ML20234E242
| ML20234E242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1987 |
| From: | Constable G, Garrison D, Clay Johnson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234E221 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-87-40, 50-499-87-40, IEIN-83-72, NUDOCS 8709220321 | |
| Download: ML20234E242 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1987040
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= APPENDIX B
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U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION ,IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/87-40
Construction Permits:
CPPR-128/ '
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50-499/87-40
CPPR-129
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Dockets:
50-498
50-499
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Licensee:
Houston'L'ighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P. O. Box 1700
Houston, Texas 77001
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~ Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
Inspection At:
STP, Matagorda County, Texas-
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Inspection Conducted:
May 11' through July 3,1987
Inspectors:
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C. E. ' Johfson, Senior Residert Inspector .
[Ktd 7 '
roject Section C Reactor. Projects Branch
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L. Gar (ison, Resident Inspector, Project-
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Sectiov C,' Reactor Projects'E, ranch
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' Approved:
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\\f.__Can&tsbTii, Chief, Project Section C
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Reactor Projects' Branch
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B709220321 070917
ADOCK 0S000498
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted May 11 through July 3, 1987 (Report 50-498/87-40;
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50-499/87-40)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including site tours,
licensee action on previous inspection findings, licensee action on previously
reported items,-licensee action on IE Notices, followup on 10 CFR Part 21
reports, pipe supports and restraints, and followup on allegations.
Results: Within the seven areas inspected, one violation was identified
(failure to follow procedures, paragraph 7).
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Persons Contsted
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. Principal Licensee Employees-
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- J. T. Westermeier, Project Manager'
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T. J. Jordan,' Project ;QA Manager
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A. Ayals,: Project; Compliance -
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A. C.' McIntyre, Principal Enginser
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- S. Head, Lead Project ~ Compliance Engineer
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- W. P. Evans, Project Compliance Engineer
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J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance.
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I. L.l Guthrie, Manager, SMETEAM .
- J. Mertink, Technical Support
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Bechtel Power Corporation '(Bechtel)
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R. H. Medina, Lead QA Engineer
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C. W. Humes, Site Prnject Engineer
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In addition to the stsve, the NRC inspectors also held discussions dth
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other members of HL&P, Bechtel, and Ebasco staffs.
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- Denotes those individuals attending the exit ir,t?rvTew conducM d on
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July 2, 1987.
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Site Tours
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The NRC resident. inspectors made routine site tours of Unids 1$nd 2 in-
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order to observe ongoing work. activities and the condition of ihl stalled, ';
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safety-related equipstt, and plant ~ status., 'The following areas werei
inspected:
fuel handling' t>uildings (FHB),?nechanical and. electrical
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auxiliary buildings 1(HEAB).,, diesel generntor buildings (BGB), reactor.
containmentbuildings(RCB),isolationsalvecubicles(IVC),and
associated laydown.and warehouse areas.
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Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identiffed.?
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LicenseeActiononPrevih0sInspectionFind_i_ngs
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(Closed) Open Item (498/8707-01; 499/8707-01)
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- This item was identified:by the NRC inspector and concerned requirements
in paragraph 5.7.3.4 of Sp6cification SL340JS1002 which allcws weldirg' int
excess of.that required by design drawings. The NRC inspector fel that ;
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O was;not good fr.dustry prac5ke to add weld material in excess of design
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drawing requirements... A review of several pipe support drawings indicated
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that tnyt structurel: joint configurations are of c type where additional
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we'iding w6uld notuinpact on the funct. ion of the connection. Some
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connections do exist where additional wid, if added, would compromise the
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integrity of the ;onnection; however, 'these joints are shown on the
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Interviews with m;ality : control (QC) personnel indicate that they fully
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Nnderstand the intent'of the specification and that to the best of their
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' H" function" as- defined L<y, paragraph S.7.3.4.
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This item M.iconsidere,i closed.
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,(Closed)OpenItem(498/8521-641 99/8521-64)
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'This item concerned the use' of Fel-Pra.1000 thread lubricant. This
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's anti-seize product.has not been purchased for use at the site since 1982.
