Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Various Compliance Issues
	ML20216C229
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	09/02/1997
From:	; NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20216C223	List: B16595, Application for Amend to License DPR-65,incorporating Various Compliance Issues Identified in TS; ML20216C229;
References
	NUDOCS 9709080248
	Download: ML20216C229 (40)
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...

i Docket No. 50-336 B16595 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Compliance issues Marked Up Pages September 1997 9709000248 970902' ~

-PDR ADCCK 05000336 P

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-Febe u ry 1&o.1992 4 IfiDII LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEf tl&NCE REOUIREMENTS

!&lii SECTION 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT...............................

3/461 Containment Integrity.............................

3/461 Containment Leakage...............................

3/462 Containment Air Locks.............................

3/466 I nte rnal Pre s sure.................................

3/4 6 8 Air Temperature...................................

3/46.g Cont ainment Structural Integri ty..................

3/4 6 10 3 4.5.2 DEPRESSUR11ATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS..............

3/4 6 12 eJ fody ontainaent Spra h..........................

3/4 6 12

8"8

--Contei rst.t Ai r Reci rsdat4en-Systes..............

3/4 + 14 %

7 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES......................

3/4 6 15 Containment Ventil ation Systes....................

3/4 6 19 l

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL...........................

3/4620 Hydrogen Monitors.................................

3/46-20

}

f El ectri c Hydrogen Recombi ne rs = M.................

3/4621 Hydrogen Purge System.............................

3/46-23 Post-Incident Recirculation Systems...............

3/4624 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT.............................

3/4 6 25 Enclosure Building Filtration System..............

3/4 6-25 Encl o sure Buil ding Integrity.....................

3/4628 j

""it w.InitTt VII AmendmentNo.#f[$

-Auswa4,-49n4._

DEFINITIONS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.8.C0NTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

1. 8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

a.

Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve systemt or b.

Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, 1.8.2 The equipment hatch is closed and sealed, and 1.8.3 The airlock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION i

1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequen-tial, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

4 CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1-2 1

u February 15,1??S a REACTIYfTY CONTROL SYSTEMS BORON QILUTION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.3 The flow rate of reactor coolant through the core shall be 2 1000 gpm whenever a reduction in Reactor Coolant System boron l

concentratien is being made.

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES.

ACTION:

With the flow rate of reactor coolant through the core < 1000 gpm, l

imediately suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

4.1.1.3 The reactor coolant flow rate through the core shall be determined to be 21000 gpm prior to the start of and at least once per hour during a reduction in the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration by either:

a.

Verifying at least one reactor coolant pump is in operation, or b.

Verifying that at least one low pressure safety injection pump is in operation and supplying 2 1000 gpm through the core.

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MILL 5 TONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 AmendmentNo.M 0107

an=y 3. !M9--e REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:.

a.

No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, b.

1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, c.

1 GPM total primary to-secondary leakage through both steam generators and 0.10 GPM through any one steam generator, and d.

10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTIDN:

a.

With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months , b.

With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits byp l.

Mopi'toringthe ntainment tieosphere particulate radio (ctivity at a

east once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , b

Monitoring,the containagnt sump inven ory at leas once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months /

/

7@ at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months during steady state, operation except when l

rformance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

f 4

[7 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-9 e

_a

.May 12, 1979 g3 f Or Irb**lAV04ll EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS g g /g ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T,yg >,.300'F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two separate and independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a.

,0ne OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, b.

One OPERABLE low-pressum safety injection pump, c.'

A separate and independent OPERABLE flow path capable of 3

l taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a safety injection actuation signal and automatically trans-l ferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recircu-1ation actuation signal, and d.

One OPERABLE charging pump with a separate and independent OPERABLE flow path from an OPERABLE Boric Acid Storage Tank via either an OPERABLE Boric Acid Pump or a gravity feed connection.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3*.

ACTION:

a.

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date'.

With pressurizer pressure > 1750 psia.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3

bO D b'+'dn ~ Og /

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS A/o Chongt

. SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1.

Verifying that each high-pressure safety injection pump:

a)

Starts automatically on a test signal.

b)

Develops a differential pressure. of 2 1231 psi on recirculation flow, c)

Operates for at least 15 minutes.

2.

