ML20215H466
| ML20215H466 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1987 |
| From: | SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215H460 | List: |
| References | |
| ERPT-E0214, ERPT-E214, NUDOCS 8706240112 | |
| Download: ML20215H466 (64) | |
Text
I l
C i
1 1
1 ENGINEERING REPORT ERPT-E0214 l
}
ELECTRICAL TERMINATION INSPECTION AND UPGRADE PROGRAM RESULTING FROM THE DECEMBER 26, 1985 ICS POWER FAILURE l
1 i
June 8,1987 i
i di s
8706240112 870617 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O
PDR i
s TABLE OF CONTENTS EAgt I.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1 i
'II.
INTRODUCTION 4
III. DEFINITIONS 6
IV.
~ DETAILED PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 7
i i
A.
December 26, 1985 Failure and Consequences 7
B.
Inspection and Upgrade-Control / Computer Room 8
1.
Initial ICS and NNI Inspection 8
2.
Compression Lug Termination Testing 11 3.
Program Expansion 16.
4.
Internal Termination Inspection Validation 20 5.
Other Problems Addressed 23 6.
Inside Control / Computer Room Summary 30 C.
Long-Term Inspection and Upgrade Plan 33.
V.
DOCUMENTATION 35 A.
Engineering Specifications 35 B.
Quality Assurance 35 VI.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 38 VII. CONCLUSIONS 40 VIII. REFERENCES 42
-- -------------------- --------------d
LIST OF TABLES BilLE TITLE 1
Control / Computer Room Program, Panel and Cabinet Inspection Scope l
2 Control / Computer Room Program, Inspection Summary by Termination Type 3
Control / Computer Room Program, Rework Summary 1
4 Control / Computer Room Program, Documentation Summary 5
Program Documentation Listing 6
Remaining Scope of Hork
i 1
LIST OF FIGURES i
l l
i FIGURE TITLE 1
Compression Lug Termination Basic Components 2
December 26, 1985 ICS Compression Lug Termination Failure 3
Control Room / Computer Room Equipment Layout 4
SFAS ETC-Molex Compression Lug Failure I
I 5
SFAS ETC-Molex Compression Lug Failure 6
Trimed Termination Lug b
l
i 0
I.
EXECUTIVE SUl+1ARY An Electrical Termination Inspection Program was initiated as a result of the December 26, 1985 Rancho Seco reactor trip in which a faulty compression lug termination, in Integrated Control System (ICS) cabinet j
H4ICl, caused the loss of ICS control power.
As a result of subsequent inspections of panel conditions, upgrade actions were taken to address various questionable termination installations in selected control room panels and cabinets.
The initial program inspection scope focused on ICS and Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) cabinet compression lug terminations using experience based visual acceptance criteria.
This inspection effort revealed other questionable installations.
The inspection scope was ultimately expanded to include:
A) solder connections, wire wrap terminations and other suspected panel deficiencies and B) selected Control Room Bailey Controls Company panels.
The identification of compression lug failure modes, differing from the December 26, 1985 failure, led:.to the development and implementation of l
a secureness verification inspection program.
This program was accomplished to ensure that potential lug failures were identified and corrected.
Over 44,000 terminations within the Control / Computer Room were subjected to Quality Control / Engineering inspection.
This extensive inspection effort resulted in the identification of only 22 actual failures subsequent to the initial December 26, 1985 ICS failure.
Terminations were identified as " failures" when the lug became disconnected from the conductor during the conduct of the inspections.
All failures were found in the Bailey Controls Company panels and cabinets.
For all types of terminations, 55% (12 out of 22) were failures of factory installed l l
ETC-MOLEX Incorporated compression lug terminations.
District installed AMP Incorporated compression lug terminations made up 23% (5 out of 22) of the failures.
The remainder of the failures were internal solder and wire wrap terminations.
A breakdown' of the inspection results, by termination type, is provided in Table 2.
In addition to the 22 failures, the inspection program identified approximately 7,800 terminations whose installation deviated in some way from standard workmanship methods.
These replacements and reworks were performed as a result of deviations from the District's desired workmanship standards rather than a result of any immediate or long term safety concern.
Termination REPLACEMENTS were performed for reasons that include the use of. single crimps, wrong size lug for the conductor size, lug stud hole too large for terminal screw, lugs bent more than 90 degrees, conductor insulation extending too far into lug barrel and other similar deviations.
Termination REWORKS were performed for reasons that include more than two lugs on a single s'tud, two lugs under one terminal screw not installed back to back and lugs installed face down.
For the compression lugs, seventy percent of these questionable terminations were factory installed ETC-M0 LEX terminations.
All questionable installations inspected were either replaced or evaluated and accepted under the upgrade program.
During the Electrical Termination Inspection and Upgrade Program, a significant number of general panel / cabinet improvements were accomplished.
This upgrade work was performed and inspected to detailed acceptance criteria.
The effort has given the Rancho Seco staff an increased awareness of the importance of stringently applied overall workmanship standards.
The results of the Control / Computer Room inspections prompted the District to implement a long-term program to upgrade terminations located in panels outside the Control Room.
This work will utilize a j
documented, procedure (QAIP 15) based method of inspecting other termination locations.
Special emphasis will be placed on ETC-M0 LEX lugs and panels identified as critical to plant operation.
Upgrade work will be scheduled for completion consistent with the criticality of the required work, operational requirements and organizational resource demands (see Table 6).
The District's Electrical Termination Inspection and Upgrade Program spanned a fifteen month period of intensive work.
The combined Engineering, Operations, Maintenance and Quality Assurance effort resulted in the expenditure of an estimated 25,000 manhours. The results of the program clearly demonstrate that no overall termination failure problem existed and that no significant safety hazard existed, as evaluated against 10CFR21 criteria. Where isolated deficiencies were identified, corrective action.was accomplished. The extremely wide scope and intensity of this self-initiated program has been both comprehensive and conservative. Comprehensive in terms of the types of l
terminations inspected and the detailed inspection criteria used.
Conservative in terms of the quantities of terminations replaced solely j
because of " questionable" workmanship quality. The District has demonstrated a commitment to excellence during this inspection and upgrade effort.
3--
)
II.
INTRODUCTION 1
~
The December 26, 1985 reactor trip involving the loss of power of the Integrated Control System (ICS) was the direct result of a faulty compression lug termination within ICS' Control Room cabinet H4IC1.
As a result of this failure, the District implemented a comprehensive Electrical Termination Inspection and Upgrade Program.
The program assured that other terminations existing in selected panels and cabinets supplied by Bailey Controls Company (A) met documented inspection criteria and (B) would reliably perform their intended function.
This report describes the District's program for the closure of the electrical termination issue stemming from the December 26, 1985 event.
The Electrical Termination Inspection and Upgrade Program included the following tasks:
A.
IDENTIFY QUESTIONABLE ELECTRICAL TERMINATIONS:
Identification and documentation, through detailed inspection, of electrical terminations not fully complying with conservative installation acceptance criteria.
8.
IDENTIFY OTHER POTENTIAL DEFICIENCIES INSIDE CABINETS AND PANELS:
Identification and documentation, through inspection, of other questionable conditions in the cabinets and panels.
C.
CORRECT ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DEFICIENCIES:
Implement controlled and documented rework / upgrade actions tc correct all identified deficiencies.
4 D.
DETERMINE PROBLEM TRENDS:
Determine if trends in failures or deviations exist which are associated with (a) specific electrical termination manufacturers, (b) the panel / cabinet manufacturer or (c) District construction or maintenance methods and procedures.._ -_
i --
I' E.
ENSURE FUTURE QUALITY: Take actions to provide assurance that
' electrical termination deficiencies do not occur in the future.
This report describes the initial scope of the program, its evolution and expansion, the subsequent District actions, significant findings, program conclusions, and long-term actions for ensuring a continued high level of quality.
sa f
?
6 4
=
~.
III.
DEFINITIONS Throughout this report, the below listed terms are used.
These terms are defined as follows:
J A.
