ML20216J292
| ML20216J292 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1998 |
| From: | NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216J275 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9803230399 | |
| Download: ML20216J292 (11) | |
Text
Docket No. 50-423 817114 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Marked Up Technical Specification Page March 1998 9803230399 980316 j
DR ADOCK 0500 3
1
l December 28,1995 CONTAIMMENT SYSTEMS
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BASES 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMECARY LEAX COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (Continued)
Surveillance Recuirew nts A
Cumulative operation of the SLCRS with heaters operating for at least 10 l
continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of i
moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31-day frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and con-trols. This test is performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIL once per 31-days,
- b. c. e. and f These surveillances verify that the required SLCRS filter testing is performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.
ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.
The surveillances include testing HEPA filter perforiaance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal ( eneral use and following specific operations). (
SivSErr A
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i 4
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The autocatic startup ensures that each SLCRS train respnds properly.
The REFUELING INTERVAL frequency is based on the need to perform this l
surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance was performed with the reactor at pcVer. The surveillance verifies that the SLCRS starts on a SIS test signal.
It also includes the automatic functions to isolate the other ventilation systems that are not part of the safety-related postaccident operating configuration and to start up and to align the ventilation systems that flow through the secondary containment to the accident condition.
The main steam valve building ventilation system isolates.
Auxiliary building ventilation (normal) system isolates.
Charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump area cooling subsystes aligns and discharges to the auxiliary building filters ~ and a l
filter fan starts.
Hydrogen recombiner ventilation system aligns to the postaccident configuration.
The engineered safety features building ventilation system aligns to the l
postaccident configuration.
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l NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. F 123 esu l
PLANT SYSTEMS April 10, 1997 i
BASES 5/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) l During the first hour, the control room pressurization system creates and maintains the positive pressure in the control room. This capability is verified I
by Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.C, independent of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.e.2.
Furthermore, ACTIONS A.2 and B.1 of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.8 requires that an OPERABLE control room emergency air filtration system be initiated and maintained in the recirculation mode followin envelope pressurization systems becoming inoperable (e.g., g both control room a breech in the control room envelope). Running the control room air filtration system in the l
recirculation mode with the control room emergency pressurization inoperable would prohibit the ability to create and maintain a positive pressure in the control room envelope, because no source of air would be available to pressurize the control room envelope. A CBI signal will automatically align an operating filtration system into the recirculation mode of operation due to the isolation of the air supply line to the filter.
After the first hour of an event with the potential for a radiological release, the control room emergency ventilation system will be placed in service in either the recirculation mode (isolated from the outside environment) or filtered pressurization mode (outside air is diverted through the filters to the control room envelope to maintain a positive pressure). The mode of service for the control room emergency air filtration system will be based on the
- radiological conditions that exist outside the control room. Alignment to the filtered pressurization mode requires manual operator action to open the air supply line.
h 4 PO 4.7.7.e.3 This surveillance verifies that the heaters can dissipate 9.4 i 1 kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. The frequency is at least once per t
REFUELING INTERVAL.
4.7.7.f Following the complete or partial rep 1.acement of a HEPA filter bank, the i
operability of the cleanup system should be confirmed. This is accomplished by j
verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass i
leakage testing acceptance criterion of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 1,120 cfm i 20%.
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 83/47-16 Amendment No.136 0609
April 10, 1997 PLAhT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.9 AWillARY BUILDING FILTER SYSTEM
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The OPEMBILITY of the Auxiliary Building Filter System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the equipment within the charging pump, component cooling water pump and heat exchanger areas following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The charging pump / reactor plant i
component cooling water pump ventilation system must be operational to ensure operability of the auxiliary building filter system and the supplementary leak collection and release system. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to j
reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation t f this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was 4
assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural IN.T EK y
g gg All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is main-tained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.
For the purpose of declaring the affected system OPERABLE with the inoperable snubber (s), an engineering evaluation may be performed, in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.
Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by i
size. Snubbers of the same manufacturer but having different internal mechanisms are classified as different types.