Verifying that each low-pressure safety injection pump:

a)

Starts automatically on a test signal, b)

Develops a

differential pressure of 2 157 psi on recirculation flow, c)

Operates for at least 15 minutes.

3.

Verifying that each charging pump:

a)

Starts automatically on a test signal, b)

Operates for at least 15 minutes.

4, Verifying that each boric acid pump (when required OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2.d):

a)

Starts automatically on a test signal, b)

Develops a

discharge pressure of 1

98 psig on recirculation flow, c)

Operates for at least 15 minutes.

5.

Verifying that upon a sump recirculation actuation signal, the containment sump isolation valves open.

6.

Cycling each testable, automatically operated valve through at least one complete cycle.

7.

Verifying the correct position for each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position.

8.

Verifying the correct position for each remote or automatically operated valve.

9.

Verifying that each ECCS subsystem is aligned to receive electrical power from separate OPERABLE emergency busses.

MILLST0flE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-4 ec:1 Amendment No. 52, 159

F O I X & & M Yy Julv N, loop

. EMlRGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 4

SURVEftlANCE RE001REMENTS (Continuedi Verifying that the following valves are in the indicated 10.

position with power to the valve operator removed:

4 Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position,

2-51-306 Shutdown Cooling Open Flow control 2-SI 659 SRAS Recire.

Open*

2-$1-660 SRAS Rectrc.

Open*

2-CH-434 Thermal Bypass Closed **

By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, b.

etc.) is present in the containment which could be trash, clothing,he containment sump and cause restriction of the transported to t aump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall se perfonned:

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing 1.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of 2.

containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

At least once per 18 months by:

c.

Verifying automatic interlock action of the shutdown cooling 1.

system from the reactor coolant system by ensuring that with a simulated reactor coolant system pressure signal greater than l

or equal to 300 psie the interlock prevents the shutdown cooling system suction valves from seing opened.

A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that 2.

the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screans, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

Verifying that a minimum total of 110 cubic feet of trisodium 3.

phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.

Verifying that when a representative sample of 0.3510.05 lbs 4.

of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 5015 gallons of 180 i10*F borated water from the RWST, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to 2,6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

To be closed prior to recirculation following LOCA.

- 2-CH-434, a manual valve, shall be locked closed.

AmendmentNo.7,#,U,/d/

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5 5 161 esas I

c.0ctober-frp-isso_e_. --

EMERGEN2Y CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 5.

Verifying a total leak rate less than or equal to 12 gallons per hour for the high pressure safety injection system in conjunction with the containment spray syste.m (reference Specification + 6.2.1 p at:

a)

A high pressure safety injection pump discharge

~

pressure of greater than=or equal to 1125 psig on recirculation flow, for the parts of the system between the pump discharge and the header injection

, valves, including the pump seals.

b)

Greater than or equal to 22 psig at the pump suction for the piping from the containment sump check valve to the pump suction.

I a

e

' ' MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5a AmendmentNo.[

-dune-w.,4 R EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) d At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by cycling each 5,ower operated valve in the subsystem flow path not testable during plant operation through one complete cycle of full travel, e.

B e-vis"al verif4catter that each of the throttle valves in Table 4.5 1 will e pi. 1; the : rr M:t ::itier..

This verification shall be

e. m p f m n.~ of ~<4 *A s<. A L performed:

ve dy,9

,,Jye ~< w e/ n.n.

<n,. n-J 1.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following the completion of each valve stroking operation, 2.

Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after caintenance, repair, or replacement work is perfomed on the valve or its associated actuator or its control circuit; or 3.

At least once per 18 months.

f.

By conducting a flow balance verification immediately prior to returning to service any portion of a subsystem after the completion I

of a modification that could alter system flow characteristics. The injection leg flow rate shall be as follows:

1.

HPSI Headers - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be 2 471 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be 1 675 gpm.

2.

LPSI Header - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be 2 2850 gpm.

The sum of the four injection flows must be l

1 4500 +

RWST level (%) - 10(%) x 200 90%

g.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal:

1.

The valves in the boron injection flow path from the boric acid storage tank via the boric acid pump and charging pump actuate to their required positions, and 2.