INTERNAL TERMINATIONS - Factory installed terminations by the i
panel / cabinet manufacturer.
B.
EXTERNAL TERMINATIONS - SMUD installed terminations at the interface between the field wiring and the vendor supplied panel / cabinet.
(Note: All lug terminations used by SMUD are manufactured by' AMP Corporation).
I l
C.
SMUD REPLACED INTERNAL TERMINATIONS - Panel / cabinet factory installed terminations subsequently replaced by SMUD with AMP lugs.
j D.
TERMINATION FAILURE - A termination which becomes disconnected from the conductor during the inspection process.
E.
TERMINATION DEVIATION - A termination whose visual characteristics I
do not completely conform to the District's visual inspection i
acceptance criteria.
F.
ELECTRICAL ENCLOSURES CRITICAL TO PLANT OPERATION - Cabinets and j
panels containing system instrumentation and controls designated as either Class I, required to mitigate a UFSAR Chapter 14 accident /
transient or required to mitigate a 10CFR50 Appendix R fire.
G.
ETC-MOLEX TERMINATIONS - Insulated electrical terminations manufactured by ETC-MOLEX Incorporated.
H.
AMP TERMINATIONS - Insulated electrical terminations manufactured by AMP Incorporated.
I.
SECURENESS VERIFICATION INSPECTION - Inspection method of applying a designated ten: ion to the electrical termination conductor to establish the mechanical integrity of the termination crimp.. _ _ _ _ _ _
a:
IV.
DETAILED PROGRAM DESCRIPTION-A.
DECEMBER 26,'1985 FAILURE AND CONSEQUENCES On December 26,1985, _at 0414 hours0.00479 days <br />0.115 hours <br />6.845238e-4 weeks <br />1.57527e-4 months <br />, tne Rancho Seco reactor tripped on high Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure due to a reduction in main feedwater flow to the steam generators. The reduction in flow was initiated by a loss of ' electrical power to the unit's Integrated Control System (ICS).
The ICS provides the proper coordination of the reactor, steam generator feedwater control and the turbine under various operating conditions.
This coordination consists of producing the best load response to the unit load demand while recognizing the capabilities and limitations of the reactor, steam generator feedwater system and turbine. Prior to the reactor trip, the unit was operating in a steady-state condition at 75 percent power.
A detailed description of the December 26,1985^ event is provided in Reference 1.
During the post-event testing of the ICS Power Supply Monitor (PSM) located in ICS. cabinet H4IC1 within the Control Room, the bus monitor appeared to have a drifting trip point.
Shunt trip switches did not operate at the required set point for positive 2'4V DC voltage. An unknown external resistence was suspected in the PSM circuitry.
When tested, an external resistence was found in the termination on the positive 24V DC bus monitor connection.
The connecting terminal lug was determined to be the source.
This lug actually fell off the conductor wire when it was lifted (Reference 2).
I 1
The failure of the connection was caused by the improper factory installation of the terminal lug on the Power Supply Monitor wire.
j The failed lug was subsequent 1v identified to be an AMP Incorporated compression lug, #10-12 AHG.
The basic components of i
this type terminal lug are shown in Figure 1.
Detailed examination of the failure revealed insufficient insertion of the conductor into the lug barrel.. This resulted in an inadequate barrel crimp on the conductor strands at the tongue end of the lug, creating a loose, high re:istence connection (Figure 2).
B.
INSPECTION /M RESOLUTIDN - CONTROL /CQHPUTER ROOM 1.
INITIAL ICS AND NNI INSPECTION The failed internal compression lug was documented by Nonconforming Report (NCR) #S-5294.
This NCR was dispositioned to visually inspect all internal and external terminations in the five (5) ICS cabinets and the seven (7) Non-Nuclear Instrumentation f.lfNI) cabinets in the Control / Computer Room.
The NNI cabinets were included within the scope of the inspection because:
(a) both systems were manufactured by the Bailey Controls Company; (b) ther.e is proximity in the manufacture dates of the ICS and NNI cabinets and (c) there is a similarity in the functional and physical characteristics of the equipm:>rt. The subsequent inspections by Quality Control resulted in NCRs #S-5302 and #S-5299 for the NNI and ICS cabinets, respectively.
These initial inspections were performed utilizing experience based visual inspection criteria and Work ikquests only. i i
All subsequent inspections were performed using pre-planned Maintenance Inspection Data Reports which contained detailed wire termination installation specifications and inspection criteria.
These specifications were developed from the then recently issued Nuclear Engineering Procedures.
Included in these detailed specifications were visual acceptance criteria for electrical terminations, including compression lugs, solder and wire wraps.
(Section V of this report more fully addresses the development and content of these specifications).
Failures and deviations -as found during initial inspection where documented on NCRs for disposition.
Other similar deficiencies found during reworking /later inspection were j
corrected using stringent installation criteria and documented
)
on the Maintenance Inspection Document Report.
I 1
The' following summarizes the initial visual inspection results and upgrade efforts for the ICS and NNI compression lug terminations.
Deviations involving solder and wire wrap terminations and components are discussed in Subsection IV.B.5 of this report.
Findings
.y
( A) Panels' Inspected:
12 (91' Compression Lug Terminations Inspected:
2,250 (C) Failures:
2 0'
(D) Deviations / Reworks:
950
)
5'
. E) Types of Deviations / Reworks:
(
Conductors not visible at the tongue end of the lug barrel.
(This deviation is similar to the December 26, D[
- 1985 failure in that there was insufficient penetration of. the conductor strands in the lug barrel)
).: ;
D Lfr x
_g_
I' Conductor extends too far beyond the tongue end of the 4
barrel such that the conductor strands are compressed under the terminal screw.
(This prevents the proper seating of the terminal screw and may give a false indication of the conductor to lug secureness) 1 Lug stud hole too large for terminal screw.
1 Wrong size lug for conductor size.
Improperly modified lug.
Lugs installed face down (i.e. not inspectable).
Lugs bent more than 90 degrees.
Lugs twisted or deforned.
More than two lugs on a single stud.
Incorrect shield termination.
Two lugs under one terminal screw not installed back to l
back.
Rework / Upgrade Effort
)
( A) All wiring and compression lug terminations of the type identified in the December 26, 1985 failure were ultimately inspected and failures were replaced in the ICS cabinet.
I I
! i 9
\\'
(B) A total of 950 ICS and NNI cabinet compression lug terminations, deviating from visual inspection' criteria, were either reworked or replaced with AMP compression lugs.
Documentation (A) Fourteen (14) NCRs listing failures and deviations were I
generated and dispositioned.
Sianificance I
(A) Only 2 actual failures identified out of 2,250 terminations inspected.
(B) The quality of installation of the internal terminations in the Bailey manufactured ICS and NNI cabinets was generally below workmanship. standards desired by the District today.
(C) An additional 950 terminations were replaced solely because they deviated from the District's visual acceptance criteria, not because they failed to perform their intended electrical connection function.
Resultant District Action l
l (A) On February 13, 1986, the Plant Review Committee (PRC) directed the field inspection sampling of other specific Bailey panels and cabinets in the Control / Computer Room (Reference 3).
Based upon the results of this inspection, l
on February 27, 1986, the PRC directed the expansion of the l
inspection program to include the SFAS and RPS panels (Reference 4).
i (B) Nuclear Engineering (NE) began the development of a -
_ _________L
procedure to augment the visual inspection acceptance:
~
criteria. The intent was to preclude unwarranted lug.
replacement without overlooking potential termination
. failures.
2.
COMPRESSION LUG TERMINATION TESTING
~
During the performance of the ICS and NNI inspections and relugging work, new concerns arose:
(A) Some external terminations could not be visually inspected.
without lifting the lug due to their physical location and/or orientation (installed back to back or face down).
(B) Numerous circuits required safety clearances in order to' conduct the visual inspection. Additionally, for some equipment configurations, special arrangements were needed to work around Engineered Safety Feature items.
(C) Replacement of all questionable terminations.was performed to guarantee complia'nce to the.new stringent visual acceptance criteria,' even though the probability was very high that the terminations would have functioned reliably for the life of the plant.