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All equiptient where Fel-Pro 1000 wss used, except a few Westinghouse
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'M supplied valves, have been disassembled, cleaned, and reassembled using
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'; Fel-Pro 5000. The remaining valves are being tracked on the action item
listing as Item 0709543-936 and will be cleaned and reassembled at the
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first maintenance. , ~Westir,ghousen is preparing a listing of the valves that
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may.be affected, An inspection of storage areas including warehouses,
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aini-warehouse, tor 1 rocnis, and workrareas over a 3-month period did not
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tweal any Fel Pro;1000 on site; also the reactor lower internals were
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'%sebeb,he.trg asF-irabled with Lubriplate No.1, an approved anti-seize
'compodnd,
ibe'*ffected technical manuals are due to be updated at the
n@t re.visien%1ch is estimated to be in late 1987. The action response
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ay the li ensde appears to be' adequate and this item is considered closed.
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(C'losedLIlolation(498;499/8719-01,499/8719-02,499/8719-03)
This item irvobred three exan9hs of one violation.
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=repert(SS-498;499/87-19) these examples are listed separately by tracking
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. number t3 above.
The findir.gs consisted of the following:
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.Hpe supports were not in compliance with procedures because they
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coritained protectivri cottings on their machined parts.
.b. o Heating. yentilat' ion, and air conditioning (HVAC) support did not
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meet min %un' t;fge_ distance as required by SSP 14 for the 5/8-inch
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Hilt 4 h6FMt.achini angle to the building structure,
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Class 7 kVAL supports < violated the installation cut sheet.
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Review of the licensee response and corrective action indicated that they
QC inspectors ~(safety and non-safety) quately and had retrained craft and
had addressed the generic concerns ade
in all Class 7 inspections. This
item is considered closed.
4.
Licensee Action on Previously Reported Items (10 CFR 50.55(e))
The NRC inspectors reviewed the following deficiency evaluation
reports (DER) and/or incident review committee (IRC) reports and
determined that the licensee has taken adequate corrective action on the
subject item.
(Closed) IRC 168 and 307, Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion
These items concerned the effects of microbiologically influenced
corrosion (MIC) on stainless steel. These concerns were confirmed as
problem areas to the NRC in 1983.
Since that time the licensee has
developed and implemented adequate programs tc inspect for, evaluate, and
institute corrective action for each area where MIC is suspected _ including
tanks, sumps, and piping systems.
(Closed) IRC 377, Water Hammer in the Letdown System
This item involved a water hammer event in the chemical and volume control
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system (CVCS) encompassing the letdown system in the RCB. Damage was done
to snubbers and hangers.
The NRC inspector reviewed the document package
which adequately addresses the problem.
Corrective action taken by the
licensee in replacing and repairing the restraints was verified through an
inspection of the -system where the damage occurred.
It was observed that
corrective action has been performed and no discrepancies were noted in
the construction area.
The design engineering aspects of this IRC are being reviewed by the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) (as part of an FSAR change).
(Closed) IRC 383, Shorted HVAC Fan Motors
This item concerned three 150 horsepower electrical auxiliary
building (EAB) HVAC fan motors that were run at excess power levels
resulting in motor winding short circuits. The licensee has repaired or
replaced the three motors and reduced the energy level to nameplate rating
by readjusting the angle of the fan blades. HL&P plans to increase the
horsepower of these fan motors in the near future in order to improve
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(Closed) IRC 374, Main Steam (MS) Fower Operated Relief Valves (PORV)
Hydraulic Systems
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The subject of'this IRC is the MS PORV hydraulic units. These items were
neglected during the long storage period where little or no maintenance
was performed; thus the units failed during the hot functional
tests (HFT).
Since failure, the units have been completely rebuilt by the
manufacturer. The NRC inspector inspected the four refurbished components
in Unit I which are in the process of being reinstalled.
(Closed) IRC 349, Water in Electrical Equipment
Due to lack of a roof on the IVC and heavy rain, water intruded into
electrical panels and conduit and then into motor operators for valves and
related equipment. The NRC inspector inspected the four valve cubicles
and equipment therein and deten111ned that the equipment has been
satisfactorily cleaned out and reworked as necessary. The permanent roof
has been installed and water has ceased to be a problem.