For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip casacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mec1anical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.
A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance.
with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g.,
r l
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-23 Amendment No. 77, JJ7,136 0509 o
April 12,1995 REFUELING OPERATIONS matre f
j 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodina gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.
3/4.9.12 FUEL BUILDING EXHAUST FILTER SYSTEM Ty I W The limitations on the Fuel Building E st Filter System ensure that all radioactive iodine released from an irradi d fuel assembly and storage pool water will be filtered through the HEPA filt and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Operation of the stem with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day riod is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers an EPA filters.
The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine rem al capacity are consistent yith the assumptions of the safety analyses.
SI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for sune111ance testing.
e filtration system removes radiciodine following a fuel handing or heavy load drop accident. Noble gases would not be removed by the system.
Other radionuclides would be scrubbed by the storage pool water.
Iodine-131 has the longest half-life:
-8 days.
After 60 days decay time, there is essentially negligible iodine and filtration is unnecessary.
3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY The limitations described by Figure 3.9-1 ensure that the reactivity of fuel assemblies introduced into Region II are conservatively within the assumptions of the safety analysis.
Administrative controls have been developed and instituted to verify that the enrichment and burn-up limits of Figure 3.9-1 have been maintained for the fuel assembly.
3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL POOL - STORAGE PATTERN The limitations of this specification ensure that the reactivity conditions of the Region I storage racks and spent fuel pool k,n will remain less than or equal to 0.95.
The Cell Blocking Devices in the 4th location of the Region I storage racks are designed to prevent inadvertent placement and/or storage of fuel assemblies in the blocked locations. The blocked location remains empty to provide the flux trap to maintain reactivity control for fuel assemblies in adjacent and diagonal locations of the STORAGE PATTERN.
STORAGE PATTERN for the Region I storage racks will be established and expanded from the walls of the spent fuel pool per Figure 3.9-2 to ensure definition and control of the Region I/ Region II boundary and minimize the l
number of boundaries where a fuel misplacement incident can occur.
I k
J MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 9-8 Amendment No. #, 197 107 us7 l
Irtsert A The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating. Variations in system voltage can lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage.
1 i
Docket No. 50423 B17114 4
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Retyped Technical Specification Page March 1998
CONTAllflENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.6.1 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM (Continued)
Surveillance Reauirements A
Cumulative operation of the SLCRS with heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31-day frequency was developed in consideration of the known reliability of fan motors and con-trol s.
This test is performed on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS once per 31-days.
- b. c. e. and f These surveillances verify that the required SLCRS filter testing is performed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.
ANSI N510-1980 shall be used in place of ANSI N510-1975 referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2.
The surveillances include testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating.. Variations in system voltage can lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage.
d The automatic startup ensures that each SLCRS train responds properly.
The REFUELING INTERVAL frequency is based on the need to perform this surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the surveillance was performed with the reactor at power. The surveillance verifies that the SLCRS starts on a SIS test signal.
It also includes the automatic functions to isolate the other ventilation systems that are not part of the safety-related postaccident operating configuration and to start up and to align the ventilation systems that flow through the secondary containment to the accident condition.
The main steam valve building ventilation system isolates.
Auxiliary building ventilation (normal) system isolates.
Charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump area cooling subsystem aligns and discharges to the auxiliary building filters and a filter fan starts.
Hydrogen recombiner ventilation system aligns to the postaccident configuration.
The engineered safety features building ventilation system aligns to the postaccident configuration.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-6 Amendment No. 77, J77,
'0575
l PLANT SYSTEMS l
BASES 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
During the first hour, the control room pressurization system creates and maintains the positive pressure in the control room. This capability is verified by Surveillance Requirement 4.7.8.C independent of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.7.e.2.