For the above reasons, NE conducted special testing to establish " secureness verification" criteria to augment the visua1 inspections.
The questionable lugs removed from the ICS cabinets were chosen as the test group. The actual test samples were selected.from this group using the 'following criteria:
l'
- ( A) All lugs which had no conductor strands visible from the tongue end of-the barrel.
(B) The single visibly worst case lug in which conductor strands could be seen from the tongue end of the barrel.
(C) A sample of the remaining lugs in the worst visible condition.
Using the above criteria, thirty-four (34) test samples were selected.
Both AMP and ETC-M0 LEX terminations were included in the selection.
Special Test Procedure STP-950 (Reference 5) was developed to control the testing of the thirty-four selected samples.
The basis for the acceptance criteria and conduct of the secureness testing is contained in Engineering Report ERPT-E0111 (Reference 6).
The two basic elements of STP-950 were conductor-to-termination pull force withstand capability, and a post-pull electrical function check. NE idested whether the individual samples, subjected to a spectfied pull force on the conductor wire, could maintain (1) an acceptable mechanical termination and (2) an acceptable electrical termination as verified by electrical resistence measurements.
At Rancho Seco, all compression lug terminations which are important 'to the safe operation of the plant are located within cabinets or enclosures which are accessible only to trained craftsmen and personnel.
No known industry standard exists which provides guidance on the physical testing of "in-servic.e" j
lugs installed in a normal operating environment.
The STP-950 test method was established after consideration of the internal i
~
1ayout of electrical equipment used in the plant and methods / procedures by which the District modifies and maintains
-this equipment.
Imposition of an eight (8) pound tension force, for a duration of one (1) minute, was the designated test. The eight pound test value was derived after evaluation of (1) Military Specification, MIL-T-7928, data and (2) the determination that the specified value would conservatively exceed forces that any single conductor could experience when accidently pulled or jarred during the performance of work on adjacent terminations or components, or when the lug itself was disconnected from the terminal board.
Since the cables and wiring inside most electrical enclosures are located together in bundles and secured to the enclosure or support members, any single termination would be exposed to only a fraction of the force that the cable bundle experiences.
Therefore, a high level of confidence exists that the eight pound test value conservatively encompasses the force that any one conductor might be subjected to in the operating plant environment.
Proper electrical function after the pull-force testing was determined by identifyin'g the maximum acceptable termination resistance for each wire size. This was based on the limiting voltage drop and power dissipation in the termination when carrying the specified load currents. The testing was accomplished by measuring the resistance between the conductor wire and a point on the lug tongue adjacent to the lug barrel.
The maximum allowable voltage drop was limited to 0.04 volts or less.
This value is negligible when compared to the total voltage drop in the circuit.
The maximum power dissipation in the lug wire barrel was limited to 0.4 watts, which is the maximum power dissipation that can be expected during the qualification of #10 AHG lugs, per Military Specification MIL-T-7928. -
~
~
The results of.the 34 samples tested under STP-950 are contained in Engineering Report ERPT-E0116 (Reference 7).
These results are summarized as follows:
f Findinas (A) All 34 samples passed the pull-force test.
I (B) All 34 samples passed the electrical resistance acceptance cri ter,i a..
Sianificance (A) The test performed on the " replaced" ICS terminations i
-demonstrated that the existing visual inspection and acceptance criteria was conservative.
(B) The tested lugs, while having deviated from the visual j
inspection acceptance criteria, all met the required
'l mechanical and electrical test criteria.
It was concluded that the samples would have had a high probability of functioning as intended over the life of the plant.
4 NE subsequently initiated " pull to destruction" testing o'n the inmg 34 samples.
This testing was performed under Special Test Procedure STP-951 (Reference 8). Under this test, the 34 samples were pull-tested to destruction with the maximum withstand force being recorded for each sample.
The results of this test are contained in Engineering Report ERPT-E0178 (Reference 9).
The results are summarized as follows:
- i
i Findinas (A) Twenty-five (25) conductors broke at forces ranging from 24.5_to 155 pounds.
(B) Six (6) conductors pulled out of the lug at forces ranging from 22.5 to 94 pounds.
(C) Two (2) terminations experienced broken tongues at forces of 89.5 and 155 pounds.
(D) One (1) conductor pulled out at a force of eight pounds after seven seconds.
l Sianificance (A) STP-951 demonstrated that compression lug terminations significantly deviating from the visual inspection criteria would have continued to provide a reliable electrical connection had they been left in service.
(B) Secureness verification inspection criteria could be developed to augment the inspection program for terminations where no (1) conductor strands were visible at I
the tongue end of the lug barrel, (2) lugs were installed face down or (3) lugs were installed back to back.
i -
~
Resultant DistrirJL ctions A
(A) NE established a documented procedure for performing secureness verification inspections entitled " Procedure for Performing Secureness Field Verification of Electrical Compression Terminations." This procedure is contained in
~
Engineering Report ERPT-E0178 (Reference 9). The procedure was used in the inspection of external District installed terminations.
(B) Quality Control witnessed secureness verification inspections of the Bailey Control / Computer Room panels and cabinets for external terminations.
3.
PROGRAM EXPANSION Based on the results of the ICS and NNI initial visual inspections, the PRC directed that the inspection and upgrade program be extended to include other Bailey panels and cabinets in the Control / Computer Room which were designated critical to plant operation. A list'ing of the Control / Computer Room panels and cabinets which were included in the inspection program scope is provided in Table 1.
The location of this equipment in the Control / Computer Room is provided in Figure 3.
Visual inspections of the Safety' Features Actuation System (SFAS) and Reactor Protection System (RPS) internal and external terminations were initiated next.
Secureness verification inspections were also initiated on the external terminations within these panels and cabinets. While performing the secureness verification inspection on SFAS panel H2SFA, a group of internal compression lugs were inadvertently t o
subjected to the secureness verification inspection pull-force. Within this group, one compression lug failed.
Investigation of this failure. identified a new failure mode.
The failure was caused by the insufficient insertion of the assembled compression lug in the crimping tool.
This placed the conductor insulation crimp too far forward on the lug barrel.
This resulted in the pinching and. shearing (not severing completely) of the conductor strands.
The failed internal compression lug was an ETC-MOLEX, #22-16 AWG.
Figure 4 pictorially represents this failure mode.
This new type of failure was documented in NCR #S-5521.
The disposition of this NCR required that the secureness verification inspections be performed on all internal terminations in addition to the external terminations.
ICS and NNI terminations which were not replaced after the initial visual inspections were therefore subjected to the secureness verification inspection criteria.
Due to the newly identified ETC failure, and as a result of inquiries to Babcock and Wilcox, the Bailey manufactured control room consoles (H1RI and H1RC) and primary systenf vertical panels (H2PSA and H2PSB) were added to the internal secureness verification inspection scope.
Consistent with the expansion of the secureness verification inspections to include the internal terminations, NE established the " Procedure for Performing Secureness Verification of Internal Hiring Terminations." This procedure is contained in Engineering Report ERPT-E0180 (Reference 10).
The procedure was established specifying the acceptance criteria of a 2-3 pound pull-force on the conductor wire without separation from the lug termination.
NE determined that this pull-force value was sufficient for identifying unsecure terminations based on the following: -
(A) The compression lug on the original December 26, 1985 ICS failure fell off the conductor when being lifted from the terminal, demonstrating literally no ability to withstand a tensional force.
(B) The results of STP-951 demonstrated that terminations in the worst visible condition, had an extremely high pull out resistance.
(C) The preponderance of wire terminations are tied together in bundles and secured-to the enclosure or its support members.
In accordance with the internal secureness verification procedure, training was conducted for all personnel who performed the secureness verification inspections.
This individual training was documented on training records contained in ERPT-E0180 (Reference 10).
Through the internal secureness verification inspections, two failures in the Main Console (H1RC) and one failure in an RPS cabinet (H4PR2B) were identified.