The charging pump and boric acid pump start automatically.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. f), jl/, [p 0022

. e'*

^ G-.k.".^,1^^! +

FL.EEAIMM AYSTEMS k, -

3/L6.1 ptIRARY CONTAl M M

t*

CONTAINM M _1MYtatfTY i-LIMITING CONDITIM FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

i APPL 1tABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

i Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY *, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within i

cne hour er be in at least NOT STAND 8Y within the next 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months and in COLD l

SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

i SURVE!LLANCE REQUIRENENTS l

4.5.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations not h

canable of being closed by CPERABLE containment automatic isola-tion va i

are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table l

3.5 2 of Specification 3.5.3.1, 4

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying the equipment hatch is j

closed and sealed.

j c.

By verifying the containment air lock is CPERABLE per Specifica-i tion 3.5.1.3.

l l

d.

After each closing of a penetration subject to type 8 testing (except the containment air lock), if opened following a Type l

A or 8 test, by leak rate testing in accordance with the l

Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

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0peration within the time allowances of the ACTION statements of Specifica-on 3.5.1.3 does not constitute a loss of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

l R1LLSTONE - W IT t 3/4 5 1 AmendmentNo.$7.JJ,h i

eam l

,-.r,

havat-yttPS-4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2 DEPRES$UR12AT10N AND COOLING SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT SPRAY -S?!".

80 Coo m vc Srsrea r LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION f

3.6.2.1 ITwo separafe and independedt contai tspraysystensshallblg

'0PERAltf with each spray system, capable of. tp ing sucti the RWfyr on a 40ntainment Spray Actuatjon $1gnal a. automatical transferr%g fsuctiontothncontainmentsumpona5 1rculati Actuation ignal.

Each spray s' stem flow path' from the y

9PERABLE sfutdown _cpolinn' heat exchar r-inment sung shall be yj an

-~i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2 and 3*,

ACTION:

c-With oryn containment spr[y system inoperable and all four a.

f resto)retheinoperable/lationandcoolingunitsOPERAB conta nment air recirr spray system to OP 30 next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

ith one contai" nt spray system in /

spray system or the/pperable and one cyn ain air recirculat n and cooling unit noperable, restorp either the inoperabl inoperable air irculation and cooling within the next 1)9(us within 48 hou nit to OPERABLE st or be in HDT SHUTD0 hours.

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.14 Each containment spray-system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 31 days on a STASGERED TEST BA315 by:

1.

Starting each spray pump from the control room.

2.

Verifying that on recirculation flow, each spray pump develops a discharge pressure of 1.254 psig.

=gM;et,;e..;r. pr::: rt:r pr;;:= 151 1750 p;u.-

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-12 I sEtrk f

INSERT B - Pace 3/4 6-12 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains, with each cooling train consisting of two containment air recirculation and cooling units, shall be OPERABLE.

)

i

INSERT C - Paos 3/4 6-12 Inoperable Eauipment Reauired Action

a. One containment a.1 Restore the inoperable containment spray train to spray train OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT i

SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b. One containment b.1 Restore the inoperable containment cooling train to cooling train OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c. One containment c.1 Restore the inoperable containment spray train or the spray train inoperable containment cooling train to OPERABLE AND status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT SHUTDOWN One containment within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

l cooling train

d. Two containment d.1 Restore at least one inoperable containment cooling cooling trains train to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

e. All other e.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately, combinations

J INSERT D - Paos 3/4 6-12 The Containment Spray System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 if pressurizer pressure is < 1750 psia.

I l

l

a

-Octek: 0,-1980__4 CONTAINMENT $Y$TEMS SURVEll. LANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 3.

Verifying that each spray pump operates for at least 15 minutes.

4 Cycling each testable, automatically operated valve in each spray :y:tr flow ath through at least one complete

cycle, y,,,,,

5.

Verifying that upon a sump recirculation actuation signal i

the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recirculation mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established, and g

6.

Verifying that all accessible manual valves not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position and all remote or automatically operated valves in each spray-Sb flow path are positioned to take suction from the RWST on a Containmenet Pressure--High-High signal.

b.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by cycling each power operated valve in the spray-ty:07. flow path not test-able during plant operation through at east one complete cycle of full travel, g,,

c.

At least once per 18 months by verifying a total leak rate less than or equal to 12 gallons per hour in conjunction with the high pressure safety injection system (reference Specifica-tion 4.5.2.c.5)at 1)

Dicharge pressure of greater than or equal to 254 psig on recirculation flow for those parts of the system between the pump discharge and the header isolation valve, including

/47 the pump seals.

