addressed above.
The Commission is also concerned that a ccurt could find that section 147 does not provide a basis for withholding from public disclosure generic reports, studies and analyses of sabotage vulnerabilities. Such a l
holding would be inconsistent with the national interest in preserving effective safeguards.
Moreover, it appears that without clarification of section 147, a federal court which disagreed with NRC's interpretation of section 147 could order the NRC to release security-related information similar or identical to that being i
l protected by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Even though it could be argued that NRC safeguards information is not as sensitive es 00E information because 00E facilities are of greater national security significance, public disclosure of certain sensitive generic safeguards information rel'ative to NRC facilities co.uld be of substantial assistance to one who contemplated sabotaging a 00E facility because the l
information might be identical. Accordingly, failure to amend section 147 l
could significantly negate the Congressional purpose underlying the enactment of section 148.
I Because the language of H.R. 1319 is closely related to the projections already enacted by Congress this legislation, if enacted, would not significantly 1
increase the ability of the Commission to withhold information from the public.
Yet, by explicitly authorizing the withholding of a small class of sensitive l
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safaguards information, Congress cculd help present the disclosure of information that could be of great assistance to a saboteur.
4 H.R. 1317 lReporting of Violations or Defects Our fourth legislative proposal, H.R.1317, pertains to the Commission's ability to receive proper notice of defects or regulatory violations at nuclear power plants and other regulated activities, where such defects or violations could create substantial safety hazards.
Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 provides that any individual director or responsible officer of a firm constructing, cwning, operating, or supplying ccmponents cf any facility or activity licensed or regulated under the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganizat' ion Act must promptly notify the Commission of violations of the Atomic Energy Act or any applicable regulation, order or license condition relating to substantial safety hazards or any defect which could create a substantial safety hazard.
Any person who knowingly and consciously fails to provide notice is subject to a civil penalty.
Based on more than a decade of experience in implementing this statutory provision, we believe that scre changes in section 206 are warranted.
- First, we believe that the section srculd be revised to provide that the firm, as well
E as incividual directors and responsib13 officers should be responsible for notifying the Commission. This assignrrent of responsibility would be more in accord with the general approach to regulation under the Atomic Energy Act, which imposes responsibility on the licensee, rather than individual corporate officers for compliance with regulatory requirements. Under our proposal the current provision that a civil penalty may be levied anainst individual directcrs and responsible officers for a knowing and conscious failure to notify the Commission would be retained.
However, the proposed legislation would subject a firm to sanctions for any failure to notify, regardless of its intent or degree of negligence in failing to cortply with the Commission's l
I regulations. This would ensure that the failure to report violations or I
defects, regardless of the reasons for the reporting failure, would be subject to possible civil sanctions. This approach is in accord with section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, which authorizes civil penalties for violations without regard to whether they are knowing and conscious.
4 h.R.1317 would also clarify the Commission's authority to promulgate regulations, issue orders, and conduct inspections and investigations under section 206. These provisions would codify existing practice ard remove any questions regarding the Comission's authority to take necessary actions to implement section 206.
The proposed legislation would also clarify that a firm, whether it be a licensee or a non-licensee, may be subject to a civil penalty for violating
9 Commission regulations or orders issued to irrplement ard enforce section 206.
as well as Mr violations of section 206 itself. The current statute is ambiguous regarding whether the Commission is authorized to impose sancticra against non-l.censees, such as reactor vendors.
H.R. 1317 would also make other amendments to section 206.
The bill would clarify that the requirements of section 206 must be prominently posted on the premises of any firm affected by the section, and not simply at facilities licensed under '.he Atomic Energy Act.
This would cover suppliers cf components and other firms who are covered by section 206 but who are not regulated directly under the Atcmic Energy Act.
Finally, the proposed legislation would subject the Department of Energy to the requirements of section 206 to the extent that the Department's activities, facilities or materials, are licensed by the Commission.
The Commission believes the Department of Energy to the extent it is subject to NRC licensing should be subject to the same regulatory requirements as our other licensees.