These failures were also ETC-MOLEX compression lugs with improperly placed crimps causing sheared conductor strands. NCRs were written and, dispositioned for the rework / replacement of these failures plus other deviations found in the remainder of the Bailey cabinets and panels.
The following information summarizes the visual and secureness verification inspection and upgrade effort an the SFAS, RPS, Main Console, and Primary System cabinets amd panels:
t Findings (A) Panels and Consoles inspected:
24 (B) Compression Lug Terminetions Inspected:
8,950 (C) Failures:
9 (D) Deviations / Reworks:
1,900 (E) Types of Deviations / Reworks:
)
1 Improper crimp position.-
l Lug holes too large for terminal screw.
Conductors recessed in barrel.
Conductors extending too far teyond barrel end.
i Lugs installed face down.
Improper size lug for conductor.
Bent and twisted lugs.
Rework / Upgrade Effort (A) All failures were replaced with AMP lugs.
(B) A total of 1,900 compression lug terminations verified as, deviating from-visual inspection criteria were either
{
reworked or replaced with AMP compression lugs.
i pocumentation
\\
(A) Forty (40) NCRs listir 2 failures and deviations were generated and dispositioned.
Sianificance (A) The secureness verification inspection criteria used on
]
internal terminations resulted in the discovery of a new failure mode which had passed the previous visual J
inspection.
(B) Only 9 actual failures out of 8,950 terminations inspected.
(C) All 9 failures identified subsequent to the December 26,
]
1985 AMP failure were internal ETC-MOLEX lugs.
)
4.
INTERNAL TERMINATION INSPECTION VALIDATION While performing replacement and rework activities on SFAS cabinet H4SAB resulting 'from NCR #S-5378, two ETC-M0 LEX internal compression lugs were found to have bare conductor protruding through the tongue end of the lug barrel with the conductor strands secured under the terminal board screw.' When each screw was removed, the conductors slid out of the lugs.
Figure 5 pictorally represents this failure mode.
Investigation of previous inspection documentation revealed that due to the terminal block's inaccessible location within the cabinet, an inspection had not been performed on these internal terminations.
1
~
Additionally, during the replacement of one of the. compression lugs dispositioned under NCR #S-5378, an internal lug was identified to have conductor insulation extending through, and-visible at, the tongue end of the barrel.. While sufficient electrical contact was made in this case because the-bare 1
conductor strands, extending from the barrel, made contact with the' lug tongue, the fact that the barrel crimp covered insulated conductor was unacceptable.
Previous visual inspection criteria had.not addressed this. deficiency. The internal compression lugs in this failure and the two I
identified above were ETC-M0 LEX.
Figure 5' pictorially represents this failure mode.
Due to the above ETC-M0 LEX failures, NCR #S-5612 was dispositioned to provide further inspection actions to assure the completeness and validity of the internal termination inspection program. jThese acticr2 were as follows:
(A) Nuclear Engineering and Nuclear Operntions review of all MIDRs and NCRs from previous visual inspections for the possible omission of terminations requiring inspection.
(B) Nuclear Engineering and Nuclear Operations review of the internal secureness verification inspections to ensure that all wires which were secured in tied bundles had been individually inspected.
Secureness verifications were to be performed if required.
(C) Visual reinspection of all internal ETC-M0 LEX compression lugs for conductor insulation'which may be. visible at the tongue end of the barrel.
(D) Lifting and visual inspection of all internal lugs installed either face down or behind other lugs for conductor strands trapped under terminal board screws.
Through the performance of the previous program inspections and through the reinspections per the dispositioning of NCR
- S-5612, all NNI, ICS and RPS internal terminations were both visually inspected and subjected to the secureness verification.
This is also true for the SFAS panels with the exception of the decay heat circuits required to be energized during the plant shutdown.
The terminations on these circuits will undergo a future inspection (see Table 6).
The Control Room Consoles (H1RI and H1RC) and the vertical panels (H2PSA and H2PSB) underwent a secureness verification inspection prior to the generation of NCR #S-5612 and will undergo additional future visual inspection (see Table 6).
Through the Nuclear Engineering and Nuclear Operations reviews, assurance has been provided that there have been no significant omissions of terminations requiring inspection under the scope of this program.
The following information summarizes the results of the work performed on the terminations and the reviews conducted under the disposition of NCR #S-5612.
Findinas (A) Panels Inspected:
32 (B) Compression Lug Terminations Inspected
- Approx 9,000 (C) Failures:
6 (D) Deviations / Reworks:
2,100 i
Rework /Uncrade Effort (A) Six (6) failures were replaced with AMP lugs.
(B) A total of 2,100 compression lug terminations verified as j
' deviating from visual inspection criteria were either reworked or replaced with AMP compression lugs.
Documentation (A) NCR #S-5612, supported by 36 MIDRS, were utilized to perform inspection and disposition work.
Sianificance (A) Secureness verification inspection results were re-verified through additional visual and secureness inspections.
(B) All terminations.within the program scope were re-verified as having been inspected.
(C) Visual inspection criteria was further expanded to include the deficiency of conductor insulation crimped within the lug barrel crimp.
(D) ETC-MOLEX internal terminations in Bailey cabinets have significant variations in installation workmanship quality.
1
} 1
1 l
~
5.
OTHER PROBLEMS ADDRESSED While performing the initial ICS and NNI cabinet inspections, other termination and panel workmanship quality problems were 1
noted. These problems involved the factory installation of solder terminations. the factory installation of wire wrap terminations, the District modification of external compression lug terminations and the physical condition of other termination related panel components. - A significant upgrade effort was undertaken to address questionable items identified in order to ensure the quality and functionality of the cabinets and panels.
]
J The following subparagraphs discuss'these other problems and j
the District's resolution actions.
(A) SOLDER TERMINATIONS All solder terminations on the SFAS, NNI, ICS and RPS cabinets and panels were inspected per MIDRs.containing detailed acceptance criteria.. The verification program for solder terminations was developed and performed by Instrumentation & Controls Maintenance.
The inspecti.on results revealed that there had been a lack of consistent workmanship standards applied by the manufacturer during the solder connection installation of these internal terminations.
Approximately 10% of the solder terminations inspected were reworked to meet the District's current conservative workmanship standards.
The following information summarizes the solder termination upgrade effort: _. _.. _... _.
- ~
Findinas (1) Panels Inspected:
32 (2) Solder. Terminations Inspected:
23,400 (3) Failures:
2 (4) Deviations / Reworks:
2,500 (5) Types of Deviations / Reworks:
Splattered flux.
Insufficient or excessive solder.
Grainy or porous connection.
Improper. tinning or wetting.
Icicles or bridging.
Conductor insulatien damage.
Insufficient insulation clearance.
Sianificance (1) All factory installed solder terminations on the SFAS, NMI, ICS and RPS panels / cabinets which visually deviated from the conservative District inspection criteria were reworked to the District's current workmanship standards.
(B) HIRE HRAP TERMINATIONS All wire wrap terminations on the SFAS, NNI and ICS cabinets and panels were inspected per MIDRs containing detailed acceptance criteria. The verification' program for L
the wire wraps was developed and performed by Instrumentation & Controls Maintenance.
The inspection results revealed that there had been a lack of consistent
~
workmanship standards applied by the manufacturer during the wire wrap installation of the internal terminations.
In order to assure the proper resolution of the deviations identified, the District consulted in detail with other-utilities and vendors for the establishment of rework methods and tooling.
New installation tools were procured and selected personnel who performed the wire wrap work I
were trained.
Workmanship standards were tested both-before and after performing the upgrade work.
This testing was witnessed by the District Quality Control personnel, i
Approximately 7% of the wire wrap terminations inspected r
were reworked'to meet the -District's current workmanship standards.
The following 'information summarizes the wire wrap termination effort:
Findings (1) Panels Inspected:
24 (2) Wire Wrap Terminations Inspected:
8,750 (3) Failures: 3 (4) Deviations / Reworks:
1,130 (5) Types of Dtviations/ Reworks:
Wire separation; consecutive coils not in contact.