Furthermore, ACTIONS A.2 and B.1 of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.8 requires that an OPERABLE control room emergency air filtration system be initiated and maintained in the recirculation mode following both control room envelope pressurization systems becoming
-inoperable (e.g., a breech in th control room envelope). Running the control room air filtration system in tha recirculation mode with the control room emergency pressurization inoperable woald prohibit the ability to create and maintain a positive pressure in the control room envelope, because no source of air would be available to pressurize the control room envelope. A CBI signal will automatically align an operating filtration system into the recirculation mode of operation due to the isolation of the air supply line to q
the filter.
After the first hour of an event with the potential for a radiological release, the control room emergency ventilation system will be placed in service in either the recirculation mode (isolated from the outside environment) or filtered pressurization mode (outside air is diverted through the filters to the control room envelope to maintain a positive pressure).
The mode of service for the control room emergency air filtration system will I
be based on the radiological conditions that exist outside the control room.
1 Alignment to the filtered pressurization mode requires manual operator action to open the air supply line.
i 4.7.7.e.3 This surveillance verifies that the heaters can dissipate 9.4 1 1 kW at 480V when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1980. The frequency is at least once per REFUELING INTERVAL. The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating. Variations in system voltage can lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage.
4.7.7.f Following the complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, the operability of the cleanup system should be confirmed. This is accomplished by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criterion of less than 0.05% in accordance with ANSI N510-1980 for a D0P test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of 1,120 cfm i 20%.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-16 Amendment No. JM,
0676
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.9 AUXILIARY BUILDING FILTER SYSTEN The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Building Filter System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the equipment within the charging pump, component cooling water pump and heat exchanger areas following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. The charging pump / reactor plant component cooling water pump ventilation system must be operational to ensure operability of the auxiliary building filter system and the supplementary leak collection and release system. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing. The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating. Variations in system voltage can lead to masurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage.
3/4.7.10 SNUBBERS All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is main-tained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.
For the purpose of declaring the affected system OPERABLE with the inoperable snubber (s), an engineering evaluation may be performed, in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.
Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size.
Snubbers of the same manufacturer but having different internal mechanisms are classified as different types.
For example, mechanical snubbers i
utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity I
manufactured by. Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical
)
snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.
A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50.
The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g.,
N!gLSTONE-UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-23 Amendment No. 57, JJ7, JJJ,
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.'10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL and STORAGE P00L The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.
3/4.9.12 FUEL BUILDING EXHAUST FILTER SYSTEM The limitations on the Fuel Building Exhaust Filter System ensure that all radioactive iodine released from an irradiated fuel assembly and storage pool water will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters.
The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses.
ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.
The heater kW measured must be corrected to its nameplate rating.
Variations in system voltage can lead to measurements of kW which cannot be compared to the nameplate rating because the output kW is proportional to the square of the voltage. The filtration system removes radiciodine following a fuel handing or heavy load drop accident.
Noble gases would not be removed by the system. Other radionuclides would be scrubbed by the storage pool water. Iodine-131 has the longest half-life:
~8 days. After 60 days decay time, there is essentially negligible iodine and filtration is unnecessary.
3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL - REACTIVITY The limitations described by Figure 3.9-1 ensure that the reactivity of fuel assemblies introduced into Region II are conservatively within the assumptions of the safety analysis.
Administrative controls have been developed and instituted to verify that the enrichment and burn-up limits of Figure 3.9-1 have been maintained for the fuel assembly.
3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL P00L - STORAGE PATTERN i
The limitations of this specification ensure that the reactivity conditions of the Region I storage racks and spent fuel pool k,,, will remain less than or equal to 0.95.
The Cell Blocking Devices in the 4th location of the Region I storage racks are designed to prevent inadvertent placement and/or storage of fuel assemblies in the blocked locations. The blocked location remains empty to provide the flux trap to maintain reactivity control for fuel assemblies in adjacent and diagonal locations of the STORAGE PATTERN.
STORAGE PATTERN for the Region I storage racks will be established and i
expanded from the walls of the spent fuel pool per Figure 3.9-2 to ensure j
definition and control of the Region 1/ Region II boundary and minimize the number of 1
boundaries where a fuel misplacement incident can occur.
I NILL 5 TONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 9-8 Amendment No. #, Jpp, JP/,
0670
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