ML20217D880
| ML20217D880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1997 |
| From: | Raghavan L NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D883 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9710060196 | |
| Download: ML20217D880 (8) | |
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7590 01 P UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50 302 NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF' ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE. PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CJNSIDERATION DETERMINATION. AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR 72, issued to the Florida Power Corporation (FPC or the licensee), for operation of the Crystal River Nuclear generating Unit 3 (CR3) located in Citrus County, Florida.
The proposed amendment involves a revision to the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) protective relaying scheme at CR3, as described in the Final Sdfety Analysis Report (FSAR) Chapter 8.
FPC has evaluated the proposed modifications pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and has determined that these modifications constitute an unreviewed safety question (US0) based on a resulting increase in the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. Therefore, FPC is requesting amendment of the CR3 license to resolve that USQ. The proposed modification will add new protective relays to each EDG generator output breaker to provide additional protection for a potential electrical fault or overpower condition.
Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Comission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's regulations, I[k0IONkOE00$$o2 p
-2o The Comission has made a proposed determination that the amendment i
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Comission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50,91(a), the licensee has prnvided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:
1.
'Does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an a aident previously evaluated.
The EDGs perform a support function for Design Basis Accident mitication by providing a source of emergency AC electrical power for the Engineered Safeguards loads.
For most Design Basis Accidents, a coincident Loss of-Offsite Power is postulated to occur and any single random electrical failure is considered credible including complete failure for one EDG to energize the associated 4160V ES bus.
The failure of an EDG to energize the associated 4160V ES bus is not a precursor for any postulated Design Basis Accident except Station Blackout (SBO),- The failure of teth EDGs concurrent with a Loss of Offsite Power causes a Station Blackout.
Therefore, any increase in the probability that an EDG will not energize the associated 4160V ES bus will increase the probability of a Station Blackout.
The new relaying added to each EDG has a small probability of spuriously actuating, resulting in a small increase in the probability of an EDG failing to energize the associated 4160V ES bus.
Spurious actuation of the overcurrent relaying for the load carrying 4160V ES bus offsite power source breaker will cause a loss of power on the 4160V ES bus and prevent the EDG from re energizing the bus.
In addition, a spurious actuation of the device 32X directional power auxiliary relay can cause a loss of offsite power for the associated 4160V ES bus. This spurious actuation also increases the probability of a Station Blackout. The only new system interfaces are between the EDG and 4160V ES bus systems. The modified relaying will not directly affect the fuel cladding, the Rb ctor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, or the containment building.
The increase in the probability of a Station Blackout is negligible.
Although EDG availability is a contributor to the risk of Station
Blackout, the CR 3 licensing basis assumes this event without regard to EDG reliability.
Therefore, the probability of previously evaluated accidents is not significantly increased. The new protective relaying could shorten the duration of an actual Station Blackout if a 4160V ES bus fault or other similar problem was a contributor to the event by limiting the damage to the station power systems.
The modified relaying will not increase the consequences of a Station Blackout since both EDGs and offsite power are asstmed to be unavailable.
The new protective relaying will not create any new timing or seguencing impact to the ES loads su> plied from the 4160V ES bus. The small increase in probability inat an EDG will not energize the associated 4160V ES bus does not invalidate the Design Basis Accident assumption that one EDG successfully energizes the associated 4160V ES bus (single failure proof). Therefore, the conclusions concerning fission product releases in the FSAR will not be changed.
2.
Does not ueate the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
l The modified relaying will not directly affect the fuel cladding, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, or the containment building. The modifications only impact the EDGs and 4160V ES buses.
The failure of one of the EDGs to energize the associated 4160V ES bus during a Design Basis Accident is a standard " single failure" for determining the acceptability of an accident mitigation system. A i
standby EDG and the associated 4160V ES bus are not capable of creating an accident such as a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LDCA) or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).
l There is a small increase in the probability that an EDG will-not i
successfully energize the associated 4160V ES bus.
However, the Design Basis Accident assumption that one EDG does successfully energize the bus remains valid.
Therefore, no new accident involving the failure of both EDGs other than a Statior. Blackout needs to be postulated. The proposed modifications to the EDG relaying and the small increase in the probability that an EDG will not energize the associated 4160V ES bus do not introduce any new interfaces or mechanisms that could challenge any fluid system or fission product barrier in a different way than previously evaluated. Therefore, the modifications cannot create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR.
3.
Does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The Bases of the CR-3 technical s >ecifications do not identify a " margin of safety" for the EDGs or 4160V ES buses that is applicable to the
>roposed EDG relaying modifications.
Therefore, the plant response to
)esign Basis Accidents was evaluated.
The accident analysis assumptions remain valid with the existing and proposed changes to the EDG and 4160V
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ES bus protective relaying.
Plant response will remain as evaluated in the accident analysis and the calculated primary and secondary pressures and temperatures during evaluated accidents will not be increased by the changes. The reliability of each EDG and associated 4160V ES bus is being insignificantly reduced in order to increase the availability of the EDG and associated 4160V ES bus after a fault or overcurrent condition occurs. A spurious actuation of one of the added relays might cause one EDG to fail to energize one 4160V ES bus but would not result in failure of the other EDG to perform its function. Therefore, the changes do not reduce the margin of safety in the bases for any Improved Technical Specification.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied.
Therefore the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination.
Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.
Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period, such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves j
no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State coments received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the FEDERAL REGISTER a notice of issuance. The Comissiv expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.
Written coments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications 4
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5-1 Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
Washington, DC 20555 0001 and should cite the publication date and page nuser of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice.
Written coments may also be delivered to Room 6022. Two White Flint North,11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4il5 p.m. Federal workdays, Copies of written coments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.
By October 30, 1997
. the licensee may file a request for a hearing l
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceedir>g and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.
Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Comission's " Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2.
Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Comission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Coastal Region Library, 8619 W. Crystal Street, Crystal River, Florida 34428, i
If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Conission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, i
j designated by the Cow istion or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and i
j-Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition: and the 1
Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a
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o 6-o notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and hw that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the' reasons why intervention should be pemitted with particular reference to the follwing factors:
(1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding:
(2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding: and (3) the possible offeet of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect (s) of 'e subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.
Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter.
Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted.
In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on i
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- 7 which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion.
Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a 3
genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.
Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing. including the opportunity to present evidence and cross examine witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Comission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration.
The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Comission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.
If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take plac.e before the issuance of any amendment.
A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Comission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 0001, Attention:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff may be delivered to the Comission's Public Document Room.
8 the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission. Washington, DC 20555 0001, and to R, Alexander Glenn, General Counsel, Florida Power Corporation, MAC - ASA, P, O.
Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 4042, attorney for the licensee.
Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Comission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified 1.n 10 CFR 2,714(a)(1)(ib(v) and 2,714(d),
For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated September 12, 1997, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room, located at the Coastal Regie Library, 8619 W. P.rystal Street, Crystal River, Florida 34428, Dated at Rockville Maryland, this23rd day of September 1997, FOR THE NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION h
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L. Raghavan. Sr, Project Manager Project Directorate 11 3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation e
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