Wire coil overlays.
Bent wire wrap pins.
Broken or insufficient number of coils.
Improper insulation clearance.
Sianificance (1) All factory installed wire wrap terminations on SFAS, NNI and ICS panels / cabinets which visually deviated from District inspection criteria were reworked to the District's current workmanship standards.
(C) TRIMMED LUG TERMINATIONS The inspection, disposition and rework effort under this segment of the program was the result of the District modification of compression lug terminations on field cabling. During the installation of some external compression lug terminations, the lugs were physically trimmed in order to fit the manufacturer supplied terminal blocks.
An example of this type modification is represented in Figure 6.
These modifications were identified during the initial NNI h
cabinet inspections., Since these modifications were independent of the Bailey cabinet internal termination problems discussed previously 1.n this report, a separate identification, evaluation and resolution effort was initiated by the District.
This two phased effort i
addressed (1) the Control / Computer Room and (2) outside the Control / Computer Room.
The first phase addressed the trimmed lug terminations within the Control / Computer Room which were documented on l
NCRs during the electrical termination program j
i inspections.
Each of the trimmed lug termination deviations was resolved through the following process:
l 4
(1) Evaluate adequacy of the lug tongue width against
~
vendor specified acceptance criteria to identify terminations requiring replacement.
(2) Initiate and approve Engineering Change Notifications (ECN) where cable modifications were required (reductions and splicings).
I (3) Perform the approved cable modifications and lug I
installations.
)
The results of the Control / Computer Room resolution phase are as follows:
1 Findinas I
(1) Terminations Replaced:
31 (2) NCRs Dispositioned:
14 (3) ECNs Issued:
14 l
Sianificance (1) District installation procedures will preclude future lug termination modifications.
I The second phase of the trimmed lug termination resolution effort addresses those lugs on vital power cables terminating outside the Control / Computer Room.
The inspection plan and responsible disciplines have been identified to complete this phase (Reference 12), with all required Engineering data transmitted to the appropriate disciplines (Reference 13).
This phase involves the following:
1 I
(1) Identification of vital power cable terminations which have
~
been modified.
(2) Evaluation of the acceptability of the trimmed lug terminations against vendor specified-acceptance criteria.
(3) Initiation and approval of ECNs where cable modification.
work is required.
(4) Performance of the approvr;d cable modifications and lug installations.
I (D) OTHER PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED AND RESOLVED During the conduct of the electrical termination inspection program, other cabinet and panel deviations and deficiencies were noted.
These were subsequently '
dispositioned and resolved to ensure proper function and consistency of quali.ty. Additionally, general maintenance work on the panel, cabinet and console components was performed where required.
(1) Deviations and Deficiencies:
Component leads (resistors and diodes) not covered with insulation.
Terminal blocks with chipped or broken barriers
)
between them.
Terminal blocks not labeled.
Drawing configuration discrepancies.
Damaged printed circuit cards.
Loose terminal board screws.
Broken cabinet ventilation fans.
l l l i
~
(2) Additional Maintenance Work Performed Cable cord grips reworked.
Cables rerouted and re-supported.
Conductor tie wrap supports added.
Fuse panels cleaned and repaired.
Cabinets cleaned and filters replaced.
Modules cleaned and reworked.
(3) Sionificance:
The electrical termination inspection program i
encompassed considerably more effort than the I
initial limited lug termination scope to:
a) resolve other panel / cabinet ~ deviations and deficiencies noted during the inspection process and b) perform general maintenance work to upgrade the overall condition of the enclosures and their components.
~
6.
INSIDE CONTROL / COMPUTER ROOM
SUMMARY
From the initiation of the Control / Computer Room Electrical Termination Inspection Program, the District's actions have focused on (a) the identification of all questionable electrical termination installations, (b) the identification of other potential panel / cabinet workmanship deficiencies, (c) the rework and replacement of terminations (see Table 3) not fully complying with the latest developed District workmanship i
standards and (d) the identification of termination and installation problem trends.
Through the program evolution, the identification of termination installation deficiencies required the implementation of overlapping inspection methods to ensure that I,
" actual failures" were identified. As an alternative to the visual inspection criteria, a pull-test program was developed and secureness verification inspection and acceptance criteria were established.
This second inspection method was implemented to (a) allow the verification of terminations in which complete visual inspection could not be performed and (b) assure the lugs ability to securely hold the conductor even though the visual pattern may have been irregular. Through the discovery of additional new failure modes, it became evident that the visual inspection alone did not provide assurance of the serviceability of a termination.
While the secureness verification inspection alone does ensure that the mechanical connection of the conductor wire to the terminal is acceptable, it does not ensure that the termination meets current District workmanship standards.
Therefore, both the visual and secureness verification acceptance criteria were utilized, as required, during the program.
For the program implemented subsequent to the identification of the initial December 26, 1985 ICS failure, Table 2 provides a summary of the total failures, by termination type.
It may be seen by the review of Table 2 that the total number of failures (22) identified in the program is sta.tistically insignificant relative to the total number of electrical terminations inspected.
Evaluation of the data clearly indicates that the failure rate of the factory installed ETC-MOLEX compression lugs is significantly higher than that of the non-ETC MOLEX internal and external compression lugs.
Review of the results of the inspections performed and tabulated data leads to the following summarization: - -
F (A) District installed AMP termination failure rate was insignificant (5 out of 7,000 inspected).
(B) Chronic crimp problems observed with ETC-MOLEX lug installations were not found on District installed AMP terminations.
(C) The quality of the District's workmanship on the external and SMUD replaced internal termination installations was significantly better than that of the vendor's factory installation.
This observation was repeatedly made during the program by the District inspection and maintenance personnel.
(The volume of internal termination reworks / replacements supports this observation).
(D)
Based upon the results of the inspections performed, no substantial safety hazard existed, as evaluated against 10CFR50 Part 21 criteria.
These results have given the Rancho Seco Staff a justifiably high confidence level in the workmanship quality of terminations installed by District personnel.
The failures and deviations identified during the program revealed two problem trends.
First, a lack of consistent workmanship quality in the ETC-MOLEX lug installations (primarily single crimp installations).
Second, generally poor workmanship quality in the Bailey Controls panels and cabinets for all types of termination installations (compression lug, solder and wire wrap).
For these reasons, a long-term plant wide inspection and upgrade program will be implemented.
Remaining inspections to be performed within the Control / Computer Room are identified in Table 6 of this report.
q k
~
C.
LONG-TERM INSPECTION AND UPGRADE PROGRAM 3
The inspections performed on the selected Control Room panel and l
cabinet electrical terminations resulted in an extremely low number of actual termination failures. A significant amount of resources applied to this program were dedicated to upgrading the i
electrical termination quality in the Bailey panels and cabinets to
]
the highest District workmanship standards.
The Control / Computer Room program results indicate that the originally installed
]
ETC-M0 LEX terminations have both a higher failure rate than those terminations installed by the District and a lower general workmanship quality than would be accepted today.
To provide assurance that ETC-MOLEX terminations in electrical j
enclosures critical to plant safety and operation meet District d
workmanship standards, a long-term panel inspection and upgrade program is being implemented. Quality assurance procedure QAIP 15 (effective Feb. 6, 1987), entitled " Electrical System Upgrade Program" (Reference 14), forms the basis of this long-term plant wide program.
The ongoing long-term inspection and upgrade program will ultimately raise the workmanship quality of all existing electrical enclosures in the plant.
l I -
V.
DOCUMENTATION A.
ENGINEERING SPECIFICATIONS i
Prior to the December 26, 1985 reactor trip, construction specifications contained in Nuclear Engineering Procedures, covered the installation of electrical terminations. These documents provided general standards governing the installation of terminations.
The termination lug problem made it evident that more detailed criteria was needed to (1) identify questionable terminations of existing lugs and (2) control the quality of any subsequent installations, reworks, and replacements.
This need was met by a revision of the Nuclear Engineering Procedures Manual
)
(NEPM) (Reference 11) which provided detailed instructions for the proper installation of all types of electrical terminations.