In conclusion, the Commission believes that the adoption of these amendments would clarify the scope of section 206 and thereby ensure that the Commission has sufficient authority to implement effectively the notification requirements mandated by Congress.
10 H.P. 1570--The Nuclear Power Emergency Pesponse Cata 5_. stem Act of 1987 4
H.R.1570 would require the creation of an Emergency Respense Data System
(" ERD 5").
This system would permit direct electronic transmission of selected parameters from nuclear power reactors to the Commissien.
The system would be used only during emergencies.
The Commission supports enactment of legislation such as H.R.1570 because such legislation would substantially enhance our incident response capability, l
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I The Commission has determined that URC's primary role in an emergency is to monitor and advise. Our monitoring role is in two areas.
We monitor the licensee to assure that appropriate recommendations l
are made with respect to offsite actions.
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l We also monitor the licensee to assure they are taking the 1
appropriate on-site action to mitigate consequences of the incident.
i Another aspect of our role is advisory.
We support both the licensee and the onsite NPC response team with technical analyses, advice and logistical support.
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l 11 We also support offsite authorities including ccr. firming licensee's recommendations to offsite authorities.
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Agency advice or recommendation will be made by the NRC's Chairman (or his l
designee) to a licensee manager or the appropriate state or local l
decisionmaker.
In addition to the above, NRC is the single federal focal point for keeping other Federal agencies and entities and the media informed on the status of the incident.
The effectiveness of the NRC in performing its role is dependent on the quality and timeliness of the event information the agency receives. The types of information the agency needs for emergency response are:
reactor systems conditions, containment building conditions, radioactivity release rates, and l
the plant's meterological data.
It may also be appropriate to provide state and local authorities with the meteorological and radiological data as this data is useful given their role and expertise.
Currently, the data is transmitted to the NRC from the licensee by standard voice telephone communications.
Two primary phone links are used. One is dedicated for reactor data; the other is primarily for radiological and
o 12 meteorological cata. Our experience with voice-only vergency communications--, starting with TMI and reinforced numerous tirres since then--, is that it can be too slow and can be error prone Information is misunderstood, frequently creating false issues which at best divert experts j
from the real p'roblems.
Even worse incorrect data can cause tioC to respord to j
the licensee or offsite efficials with inaccurate or outdated advice.
1 NRC's thinking on how to enhance its incident response capability has evolved over several years. The NRC has considered options varying from the Nuclear Data Link, involving extensive continuous transmission of a large quantity of parareters from all facilities, to the current system in which we rely on telechonic communications. The system determined by the Conunission to provide the cata in an accurate, reliable, and timely manner wnile minimizing the impact on our licensees is the Emergency Response Data System envisioned by this bill. We have successfully conducted tests of the ERDS concept with Duke Power Company at the McGuire facility and with Commonwealth Edison at the LaSalle facility. Both tests confirmed the advantages of having direct electronic transmission of a selected set of parameters.
Based on these successful tests of the concept, the hRC initiated an ERDS Requirements Analysis. The effort consisted of visits to the licensees to determine the design of the si+.e data systems and the availability of the data requested by the NRC.
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a Based on the results of the surveys, the Commission believes the EPOS concect can be implemented with relatively little difficulty at essentially all sites.
Ease of implementation will vary dependino on type and utilization o' 'icensee equipment.
Implementation at some sites may require a delay until other equipment upgrades are completed.
In view of the large potential benefit to the NRC incider.t response capability from the ERDS and the results of the survey indicating the relative ease of implementation, the NRC currently plans to begin implementation of the system on a voluntary basis. While we expect the majority of licensees will see the benefits of the system and will participate, there is no guarantee.
H.R. 1570 l
would make implementation mandatory for all licensees.
I H.R. 1570 would require complete implementation within 3 years of passage. The current NRC implementation plan is phased over a longer period to accommodate current licensees' schedules for equipment upgrades.
Passage of H.R. 1570 would require some licensees to accelerate their current schedules, i
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H.R. 1570 establishes the Emergency Response Data System Fund which provides for full reimbursement of ERDS costs and increased funding assurance for the NRC.