2)

Greater than or equal to 22 psig at the pump suction for the piping from the containment sump check valve to the pump suction.

d.

At least once per 5 years by perfoming an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

KILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-13 a

s

-Mard 20,1977--4 j

CONTAINMENT SYSTEM CONTAINMENT A ECIRCULATION SY TEM LIMITING ITION FOR OPE 1

3.

2.2 Four contai nt air recirculation an ling units shall 0 RABLE.

/ APPLICABILITY:

DES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

recirculation and co ng unit tainmentspraysystemy)o a.

ith one containment si OPERABLE.

inoperable and both c restore the inopera) e air recirculation and cooling unit to OPERABLE status w thin 30 days or be in SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hou b.

With one e ainment air recirculat n and cooling unit inoperabl nd one containment spr y system inoperable, restore p ther the inoperable ai recirculation and cool g

/

unit o vthe inoperable spray s tem to OPERABLE status (thin 48 h rs or be in HOT SHUT within the next 12 ho s.

I c.

W)htwocontainmentair circulation and cooling units noperable and both con inment spray systems OPJRABLE.

/

restore at least one the inoperable air rec fculation

/

and cooling units to ERABLE status within hours or be in HDT SHUTDOWN ithin the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months URVEILLANCE RE001 REM S

j i

4.6.2.

ch containment air recirculation and cooling unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BAS 15 by:

a.

Starting in low speed, each unit from the control room, b.

Verifying that each unit operates for at least 15 minutes, and c.

Verifying a cooling water flow rate of 3,500 gpm to each cooling unit.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2' 3/4 6-14

e e w, n. 1o9 %

DESIGN FEATURES k

num 5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the reactor coolant system is a nominal 10,981 ft'.

5.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 5.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems are designed and shall be maintained in accordance with the d -;.. 7 design provisions contained in Section 6.3 of the FSAR with allowance [or normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements.

5.6 FUEL STORAGE CRITICALITY 5.6.1 a)

The new fuel (dry) storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with sufficient center to center distance between assemblies to ensure a k n s.95.

The maximum nominal fuel enrichment to be stored in these racks is 4.50 weight percent of U-235.

L b)

Region A of the spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a nominal 9.8 inch center to center distance between storage locations to ensure a K,n s.95 with the storage pool filled with unborated water.

Fuel assemblies stored in this region must comply with Figure 3.9-4 to I

ensure that the design burnup has been sustained, c)- Region B of the spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a nominal 9.8 inch center-to-center distance between storage locations to ensure K,n s.95 with a storage pool filled with unborated water.

Fuel assemblies stored in this region may have a maximum nominal enrichment of 4.5 weight percent U 235. Fuel assemblies stored in this region are placed in a 3 out of 4_ STORAGE PATTERN for reactivity control, d) Region C of the spent fuel storage pool is. designed and shall be maintained with a 9.0 inch center to center distance between storage locations to ensure a K,n s.95 with the storage pool filled with unborated water.

Fuel assemblies stored in this region must - comply with Figures 3.9-la or 3.9-lb to ensure that the design burn-up has been sustained.

Additionally, fuel assemblies utilizing Figure 3.9-lb require that borated stainless steel poison pins are installed in the fuel assembly's center guide tube and in two diagonally opposite guide tubes.

The poison pins are solid 0.87 inch 0.D.

borated stainless steel, with a boron content of 2 weight percent boron.

e)

Region C of the spent fuel storage pool is designed to permit storage of consolidated fuel and ensure a K,n s 0.95.

The contents of consolidated fuel storage boxes to be stored in this region must comply with Figure 3.9-3.

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 5-5 Amendment No. 77, pp. 179.

ms

117, 9,199,

171, 7

i

4

-February 15,-199& l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS t

RASES I

The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above ty s<umet in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

4Only. one HPSI pu quSERr P)

say De OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures less than or equal to 275'F due to the restricted relief capacity with Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection System.

To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.

3/4.5.4 REFUEll% WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST)

The OPERABILITV of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of boratec water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The 11mits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to tre core, and 2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition f c11owing mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inte ted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are coaststent with the LOCA analyses.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 5-2 AmendmentNo.JJ,JJJ,h 011e N

INSERT F - Paae B 3/4 5-2 Verification of the correct position for the mechanical and/or electrical valve stops can be performed by either of the following methods:

1.