It also specified detailed inspection criteria and placed significant emphasis on workmanship standards.
The revised procedure was an integral part of all subsequent inspection and rework / upgrade efforts.
The procedure was included in each MIDR and Maintenance Instruction document.
The significance of this upgrade is that the current procedure provides the District with stringent uniform criteria and standards for the installation, inspection and maintenance of electrical terminations. Additionally, Electrical Maintenance procedures and I&C Maintenance procedures are being written which incorporate the detailed workmanship standards developed during this program.
Prior to the implementation of this program, published maintenance procedures for electrical terminations were essentially non-existent.
I B.
QUALITY ASSURANCE j
The District recognized that a properly controlled program of inspection, evaluation and resolution was essential to the successful closure of the electrical termination issue.
Even though not all the work was re ;uired to be to Class I standards, Class I standards were applied across the board.
This ensured both consistency of inspection and high quality rework standards.
}
Other than the initial ICS and NNI inspections, each Quality Control inspection was perforned utilizing individual Maintenance Inspection Data Reports (MIDR).
These documents contained specific inspection instructions covering (1) terminations to be inspected, 1
(2) acceptance criteria (3) other detailed information relevant to i
the specific panel or cabinet and (4) instructions to report any and all deficiencies on hCRs.
NCRs were initiated for fritial inspection deficiencies identified.
Nuclear Engineering documented their evaluation and resolution.
All repair or accept disposition findings were approved by the Engineering Review Board.
Nuclear Operations controlled tne rework resulting from each NCR by issuing detailed Maintenance Instruction (MI) documents for the crafts tn follow during their work. Post rework Quality Control inspections were performed and documented on MIDRs.
After the completion of all work under the Work Requests, the above documents were reviewed and closed out.
The utilization of detailed inspection and maintenance criteria, under a well documented and controlled process, demonstrates both the importance and attention to detail with which the overall program was implemented by the District.
m q:n-,
.,y!,y,,1,;;
- M
,\\
- p s.3 F-
., h.b,
lf:
- ; '. r n,
i y'y
. Tablei4 provides a quantitative summary of the documentation
' generated on the Control / Computer Room Program.
Table.5 provides a detailed documentation listing.
t r
,, )' )
e, j.')I1. '
g..?,
p', }+ :
1
'B,
..(
i e
t n;
a 9
I l
rj s
Jt 1
J I
VI.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS A.
DEVELOP MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES BASED UPON ENGINEERING CRITERIA The importance of consistent design, inspection, installation and maintenance criteria for the plant has been re-emphasized as a result of this program.
j B.
A_SSURE ENGINEERING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE CHANGE CONSISTENCY To ensure that consistent workmanship standards and acceptance criteria are maintained, changes to either Engineering Procedures or Haintenance Procedures should undergo cross discipline review.
'C. ~ INTENSIFY FACTORY AND RECEIVING INSPECTIONS The program revealed that most of the termination deficiencies and deviations would have been identified either prior to vendor delivery or upon the District receipt of delivery if adequate inspection and acceptance cri,teria had been established.
D.
IMPLEMENT LONG-TERM INSPECTION AND UPGRADE PROGRAM This program has resulted in significant upgrading of specific panel terminations and components supporting the safe operation of the plant. A program for the long-term inspection of other electrical plant panels has been initiated.
This effort is being integrated into the normal plant practices when performing work in any plant electrical cabinet or panel.
~
VII. CONCLUSIONS The District initiated Electrical Termination Inspection and Resolution Program has resolved the concerns brought about by the December 26, 1986 ICS termination failure.
The development and usage of stringent inspection and engineering rework l
l criteria have assured the identification of all electrical termination failures and deficiencies within the panels and cabinets inspected.
The 22 failures identified and corrected represent a failure rate of only
.000497, through the inspection of over 44,000 electrical terminations.
l
\\
The conservative rework and replacemer.t of over 7,800 electrical l
terminations, deviating from the current workmanship installation i
standards and other observed deficiencies, has resulted in a significant increase in panel and cabinet quality.
The identification of the need to ensure that selected terminations in enclosures critical to plant operation meet the District's established workmanship standards has resulted in the long term expansion of the l
program to outside the Control / Computer Room.
This effort will provide the District with an increased confidence level as to the closure of the L
termination issue.
The development of comprehensive criteria and maintenance procedures resulting from this program, coupled with the continued District emphasis on standards of workmanship, will provide the assurance of future electrical termination installation and maintenance quality.
l l
The results of the electrical termination program have demonstrated that no significant problem existed.
Where deficiencies were identified, corrective action was undertaken.
The scope and intensity of this self-initiated program have been both comprehensive and conservative, consistent with the District's commitment to excellence. - _ _ _
j VIII'.
REFERENCES 1.
Licensee Event Report Number 85-25, Revision 1. Reactor Trip Following Loss of ICS Power, dated June 10, 1986.
j l
i 2.
Trip Report #75, Reactor Trip on December 26, 1985, Loss of ICS l
Power, dated July 22, 1986.
i 3.
SMUD Hemorandum; Plant Review Committee Meeting Minutes No. 1510, Held February 13, 1986; dated February 20, 1986.
4.
SMUD Memorandum; Plant Review Committee Meeting Minutes No. 1515, Held February 27, 1986; dated March 11, 1986.
5.
Special Test Procedure STP-950, Test Procedure for Verification of Electrical Field Cable Terminations, Revision 2.
6.
Engineering Report ERPT-E0111, Basis for Field and Internal Cable Termination Tests, dated March 19, 1986.
)
7.
Engineering Report ERPT-E0116. Recommendations Based Upon the Results of STP-950, dated April 28, 1986.
8.
Special Test Procedure STP-951, Test Procedure for Pull Out Strength Test en Field and SMUD Hodified Internal Cable Terminations, Revision 0.
9.
Engineering Report ERPT-E0178, Pull to Destruction Testing of Termination Samples to Establish Maximum Pullout Value, Suramary and Recommendations, dated April 24, 1986.
10.
Engineering Report ERPT-E0180, Investigation of Electrical Hiring Terminations - Bailey Cabinets / Panels / Consoles in Control / Computer 1
Room.
11.
NEPM 5304.8C, Construction Specification, " Electrical Cable Installation and Termination", Revision.1.
12.
SMUD Memorandum, Office of the Nuclear Engineering Manager to Office of the Nuclear Plant Manager, dated December 3, 1986, subject:
Termination Inspection Plan.
13.
SMUD Memorandum, Office of the Manager of Nuclear Engineering to Office of the Implementation Manager, dated December 23, 1986, subject: Nuclear Engineering Data Required to Complete the Electrical Termination Inspection and Rework Program.
14.
Quality Assurance Inspection Procedure No.15 (QAIP 15), " Electrical System Upgrade Program", Feb. 6, 1987.