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14 We believe H.R.1570 would be improved if Congress provided arcater guidance regarding the establishment of the fund.
The legislation should indicate who is to pay into the fund, when are payments to be made, and provide a formula er criteria for determining how much each licensee should pay.
It would be difficult to establish the fund witnout such direction.
In conclusion, H.R. 1570 would provide for expeditious and consistent l
1 implementation of an Emergency Response Data System and would greatly enhance our incident response capability.
If H.R.1570 is enacted, we plan to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to define the nature of the system to be required, and we would work closely with the States to help assure, to the extent possible, that any special data needs for their emergency response decisions are accommodated.
H.R. 1530 Western Low-level Waste Disposal Compact l
H.R.1530 is before Congress so that the States of Arizona, South Dakota, and I
certain other eligible States, may obtain Congressional consent as required by 4
the Constitution to enter into an interstate compact regarding the disposal of I'
I low-level radioactive waste.
Since the passage of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 (Public l
Law 97-573) we have seen most of the States working to fulfill their obliga-tions to provide disposal capacity for low-level radioactive waste. All of this effort has led to the Congressional consent to 7 compacts covering 35 i
15 states in Title II - Omnibus Low-Level Raoicactive Warte :nterstate Compact Corsent Act (Public Law 99-240).
Both Arizona and South Dakota have been working hard since 1980 to achieve provisions for the disposal of low-level I
radioactive waste in their States.
Arizona participated in negotiations with I
the Rocky Mountain States and California before it settled with'its current i
partner, South Dakota, in the Western Compact.
Additionally, Arizona has accepted the responsibility to become the host State and is in the process of enacting the necessary siting legislation.
During this same time frarre, South Dakota investigated the possibility of hosting a site at Igloo to be developed by Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. South Dakota also considered, along with North Dakota, a two-State compact.
These efforts did not materialize so South Dakota then negotiated separately with both California and Arizona to form a Western Ct.mpact. Only the one with Arizona came to fruition with both States enacting the required compact legislation. Our analysis of the Western Compact considers the historical record of the development of this policy issue in the two States.
The Comission supports the basic policy of encouraging regional solutions to the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. We believe that regional sites are preferable from a public health and safety standpoint to a proliferation of smaller, and possibly economically marginal facilities. Also, as we have testified previously, there should be a home for all waste generated within the States. Given the historical developments of the compacting process in the two States, we have no overall objections from health, safety, and environmental considerations of the two States, Arizona and South Dakota, forming the Western l
'E Compact.
In fact, it would be desirable to include California and North Dakete as weil. A more complete discussion of this rationale is giver, in the enclosure to my testimony.
Our major concerns with the details of the Western Compact relate to several of the definitions contained in the Compact. We would prefer that those definitions conform more closely to the language of the low-level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, to avoid any confusion. A more complete discussion of our concerns as well as a number of other com> ants that we believe may be helpful is given in the enclosure to this testimony.
In conclusion, we support Congressional consent of the Western Low-Level Waste Disposal Compact and commend Arizona and South Dakota for the efforts they have j
made during the past 7-years in arriving at a satisfactory solution to the difficult task of fulfilling their responsibilities of providing for low ' level waste disposal capacity.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my personal statement.
Enclosure i
l DETA! LED COMMENTS ON H.R. 1530 i
PARTY STATE ANALYSIS The Commission has always supported the basic policy first spelled out by the
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Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (P.L 96-573) of encouraging regicnal
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solutions to the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.
Regional sites are preferable from a public health and safety standpoint to a proliferation of smaller, and possibly economically marginal facilities.
1 We believe that the Western Low-Level Waste Disposal Compact is in concert with the policy of encouraging regional solutions.
First, by compacting with Arizona which is designated in the compact as host State, South Dakota will not have to provide a disposal site that could be economically unsound, because of the small amount of routine waste that is currently generated within that State.