Visually verify the valve opens to the designated throttled position; or, 2,

Manually position the valve to the designated throttled position and verify that the valve does not move when the applicable valve control switch is placed to l

"OPEN" i

Sesember 20;-1996 -<_

F4.8 CONTAIMDff EYSTEMS Basts 3/4.8.1 PRIMARY CONTAIN4fMT 1/4.8.1.1 CONTAfWWENT fWTERRffY Primary CONTAINKENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restrictier., in conjunc-tion with the leakage rate 11altation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the 11alts of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

e 4-IA/ SERT (i 3/4.8.1.1 CONTAINWENT LfAKPAF The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure of P.,

As an added conservatisa, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further lialted to < 0.75 L. during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

3 /4.8.1.1 CONTAINWENT AfR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and leak rate given in Specifications 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2.

The limitations on the air locks allow entry and exit into and out of the containment during operation and ensure through the surveillance testing that air lock leakage will not become excessive through continuous usage.

MILLSTONE - W11T 2 8 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. M. h ese

INSERT G - Pace B 3/4 6 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required in MODES 1 through 4. This

requires an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system. In MODES 1,2, and 3 this is satisfied by the automatic containment isolation signals generated by low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure. In MODE 4 the automatic containment isolation signals generated by low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure are not required to be OPERABLE Automatic actuation of the containment isolation system in MODE 4 is not required because adequate time is i

available for plant operators to evaluate plant conditions and respond by manually -

operating engineered safety features components. Since the manual actuation (trip pushbuttons) portion of the con'ainment isolation system is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, the plant operators can use the manual pushbuttons to rapidly position all automatic containment isolation valves to the required accident position. Therefore, the containment isolation trip pushbuttons satisfy the requirement for an OPERABLE l

- containment automatic isolation valve system in MODE 4.

e

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURilATION AND C00L1HG SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY 4 Coca d 5y The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed for the system outside containment during the recircula-p tion phase will not be exceeded.

3p c._> > rnwvu uu.Epv M e eEt!n.cyt n!nw sysTEu a

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensurea that

1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunctio he containment spray syste g post-OCA conditions, gg7 3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINf1ENT ISOLATION VALVES 1

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the co'ntainment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the continment atmos-phere or pressurization of the containment.

Containment isolation within

the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material

o the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the laqalyses for e LOCA.

The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required ko be cicsed and electrically deactivated during plant operation since these

(

halves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam Dine break accident.

Such a demonstration would require justification of -

[

be mechanical operability of the surge valves and consideration of the j '.a;propriateness of the electrical override circuits. Maintaining these livalves closed during plant operatiens. ensures that excessive quantities of iradioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

~

i li:LLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 2/

6-3

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-,c INSERT H - Pace B 3/4 6-3 To be OPERABLE,- the two trains of the containment spray system shall be capable of taking a suction from the refueling water storage tank on a containment spray actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recirculation actuation signal. Each containment spray train flow path from -

the containment sump shall be via en OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger.

The containment cooling system consists of two containment cooling trains.

Each containment cooling train has two containment air recirculation and cooling units.

For the purpose of applying the appropriate action statement, the loss of a single -

containment air recirculation and cooling unit will make the respective containment cooling train inoperable.

Either the containment spray system or the containment cooling system has sufficient heat removal capability to handle any design bases accident. However, the containment spray system is more effective in dealing with the superheated steam from

- a main steam break inside containment. Therefore, at least one train of containment spray is always required to be OPERABLE, when pressurizer pressure is > 1750 psia.

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Docket No. 50-336 B16595 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Compliance issues Retyped Pages September 1997

INDEX LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

SECTION EAE A

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.................

3/4 6-1 Containment Integrity................

3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage.................

3/4 6-2 Containment Air Locks 3/4 6-6 Internal Pressure 3/4 6-8 Air Temperature...................