i 1
i
) i
TABLE 1
~
CONTROL / COMPUTER' ROOM PROGRAM PANEL AND CABINET INSPECTION SCOPE DESCRIPTION PANEL / CABINET IDENTIFICATION INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM H4IC1 CABINETS H4IC2 H4IC3 H4IC4 H4ICS NON-NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION H4PIO1 CABINETS H4PIO2 H4PIO3 H4PIO4 H4 PIOS H4PIO6 H4PIO7 SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION H4SAA SYSTEM ANALOG CABINETS, H4SAB CHANNELS A, B AND C H4 SAC i
SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION H4SDA3 SYSTEM DIGITAL CABINETS, H4SDA4 CHANNEL A H4SDAS SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION H4SDB0 SYSTEM DIGITAL CABINETS, H4SDB00 CHANNEL B H4SDB1 H4SDB2 SAFETY FEATURES CONTROL H2SFA PANELS H2SFB PRIMARY SYSTEM CONTROL H2PSA *
- See Table 6 PANELS H2PSB
- Note 4 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM H4PRIA CABINETS, CHANNELS A#B,C AND D H4PR2A H4PR1B H4PR2B H4PR1C H4PR2C H4PR1D H4PR2D PROCESS RECORDING CONSOLE HtRC REACTOR & ICS CONTROL CONSOLE HIRI
TABLE 2
~
CONTROL / COMPUTER ROOM PROGRAM INSPECTION
SUMMARY
-BY TERMINATION TYPE TYPE TERMINATION TOTAL tot ^L FAILURE p3xLURES i
fDS
[8 7100 5
.0007 CT N
fUEN R
N D
1525 fUE 3325 12
.0038 N N^
N I
A ED SOLDER TERMINATIONS 23,400 2
.00009 WIRE WRAP TERMINATIONS 8750 3
.0003 TOTAL 44,100 22
.00049
4 MN O
O O
O O
O m
m O
i gg S
N m
W m
m n
g W1 o
o O
E<
W W
I I
I M
E U)
W
~
22
(.D O
E W
1 o
O O
O O
O g
W W
O O
O EO M
N (r)' O%gr x
W E - Q)
Z O
O O
O O
O u
O O
W O
O W
I O
- JW Z
co N
N CD
@ h2X
' u)) to y
W N
N z
O WO H E 2
EJ o W 1
O g
o o
o o
o E
E O
N u)
W (O
W l
CD J-
-O E
cn
+
cn N
o O
u) 2&2 1MO W
O CJ' M
o
.se 5
s W
N m
+
e N
3 O<Z Z1-5 d
m m
m s -
Z o
1 zee" s
255!
Z
~
O m
m ru>L H
l i
l
TABLE 4 CONTROL / COMPUTER. ROOM PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION
SUMMARY
DOCUMENTATION NO. OF SYSTEM PNL. 'S INSPECTION INSP'D AND REWORK ECN 'S
( DCN 'S )
MIDR 'S NCR 'S W/R 'S NNI 7
47 13 47 5
ICS 5
25 6
19 SFAS 12 70 28 82 12 RPS 8
57 19 86 5
NAIN CONS./
4 4
1 4
VERT.
PANELS TOTAL 36 203 67 238 22
TABLE 5 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION LISTING PANEL / CABINET SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NCR MIDR WORK RE00EST ICS H4IC1 S-5299 EM-128 111664 EM-129 111664 EM-130 111664 S-5423 EM-187 113398 S-5469 IC-127 114023 S-5491 EM-208 113410 S-5560 IC-149 114842 S-5612 EM-325 110021 IC-119 109809 ICS H4IC2 S-5299 EM-131 111665 EM-132 111665 S-5423 EM-188 113399 S-5469 IC-127 114023 S-5612 EM-277 116734-IC-119 109809 ICS H4IC3 S-5299 EM-133 111666 S-5423 EM-189 113400 EM-190 113400 S-5469 IC-127 114023 S-5612 EM-258 116735 ICS H4IC4 S-5299 EM-135 111667 S-5423 EM-191 113401-EM-192 113401 S-5469 IC-127 114023 S-5612 EM-259 116736 ICS H4IC5 S-5299 EM-134 111668 S-5423 EM-193 113402' EM-194 113402 S-5612 EM-266 116737 NNI H4PIO1 S-5302 EM-136 109478 i
S-5375 EM-224 114092 S-5429 EM-172 113387 EM-173 113387 S-5468 IC-130 113419 S-5487 EM-284 115278 IC-166 116.453 S-5612 EM-257 116957 IC-121 109810 IC-123 109814
)
1 TABLE 5 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION LISTING PANEL / CABINET SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NCR MI DR WORK REOUEST
)
l NNI H4PIO2 S-5302 EM-138 111756 f
S-5375 EM-224 114092 S-5381 EM-213 114080 l
S-5386 EM-216 114076 EM-?l7 114076 S-5394 EM-216 114076 EM-217 114076 S-5429 EM-174 113388 EM-175 113388 S-5468 IC-130 113412 S-5487 EM-284 115278 IC-166 116953 S-5612 EM-260 11674?
i IC-121 109810 IC-123 109814 NNI H4PIO3 S-5302 EM-254 11?081 S-5375 EM-224 114092 S-5381 EM-214 114080 1
S-5429 EM-176 113389 S-5468 IC-130 113412 S-5487 IC-166 116953 EM-284 115278 S-5612 EM-262 116743 IC-121 109810 IC-123 109814 IC-171 116854 IC-171 '
116855 NNI HAPIO4 S-5302 EM-139 111758 EM-164 104151 S-5375 EM-224 114097 S-5429 EM-177 113390 l
EM-178 113390 l
S-5487 EM-284 115278 IC-166 116953 S-5612 EM-261 116744 IC-123 109814 IC-171 114854 IC-171 114855 NNI H4PIO5 S-5302 EM-143 111759 S-5375 EM-224 114092 S-5429 EM-179 113391
TABLE 5 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION LISTING PANEL / CABINET SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NCR MIDR WORK REOUEST EM-180 113391 S-5466 IC-126 114020 S-5486 IC-128 114077 S-5543 IC-139 114837 S-5612 EM-270 116745 IC-120 109811 IC-122 109813 NNI H4PIO6 S-5302 EM-144 111760 EM-185 113385 EM-186 113386 S-5375 EM-224 114092 S-5381 EM-215 114080 5-5429 EM-181 113392 EM-182 113392 S-5466 IC-126 114020 S-5486 IC-128 114077 S-5543 IC-139 114837 S-5612 EM-263 116746 EM-263 116195 L
IC-120 109811 IC-122 109813 NNI H4PIO7 S-5302 EM-145 112002 S-5375 EM-224 114092 S-5429 EM-183 113393 EM-184 113393 S-5466 IC-126 114020
)
S-5486 IC-128 114077 S-5543 IC-139 114837
{
S-5612 EM-264 116747 IC-120 109811 IC-122 109813 SFAS H4SAA S-5371 IC-134 114072
~
EM-221 114072 EM-137 111781 S-5492 EM-166
.111843 EM-219 114066 S-5612 EM-283 116875 S-5629 IC-170 113838 IC-170 116850 SFAS H4SAB S-5378 IC-135 114075 IC-135 112086 EM-141 108431 EM-218 114074
TABLE 5 j
PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION LISTING PANEL / CABINET SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NCR MI DR WORK RE0 VEST S-5493 EM-167 111841 EM-223 114081 S-5612 EM-269 116961 S-5629 IC-168 116A51 IC-168 113839
.SFAS H4 SAC S-5375 IC-136 114803 EM-140 108d30 EM-225 114802 S-5612 EM-276 116732 S-5629 IC-169 116852 IC-169 113840 SFAS H4SDA3 5-5393 IC-146 114862 EM-164 111785 EM-238 114861 l
S-5495 EM-168 111844 EM-240 114856 S-5612 EM-271 116963 S-5629 IC-174 116864 SFAS H4SDA4 S-5417 EM-211 114049 S-5418 IC-138 114827 EM-142 111784 EM-233 114826 S-5612 EM-273 116733 S-5629 '
IC-175 116865 SFAS H4SDA5 S-5382 EM-152 111796 EM-235 114825 S-5502 EM-209 114051 EM-170 111849 SFAS H4SDB1 S-5399 IC-143 114836 EM-147 111786 EM-243 114835 S-5410 IC-145 114844 EM-203 11847 EM-237 114853 S-5612 EM-265 116962 S-5629 IC-172 116866 SFAS H4SDB2 S-5397 IC-140 114830 EM-148 111787 EM-245 114829 S-5435 EM-239 114839 S-5612 EM-275 116730 S-5629 IC-173 116867
TABLE 5 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION LISTING PANEL / CABINET SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NCR MIDR WORK RE00EST SFAS.