For the last few years, this volume has been less than one cubic meter j
per year. Estimates of future waste generation in that State are small except possibly when the Pathfinder Nuclear Generating Station, currently inoperative, is finally decommissioned.2 Second, the compact has provisions that allow California and North Dakota to become party members. (See Article 7, p. 22, lines 9-15). North Dakota is the cnly other State in the west still seeking a solution to its waste disposal responsibility.
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s Furthermore, if California were to join, the compact has a provision for it to became the host State replacing Arizona (See Article 4, p.16, lines 10-19).
Tr fact, there is activity within the California legislature to move forward with a Western compact.
California would become the host State with Arizona and the Dakotas as the other party States.
In past years, initiatives in California failed to consumate a Western compact with Arizona, but they may l
succeed now. Responsible parties within Arizona and South Dakota are maintaining a flexible approach with regard to negotiations with California.
This fact is especially important since California is making progress toward 1
siting a disposal facility in its southern desert region.
From NRC's point of view, it would not be in the best interests of the country and the region to have a disposal facility in California sited across the border from another disposal facility in Arizona.
A number of persons in the States and Congress are concerned that by including l
the Dakotas the basic policy of a regional approach will be violated by not having contiguous States and that the transportation routes of low-level radioactive waste will be too long.
We believe that although it appears on 1
the surface that it would be more desirable for the Dakotas to join for example, the Rocky Mountain Compact, that in practice, it does not make much difference. The reason is because of the small volume of waste that would have to be transported from the Dakotas to a disposal site, either in California or Arizona.
In addition, transportation of such waste is safe.
Our studies indicate the overall risk for shipments of this type is small.
The regulations are adeouate to protect the public against unreasonable risk from transport of radioactive material. Furthermore, the pertinent legislation does not require l
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a that a compact region be made up of contiguous States. The Congress has already consented to three compacts that do not have contigucus States, the Occky Mountain, Northeast, and Northwest Compacts.
In addition, the Central-Midwest Compact essentially bisects the Midwest Compact.
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variety of historical, geographical, and political reasons, if the Dakotas believe that they have struck the best deal from their point of view with Arizona, and if California chooses to join, then NRC would support them in their choice. We have no objections from health, safety, and environmental considerations. All of these States will have a home for their waste which is I
the primary consideration that NRC has emphasized in previous hearings on other compacts.
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REGULAT00.Y ANALYSIS Our major cencerns with the Western Compact relate to several of the defini-tions contained in the compact.
The language in H.R. 1530 should conform more 1
closely to the language of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
.Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-240) that was enacted on January 15, 1986 to avoid any confusion and eliminate such concerns.
For example, the consent language fcund in section 5 of H.R.1530 should closely follow the consent language of section 221 of Public Law 99-240.
In addition, we have a number of other comments that we believe may be helpful.
4 1
y Definition of Low-Level Radioactive Waste J
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Article 8.(H), p.5, gives a definition of low-level radioactive waste that does i
not conform closely to the definition of Public Law 99-240..
The definition in the Western Compact excludes transuranic waste but does not deffne it. There is no statutory definition elsewhere.
Because of this situation, the approach used in Public Law 99-240 is to remain silent with regard to transuranic waste and instead say that the radioactive material must also be what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, consistent with existing law, classifies as low-level radioactive waste. Also, by stating in Article 2 (8)(a) that "the waste is not uranium mining or mill tailings," there is a partial redundancy because uranium mill tailings is the same as by-product material (as defined in Section 11.e.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(e)(2)).
Such a definition is already included.
Uranium mill tailings have never been considered low-level radioactive waste.
Our recommendation is that the Western Compact definition for low-level radioactive waste and the compact responsibilities conform to the language that was arrived at in Public Law 99-240. We believe that adcption of the same language will ultimately result in consistent regional policies.
5 Other connents Article 1.
Compact Policy and Formation Article 1, p.3, lines 4-9, states that the U. S. Congress by enacting Public Law 96-573 has encouraged the use of interstate ccmpacts to provide for the establishment and operation of facilities for regional management of Icw-level waste. (emphasis added) We believe that both Public Law 96-573 and Public Law 99-2*0 focus on the establishment of regional disposal facilities. For example, see Section 4.(a)(2), Public Law 99-240.
