ML20215D738

Notice of Violation from Insp on 870316-27 & 0413-17

ML20215D738
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	06/10/1987
From:	Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20215D725	List: ML20215D721 ML20215D738 ML20215D751
References
50-327-87-18, 50-328-87-18, NUDOCS 8706190126
Download: ML20215D738 (2)

Text

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ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION 1

Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79

'During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on March 16-27 and April 13-17, 1987, a violation of NRC requirements was identi-fied. The violation involved a failure to properly control post-modification  ;

testing. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR 2, Appendix C (1985), the violation is discussed below:

i Criterion XI of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, as implemented by TVA Nuclear Quality I Assurance Manual (NQAM), Section 2.11, requires that a test program be established and conducted to assure that structures, systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service. In order to accomplish that goal, Criterion XI requires that the test program be performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate applicable requirements and accept-ance limits; that the test procedures include provisions for assuring all test j prerequisites have been met and adequate test instrumentation is available and used; and that the test results are documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been met.

Contrary to the above, the NRC inspectors identified cases in which the licensee failed to ensure that test procedures and instructions contained the necessary requirements, thet tests were performed in accordance with procedure requirements, and that test results were properly documented and evaluated.

These include the following examples (section numbers refer to the body of the report):

1. During functional testing of containment isolation valves, handwritten changes were made to the approved test package without required signa-tures, initials or approvals; the test instructions provided incorrect directions regarding the energizing of a valve solenoid; and the cognizant engineer unilaterally changed the approved test instructions after test performance to reflect the test results (Section 4.b).

2. During component cooling system pump tests, the test procedure did not specify a proper switch alignment, breakers could not be closed because of the misalignment, and the discrepancy was not recorded by test personnel (Section 4.e.1).

3. During motor bump tests, inadequate instructions resulted in the inadvertent start of a decoupled motor, which also threw potentially contaminated grease on ,two persons outside the contamination zone (Section 4.e.2).

8706190126 870610 PDR ADOCK 05000327 O PDR

4. Three boron injection tank isolation valves were energized contrary to procedure requirements, one of the valves was operated over a hold tag on the valve control switch, and procedure steps were not signed off as completed (Section 4.g).

5. During functional and stroke time testing of a containment standpipe

. isolation valve, a faulty indicator dial was used to determine valve mid-position, and there were no procedure instructions for determining  !

valve full-open position (Section 4.1).

6. During testing of boric acid transfer pumps, the flow diagram in the )

control room had incorrect piping class boundary designations, and inadequate test conditions were specified in the applicable surveillance instruction (Sections 5.a.2 and 5.a.3).

7. Discrepancies were found between procedure sketches and field markings-for vibration monitoring of the motor-driven and turbine-driven AFW pumps, I component cooling pumps, one RHR pump, and a boric acid transfer pump (Section 5.a.4).

8. Work activities, including dissassembly and reassembly of a bolted flange and other joints and cleanout of instrument tubing, were performed without J work instructions, inspections, or second party verification of joint +

makeup (Section 5.a.5).

9. During functional testing of diesel generator room exhaust fans, a step verifying that red lights on the fan breaker were energized was signed off, when in fact the panel lights were burned out (Section 5.c).

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement II).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, TVA is hereby required to submit to this office within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation: (1) admission or denial of the violation; (2) the reason for the violation if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; I (4) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION xkt Stewart D. Ebneter, Director TV4 Project Division Office of Special Projects Dated this 10th day of June 1987