3/4 6-9 Containment Structural Iritegrity 3/4 6-10 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4 6-12 I

Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3/4 6-12 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 3/4 6-15 Containment Ventilation System 3/4 6-19 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL 3/4 6-20 Hydrogen Monitors 3/4 6-20 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners - M.......... 3/4 6-21 Hydrogen Purge System................ 3/4 6-23 Post-Incident Recirculation Systems 3/4 6-24 3/4.6.5 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT................ 3/4 6-25 Enclosure Building Filtration System 3/4 6-25 Enclosure Building Integrity 3/4 6-28 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 VII Amendment No. Jpp, JJJ, 0311

DEFINITIONS CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.8 CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

1.8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

a. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system,* or l

b. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, 1.8.2 The equipment hatch is closed and sealed, and 1.8.3 The airlock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3.

CHANNEL CAllBRA1 ION 1.9 A CHANNEL CAllBRATION shall be the adjusthent, as nerassary, of the l

channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alt.rm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CAllBRATION may be performed by any series of sequen-l tial, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is l

calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during opuration by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

In MODE 4, the requirenient for an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system is satisfied by use of the containment isolation trip pushbuttons.

i NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1-2 Amendment No.

0312

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SY!TEMS 19RON DILUTION LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.3 The flow rate of reactor coolant through the core shall be t 1000 gpm whenever a reduction in Reactor Coolant System boron concentration is being made, j

APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES.

ACTION:

l l

With the flow rate of reactor coolant through the core < 1000 gpm, immediately suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.3*

The reactor coolant flow rate through the core shall be l

determined to be 21000 gpm prior to the start of and at least once per hour during a reduction in the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration by either:

a.

Verifying at least one reactor coolant pump is in operation, tir b.

Verifying that at least one low pressure safety injection pump is in operation and supplying 1 1000 gpm through the core.

When the plant is in MODE 1 or 2, reactor coolant pumps are required to be in operation.

Therefore, Surveillance Requirement 4.1.1.3 does not have to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

This exception does not apply if operating in accordance with Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

NILL 5 TONE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-4 Amendmer.t No. 177 0313 s...

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ILEACTOR COOLANT 5Y.5 TEM ltEACTOR.C0OLANT SY$ TEM LEAKAGE LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.6.2 Rea: tor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

a.

No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAXAGE, b.

1 GPM UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, c.

1 GPM total primary to secondary leakage through both steam generators and 0.10 GPM through any one steam generator, and d.

10 GPM IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months , b.

With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leikages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months during steady state operation except when operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 4-g Amendment No. 17,77,77,p),

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4 DKjtGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) i 5.

Verifying a total leak rate less than or equal to 12 gallons per hour for the high pressure safety injection system in conjunction with the containment spray system (reference Specification 4.6.2.1.1.c) at:

l a) A high pressure safety injection pump discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 1125 psig on recirculation flow, for the parts of the system between the pump discharge and the header injection valves, including the pump seals.

b)

Greater than or equal to 22 psig at the pump suction for the piping from the containment sump check valve to the pump suction, f

l NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/45-5a Amendment No. U,

0316 w+~

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ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SY$ H g SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 5 (Continued) d.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by cycling each power operated valve in the subsystem flow path not testable during plant operation through one complete cycle of full travel.

e.

By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical i

position stop for each of the throttle valves in Table 4.5-1.

This verification shall be performed:

1.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months following the completion of each valve stroking operation, 2.

Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator or its control circuit, or l

3.

At least once per 18 months.

1 f.

By conducting a flow balance verification immediately prior to l

returning to service any portion of a subsystem after the completion l

of a modification that could alter system flow characteristics.

The injection leg flow rate shall be as follows:

1.

HPSI Headers - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be 1 471 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be s 675 gpm.

2.

LPSI Header - the sum of the three lowest injection flows must be 1 2850 gpm. The sum of the four injection flows must be g ann, g RWsT level (%) - 10 (t) x 2nn; 90%

g.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that on a Safety injection Actuation test signal:

1.

The valves in the boron injection flow path from the boric acid storage tank via the boric acid pump and charging pump actuate to their required positions, and 2.

The charging pump and boric acid pump start automatically.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. JJ JJ. 177 0316

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,e 1/4.6 CONTAINMENT.5YSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAIMMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONo! TION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY *, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINHENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isola-tion valves ** and required to be closej during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except as provided in Table 3.6 2 of Specification 3.6.3.1, 1

b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying the equipment hatch is closed and sealed.

c.

By verifying the containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specifica-tion 3.6.1.3.

d.