The definition of
" management" in the Western Compact, Article 2(9), does include disposal.
Nevertheless, in view of the above, we recommend that the word " disposal" be substituted for the word " management."
Article 2.
Definitions Article 2 (3), p.4, defines " disposal" to mean "the permanent isolation of l
low-level waste pursuant to requirements establishment by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Environmental Prctection Agency under applicable laws, or by a Party State if that State hosts a disposal facility." This definition differs from the term used in Public Law 99-240, which is, "the permanent isolation of low-level radioactive waste pursuant to the requirements established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under applicable laws, or by an agreement State if such isolation occurs in such agreement State." The Western Compact definition is incorrect in referencing " Party State" rather than " Agreement State," if the State is to have the regulatory responsibilities
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to establish requirements. We suggest that the Western Compact's definition of
" disposal" conform to that of Public Law 99-240 to avoic confusion.
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Articles 2 (17), p. 6, defines " site closure and stabilization" to mean "the activities of the operator taken at the end of the disposal facility's l
operating life to assure the continued protection of the public from any residual radioactivity or other potential hazards present at the facility." We l
l believe that the definition in 10 CFR Part 61, Licensirg Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, is prrferable.
It is - "those actions that are i
taken upon completion of operations that prepare the disposal site for i
custodial care and that assure that the disposal site will remain stable and will not need ongoing active maintenance." The NRC objective is to avoid, if at j
all possible, the need for ongoing active maintenance during the institutional control ceriod.
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l Article 2 (16), p. 6, defines " transporter" as a person who transports low-level radioactive waste. Standard terminology by the U. S. Department of Transportation is " carrier" instead of " transporter". We suggest keeping with l
standard terminology. The use of the word " transporter" will have to be l
changed in Article 4 (1)(b), p.18.
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7 Article d.
Rights, Responsibilities, and Obligations of Party States 1
Article 4. (1)(c), p.17, line 21, uses the term " perpetual care" with regard to j
ensuring that charges for disposal of low-level waste at the regional facility are reasonably sufficient. We are not sure what this term means since it is not defined. We presume it means "long term care" as described in the NRC staff branch technical position, " Funding Assurances for Closure, Postclosure, and Long Term Care of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility," WM-8206, June 4,.
1982. The NRC staff is cautious about the use of a " perpetual" care financial l
arrangement for LLW disposal site.
Rather, it believes there should be a limited financial responsibility for long-term care for a period of up to 100 years of active institutional centrol.
Accordingly, we recommend that the wording in Article 4 be changed to read "long-term care" instead of " perpetual care."
l Paragraphs (7) and (8) cf Article 4, p.20, and Article 3, (10), p.12, require that data and information be acouired from generators for decisionmaking purposes. However, these sections do not have requirements for open access for data and information or sanctions against generators for withholding data and information. We recommend such open access and sanction requirements be included in the compact.
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l F00Th0TES 1.
Answer to Question 15, "Go it alone States," Joint Fearing before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Er.ergy and Natural Resources and the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the l
Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, 99th Congress, l
First Session on S.1517 and S.1578, October 8,1985, S. Hrg.'99-349, p.
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578.
2.
The nuclear portions were decommissioned in 1968 and put in the safe storage configuration, whereas the plant was refitted with fossil fueled boilers.
It remains to be seen how much waste will ultimately have to be shipped to the dispesal site when the reactor is completely l
decommissioned.
3.
" California / Arizona low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact," A. B.
No.1000, Introduced by Assembly Member Peace, California Legislature, February 26, 1987.
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" Western Low-level Waste Disposal Compact," A. B. No. 1170, Introduced by Senator Alquist, California Legislature, March 5, 1987.