(Closed) IRC 378, Reactor Filters
This item concerns the degradation of the full flow filters utilized
during the HFT.
NRR has reviewed this matter and concluded that remaining
filter fragments do not represent a significant, safety hazard. NRC
Region IV inspectors have observed the licensee's search for the filter
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material and have concluded that the search was extensive and that all
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reasonable efforts have been made to locate the missing material.
(Closed) IRC 392, Telemecanique Class 1E Motor Control Centers (MCCs)
This item concerned Telemecanique seismic qualification report for
Class 1E MCCs.
During a routine review of vendor seismic reports, it was
identified that Telemecanique had a test requirement for snug tightening
of the bolts connecting the MCC side panels to the top of the base
mounting sills. The vendor also required the torque of the bolts to be
150 to 162 inch-pounds. This was required to be verified after
installation, but prior to energization.
The requirement was not included in the supplier's installation drawings
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or the technical manual.
In addition, the requirement was not inserted in
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the seismic qualification report until after the MCCs had been installed
and energized at STP.
Since this requirement did not exist in the vendor
manual, the MCCs were received and installed without verification of the
torque values.
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Review of the licensee's corrective action indicated that all MCCs
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involved in Units 1 and 2 have been torqued and inspected by QC. This
item is considered closed.
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(Closed) IRC 220, Failure of Fire Dampers to Close
This item concerned Ruskin fire dampers failure to close.
Ruskin filed a
Part 21 report on fire dampers that would fail to close under normal flow
conditions resulting in the penetration of fire barriers during a
poi,tulated fire. This violates the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A,
General Design Criterion 3, Fire Protection. This deficient condition
affects Model NIBD-23 furnished with closure springs by Ruskin which were
supplied to STP.
Review of the licensee's corrective action indicates that in-situ testing
of these dampers was done with larger springs added for closure. Where
dampers failed with the addition of the larger springs, interrupters were
added upstream of the 'affected damper for added assurance. Thermal
fusible links on certain multiple section dampers were replaced with
electrothermal links where simultaneous closure of the damper sections is
required. Administrative controls were added to stop air flow in the EAB
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment rooms which
require operator action to manually de-energize the appropriate fans upon
detection and verification of fire in any one of the segregated HVAC
equipment rooms.
This administrative control will be included in the Post-Fire Operator
Action and Equipment Protection Requirements (5A019MFP001, Revision 5).
This item is considered closed.
5.
Licensee Action on IE Notices (IEN)
Licensee action on IEN 83-72, " Environmental Qualification Testing," has
been reviewed by the NRC inspector and found satisfactory.
6.
Followup on 10 CFR Part 21 Reports
The following Part 21 reports are considered closed based on the licensee
evaluation that the subject of the report does not effect the processes or
design function:
NRC Log No.
Reporting Vendor
Letter Date
P21-87-25
Sorrento Electronics
02-23-87
8604372
Cardinal Products
03-11-86
8604642
GE/Yokogawa
06-09-86
P21-87-19
11-10-86
P21-87-31
Houglito
12-19-86
P21-87-20
Automatic Sprinkler
12-01-86
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Pipe Supports and Restraints
During a walkdown tour of Unit 1 containment, the NRC inspector was
Removal (g the Reactor Containment (RC) loops, and Residual Heat
inspectin
RHR) systems and restraints.
During this observation two
restraints were noticed missing and one spring hanger was noticed to have
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it's locks still in place. The NRC inspector discussed his findings with
HL&P. The NRC inspector was informed that the two restraints were planned
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to be installed shortly and the reason they were not is because of
possible damage to them if installed'early due to their unique design.
This was verified by the NRC inspector. The NRC inspector was informed
that Support No. RC-1212-HL-5001 should have the stops installed because
the system was empty because of work being done to the lubrite plate
attached. The NRC inspector then requested the startup work request (SWR)
and nonconformance re) ort (NCR) generated on the support. Review of these
documents indicated t1at the work on the NCR No. SC-04048 was complete,
and that SWR No. 16820 was also complete.
However, the SWR had special
instructions which required the Startup Support Group to record cold spring
settings before disassembly,' and reset to recorded load after rework was
complete as required by SSP 9.