H4SDB0 S-5387 EM-151 111799 EM-230 114828 S-5509 EM-204 111848
}
SFAS H4SDB00 S-5398 EM-155 111798 EM-242 114062 EM-242 114064 S-5510 EM-202 111846 EM-229 114823 SFAS H2SFA S-5425 EM-220 114050 S-5430 IC-150 115520 EM-162 111801 EM-249 115519 S-5612 EM-256 116959 EM-171 111840 SFAS H2SFB S-5426 EM-201 111845 EM-253 115515 S-5446 IC-177 114882 EM-161 111797 EM-247 114881 S-5612 EM-255 116960 RPS H4PRIA S-5390 -
IC-148 114858 EM-149 111793 EM-236 114857 S-5612 EM-279 114265 S-5629 IC-163 116847 IC-163 116857 EM-167 116853 EM-198 111853 RPS H4PR2A S-5400 EM-227 114816 S-5401 IC-133 114054 EM-150 111791 EM-212 114055 S-5612 EM-267 116958 S-5629 IC-163 116847 IC-163 116857 EM-197 111854 EM-153 113834
TABLE 5 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION LISTING PANEL / CABINET SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NCR<
MI DR WORK RE0 VEST RPS H4PRlB S-5395 IC-147 114879 f
IC-147 108503 EM-159 111790 j
EM-159 108503 EM-246 114R78 EM-246 108503 S-5396 IC-141 114853-EM-200 113403 S-5612 EM-280 114266 S-5629 IC-165 116848 IC-165 116858 EM-167 116853 EM-154 113835 EM-206 111863 RPS H4PR2B S-5411 IC-137 114832 IC-152 115527 EM-156 111795 EM-228 114831 i
S-5513 IC-142 114854 EM-231 114840 l
2 S-5612 EM-282 114434 S-5629 1C-165 116848 IC-165 116858 EM-207 111864 EM-154 113835 RPS H4PR1C S-5402 IC-131 114078 IC-151 115528 EM-157 111788 S-5403 EM-244 114880 EM-244 108503 S-5612 EM-281 114267 S-5629 IC-162 113611 IC-167 116853 EM-199 111850 EM-155 113836 RPS H4PR2C S-5406 EM-205 111861 EM-234 114838 S-5407 IC-132 114052 EM-210 114053 S-5409 EM-160 111792 S-5612 EM-288 114338 S-5629 IC-162 113611 EM-155 113836
L v.
TABLE 5
~
PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION LISTING PANEL / CABINET
~
SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION NCR MI DR WORK REOUEST RPS H4PR 1D -
S-5408 IC-157 115532 IC-157 108503 EM-158 111789 EM-158 108503 EM-250 115531 EM-250 108503 S-5612 EM-286 114342 S-5629 IC-164 116849 IC-164 116859 EM-167 116853 EM-195 111856 EM-156 113837 RPS H4PR2D S-5404 IC-144 114860 EM-154 111794 EM-241 114859 S-5424 EM-226 114801 S-5612 EM-287 114341 S-5629 IC-164 116849 IC-164 116859 EM-196 111855 EM-156 113837 i
1 TABLE 6 REMAINING SCOPE OF-HORK i
i
(
l.
Inspection of SFAS Decay Heat System circuit terminations not inspected previously due to circuit energization.
2.
Inspection of vital power cable terminations, outside the control / computer room, identified to have a high probability of having field modified (trimmed) terminal lugs.
3.
Inspection of panels / cabinets critical to plant operation located outside of the control / computer room, will be accomplished under the QAIP 15 program.
4.
Further visual inspection of control / computer room vertical panels H2PSA/H2PSB and consoles HlRI/HIRC, will De limited to that described in NCR S-5612, Rev.1 paragraph E, which reads as follows:
"The process recording console HlRC, reactor and ICS control console HlRI, and tne primary system panels H2PSA and H2PSB will De visually inspected under the Electrical System Upgrade Program QAIP-15 during tne current EFIC modification work.
Also, all terminations made with ETC Molex terminal lugs will receive secureness verification per MIDR and the terminal screws for these lugs will be torqued to verify tightness.
Except as coincident with the EFIC work this inspection will not involve lifting the terminations.
Deficient conditions will be immediately reworked."
0 W
b 5-4
-Z td ZO CL E
O O
Z O
E w
W d
5 o
E d
Z S
WH x<
O w
O r
e 1.L.
tDw D
(
5 m
U)
m
E RUL I
AF N
L O
EP I
RM T
RI AR A
BC N
I h_
M R
I l X
ET G
4 UL 7
y O
N T
2N a
TFN L r
r NOI O
E EI INR R
d.I S
COO NO R
~
IIT DT S
?
i FRU 0 PUD GR
.M UEO MON SSNG INA I P NNO M
IIChROT F
CCS OC esun S
n C
u I
nam S
e 8
s 9
u 1
AC 2
LUS R
N EB I
M ECED
{
l
[HICPH4CRTI H4CDG H4iSe t l
lnyg gg4 L
/
REMOTE IN
^"#
H4COAC aggggg 01 02 Os S
i Q{QeTCl H4Ctp H4MSE H4C g2kS4
]
H4 CPU OARI
"'C^"
H4SA H4IO!S NNT FEATum m DIC TM U N f
)VfhEIYgg;3342%A$AMpf)$
01 M
M N
m H480A H4Sm g y NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAT!ON REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM CD PUTER
$1Ot ANALWi W TER y!,Ap'2AQ18]28,y'm7c[yQ10j s "V v
vMv=w' = = =
g (m
x 00 l 01 l 02 03 04 01 l 02 l 08 l 04 "N
y v
v H4CP M4 CAL H4PR
~
E.
T.
REACTOR COOLANT PLANT H40S B{. PROT. $
U.
H4 NG Cl0 FEA S
-2 A
TLMSIE H4 7/g RDEAT TV H4LP g,w mw x r' 1
H2PS8 ELEC.
AUTO.
CANAL ETER SYNC.
PUPP SE ARY SYSTE H3E H41A M4V8 H4WW M4SU-1
.---,7-PROCESS H2r$
RECORolNG COMPUTER (PERATOR K307 H1RC REACTCpt AMI-m
'* k RAD. PCN.
- !h1LRURATED C mi.'SYS'.s SlLlA HSTP >
S TEST H4MR PNL.
H4!C SECONDARY SYSTEM HISS mL""!?i%
C m iCg 4o~
.0.
INSiS9 dWiMNT
=S ei K1CRT ELICTRIC H4PIO H4P!O l
Sw!TCHtwG cv S10c)
<x SIDE) g MON! TOR H2ES i
Q % ] CROSSHATCHING IDENTIFIES INSPECTED PANELS 3
FIGURE 3 I
CONTROL ROOM / COMPUTER ROOM EQUIPMENT LAYOUT i
1 1
ELRN BOOG ATIU TCTL PUR EOEO CNST CONN ACII GU L
I l -
1 I N
P O
M I
Ns L
y I
S YYR R
2I-BLC S
OS TO R E
CNDED 4 R UAEPE ORR7N 5 m P
E AhO M
EPI f
HMT U
7 7-C R C SII L
S U
I O
X G
A P
E F u
I L
F O M
?^
j^
C T
E f.
+:
i-g S
g A
s s
F S
PREG NESN IPUI RO L 3
i CRRO POO EM T LIL G OF NOOO ITT S
E UQ tlll llllll ll
a 9
'J L
s
~
n f
gVx N
j-X O
N I
O E
S
=
I T
S A W L
E R
g U
y$ s 5R E
[
^=
S S
P g$
DR 5*
E g
C NE 2
N gg M
S
$~5 EO R I
g AD G$_ i RN T
U
.A R
RC D
TU L
R O
U S
A Y
T I
X G
C G
A O
RN B b'
U E F OI i
D I L TDL N
UE M
N C
DT I
NX M E
n C
OE R V
C a
T E
I T
S m
E S
u E
n S
CX a
A E
m F
m S
ana
1 T
I k
LA ON TIM R
EE MTD M R hFB TA IO o
G G
U G
L U
U L
L NO N
N I
Km O
O T
I 3
A T
I 6 T N
A I
N A
M I
R M
3 E N E
R I
T E
R M
T U R D
E D
G E E
I T I
F I
F F
I D
D I
O D
E a
M O
M N
M U
M w
I R
T l
l
,l l
)llLI