4 Letter to the Honorable Steve Peace, Majority Whip, California State Assembly, from Morris K. Udall, Chainnan, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,-dated March 12, 1986; (Attached)and
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Letter to the Honorable William J. Janklow, Governor of SOLth Dakota, from i
Senators Alfred E. Alquist and Marian Bergeson, California Legislature, dated February 18, 1986. (Attached) l l
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' O enmassw'emanam Attachrent
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5 TATE SENATOR
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o ALFRED E. ALQUIST
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- m. man sounm aame sureusesse SANTA CLARA COUNTY e
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l February 18, 1986
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The sonorable William J. Janklow l
Governor of South Dakota State capitol Building 500 East Capitol Pierre, South Dakota 57501 i
Dear Governor Janklows i
It has come to our attention that there is now before your State Legislature
' Western Low-Level Waste Disposal Compact" and include Ca along with Arizona, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
We further understand that this measure has your support.
As the authors of California's law to create a low-level radio-active waste disposal facility in our state (urgency, bipartisan legislation overwhelmingly approved by the California Legislature in 1983 and which has been under implementation for two and a half years), and as the authors who are carrying the ratification ~
measure for the Western Compact between California and Arizona which has been negotiated by Governors Deuknejian and Babbitt, we feel compelled to convey to you and the South Dakota Le and its provisions.gislature our severe aisgivings about 23 1356 Inclusion of non-regional states such as the Dakotas in the Western Compact wou.d seem to us to violate the intent of Congress, and it is, therefore will approve such an arrangemen,t. risky to assume that Congress In 1980 and again in 1985, Congress has declared its policy that "the disposal of low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and of,fectively managed on a f
regional basis."
To carry out this policy, Congress has autho-rized the states to " enter into such compacts as may be necessary to provide for the establishment and operation of regional dis-posal facilities for low-level radioactive waste.*
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(Emphasis added.)
Whether or not Congress would approve such a skewed l
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Governor Janklow Februa ry 18, 1986 Page Two construct of a regional compact as that proposed by E31356, we do not know.
We are confident, however, that Congress will look with favor on a compact consisting of California and Arizonas therefore, nothing should be done to upset the agreements between us and our southwestern neighbor.
We have no objection should South Dakota wish to seek admission to the Western Compact, however, we respectfully suggest to you that at this late date, mutual respect between and among the states requires that south Dakota accept the Western Compact as you find it.
Instead, En 1356 would rewrite the provisions of the Western Compact in a manner which would disrupt both the relationship between California and Arizona, as well as California's process to develop and regulate a low-level waste disposal facility.
Provisions of BB 1356 violate federal law and intrude upon California's authority to regulate its own disposal facility as an Agreement state under section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act.
We would be pleased to discuss with you in detail our concerns with the provisions of E3 1356.
A few of our concerns are:
- The liability fund proposed in EB 1356 would establish an inferior mechaniam for providing liability coverage.
Liability coverage is a matter for regulation by the host state (California) and is addressed in our state regulations.
Liability coverage for radiation hasards can be more effectively provided by insurance which is readily available at low rates that by the fund mechanism proposed in Articles 3 and 4 of EB 1356.
In this regard, E3 1356 would usurp California's authority and would cost Californians millions of dollars in unnecessary fees.
Should such a fund be necessary for post-closure protection, our state regulators will make that determination and see that it is established.
- Press reports indicate that you would like to see south Dakota absolved of any liability in the unlikely event of a problem at a disposal site in California.
Please understand that there is no way California can provide a grant of indemnification.
- Article 3 of EB 1356 would assign to the compact commission duties and authorities to regulate disposal for health and safety which, under federal law, belong to either.the Nucitar Regulatory Commission or to California as the Agreement state regulator.
Functions assigned to the compact commission in Article *3 of KB 1356 duplicate work underway by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
EB 1356 would establish a disposal standard without definition inviting second-guessing and uncertainty as to the meaning of the standard.
In this regard, we respectfully invite your attention to Section 4 (b) (3) (B) of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (P.L.99-240):
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Governor Janklow February 18, 1986 Page Three "Nothing contained in this act or any compact may be construed to confer any new authority on any compact commineion or state (3) to regulate health, safety, or environmental hasards from source material, by-product material, or special nuclear materials..."