The construction support group failed to
maintain cold position after balancing of the piping system in that they
did not assure the line was filled with water prior to verifying cold load
position. This was attributed to a field engineer's lack of awareness of
the requirement and the Startup Support Group not interfacing with
construction to have pipe supports rebalanced after rework.
Further
investigation by the licensee has identified other deficiencies which are
detailed in Significant Problem Deficiency Report (SPDR) No. E87068Q.
This is an apparent violation (498/8740-01).
8.
Followup on Allegations
(Closed) Allegation 4-87-A-051
It was reported that during(the structural integrity test (SIT) and
integrated leak rate tests ILRT) that some grout was displaced and some
small voids were formed.
NRC inspectors were present and observed the SIT
and the ILRT. Those tests were successfully completed and indications are
that the leak rate was very small (a small fraction of the allowable
design leak rate).
Since the allegation was from an anonymous source and
additional detail could not be obtained, the NRC inspector discussed the
tests with other inspectors to learn what may have occurred which would
have led to the allegation. One possibility is that beneath the concrete
in the containment and on top of the liner plate, there is a system of
leak chase channels welded to the plate; these channels are connected to
standpipes which can monitor any leakage.
In preparation for the tests a
minor amount of concrete had to be chipped away from the standpipe
connections for access. After the test these areas were grouted.
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During the same time frame, minor cosmetic repairs were made outside of
the containment at some electrical penetrations by filling in or building
up using grout as the filler.
The NRC inspectors who were present during the tests observed no
discrepancies similar'to the allegation.
This allegation could not be substantiated.
(Closed) Allegation 4-87-A-032
This item concerned a news report that a local fasterner distributor had
alleged the use of " Counterfeit Bolts" at STP.
It was alleged that:
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(1) a scrap bolt, from the site, had been privately tested and failed a
test for hardness; (2) inferred that bolting on site was generally
questionable as to quality; and (3) made innuendo that some project
bolting may be counterfeit.
HL&P investigated the remarks made during the news broadcast and reported
their findings to NRC Region IV in a letter dated May 27, 1987. The NRC
inspector reviewed the results of HL&Ps review and observed the following:
The bolt reported as failing the hardness test was subsequently
tested by Southwest Laboratories (Report No. T-0H747) and was found
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to meet all of the requirements for the American Society for Testing
Materials (ASTM) A307 Grade A specification. Tests were made for
chemistry, tensile strength, and hardness.
The problems identified by the NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT)
in 1985 were also mentioned in the news stories. Control of
safety-related bolts was an issue identified by CAT which has been
evaluated for corrective action and found to be satisfactory. This
item was closed in previous inspection reports.
One nonsafety-related valve vendor was found to have incorrect
bolting in non-pressure retaining parts in some valves.
These
incorrect bolts were marked as Grade 8, but, in fact, were Grade 8.2.
These bolts were furnished by Pacific Valve as a part of their
product.
An analysis of the test results by Pacific resulted in
their finding that the bolts exceed the requirements for their
intended use.
Site Procedures SSP-52
Installation, Assembly, and Disassembly of
Permanent Plant Equipment; and SSP-57, Installation, Assembly, and
Disassembly of Electrical Equipment, contain instructions for the
control and verification of fasteners. The licensee also has a User
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Testing program which test various materials including threaded
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Although.it cannot be co'ncluded that the mismarked bolts are not
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counterfeit,L HL&P has 'a testing and.quelity program that should ensure
that bolts used onsite are appropriate for their intended use. These.
allegations could not be substantiated.
(Closed)' Allegation 4-87-A-039
It was reported that two nonsafety-related hangers in the Unit l' closed
loop-auxiliary cooling water system in the turbine building had been
- deleted in_ a drawing revision;- however,'the hangers were still in place
after 2 years. The NRC inspector verified that the' hangers were'still in
place. The responsible construction engineers were notified. Work
packages and. construction work requests were generated and the. supports
have been removed. .The NRC inspector verified the removal .and reviewed
the situation with construction engineering to assure that this was an
isolated case.
It was also alleged that there were unsupported runs of gland steam pipe
inside the condensers as long as 35 to 40 feet.
