ML20215K065
| ML20215K065 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | James O'Reilly GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215K068 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-87-066, EA-87-66, NUDOCS 8706250205 | |
| Download: ML20215K065 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1987027
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-Docket No. 50-424
JUN 121987 !
License No. NPF-68
EA 87-66
Georgia Power Company
g_ ATTN: Mr. James P. O'Reilly .
. Senior Vice President-
Nuclear Operations
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
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' Gentlemen:-
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SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-424/87-27 AND
50-424/87-30)
.This refers to the NRC inspections conducted on March 10 through April 17, .
1987, and April 28 through May 1,1987, at the Vogtle Electric Generating
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Plant, Waynesboro, Georgia. The inspections included a review of.the facts and
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circumstances surrounding 'the mispositioned controller for the Turbine Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater -(TDAFW)' pump and the mispositioned recirculation valve for
the. Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) mixed bed demineralizer which were
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identified by NRC inspectors.
NRC concerns relative to the inspection findings
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were discussed by M. L. Ernst, Deputy Regional Administrator, NRC, Region II,
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with'you and members of your staff, during an Enforcement Conference held on
May 20, 1987, at the Region II Office.
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The violations described in the. enclosed Notice of Violation involved the
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failure to control system alignment and adhere to independent verification
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requirements.
Violation A is considered significant in that on April 2, 1987,
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during an NRC walkdown of the Unit 1 Main Control Board, the TDAFW pump
controller was noted to be in the manual position instead 'of the required
automatic position.
The unit was in Mode 1 power. operation at the time of the
discovery.
While immediate action was taken to place the identified mis-
positioned controller in its correct position,' operator action would have been
required to ad,iust.the pump controller while in manual or place the controller
in automatic during response to an accident condition.
Our review indicates
the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system was signed off in the unit control log'and
in the operating procedure as being placed in standby readiness on March 30,'
1987, at 2:30 a.m.
Therefore, the maximum amount of time the TDAFW pump would
be considered inoperable, based on 'the above signoffs, is 75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> and 25
minutes.
This event resu' ed from a failure to follow plant procedure,
specifically the completion of independent verification sheets to document
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component position.
It should be noted that this condition may have existed.
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since March 28, 1987, when the TDAFW pump was last operated during the Loss of
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Offsite Power (LOSP) test.
However, this could not be substantiated as the
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independent verification sheets which document that certain components are.
properly positioned . and then independently verified to. be- correct, had not
been. completed as' required.
If the TDAFW pump had been inoperable since
March 28,1987; the TS 3.7.1.2' action statement time limit would have been
exceeded.
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Violation B is . considered significant in that on April 25, 1987, with the unit
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in Mode 1, flushing of the boron evaporator condensate lines was initiated
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under Radiation Work Permit 87-0158.
The recycle evaporator condensate filter
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housing was opened and approximately 70.to 80 gallons of resin beads wera
purged from the lines into 55 gallon drums.
At.approximately 6:00 p.m. on c.he
evening of April 25,1987, a Health Physics Technician reported radiation
exposure dose rates of 0.6 mrem /hr on contact with the resin collection drums.
The Health Physics' Technician departed the work area and a short while later,
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an engineer:who was working on the flushing of the boron evaporator condensate
lines noticed the resin beads being purged from the system had changed color
and dosimeters began to alarm. A Health Physics Technician was summoned to the
work area and a radiation survey revealed area dose rates of 20 mrem /hr and
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contact dose rates of 180 mrem /hr gamma and 6,080 mrad /hr beta on the resin
collection container. The cause of the high radiation levels was 'not
immediately: determined. Subsequent to this event, members of the plant staff
discovered that a CVCS valve was lockeo open allowing contaminated resin beads
in a- mixed bed demineralizer, used to clean CVCS letdown water, to. flow back
into the Waste Processing System - Liquid (WPSL) resin sluice header.
From
there, the highly contaminated resin flowed into the boron recovery system
recycle evaporator condensate 'demineralizer lines and then out of the opened
recycle evaporator condensate filter.
Further followup of this event by a
Region II inspector revealed that the Independent Verification Documentation
Log Sheet' completed January 27, 1987, showed the valve to be closed and
verified closed in accordance with plant procedures.
Subsequent review of the
event by plant staff on April 26, 1987, found the valve in question to be
locked open and the valve was immediately placed in the proper position. This
event resulted from a failure to follow procedure which could have led to an
unnecessary radiation overexposure.
In addition, several other events involving valve mispositioning have occurred
recently such as:
1) the diesel fuel oil supply valve which had been
positioned and verified as locked open on February 13, 1987, but subsequently
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discovered locked closed during a functional test of diesel generator IA prior
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to returning the diesel generator to service; 2) the discovery by the NRC
Resident Inspector of the locked closed steam supply valve to the turbine drive
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump on February 13, 1987; and 3) the discovery on
April 15,1987, of the inwspletely restored valve lineup for transferring
water from the recycle holdup tank to the spent fuel pool.
The events involving the diesel fuel supply valve and the steam supply valve to
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the Auxiliary Feed Pump were identified as a Seve"ity Level IV Violation in NRC
Inspection Report 50-424/86-12.
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These events basically resulted from a lack of attention to detail by plant
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personnel.
Although immediate action was taken to correct these problems when
discovered, some of these events, had they gone undetected, could have had
significant consequences.
vour proactive measures to address this general
problem of lack of attention to detail and failure to follow procedures reflect
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a multifaceted approach ranging from a re-emphasis of your operating philosophy
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to positive discipline, all of which should help to foster an individual's
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" commitment to achieving excellence."
It is also apparent that training was
not adequate for plant personnel to understand and be instilled with the proper
perspective on attention to detail.
These soft areas in the plant training
program must be fully addressed in your corrective actions in order to improve
performance in plant operations.
More attention to detail in system operation
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and configuration is required to ensure similar types of violations do not
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recur.
In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC
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Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1987) and after consultation
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with mv staff subsequent to the Enforcement Conference, I have decided that the
violations described in the enclosed Notice are categorized as a Severity
Level IV violations.
However, continued poor performance in this area would
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call into question the overall adequacy of existing programs,
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You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
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specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.
In yeur
response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional
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actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this
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Notice, including your proposed corrective actions, the NRC will determine
whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with
NRC regulatory requirements.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2,
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Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
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The responses directed by this letter and its enclosure are not subject to the
clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely,
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J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
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