After each closing of a penetration subject to type B testing (except the containment air lock), if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

0peration within the time allowances of the ACTION statements of Specifica-

. tion 3.6.1.3 does not constitute a loss of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

- In MODE 4, the requirement for an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system is satisfied by use of the containment isolation trip pushbuttons.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. 17,7),197 0316

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3/4.6.2 DEPRES$UR11AT10N AND COOLING SY$ TENS CONTAINNENT $ PRAY AND COOLING sysTENS l

LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.1 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains, with each cooling train consisting of two containment air recirculation and cooling units, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3*.

ACTION:

Inoperable Equipment Required Action a.

One containment a.1 Restore the inomerable containment spray spray train train to OPERAB.E status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

b.

One containment b.1 Restore the inoperable containment cooling cooling train train to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in HOT SHUIDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

c.

One containment c.1 Restore the inoperable containment spray spray train train or the inoperable containment cooling AND train to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or One containment be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , cooling train d.

Two containment d.1 Restore at least one inoperable containment cooling trains cooling train to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

e.

All other e.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately, combinations SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.6.2.1.1 Each containment spray train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

l a.

At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1.

Starting each spray pump from the control room, 2.

Verifying, that on recirculation flow, each spray pump develops a discharge pressure of 1254 psig,

The Containment Spray System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 3 if pretsurizer pressure is < 1750 psia.

NILLSTONE - U.417 2 3/4 6-12 Amendment No.

0317

.4.

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CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued) 3.

Verifying that each spray pump operates for at least 15

minutes, 4.

Cycling each testable, automatically operated valve in each s cycle pray train flow path through at least one complete l

5.

Verifying that upon a sump recirculation actuation signal the containment sump isolation valves open and that a recirculation mode flow path via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger is established, and 6.

Verifying that all accessible manual valves not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position and all remote or automatically operated valves in each spray train flow l

path are positioned to take suction from the RWST on a Containment Pressure--High High signal, b.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by cycling each power operated valve in the s aray train flow path not testable during plant operation throug1 at least one complete cycle of full travel.

I c.

At least once per 18 months by verifying a total leak rate less than or equal to 12 gallons per hour in conjunction with the high pressure safety injection system (reference Specifica-tion 4.5.2.c.5) at:

1)

Discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 254 psig on i

recirculation flow for those parts of the system between 1

the pump discharge and the header isolation valve, including the pump seals.

j 1

2)

Greater than or equal to 22 psig at the pump suction for 3

the piping from the containment sump check valve to the 1

pump suction.

1 d.

At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

4.6.2.1.2 Each containment air recirculation and cooling unit shall be l

demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

a.

Starting, in low speed, each unit from the control room, b.

Verifying that each unit operates for at least 15 minutes, and c.

Verifying a cooling water flow rate of 2 500 gpm to each cooling unit.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-13 Amendment No.

m,L

.t THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 1

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-14 Amendment No.

0317

ir oo DESIGN FEATURES VOLUME 5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the reactor coolant system is a nominal 10,981 ft*,

5.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 5.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems are designed and shall be maintained in accordance with the design provisions containec in Section 6.3 of the FSAR with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance l Requirements.

5.6 FUEL STORAGE CRITICALITY 5.6.1 a)

The new fuel (dry) storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with sufficient center to center distance between assemblies to ensure a k.,, s.95.

The maximum nominal fuel enrichment to be stored in these racks is 4.50 weight percent of U 235.

b)

Region A of the spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a nominal 9.8 inch center to center distance between storage locations to ensure a K,,, s.95 with the storage pool filled with unborated water.

Fuel assemblies stored in this region must comply with Figure 3.9 4 to ensure that the design burnup has been sustained, c)

Region B of the spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a nominal 9.8 inch center to center distance between storage locations to ensure K,, s.95 with a stcrage pool filled with unborated water.

Fuel assemblies stored in this region may have a maximum nominal enrichment of 4.5 weight percent U-235.

Fuel assemblies stored in this region are placed in a 3 out of 4 STORAGE PATTERN for reactivity control.

d) Region C of the spent fuel storage pool is designed and shall be maintained with a 9.0 inch center to center distance between storage locations to ensure a K,., s.95 with the storage pool filled with unborated water.

Fuel assemblies stored in this region must comply with Figures 3.9-la or 3.9 lb to ensure that the design burn up has been sustained.