It was determined that
the runs of pipe were actually 23 to 25 feet and in accordance with
Westinghouse engineering criteria.
It was alleged that supports were added to the gland steam pipe in the
Unit 2 condensers'and the same pipe in Unit I was not considered for these
additional supports.- The NRC inspector determined that six. rigid simple
supports were added to the Unit 2 piping to minimize possible deflection
although they were not required and at the time of installation there was
room in the condensers where the work could be done. .These supports were
not added to the Unit 1 condensers because they were complete and it was
considered not feasible, because of lack of working space. The
allegations were substantiated but did not impact on safety.
(Closed) Allegation 4-87-A-049
This allegation is from the same individual as Allegation 4-85-A-096
discussed in'NRC Inspection Report 50-498/86-10; 50-499/86-10. Additional
information has been received wherein the alleger stated that fully
assembled valves were passing through the sand blast booth and there was a
possibility that grit was getting into the working parts. The earlier
followup should be supplemented in Part 1 of the summary section with
understanding that the licensee-has now made a change to coatings
specification 3C080AS1001, paragraph 9.1.6.A to clarify the intent of the
30 contiguous square inches as a repair.
In Parts'2 and 3, there is no
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Discussions with the alleger indicated the following:
The protection that was provided for the valves, parts and the
actuators was masking with tape around the limit switch compartment
cover.
The alleger stated that he objected to inspecting the valve actuators
because he could.not be sure that the masking tape would not be
removed while in the blast booth.
The alleger did not recall whether
or not he had actually inspected valve actuators.
The alleger's main concern was not that the valves were not
adequately protected, but that he felt that the valves and actuators
should not have been routed through'the blast shop.
The NRC inspector reviewed NCRs BP-00459, BP-00440, BP-00465, BP-00437,
BP-00438, BP-00439, and BP-00459. These NCRs identified the
safety-related valves that had minor coatings problems which led to the
allegation. The valves were shipped to and received at STP. Upon
receipt, these valves were noticed to have inadequate cure for the
inorganic zinc primer which resulted in the NCRs being initiated. The
majority of the valves were shipped back to the vendor for repair and some
were use-as-is. The other valves and actuators were sent to the paint
shop to be blasted and recoated.
There were 22 safety-related valves, 13 nonsafety-related valves, and
33 hand wheels sent through the blast shop for repair.
The NRC inspector selected from the list of valves sent to the blast shop,
eight safety-related motor operated valves (M0Vs) for examination and
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review. Five of the valve bodies (carbon steel) were coated but the
actuators had the original factory paint intact. The motor operators of
three stainless steel valves were recoated and in accordance with normal
practice, the valve bodies were not.
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For the eight motor operated valves inspected, there was no apparent
damage to the valves, shafts, gear boxes or the motors.
Preventive
maintenance (PM) records were reviewed and PMs were documented.
It was substantiated that valves and actuators did go through the blast
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and paint shops.
It was also established during an interview with the
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alleger that the valve and actuators were protected prior to blasting and
coating. By inspection of the MOVs and review of PM records it was not
substantiated that damage had occurred. This allegation is considered
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closed. The MOVs inspected are as follows
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Room
Valve
Serial
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Reference
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No.
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Drawing No.
No.
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F008
SI-00118 CAB 229
2N122TSIO0118
SF369 PSI 572,SHTA01
V-04344
C308SW CC-0339
E6288202 3R202TCC0339
4C369PCC407,SHT04
V-10956
C3085W CC-0356
E6288201 3R202TCC0356
4C369PCC407,SHT04
V-00187
C308C
CC-0392
E628822
3R202TCC0392
3C369PCC407,SHT29
V-00771
C308SE CC-0390
E6288204 3R202TCC0390
3C369PCC407,SHT05
V-10958
C308SE CC-0374
E6288203 3R202TCC0374
3C369PCC407,SHT05
V-10957
/
M108C
CV-0033A CAB 2212
2R171TCV0033A
2M369PCV217,SHTA01
V-04346
F008
SI-0014B CAB 2215
2N122TSIO0148
5F369 PSI 572,SHT04
V-06771
8.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) on July 2, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the
inspection.
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