(Emphasis added.)
- Articles 2 and 4 of 53 1356 would require California to develop laws, regulations, and procedures for disposal of mixed wastes.
This is premature.
Resolution of the mixed waste issue is up to Congress and the federal agencies (Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulato n Commission).
Congresa wrestled with this issue in 1985, failed to reach agreement, and promised to consider the issue again in 1986.
Until the Congress acts, there is nothing the states can or should do on their own regarding disposal of mixed wastes.
- The. proposal in Article 4 by which South Dakota attempts to explicitly assign the host state responsibility to California'and Arizona while absolving itself of this responsibility is probably politically unacceptable.
- Article 7 of MB 1356 contains language implying that the compact commission has authority to close a regional disposal i
facility.
Under law, only.the host state or the Nuclear Regulatory commission can order a disposal facility closed, and we do not want that changed.
We have enclosed for your review our Senate 3111 106, which would ratify the Western Compact negotiated between California and Arizona.
The provisions of the Western Compact have been under careful review and legislative refinament for two years.
Ratification is now delayed because of atteg ts to link ratification to the issue of where a site will be located.
Under California law, siting is a matter for state regulation, and we, along with Governor Douknejian, have taken the position that the proposed linkage of compact ratification with siting issues is improper.
There are a number of regional compacting options open to south Dakota, i.e., joining the Rocky Mountain, Midwest, or central States Compact, or forming a compact with North Dakota.. However, if South Dakota wishes to join Arizona and California in the Western Compact, we again respectfully suggest that the proper
'S Governor Janklow February 18, 1986 Page Four way to do it is to take the Western Compact as it is.
For our part, we will insist that if you join us, it will be on a basis that does cot disrupt our compact with Arizona nor California's authority to regulate our own site as an Agreement State.
Sincerely, f
ALFRED
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MARIAN ERGE ON 13th Se e District 37th senate District AZA/MB/1h cc Governor George Deuknejian South Dakota Senate State Affairs Constittee South Dakota House State Affairs Comunittee 1
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V The Honorable steve Peace Majority whip california state Assembly state Capitol sacramento, California 95814
Dear Assemblyinan peace:
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The Low-Level Radioactive Waste policy Amendments Act of 1985 plainly states that it is the policy of the poderal Government that states manage their low-level radioactive waste responsi-bilities on a resional basis.
It authorises the states to enter into interstate compacts for thewse of establishing and operating reeional disposal facilities.
Although the Act does not define "regiorial," I assumed throughout the legislative process that the ters would be given its oustomary. meaning and read as referring to areas eaamaand of several contivuous states.
As stated in the Interior comunittee's repora en sne mill, v.he Act was designed to encourage the formation of regional compacts so as to minimise the number of disposal sites, thereby reducing the cost of the disposal for lowalevel waste generators and improving the nation's ahility to monitor sites after closure.
As one of the prinicpal' authers of the Amt, " do not believe eh.* = bilateral compact between states as w;, sea,y separasen as California ans sourn uamosa is consistent witn une zoreoning coals.
It wou14 result in wastes being shipped great distances,
-perhaps as much as 1,500 miles, ever the Rocky Mountains, and
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through two other regional compacts.
Moreover, I do not believe that such a compact would provide for the establishment and operation of a " regional" disposal facility within the meaning of section 4 (a)(2) of the Act, er indeed any customary meaning of the word " regional."
I do not express any opinion on whether or not the Congress ultimately might give its consent to such a compact.
The Congress already has consented to non-contiguous compacts.
As presently constituted,ethe Northwest compact bisects the Rocky Mountain Compact, and the Central Midwest Compact bisects, e
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t the kidwest compact.
Nonetheless, I believe the conte 3 plated California-south Dakota compact presents an even more extreme with the spirit, if not the letter, or cne Act. case than either of thos i
Sincerely, J
Nmsn.mu.
1 Chairman I
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