Additionally, fuel assemblies utilizing Figure 3.9 lb require that borated stainless steel poison pins are installed in the fuel assembly's center guide tube and in two diagonally opposite guide tubes.

The poison pins are solid 0.87 inch 0.D.

borated stainless steel, with a boron content of 2 weight percent boron.

e)

Region C of the spent fuel storage pool is designed to permit storage of consolidated fuel and ensure a K,,1 0.95.

The contents of consolidated fuel storage boxes to be stored in this region must comply with Figure 3.9 3.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 5-5 Amendment No. 77. pp. 197.

osse 117, life ilFe ill,191 4..

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EMERGENCY C0RE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES The purpose of the ECCS throttle valve surveillance requirements is to provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA.

Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration,(2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS LOCA analyses.

Verification of the correct position for the mechanical and/or electrical valve stops can be performed by either of the following methods:

1.

Visual 11y verify the valve opens to the designated throttled position, or 2.

Manually position the valve to the designated throttled position and verify that the valve does not move when the applicable valve control switch is placed to '0 PEN."

Only one HPSI pump may be OPERABLE in MODE 4 with RCS temperatures less than or equal to 275'f due to the restricted relief capacity with Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System.

To reduce shutdown risk by having additional pumping capacity readily available, a HPSI pump may be made inoperable but available at short notice by shutting its discharge valve with the key lock on the control panel.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST}

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient su) ply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a

.0CA.

The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water. is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subtritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water v'.,1umes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive contrM assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2' B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. (J. 177. JJJ.

0319 a.., _,y s

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3/4.8 CONTAll8 TENT SYSTDis BASE 5-3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage' paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunc-tion with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is required in MODES 1 through 4.

= This requires an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3 this is satisfied by the automatic containment isolation signals ger,erated by low pressurizer pressure and high containment pres 2ure. -In MODE-4 the automatic containment isolation signals ~ generated by low pressurizer pressure and high containment pressure are-not required to be OPERABLE-Automatic actuation of the containment isolation system in MODE 4 is not required because adequate time is available for-plant operators to evaluate plant conditions and respond by manually operating engineered safet Since the manual actuation (trip pushbuttons) y features components.

portion of the containment isolation system is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, the plant operators can-use the manual pushbuttons to rapidly position all

- automatic contair. ment isolation valves to the required accident position. Thereforn, the containment isolation trip pushbuttons satisfy the requirement for an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system in MODE 4.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment-leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure of P,.

As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is-further limited to < 0.75 L during performance of.the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

-- 3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

- The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment

. air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and leak rate given in Specifications 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2.

The limitations on the air locks allow entry and exit-into and out of the containment during operation and ensure through the surveillance testing that air lock leakage will not become excessive through continuous usage.

MILLSTONE '- UNIT 2 B3/46-1 Amendment No. JM, #7 0320 y-

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@ NTAINMENT SYSTEM 1 BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS l

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA.

The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed for the system outside containment during the recircula-tion phase will not be exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during nonnal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray system during post-l LOCA conditions.

To be OPERABLE, the two trains of the containment spray system shall be capable of taking a suction from the refueling water storage tank on a containment spray actuation signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a sump recirculation actuation signal.

Each containment spray train flow path from the containment sump shall be via an OPERABLE shutdown cooling heat exchanger.

The containment cooling system consists of t <o containment cooling trains.

Each containment cooling train has two conta.iment air recirculation and cooling units.

For the purpose of applying the appropriate action statement, the loss of a single containment air recircu'stion and cooling unit will make the respective containment cooling train inoperable.

Either the containment spray system or the containment cooling system has sufficient heat removal capability to handle any design basis accident.

However, the containment spray system is more effective in dealing with the superheated steam from a main steam break inside containment.

Therefore, at least one train of containment spray train is always required to be OPERABLE, when pressurizer pressure is 1 1750 psia.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmos-phere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 b 3/4 6-3 Amendment No.

0321

)au CONTAINMENT.$YSTEM3 BASES 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed and electrically deactivated during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Such a demonstration would require justification of the mechanical operability of the purge valves and consideration of the appropriateness of the electrical override circuits. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B3/46.3a Amendment No.

0321

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4

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ML20216C229

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